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**CREATING IDENTITY:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND
COMMUNICATION IN A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE.
THE EUROPEAN GENDARMERIE FORCE
CASE.**

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“One cannot not communicate”

Paul Watzlawick

Ai miei genitori,
il mio più grande sostegno

A Francesca e Paolo,

Al Comitato di Vicenza di Croce Rossa Italiana,
per tutti gli insegnamenti, per la quella che sono

Alla Forza di Gendarmeria Europea,
che mi accolta con amicizia

Grazie

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ABBREVIATIONS

AdC: Italian Arma dei Carabinieri

CIMIN: Comité InterMinistériel de Haut Niveau

EGF: The European Gendarmerie Force

EUROGENDFOR: The European Gendarmerie Force

FN: French Gendarmerie Nationale

GC: Spanish Guardia Civil

GN: Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana

HQ: Headquarters

IO: International Organisation

JR: Romanian Jandarmeria Română

KM: Dutch Koninklijke Marechaussee

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO: Non-governmental Organisation

OSCE: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

U.S.: United States of America

UN: United Nations

ABSTRACT

La tesi di seguito elaborata rappresenta un insieme di linee guida specificamente formulate per supportare lo sviluppo di una strategia di comunicazione digitale per la Forza di Gendarmeria Europea (EGF), una forza di polizia a statuto militare istituita con lo scopo di monitorare ed intervenire in situazioni di instabilità e conflitto, laddove le strutture governative e di controllo dello Stato coinvolto non riescano più a supportare un ordinario svolgimento delle funzioni pubbliche e ne richiedano l'intervento, accordato da una delle Organizzazioni Internazionali¹ cui EGF serve di supporto.

Obiettivo di questa ricerca è la dimostrazione dell'importanza che la comunicazione digitale ricopre nell'ambito delle Organizzazioni Internazionali, affinché questo settore di studio, ad oggi interamente dedicato alle aziende, possa ampliarsi verso le Relazioni Internazionali, apportando nuovi input e soluzioni.

Le argomentazioni sostenute in questo lavoro sono frutto del tirocinio che ho potuto svolgere all'interno dell'Organizzazione, nato dalla necessità di digitalizzare la comunicazione della stessa per due motivi principali, da una parte l'esigenza di entrare a far parte del mondo social, eventualità che come vedremo è comune a tutte le Organizzazioni Internazionali; dall'altra la volontà da parte di EGF di espandere il proprio pubblico, creando un dialogo di scambio con gli utenti.

Oggetto d'analisi è quindi l'importanza dei Social Media, come imprescindibile strumento di comunicazione esterna. Ma non solo, parte del lavoro è dedicata alle critiche che sono state indirizzate alla Forza di Gendarmeria Europea, sia da parte di gruppi estremisti di matrice politica, sia da parte della popolazione della città che ne ospita il Quartier Generale: Vicenza. Questo passaggio è necessario alla comprensione della correlazione offline-online, un binomio dal quale non si può prescindere qualora si debba organizzare una strategia di comunicazione esterna. Infatti, affinché una strategia digitale possa essere vincente è necessario creare delle solide basi a livello di comunicazione tradizionale, sulle quali poter poi strutturare una migliore targetizzazione dell'audience e del planning comunicativo.

L'attenta selezione del bacino di utenza a cui un'organizzazione si rivolge, selezionato in base a variabili che spaziano tra le numerose sfere di appartenenza della persona, non

¹ UE, NATO, ONU, OSCE. Questa rappresenta l'unica possibilità secondo la quale la Gendarmeria Europea può intervenire in un teatro estero.

è una scelta opportuna e indispensabile solo in materia di Web Marketing, bensì si rivela vincente anche a proposito della dimensione offline dell'organizzazione stessa.

O meglio, il processo di targetizzazione ad opera di un'istituzione parte dall'offline per svilupparsi, in un secondo momento, online. In questo senso, è possibile intendere l'importanza della creazione di un dialogo stabile e positivo tra l'organizzazione e la comunità.

Gli argomenti fin qui riportati contribuiscono in maniera corale allo sviluppo della creazione dell'identità necessaria alla diffusione della cultura corporativa della Gendarmeria Europea, necessaria a garantirne una duratura permanenza nel web.

A livello metodologico, la prima parte del lavoro è incentrata sull'analisi dell'Agenda Digitale Europea, uno strumento di ricerca pubblicato dalla Commissione Europea in seno agli obiettivi Europa 2020, relativo ai tassi di influenza digitale all'interno dei Paesi Membri.

Da qui la decisione di investigare tali valori all'interno delle nazioni che compongono la Forza di Gendarmeria Europea, i sette Paesi Membri, Francia, Italia, Paesi Bassi, Polonia, Portogallo, Spagna e Romania e la Lituania in qualità di partner dell'organizzazione.

Lo studio dell'Agenda Digitale è quindi fondamentale per EGF poiché permette di considerare i possibili livelli di recezione della propria strategia digitale a livello dei paesi che la compongono. Inoltre, permette di effettuare una stima sulla futura recezione degli stessi. In questo senso è possibile ritenere un immediato coinvolgimento da parte di Francia, Spagna e Olanda, i paesi con il più alto tasso di penetrazione dei Social Media, ed una futura implicazione dell'Italia, uno tra i membri dell'Unione Europea meno digitalizzati ma che presenta forti segni di sviluppo, soprattutto per quanto riguarda l'uso dei Social Media.

Seguendo il tradizionale schema dell'analisi della concorrenza, sono analizzati i principali Social Media, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube e Twitter, sia delle forze di gendarmeria che compongono EGF, sia delle Organizzazioni Internazionali a cui la Gendarmeria Europea può servire di supporto: le Nazioni Unite, la NATO, l'Unione Europea e l'OSCE. I quattro casi ritenuti più significativi, vengono analizzati in singoli paragrafi per capire in che modo e con che contenuti sia possibile costruire una solida reputazione online e come poterla adattare ai continui cambiamenti che le

Organizzazioni Internazionali si trovano ad affrontare in base al volubilità dell'assetto internazionale.

Il secondo importante approccio metodologico è rappresentato da un questionario da me redatto e somministrato al personale della Forza di Gendarmeria Europea, sviluppato allo scopo di creare una nuova identità corporativa, base della cultura e dei valori da diffondere sui Social Media. Per poter rendere effettiva quest'ultima affermazione, è risultato opportuno avvalersi del metodo bottom-up , ossia di rendere protagonisti della definizione dell'identità della struttura i suoi funzionari, per far sì che la strategia digitale possa risultare il più possibile autentica e trasparente.

Questa decisione dipende da due motivi principali.

Anzitutto, la doverosa considerazione delle forti critiche mosse all'organizzazione e di alcune scelte inappropriate da parte della stessa, una situazione che presenta caratteri di interscambiabilità. Infatti, se da una parte della questione si trovano l'opposizione politica ed ideologica, supportate da una tesi antimilitarista in una città con una forte presenza militare statunitense; è vero anche che dall'altra vi è un'organizzazione i cui vertici non hanno saputo considerare il delicato equilibrio diffuso in città e, più in generale, tra l'opinione pubblica europea, corroboratosi principalmente negli anni in cui la Forza di Gendarmeria è stata costituita, momenti che sono coincisi con l'acuirsi dei conflitti in Medio Oriente.

Come risulta dall'analisi da me sviluppata, questa situazione, che è stata in molte occasioni frutto di errate convinzioni e generalizzazioni da un lato, e di *eccesso di silenzi* dall'altra, poteva essere se non evitata, quantomeno concisamente risolta, tramite un mirato utilizzo della comunicazione esterna. Segue quindi una trattazione specifica di come la corretta instaurazione di un dialogo, possa contribuire in termini di visibilità e credibilità di un'organizzazione.

A concludere la ricerca vi è una riflessione sulla creazione di un'identità societaria per la Forza di Gendarmeria Europea, costituita da una nuova struttura di valori volta a spiegare in modo vivace ed autentico l'effettivo ruolo e le attività di un'Organizzazione ancora poco conosciuta. Identità e cultura rappresentano forse la sfida più grande che EGF si trova a dover affrontare dal punto di vista comunicativo, una prova fondamentale per la sopravvivenza pubblicitaria dell'organizzazione. Infatti, una cattiva o sbagliata comunicazione, in questo senso sia tradizionale che digitale, può contribuire

al fallimento della presenza esterna di una società, sia essa un'Organizzazione Internazionale o un'azienda incanalata nei più tradizionali schemi del Web Marketing. Ridare nuova vita al *brand EGF* può invece significare la diffusione su larga scala dell'organizzazione, inserendosi in un contesto oggi molto significativo, ossia quello della ideazione di una nuova architettura per le forze di sicurezza e per la loro necessità di riavvicinarsi secondo nuove metodologie alla popolazione. Un percorso che in grande parte si sviluppa attraverso la comunicazione digitale.

