L'evoluzione dell'economia russa: istituzioni e crescita di lungo periodo

Abstract

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia began a process of transition from administrative command to market economy, which, in many aspects, is far from being completed. At present, Russia combines, on the one hand, fragile market institutions, which are unable to protect property and contract rights, to foster entrepreneurial activity and to prevent rent-seeking behaviours, and, on the other, a highly authoritarian political system, which hinders the formation of democratic institutions and weakens the rule of law. As a result, long-term economic growth, which in virtuous economies is achieved through investments in human capital and innovation, in Russia is impeded. The aim of this dissertation is to explain why Russia has developed a model of “bad” capitalism over the years and how this inefficient archetype can be improved through the transition towards more inclusive political and economic institutions. In order to develop the topic in depth, this dissertation is divided into five chapters: the first one provides an institutional framework to better understand why Russia could potentially rise or decline in the near future; the second one summarizes the evolution of the Russian economy from the demise of the Soviet bloc until the 2008-09 global crisis; the third chapter analyzes the current difficulties of Russian capitalism and the policy of reform undertaken by the government to correct them; the fourth chapter deals with Russia’s accession to the WTO as an effort to modernize its institutions; in the light of this problematic institutional structure, the last chapter examines the economic relations between Russia and Italy.