



Università
Ca' Foscari
Venezia

Master's Degree programme – Second Cycle
(*D.M. 270/2004*)
in International Relations

Final Thesis

—

Ca' Foscari
Dorsoduro 3246
30123 Venezia

**Yugoslav Identity:
A Lost Opportunity?**

Supervisor

Ch. Prof. Antonio Trampus
Ch. Prof. Maurizio Cermel

Graduand

Federico Panetta
Matriculation Number 848412

Academic Year

2015 / 2016

INDEX

ABSTRACT	5
CHAPTER I	13
I – THE ORIGINS OF THE ETHNIC CONFLICTS	13
CHAPTER II	21
II – THE WESTERN BALKANS CASE	21
II - 1.IDENTITIES	23
1.THE BEGINNING: OTTOMAN EMPIRE	23
2.SERBIA	24
3.CROATIA	27
4.BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA	28
5.OTTOMAN DOWNFALL	31
CHAPTER III	34
III – YUGOSLAVS	34
1.YUGOSLAVISM	34
2.BOSNIAN CASE	35
3.HISTORICAL ASPECTS: THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS, AND SLOVENES	37
4.TOWARD COMMUNISM	40
CHAPTER IV	41
IV – TITO	41
1.BETWEEN THE TWO WARS: POLITICAL ISSUES	41
2.THE SECOND WORLD WAR	44
3.TITO AT POWER: REPLICATION OF SOVIET MODEL	47
4.CONSTITUTION MAIN ASPECTS	48
5.BREAK WITH THE USSR	51
6.NEW MINDSET	52
CHAPTER V	56
V – DECLINE OF COMMUNISM	56
1.KOSOVO	59
2.FROM SLOVENIA SECESSION: THE END OF THE FEDERATION	60
3.FROM THE DAYTON AGREEMENT TO KOSOVO’S CONFLICTS	63
VI.2 – ICTY	66
1.CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL FRAME: BIRTH OF “AD HOC” COURT.	66

2. ICTY	67
3. STATUTE	67
CHAPTER VI	70
VI – YUGOSPHERE	70
1. CONTRAST: NATIONALISMS	76
2. BALKANS TODAY – POLITICAL OVERVIEW	79
BIBLIOGRAPHY	84
WEBSITE CITATION	85

ABSTRACT

La configurazione delle relazioni tra popoli e la loro distribuzione geografica necessita di essere ascritta a vari fattori, primo fra tutti il fenomeno migratorio. Le migrazioni “antiche”, che costituiscono oggi un tema *classico*, hanno portato ad un assestamento di relazioni (commerciali, economiche, e culturali), generalmente configuratosi in una bilanciata integrazione di diversi gruppi.

Diversamente è avvenuto per le migrazioni “moderne”, che hanno incontrato sovrastrutture economiche ed ideologiche differenti. Sebbene i nazionalismi scaturiti dal XIX secolo abbiano cercato di *dividere* i popoli in porzioni territoriali definite, secondo diversi criteri (religiosi, etnici etc.) un’analisi globale dell’allocazione di persone su diversi territori, o più precisamente – in riferimento alle concezioni nate dal 1800 – nei diversi Stai, rivela la coesistenza di diverse popolazioni che si identificano in *gruppi* differenti. Inoltre, ogni essere umano può essere, secondo questi parametri, ricollocato in diverse *molteplicità identitarie* legate ad un complesso processo di auto-identificazione con più gruppi.

Le condizioni di coesistenza fra questi sono spesso regolate da relazioni di “maggioranza” e di “minoranza”. Da qui la necessità di un riconoscimento *ufficiale* della minoranza, incardinato in vari strumenti del diritto e della politica, come gli Statuti e le Costituzioni, al fine di mantenere la sicurezza degli individui.

Da qui nasce uno dei principali quesiti che gli antropologi si sono posti, legato allo stato di convivenza di diversi gruppi: “perché le relazioni etniche spesso si risolvono nel conflitto?”. La risposta non è definita né universalmente accettata, e non certamente può derivare da una sola branca delle scienze; lo studio e l’analisi di questa tipologia di relazione necessita un “modello interpretativo multidimensionale”.

Una delle possibili risposte può essere evinta dagli studi di I. Wallerstein, economista e sociologo statunitense, il quale alloca la causa dei cambiamenti sociali

moderni, su scala globale, alle dinamiche capitalistiche. Questi individua nell'era capitalistica delle "contraddizioni interne", relative a diverse "forme politiche ed economiche" che portano a dicotomie sociali come il razzismo o il sessismo. Nell'annoverare una lista di dicotomie Wallerstein pone al quarto posto le dicotomie relative alle comunità "create artificialmente" che individua nelle identità nazionali. Inoltre Wallerstein si preoccupa di definire il concetto di "gruppo" mettendo in luce come particolari "segni" possano essere allocati a parti di una popolazione, da cui deriva una minoranza.

Una progressione di tali studi viene individuata negli studi di A. Giddens, che divide storicamente le società in "premoderne" e "moderne". Le seconde sono caratterizzate dall'elemento della "mobilità", quale fattore chiave dello sviluppo del sistema globale, e il cui oggetto è lo *spostamento culturale*. Giddens ha una visione non pacifica della globalizzazione, che implica delle "pericolosità".

A questi studi si possono aggiungere le *compressioni* generate da *azione e reazione*, negli studi di R. Robertson, che arriva a sostenere non tanto che la globalizzazione distrugga realtà locali (*comunità*) ma le forzi a ricostruire il loro senso di appartenenza, implicando nella ricerca di *omogeneità* il sorgere del conflitto come affermazione di una cultura dominante.

T. Parson individua le precondizioni di un sistema simbolico nell'elaborazione tradizionale dei codici di integrazione, individuando pluralismi etnici e religiosi (perfettamente applicabili alla questione Jugoslava, mentre A.D. Smith sembra fornire un'ulteriore definizione di "identità" nel senso di contiguità tra più generazioni, definendole "famiglie di culture", senza escludere la sovrapposizione di alcune culture in diverse aree. In questo senso il concetto di etnicità diventa un "rifugio" contro la complessità del mondo globale. Da qui si introduce il concetto di A. Moore di etno-territorialità, arrivando così alla nascita del *nazionalismo* che è, per E. Gellner la coincidenza tra unità politica e nazionale. Una semplice terra diventa così un *territorio nazionale*. Quando un nazionalismo arriva al potere si instaura una *etnocrazia*.

A questo punto, per rispondere alla domanda iniziale, un ulteriore passo viene fatto da R. Hassner, che rileva come il territorio, nell'ottica nazionalista, acquisti "sacralità" e in quanto tale, ai massimi estremi, possa necessitare di una purificazione, arrivando alla pulizia etnica.

Il secondo capitolo si articola in una ricostruzione dello "sviluppo etnico" nei Balcani. In primo luogo viene spiegato come non ci sia omogeneità metodologica nell'interpretazione della definizione di "Balcani". Si sceglie quindi di utilizzare il termine, salvo precisazioni, per indicare il territorio che ha composto l'ex Jugoslavia. Inoltre si specifica anche la non equità di fonti storiche "interne" ai paesi trattati, ragione per la quale la trattazione non potrà essere perfettamente omogenea.

Il testo propone una rapida trattazione dell'occupazione da parte dell'Impero Turco sul territorio, chiarendo in primis che fino al Congresso di Berlino del 1878 non è possibile fare riferimento alla dimensione dello Stato-Nazione all'interno del territorio. La realtà imperiale turca struttura il suo dominio sulla *fedeltà dinastica*, riconoscendo solo un'identità religiosa, e la consequenziale suddivisione del territorio secondo il sistema dei *millet*. Il territorio Serbo è il primo ad ottenere una forma di indipendenza dal sultanato, attraverso le rivolte agrarie dei primi decenni dell'ottocento, con la comparsa delle famiglie Petrovic e Obrenovic, e il riconoscimento del principato nel 1829 con il trattato di Adrianopoli. Nel 1869 viene istituita la prima costituzione dai caratteri "moderni" del paese. Per quel che riguarda la Croazia, invece, viene analizzato il rapporto *sui generis* – per il grado di autonomia – con la monarchia Asburgica, che ne controlla i territori. Dopo una breve trattazione sugli sviluppi dei rapporti tra Austria-Ungheria e Croazia, soprattutto nel XIX secolo, viene messo in luce come lo storico legame abbia definito etnicamente il territorio, dandogli una forte impronta culturale Latino-Cattolica, contrapposta a quella Bizantino-Ortodossa della Serbia. Si conclude con le rivolte nel territorio.

Il caso Bosniaco è invece quello più problematico da analizzare sotto il profilo etnico, poiché, in realtà, il secolare dominio Turco e lo sviluppo prettamente rurale del territorio – legato alla struttura dei millet, alla mancanza di un'élite aristocratica e alla

contaminazione turca – abbia fatto sì che il paese non abbia sviluppato una vera coscienza nazionale almeno fino al 1900. Infine, il capitolo si chiude con una ricostruzione sommaria della caduta dell'impero Ottomano, che porta al congresso di Berlino ma soprattutto all'annessione della Bosnia-Erzegovina all'impero Asburgico, e alla considerevole *modernizzazione* che questo comporta per il paese, compreso l'approvazione della costituzione del 1910 e l'inizio, seppur non definibile ancora come coscienza nazionale, di una "distinzione" bosniaca. Sottolineato è il dualismo di questo processo, dovuto all'esposizione ad una cultura "aliena" (quella dell'Europa occidentale) e alla resistenza alla medesima.

Il terzo capitolo introduce la questione dello *Jugoslavismo*, sottolineando come questi sia un relativamente recente argomento di studio. Le origini del concetto sono da attribuirsi alla corrente degli *Illirianisti*, nata tra gli intellettuali Croati tra il 1830 e il 1840, che vedevano un "antenato comune" tra i popoli Slavi Meridionali, gli Jugoslavi, appunto. Queste teorie nascono dal fatto che le origini *etniche* non sono totalmente chiare, e al tempo il concetto stesso di nazione risulta "fluido". Per quel che riguarda i Bosniaci si tende a farli risalire ad antiche migrazioni degli stessi Serbi e Croati, quindi anch'essi inseribili in questa macro famiglia insieme a Sloveni e Macedoni slavi.

L'inizio del xx secolo è caratterizzato dalla fioritura di nuove correnti nazionaliste in tutta la regione, che vengono però fermate dalle forze imperiali. Nel tentativo di salvare alcune istanze culturali e politiche da essi derivati (i nazionalismi) si inizia a sviluppare un approccio multietnico, collettivista, tra Serbi Croati e, in misura minore, Bosniaci di origine Serba e Croata. Effettivamente l'insorgere dello Jugoslavismo in Bosnia-Erzegovina è più complesso da ricostruire, dal momento che inizierà a svilupparsi in maniera "considerabile" solo all'inizio della Prima Guerra Mondiale. Ciò nonostante, alcuni casi paradigmatici dello sviluppo di tale movimento, prima culturale e poi politico, nascono proprio in seno alla Bosnia. Si ricorda il movimento studentesco *Mlada Bosna* (Giovane Bosnia), e le opere di intellettuali come Vladimir Ćorović (Serbo di Bosnia) che arriva a definire l'istanza di radunare gli slavi del sud come un processo fisiologico e naturale (sotto il profilo politico culturale).

Un nuovo paragrafo descrive la formazione, nel 1918, del *Regno dei Serbi, Croati e Sloveni*, quale prima forma istituzionalizzata di stato Jugoslavo, attraverso la *Dichiarazione di Corfù* e la votazione, nel 1921, della sua prima Costituzione. Si nota come i partiti coinvolti in tale processo furono tutti *eticamente affiliati*, con particolare enfasi sull'Organizzazione Jugoslava Musulmana (JMO) prima forma di riconoscimento dei *Bosniacchi*. Si nota inoltre che l'unico partito non affiliato fu il Partito Comunista, il cui voto, peraltro, fu decisivo per l'approvazione, e soprattutto che pochi mesi dopo sarebbe stato dichiarato illegale.

Il regno fu diviso in distretti denominati *banovine*, i cui confini non coincidevano con le antiche demarcazioni, creando così dei forzati raggruppamenti, creando alcune divisioni interne allo Stato stesso.

Come spiegato nel quinto capitolo, la fragilità del paese è da attribuirsi in primo luogo alla giovane età di un'istituzione che non aveva precedenti, ma soprattutto alla divisione interna non solo etnica, ma politico-culturale. La Croazia era caratterizzata da una visione profondamente contrattuale dello Stato, e legata ad alcuni organi che con il nuovo regno erano spariti. Inoltre il processo di formazione culturale faceva riferimento a culture diverse, quello Croato e Sloveno più occidentalizzato, quello serbo legato all'ortodossia (influenzato quindi dal bizantinismo). Inoltre la componente Musulmana era adesso equamente integrata nello Stato.

Ad ogni modo fu la turbolenta situazione politica che facilitò Re Alessandro nel suo colpo di Stato del 1929, e che portò al suo assassinio. Il principe Paolo fu più moderato, e nel 1939 cercò il compromesso (*sporazum*) con la Croazia per una nuova banovina. Ma la guerra investì il paese, l'esercito Jugoslavo sconfitto in 11 giorni, Zagabria occupata il 10 aprile 1941 e Belgrado poco dopo. Alcuni territori furono annessi dall'Asse al nuovo Stato Indipendente di Croazia, tra cui la Bosnia, sotto il controllo del movimento ipernazionalista Ustasha di Ante Pavelić, che intraprese una politica fortemente antiserba. In Serbia si instaurò il governo di Milan Nedić, anch'esso ultranazionalista. Nel frattempo si svilupparono due forme, contrapposte, di resistenza: i Partigiani di Tito, di matrice comunista, che formarono poi nel 1942 l'AVNOJ (Consiglio antifascista di

liberazione popolare della Jugoslavia), e i Chetnici di Mihailović, movimento filomonarchico unicamente serbo. All'inizio della guerra i due movimenti tentarono un accordo ma la ragioni ideologiche, soprattutto di Tito, non lo resero possibile. Con il sostegno dei Britannici tra il 1944 e il 1945 il paese fu liberato.

Si instaura in questo contesto al potere Josip Broz "Tito". Inizia qui nell'elaborato una riflessione sul modello Socialista applicato da Tito, analizzando gli aspetti principali della Costituzione del 1946 e le sue affinità con quella sovietica, e la differenza con quello che diverrà poi, con la costituzione del 1953, l'inizio dell'era del "Titoismo originale". Della prima viene proposta una breve analisi degli articoli fondamentali, sottolineando l'equità tra i popoli proposta dalla stessa e la natura Federale del novo Stato, la Repubblica Socialista Federale di Jugoslavia (SFRY). Si analizzano poi le ragioni della rottura con Stalin, dal 1948, la necessità per Tito di uno Stato non allineato, indipendente, ma anche la fragilità di un nuovo Jugoslavismo, le cui istanze, fino a quel momento si erano basate sulla sovrapposizione ideologica al Comunismo.

Gli anni '50 e '60 sono anni di nuovi approcci, quelli dell'autogestione del paese, dell'istituzione del Movimento Non Allineato (NAM), e della posizione politicamente strategica della Jugoslavia tra i due colossi antagonisti durante la guerra fredda. Sono però anche anni di crisi che sfociano con, appunto, la Crisi Croata del 1971, le cui radici sono sì economiche, ma il risvolto assume una dimensione fortemente culturale e, in relazione al tema di questo lavoro, abbraccerà le radici di nuovi nazionalismi nel paese. L'ultimo tentativo di Tito di salvare la natura egualitaria della Repubblica arriverà con la Costituzione del 1974 e una nuova serie di riforme. Da questa verranno istituiti i diritti delle sei Repubbliche Federali e delle due Province Autonome (Kosovo e Vojvodina) – tra cui il diritto all'autodeterminazione, si infiammerà il mito dell'uomo carismatico anche oltrei confini della Jugoslavia ma inizierà anche un periodo fortemente repressivo.

Il quinto capitolo dell'elaborato analizza il declino del Comunismo nel paese, in piena coerenza con il declino socialista in tutta l'Europa orientale, il collasso della Federazione e l'insorgenza dei nuovi nazionalismi balcanici. Le ragioni di tale processo trovano appoggio nella forte crisi economica ed istituzionale del paese, ma viene fatto

notare, in comparazione con altre realtà politiche, che l'esplosione conflittuale non è da considerarsi come un naturale effetto di queste, quanto più alle radici ideologiche che da più di un secolo avevano mirato l'idea di una riunificazione degli Slavi del Sud, e che il garantismo di Tito aveva solo assopito.