I. INTRODUZIONE

Aprire la tesi l'introduzione, dedicata all'inarrestabile fenomeno Social Media, un fenomeno di portata globale che si colloca trasversalmente in ogni sfera della definizione della vita delle persone e che, proprio in base a questa caratteristica, sta in parte ridefinendo Relazioni Internazionali, sia rendendole più fruibili da parte di tutti, indipendentemente dalla posizione geografica, sia permettendo alla maggior parte delle persone di prenderne parte, indipendentemente dall'appartenenza o meno all'ambito. Tra gli esempi a supporto di questa argomentazione, uno risalta più di tutti, il fenomeno delle Primavere Arabe, che è nato e si è sviluppato attraverso i Social Media, nel caso specifico Twitter. Senza alcun supporto digitale è possibile immaginare che tali proteste sarebbero rimaste a lungo sconosciute, o meglio affrontate dalla stampa internazionale come un conflitto nei tanti conflitti già esistenti. La determinazione dei giovani che hanno preso parte alle proteste e la libertà di espressione resa possibile dai Social Media, così come la possibilità di creare contenuti virali, hanno fatto sì che la questione guadagnasse sempre più visibilità, dando voce, anche a chilometri e chilometri di distanza, alla rabbia e alle speranze di intere nazioni, definendo la piena portata che un fenomeno generazionale può assumere.

Da qui in poi sono diventati sempre più frequenti i diplomatici pronti a *duellare* via Social, o le Organizzazioni Internazionali determinate a sviluppare una campagna virale. In questo senso va il supporto fondamentale che i digital tools stanno fornendo al Movimento Internazionale di Croce Rossa e Mezza Luna Rossa e alle sue Società Nazionali, nel quotidiano impegno di ricerca di familiari dispersi o persone scomparse a causa dei fenomeni migratori.

Risulta quindi lampante come le Organizzazioni Internazionali, qualunque sia la loro natura e il loro scopo, non possano più prescindere da questa necessità digitale. È pertanto importante sottolineare come i Social, nonostante apparentemente risultino essere un mezzo per lo più ludico e di semplice utilizzo, richiedano invece costanza, organizzazione e presenza. Sottovalutare la questione scegliendo i contenuti sbagliati, o manifestando la propria presenza ad intervalli non regolari, così come non curare le domande e le necessità dei propri utenti, può rivelarsi estremamente dannoso per un'organizzazione, determinandone, in alcuni casi, la perdita di credibilità.

II. THE EUROPEAN GENDARMERIE FORCE

Il secondo capitolo è incentrato sulla descrizione del funzionamento e dei compiti della Forza di Gendarmeria Europea, un'organizzazione di forze di polizia a statuto militare, attualmente composta da sette Stati Membri, Francia, Italia, Paesi Bassi, Polonia, Portogallo, Romania e Spagna e dalle rispettive Gendarmerie Nazionali², a cui si aggiungono la Lituania in qualità di partner e la Turchia come osservatore.

Il processo che ha portato alla creazione della Forza di Gendarmeria Europea è stato sin da subito complesso a causa di numerose implicazioni politiche ed amministrative. L'idea della realizzazione di un'unica forza di gendarmeria europea venne avanzata nei primi anni Duemila dalla Francia, e fu proprio grazie alla determinazione dell'allora Ministro della Difesa Michèle Alliot-Marie che, nel 2004, Francia, Italia, Paesi Bassi, Portogallo e Spagna firmarono la Dichiarazioni di Intenti³, a Noordwijk, nei Paesi Bassi, gettando le prime basi della Gendarmeria Europea.

Il documento presentava in nuce quelli che poi sarebbero diventati i contenuti del trattato costituente, definendo il ruolo e le attività dell'organizzazione e stabilendone lo scopo: la creazione di una zona di libertà e giustizia, all'interno della cornice normativa stabilita dalla Politica di Sicurezza e Difesa Comune dell'Unione Europea. Pertanto si stabiliva che la Gendarmeria Europea non fosse né propriamente inserita all'interno dell'Unione Europea, né completamente estranea. Questo a seguito dei difficili negoziati che precedettero la firma di Noordwijk, nei quali la Germania ebbe un ruolo decisivo nello stabilire l'impossibilità della Gendarmeria di fungere da agenzia dell'Unione Europea, per due motivi principali. Da una parte la Costituzione, che, per chiari richiami storici, non consente alla polizia di prendere parte in attività militari; dall'altra la riluttanza dei politici tedeschi nei confronti del progetto.

Nel 2006 l'organizzazione venne resa operativa e nel 2007 i cinque Stati Fondatori firmarono il Trattato di Velsen⁴, ufficializzandone la fondazione.

² Stati Membri e Gendarmerie Nazionali: per l'Italia l'Arma dei Carabinieri; per la Spagna Guardia Civil; per la Francia la Gendarmerie Nationale; per il Portogallo la Guarda Nacional Republicana; per l'Olanda la Koninklijke Marechaussee; per la Romania la Jandarmeria Română; per la Lituania la Viesojo Saugumo Tarnyba e per la Turchia la Jandarma.

³ Declaration of Intent, Noordwijk, the Netherlands, 2004. Annex A.

⁴ Velsen Treaty, The Netherlands, 2007. Annex B.

Il capitolo affronta quindi l'analisi dei più importanti articoli inclusi nel trattato, al fine di spiegare l'esatto funzionamento della Forza di Gendarmeria Europea.

La seconda parte, intitolata *The European Gendarmerie Force Mission*, presenta una panoramica delle attività che l'organizzazione ha svolto in diversi teatri esteri, in supporto all'Unione Europea, alla NATO e alle Nazioni Unite. Funzione di questo paragrafo sono sia la descrizione dei numerosi compiti che la Gendarmeria può svolgere, dalla gestione delle crisi dovute a catastrofi naturali o conflitti, al supporto umanitario alla popolazione; sia la spiegazione del ruolo fondamentale che la Forza di Gendarmeria Europea può avere nella cooperazione tra Gendarmerie Nazionali al fine di incrementare la sicurezza interna ed esterna all'Europa, sempre ricordando il delicato assetto internazionale relativo all'impiego di contingenti militari all'estero. Infatti, negli ultimi anni l'opinione pubblica europea ed internazionale hanno espresso la propria preferenza verso un coinvolgimento di tipo diverso, in questo senso la comunicazione digitale può aiutare la Gendarmeria Europea ad essere pioniera nel convertire parte del tradizionale impegno all'estero, in nuovi tipi di attività da gestire online da remoto.

III. USE OF THE INTERNET

Il terzo capitolo, analizza la diffusione e l'utilizzo di internet all'interno degli Stati Membri della Forza di Gendarmeria Europea.

La prima parte, relativa all'elaborazione di dati Eurostat, è incentrata sull'indagine dell'uso di internet e dei Social Media da parte delle imprese europee, le quali presentano un tasso di digitalizzazione maggiore rispetto alle Organizzazioni Internazionali e per questo prese a modello per il caso di studio. Dai dati elaborati risulta una chiara disparità di digitalizzazione tra i Paesi Membri di EGF, nella fascia più bassa della classifica è possibile trovare Romania, Polonia e Francia, nella fascia media Italia, Lituania, Spagna e Portogallo e nella più alta i Paesi Bassi.

Ad avvantaggiarsi maggiormente della possibilità di utilizzare internet ed i Social Media per il proprio business, sono particolarmente le piccole imprese, che tramite la creazione di un'avvincente identità corporativa pubblicizzano il proprio brand. Questo esempio è molto significativo per la Forza di Gendarmeria, analogamente catalogabile come una piccola impresa.

Nella seconda parte del capitolo viene analizzata l'Agenda Digitale Europea (DAE) un dettagliato strumento relativo alla digitalizzazione europea, messo a disposizione dalla Commissione. Tramite la DAE è stato possibile analizzare numerose variabili necessarie a comprendere l'utilizzo di internet all'interno dei Paesi Membri di EGF, per poter così calibrare l'utilizzo dei Social Media da parte dell'organizzazione.

Le prime variabili considerate riguardano la presenza di connessioni internet a banda larga nelle famiglie europee e la diffusione di connessioni mobili differenziate tra 3G e 4G, in base alle quali varia il tipo di contenuti da presentare sui Social, sia per la diversa dimensione tra schermo del computer e dello Smart Phone, sia per il diverso utilizzo che i due strumenti hanno in funzione del tempo dedicabile ai contenuti sulla base del device utilizzato.

Sulla base del Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI), è stato possibile analizzare nel dettaglio il comportamento online di ogni singolo stato, in modo da definirne gli ambiti maggiormente significativi ai fini di questa ricerca: il tasso di penetrazione di internet e ed i relativi utenti; il tasso della penetrazione dei Social Media ed i relativi fruitori; il tasso di penetrazione di abbonamenti mobili, di traffico mobile e di utilizzo dei Social da cellulare.

