The JFK Administration and the Failure of the "Amini Experiment" in Iran, 1961-1963

Abstract

The present work investigates the United States’ (US) push for reform in Iran at the time of the Kennedy administration and, more specifically, the US stance vis-à-vis the reform-minded government of Prime Minister Ali Amini. The first introductory chapter aims at providing a basic knowledge of the historical and political context in which the key events under investigation are placed. For this purpose, it begins with an overview of US foreign policy toward Iran from the end of the Second World War up to the late 1950s. Before delving deeply into US-Iranian relations during the Kennedy years, a brief section of the chapter will be devoted to dealing with President Kennedy’s emphasis on development aid, and the theoretical foundations of US development policy. The central part of the chapter will then consider Kennedy’s encounter with Iran in 1961 and explain how the country’s internal instability and its proximity to the Soviet Union made Iran a test case for the application of modernization theories. Considering the years 1961-1963 as the reference period, the second chapter will deal with the Amini government first, and then the Shah’s resumption of direct power. In the third chapter, by thoroughly analyzing a different set of primary sources, an attempt will be made to examine both the way in which the US position toward Amini’s government formed, evolved, and consolidated and the considerations that led the United States to eventually give up on Amini, embrace the Shah’s authoritarian vision of modernization and support his dictatorial rule. By doing so, this thesis seeks to take stock of the historiographical debate over the JFK administration’s accomplishments in Iran and confirm the hypotheses over the ultimate failure of the US policy toward Iran.