Viene quindi descritto il processo di separazione, tra il 1991 e il 1992, di Croazia, Slovenia, Macedonia e Bosnia, esplicando come in Croazia e in Bosnia questi abbiano assunto la dimensione del conflitto, tra il nuovo interesse nazionalistico di Serbia e Croazia di affrancarsi l'una dall'altra, e il desiderio di riannettere parti della Bosnia considerate etnicamente Serbe o Croate. Il conflitto arriverà a tali livelli di atrocità da rendere necessario l'intervento della Comunità internazionale, attraverso le Risoluzioni del Consiglio di Sicurezza dell'ONU, che porterà agli interventi NATO e delle forze UNPROFOR, dell'OSCE, alla fondazione del Tribunale Speciale per l'Ex Jugoslavia, agli Accordi di Dayton, e l'instaurazione di altre agenzie. Viene preso a caso paradigmatico il genocidio di Srebrenica. Da qui l'analisi prosegue sulla seconda esplosione conflittuale, nel 1999, in Kosovo. In Kosovo si contrappongono le forze dell'UCK alle forze Serbe (ancora formalmente jugoslave).

Viene infine proposta una piccola riflessione sulle critiche verso gli interventi NATO contrapposte ad uno strumento giuridico, il Tribunale Speciale, e il suo valore universale nell'ampliamento della definizione, e protezione, dell'atto genocidario.

In ultima istanza, al sesto capitolo, si propone un concetto nuovo, emerso dalle ceneri del progetto jugoslavo: la Jugosfera. Proposta dall'economista e giornalista *dell'Economist* Tim Judah, nel 2009, questa nuova realtà culturale viene analizzata seguendo e avvalorando i passaggi che portano Judah a ritenere che esista, *de facto*, una nuova coscienza jugoslava tra le popolazioni dell'ex repubblica, avvalorata aspetti sia puramente economici e commerciali, sia da aspetti culturali, nonché politici ed istituzionali. La teoria di Judah è stata largamente criticata da argomentazioni che richiamano ad un'altra effettiva presenza negli stati in questione, i nazionalismi. Ma anche su questo piano la risposta sembra essere avallata da elementi e puramente concettuali e filosofici, e dalla comparazione da realtà istituzionali già esistenti.

Collante di tutta l'argomentazione di Judah sarà la propensione filo-europea che i Balcani stanno sperimentando, e le opportunità che l'Unione Europea propone ai paesi balcanici. L'Unione diventa quindi fine ultimo e deterrente per nuovi nazionalismi.

La tesi si chiude con una piccola panoramica degli aspetti politici più rilevanti degli ultimi anni nei Balcani. Il quesito sull'opportunità perduta resta aperto, ma le argomentazioni a favore di una nuova consapevolezza e identità jugoslava sembrano evolversi e accrescersi nel tempo.

CHAPTER I

I – THE ORIGINS OF THE ETHNIC CONFLICTS

The current configuration of the peoples' relationships, and their geographical distribution, are to be ascribed to various factors, among which migrations are the basis. *Ancient* migrations led to peaceful coexistences, commercial and cultural exchanges, alliances – as well as wars, invasions and relations of submission throughout the world – ¹, but they all resolved in a generally balanced integration of groups, that developed through the centuries in modern political entities, such as States. These migrations are nowadays considered as a *classic* theme in the academic discussion².

On the other hand, *modern* migrations are still object of study, being their origins, and so their nature and their effects different. Despite the 19th century nationalist aim to *divide* peoples in separate territories – according to certain criteria (religion, language, ethnicity and so on) – the worldwide existing situation reveals that on a single territory, or more accurately within single States, there is always a multitude of coexisting people which identify as part of specific groups³. Furthermore, every human being can be recollected into a specific *identity complexes*, at least in anthropological terms, and really often this identification – usually related to a process of *self-identification* – is not ascribable to a single criterion (i.e. to a single group).⁴

The conditions of this coexistence change radically from a territory to another. Cohabitation is usually regulated by 'majority' and 'minority relations', but it can also find a path of governance in *consociational* models, above all when the population is equally distributed⁵. The *official* recognition of a minority in a certain territory, for

¹ V. COTESTA, *Sociologia dei Conflitti Etnici*, Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2005, p.3

² *Ibidem*, p.6

³ *Ibidem*, p.4

⁴ R. GALLISOT in R.GALLISOT – A. RIVERA, *L'imbroglione etnico in dieci parole chiave*, Edizioni Dedalo, Bari, 1997, p. 117

⁵ V. COTESTA, *Sociologia dei Conflitti Etnici*, Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2005, p.4

instance through the submission of a *Statute*, becomes so far a cardinal issue related with the politics of a State and its institutions, but even more a matter of security for native and foreigner inhabitants of the territory.

In so far, these theoretical analyses on coexistence through the peoples, the main question anthropologists had to deal with is: *why do ethnic relations often resolve in conflicts?* The answer is not defined or clear, as well as univocal, because many branches of science tried to find an answer, so that it's necessary at this point to take in account different perspectives provided by sociologists, historians, economists, jurists and so on, in order to try to obtain a structural – although not perfectly complete – result, aiming to a “*multidimensional interpretative model*”⁶ which takes care of various aspects and disciplines.

One of the most prominent study, it is possible to take in account, is provided by the U.S. economist and sociologist I. Wallerstein. In his work, *The Modern World System*, he segmented the *economy world system* in two categories, the ‘geographic’ and the ‘hierarchic’ one. The system his theory refers to is not the whole world, but the structure of change taking place on it, or, more precisely, the *worldwide social change*, being it blamed on capitalism⁷.

According to Wallerstein, the Capitalist Era is affected by some internal *contradictions*, which can be related to ‘economic’ or ‘politic forms’ of the *governmental system*. It is not object of this work to deepen the technical aspect of his studies, but it results quite useful to report Wallerstein’s conclusion that those contradictions create dichotomies among people, resulting in phenomena like racism or sexism. To a certain extent, which is located in the ‘*4th contradiction*’ of Wallerstein’s work, this divergence finds his basis on communities *artificially created* – whose roots should be found in an ancient yesterday – and located in a collective territory: the *national identities*⁸.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p.7

⁷ *Ibidem*, p.15

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp.24-25

Wallerstein's theory has been largely criticized because of some methodological limits, as the fact that there is no univocal definition of 'social change', neither a shared unit of measurement to define it throughout the different States realities on which it could be applied. Despite this, it seems essential for the purpose of this work to describe how, introducing the concept of culture, Wallerstein also provides the concept of "groups". He highlights that 'signs' contradistinguishing a group must be allocated to a part of a population, but never to all the people (which would lead us to refer to a *universalist* approach) neither to a small or not relevant number of people (theoretically referring to an "individual" distinguishing sign)⁹. Exactly this second aspect will be essential to understand the nature of *minorities* – and their coexistence – in the Western Balkans.

A progression of Wallerstein's work is provided by Anthony Giddens' *The consequences of Modernity*, where a *multidimensional* model of the globalization processes is proposed. Giddens recalls Wallerstein's idea of the economic – instead of political – nature of capitalism as a globalizing process, but refuses capitalism as the only responsible of *modern* transformations¹⁰. Through a complex combination of different factors related with disaggregation and reordering of social relations in space and time Giddens proposes a division between '*premodern*' and '*modern societies*'; both present factors of risk, among which war is taken in consideration for the latter ones. Furthermore, modern societies again are characterised by the phenomenon of migration. More precisely migration is a fact related also with the first kind of society, but only in the second, which is based on *mobility*, as a core factor of the development of a globalised system, migration becomes a foundation of society, as well as a foundation of goods and capitals mobility, and at the same time a consequence of them. Finally, object of migratory movement is the *culture*. This brings his view to this work: as a matter of the fact, "Giddens' view on globalization is no peaceful. Modernity implies different forms of danger¹¹" whose effects can affect the economic and political dimensions, the industrial one and even the military and environmental one. Above all,

⁹ V. COTESTA, *Sociologia dei Conflitti Etnici*, Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2005, p.22

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p.28

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp.34 - 35

concerning the political aspect, Giddens refers to it not only as the relation through the nations, but also as an expression of a conflictual relations among members and *groups* of society¹². This dual aspect, as it will be shown, deeply affected the Balkan region and its dwellers during the '90s conflicts.

A further evolution of Giddens' theory of the multidimensional model can be found in R. Robertson's work (1992), who identifies the existence of a 'global field' before modernity, in a complex articulation of *action* and *reaction* among the actors – seen as integrated parts of the system – of this field¹³. Differently from Wallerstein and Giddens, Robertson emphasises the cultural dimension (not excluding, anyway, the political and economic ones). Being every actor part of the system (the *field*, indeed) throughout the world it is possible to identify some *compression effects* that can result in "collisions through corporate, community and civil narrations"¹⁴. According to Robertson's theory, local communities are a product of globalisation and de-globalisation processes, and they are theorized within them, not in contraposition. Indeed, globalization doesn't destroy local realities (*communities*) but forces them to rebuild their sense of "feeling home", to rediscover their identity through 'tools' like "nostalgia" – as a mixture of sense of loss and perception of history in a declining tendency¹⁵ – and the affirmation of their own cultural peculiarities through ethnicity and nationalism (that is *fundamentalism*). At this point seems necessary to specify that the term "community" differently from the term "society" has its roots and prevalent use only in Political Philosophy masterpieces (as Hobbes and Rousseau's ones). This term confers an identity and it is emotionally perceived. In other words, a *Community* defines an internal group revealing specific borders through a specific "us" and a general "others", which are excluded by definition¹⁶.

¹² *Ivi*

¹³ *Ibidem* p.45

¹⁴ R. ROBERTSON (1992) in V. COTESTA, *Sociologia dei Conflitti Etnici*, Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2005, p.45

¹⁵ Robertson's definition of "**nostalgia**" is a further re-elaborated version of G. Stauth's and G.B. Turner's one, conveyed in *Nostalgia and postmodernism and the critique of mass culture*, 1988.

¹⁶ R. GALLISOT in R.GALLISOT – A. RIVERA, *L'imbroglione etnico in dieci parole chiave*, Edizioni Dedalo, Bari, 1997, p. 25

Robertson's research for an internal homogeneity within a national society "implies conflicts for the affirmation of a dominant culture, and, at the same time, the passage to the latency of the defeated cultural forms¹⁷". Overturning old theories, Robertson asserts that fundamentalism is directly tied to the global culture, being it – as already said – a *production* of it, and meanwhile a *reaction* of this culture, since divergent realities are not able to assimilate each other without losing their identities: fundamentalism configures itself as *resistance* to globalization, but doesn't extrapolate itself from the whole system¹⁸.

Another fundamental contribution to the aim of this work is given by the American Sociologist T. Parsons, who identifies the *preconditions of modernity* in the generalisation of symbolic systems. In his work, great relevance is given to the main religions – as expression of the *traditional* elaboration of codes of integrations through peoples – in competition, and even in contrast, with the ancient Greek rationalism rebirth within the Renaissance humanism, laying the intellectual bases for the legitimization of *modernity*¹⁹. The evolution of this contrast will reach (at least in Europe) his peak along three centuries, and among three big revolutions: the industrial, the democratic and the educational ones. Although the paradigm in Parsons view is the US society (i.e. a formal democracy with a *societal community* well divided from the State), allocating it in a *diagnosis* of the globalisation processes affecting the whole world, his idea of a "happily constituted"²⁰ community results – at least for two main features – quite useful to a comparison with the former Yugoslavian one. Indeed, Parson depicts a society characterised by a *religious pluralism* and above all an *ethnic pluralism*.²¹

Parsons' description allows to strengthen the relation between *modernity* and the ethnic conflict – as the society dealing with the *modern migration* takes shape as a society based by a *melting pot* of identities.

¹⁷ V. COTESTA, *Sociologia dei Conflitti Etnici*, Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2005, p.47

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p.48

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, pp.55 – 56

²⁰ PARSON (1971), in *Ibidem*, p.61

²¹ *Ibidem*, pp.58 – 61

Deepening this view, and trying to understand the importance of *culture* as a contradistinguishing sign of coexisting groups, A.D. Smith's theory seems to provide a further explanation of the concept of identity. The British sociologist declares himself sceptical about a "global culture" since an *identity* implies a sense of continuity among generations of men and shared memories of specific events regarding a collective (i.e. of a specific group) history, all this within a sense of a common fate; a global culture would result inadequate in fulfilling those parameters. Despite this, Smith doesn't deny a tendency of overlapping different cultures in specific areas: he speaks about a "family of cultures", or more specifically "cultures of area" when, for instance, he refers to the European family, where a series of elements stratified one over the others – in this case a political tradition heading toward democracy, the institution of legal codes, ethic traditions related with the Judaic-Christian roots but also the cultural development passed across the age of Enlightenment, Romanticism and so on –²². *Cultures of area* in a certain way overcome *national cultures*, but from the historical view point they were not able to set a landmark toward a deeply rooted *common culture* among different peoples; they were not strong enough to be perceived as a solution to limitations and issues originating from national cultures. This phenomenon creates a dichotomy between the two culture in the dimension of peoples' perception, and events like migrations and, consequently, mixture of identities lead to *powerful reaction* within indigenous (i.e. national) realities.

Following this thread, it is possible to evince that after the reception of an alien culture, the powerful reaction of an indigenous one is the collision – so the conflict – between them, firstly by setting metaphorical – but also physical – walls to exclude *the other*, through political and social tools like the revival, and then converting it in ideology, of local identity and highlighting their risk position. In this way, the concept of ethnicity becomes "a shelter against society and global culture complexity"²³. This process can be allocated to the A. Moore's description of what he calls "discursive" and

²²*Ibidem*, p.79

²³*Ibidem*, p.85

“material” ethno-territoriality, since a certain social narrative and a political rhetoric lead to a sharpening of the boundaries between supposed ethnic groups, establish connections between a given group and a specific territory and finally justify certain claims for political authorities²⁴.

It is possible now to make another step trying to understand the effect of the ideologization of an ethnicity as directly linked to the ideologization of a national culture, resulting in *nationalism*. Taking, for instance, E. Gellner’s definition of nationalism, it is easy to find how this phenomenon is source of an active and effective political action. He defines nationalism in terms of coincidence between *national* unity and *political* unity, subsequently passing from a form of political *sentiment* – in Gellner’s prospective a sentiment of anger for its violation – to a political *movement*²⁵. Furthermore, being ethnic wars always correlated to a coexistence of two – or more – groups on a territory, *territoriality* results as an “essential component in nationalist politics”, since the creation of a “homeland” is the basis to set a nationalist political action program: a simple *land* turns to a *national territory*²⁶. So it is not difficult to understand how territoriality emerges upon political claims involving ethnic and cultural identity, but above all “political authority by identifying [...] territories as belonging to or appropriate for certain ethno-national categories”²⁷. Once a nationalist movement gains power over a certain territory a specific kind of regime can be established: an *ethnocracy*, distinguished from other regimes by the “systematic privileging of the *ethnos* over the *demos*”²⁸. Ethnic claims start to be perceived as inseparable from a territory, by a simplification of a category (i.e. ethnicity) used as a “container schema”, leading relationships through people in terms of a “self” radically divergent from the “other”.

²⁴ A. MOORE, “Ethno-Territoriality and ethnic conflict” in *Geographical Review*, vol. 106 (1), January 2016, p.96

²⁵ V. COTESTA, *Sociologia dei Conflitti Etnici*, Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2005,, p.111

²⁶ A. MOORE, “Ethno-Territoriality and ethnic conflict” in *Geographical Review*, vol. 106 (1), January 2016, p.94

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p.95

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p.100

Finally, it is possible to provide a symbolic answer to our first question, given the complexity of such a theme and various viewpoints that the academic universe can choose to orientate its analysis: *Why do ethnic relations often resolve in conflicts?*

An ethnic identity and its relative attribution of political authority come to be constructed as indivisible from a certain territory. The bond between lands and ethnicity is so important that R. Hassner, referring to their relation, arrives to attribute the adjective of “sacred” to a territory object of a nationalist claim²⁹. Taking a little backward step in this text, it was taken in consideration how the processes of identification – and *self-identification* – lead portions of population to consider themselves as radically part of specific *groups* – through perceptible *signs* like language or skin colour, but even more frequently through imperceptible ones such as religion and culture –, and it was highlighted how those groups could incur to contrast. Once reached the attribution of *sacredness* for the territory, as a basis for an ethnic classification, it doesn’t sound incoherent to read and report that “purification quite literally revolves around the need to define the proper place of putative ethnic group³⁰”. War in conclusion results as the final answer of a deep and blind need of affirmation.

Purification of the space is the most extreme achievement in an ethno-nationalist project, but it clearly mirrored some of the most relevant conflicts of the 20th century, as the Second World War, or the Rwanda’s conflict of the earlier ‘90s. The *etničko čišćenje*, the “ethnic cleansing” is one of the most obscure aspects of the conflicts that involved the Western Balkans, but for sure one of the most relevant aspects as well to go on deepening the reflection and the study about identities in this area, reflecting on their consequences on the global scale and trying to understand which perspectives lie on the path of this portion of Europe.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p.101

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p.103

CHAPTER II

II – THE WESTERN BALKANS CASE

Trying to apply all those reflections on the western Balkans analysis, it is necessary to deal with the first question anthropologists studying the area had to answer: “what and where is *the Balkans*?”³¹

Despite many attempts, we still don't have a unanimous answer but many shared elements to be recollected in different definitions. Starting from the geographic collocation of the States involved, it is quite easy to find a divergence from maps issued in different countries. For instance, US and French maps allocate the Republic of Slovenia as part of “the Balkans”, but German and UK ones do not.³² For this reason the definition itself of the *Balkans* is to be considered as an arbitrary choice led from the analysis conducted. For the purpose of this work, or at least the in-depth analysis of the concept of Yugoslavian identity, all the countries coming from the Yugoslavia's dissolution will be referred as part of the Balkans, or more precisely of the Western Balkans.