In seguito gli stati della Gendarmeria Europea sono esaminati secondo due diverse metodologie. La prima parte presenta una panoramica delle variabili appena presentate, che ho organizzato raggruppando gli Stati Membri per aree geografiche: Francia e Paesi Bassi; Polonia; Italia, Portogallo e Spagna; Lituania e Romania.

La seconda parte invece fornisce una precisa analisi, in modo da poter conoscere dettagliatamente il tasso di digitalizzazione di ogni Stato Membro.

Attraverso la Digital Agenda Scoreboard, sono infine esaminati i progressi di ogni Stato per quanto riguarda le seguenti variabili da me isolate: connettività, capitale umano, uso di internet; integration and digital technology e digital public service. Anche qui la comparazione dei dati conferma il primato dei Paesi Bassi. L'analisi della Digital Agenda Scoreboard permette inoltre l'individuazione di un ulteriore dato, ossia la comprensione dei contenuti maggiormente condivisi via Social in ogni stato preso in considerazione, questo permette di definire al meglio la strategia digitale della Forza di Gendarmeria Europea.

IV COMPETITOR ANALYSIS

In questo capitolo viene analizzato il comportamento online delle singole Forze di Gendarmeria che compongono EGF e delle Organizzazioni Internazionali per le quali la Gendarmeria Europea funge di supporto, per capire come questo aspetto venga trattato da diverse organizzazioni accomunate dallo stesso obiettivo, la sicurezza della collettività. Quattro categorie social sono analizzate per ogni caso: Twitter, Facebook, YouTube e Instagram. Segue alle singole analisi un approfondimento composto dai quattro casi risultati più significativi.

La prima parte è dedicata al comportamento social dei Membri della Gendarmeria Europea, analisi dalla quale Spagna, Italia e Paesi Bassi risultano essere i più interessanti in termini di utilizzo e sviluppo social. La Guardia Civil spagnola si caratterizza per un recente miglioramento della policy di comunicazione esterna, da cui è conseguito un miglioramento della credibilità sociale dell'istituzione, confermato dal Centro di Investigazione Sociologica (CIS). L'Arma dei Carabinieri per la brillante gestione delle pagine Instagram e Twitter, capaci di unire legalità e protezione del cittadino ad un aperto dialogo che coinvolge quotidianamente il Primo Ministro ed i singoli Ministeri. La Koninklijke Marechaussee olandese per aver impostato la propria comunicazione social instaurando un rapporto di familiarità e autenticità con il pubblico, ottenendo così un ottimo ritorno di immagine e popolarità.

La seconda parte del capitolo è invece relativa alle quattro Organizzazioni Internazionali - UN, NATO, UE, OSCE - e del loro utilizzo dei Social Media. Viene quindi riportato nel dettaglio il caso studio riguardante la NATO, che grazie alla lavoro di un articolato team di comunicazione, garantisce la continua presenza di contenuti altamente coinvolgenti, come i mini-documentari visibili sul canale YouTube o come le NATO Challenges, dei contest dedicati al pubblico per la partecipazione di progetti di tipo diverso, quali la realizzazione di un nuovo logo.

V. THE EUROPEAN GENDARMERIE FORCE STRATEGY

Una volta definito il tasso di utilizzo dei Social Media all'interno dei Paesi considerati e stabilito quali sono i contenuti vincenti da utilizzare, il quinto capitolo presenta una circostanziata valutazione dei due principali strumenti digitali: Facebook e Twitter.

I due strumenti digitali sono quindi analizzati nel dettaglio per conoscerne con esattezza le potenzialità che possono offrire ad un'Organizzazione, in termini di visibilità online e di creazione di campagne virali.

In entrambi i casi viene sottolineata la vantaggiosità dei Social Media rispetto alla pubblicità tradizionale, per due motivi principali: la maggiore economicità di una campagna online e la possibilità di raggiungere un pubblico molto più vasto, su scala globale.

L'analisi delle due piattaforme suggerisce che la Forza di Gendarmeria Europea dovrebbe quantomeno inizialmente utilizzare Twitter, non solo per i servizi business offerti dallo stesso, ma anche per la sua propensione a fungere da vetrina, basti pensare a quanto questo strumento è utilizzato in ambito istituzionale, sia a livello nazionale che globale.

VI. THE SURVEY

Vengono qui presentati i risultati del questionario dal titolo *How we create our values?* condotto all'interno della Forza di Gendarmeria Europea, funzionale alla creazione di una vivace identità corporativa capace di favorire la presenza dell'organizzazione sui Social Media.

Il questionario è stato sviluppato affinché fosse possibile elaborare i risultati seguendo il metodo di analisi bottom-up, andando così a creare un sistema di valori per la strategia online basati sull'esperienza del personale stesso.

In accordo con i risultati, i valori che la Forza di Gendarmeria Europea dovrebbe diffondere sui Social Media, sotto forma di visual content e post, sono funzionali non solo alla organizzazione, ma, in maniera più generale, anche al ruolo delle forze di polizia.

Questo dipende dal fatto che i risultati suggeriscono delle soluzioni incentrate sul ruolo di aiuto e sostegno che i gendarmi possono avere nei tipi di operazioni in cui la Gendarmeria Europea è coinvolta.

La base sottostante la creazione di una identità societaria vincente, è rappresentata dalla capacità di sviluppare una storia in cui gli utenti possano identificarsi ed è in questo senso che i risultati del questionario assumono particolare importanza.

Infatti, tra le parole scelte con più frequenza per descrivere la Gendarmeria Europea si trovano *amicizia, cooperazione, onore e flessibilità*, valori che perfettamente si adattano alla vita di ogni potenziale utente. Da qui la raccomandazione di coinvolgere i destinatari in un'esperienza unica, quella di sentirsi parte di una Forza di Gendarmeria al servizio dei cittadini.

VII. INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION

Il capitolo affronta il rapporto tra la Forza di Gendarmeria Europea e l'opinione pubblica, con un attento focus relativo alle tensioni succedutesi negli anni.

L'obiettivo del capitolo è di comprendere le principali critiche mosse alla Forza di Gendarmeria Europea e gli autori delle stesse.

Analogamente vengono analizzate le policy dell'organizzazione che meno hanno sortito risultati in ambito comunicativo nel periodo considerato.

Nonostante la Forza di Gendarmeria Europea sia un'istituzione recente, negli anni è stata al centro di forti critiche da parte sia di gruppi di opposizione politica, sia da parte di gruppi di abitanti della città in cui è situata. I motivi di tale astio sono da rintracciarsi nelle tensioni già presenti negli anni di fondazione della Gendarmeria, tensioni dovute alla numerosa presenza militare statunitense a Vicenza, al tempo impegnata nei conflitti scoppiati in Afghanistan ed Iraq. È in questo periodo che si può identificare l'inizio di un forte disaccordo da parte di componenti dell'opinione pubblica nei confronti dei metodi intrapresi dalla Comunità Internazionale per fronteggiare il terrorismo.

Da punti di vista più estremisti, la situazione è andata acuendosi nel 2006, quando venne stabilita la costruzione di una seconda base americana. Così, quando a distanza di pochi mesi la Gendarmeria Europea fu inaugurata, la questione incontrò diversi motivi di contrasto particolarmente in sede locale.

Questa sovrapposizione di eventi sfociò rapidamente in una situazione di forte confusione sul ruolo di EGF. Un'ulteriore complicazione si verificò nel 2011 a seguito delle violente manifestazioni di piazza avvenute in Grecia a causa della crisi economica. In questo caso, proprio tramite internet, vennero diffuse notizie prive di fondamento circa l'impiego di reparti della Forza di Gendarmeria Europea a scopo repressivo. Tutto ciò dette inizio ad una serie continua di interpretazioni non corrette delle missioni della Forza di Gendarmeria, che hanno messo a rischio l'immagine dell'istituzione.

VIII. CREATING IDENTITY

Il capitolo affronta le principali regole da tenere in considerazione qualora si decida di intraprendere la strada della comunicazione digitale e di come queste possano essere messe in atto dalla Gendarmeria Europea.

Ho quindi individuato quattro principali linee guida di supporto allo svolgimento del capitolo, rappresentate dalla complessità che il concetto di identità sta assumendo in un mondo dominato dalla continua esposizione dell'io; dall'identità corporativa come base di una solida reputazione online; dall'importanza del comportamento online di un'organizzazione; dalla partecipazione del pubblico.

È quindi affrontata l'importanza di un dialogo aperto, reciproco ed inclusivo con gli utenti, base della presenza online di aziende ed organizzazioni.

Il primo paragrafo affronta il significato di identità in termini di multiculturalità, inclusività ed esclusività e appartenenza, per capire come la nozione si sviluppi anzitutto a livello del singolo individuo.

A tale proposito viene avvalorata la tesi della pluralità dell'identità sviluppata da Amartya Sen, estremamente esplicativa di come oggi il web permetta alle persone di esprimere contemporaneamente più sé, all'interno di gruppi composti da persone che condividono gli stessi interessi. È quindi data una spiegazione sia alla pressione culturale, e a quanto questa possa influire nelle manifestazioni identitarie degli individui, sia a come i Social Media stiano contribuendo o meno ad un cambiamento della stessa.

