Abstract:
The thesis aims at highlighting and analyzing the diplomatic action made by both Russia and the United States in the Kosovo War occurred between 1998 and 1999. It was an armed conflict between the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and the Albanian national liberation movement UCK (Ushtria Çlirimtare and Kosovës), also known as KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), which claimed the independence of Kosovo. Following several episodes of repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo by Serbia and a series of failed negotiations with Serbian President Milosevic, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) decided to support the KLA and intervene militarily on the territory. The related events are not the product of the NATO intervention, or at least not entirely, but more of the diplomatic meeting between the real protagonists, namely the United States and Russia. Through the analysis of primary sources such as memoranda from the national archives and the memories of the protagonists involved, the thesis highlights how the Kosovo War did not end exclusively through the massive bombings of the Atlantic Alliance, but also thanks to the brilliant diplomatic skills of the Russian envoy Chernomyrdin, US Vice President Gore and Ambassador Talbott, who convinced President Milošević to surrender. Moreover, the event dates “only” to about twenty years ago, which makes the relative historiography not as abundant or necessarily exhaustive as that about other conflicts involving the United States.
This thesis therefore aims to contribute and enrich a recent historiography and not as vast as others.
The structure of this study is tripartite. The first chapter deals with a detailed summary of the related events. The second chapter presents the United States and Russia at the beginning of the conflict, analyzing the US humanitarian motives that constitute NATO's casus belli and the reasons for Russia's initial aversion to the military intervention of the Atlantic Alliance. The third chapter instead shows Russia and the United States as essential diplomatic protagonists for the end of the conflict. It presents the contents of a series of memoranda declassified on 2 May 2019 and made available by President Clinton's Digital Library. At the time of writing this thesis, that is spring and summer 2021, there are no essays or academic texts that report these documents. Consequently, the narration and analysis of this chapter will take place mainly through primary sources.