This approach is, nevertheless, not free from some methodological obstacles: first of all, the ethnological study of the relations through those countries highlights a not balanced “tradition” of this academic field itself *within the counties*. Whilst in some areas it is easy to find the setting of these kinds of studies even before the World War II (as in Croatia and Serbia), in other regions, such as Kosovo and Montenegro, researchers have to deal with a “lack of ‘indigenous’ anthropological tradition”³³ (really often those areas have been discussed by “outsiders”, so that an accurate analysis needs to identify a certain point of view or another, and above all it needs a reorganisation of the

³¹ A. BOŠKOVIC, “Distinguishing ‘self’ and ‘other’. Anthropology and national identity in former Yugoslavia”, in *Anthropology Today*, Vol. 21 n° 2, April 2005, p.8

³² *Ivi*

³³ *Ibidem*, p.9

discipline and the studies conducted). For this reason, it will be necessary in this work, sometimes, to tear the section of discussion apart, dividing them according to different criteria, like the country discussed, or the chronological order of some events taken into consideration.

II - 1. IDENTITIES

Within former Yugoslavian social sciences, with particular emphasis on the branch of ethnology, researchers have always aimed to obtain “acceptance and recognition of their own ‘people’”³⁴ (*narod*, in Serbian), contributing to the building of the ‘nation’; despite this, these kinds of studies find their roots only in the former 20th century³⁵. The reasons of such a delay are to be allocated to a first, central, consideration: it was only in the 1878, with the *Congress of Berlin*, that the Balkans area made its factual entrance in Europe, starting that process of adaptation to the – purely European – principle of the “Nation State”, or rather the correspondence of the *borders of the State* with the *cultural identity ones*³⁶. This principle was almost unknown within the Ottoman Empire, which dominated the area until the end of the 19th century.

1. THE BEGINNING: OTTOMAN EMPIRE

It is fundamental to understand that it results anachronistic to associate the Ottoman dominion to a *Western classification*, as it often happened, of a “Turkish Empire”. The Ottoman system was grounded in the *dynastic loyalty* to the sultan, and the only *identity* formally recognised within the conquered territories was the *religious identity*, being Islam the State religion. Conversion was almost mandatory for the higher imperial offices, and a various range of policies were applied to non-Muslims conquered communities within the broad territory of the Ottoman Empire: sources refer about proper extermination in certain areas, and about situations of partial or total tolerance in some others. The most common regimes were the ones which called for *direct taxes*. One of these regimes was based on the *devshirme*, also known as the *tribute in blood*: a percentage of young males’ population was taken from the Christian communities

³⁴ A. BOŠKOVIC, “Distinguishing ‘self’ and ‘other’. Anthropology and national identity in former Yugoslavia”, in *Anthropology Today*, Vol. 21 n° 2, April 2005, p.8

³⁵ Famous examples are easy to be found, as – for instance – Stanoyevich’s evolutionist works, written around the 1919.

³⁶ G. FRANZINETTI, *I Balcani dal 1878 a oggi*, Carrocci Editore, 2° edizione, 2010, p.10

dwelling villages of the Balkans (and Anatolia), to be firstly converted, and then integrated in particular civil and military bodies of the State, to serve it. They were named *Janissaries*³⁷. It was only in the 1839 that the so-called period of the *Tanzīmāt* (lit. *reorganization*) began, through an imperial decree, a period characterised by a renewal of the administration of the Ottoman Empire. This juridical norm granted a set of rights to the people subjected to the sultan dominion, with no regard to the confessional faith³⁸, affecting also the autochthonous population of the Balkans.

The fundamental and undisputed point in Ottoman policies – core for the successive Balkans' development, and crucial to the topic discussion of this work – was the subdivision of the non-Muslim population through all the territory of the Empire: the *millets*. A *millet* was a special governmental system that grouped the different *religious* communities; its peculiarity was that such a division was not set on a *territorial basis*. Those communities, scattered along the territory, should refer to their head chief, which in turn had direct liability toward the Ottoman offices. The most important *millet* was the Greek-Orthodox one of Constantinople, reference for all the orthodox communities, included the Balkan ones; it was only toward the end of the 19th century, in fact, that the Ottoman regime allowed the recognition of the various autocephalous churches, whose fragmentation bases were *linguistic* and *cultural*, becoming so on a further element of distinction – and recognition – for many minorities³⁹. In the Balkan region, having been the feudal lords eliminated, all the lands properties were posed under the formal control of the sultan. This allocation removed any hereditary élite formally recognized (i.e. any kind of aristocracy) within the autochthonous populations. Together with the *millet* system, the Ottoman offices thus had the possibility to relate only with some selected representatives, who were granted a broad grade of autonomy.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p.13

³⁸ E. HÖSCH, *Storia dei paesi Balcanici, Dalle origini ai giorni nostri*, Giulio Einaudi Editore, Torino, 2005, p.118

³⁹ G. FRANZINETTI, *I Balcani dal 1878 a oggi*, Carrocci Editore, 2° edizione, 2010, p.13

At the beginning of the 19th century, the high level of underdevelopment – compared with the rest of Europe – of the region, due to such a governmental system, in coincidence with the Napoleon wars occurring in Europe at the time, brought the region to a situation of instability which posed the roots for a range of (necessary) reforms, led by the sultan Selim III. Those reforms, despite the need of almost a century and many adjustments along this time, reshaped the Balkans internal government system into a proper modern bureaucratic structure⁴⁰. Furthermore, between the 1804 and 1829 a series of uprisings affected the region, leading to the independence of the State of Serbia⁴¹. It must be noted that, in the Serbian case, the independence of the country was only a collateral consequence of an uprising, whose nature was, instead, *legitimist* toward the sultan, “although the cultural and political romanticism of the 19th century interpreted those [two – i.e. Greek and Serb] revolts in accordance with the common thread of Risorgimento’s emphasis, as they were expression of ‘rebirth’ of oppressed nationalities”⁴². In fact, the protests in Serbia began against some new taxes imposed to the peasants. It is in this context that character of Đorđe Petrović emerges. Đorđe Petrović, better known as Karađorđe (Black George, 1752 – 1817), was a pig farmer who led the First Serbian Uprising in the Ottoman *Sanjak* (administrative unit) of *Smederevo*, establishing a first, not recognised, government that was repressed in the 1813. Across the course of those years the uprising had lost its local and legitimist dimension, bringing to the Second Serbian Uprising in the 1815, led by Miloš Obrenović (1780 – 1860), another rebels’ leader. Obrenović obtained a partial autonomy for the Serbs and Belgrade, and, after killing Đorđe Petrović, signed a treaty with the Ottoman offices to normalise the relations between Serbs and Turkish, establishing the *Serbian Principality* and becoming Prince of Serbia. This autonomy gained *international recognition* in the 1829, with the *Treaty of Adrianople* (also known as *Treaty of Edirne*) within the context of the Russian-Turkish War of 1828–29⁴³.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p.17

⁴¹ And Greece as well.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p.17

⁴³ *Ivi*

After the autonomy, Serbia saw on its path a rapid development of the bureaucratic system and the birth of a new own army. It was in this context that the Prince Obrenović was forced to allow a first *Constitution* (1838) for the State – that sets the first institutional step in the discourse of this work, as the identity of a people was at this time finding an own juridical basis. After a brief parenthesis, with the House Obrenović deposed and substituted by the House Petrović – led by Aleksandar (soon of Karađorđe) – in the 1859 the Obrenović dynasty regained the power; they would have ruled the State until 1903.

Under the pressure of the liberal movements, in 1869, the Prince was forced to allow a *new Constitution*, that a retrospect analysis reveals as more aligned with European standards of the time – if not, for some aspects, more innovative. Among the main points, it is to be highlighted that the National Assembly (*Narodna Skupština*) was reactivated, and the universal suffrage was, essentially, allowed. The right of secrecy of the vote was approved in the 1888. Despite many difficulties, and an objective delay – if compared with Western Europe countries -, in the second half of the 19th century Serbia gained a modern constitution⁴⁴, and within the discourse of this work, it is possible to state that the country reached that previously called *modernity* taken as a basis for the definition of an own *identity*.

Given this background, great support to the recognition of an own identity, and an own “people”, is also to be allocated within the intellectual and academic sphere. Extensive studies were promoted to identify the “national spirit” (concept already spread in the 18th century by German philosopher as *Volksgeist*), in order to enforce the *nation building*. Great emphasis, as well as it happened, for instance, before within the Russian Empire⁴⁵, was given to the study of the *folks*, and the elevation of the figure of the

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p.23

⁴⁵ References maybe found in many essays and articles, for instance in A. REMNEV, N. SUVOROVA, “The Russian Cause” on the Asiatic Borderlands: The “Russianness” Under Threat and “Questionable Kulturtragers”, *Ab Imperio*, 2/2008

peasant as *iconic* basis, for pureness and “nobility”, to ground the development of a proper own people⁴⁶.

3. CROATIA

A different argumentation must be developed for what concerns Croatia-Slavonia.

Until the 1878, with the *Congress of Berlin*, part of the Balkan territories under the dominion of the Habsburg Monarchy included the *Military Frontier*, a province at the southern border hedge of the Empire, which was granted a certain grade of autonomy, in exchange for being used as a *cordon sanitaire* against the Ottoman Empire. This strip of land included Croatia-Slavonia and, with marginal importance – because of its rural nature and the codominance with the Italian Kingdom – Dalmatia⁴⁷.

Just ten years before, in the 1867, the *Austro-Hungarian Compromise* (*Österreichisch-Ungarischer Ausgleich*, or broadly known with the abbreviation *Ausgleich*) had been signed. The Compromise established a new *factual* union between the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary. The lands owned by the House of Habsburg were fragmented into two main regions: the Cisleithanian (under the Austrian government) and the Transleithanian (under the Hungarian one, and known for this reason as the *Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen*, which included Croatia-Slavonia). The crucial passage of this division was the separation of their administrations into *two parliaments* as well⁴⁸. Final and fundamental element of the Compromise was the establishment a new grade of autonomy for Croatia-Slavonia.

It is to be noted that the Croatian-Slavonian territories – for geographic reasons – had been politically tied to the Hungarian Kingdom since the 11th century: this explains how, across the successive centuries, their Slavic populations developed a Catholic identity.

⁴⁶ A. BOŠKOVIC, “Distinguishing ‘self’ and ‘other’. Anthropology and national identity in former Yugoslavia”, in *Anthropology Today*, Vol. 21 n° 2, April 2005, p.10

⁴⁷ G. FRANZINETTI, 2010, p.24

⁴⁸ http://www.treccani.it/scuola/lezioni/storia/l_impero_austro_ungarico.html

Despite this, after the 1857 the government from Budapest aimed at the creation – throughout all its administrated territories – of a new *Nation State*, that meant that it should have been perceived as *Hungarian* under all the viewpoint, firstly the cultural one. In order to do this, the central power even needed to forcibly impose its authority on the Slavic communities of Transleithania. In this context, the Croatian élite started to struggle against a new kind of cultural repression and a set of changes – seen of course as an alienation of the gained autonomy; the centuries-old *loyalty* to the dynasty – and the State religion – requested to the Slavic people, were now shifting and turning into a newly imposed *cultural-linguistic identity*. This historical passage appears now fundamental to understand how the threat of the self-alienation became a contributing factor to the creation and the development of the Yugoslavian identity, reallocating as a basis for the ethnic recognition the rank of the *confessional roots* in favour of the *linguistic ones*⁴⁹.

From the academic viewpoint, even in Croatia, as well as in Serbia and Slovenia, “the insistence on studying one’s own ethnic group (*folk*) also remained at the core of ethnological tradition”⁵⁰. The study of the Croatian peasant remained a core aspect of ethnology, sometimes highlighting a certain distinction between the “tribal culture” of other Southern Slavs’ ancestors, described as violent and aggressive, and the “co-operative” peoples dwelling the Croatian prairies⁵¹.

4. BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Generally speaking, it was largely argued that it was thanks to Serbs’ national ideology if the country expanded till the formation of Yugoslavia. It is true that, at the end of the 19th century, Serbs lived split in many countries, firstly of course Serbia, Montenegro and as a *minority* in many areas of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Croatia, former Slavonia, Dalmatia and from the 1878 Bosnia-Herzegovina). Despite this, Serbs living in Bosnia tended not precisely to promote a real unification between the two

⁴⁹ G. FRANZINETTI, *I Balcani dal 1878 a oggi*, Carrocci Editore, 2° edizione, 2010, p.24

⁵⁰ A. BOŠKOVIC, 2005, p.10

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p.12

countries, but mostly they aimed to a more “practical objective of safe-guarding the Serb-Orthodox culture and identity against the perceived threat of [...] the Catholic Austro-Hungarian Empire”⁵². It was only at the threshold of the First World War that Serb irredentists promoted, with a new and powerful energy, their claim for a unified Serb community, but failing in this aspiration⁵³.

When Bosnia became a part of Austro-Hungarian Empire, a blooming of new ideologies with nationalist roots took place, and a growing number of intellectuals started to consider the gain that could derive from a more incisive promotion of a *collectivist multi ethnic identity*. It’s fundamental to highlight the birth of this process in Bosnia because under the Ottoman empire the country “generally lacked a unified vision of what it meant to be ‘Bosnian’”⁵⁴. It is not difficult to reconstruct the reason of this lack. The first sources about a relatively independent Bosnia are related with the character of *Ban Kulin*, governing the north-eastern part of the region in the 1180. The region expanded until 1463, even exceeding nowadays borders of Croatia and Serbia, under King Tvrtko (fig.2⁵⁵). Bosnians didn’t define themselves within one confession, but affiliated with the Catholic (Croats related) or the Orthodox (Serbians related) Churches depending on the area the lived in. Between the 14th and 15th Centuries, as previously told, the Ottoman Empire conquered all the Balkans region.

⁵² J. ŽDERO, *Serbs, Bosnian, and Yugoslav: The Bosnian Serb Intellectuals on the Road Toward a Multi-Ethnic Identity, 1878 – 1914*, Ph.D dissertation, University of Western Ontario, London (ON), 2009, p.33

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p.1

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, p.5

⁵⁵ <https://bosniahistory.wordpress.com/>




Figure 2 - Medieval Bosnia

The change deeply affected the Bosnian territories, under the cultural, social, as well as the political viewpoint – above all if compared with other Balkans areas. Islamic religion played a central role by turning over the local Christian élites; between the 16th and 17th centuries Muslims became the absolute majority of the region. The first reason is to be allocated to a different and higher organization within Serbian and Croat Churches. Furthermore, Bosnia was composed by an overwhelmingly agrarian society (around 88% of population), making the urban (i.e. more cosmopolite and multi-ethnic) realities less flourishing than in Serbia and above all in Croatia. In addition, the system of ‘*millet*s’ let almost unrepresented all the Christian peasant communities scattered throughout the territory.

Despite their common language and roots, under the Ottoman rule Bosnian dwellers gradually lost their sense of unity, living into separate administrative entities,

and deepening their cultural differences up to, across the centuries, distinguishing into *separate* religious-ethnic groups⁵⁶.

5. OTTOMAN DOWNFALL

As already seen, the second half of the 19th century was characterized by a series of loss and crises for the Ottoman Empire within the Balkans. Financially speaking, the empire arrived to a declaration of default in 1875⁵⁷. Furthermore, a set of insurrections involved all the area, the Bosnia-Herzegovinian included. Especially Herzegovina, one of the most difficult area to be controlled because of its geographic morphology, and dwelled primarily by Croat-Catholic peasants, saw in the 1876 within its territories a growing amount of agrarian revolts related to the economic and administrative reforms started at the beginning of the 1850s. Those uprisings, which took place as well as in Serbia with a spontaneous and local entity, found support with human and material supplies by nationalist movements of neighbour countries, above all Serbia (in the *Bosna* province), Montenegro (supporting Herzegovina breeding ground of the rebellions) and the southern Slavs autonomous committees within Habsburg territories.

In the 1876 the sultan Abdul Hamid II tried to allow a new Constitution envisaging the election of proper representative organs of the minorities, but this attempt failed. The troubling situation of all the Balkans area assumed – or better *joined* – an international dimension, being all the European geopolitical situation reshaping itself; as a matter of the fact the Balkans were now gaining a new weight in the theatre of the “power game” of the most powerful countries, not only the Ottoman one, but also with the Austro-Hungarian one and their relations with, firstly, the Russian one, but also involving Great-Britain, France and Germany, and, consequently, leaving new glimmers of uncertainty throughout Europe.