Il secondo paragrafo è incentrato sull'identità societaria e sulla sua importanza ai fini di una duratura permanenza online. L'identità corporativa è la percezione che gli utenti hanno di un'organizzazione, pertanto dipende dall'insieme di valori che la stessa possiede e diffonde. Questo ovviamente contribuisce a distinguere un'istituzione dai possibili *concorrenti* e a creare un proprio bacino d'utenza.

Il Paragrafo affronta anche nel dettaglio le cinque macro-regole che ritengo essere funzionali alla realizzazione di una corretta strategia digitale: 1. il pubblico, attore fondamentale di questa rivoluzione social; 2. il binomio online-offline, e la sua indispensabile interscambiabilità; 3. le critiche, inevitabili indipendentemente dal tipo di comunicazione che si intraprende; 4. la presenza, le assenze in rete difficilmente vengono perdonate; 5. l'organizzazione, una delle chiavi del successo sui Social Media.

Nel terzo paragrafo viene illustrato il Prisma di Kapferer, modello utile alla creazione di una completa identità societaria, originale ed accattivante.

Il quarto paragrafo analizza il comportamento da tenere online, un tema di rilevante importanza. Viene quindi analizzato il modello *Dragonfly Effect*⁵, sviluppato dalla Professoressa Aaker dell'Università di Stanford. L'utilizzo simultaneo delle quattro variabili che compongono lo schema, permette di ottenere successo online.

Il quinto paragrafo analizza le forme di partecipazione del pubblico e di come questo debba contribuire alla creazione dei contenuti online e alla loro diffusione. Le organizzazioni, così come le aziende, non possono più pensare al marketing come qualcosa di autonomamente sviluppato ed *imposto* sugli utenti, primi contributori alla comunicazione esterna delle istituzioni. Viene quindi pensato un corretto stile che la Gendarmeria Europea può utilizzare con il proprio target.

Infine, il sesto paragrafo, affronta le nuove regole che coinvolgono il marketing e lo storytelling online. Come la natura trasversale che la comunicazione ha assunto attraverso i nuovi media, una condizione che la rende imprescindibile da ogni ambito della vita quotidiana. Viene quindi analizzato il concetto di sviluppo dello storytelling, cosa raccontare, come coinvolgere il pubblico.

A corollario del paragrafo degli esempi che la Forza di Gendarmeria Europea potrebbe utilizzare per la propria strategia digitale.

⁵ Joseph Sassoon, *Web Storytelling*, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2012, p. 25

CONCLUSIONI

A conclusione della ricerca è quindi importante affermare l'importanza che la comunicazione digitale ricopre nell'ambito delle relazioni internazionali, lasciando spazio ad un futuro sviluppo della materia.

La Forza di Gendarmeria Europea può in questo senso ricoprire un ruolo pionieristico, ricercando le migliori forme di comunicazione per una forza di polizia, al fine di instaurare un aperto e solido dialogo con la popolazione e far così fronte alle nuove minacce globali, spesso proprio legate al mondo digitale.

È quindi possibile soddisfare il postulato di partenza di questo lavoro?

In termini di sviluppo futuro è certamente affermabile la possibilità di creare innovazione in termini di comunicazione e Social Media per le Organizzazioni Internazionali, ridefinendone le regole al di fuori dei classici schemi d'impresa.

In questo senso, il suggerimento per la Forza di Gendarmeria Europea è di seguire le regole qui delineate, al fine di migliorare la propria visibilità online e provvedere al meglio alle nuove esigenze della popolazione digitale.

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, Social Media represent an unstoppable global phenomenon.

Rapidly, these new tools are replacing traditional ways of communication, creating a more and more connected world.

In this contest, it is possible to affirm that Social Media are also impacting International Relations, as well as every other sphere of life.

The rise of Social Media can be seen as a response to the current historical moment, indeed, their spread coincide with an intense dispersion of authority and a need for transparency. In this sense, Social Media are the most direct ways leaders and organisations have to communicate with citizens across the globe.

It is a new conception of diplomacy, more welcoming and approachable.

But not only, Social Media have also been the voice of a revolution, the voice of the Arab Spring.

In 2010, the outburst of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia marked the beginning of the so-called Arab Springs. From here on, within a short period of time, uprisings exploded throughout many countries displaying people dissatisfaction caused by poverty, corruption, political repression, censorship and ideological control.

Within a year, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain and Syria, were involved in the will of the change, but, as the flow of history has shown, the results are far from what was expected, particularly when the duplicity, here in the entire definition of the word, of the International Community is considered in its pivotal role: on the one hand a huge lack of interest in helping the rebels create their freedom, on the other one, the usual excessive interference, as the complete failure of the U.S. intervention in Libya⁶.

However, the Arab Springs saw the beginning of one crucial phenomenon, destined to redefine not only Arab Revolutions, but the entire concept of latter International Relations: the so-called Twitter Revolution⁷.

⁶ Alan Kuperman, *Obama's Libya Debacle. How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure*, Foreign Affairs, 2015.

⁷ As stated in *Foreign Policy*, it firstly started in Tunisia to move to the most famous Iranian Twitter Revolution. Ethan Zuckerman, *The First Twitter Revolution? Not so fast. The Internet can take some credit for toppling Tunisia's government but not for all*, Foreign Policy, 2011.
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/15/the-first-twitter-revolution-2/>

Remarkably iconic is the Tweet of Hir Hosein Mousavi, former Iranian Prime Minister and leader of the opposition, who directly addressed Twitter: «Twitter is currently our ONLY way to communicate overnight news in Iran, please do not take it down»⁸.

In that occasion Hilary Clinton, former U.S. Secretary of States, emphasised the importance of freedom of speech made possible by Social Media: «[...] and therefore, we promote the right of free expression. And it is the case that one of the means of expression, the use of Twitter, is a very important one not only to the Iranian people, but now increasingly to people around the world, and most particularly young people. I wouldn't know a Twitter from a tweeter – (laughter) – but apparently, it is very important. And I think keeping that line of communications open and enabling people to share information, particularly at a time when there was not many other sources of information, is an important expression of the right to speak out and to be able to organize that we value»⁹.

How can we imagine such a global scale mobilisation without the use of this narrative and visual tools?

Due to these precious features people had the right to develop powerful narrative, by sharing emotional contents with the rest of the world and make it know the Arab Springs, as it is now with the Syrian Civil War.

Therefore, I would like to state that Social Media are leading this generation social change. They are the key of transnational virtual communities, the new way for people to get in touch with politics.

People can now influence their own world and their own politics, by creating the right environment for themselves and future generations. We are all contributing in this new challenge; we are all redefining the boundaries of power.

Through digital platforms everyone can create social meaning contents, by uploading videos or writing posts or sharing pictures.

The traditional wide gap between people and institutions is now reducing, e.g. due to the less formal structure that Social Media have. This feature permits to share comments with Institutions and politicians.

Unfortunately, this wide communication revolution that is covering most aspects of Politics, is not much developed for diplomacy. In fact, even if the change is starting to

⁸ <https://twitter.com/mousavi1388/status/2184577675>

⁹ <http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/06/125044.htm>

involve this institution, formality is still extensively widespread. Indeed, Social Media come with a stigma: the idea that they are not the proper way for formal institutions to communicate.

In a certain sense, this assumption can seem true but for sure not valuable, indeed, the most common mistake that can be made in eras of change is to underestimate the crucial importance that the change itself has, relying on the old, on what is known.

Partially, global diplomacy is slowly transitioning to digital tools of communication, still largely relying on traditional ways of communication.

Whereas, regarding International Organisations, Social Media is on top of their communications agenda.

In fact, as specified in this paper, the majority of International Organisations, as the United Nations, NATO or the European Union, have a vast and prolific use of Social Media.

On this regard, it is important to underline the *vital* role that Social Media have within the dramatic question of immigration. Indeed, Social Media are getting the place of traditional communication in spheres that concern the search for family members sprinkled through Europe or sometimes the world¹⁰, assistance provided by the ICRC and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as well as the role of the International Organisation for Migration¹¹. Without Social Media, their support to migrants would be useless.

That depends on the fact that in every part of the world, more and more people own a smartphone and, for that, they are Social Media users. Smartphones are so widespread that it is estimated that by 2017, one third of the global population will own one¹².

Therefore, these data give measure of the importance for International Organisation of upgrading communication strategy and connect globally.

In this framework, I would like to propose a Social Media plan for the European Gendarmerie Force, the International Organisation in which I had the opportunity to do my internship.

Two main reasons can be drawn to this purpose.

¹⁰ RFL – Restoring Family Links. The ICRC and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies provide this service since the First World War.

<http://familylinks.icrc.org/en/Pages/home.aspx>

¹¹ Both the Organisations are playing a decisive role in raising awareness through people, especially with the use of Social Media.

