Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements: a theoretical and ethical analysis

Abstract

One of the main challenges facing the future is implementing a successful climate policy. Climate change is economically defined as a global public good, resulting in one of the biggest social dilemmas of the latest years. The research aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the limits to cooperation in climate policy starting from the examination of the antecedent models of environmental agreements – Earth Summit, Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement - and the intrinsic obstacles of climate change to international cooperative results. The paper contains a selective review of experimental literature and contributions from non-cooperative game theory. The objective is to identify significant variables and political conditions responsible for insufficient progress on climate change mitigation. A potential solution analysed is the Climate Club approach proposed by the economist and Nobel Prize winner William Nordhaus. The work concludes with an ethical reflection on the climate change social dilemma and the critical lack of responsibility proved by countries in absence of economic and political incentives.