This was the scenery in which Russia and Turkey signed the *Treaty of San Stefano* (3 march 1878), and then, to countervail the political balance of power, the main nations

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p.40

⁵⁷ G. FRANZINETTI, 2010, p.25

decide to call for the *Congress of Berlin*, through which Serbia and Montenegro were formally recognized as independent States and Bosnia-Herzegovina became an Austro-Hungarian protectorate – even if still officially part of the Ottoman Empire⁵⁸.

The Bosnian-Herzegovinian situation remained a proper *political anomaly* until the 1908 (when it was *formally annexed* to the Empire), in a “institutional limbo”⁵⁹ being it not part of the Austrian or Hungarian provinces, neither under a factual dominion of the Ottoman Empire. It would be in this context that a growing number of “intellectuals began to consider the benefits of encouraging a collectivist, multi-ethnic identity”⁶⁰. The first decade of the 20th century was probably one of the most determinant period for the affirmation of the country own identity. Bosnia-Herzegovina passed through a considerable “modernization”, a key factor, as already seen. As a matter of facts, after 1878 Vienna tried to fight national separatisms, within the Empire, through a large permission for the access into the imperial bureaucracy to an increasingly multi-religious exposition; furthermore, Hungary started a set of policies for a common national integration – in the attempt to discourage separate politics for ethnic groups living within Bosnia. The main intention was to tie up all the intern communities of the territory by a shared loyalty toward the Monarchy. Although, at the very beginning of its control, the Empire banned in Bosnia both the political and cultural activity (included the foundation of political parties)⁶¹, after the complete integration of the territory, in the 1908, the Empire introduced new institutions to Bosnia, including a proper *Constitution* (1910). The region underwent a radical change, getting “Europeanized”. All these factors contributed to the first identification of the people dwelling the country with a common “Bosnian” ***distinctiveness***.

All this process results almost paradoxical, since the birth of Bosnian self-consciousness is to be interpreted as dual result of the same phenomenon: both the *exposure* to a

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, p.29

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p.31

⁶⁰ J. ŽDERO, 2009, p. 5

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, p.33

certain culture (i.e. the Western Europe one) and the *resistance* to it – since it was perceived as a “top-down” imposition – contributed to its affirmation⁶².

Although it is possible to “read” the passages of this period as a first, fundamental, step of definition for Bosnia, a situation characterised by a *continuum* of uncertainty, across the previous centuries, cannot be considered overcome in few decades – since Bosnia still has certain residues of it. Its heritage can be still gather in a 1991 census, which revealed that Bosnia was the most nationally diverse country of former Yugoslavia, being its territory dwelled by around 44% Muslims (nowadays called *Bosniaks*), 31% Serb-Orthodox, 17% Croat-Catholic, and other minorities. In ethnic terms this explain the nature of Serb and Croat nationalist arguments on the claim to the territory.

For those reasons, it is not possible to define or allocate a Bosnian *proper identity* at least until 1918, with the institution of the Yugoslav Kingdom⁶³, but for sure, it is possible to state that the 20th century opened to a new self-consciousness of the country, fundamental to the understanding of the successive events occurred within the country.

⁶² *Ibidem*, p.7

⁶³ *Ibidem*, p.20

CHAPTER III

III – YUGOSLAVS

1. YUGOSLAVISM

From the historic viewpoint, Yugoslav identity is a very recent subject of study. It is possible to allocate the Yugoslav idea of nationhood between the 1830's and the 1840's. The **Croatian** intellectuals developed the concept of "Illyrianism", under the belief of a common ancestor among the South Slavs, the Illyrians. This concept was developed along all the century, with the purpose to enforce the Croatian coalition under the hegemony of the Austro-Hungarian Empire⁶⁴, recollecting all the linguistic, cultural, geographic, and historical ties among the Balkans inhabitants whose ancestor had settled in the area between the 6th and the 7th century. But it was the **Serbs'** impulse – as already told, having them failed in their first aspirations – that reveals itself determining, by turning in supporting the unification of all that communities that could be included in the group of the "South Slavs" – the Yugoslavs, referring to Serbs, Croats, Slovenes but also a minority of Macedonians Slav-speaking⁶⁵.

The boundaries of the Serbs and Croats' identities were not totally clear, and deeply related with ancient memories of the first settlements throughout the Balkans – and this was a key factor in modern times for the claims to proclaim control over Bosnia, asserting that Bosnians were "real" Serbs and Croats⁶⁶. The "fluid definition of what constituted a *nation*"⁶⁷ provided the previously mentioned Habsburg Slav intellectuals to develop a new concept of nationhood clustering Croats, Serbs, Slovenes and Slav Macedonians.

⁶⁴ J. ŽDERO, *Serbs, Bosnian, and Yugoslav: The Bosnian Serb Intellectuals on the Road Toward a Multi-Ethnic Identity, 1878 – 1914*, Ph.D dissertation, University of Western Ontario, London (ON), 2009, p.43

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p.1-2

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, p.36

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, p.43

The beginning of the 20th century was characterised by the blooming of nationalist movements, taking place across the first two decades' century, being them involved in the principal political – and warlike – events of the time; from the *Young Turks* revolts, the collision of nations within the Western Europe, concerning the First World War, or the Russian revolution. This led all the main powers to repressive approaches toward those movement. For what concerns the Balkan areas of Serbia and above all Croatia, the development of a collectivist, multi-ethnic approach throughout the Balkan States (and autonomies) was the last try *to grant all the nationalist movements a political and cultural survive* firstly inside the Austro-Hungarian frame, and later against the political fragmentation of the main power within the area. This reveals that the aim of intellectuals was not to create a “uniform (*ethnic*) national people [...] but [...] the development of a multi-ethnic, triune *identity*⁶⁸” within “dynamics of ‘groupness’ [...] gone beyond ethnicity”⁶⁹.

2. BOSNIAN CASE

Differently from the Serbian and Croatian cases, it is not easy to reconstruct the formation of the “new” Yugoslav ideology in Bosnia. Despite the Austro-Hungarian administration records (mostly censuses), which were made publicly accessible only after the Second World War, the most relevant source historians had to work on resulted in journal pieces. Furthermore, as already seen, there is no balance among the number of sources and studies bloomed within the Balkans states in the 19th and 20th centuries; whilst there are historical sources dealing with Yugoslavism with reference to Serb and Croatian intellectuals already in the 1830's, among Bosnian ones such a consciousness seems to have merely started in the mid-nineteenth century and developed on a considerable scale only at the beginning of the First World War. Unfortunately, in behalf of Serb and Croatian contribution to Yugoslavism, little examination was given at the time by both Western and Balkans intellectuals to relevant

⁶⁸ It must be specified that the so called “Trialist” program was at its origin the Croat intellectual project to unify the ancient territories of the medieval Croatia (i.e. with Slavonia and Dalmatia) and, after 1878, Bosnia. Ref. J. ŽDERO, 2009, p.44

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, p.3-4, *emphasis added*.

exceptions that the course of history made aftermath more popular. One example was the “Young Bosnia” movement (*Mlada Bosna*), a revolutionary movement whose members were mostly students (Bosnian Serbs and Croats but also Bosniak), and where, for instance, Gravelo Princip was an associate⁷⁰.

Despite this, a fundamental – and *foundational* – study on Yugoslavism in Bosnia is provided by an exception for importance and reputation, the work of Bosnian Serb scholar Vladimir Ćorović (1885-1941) and his book *The political Circumstances in Bosnia and Herzegovina*⁷¹, in which it is argued that, from the Serbs’ of Bosnia longing for annexation to *Serbia*, such a desire developed and broadened in a new wish to unite all the South Slavs, as a “natural” and physiological phenomenon⁷².

To understand how it could be felt as “natural” such a phenomenon it is fundamental to remember that during the 19th century the theories concerning the “Great Serbs” and the “Great Croats” had been exported to the Bosnian region. This led to the affirmation of the political consciousness, at least among the few intellectuals; after the enforcement of compulsory schooling provided by the Austro-Hungarian modernization, such a consciousness became more accessible to the population⁷³ and became to set its roots throughout the country.

⁷⁰ J. ŽDERO, 2009, p.19

⁷¹ Original title: *Političke prilike u Bosni i Hercegovini*, 1939

⁷² *Ibidem*, p.16

⁷³ *Ibidem*, p.42

3. HISTORICAL ASPECTS: THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS, AND SLOVENES

The first *institutionalization* of collectiveness for the Southern Slavs, took place with the *Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes*, in 1918. It included the territories of nowadays Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, and it could be defined as the first Yugoslav National State (fig. 1⁷⁴).



1 - Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

The consolidation of a *collective political institution* was not easy, but the flow of the events of the second decade of the 20th century created the path to its achievement. The First World War battles officially finished in the 1918 with the *Armistice of Compiègne*, better known as the *Armistice of 11 November*, which decreed the

⁷⁴http://www.arhivju.gov.rs/active/en/home/glavna_navigacija/izlozbe/izlozbe_arhiva/izl_2009_stalna.html

termination of some of the main Empire of the time, **the Austro-Hungarian included** – and with the *Armistice of Mudros* (30 October 1918), concerning the end of hostilities in the Middle Eastern theatre. But despite the end of the war, it was necessary to wait until the 1923, with the *Treaty of Lausanne* (23 July), to find a first effective peacetime within the Balkans area⁷⁵.

As a matter of the fact the birth of the kingdom was decreed by the *Corfu Declaration*, signed in the 1917 by the Serb Government – government-in-exile at the time – and the Yugoslav Committee (*Yugoslavenski odbor*) for the creation of the new State. Despite this, the juridical nature of the State, above all the decision to attribute to it a *federal* or *unitary* configuration, was postponed and conferred to the future *Constituent Assembly*. Although, in fact, for a long time the perspective of the creation of such a kingdom was considered as a mere expansion of Serbia, such an aim was not possible, and not only because of the multi-ethnic multiplicity present on the territory. The main obstacle for this kind of project were the *historical entities*. At that age the political configuration of the territory appeared peculiarly fragmented, being it divided into only two independent States (Serbia and Montenegro), Austrian territories (Slovenia and Dalmatia), Hungarian territories (Croatia-Slavonia and Vojvodina) and shared Austro-Hungarian administrative sections: Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, the percentage of population of the whole Yugoslav territory was not equally subdivide within those entities, which had their own currencies and customs zones⁷⁶.

It appears interesting to highlight the great effort of the central power from Belgrade (i.e. the Serb monarchy) to emphasise in any way the *nature of uniformity* of the new State by a wide set of policies in every field. Education was affected too; national pre-war textbooks were substituted by new ones which drew attention to the South Slavs' identity, glorifying commonalities on cultural, social, and political sphere, not avoiding a certain criticism from Serb and Croat intellectuals⁷⁷.

⁷⁵ G. FRANZINETTI, *I Balcani dal 1878 a oggi*, Carrocci Editore, 2° edizione, 2010, p.33

⁷⁶ *Ibidem*, pp.45-46

⁷⁷ J. ŽDERO, *Serbs, Bosnian, and Yugoslav: The Bosnian Serb Intellectuals on the Road Toward a Multi-Ethnic Identity, 1878 – 1914*, Ph.D dissertation, University of Western Ontario, London (ON), 2009, p.14

The 28 June 1921, with a simple majority (223 votes in favour, 35 against and 158 abstained) the General Assembly – mostly Serbian composed – approved the new *Constitution*, inspired by the Belgian one, with a *centralist system*.

Two main political aspects regarding the Assembly to be highlighted are that, firstly, all the party involved resulted *ethnically affiliated*: from the most relevant can be included the Radical Party, related with pre-Yugoslavian Serbs (*srbijanci*), the Democratic Party, Serbian too but involving a more disaggregated Serbian communities, above all the northern ones (*prečani*), the *Croatian Peasants Party*, Catholic oriented – restored in the 1991 –, and the **Yugoslav Muslim Organization** (*JMO, Jugoslovenska muslimanska Organizacija*). The only not ethnic affiliated party, which had gained at the 1920 elections the 12,5% of votes, was the *Communist* one: it would be proclaimed illegal few months after the constitutional elections. The second interesting aspect, almost resulting peculiar if compared with the development of the relations at the end of the century, was that it resulted *decisive* to the approval of the Constitution the Bosnian and even the Kosovo-Albanese voters' support⁷⁸.

The Kingdom policy resulted as *centralist*, or, better expressing the concept, as “*yugoslaving*”: the old regions were reorganized in districts (*banovinas*), whose borders were intentionally reshaped **in order not to coincide with the old dividing lines**⁷⁹. This kind of approach didn't obtain a wide acceptance, and in the 1931 a *new constitution* was proclaimed, aiming to establish a new *constitutional monarchy*, but factually centralizing the monarchic power. Also this reform was not appreciated, triggering many adverse reactions within opposite parties: as a final result of such a division in the 1934 the King Alexander I of Yugoslavia was assassinated. The successive five years resulted in a series of issues related with internal *questions*, firstly the Croatian one. In the 1939 a negotiation was started between the monarchy (represented by Prince Paul I) and Vladko Maček, representor of the *Croatian Peasants Party*, trying to grant a special agreement (*sporazum*) in order to create a special and autonomous *banovina* for Croats,

⁷⁸G. FRANZINETTI, 2010, p.47

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, p.49

with an own assembly, which would have appointed its governor (*ban*) for the district. The agreement was signed in the 1939, but the wave of the Second World War made it ineffective⁸⁰.

4. TOWARD COMMUNISM

It is necessary to note that there is a divergence in Western scholarships⁸¹ – as well as divergent were the autochthone theories –, between the “classic” scholars’ approach to this theme and some more recent studies. The former tended to see the Yugoslavism as a sort of popular movement born among the population of the urban spaces – so with a higher education –, taking place *in coincidence* with the awakening of the nationalist movements of 19th century within the Balkans. The latter broadly supported a more fragmented idea of Yugoslavism, as a result of the attempt to overcome the fragmentation of all the nationalist movements of this period, stressing the final role of *communist* ideology spread at the eve of the Second World War⁸².

⁸⁰ *Ivi*

⁸¹ One of the most prominent name it is possible to refer to is Robert J. Kerner.

⁸² *Ibidem*, pp.14-16

CHAPTER IV

IV – TITO

The character of Josip Broz “Tito” (1892 – 1980) emerged during the First World War, when the Serbs sided with the *Allies*, whilst Croats, Slovenes and Serbs of Croatia decide to support the Central Powers. Many of them were imprisoned, some others, as Tito, succeeded in escaping the countries and joining the Red Army⁸³. But It would be necessary to wait until the Second World War to see the rise of the Communist ideology within Yugoslavia.

1. BETWEEN THE TWO WARS: POLITICAL ISSUES

As already said, after the defeat of the central Empires, and the *Corfu negotiations* the Constitution of 28 June 1921 instituted the *Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes*, and in the 1931 it would be officially called Yugoslavia. After the institution of the Kingdom, an attack against the Interior Minister posed the path to proclaim the communist party illegal. Anyway, the *party division system* made it difficult to control the country and this led to Alexander’s *coup d’Etat* of the 6 June 1929, whose effects remained until the 1939.

As many historians pointed out, the fragility of the country is firstly to be attributed to the fact that the new institution had no precedent – as it was for instance, for the renewed birth of Poland⁸⁴.

But that was not the only reason; the “vision” itself of the State was different among the different parts composing the Kingdom. From the political viewpoint, Croats had always

⁸³ J. KRULIC, *Storia della Jugoslavia, dal 1945 ai nostri giorni*, Bompiani-RCS libri S.p.a., III Edizione, Milano, 1999, p.15

⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, p.14

had a “deeply contractual vision of their State”⁸⁵, and the abolition of many institutional bodies, as the *Diet* (the regional assembly) or the local *militia* were not well accepted from the *Croatian Peasants Party*. Furthermore, with the new *banovina* lines, the country was characterised by a melting-pot of nationalities – with three main Slav languages, Croat-Serb, Slovene and Macedonia, and some minor ones like the Turkish and the Romanian.

Furthermore, with some religious minorities, as the Ashkenazi and the Sephardi Jews a great divergence existed through Muslim communities and the Christian (Orthodox and Catholic) one.

Properly the former two signed the main gap between the Yugoslav people, a division whose roots are to be found in ancient times – with Theodosius’s division of the Roman Empire of the 395 A.D. along the Drina river in Bosnia. This separation also mirrored the cultural difference. Although some linguists tried to identify a linguistic line of separation between them, the differences can be allocated to a macro family containing three groups of languages. As a matter of fact, Croats and Serbs ethnic divergence essentially lies not on the language itself, but on the cultural root in which they developed: the first was surrounded by the Latin culture, whilst the second was Byzantine influenced. As it will be shown, this fact will be relevant around fifty years later, during Tito’s government. For that time, it appears relevant to note that this made the Croats find their representation in the social role of their people, supporting the *Croatian Peasants Party*.

But even more interesting is the attribution it is possible to call for Muslims of Bosnia. It is not clear how the conversion broadly spread, but it is widely accepted that it happened around the 15th century and that the main change in the original culture was the introduction of some Turkish words in the Serbian language. As already explained, Bosniaks didn’t have a proper self-consciousness as a people until the 19th century, when they were formally recognized. In the period between the two wars they found mainly

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*, p.16

source of representation and identification in their political party, the Yugoslav Muslim Organization⁸⁶.