¹² Data at <http://www.statista.com/topics/840/smartphones/>

Firstly, the general need to embrace Social Media, which are instrumental to every IOs and NGOs. Indeed, it is not possible to think a non-digital International Organisation. Secondly, the specific need for the European Gendarmerie Force to counter negative advertising and damaging press campaigns mostly run on the Internet.

Hence, the aim of this paper is to develop a guideline on how Social Media can be used properly and best adapted to an International Organisation such as the one in question.

Furthermore, a consistent part of the focus of this research lies in the creation of a solid values structure to spread among EGF audience.

Therefore, the focus of the dissertation is the importance for the European Gendarmerie Force to go social and run a Social Media Campaign, recognising the crucial significance of new tools of communication, the smartest solution to involve the audience, creating harmony.

Involvement is the key word of this work, indeed, on Social Media everything is made to always involve current and new followers.

To get there, the European Gendarmerie Force needs to raise its brand awareness.

Regarding this point, four main aspects are important to underline.

Firstly, listen. An organisation should always listen to its target, to understand its behaviours and preferences. Listen always includes observe, market researches are crucial before creating a campaign.

Secondly, *storytelling*. The triumph of involvement. This feature is instrumental when an organisation decides to go social, by using storytelling the organisation create its own biography by using its own values and by absorbing what the audience mostly like about it. It is a never-ending and mutual exchange of ideas, values and information between the organisation and its audience, which creates potentially unbreakable bonds.

Thirdly, *the dragonfly effect*¹³. When running a well-finished Social Media campaign, the organisation has to take care about the online, and at the same time, to strengthen its offline presence. The *dragonfly effect* refers to the continuous twine between online and offline.

¹³ Joseph Sassoon, *Web Storytelling*, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2012, p.6

Lastly, *be there*¹⁴. Indeed, Social Media require constancy and stability in sharing posts. Our relation with the audience needs to be constantly nourished, otherwise it will quickly end with negative implications; unfortunately, anything on the Internet is short-lasting if not promoted.

In order to succeed, these are the main aims that European Gendarmerie Force's Communication Team should keep in mind in every step of the creation of the Social Media strategy.

Concluding, as stated in this paper, statistics are clear: Social Media are overtaking the role once detained by websites. For that, the only and right way to spread the European Gendarmerie Force values among people across Europe is to go social.

¹⁴ G. Laurita, R.Venturini, *Strategia Digitale: comunicare in modo efficace su internet e i Social Media*, Milano, Hoepli, 2014

II

THE EUROPEAN GENDARMERIE FORCE

The European Gendarmerie Force is an International Organisation, based in Vicenza, Italy.

It was established in 2007 with the Treaty of Velsen signed by France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands.

At date, the European Gendarmerie force is composed by six gendarmerie forces: the Italian Arma dei Carabinieri, the Dutch Koninklijke Marechaussee, the French Gendarmerie Nationale, the Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana, the Spanish Guardia Civil, and the Romanian Jandarmeria Română. Lithuanian Viesojo Saugumo Tarnyba is an EGF partner¹⁵, while the Turkish Jandarma is currently an observer¹⁶. Therefore, the European Gendarmerie Force is composed by police forces with military status¹⁷; this feature permits to the organisation to participate in peacekeeping operation abroad.

The European Gendarmerie Force creation process has been complex since the beginning, for both political and administrative reasons.

The idea of a European Gendarmerie Force, or EUROGENDFOR, was first suggested in France, a Nation with a meaningful gendarmerie tradition, which strongly stood up for its creation. Due to France determination, in 2004¹⁸ France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain signed a Declaration of Intent, in Noordwijk, the Netherlands.

The main aim of the new established organisation was to improve European Security and Defence Policy and to create a zone on freedom and justice¹⁹.

The seven pages declaration is an accurate first summary of the European Gendarmerie Force duties. It clarifies the mission, the structure, legal aspects and admission requirements. In an overall perspective, it specifies the capability of the organisation to *conduct police missions in crisis management*, the international aspect of it, and rapid

¹⁵ Chapter XI, Article 44 on Partner Status, the Treaty of Velsen

¹⁶ Chapter XI, Article 43 on Observer Status, the

¹⁷ The feature *police forces with military status*, is EGF fundamental premise.

¹⁸ September 17, 2004.

¹⁹ Declaration of Intent, Annex A

deployment²⁰.

At a structural level, the Declaration contains guidelines about formal organisation; therefore, the creation of a High Level Interdepartmental Committee, CIMIN, composed of representatives of the responsible ministries of each country, assures the political-military co-ordination, appoints the EGF Commander, provides him with directives and provides the guidance for employment. It also specifies that *working groups will assist this Committee*²¹. Furthermore, the Declaration asserts that the headquarter will be in Italy, but it does not reveal the place.

A particularly important part is contained in paragraph III, The Framework, which elucidates that, due to the Helsinki Headline Goal²² and the Brussels conference held on November 19, 2001²³, both focused on European military capability to conduct full military operations and on the so-called Petersberg-tasks²⁴, on European humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and the tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, the European Gendarmerie Force is at the disposal of the European Union.

Moreover, in the paragraph is specified that the European Gendarmerie Force can also be at the disposal of other International Organisation, such as NATO, the UN and OSCE, but also at the disposal of an *ad hoc* coalition²⁵.

Considering admissions requirements, the Declaration on Intent specifies that full membership is guaranteed to European Member State possessing a police force with a military status. To welcome a new Member, unanimity is needed²⁶.

In the following years, the EGF creation process continued, on January 23, 2006²⁷ the European Gendarmerie Force was officially opened in Vicenza, Italy and, on October 18, 2007 Spain, Italy, France, the Netherlands and Portugal signed the Treaty of Velsen, however, the Treaty has not yet been ratified.

Here I would like to propose a closer analysis of the steps that led to the creation of the

²⁰ The EGF can deploy up to 1,000 personnel in 30 days.

²¹ Ivi

²² Military Headlines Goals (HLGs), 1999, included in the European Union External Action

http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/military_headline_goals/index_en.htm

²³ 2386th Council Meeting on General Affairs,

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/seerecon/calendar/2001/events/c20011119_ga.htm

²⁴ As specified in the Petersberg-tasks, an essential part of the EU CSDP, set out in the Amsterdam Treaty

http://eeas.europa.eu/index_en.htm

²⁵ Declaration of Intent, p. 3. The principle is then reaffirmed in the Treaty of Velsen, Chapter III, Article 7.3g

²⁶ Unanimity is required for every EGF decision, from procedural to operational questions.

²⁷ Weger, M. de, *The Potential of the European Gendarmerie Force*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, The Hague, 2009, p. 12.

European Gendarmerie Force.

As Dutch scholar Michiel de Weger states out in his work about EGF²⁸, the idea of the creation of the Organisation begun as an idea of the French government. Essentially, France wanted to establish a cross-national gendarmerie Organisation, not linked to the European Union, therefore, in this sense, an autonomous gendarmerie force.

On the contrary, the other four Nations involved came out in favour of a European Gendarmerie Force created in the framework of the European Union, to also maximise already existing European structures, with the leading role of Italy that at that time was particularly engaged in European Security and Defence Policy²⁹.

However, as negotiations began, two main questions halted the French dream: on the one hand, the fact that once the dialogue between Nations began, the creation of a gendarmerie force in the framework of the EU was not possible. On the other, involved nations had different opinions on how the gendarmerie should have been.

The explanation of the first clause lies in the fact that not every European member states have positive feelings towards police forces with military status and that not every European member states have a gendarmerie force³⁰. Particularly, this issue involves Germany; indeed, due to German recent history, army involvement is almost *invisible*³¹. As stated at Article 87a of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, the established Armed Force basically has police support functions in a state of defence³², meaning that the use of military force is not allowed for police services.

This condition depends on both political and historical reasons, which determined the firm distinction between military and police tasks.

This comes particular clear through the words of the former German Defence Minister Peter Struck, who, in 2004, when asked about a possible involvement of his country in the European Gendarmerie Force, said: «We have absolutely no plans to join this force»³³, he then explained that for historical reasons, Germany has now good

²⁸ Ibidem

²⁹ Reuben Wong, Christopher Hill, *National and European Foreign Policies - Toward Europeanization*, Routledge, 2011. P 65

³⁰ E.g., Great Britain, Germany and Sweden do not have a gendarmerie force.

³¹ *No shooting please, we're German. Germans still have a uniquely complicated relationship with their soldiers*, The Economist, 2012.

³² Deutscher Bundestag, *Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany*, Article 87 [Armed Force]. https://www.bundestag.de/blob/284870/ce0d03414872b427e57fccb703634dcd/basic_law-data.pdf

³³ Interview realised on September 16, 2004 to WDR Television, in *EU Defense Ministers Plan New Paramilitary Force*, Defense-Aerospace, September 16 2004. [http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/45510/eu-to-set-up-paramilitary-police-force-\(sept.-17\).html](http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/45510/eu-to-set-up-paramilitary-police-force-(sept.-17).html)

motivations for not having anymore a military force to ensure internal security³⁴.

