Abstract:
This thesis examines the analysis produced by the United States Central Intelligence Agency regarding the situation in South Asia. The time period taken into consideration ranges from the beginning of the 25 March 1971 military operation in East Pakistan under President Yahya Khan to the third Indo-Pakistani conflict. The objective of this study is to comprehend the CIA’s vision of the events taking place in Pakistan and India throughout the year 1971 and its foreign policy proposals compared to the final Nixon Administration posture.
The thesis sets the stage for the domestic Pakistani crisis, underlining causal factors of animosity between the central government and the Eastern wing population and the expansion of the internal Pakistani crisis to a regional one with the inclusion of international powers. The body of work incorporates sources from official documents, diaries, memoirs, recordings and interviews, delving into the decisions made by the Nixon Administration regarding its foreign policy toward Pakistan and India and defining the motivations behind such posture. The research accentuates the centrality of the White House in the decision-making process, giving space to different and contrasting perspectives on the crises and the ideal course of action, focusing particularly on the perspective of the CIA.