At the eve of the 1929, the troubled and complex political life of the country facilitated King Alexander's *Coup d'Etat* of the 6th January, even if its establishment was not immediate. Many occasion of fight put at risk the stability of the government. In the 1928 Stjepan Radić, cofounder of the *Croatian Peasants Party* accused a Montenegrin depute, Puniša Račić, leader of the People's Radical Party, of corruption. This was only the peak of a series of accusations and culminated with the assassination of Stjepan Radić. With him the perspective of a new Serb-Croat coalition died too⁸⁷. The Croats deputies left the Assembly (*Skupčina*) and retired in Zagreb. After a brief caretaker government led by Anton Korošec – leader of the Slovenian People's Party.

The Prince regent Paul Karadjordjević was a more moderate governor, searching for and reaching – 26 August 1939 – the new compromise (*sporazum*) to the allocation of a new *banovina* to Croatia, with the new Croat party leader, Vladimir (Vladko) Maček⁸⁸, who had been, under Alexander, a paradigmatic character of that “middle-class intellectuals who were opposed to the Serbian-dominated government of Yugoslavia”⁸⁹. Prince Paul tried to keep the country far from the European crisis. For this reason, his Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović firstly declared the country neutral, but in the attempts to keep good relations with the neighbour of the Axis, above all Italy, he started to support them. The ambiguity of its policies lead Prince Paul to substitute him with Dragiša Cvetković. But On 27 March 1941, after France defeat and the Italian invasion of the Balkans, it was the Prince himself that was forced to sign the Tripartite Pact. This is a crucial passage to understand how the country underwent the communist revolution. After the sign, the Serb army and the central government interpreted it as a betray and organized a new *coup d'état*. It was the 27 March 1941, when many demonstrations started in Belgrade, with people shouting “*bolje rat nego pakt, bolje grob nego rob*” (better a war than the

⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, p.18

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, p.19

⁸⁸ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sporazum>

⁸⁹ <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vladko-Macek>

pact, better the grave than a slave). A new military government was instituted, led by the general Dušan Simović. Simović tried to mediate with Germans but the 6 April 1941 Belgrade was bombed and the German forces invaded the country⁹⁰.

2. THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The analysis of the events concerning Yugoslavia during the Second World War constituted a real issue for historians because of their vagueness, obstructed by some sources issues, firstly related with their objectivity. Despite this, it is methodologically acceptable the reconstruction of the events that characterised the period, above all taking in account the fact that some instances born during the war were recalled in the '90s conflicts⁹¹.

The Yugoslav army was defeated in 11 days (from the 6th to the 17th April 1941), Zagreb was already occupied the 10th and Belgrade few days later.

Some territories were integrated to the Italian, German and Hungarian ones, the others (Bosnia included) underwent the administration of the new Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatske*) – (fig. 1⁹²). The Axis powers had previously proposed Vladko Maček to create a new government, but he refused to cooperate. For this reason, the Germans assigned the leadership of the country to the Ustaše movement. Ante Pavelić assumed the Ustaše title of *Poglavnik* (respectable, honourable). The Ustaše movement, heavily influenced by Nazism and fascism, heavily interposed itself against the Serb ethnicity: it promoted a corporatist economy, suppressed the orthodox confessional schools, forbade Cyrillic alphabet, and banned Serbs (along with Jewish people) from the public offices⁹³.

⁹⁰J. KRULIC, 1999, p.20

⁹¹*Ibidem*, p.23

⁹²https://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kopnena_vojaska_NDH#/media/File:Domobranstvo_zborna_podru%C4%8Dja.PNG

⁹³J. KRULIC, 1999, p.24



Fig. 1 - Independent State of Croatia (1941 -1943)

For what concern Serbia, after being occupied, in the August of 1941, the country underwent the rule of the General Milan Nedić, a Nazi collaborator who claimed for its choice as a political protecting position for the Serbs. With him emerged the character of the former Alexander's minister Dimitrije Ljotić, who had founded the movement *Zbor* (Rally) after the King's assassination in 1934. The movement was characterised by a strong ultranationalist ideology, in contrast with the Yugoslavist paradigms, and it owned an anti-Semitic heritage associated with a rigid interpretation of the Orthodoxy⁹⁴.

It was in this context that two forms of anti-Axis resistance emerged: The Partisan one and the Chetnik one, later renamed "Yugoslav Army in the Homeland" (*Jugoslovenska*

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*, p.23

vojska u otadžbini) instituted by the officials of the Kingdom Army, led by Draža Mihailović. It is hard to find objective sources regarding the Chetnik: it is attested that their enrolment in the troops **solely** regarded the Serb ethnic group, being the group a pan-Serb movement, and that their relations with other ethnic groups, above all the Turkish-rooted ones was really often of conflictual nature. Some cases burst in proper massacres, as the Sandžak one⁹⁵. Furthermore, the group can be recalled for two different main coalition, Mihailović's one and the one led by the already quoted Milan Nedić; as already seen the latter chose a form of collaborationism with the German forces⁹⁶. But a further issue emerges in the Chetnik phenomenon analysis: it is not still universally accepted if the military movement must be considered as a whole, or if it gathered under the same "ideological bases" many different groups that acted in an almost independent way⁹⁷. What is well define from the historical viewpoint is the declared hostility between Chetniks and Partisans, although such a gap is to read as an evolution of the two-group identity. In fact, at the very beginning of the undercover battles of the 1941, Tito and Mihailović tried to form a coalition against the German troops, but their strategies resulted too conflicting. Furthermore, as it has been highlighted, Mihailović, still tied to the ancient militarism of the first world war, "never understood the ideological nature of the war" that drove Tito, who saw the German defeat as the first *mean* toward a Communist Yugoslavia⁹⁸.

Following this path the Partisan movement gave birth to the AVNOJ, the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (*Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Jugoslavije*). The AVNOJ was established to control territories conquered by the Partisans. According to the discourse and the topic of this work, it is important to underline the institution of this body – on 26 November 1942 – since it represented the first proper **Yugoslav** deliberative body with socialist roots, after the exclusion of Communist Party in the '20s. The first action of the Partisans was the reconquer of the

⁹⁵ *Ibidem*, p.26

⁹⁶ A. CATTUNAR, "La liberazione di Gorizia: 1 maggio 1945 Identità di confine e memorie divise: le videointerviste ai testimoni", in *Storicamente*, 5 (2009), no. 26, Università di Bologna

⁹⁷ *Ivi*

⁹⁸ J. KRULIC, 1999, p.27

region of Užice. From there Tito's general staff headed toward Bosnia, fighting from the 1941 to the 1944, and then toward Kosovo (*collaborationist* until 1944). It is to highlighted that from 1943 the Partisan forces gained the British support – also with the mediation of Churchill's men Sir Fitzroy Maclean and Sir Frederick Deakin – against the Chetnik ones: differently with other Socialist regimes (as the Greek one) the Yugoslav one began from this simple choice to be a “reason of interest” of the Western countries. As a matter of the fact the British troops with the support of the Red Army conquered all the Norther Serbia, and on 15 may 1945 the Chetniks were defeated. This defeat reveals itself to be fundamental in the analysis of the '90s conflict: a strong rhetoric recalled for the *Bleiburg repatriations*, a set of events that took place in the area of the city after the end of the hostilities, involving some proper massacres toward some Axis affiliates by Tito's forces hands, and that was reinterpreted under an ethnic key during the '90s⁹⁹.

3. TITO AT POWER: REPLICATION OF SOVIET MODEL

The application of the Socialist model within former Yugoslavia is sometimes recalled as the “Original Titoism” (or sometimes recalled as “Titism”) referring to a new model that was applied after the schism between Tito and the Soviet Union. But it is necessary to remember that the former Tito had a strong bound with the Leninist model, that it was factually applied in the first years of the *Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*. As a matter of the fact, all the new socialist republics emerged after the WWII mirrored the structure of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – and it must be highlight that such replication was, at the beginning at least, a voluntary choice – and so it happened in the SFRY. In such a model a Leading Party and the institution related to it became the fundamental request of the country, strengthened by a widespread propaganda and the factual elimination of any form of opposition. The model, starting from the USSR

⁹⁹ *Ivi*

constitution of the 1936, call for a Federalist division of the State, a collegial management, and the affirmation of some core economic and social rights¹⁰⁰.

Furthermore, not forgetting Tito's ideological reasons, the explicit celebration of the 1936 Constitution had an historical meaning, through the new order established in Yugoslavia, *Socialism* was becoming a factual reality, now including all the Southern Slav people.

4. CONSTITUTION MAIN ASPECTS

In 1945 King Peter II was officially deposed and in the 1946 the Constituent assembly approved a new Constitution, divided in sixteen chapters, dealing with the many different aspect of State life. The organization of the power was subdivided – even here close to the Soviet Union model –, through a Parliament composed by two Chambers – a Federal one, and one elected with a regional criterion – and from the two Chamber the emanation of many bodies as a Collective presidency (called Presidium of Yugoslavia) a Council of Ministers, with Tito as chief¹⁰¹.

Furthermore, dealing with the purpose of this work and the theme of the ethnic coexistence, it seems opportune to take under consideration few articles included in the Constitution.

The first *five* articles defined the nature of the new Yugoslavia (as federal and popular) and described some institutional aspects – such as the flag description – but above all the second article declared the subdivision of the territories in six Republics and two Autonomous Province. Here is the extract:

“ARTICLE 2. The Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia is composed of the People's Republic of Serbia, the People's Republic of Croatia, the People's Republic of Slovenia, the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the People's Republic of Macedonia and the People's Republic of Montenegro.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, p.30

¹⁰¹ *Ibidem*, p.33

The People's Republic of Serbia includes the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the autonomous Kosovo-Metohijan region.”¹⁰²

The articles from the 6th to the 8th explicated the condition for the elections and from the 9th to the 13th the Rights of peoples and Republics are affirmed. It is to be highlight that the 11th one recalled for the right of every Federal Republic to its own constitution, but affirming that such constitution should be coherent with the Federal one. It is possible to underline here the first socialist attempt to not deny the ethnic diversification of the country but introducing a new – and for the theme of this work, fundamental – aspect of the public life of the Yugoslav people: the difference between *nationality*, related with the ethnic belonging, and the *citizenship*, the bound with the State¹⁰³.

The articles from the 14th to the 20th recalled for the economic fundamentals, reminding the people ownership of them, whilst from the 21st to the 43rd the Constitution take in consideration the rights and duties of the citizens.

Interesting element of analysis is the 21st, that cited:

“ARTICLE 21. All citizens of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia are equal before the law and enjoy equal rights regardless of nationality, race and creed. No privileges on account of birth, position, property status or degree of education are recognized.

Any act granting privileges to citizens or limiting their rights on grounds of difference of nationality, race and creed, and any propagation of national, racial and religious hatred and discord are contrary to the Constitution and punishable.”¹⁰⁴

It results as the ultimate will of the Constituent Assembly to grant equal value to each dweller of the Yugoslavian territory. Furthermore, as already seen, core aspect of the Balkans social life had always posed its roots in the religious affiliation, above all for what concerned the field of education; the constitution protected it as an individual right, but it also fully separated it from the *institutional* live (i.e. the State one), as affirmed

¹⁰² http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Yugoslavia_1946.txt

¹⁰³ J. KRULIC, 1999, p.32

¹⁰⁴ http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Yugoslavia_1946.txt

through the 38th article – concerning education –, claiming: “[...] elementary education is compulsory and free. The School is separate from the Church”¹⁰⁵.

As already expressed, part the aim of this work is to find a factual relation between some aspects of the civil live, both simply cultural or more politically related, within the Yugoslav discourse, with the institutional response those aspects found. The nature of this first Constitution is not universally defined in the academic sphere: some historians saw it, as well as the Soviet Union one, as a “programmatic” Constitution apt to interpret a factual situation of the country¹⁰⁶ - above all for the absence of a proper political opposition within the Constituent Assembly – and so not being configured as a *fundamental source of Law* as it was, for instance, the U.S. one. Despite this the Constitution represents a fundamental step toward the realization of that project begun – from the institutional viewpoint – with the *Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes* of, using the words of the Croat poet Vladimir Nazor, giving birth to a national consciousness¹⁰⁷.

Despite this purpose, it must be noted that since the first years of the new State, sparkles of ethnic hatred emerged, leading to repressive solution. One example is provided by the Serbian peasants’ revolts against the Macedonian ones, of the 1949. Furthermore, at the very beginning of the 1946 the Macedonian integration appeared as a paradigmatic case of incorporation, since the rhetoric of the time presented the constitution of the Federal Republic as the rebirth of a culture fragmented along the centuries by external factors. But factually from the 1945 and the 1947 Macedonia was interested by the foundation of a relevant amount of secret anti-communist association. The answer was a broad intervention of the security agency OZNA (*Odeljenje za Zaštitu NARoda - Department of National Security*)¹⁰⁸.

¹⁰⁵ *Ivi*

¹⁰⁶ References about this viewpoint can be found in *R. Amond, Démocratie et Socialisme, Gallimard, Paris, 1963*

¹⁰⁷ J. KRULIC, 1999, p.35

¹⁰⁸ *Ibidem*, p.37

5. BREAK WITH THE USSR

The official break with the USSR took place on 28 June 1948, with a transition period that would lead the invention of the new, and in this sense original, Yugoslavia of the self-management, under a new physiognomy that could give a new “communist legitimation” to the State.

Such break is to be blamed to Stalin, scare by the broad consent of Tito and his independency attitude, not being the marshal easily controllable by the Soviet Secret Services. The “monolithism” of the international relationships appeared fundamental per the Soviet Union at the eve of the Cold War¹⁰⁹. Stalin individualized in Milovan Gilas (1911 – 1995), Vice-president in Tito's regime and diplomat for the relations with the Soviet Union, a possible path of conjunction with the Yugoslav Republic and propose to him to work with a chosen delegation to the annexation of Albania to the SFRY, but soon discovered that two delegation of the Republic had already been sent without any consultation.

After a long set of consultations and proposals to Yugoslavia, that involved also Edvard Kardelj (future redactor of the 1974 Constitution), a letter of direct accuses, signed by Stalin himself and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, was addressed to Tito on 27 March 1948, in which it was claimed for an abuse of the *Cominform* as an instrument of dominion on other communist parties¹¹⁰. A long correspondence between the two States took place in the following months. The crucial event was the accusation of betray toward Sreten Žujović, a member of the Central Committee, who was respondent of having transmitted confidential information to the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Levrientiev. According to Stalin viewpoint such a behaviour was to be considere as a normal routine in the Soviet Satellite States relations with the Union. On the other hand, Tito interpreted it as an interference to Yugoslav sovereignty and its independence, both legitimated by the war victory¹¹¹. The official Stalinian condemn

¹⁰⁹ *Ibidem*, p.67

¹¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p.68

¹¹¹ *Ibidem*, p.69

and the consequential break took place on 28 June 1948. Despite the factual independency Yugoslavia had gained, the *Yugoslav communism* was now facing an identity crisis, since the communist ideology – worldwide associated to the Soviet Union – was supposed to be the core identity element of what at the time should mean to be a Yugoslav. This is a fundamental aspect in the analysis of the Yugoslavism meant as the common identitarian recognition of a broad number of ethnic groups. It has been remarked that “keeping in mind both communist ideology and the desire to strengthen the new Yugoslav union [...] historians continued to emphasize the historic link and collective achievements of the South Slavs”¹¹². In this sense, interpreting history in the light of the Marxist view, ***it was the communist movement*** that became the key tool through which *Yugoslavism instances* could be emphasized and absorbed¹¹³.

6. NEW MINDSET

At this point the core issue for the ruling class of Yugoslavia was to find an alternative model to the Stalinist one: the principal ideologists of communism, as Moša Pijade, Edvard Kardelj, or Milovan Gilas started to work together and at the VI Congress of the Party of the 1953, Gilas's current obtained approbation and Tito accepted the *working class self-managing model*¹¹⁴. It is interesting to highlight how after just one year, with an article published by the “*Borba*”, the official newspaper of the Yugoslav Communist League, in the 1954, Gilas himself openly criticized some tendencies in the ethics of the Communist ruling class within the State. For this reason – that led to a series of internal fights – Gilas came to be expelled from the Party, but for sure a relevant element emerges from this fact: the “original Titism” was not still complete and sufficiently ready to be considered consolidated. Although it came to life in the first years of the '50s, it would need more than ten years to consolidate and many future adjustments. The first one would be, on 2 June 1955, the sign of a “Declaration of

¹¹² J. ŽDERO, *Serbs, Bosnian, and Yugoslav: The Bosnian Serb Intellectuals on the Road Toward a Multi-Ethnic Identity, 1878 – 1914*, Ph.D dissertation, University of Western Ontario, London (ON), 2009, p.17

¹¹³ *Ivi*

¹¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p.71

reconciliation” between Tito and Nikita Khrushchev, after Stalin’s death¹¹⁵. Despite this, Tito did not renounce to the Yugoslav autonomy. He started new relations with Jawaharlal Nehru and Sukarno, respectively India and Indonesia’s first presidents and Gamal Abd el-Nasser, Egyptian Prime Minister, and with them, after the Bandung Conference of the 1955, they founded the *Non Aligned Movement* (NAM) in Belgrade, with the 1961 *Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries*¹¹⁶. Furthermore, and even more surprisingly, Tito decide to adhere the “*Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation*” – better known as the “*Balkan Pact*” – of 1953, signed by Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, in Ankara. The treaty took in consideration the eventual creation of a co-operative military force of the three States. The very incredible feature of such a decision, was given by the fact that Turkey and Greece were members of the *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation* (NATO). Despite Yugoslavia didn’t joined NATO – being it a Communist State, whilst the organisation was factually a union of capitalist States – the *Balkan Pact* allowed Yugoslavia to find a way to affiliate itself with NATO indirectly¹¹⁷.