Clearly, both German impossibility and its reluctance in participating in EGF, determined the end of a possible creation of the European Gendarmerie Force within the EU framework.

Secondly, the fact that the five participating countries had different ideas about what EGF should have been. This depended on the different capacity each gendarmerie have. In the scheme elaborated by Michiel de Weger, it is possible to divide in three blocks³⁵ of nations: France and Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands and Spain.

De Weger describes the condition of Italy and France as the two European countries with the largest gendarmerie forces; therefore ready to participate in the creation of the European Gendarmerie Force.

While, Portugal and the Netherlands are described as small forces with very few personnel. Finally, Spain, a medium-capacity force in between the others.

The scholar claims that the idea the five countries had about EGF was a projection of their own internal gendarmerie capacity.

Nevertheless, they all agreed on the basic principles of the European Gendarmerie Force, therefore the will in participate in police operations necessary in conflict areas.

During negotiations even other nations were interested in joining the European Gendarmerie Force, Austria and Belgium for example, but they did not took part eventually. While, Poland and Romania³⁶ became full member, Lithuania is currently a partner and Turkey an observer³⁷.

Here a focus on the most important aspect included in the Treaty.

Firstly, the strategic level: the CIMIN^{38 39}.

The CIMIN is the decision-making body; it ensures both political and military coordination.

The CIMIN consists of representatives of each Member States, as decided by the origin country. As a general regulation, CIMIN is composed by a High Representative of Foreign Affairs for each Member States; a High Representative of the Ministry of Interior of Defence for each Member States, and the General Commander of the

³⁴ Tasks performed by police.

³⁵ Weger, M. de, *The Potential of the European Gendarmerie Force*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, The Hague, 2009, p.13

³⁶ 2008

³⁷ All four countries applied for full membership

³⁸ Comité InterMinistériel de Haut Niveau or High Level Interdepartmental Committee


³⁹ Treaty of Velsen, Chapter III, Article 7

Gendarmerie Force⁴⁰.

The High Level Interdepartmental Committee reunites twice a year and is provided with the support of a working group.

The chart below represents CIMIN working process⁴¹, made up by its three levels: political and strategic level, the operational level and the tactical level.

CHART 1



Secondly, the operational level: EGF Permanent HQ⁴².

The Commander in force and its staff, which includes both police and civilian personnel assigned by the parties, compose EGF Permanent *multinational*⁴³ Headquarters.

The Permanent HQ acts in accordance with the CIMIN, which has to approve HQ involvements in activities and operations.

The Headquarters are located in Vicenza, Italy as Italy is the host country. Therefore, as defined in Chapter IV, Article 10 of the Treaty, Italy not only provides *at no charge*⁴⁴ facilities to EGF, it also take care of all the requirements necessary to the right functioning of the Organisation, such as *electricity, postal, telephone and telegraph services*⁴⁵ and so on

⁴⁰ The presidency of CIMIN rotates every year

⁴¹ Adapted from *European Gendarmerie Force, Keynotes on Eurogendfor Identity and Tasks*. With permission of The European Gendarmerie Force HQ, p.3

⁴² Treaty of Velsen, Chapter I, Article 3; Chapter III, Article 7; Chapter IV, Article 10, 11

⁴³ Treaty of Velsen, Chapter I, Article 3a


⁴⁴ Treaty of Velsen, Chapter IV, Article 10

⁴⁵ Ibidem

The following chart shows the current EGF Permanent HQ structure⁴⁶, including roles by nation.

As we can see, the European Gendarmerie Force has no permanently assigned force, as it is engaged on ad hoc basis depending on the type of missions they are going to join in.

CHART 2



The ad hoc characteristic perfectly gather with the was majority of EGF tasks, starting from the fact that it can be placed both under military command or under civilian authority⁴⁷, depending on the gravity of the situation the Organisation has to face. Moreover, the European Gendarmerie Force can also work jointly to other forces⁴⁸, therefore it can be properly deployed in every stage of an on-going crisis, from first organisation in the field, usually substituting inexistent local police, to the crucial help of supporting the transitional phase from military to civilian command.

Chapter II also analyses in depth EGF tasks⁴⁹, here listed:

- performing security and public order operations;
- monitoring, advising, mentoring and supervising local police in their day-to-day work, also with criminal investigation;

⁴⁶ Retrieved from the European Gendarmerie Force website, <http://www.eurogendfor.org/organisation/phq-organisational-chart>

⁴⁷ The Treaty of Velsen, Chapter II, Article 4.2

⁴⁸ The Treaty of Velsen, Chapter II, Article 4.1

⁴⁹ The Treaty of Velsen, Chapter II, Article 4.3

- public surveillance, traffic regulations, border policing and general intelligence work;
- implement criminal investigation work, including detecting offences, tracing offenders and transferring them to the appropriate judicial authorities;
- protecting people and property and maintaining order in public disturbances;
- training police officers as regards international standards;
- training instructors, particularly through co-operation schedules.

Finally, as affirmed in Article 6 on *Conditions for engagement and deployment*⁵⁰, the possibility to participate to a mission is considered case by case by the High-level inter-departmental Committee, the eventuality does not commit every Member State to participate.

2.1 THE EUROPEAN GENDARMERIE FORCES MISSION

At date, the European Gendarmerie Force has joined five missions abroad, EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia Herzegovina, MINUSTAH in Haiti, NATO training mission in Afghanistan, EUFOR RCA in the Central African Republic and EUCAP SAHEL in Mali.

On December 2007, The European Gendarmerie Force joined the EUFOR ALTHEA mission⁵¹, which was established in 2004 by the European Union. Therefore, all EGF Members were still participating in the operation, but with the organisation intervention coordination changed, from Italian Arma dei Carabinieri, to the European Gendarmerie Force, again with an Italian commander.

In 2010, following the U.N. Resolution 1908⁵², the European Gendarmerie Force was deployed in Haiti, taking part in the MINUSTAH MISSION, with an Italian and a French formed police unit⁵³.

During the ten-month mission⁵⁴, EGF was involved in U.N. civilian police support and in the support of both local police and humanitarian assistance.

⁵⁰ The Treaty of Velsen, Chapter II, Article 6

⁵¹ EUFOR ALTHEA, <http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php>

⁵² Security Council Resolution 1908, S/RES/1908 (19 January 2010), available from undocs.org S/RES/1908

⁵³ Adapted from *European Gendarmerie Force, Keynotes on Eurogendfor Identity and Tasks*. With permission of EGF HQ, p. 13

⁵⁴ From February 2010 to December 2010, IBIDEM

In its role of training instructor, the EGF participated in the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, 2009. There, the European Gendarmerie Force worked side by side with the local Afghan National Police.

In 2014, the European Gendarmerie Force was involved in two different EU missions, on the 1st of April it was deployed in the Central African Republic⁵⁵, to help local police restabilising the rule of law in a very frail situation in which the majority of the crimes remained unpunished and there was no maintenance of public order.

Secondly, on the 15th it was deployed in Mali⁵⁶, for a civilian mission aimed to the establishment of democratic circumstances for a stable and peaceful condition in the country.

Through EGF involvement in abroad missions, it is possible to better understand the dual police-military character. Indeed, it is thanks to this feature that the organisation can join both military and civilian missions and, either ways, take control of the chain of command.

This is extremely important because it permits to carry out the most important task the European Gendarmerie Force has when abroad, that is to assume policing tasks in the transition from the military to the civilian phase, in peacekeeping operations after a conflict.

Thus, gendarmerie is the best force to help transitioning from a military to a civilian phase, because it ensures efficiency through rapid deployment, self-sustainment and crisis management. At the same time, gendarmerie cannot be directly involved in the conflict; rather it controls opponents ensuring respect for the rule of law.

Therefore, through its commitment abroad, the European Gendarmerie Force has proved to be functional to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, for two main reasons: on the one hand because of the fact that in the very last years western countries changed their approach to intervene abroad favouring peacekeeping and civilian solutions, role in which EGF suits perfectly. On the other hand, the European Gendarmerie Force has demonstrated to be the perfect support for populations involved in the unfortunate events, because of its neutral role for what concerns the conflict and of its ability to restore a peaceful status.

Certainly, when considering EGF capabilities it is important to ponder that its involvement abroad depends not only on the consensus or not of Member States to take

⁵⁵ EUFOR RCA in the Central African Republic, http://www.esercito.difesa.it/operazioni/operazioni_oltremare/Pagine/Repubblica-Centro-Africana-EUFOR-RCA.aspx

⁵⁶ EUCAP SAHEL Mali, <http://eucap-sahel-mali.eu/about/the-mission/>

part in a mission; but also it can be influenced by different responses on international security of the international Community.

