Reagan’s foreign policy and the War Powers Resolution: El Salvador and Nicaragua as test cases of the limits on presidential power

Abstract

The thesis aims at exploring the implications of the War Powers Resolution with specific regards to Reagan’s foreign policy towards El Salvador and Nicaragua. The short introductory chapter deals with the historical-political circumstances underlying the congressional drive for a legislative tool aimed at linking the decisions of the executive to the mandatory and complementary expression of support on behalf of the US Congress. The careful reconstruction of the process leading to the consolidation of a congressional consensus over the need to rein in the imperial tendencies of the executive has been particularly insightful in that it highlighted the catalysing function of the unilateral actions of the Nixon administration, which de facto accelerated the legislative process culminating in the adoption of the War Powers Resolution. The first chapter begins with an overview of the major geopolitical changes of the late 1970s, and of the implications these had on the Carter and Reagan presidencies. The following section deals with the reconstruction of the main phases of the political rise of Ronald Reagan, examining the characterizing moments of his career and the electoral program of the 1980 elections. The following part of the chapter is dedicated to an in-depth analysis of the US foreign policy under the Reagan administration, with particular reference to the crucial role played by conservative think tanks in the definition and development of the administration’s policy throughout the 1980s. Finally, the conclusive section briefly explores the relations between the rise of the Unitary Executive Theory and the War Powers Resolution, a particularly insightful perspective which has allowed to detect the signals pointing to a return of an imperial executive, the begin thereof coincides with the Reagan presidency. Chapter two and three follow a symmetric structure. Starting with a thorough historical reconstruction aimed at exploring the origins of the socio-political turmoil of the two Central American countries, the chapters move towards an analysis of the US-Salvadoran and US-Nicaraguan relations under the Carter and Reagan presidencies, with a careful eye to the identification of both the points of continuity and discontinuity between the two governmental experiences. The central part of the chapters consists in a detailed examination of the major phases of the development of Reagan’s foreign policy towards El Salvador and Nicaragua, with the aim of understanding the historical events on a variety of levels, namely, the dynamics of the US politics, the positions and ideologies of the relevant actors involved, and, most relevantly for the purpose of the dissertation, the Reagan administration positions vis-à-vis the limits imposed by the law. The comparative analysis of Reagan’s foreign policy towards El Salvador and Nicaragua – based on both the “classical” literature on the subject and newest publications and evidence – has demonstrated, on the one hand, the actual weakness of the War Powers Resolution alone as a means of preserving the balance between powers in matters of foreign policy; on the other hand, it has enabled to consider the complementary and alternative array of legislative tools the US Congress can make us of to affect the executive powers.