A careful description of the internal policies carried on by Tito during his life as Chief of the State would impossible and out of the theme of this work. But it can be highlighted that between the ‘60s and the ‘70s the country needed a set of economic reforms, above all one in the 1965, concerning the financial sphere, changing various times the nature of the Banks, their management and the allocation of funds. But these reforms did not strengthened the country and the main consequences were a rise of unemployment and prices, with a devaluation of the Dinar¹¹⁸, and moreover, with this economic situation within the country, for sure problematic, some new political contradictions that were deriving and evolving from it, emerged, as the **Croatian crisis** of the 1971, seen as the consolidation of a new ruling class with “oligarchic” features – born, according to Tito’s

¹¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p.73

¹¹⁶ <http://www.nam.gov.za/background/history.htm>

¹¹⁷J. KRULIC, 1999, p.74

¹¹⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 82-84

viewpoint, from an excess of Banks power, and whose divergences could be a perfect path to some *nationalistic* returns.

7. CROATIAN CRISIS

The first element of the Croatian crisis was for sure of economic nature: the local economist started to claim for the possibility to face the crisis detaining an own decentralized banking system, above all to allocate – and not to lose – the high income deriving from the touristic sector. Despite this, the spark of the burst is everything but far from not being cultural. The first sign of the Serb-Croatian animosity could be already individualized during the 1967, when the non-governmental Croatian national institution, called “Matica Hrvatska” (Croatian Matrix) ¹¹⁹ started to publish the periodical “Kritika”, dealing with the theme of Croatian minorities across the other Federal Republic, and raising topic discussion concerning the linguistic differences between Serbian and Croatian Languages¹²⁰. It sounds peculiar keeping in mind that more than a century before the “Matica Hrvatska” was one of the flourishing nurturer of the Illyrian movement.

At the beginning of the 1970s many Croatian historians, intellectual and militaries, among which the former general Franjo Tuđman, started to deny the Croatian responsibilities of the Second War. Furthermore, a nationalist movement led by Ivan Zvonimir Čičak, emerged in the Republic as a student movement. But soon its range of action propagated till taking the dimension of a mass movement. This led the League of Communist to allow some concessions. Tito realized the dimension of the movement only after visiting Zagreb in the 1971, coming to speak about a “counterrevolution”¹²¹. The movement actions were, however, justified by the League of Croatian Communists Central Committee: Tito didn’t ignore the fact that at the same time a new Croatian constitution was a topic discussion, and that such a constitution would have envisaged

¹¹⁹ <http://www.matica.hr/omatici/>

¹²⁰ J. KRULIC, 1999, p.90

¹²¹ *Vj*

a “sovereignty declaration”, a separated coin and above all a dislocated *Central Bank* for the *domestic income* management. All these reasons led the Marshall to accuse the party executive of being employing unconstitutional instruments and forced 400 members to resign.

Tito felt the need to give birth to a new *radical* reform of the State Structure, that led the *Constitution of the 21st February 1974*. Tito was sure that this new overturn of the State would have paralysed the formation of new autonomous élite. The direct aimed was to reinforce the *direct democracy*¹²², against any form of *representative* one, more related with the Western ideologies. The side effect of this approach would be an inflame cult of Tito, but above an even more coercive repression of the oppositions.

¹²² *Ibidem*, p.98

CHAPTER V

V – DECLINE OF COMMUNISM

The decline of the communist systems in eastern Europe finds its roots in many different reasons. Firstly, from the 70's all the regimes were not as able as they were until the 60's to adapt themselves to the economic and technological changes occurring in those years, causing distress within the models of economic development¹²³. Another crucial element was the slowdown of social mobility within the system itself, that should grant population a further development of their social position and wealth¹²⁴. But despite this, not all the former socialist and communist countries occurred in a warlike crisis as it happened in former Yugoslavia. It must be highlight that the main consequence of the communist decline in Eastern Europe brought the Soviet Union leadership to promote a set of reforms with a *reformist orientation* that led the Soviet Union to distance itself from the Soviet Satellite State or establish some new *reformism oriented* ruling classes. This explains, for instance, the relatively peaceful transition which took place in Bulgaria. But the situation within the former Yugoslavia was different: the country had been out of the Soviet influence since the 1948, and a total lack of a stabilizing **external** force able to counterbalance the internal interests with some foreign or external interests for the country contributed to the following crisis of the Balkans – even if this must not be interpreted as a direct and unique cause¹²⁵. Furthermore, it must be highlighted that Yugoslavia had always gained a “special” treatment from the Western countries, not being It part of the Soviet influence. For this reason, despite the signature of the *Helsinki Accords* – whose Principles Declaration seventh article claimed for “Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief”¹²⁶ –, in 1975, Tito's repression policies did not get high resonance,

¹²³ G. FRANZINETTI, *I Balcani dal 1878 a oggi*, 2° edizione, Carrocci Editore, Roma, 2010, p.81

¹²⁴ *Ivi*

¹²⁵ *Ibidem*, p.82

¹²⁶ <http://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act?download=true>

even if, sometimes, their reason were constituted only by “crimes of opinion”. Such policies were the first germs of the future dissolution of the Republic. Among the names listed in Tito’s purges, emerge characters that would have been relevant for the successive decades of the Yugoslavia political life: examples are Franjo Tuđman as a Croat nationalist, Alija Izetbegović as an Islamic integralist of Bosnia, and even Vojislav Šešelj as a Serbian nationalist. It is possible to call for a proper “repressive yugoslavization”¹²⁷.

After Tito’s death and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, over the ‘80s and the ‘90s, a renewed appearance of nationalisms overwhelmed the Balkans, with emphasis with the Federal State of Serbia and Croatia within Yugoslavia. Even if the SFRY was formally a Socialist country until its dissolution, it is not historically possible to talk about “communism” or “socialism” after 1990, “having been it a political and ideological formation already dissolved at the time”¹²⁸ The country was facing a period of substantial economic and political crisis, bringing the central Yugoslavian government in apposition of weakness in contrast with the militant nationalist movement blooming at the time. Political leaders started to use hate propaganda to centralised the core of the problems in the inner contrast among various ethnic groups coexisting in the Federation¹²⁹.

According to the *Constitutional Procedure* for the succession, after Tito’s death, it was established a Collective Administration group and the position of head of State was assigned through the different Federal Republics exponents, in rotation. As already said, Yugoslavia was at the time undergoing a drastic economic crisis, emerged in 1981 when the *net external debt* began to create financial issues to the Country, so that some internal political crises, like the Kosovar one, were overshadowed¹³⁰. The set of reforms taken to countervail the crisis summed up with the weakness of the Federal System

¹²⁷G. FRANZINETTI, 2010, p.85

¹²⁸*Ibidem*, p.95

¹²⁹ V. ZEJNULLAHI, “Balkan Conflict, the Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ICTY” in *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. V, n. 19, MCSER Publishing, Rome, 2014, p.265

¹³⁰ G. FRANZINETTI, 2010, p.86

(sharpened after Tito's death) brought to the rise of numerous forms of political dissent, culminating in nationalist movements.

Despite the fact that SFRS was facing a one its most critical periods, at their very beginning, in the 1991, the Balkans wars appear as a not too realistic conflict¹³¹, or at least – as observed by many historians¹³² – the outcome of a war is not to be considered as a *natural* or a so *consequential* result of the crisis, and this is one of the first reason why the flow of events degenerate under the eyes of the international community. The nature of the Yugoslavian crises was variegated, and involved many branches of the political, economic, and social life of the State. In line with the above-quoted external debt, the country had to face a blooming inflationary process which reduced the buying power of the population, all this in conjunction with the failure of the self-management system. This situation raised the average unemployment rate to the 16,6% in 1986, but with great divergence from a Federal Republic and another (for instance in Bosnia it reached the 24,3%) exacerbating the already existing life standard discrepancy across the country¹³³.

Furthermore, even if the State ruling system had reached an effective (i.e. *federal*) subdivision of the power – distributed to the single parties of the *League of Communists* –, along with the loss of Tito's *guarantism* the system lost its practicality, incurring in the increase of the federal organs "paralysis"¹³⁴. Few federal bodies, as the YPA, the Yugoslav People's Army (*Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, JNA*), were managed with a system that went beyond the single Republic, but usually they also had to relate with other agencies responding on regional basis. The *one-party state* internal conflict also mirrored and increased the divergences in attribution of power of the various Republics and autonomies (with reference to the 1974 *Constitution*), especially between

¹³¹ N. JANIGRO, *L'esplosione delle Nazione, le guerre balcaniche di fine secolo*, Feltrinelli Editore, Milano, 1999

¹³² As stated, for instance, in LORY. B., *L'Europe Balkanique de 1945 à nos jours*, Ellipses, Paris, 1996

¹³³ G. FRANZINETTI, 2010, pp.86-87

¹³⁴ *Ivi*

the Republic of Serbia and the Socialist Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina (which both had the power of veto within the Serbian Parliament).

It is so easily to understand that the ethnic “turn-up” was an evolution of a previous break within the entities of the communist party, and it didn’t take place in Vojvodina only because the *majority* of its dweller was Serbian.

1.Kosovo

As already seen, Kosovo has always been characterised by a deep dichotomy between Serbs and Albanians. After the 1974, the province obtained an *effective* autonomy, having, as it was for proper Republics, the right to the vote at the Federal Executive Council (*Savezno izvršno veće, SIV*), distinguished by the Serbian one. Furthermore, the Albanian Communist Party strengthened its policies toward the affirmation the culturally Albanian prevalence, influencing also the occupation of Serbs and Montenegrins within the public and official offices. This phenomenon is to be allocated among the reasons of the big migration flows of Kosovar Serbs and Montenegrins from the province toward Serbia and other Republic of the SFRY that occurred at the time, even if it is not possible to determinate which rate of migration was due to the “albanianisation” of the region and which to actual economic reasons, but it can be stated that all of them contributed to the migration and, above all, that the Serbian public opinion perceived it as a real act of expulsion, whose roots were to allocated to an ethnic basis¹³⁵.

Finally, it must be recalled the internal conflict of the *Communist League*, that included all Yugoslavia’s parties and consequently didn’t leave out the exponents of the Kosovar faction.

¹³⁵*Ibidem*, p.89

2. FROM SLOVENIA SECESSION: THE END OF THE FEDERATION

The position of Slovenia within the discourse concerning *Yugoslavism* has always been a core element – both in the monarchic and the socialist periods – since it played the role of counterbalance of the weight Serbia could gain in the internal dominance. Slovenia had always affirmed itself as a mediator through the various counterparts constituting Yugoslavia.

With the decline of the State, and the various pre-called issues it faced between the '80s and '90s, Slovenia's position started to change and the Republic began to take some distances from Belgrade. The *institutional* break occurred the 27 September 1989, when the Slovenian Assembly approved a series of amendments to the Slovenian Constitution which excluded the leading role of the Communist League, and reaffirmed the Republic right to sovereignty, self-determination and above all the right of secession¹³⁶. On 23 December 1990, Slovenia indicted an independence referendum, whose result was clear: the 88.5% of electors voted for the separation of the country. With a formal act, Slovenia independence was declared on 25 June 1991.

Thus the 1991 brought to the first formal dispute of Slovenia and Croatia, accusing "Serbia for unfair dominance of the Yugoslav government, army and finances".¹³⁷ In a certain way, the legitimation of the conflict divides it in two side, one catholic, democratic, and Europeanist, in a certain way Western, against the orthodox, Byzantine, totalitarian one, the new East¹³⁸. After the Declaration of independence, the *Yugoslav National Army* (JNA) was sent in a short military conflict against the Slovenian force, in the aftermath called "ten days War". The war was won by the Slovenian.

Many historians agree in affirming that the not too incisive attack toward Slovenia mirrored the Serbian interest itself in not having **within** former Yugoslavia a potential enemy in the creation, coherent with nationalist movement of the time, of a Big

¹³⁶ Ivi

¹³⁷V. ZEJNULLAHI, 2014, p.265

¹³⁸N. JANIGRO, 1999, p.17

Serbia¹³⁹. Factually, the declaration of independence of Slovenia marked the end of the *Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*. The other Federal States that followed Slovenia were, in order, Croatia, Macedonia, and finally Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1992.

Of the former Socialist Republic, the composing States remaining were, at the time, only Serbia and Montenegro, which proclaimed at 27 April 1992 the new born *Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* (FRY), and that in the 2003, after the conflicts, would have changed its name in *State Union of Serbia and Montenegro*.

The most obscure effects of this period of collision, anyway, started in Croatia. After the “ten days War” the JNA was deployed in Croatia, in coincidence with the turnover of the Croatian government in favour of the nationalist movement. At the same time, local Croatian Serbs upraised against Croatia with the support of the JNA, declaring the new independence of a southern region, proclaimed the *Republic of Serbian Krajina* (fig.1).



Fig. 1 - Republic of Serbian Krajina 1

It was in this context that the Croats and non-Serbian Minorities were deported from the areas: a ferocious ethnic cleansing began¹⁴⁰, and the violent bombings of Vukovar

¹³⁹V. ZEJNULLAHI, 2014, p.266

¹⁴⁰ Ivi

and Dubrovnik took place. Croatia regained the southern territories only in the 1995, and the eastern territory of Slavonia was reintegrated during the UN peaceful transition of the 1998.

Despite this, an even bloodier theatre took place in the Bosnian lands. Has already seen, the territory was fragmented in many Croats Catholic and Orthodox Serbs' town, causes of many claims from the two States, enhanced by their strategic positions. Such an interest led the two federal presidents of the republics Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević, before the burst of the tension, on 25 March 1991, to the "Karađorđevo meeting", North-western Serbia. The issue dealt during the meeting was the Yugoslav crisis but core result of the discussion was the agreement on the partitioning, following ethnic criteria, of the Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But on 29 February 1992 a referendum with a more 60% of agreement led to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian independence. The consequences are notoriously known. In April 1992, the Serbs of Bosnia rebelled and found strong support by the JNA, coming to the declaration of secession of portion of territory and founding the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The conflict gave birth to one of the bloodiest and most atrocious theatre of Europe's last century history, aggravated by a clear ethnic connotation. *Over 200,000 people were killed*, thousands of women raped and a proper forced diaspora took place, with more than 2 million people forced to leave their villages¹⁴¹. During the first set of conflicts, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fell under the accused of the international community, leading to the intervention of NATO's forces and the *Security Council* of the United Nations to promote strict economic sanctions. After the embargo, the final action taken by the international community regarded the approval of the resolution that sent the UN forces against Serbia and Montenegro's army. The intervention of those two agencies was broadly critiqued, not as much for the cause itself, than rather for the methods adopted and the systematic incapacity to dispose a set of concrete actions that could factually help the populations involved.

¹⁴¹Vj

The most famous – criminal – example related with those facts took place for sure, at the peak of the war, in 1995, in the town of Srebrenica. Srebrenica had been declared a “protected area of the United Nation”, but despite this the Serbian forces led by the commander Ratko Mladić were able to attack the town and, in few days, to execute around 8,000 **Bosniak** men and to expel the remaining women and children¹⁴².

3. FROM THE DAYTON AGREEMENT TO KOSOVO'S CONFLICTS

The conflicts were concluded with the *General Framework Agreement for Peace* (GFAP), better known as the *Dayton Agreement*, established in Dayton, a small city of Ohio, United States, in November 1995, and then formally signed on 14 December 1995 in Paris. The accord established that the *State of Bosnia Herzegovina* had to be considered as a Federation of *Bosnia-Hzegovina*, as complete state, and the *Republika Srpska*. More importantly, it was decided that no entity – so neither the *Republika Srpska* – could separate without a due legal process, and no other outside entity could lay claim to portions of the territory¹⁴³. Furthermore, the agreement instituted the activity of many international organizations to supervise, and support some goal attached in the agreement. The responsibility for the implementation of the military presence of the international community was definitely given to the *NATO Implementation Force* (IFOR), with the retirement of the UNPROFOR forces as a consequence. The civil implementation tasks were assumed by *The Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina* (OHR), an “ad hoc” instituted international organization¹⁴⁴. Finally, in order to organise the first free election after the conflicts within the region, the supervision and organisational task was assigned to the *Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe* (OSCE).¹⁴⁵

¹⁴² V. ZEJNULLAHI, 2014, p.266

¹⁴³ http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf

¹⁴⁴ http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1139

¹⁴⁵ P. CANNON, *The Third Balkan War and Political Disunity: Creating A Cantonal Constitutional System for Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Jrnl. Trans. L. & Pol., Vol. 5-2, 1996

Unfortunately, not all the political issues affecting the region found a solution. Dayton agenda was very full and complex, and a solution for the Kosovo turbulences could endanger the other peace process negotiation. Since 1990, the Albanian community never stopped to ask for independence and enhancing the civil resistance. The situation burst in the 1998, when the *Kosovo Liberation Army* (KLA, or *Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës – UÇK*) started a violent revolt against the Serbian ruling class. The Serbian answer was even sharper: the army attacked the civilians and forced many Kosovar of Albanian origin to leave their home: a new conflict with ethnic features began, resorting to the use of massacres and following the violent diasporic path.