Lastly, it is important to address an important role EGF has in domestic affairs, i.e., as suggested by De Weger, it can prevent opponents from turning into enemies and from alienating public opinion⁵⁷. For the scholar this aspect depends on the different role the European Gendarmerie Force has if compared with the army, and for that it can create a different and less frightening connection with civilians.

Therefore, it is important to underline the crucial role the European Gendarmerie Force could have in increasing European cooperation between national armed forces and in strengthening common policies on internal and external security management.

Nevertheless, among the great amount of tasks conferred to EGF, the future of abroad missions is uncertain. Mostly, it depends on the noteworthy change in the Balance of Power that it is taking place latterly, which is establishing a new equilibrium constituted by an unconventional form of interaction: digital communication.

This change in International Relations is deeply related to a general transformation in the entire global society; Social Media as much as quick and effective communication, are redesigning every aspect of life, making digital communication a basic life feature.

Nowadays, the majority of governments are not willing to commit their armed forces abroad as it was in the past, consequently it can be a new issue to deal with for organisations like the European Gendarmerie Force, founded on the principle of bring help in conflict areas abroad. In this case, a brilliant solution could be represented by the introduction of new remote activities based on digitalisation, next to traditional commitment abroad. For instance, the production of interactive lessons to distribute to foreign police forces as online learning platforms, this integrative solution could be good for two different reasons, indeed, on the one hand it permits to cut costs for the European Gendarmerie Force in situations in which intervention is not essential, on the other, it permits to educate and train police forces outside the framework of a military mission. Moreover, another challenging solution is represented by the commitment of developing preventive diplomacy within the use of Social Media. EGF should catch the momentum and become an international digital pioneer within police digitalisation.

⁵⁷ Weger, M. de, *The Potential of the European Gendarmerie Force*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, The Hague, 2009, p.37

III

USE OF THE INTERNET

An analysis of the European digital agenda is necessary to understand how European countries use the Internet and how this behaviour has changed through the years. This is instrumental to my research, to better understand the national and international use of Social Media, with a special focus on EGF members.

Clearly, to understand how to set up EGF Social Media profiles, it is necessary to analyse how the Internet is used among Member States, how they are ranked in statistics and what can be improved. In this chapter, researches conducted in European will be explored, therefore, Eurostat surveys and the European Union Digital Agenda Scoreboard, which is part of the Europe 2020 strategy⁵⁸.

3.1 ANALYSING DATA

The study presented in 2014 by Eurostat⁵⁹, is focused on the use of Social Media by enterprises in the European Union as part of the strategy to integrate information and communication technologies, ICT, in business.

Even if data are not specifically referred to International Organisations, they are instrumental to the aim of this chapter.

Indeed, through these data is possible to analyse a specific trend on European behaviour toward Social Media. I decided to integrate both insights, the use of Social Media for politics and business, because the most valuable impact of Social Media that can be currently measured is on firms.

Social Media refer to Internet based applications such as social networks, blogs, multimedia content-sharing sites and wikis. Fundamentally, enterprises use Social Media for image building or for marketing products. Generally, Social Media are used to engage a specific audience in the exact way it wants to be reached.

⁵⁸ <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/europe-2020-strategy>

⁵⁹ EUROSTAT, Social Media, Statistics on the use by Enterprises. Businesses raise their Internet profile by using Social Media, 2014

In the chart below⁶⁰, it is possible to notice enterprises' presence on the Internet in 2013.

As we can see, the Netherlands has the highest percentage of enterprises' websites, 84%; the highest percentage of formal policy for Social Media use, 18%, and the highest percentage of Social Networks, 45%. Moreover, 32% of Dutch enterprises use two or more types of Social Media, while 50% of them use at least one Social Media. On the other hand, Romania is the country with the lowest percentage of enterprises' websites, 42% and just 6% of enterprises use two or more types of Social Media. Also, Poland is the country with the lowest percentage of formal policy for Social Media use, 3%, and Social Networks, 16%.

ENTERPRISES' PRESENCE ON THE INTERNET 2015

	Website	Formal policy for social media use	Social networks	Enterprise blog or microblogs	Multimedia content-sharing websites	Wiki-based knowledge-sharing tools	Website and social media	Use only one type of social media (*)	Use two or more types of social media (*)	Use at least one type of social media (*)
EU28	73	8	28	10	11	6	28	15	15	30
BE	78	9	31	10	16	5	33	18	17	35
BG	47	6	30	5	9	4	21	21	11	31
CZ	80	5	15	3	6	2	15	10	6	16
DK	92	16	36	8	14	5	39	25	15	40
DE	84	7	29	7	13	11	30	16	17	33
EE	76	4	24	5	7	2	25	18	8	27
IE	75	20	46	20	14	7	42	24	24	48
EL	61	8	28	11	16	7	28	16	18	34
ES	68	9	29	13	15	5	27	13	18	31
FR	65	4	17	5	5	3	18	12	7	19
HR	68	7	30	6	14	13	30	21	16	37
IT	67	5	21	6	10	4	22	14	11	25
CY	66	17	37	13	13	4	33	22	17	38
LV	56	3	13	7	5	2	14	8	8	15
LT	75	6	31	9	16	14	33	21	17	38
LU	79	6	26	8	12	7	27	15	15	30
HU	61	3	22	2	10	6	22	17	9	26
MT	78	14	52	12	20	11	50	30	25	55
NL	84	18	45	27	23	7	48	18	32	50
AT	86	11	35	7	14	10	37	21	18	39
PL	66	3	16	3	8	4	17	12	7	19
PT	59	9	33	6	12	4	29	21	14	36
RO	42	5	17	3	6	2	14	13	6	19
SI	80	9	34	8	13	2	35	23	14	37
SK	80	8	21	4	11	6	23	14	12	26
FI	94	13	34	8	14	6	36	21	16	37
SE	89	15	42	13	16	9	44	24	21	45
UK	82	15	40	23	15	6	41	14	28	42
IS	83	12	58	14	18	5	54	36	24	60
NO	79	17	43	9	12	5	41	31	15	46
MK	54	8	33	6	15	7	28	20	16	36

(*) Differences between the last column and the sum of the previous two columns are due to rounding.


An overview of the chart⁶¹ allow us to see that EGF Members are placed at different levels, in fact it is possible to find Poland, Italy and Romania in a low percentage group, while, four States are in a medium percentage group: Lithuania, France, Spain and Portugal.

Eventually, the Netherlands is the only Member State that belongs to the highest percentage group.

⁶⁰ Retrieved from EUROSTAT, Social Media, Statistics on the Use by Enterprises, 2015

3.2 THE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA⁶²


In 2013, about 30% of European enterprises regularly used Social Media. Of them, 79% of enterprises did it to build an engaging image and to sell products online. Another important datum to analyse is that the purpose of 15% of European enterprises that used Social Media, was to collect customers' opinions and reviews and to answer their



ENTERPRISES USAGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA BY PURPOSE OF USE IN 2013

The second chart⁶³ shows a comparative analysis of the use of Social Networks in 2013 and in 2015.

As usual, it is possible to divide in three different groups EGF Members, where in the lowest part there are Poland, Romania and France; in the middle Italy, Lithuania, Portugal and Spain and in the highest part of the chart there is the Netherlands.



ENTERPRISES USAGE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS, 2013-2015

⁶² EUROSTAT, [Social Media Statistics on the use of Enterprises, 2013-2015](#)

⁶³ Ibidem

As we can see, the Netherlands is the country that has both the best result among EGF Members, and that has grown the most in terms of use of enterprises use of Social Networks. In fact, it results with a +16%.

Within an important gap, there is the second best result: Italy. This country has grown +14%, passing from 21% to 35%.

3.3 EUROPEAN SOCIAL MEDIA USAGE

Over the last decade, the Internet usage has changed completely, shifting from static webpages to new tools of communications, which permits virtual interactions between users and consequently, to reach a targeted audience.

Therefore, it has been possible for customers to influence business decisions and to assist companies in designing and marketing their products.

A steady presence on the Internet is fundamental for companies and organisations, indeed Social Media cross-references on the website are as important as the possibility to sell products online, and as the online presence itself.

It is possible to recognise four subcategories of Social Media:

- Proper Social networks: Facebook, LinkedIn, Xing.
- Corporate blogs or microblogs⁶⁴: Twitter, Present.ly.
- Multimedia content-sharing websites: YouTube, Flickr.
- Wiki-based knowledge-sharing tools.


In 2013, 30% of enterprises that used Social Media used at least one of these types of Social Media. Why Social Networks are more popular than other types of Social Media?

That is because they permit both to companies, or organisations, and customers to connect and share information and opinions on products. Social Networks are also characterised by the possibility of creating communities of people with common

⁶⁴ To microblog means to post very short text messages, usually a few hundreds characters or less, and share hyperlinks to other websites, which usually contain longer texts, videos, pictures.

interests - in this specific case, communities can be related to the activities of the company or of the organisation, and of course to their aim.

To EGF, social network communities can be a bright response to the existent negative communities that have criticised the organisation.



