Abstract:
This research focuses on the analysis, from a game theoretical perspective, of International environmental agreements in the presence of adaptation. Despite its private good nature, adaptation plays a crucial role in climate agreements negotiation because of its strategic relation with mitigation. For this reason, it is very important to include both strategies in IEAs modeling.
The dissertation is a collection of three papers which expand the existing literature on IEAs in different directions: 1) the standard mitigation-adaptation game (M+A-Game) is analysed in a Stackelberg scenario; 2) the strategic relation between mitigation and adaptation and its effect on climate negotiation is analysed assuming that mitigation, attenuating climate change damages, can also affect the effectiveness of adaptation; 3) the existing theoretical results are tested through an integrated assessment model application.
The strategic relation between mitigation and adaptation, the effect of adaptation on mitigation strategies and on negotiation’s outcome are analysed. Successful climate cooperation requires both large stable coalitions and high welfare improvements with respect to non-cooperation. The paradox of cooperation persists in most of the game configurations considered. Optimistic results arise only in a situation in which strategic complementarity holds both in mitigation and mitigation-adaptation space.
