Three essays on cheap talk

dc.contributor.advisor	Currarini, Sergio
dc.contributor.author	Chand, Arya Kumar Srustidhar <1984>	it_IT
dc.date.accessioned	2013-06-14T07:45:23Z
dc.date.available	2013-06-14T07:45:23Z
dc.date.issued	2013-05-06
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10579/3017
dc.description.abstract	The three essays in this thesis are based on strategic communication associated with the Cheap Talk literature. The first essay is a discussion of strategic communication that arises in the classical resource allocation problem. The second essay focuses on Cheap Talk where the signals of the senders and the receiver are correlated. The third essay explores the theme where a sender while transmitting the information takes into account that the information may be leaked by the receiver to third party.	it_IT
dc.description.abstract	La tesi e’ un compendio di tre articoli tra loro indipendenti basati sulla comunicazione strategica associata alla letteratura su Cheap Talk. Il primo articolo discute la comunicazione strategica che si riscontra in un classico problema di allocazione delle risorse. Il secondo articolo si focalizza sul Cheap talk in cui i segnali del mittente e del ricevente sono correlati. Il terzo articolo analizza la tematica in cui il mittente, trasmettendo le informazioni, prende in considerazione il fatto che le informazioni possono essere filtrate al ricevente da una terza parte.	it_IT
dc.language.iso	en	it_IT
dc.publisher	Università Ca' Foscari Venezia	it
dc.rights	© Arya Kumar Srustidhar Chand, 2013	it_IT
dc.subject	Correlation	it_IT
dc.subject	Leakage	it_IT
dc.subject	Cheap talk	it_IT
dc.subject	Budget constraint	it_IT
dc.title	Three essays on cheap talk	it_IT
dc.title.alternative	Tre articoli su cheap talk	it_IT
dc.type	Doctoral Thesis	en
dc.degree.name	Economia	it_IT
dc.degree.level	Dottorato di ricerca	it
dc.degree.grantor	Scuola superiore di Economia	it_IT
dc.description.academicyear	2013	it_IT
dc.description.cycle	24	it_IT
dc.degree.coordinator	Bernasconi, Michele
dc.location.shelfmark	D001230	it
dc.location	Venezia, Archivio Università Ca' Foscari, Tesi Dottorato	it
dc.rights.accessrights	openAccess	it_IT
dc.thesis.matricno	955562	it_IT
dc.format.pagenumber	VI, 90 p.	it_IT
dc.subject.miur	SECS-P/01 ECONOMIA POLITICA	it_IT
dc.description.note	Doctor Europaeus	it_IT
dc.description.tableofcontent	Acknowledgments .... i; Preface .... 1; 1 Strategic Information Transmission with Budget Constraint .... 5; 1.1 Introduction .... 6; 1.1.1 Related Literature .... 7; 1.2 Model with Two Farmers .... 9; 1.3 Strategic Communication .... 17; 1.3.1 No Fully Revealing Equilibrium .... 17; 1.3.2 Interval Partition .... 18; 1.4 Effect of Budget on Information Transmission .... 20; 1.4.1 Equilibrium where One Farmer Reveals Fully ..... 21; 1.4.2 {2} × {2} Symmetric Equilibria .... 22; 1.5 Equilibrium Selection .... 24; 1.6 Conclusion .... 27; 1.7 Appendix .... 29; 2 Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals .... 41; 2.1 Introduction .... 41; 2.2 Model with Two Players .... 44; 2.2.1 Truth Telling Equilibrium .... 46; 2.2.2 Selecting Correlation .... 49; 2.3 Model with n-Players .... 54; 2.3.1 Truth Telling Equilibrium .... 56; 2.3.2 Selecting Correlation .... 62; 2.4 Conclusion .... 68; 2.5 Appendix .... 68; 3 Information Transmission under Leakage .... 73; 3.1 Introduction .... 74; 3.2 Model of Information Leakage .... 76; 3.3 Truth Telling Equilibrium .... 77; 3.4 Leakage vs Non-leakage .... 80; 3.4.1 A Fixed First-hand Receiver .... 81; 3.4.2 Randomly Selected First-hand Receiver .... 85; 3.5 Conclusion ..... 86; 3.6 Appendix .... 86; Bibliography .... 89	it_IT
dc.identifier.bibliographiccitation	Chand, Arya Kumar Srustidhar. “Three essays on cheap talk”, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, PhD tesi, 24. cycle, 2013	it_IT