The first attempts of mediation failed, and after the Rambouillet Agreement, NATO carried on a campaign of air bombing that included Kosovo and Serbia, and lasted 78 days – from 24 March to 10 June 1999. The NATO attack was broadly criticised. Firstly, the proper “war-structure” of the campaign led to an even stronger response from the counterpart, with the beginning of the deportation from Kosovo. Furthermore, many jurists found illegal and incoherent with its Charter the NATO’s intervention. It was even affirmed that “the NATO attack not only seem[ed] illegitimate from the point of view of the international relations and international law (according to the principles of the UN Charter), but also in relation to the Treaty itself”¹⁴⁶.

At the end of the 78 days, Serbian president Slobodan Milošević decided to retire the Serbian troops and in June 1999 accepted the international administration installed within the region. Despite this, after the bombing campaign carried on by NATO, in the 1999, an overturning of perception took place, and Serbs started to identify themselves as the victims of the conflict. This is a core aspect to understand *the populist success of those year*, aspect that received no high consideration by outside observers¹⁴⁷. On 17 February 2008 Kosovo’s parliament announced the Region independence, later confirmed by the International Court of Justice. Meanwhile the Serbian troops had been

¹⁴⁶ E. DI NOLFO, In CABONA M. (edited by), *“Ditelo a Sparta”, Serbia e Europa, Contro l’aggressione della Nato*, Graphos, Genova, 1999, p.99

¹⁴⁷ A. BOŠKOVIC, “Distinguishing ‘self’ and ‘other’. Anthropology and national identity in former Yugoslavia”, in *Anthropology Today*, Vol. 21 n° 2, April 2005, p.9

moved in the municipality of Preševo, mostly Albanian. The local population started to organize a self-defence force, named UÇPMB (*Ushtria Çlirimtare e Preshevës, Medvegjës dhe Bujanocit* – Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac) and a second minor fight began. In order to avoid a second eruptive war, Pieter Feith, Secretary General of NATO Ambassador, was sent to manage new negotiations between Serbs and Albanians. A peace agreement named *Končulj Agreement* was set, even though tensions still persist in the zone¹⁴⁸. Furthermore, the animosities moved from Preševo to *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* (FYROM). In early January 2001, a new army for ethnic Albanians of Macedonia, the *National Liberation Army* (NLA - *Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare - UÇK*¹⁴⁹) was organised, fighting against the national forces for months. The peace was reached through the *Ohrid Framework Agreement* (August 2001) which ended the local conflict, defined the disarming for UÇK and allowed the recognition of other official languages with the Macedonian one, if they are spoken by the 20% of the population (i.e. factually Albanian, covering the 25%)¹⁵⁰.

¹⁴⁸ V. ZEJNULLAHI, 2014, p.267

¹⁴⁹ Not to be confused with the Kosovar one, the *Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës – UÇK*

¹⁵⁰ V. ZEJNULLAHI, 2014, p.268

VI.2 – ICTY

1. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL FRAME: BIRTH OF “AD HOC” COURT.

It has been chosen to dedicate a separate section the *International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia* (ICTY), since the guarantee and respect of the *Human Rights* through criminal law instrument *usually* are first *matter of competence* of the judicial systems of single states; in this sense the Tribunal represents a very exception for two main reasons: firstly it deals with the accusation and the prosecution of acts “committed by individuals”, in contrast with the common arbitral institution founded to solve controversies and for the allocation of responsibilities of the States¹⁵¹, secondly because of its recall to the UN General Assembly “*Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*”, n.260, adopted on 9 December 1948. The peculiarity of such a convention, that leads us to recall it in this work, is the deep nature of the acts it takes in examination, diverging specific crimes like *Crimes against humanity*, from violent acts specifically intended to the refusal of the right of existence of whole human groups¹⁵².

The violation of the values nowadays considered *universal* among the *States Community* can call for the need to involve the *International Community*, in order to allocate a balanced and rightful punishment to the prosecutors of such crimes, in the interest of the whole Community and as a guarantee of peaceful coexistence. The first step to overcome the mere single State dimension, and to obtain an effective control over the observance of those values, is provided by the obligation of internal guarantee that each State subscribes in the act of signing international agreements and treaties. These agreements don't enclose only the obligation of restrain and ban of certain individual behaviours, but as also to exert their *criminal jurisdiction* even in absence of legal connections usually required (i.e. regardless of where the alleged crime was committed, or the nationality of the prosecuted individual)¹⁵³.

¹⁵¹ C. FOCARELLI, *Diritto Internazionale I, Il sistema degli Stati e i valori comuni dell'umanità*, CEDAM, 2012, p.400

¹⁵² *Ibidem*, p.491

¹⁵³ *Passim* A. MARCHESI, *La protezione internazionale dei diritti umani. Nazioni Unite e organizzazioni regionali*, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2011, pp.11-21

2. ICTY

The numerous atrocities that took place in Croatia and later Bosnia-Herzegovina led the UN Security Council to carry on some direct investigation carried on by a chosen *Expert Commission* in order to understand if what was happening in the country could be considered conformed with *Humanitarian Law*. Evidences affirmed the very contrary. In force of this reason, on 25 May 1993, the UN Security Council adopted the **Resolution n.827**¹⁵⁴, which instituted the Court, but it also contained the Statute and the procedure of the same. The Tribunal entered in force on 14 March 1994.

The aim of the Tribunal is to prosecute not the States themselves, but the *individuals* guilty part of the criminal events. It is very important to highlight the neutrality of the *Courts*, that, in complex but effective system of election of its judges proposed a solution that could avoid any nationalistic claim for an unfair and not equal treatment¹⁵⁵. Describing all the feature of the Tribunal would be an analysis that dissociate from the topic of this work, but it results coherent and useful to understand some elements of the *Statute* – in particular the first five articles – that pose the *Law Sources* firstly for the ademption of the trials, and secondly, for an incrementation of the law literature on the sphere of the ethnic conflict resolution.

3. STATUTE

As already seen, the Statute of the ICTY is instituted by the *Security Council resolution n.897*, but it was undated in the 2009 introducing, among many feature, an extension of its mandate. It is structured in 34 Articles, that state the aims, the organization and the procedures of the Institution.

The first five articles deal with the competencies of the Tribunal, but above all the *crimes* prosecuted. This is the core aspect of the action it can undertake, since it

¹⁵⁴ http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_827_1993_en.pdf. Updated version at <http://www.icty.org/en/documents/statute-tribunal>

¹⁵⁵ <http://www.icty.org/en/about>

enforces the connection between the ethnic persecution within the sphere of the “*crimina iuris gentium*”, including “torture or inhuman treatment, extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried, out unlawfully and wantonly, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilians” [Art. 2] or the prosecution “of persons violating the laws or customs of war” [Art.3] and “crimes against humanity” [Art.5]

Furthermore, the most relevant article related with the purpose of this work, seems to be the fourth one. Here it is reported:

“Article 4 Genocide: 1. The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing *genocide* as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.

2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 5 (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

3. The following acts shall be punishable: (a) genocide; (b) conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) attempt to commit genocide; (e) complicity in genocide.”¹⁵⁶

This article, at the second clause, highlights the ethnic and cultural basis that lead a criminal action to be considered *Genocide*, in reference to the ethnicity, nationality, race, and region. Within the Balkan conflicts context, those aspects intersect each other, being, as previously demonstrated, the ethnic divergence of the former Yugoslavia inhabitants originated by a cultural and above all religious split, and being evolved – sometime almost forcibly, as in the Bosnian case – in proper nationality. This intersection, factually born and grown with the development of the nationalist ideologies all over Europe, created a unique spiral of mutual hate that populism enforced till the eruption of the war. In this sense, the provision of a *super partes*

¹⁵⁶http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf

institution as the Tribunal is, born in the “womb” of the *Universal Principles* developed by the international community, and that allocated responsibilities directly to their actor (i.e. without affecting one ethnic, religious or national group as a self) seems to be the right counterpart to the more dangerous approach of the military constriction.

CHAPTER VI

VI – YUGOSPHERE

In the last years, since the end of the '90s conflicts, many changes affected the territories of Western Balkans. As stated by Tim Judah, reporter for *The Economist*, in one of his most interesting and controversial paper, the most profound change should be allocated in the emergence of new concept called "*Yugosphere*". Judah forthwith specifies that this new "space" is to be inserted in the European context, or more precisely along the path of the European integration. His analysis, factually provocative and generalist, doesn't deal with an already accomplished set of events, but rather to a series of facts that could lead to a deeper reflection on what, from the social, economic and as a consequence, political viewpoint is happening now among the countries of former Yugoslavia. He also specifies that his work "does not suggest that the old Yugoslavia is returning under a different guise"¹⁵⁷ but rather that a series of events are today still not well studied and so their potential effects are not taken under consideration.

Judah's claim seems to have been heard, since other author endorsed or deepened his position. Some theories individualise a socio-cultural space of Yugoslavia that would still exist, having it overcome the '90s conflicts, and the dissolution of former Yugoslavia¹⁵⁸. Appear now reasonable trying to explain the concept behind the Yugosphere. To do this, it is fundamental to individualise who are the actors of such a theoretic space. It is affirmed that people constituting this "sphere" is a diasporic group "speak – and act "discursively" – as Yugoslav"¹⁵⁹, the use the same semiotic language (not linguistic) of a specific political context not existing anymore. After the '90s wars, with their tumultuous but even sudden changes, many people find themselves forcibly

¹⁵⁷ T. JUDAH, *Yugoslavia is dead, long live the Yugosphere*, LSEE, London, 2009, preface p.vi

¹⁵⁸ F. MAZZUCHELLI, *What remains of Yugoslavia? From the geopolitical space of Yugoslavia to the virtual space of the Web Yugosphere*, e-Diasporas Atlas, Paris, 2012, p.4

¹⁵⁹ *Ivi*

moving from their birth-town, or living in a completely different social economic environment, with a feeling of traumatic and loss of identity, cultural and geographic¹⁶⁰.

This led to a long process of normalization and stabilization of the new independent States, whose effects are still noticeable. For instance, at the very begin of his work Judah poses the first issue Serbia has to deal with regarding its position on the international theatre. The 2009 is the year in which former Serbian President Boris Tadić attended the 15th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (whose co-founder was Josip Tito) taking place in Egypt. Serbia's position is critique since the relations with the countries of the movement are necessary to "lobby to stall recognitions of Kosovo"¹⁶¹ but, even bringing the Yugoslavian heritage within the Movement, nowadays Serbia is a State completely different – and less influential – than it was Yugoslavia. Furthermore, none of the former Yugoslavia's countries were members of the Movement. Despite this, president Tadić proposed the former Yugoslav States to cooperate in the organization of the 2011 gathering of the Movement in Belgrade to commemorate its 50th year. What appears interesting it is not only the positive answer of the countries, but rather the argumentation of Tadić, that highlighted the strong economical – and so cooperative – bond between companies of the former Republic, above all comparing their competitive power on the international market if gathered, than if posed on the market alone. Here appears the first statement of Judah, that is that "while Yugoslavia is long gone, a Yugosphere has emerged across the lands it once encompassed"¹⁶².

His statement takes in consideration the possibility of a "still existing texture"¹⁶³ in the set of exchanges and relations through people once living in the former Yugoslavia, as if the Western Balkans were less fragmented then the conflicts seem to have done, and the single borders of the States more penetrable.

From this point, Judah starts to clarify the meaning of the concept he is proposing, the *Yugosphere*. He starts from some "basic facts" – as the fact that about 22million living

¹⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, p.5

¹⁶¹ T. JUDAH, 2009, p.1

¹⁶² *Ibidem*, p.2

¹⁶³ F. MAZZUCHELLI, 2012, p.5

in the region of former Yugoslavia share the same language, with minor variations – to proceed deeper in some sociological aspects, as the perception inhabitants of former Yugoslavia’s States have regarding what they consider “foreign countries” with different parameters for the other States of the former Yugoslavia rather than any other State – even neighbours, maybe with the further reason that, with exception for Slovenia (at that time) many citizen had free permission to travel across the States.

Along with the economic considerations, Judah underlines the figures related with the import/export sectors of the countries, or better within the Western Balkans region. One of the most relevant date is the bound between Croatia and Bosnia’s markets, with Croatia as leading partner of Bosnia for what concerns the importations – always keeping in mind that the percentage are referred to the 2009, with Croatia still outside the European Union. Even Kosovo, in spite of its political problem with Serbia, seems to find in the State (with Macedonia) one of its leading partners. Judah provides many examples, mostly related with service companies and the telecommunication ones¹⁶⁴. This fact is described as “natural”, since the broader set of programming and communicative services had for many years marketed for the whole *region*, not for the single Federal Republic, and a sort of “know how” of this kind of market is identified. The same path seems to be the one that many multinational corporation were searching for in allocating their retail knot. *Ikea* is provided as a sample.

Covering the media aspects, Judah considers the “former Yugoslav factor” as a stable component in the service provision. It seems that many TV productions, or even historical publishing groups (as the one of the most important Serbian daily, *Politika*) to encounter the *factual* request of their targets, had to insert and cover multinational elements (but always delimited within the former Yugoslavia boundaries). Studying the labour market of certain areas Judah makes an additional consideration: the labour market searches for competitive competences to be inserted in specific areas. In the

¹⁶⁴ T. JUDAH, 2009, p.5

Croatian case, it results necessary to find workers from Serbia on behalf of the labour cost and for the major ease to insert and integrated them in the Croatian contexts.

Finally, but not less relevantly, the social aspects of some “areas” are taken under consideration: as well as certain affinities bond the Scandinavian countries, so it happens throughout the Western Balkans ones, for instance in music traditions or food ones (all spheres that are then applied to specific markets and produce economic gains). Judah comes to state that “lingering for nationalist opposition [...] from the 1990s has become [*nowadays*, ed.] little more than ineffective whimpering”¹⁶⁵. Some relevant cultural events (that, it must be reminded, are always linked with specific areas of business, as the touristic one) are even taken in consideration regarding their international importance and resonance: their value is strengthened by the wide offer provided not only by a specific country (i.e. an hosting State that propose its own culture) but by the clustering of many Western Balkans resources. Judah provides the example of a business websites and festivals.

But if trade, markets, and business are all core elements of the economic sphere, even criminality has its own incidence in the political and economic as well life of a country. Judah registers an increasingly coordination and collaboration between crime organizations throughout all the Western Balkans. Deepening the effect of such a phenomenon falls outside the aim of this work, but it seems fundamental to highlight an issue related to it: the security question. Since the problem affect transversally the region, the national forces had to cooperate, above all sharing “know how” and collaborate in order to develop specific training programs¹⁶⁶. In this sense, Judas refers about a major support deriving from projects carried on with NATO’s partnership. In a certain way, this fact enforces the viewpoint – but of course not assertively – laying behind the idea of an even more western orientation of the region. The main institution within it is rebuildable this kind of cooperation is the *South-eastern Europe Defence Ministerial* (SEDM), a regional cooperation mechanism born from the international

¹⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p.9

¹⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, p.11

society will to avoid any forma of reiteration of the events that affected the Western Balkans during the '90s. It was instituted with the MPFSEE Agreement signed on 26 September 1998, but further developed in next years, above all after the Kosovo's conflict. This instrument refers to a special *Process* which factually began with a *Meeting of Ministers of Defense* of nations of South-East Europe, which took place in Tirana in March 1996. As it can be discovered in the official website of the institution, the SEDM objectives are the following:

- “Promotion of mutual understanding, confidence and cooperation among member countries
- Contribution of SEDM and Multinational Peace Force of the SEE (MPFSEE) / South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) to regional and worldwide security and stability
- Enhancement of the SEEBRIG interoperability and capability to deploy in peace support missions
- Facilitation of SEEBRIG employment in peace support operations
- Promotion of Euro-Atlantic integration processes of SEDM member nations
- Implementation and development of the SEDM projects
- Enlargement of the SEDM process with new members
- Cooperation with International Organizations (UN, EU, NATO and OCSE)”¹⁶⁷

Furthermore, the will to foster the Stability Pact led to the formation of the *Regional Cooperation Council (RCC)*. On 27 February 2008, the meeting of the *Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP)*, taking place in Sofia, instituted the Council with the purpose of promoting and enhancing the regional cooperation in South East Europe, and supporting the European and Euro-Atlantic integration¹⁶⁸. The RCC is based in Sarajevo, and it actively works within many areas, firstly in the economic and social development, dealing with energy production sources

¹⁶⁷ <https://www.sedmprocess.org/web/sedmp/home>

¹⁶⁸ <http://www.rcc.int/pages/2/overview>

and infrastructures construction promotion. Furthermore, the Councils supports cooperation to improve justice within the single countries and promote security cooperation. Finally, the Councils activities regard the building of human capital, deal with the media development, try to enforce all the spheres of the civil society activities¹⁶⁹.

