The US and the Transnistria war of 1992. A case study of US policy toward Russia

Abstract

The approach of George HW Bush's administration to the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent birth of 15 independent republics is generally regarded as that of caution and restrained power balancing. While the Bush Administration acted decisively and proactively after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the stance toward the newly formed Russian Federation revolved around calculating costs and benefits without endangering a range of important political and security agreements while upholding the ideal of an international rules-based order. After reviewing the general ideology and actions of the Bush Administration and the events that transpired in Transnistria, this thesis analyzes the actions of the United States government concerning the Russian military support of local separatists in the Transnistrian War. It finds that Bush Administration, in line with the scholarly findings on other dimensions of US foreign policy, abstained from pursuing a principled stance toward the Kremlin despite a glaring security threat coming from the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria. This carries important lessons for historical relevance and contemporary US foreign policy toward Russia; while the US enjoyed a period of Russian political weakness, the approach of restraint vis-à-vis Russian actions against Moldova failed to build peace through American leadership.