Abstract:
The Russian invasion of last February divided politics and public debate, confronted by the brutality of a war vividly covered by media and the pending nuclear threat.
The European Union and the US decided to impose sanctions on the Russian Federation to deter further developments.
These sanctions targeted individuals, such as the oligarchs, and the supply of weapons and dual-use goods.
Dual-use goods are items that were created and intended for the civilian market but may have an application on the battlefield, for instance, trucks or drones.
The sanctioning regime requires the application of Counter Terrorism Financing supervision, which involves private obliged entities such as banks and other intermediaries.
However, the sanctions are not intended to target Russian civilians so the importation and exportation of many products such as necessities is still allowed.
Nevertheless, payment is a problem since most Russian banks have been excluded from the SWIFT circuit: this makes any transaction much more complicated and usually requires a triangulation with a CTF-compliant state.
Such a difficult situation requires an analysis of the real impact of the sanctions and poses a severe doubt on whether these bans can be counterproductive.
More precisely, in dealing with such a gigantic superpower the EU is faced with a dilemma: is it possible to target only Russian military capabilities efficiently without harming both Russian and European economies and, indirectly, their population?