Since the seven former-Yugoslavia's States are member of the RCC, according to Judah's viewpoint, the RCC must be seen as clear signal that a new geopolitical reality is taking shape in the Western Balkans¹⁷⁰, highlighting as a cofactor that some other members were at the same time included in the EU and NATO agreements (a specific reference to former Yugoslav cases is provided for Slovenia, being the year of the article publication the 2009, but it must be noted that Croatian political developments enforced its theory).

To enforce his statement Judah hence proposes a list of further organisation involved in the process of cooperation within the region, including, for instance *The South East European Trade Union Forum*, mainly supported by the *Croatian Trade Union Association*, or even more important, the *Central European Free Trade Agreement* (CEFTA), a trade agreement – nowadays, despite the name – between South-eastern European countries with a EU accession agenda, which was actually founded by Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (that left the organization after their entrance within the European Union) on 21 December 1992, and whose Founding Agreement was modified on 19 December 2006; it involved many other non-EU (at least, at that time) countries, included Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and Kosovo, in exercise of the powers conferred by the UN resolution 1244¹⁷¹.

The most interesting feature of such agreement is the fact that CEFTA provides the involved States a set of norms that makes them “EU compatible” so that each State can participate to the trade with a single bilateral agreement.

¹⁶⁹ *Ivi*

¹⁷⁰ T. JUDAH, 2009, p.13

¹⁷¹ <https://cefta.int/cefta-parties-2/>

Eventually, Judah's thesis claims for a broad reconnection of political and economic ties that were broken during the 1990's wars. Such links for sure had been developed by the EU contribution: here is the key factor affirmed in Judah's work and now examined.

1. CONTRAST: NATIONALISMS

The peculiarity of the *Yugosphere* lies in the ethnic recognition: since the complex development of the region had allocated, as widely seen before, different ethnic groups – which clearly affiliate themselves to a specific cultural element (i.e. for instance, the Orthodox religion) – in a fragmented multitude of areas, and since the '90s conflicts led to a proper phenomenon of migration – some authors come to talk about proper diasporas. This is the reason why some Bosnian citizen don't recognize themselves with a Bosnian Nationality.

Many critiques moved against Judah's article laid on the factual fragility of the Western Balkans situation and the contradiction regarding the identification and recognition of certain nationalities (firstly for what concern Serbia and Kosovo). Judah himself doesn't deny the fact that, in some cases – above all in Bosnia – “the war in people's heads is not over”¹⁷² – using his words. Analysing the Serbian case, it emerges that a strong nationalist sentiment lies within the Republika Srpska of Bosnia and the Serbian enclave in Kosovo. Judah talks about a *Serbian world* outside Serbia: media and education are Serbian set up. For what concerns Bosnian Serbs, special privileges are provided by Serbia itself to those non-Serb citizen. The most relevant one is the possibility to get a Serbian passport, which provides visa free travel within the Schengen area. The same right is denied to Bosnian citizen with no Serb nationality. The Kosovo situation is a little more complicated, since Serbia doesn't recognise the State. But the effects are as well relevant. Some relevant aspects of public life are affected by the Serbian affiliation, from currency used to the possibility to vote for Serbian politicians¹⁷³.

¹⁷² T. JUDAH, 2009, p.26

¹⁷³ *Ibidem*, p.28

Serbian sphere reveals to be the widest one, but only because of the higher number of Serbs across the region.

Such phenomenon regards also the Croats, the second biggest sphere, with entire Croats' communities living in above all in Herzegovina, but also in other areas. As well as for Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats are formally Bosnian citizen, but they have access to Croatian passports and right of vote for Croatian institutions.

At this point, it must be highlight that the dialectic turnover proposed poses the accent on the form of *internationalism* that, in a synergic action from both the inside of the region and the outside, convert the *nationalist forms* following the economic exchanges the market required. But the *Yugosphere* is to be interpreted firstly as a shared experience of memory and recognition. In the 1985, Yuri Mikhailovich Lotman (1922 – 1993) a Russian linguist and semiotician, coined in a nowadays very famous concept, the *Semiosphere*, in his homonymous essay¹⁷⁴. This concept can be defined as an:

“homogeneous cultural universe: a semiotic space that occurs as a continuum in which all the – broadly speaking – ‘texts’ of a culture are immersed and circulate, interacting each other and producing new meanings”¹⁷⁵.

The *Semiosphere* thus interacts through a core tool, the *border*, which define the demarcation line of a cultural/semiotic environment from any others. At the same time, the border results permeable, so that some element of one universe can cross and be shared with another one. On the theoretic viewpoint, this is the way Judah's *spheres* works. On a global scale the author describes Europe as a “sphere” meaning not only a shared geographical space, but also a shared history and both cultural and political experiences. Some of these shared element a purely European, whilst some other are depicted as “partially” European, and above all – explaining this concept with a further

¹⁷⁴ <http://www.studiculturali.it/dizionario/lemmi/semiosfera.html>

¹⁷⁵ F. MAZZUCHELLI, 2012, p.6

subdivision, recalling another theoretic instrument, the Venn Diagrams – the fact of being part of a very circumscribed *sphere* does not denied to share some elements with another one. This is the case of the *Yugosphere*, according to Judah: the emergence and the identification within certain definite abstract borders can be inserted in the European political context, as well as there is no contradiction in the integration of some national spheres (i.e. the Croat one, the Serb one, and so on) to a broader one¹⁷⁶.

The largest part of dwellers of the former Yugoslav area share almost the same language and intersect their citizenship. The closest example of such a situation provided by Judah is the Scandinavian one, wondering if it could be possible a comparison of the situation regarding the *Yugosphere*, and the aspect that consolidated the Scandinavian countries within the *Nordic Council*¹⁷⁷. Judah does not provide an assertive question, but it seems legitimate the claim for a Europe broadly characterised by a number of “sub-sphere”, leading to regional cooperation that enforces the connection within the entire European areas, or being more accurate, the areas involving countries part of the European union and their direct neighbours.

In this sense, it is possible now to state that if the Yugoslavian identity was a lost opportunity for the region to prosper and maintaining a peaceful inner situation – probably because of the speed of a forced process within the Western Balkans in the laps of only a century –, the Yugoslav heritage left for sure a great opportunity to coalition and enforcement of every entity present on the territory. The enlargement of the European Union hence presents itself as the greatest opportunity – and the core tool – to introduce all the harmony factors that could reunite all the *Southern Slaves* not in a State, anymore, but for sure in a great, unique, self-consciousness.

¹⁷⁶ T. JUDAH, 2009, pp.20-21

¹⁷⁷ *Ibidem*, p.25

2. BALKANS TODAY – POLITICAL OVERVIEW

After twenty years of great instability, political crises and territorial disputes, among the more relevant political situations within the area of former Yugoslavia¹⁷⁸, Serbia's one today seems to have gained the highest level of stability. From the political point of view, Aleksandar Vučić's administration has gained, at his second mandate, the highest rate of consensus, even broader than Slobodan Milošević one – it must be remembered that “the majority of the Serbian population consistently supported the nationalist policies of the former Serb, and Yugoslav, president, Slobodan Milošević, from 1987 until 2000”¹⁷⁹ – although partially because of the incapacity of the main political opponent to create a strong coalition. Kosovo's dispute still remains open, since there is no formal recognition of the State independency, but the **Bruxelles Agreement of 2013** (in Serbian Бриселски споразум) – negotiated by the former Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dačić and by Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi – sets forth the Serbian acceptance of Kosovo political system¹⁸⁰. This is a fundamental step toward the process of accession to the European Union, given the fact that over 50% of the commercial exchange volume of Serbia is nowadays with the Union. At the same time, Belgrade has never renounced to its political alliance with Russia, which allows the country to maintain a certain grade of security between the two political realities (i.e. Russia and EU). On the other hand, the EU seems appreciating Vučić programs of privatization of the State resources. This policy attracted many multinational companies inside the country and the government had the possibility to provide some guaranties to the international institutions the country took accords with, firstly the *International Monetary Fund*¹⁸¹.

Even Macedonia provides interesting element of study. In the last two years, the Country have been characterised by a governmental crisis that led to very fierce manifestation against Nikola Gruevski, former prime minister of the country and now

¹⁷⁸ <http://www.eastjournal.net/archives/78435>

¹⁷⁹ A. Bošković, “Distinguishing ‘self’ and ‘other’. Anthropology and national identity in former Yugoslavia”, in *Anthropology Today*, Vol. 21 n° 2, April 2005, p.9

¹⁸⁰ <http://www.eastjournal.net/archives/78435>

¹⁸¹ *Ivi*

substituted by Emil Dimitriev, elected from the same party, the *Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity* (VMRO-DPMNE). The turbulence was stabilised only by the EU intervention¹⁸². In this sense, it is interesting to highlight that, although the party was broadly accused of being nationalist, in the last years it has carried on a pro-European and pro-NATO policy.

For what concerns Croatia has seen in the very last year a period of governmental crisis carried by some accuses of conflict of interest, moved toward Tomislav Karamarko, the *First Deputy Prime Minister* of Croatia under Tihomir Orešković government. The crisis was solved with new elections, that nevertheless confirmed the same coalition, but under the leadership of Andrej Plenković. Despite the press observed in the last years the presence of some nationalistic sparks throughout the country. Plenković has declared that fundamental objective of his international policy is the European integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, promoting the equality recognition of Bosnian Serbs and Croats, and Bosniak¹⁸³. This statement can be read in two ways: if from one viewpoint this is a clear affirmation of Europe-oriented perspective for the Balkans area, on the other hand it must be considered the intention of creating a new autonomous Croatian entity within Bosnia, equal to Republika Srpska. Such a claim is not just a theoretic hypothesis, but the official stance of the *Croatian National Council* affirmed on 28 January 2017 at its seventh session. Božo Ljubić, the council president, has talked about the need of an administrative-territorial reorganisation, receiving even the Republika Srpska support¹⁸⁴, although, as already seen, the Bosnian Constitution doesn't allow any further division, if not with constitutional means. Even in this case the European Union observation factually works as deterrent to any nationalist claim, or at least any formal support from Croatia to illegal and bellicose purpose. The need of strengthening of the “Yugosphere” relations seems in this case even more sensate, concerning it a EU country.

¹⁸² *Ivi*

¹⁸³ <http://www.eastjournal.net/archives/77452>

¹⁸⁴ <http://www.eastjournal.net/archives/81255>

Finally, a close consideration must be provided about Kosovo. As already discussed, Kosovo situation presents itself difficult and delicate, above all in regards with its relations with Serbia. On April 2016, a new controversy emerged between the country government and the mission EULEX (*European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo*), approved on 16 February 2008. The governmental coalition of the country, whose chief is Isa Mustafa, claimed for the transfer of all the juridical competencies from the EULEX courts to the national ones. The Kosovar political situation is still not really clear, since many scandals related with corruption emerged in the last years and, above all, since former rebels entered in the governmental coalition and didn't appreciated some decision taken by the EULEX courts toward other rebels¹⁸⁵.

Furthermore, a new period of tensions between Pristina and Belgrade derived, in the last months, from the nationalization of the mining complex of Trepča by Kosovo's government - through a Parliament law - and the building of a wall along a bridge in Mitrovica by Kosovar Serbian authorities. The "wall incident" found a solution on the middle of January 2017 with its demolition¹⁸⁶.

Eventually it results a core element of analysis the relation between Kosovo and Turkey, so involving the European Union interests. As a matter of the fact, according with the 2015 data, Turkey is the second country for the *Foreign Direct Investment* (FDI), after Switzerland¹⁸⁷., above all for what concerns the infrastructural development. Foreign policy of Turkey, in the last years, adopted the doctrine of the so called "*Neo-Ottomanism*", concerning the spread of Ankara's influence on Sates with religious affinity¹⁸⁸. In this sense the ethnic recognition of the country will play a crucial role on the Europeanisation of the State, so of its relation with other Westerns Balkans countries and consequently to the achievement of not a formal, but factual, stabilisation of the entire area.

¹⁸⁵ <http://www.eastjournal.net/archives/72208>

¹⁸⁶ <http://www.eastjournal.net/archives/80930>

¹⁸⁷ A. VRAČIĆ, *Turkey's Role in the Western Balkans*, SWP, Berlin, 2016, p.22

¹⁸⁸ <http://www.eastjournal.net/archives/80359>

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- A. BOŠKOVIC, "Distinguishing 'self' and 'other'. Anthropology and national identity in former Yugoslavia", in *Anthropology Today*, Vol. 21 n° 2, April 2005
- A. CATTUNAR, "La liberazione di Gorizia: 1 maggio 1945 Identità di confine e memorie divise: le videointerviste ai testimoni", in *Storicamente*, 5 (2009), no. 26, Università di Bologna
- P. CANNON, *The Third Balkan War and Political Disunity: Creating A Cantonal Constitutional System for Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Jrnl. Trans. L. & Pol., Vol. 5-2, 1996
- V. COTESTA, *Sociologia dei Conflitti Etnici*, Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2005
- M. CABONA (edited by), *"Ditelo a Sparta", Serbia e Europa, Contro l'aggressione della Nato*, Graphos, Genova, 1999
- C. FOCARELLI, *Diritto Internazionale I, Il sistema degli Stati e i valori comuni dell'umanità*, CEDAM, 2012
- G. FRANZINETTI, *I Balcani dal 1878 a oggi*, Carrocci Editore, 2° edizione, Roma, 2010
- R. GALLISOT – A. RIVERA, *L'imbroglione etnico in dieci parole chiave*, Edizioni Dedalo, Bari, 1997
- E. HÖSCH, *Storia dei paesi Balcanici, dalle origini ai giorni nostri*, Giulio Einaudi Editore, 2005, Torino
- N. JANIGRO, *L'esplosione delle Nazioni, le guerre balcaniche di fine secolo*, Feltrinelli Editore, Milano, 1999
- T. JUDAH, *Yugoslavia is dead, long live the Yugosphere*, LSEE, London, 2009
- J. KRULIC, *Storia della Jugoslavia, dal 1945 ai nostri giorni*, Bompiani-RCS libri S.p.a., III Edizione, Milano, 1999
- A. MARCHESI, *La protezione internazionale dei diritti umani. Nazioni Unite e organizzazioni regionali*, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2011

- F. MAZZUCHELLI, *What remains of Yugoslavia? From the geopolitical space of Yugoslavia to the virtual space of the Web Yugosphere, e-Diasporas Atlas*, Paris, 2012
- A. MOORE, "Ethno-Territoriality and ethnic conflict" in *Geographical Review*, vol. 106 (1), January 2016
- A. VRAČIĆ, *Turkey's Role in the Western Balkans*, SWP, Berlin, 2016
- J. ŽDERO, *Serbs, Bosnian, and Yugoslav: The Bosnian Serb Intellectuals on the Road Toward a Multi-Ethnic Identity, 1878 – 1914*, Ph.D dissertation, University of Western Ontario, London (ON), 2009
- V. ZEJNULLAHI, "Balkan Conflict, the Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ICTY" in *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. V, n. 19, MCSER Publishing, Rome, 2014

WEBSITE CITATION

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION

- <https://cefta.int/cefta-parties-2/>
- <http://www.icty.org/en/about>
- <http://www.icty.org/en/documents/statute-tribunal>
- http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_827_1993_en.pdf
- <http://www.nam.gov.za/background/history.htm>
- http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1139
- <http://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act?download=true>
- http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf
- <http://www.rcc.int/pages/2/overview>
- <https://www.sedmprocess.org/web/sedmp/home>

OTHERS

http://www.arhivyu.gov.rs/active/en/home/glavna_navigacija/izlozbe/izlozbe_arhiva/izl_2009_stalna.html

<https://bosniahistory.wordpress.com/>

<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vladko-Macek>

<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sporazum>

<http://www.eastjournal.net/archives/72208>

<http://www.eastjournal.net/archives/77452>

<http://www.eastjournal.net/archives/78435>

<http://www.eastjournal.net/archives/80359>

<http://www.eastjournal.net/archives/80930>

<http://www.eastjournal.net/archives/81255>

<http://pollitika.com/masovni-pokret-u-hrvatskoj-1971-godine-0>

<http://www.studiculturali.it/dizionario/lemmi/semiosfera.html>

http://www.treccani.it/scuola/lezioni/storia/l_impero_austro_ungarico.html

http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Yugoslavia_1946.txt