ENTERPRISES USAGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA, BY PURPOSE OF USE AND SIZE CLASS, 2013

Blogs and microblogs need to be frequently updated, even more than Social Networks.

They mainly act like a showcase: Twitter allows companies and organisations to share all the contents they want -text, videos or picture- without creating any kind of immediate debate.

Multimedia content communities give Organisations the opportunity to share media subjects and to present their products or activities. Thenceforth, this type of contents can be linked to the main website or to other Social Media.

On this point, it is instrumental to underline that the Netherlands is the EU country and EGF Member where corporate blogs, microblogs, 27%, and multimedia content-sharing websites, 23%, are most used.

Regarding wiki-based knowledge sharing tools, in 2013 only 6% of European enterprises used them and it depends on the fact that every person, without any restriction, can change websites like Wikipedia in every moment.

Of course, this choice is not safe, neither for companies, nor for International Organisations.

3.4 SOCIAL MEDIA FOR BUSINESS

Why Social Media are a company best strategy? Social Media can be useful to reach the outside world (customers, business partners or other organisations), for communication inside the firm and for a specific purpose, like recruit employees. EGF strategy takes into consideration the first two points. Furthermore, statistics also show that just 8% of enterprises using Social Media have an official Social Media policy, which implies objectives, rules, procedure, and, of course, an investment needed.

An official policy would be important to have also because it sets out rules for employees on how they can use Social Media on behalf of the enterprise; for that, it is strongly suggested the adoption of an official policy for Social Media use.

For the Eurostat parameters, it is possible to categorised the European Gendarmerie Force as a small firm, which employs between ten and forty-nine.

Thus, how large and small firms differentiated within the use of Social Media? On this point, statistics underline how little the difference is, just few percentage points. But not only, also purposes are the same.

In 2013⁶⁵, 72% of small enterprises used Social Media for image building and marketing products, compared with 79% of large firms, while 49% of small companies used Social Media to obtain customers' opinions or reviews and answer questions, compared with 57% of large companies.

The relevance of the comparison lays in the fact that whether few or many employees make up the company or the organisation, the importance of Social Media is unchangeable: the main aim is the development of a corporate culture and identity.

The European Commission in the 2015 Commission Staff Working Document also examines the topic, within the Implementation of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communication⁶⁶. The document contains part of the Digital Agenda for Europe, which is a pillar of the Europe 2020 Strategy.

⁶⁵Eurostat, Social Media Statistics on the use of Enterprises, 2013

⁶⁶ Commission Staff Working Document, *Implementation of EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communication*, 2015

3.5 EUROPE 2020

In 2010 the European Commission launched the Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE), which I would like to take into consideration, as the European Union is one of the international endorsers of EGF.


The DAE is part of Europe 2020 Strategy, a plan for the rapid growth and smart progress among European countries and digital technologies are one of the pillars considered in the strategy.

In the Implementation of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communication, there are some very interesting data for this research⁶⁷. The document takes into consideration the goals reached, or not, by Member states about the usage of digital technologies.

Thus, there are data on the coverage of fixed broadband, which passed from 95% in 2011 to 97% in 2014 (percentage of homes)⁶⁸.

Another very relevant datum is the percentage of fixed broadband take-up that changed from 62% in 2011 to 70% in 2014⁶⁹.

While, regarding the subscription of mobile broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants), statistics say that it changed from 47% in 2011 to 72% in 2014⁷⁰. For that, it is possible to affirm that in the last years Internet coverage through Member states stabilised, both for fixed broadband networks and for Mobile broadband via 3G networks.



FIXED BROADBAND TAKE-UP (AS % OF HOUSEHOLDS), 2014

⁶⁷ Data are updated at June 2015.

⁶⁸ Commission Staff Working Document, *Implementation of EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communication*, 2015

The Internet diffusion changes from country to country, e.g. fixed broadband take-up, as percentage of households, in 2014 demonstrates how between the country with the lowest percentage, Italy, and the one with the highest percentage, The Netherlands, there are more than forty-five points of difference. However, differences between states are generally not particularly marked.

Dissimilarities are present in the Mobile broadband penetration graph. As we can see in 2015, between Hungary, the country with the lowest percentage, and Finland, the country with the highest percentage, there is a difference of almost one hundred and five percentage points.

Regarding the EGF Members, we can notice that Portugal is the country with the lowest percentage of mobile broadband subscriptions, a little more than 50%; this result is in order followed by Romania, Lithuania, France, The Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Poland with almost 100%⁷¹.

Moreover, regarding the so-called next-generation access, NGA, coverage the situation is more harmonised.

Indeed, Italy, France and Portugal are the countries with the lowest rate of fixed NGA coverage, while, starting from Romania percentages among countries are similar and stabilised between 70% and 100% annual growth⁷².

The Implementation of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communication offers a reasonably fundamental paragraph on International comparison. In fact, it compares the trend in fixed broadband subscriptions and the penetration of mobile broadband in Asia, Japan and South Korea, the United States of America and the European Union⁷³.



As shown in the chart, results to the first variable are similar among considered countries, while differences exist for the second variable.

Indeed, in Japan, South Korea and the United States, 4G is frequently used instead of 3G. This aspect is a major contributor Europe the lowest score in the rank

⁷¹ Commission Staff Working Document, *Implementation of EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communication*, 2015

⁷² *Ibidem*.

⁷³ *Ivi*, page 6.



⁷⁴ Fixed and wireless broadband take-up, subscriptions/100 people,

Retrieved from OECD Broadband Portal, <http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/broadband-statistics-update.htm>

⁷⁵ Percentage of 4G connections by market. Retrieved from GSMA Mobile Economy 2015, GSMA Mobile Economy North America 2014, http://www.gsamobileeconomy.com/GSMA_Global_Mobile_Economy_Report_2015.pdf

The use of the Internet is an important global phenomenon, rapidly growing; indeed, two billion people⁷⁶ out of the total world population are Internet users. Thus, total global Internet penetration is 37%, of which 26% is active on social networks, while 93%⁷⁷ is the percentage of mobile subscription penetration.

Europe is one of the most social places in the world. Indeed, in 2014 it was reported that 19% of the population is an Internet user, 16% is a Social Media user and 15%⁷⁸ has a mobile subscription.

More social than Europe is East Asia, 29% of the population using Internet, 37% of the population using Social Media and 22% with a mobile subscription. Africa has a more social profile than Oceania, with 8% of people using the Internet, 4% Social Media and 11% having a mobile subscription, while Australia, New Zealand and the rest of the continent only totalise 1% for each variable. North America is less social than Europe, with only 11% of the population active on both the Internet and Social Media, and 5% owning a mobile account.

In Europe, Internet penetration is 68%, while mobile subscription penetration is 139%, which means that on a total population⁷⁹, the number of active mobile subscriptions is more than one million people⁸⁰. Out of the total EU population 40% are active Social Media network users.

In Europe, more than two hundred million⁸¹ are active Social Media users that access Social Media on any device, which means 40% of the total population, while two hundred million⁸² are those who access on mobile device, 26% of the whole population. Mobile penetration in the European Union is ranked at a high level, indeed, 78% of Europeans own a mobile phone, which means 576 million people.

Due to the accuracy of the country profiles elaborated in the Digital Economy and Society Index, DESI⁸³, I created five geographical groups, Western Europe, Central Europe, Southern Europe, Baltic States and Southeast Europe to sum up the digital situation existing in each EGF Member states. The groups are followed by a sixth paragraph gathering the information needed. For each group, parameters taken into

⁷⁶ As reported by Eurostat, Internet users are 2,640,432,161 out of 7,095,476,818 world population.

The Usage in the European Union EUROSTAT, 2015 <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>

⁷⁷ Internet World Stats <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats9.htm>

⁷⁸ The Usage in the European Union EUROSTAT, 2015 <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>

⁷⁹ 738,853,985 people, *ibidem*

⁸⁰ 1,025,340,015, *ibidem*

⁸¹ 239,155,800 people, Internet World Stats <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats9.htm>

⁸² 193,789,000 people, The Usage in the European Union EUROSTAT, 2015 <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>

⁸³ DESI 2015 Country Profiles, <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/desi-2015-country-profiles>

consideration are Internet penetration, Internet users, Social Media penetration, Social Media users, Mobile subscription penetration, Mobile broadband penetration and Mobile social penetration, out of the total population of the considered area.

1. Western Europe: France⁸⁴ and the Netherlands⁸⁵.

The total population of this area is about 161,837,043 people, and the Internet penetration rate is 85%, with 50% active Facebook users and 119% mobile subscription penetration. Thus, more than a third of the total population is active on Social Media on a mobile device.

- Internet penetration: France 83%, the Netherlands 93%.
- Internet users: France 54 million people, Netherlands 16 million people.
- Social Media penetration: France 42%, Netherlands 52%.
- Social Media users: France 28M, Netherlands 8.8M
- Mobile subscription penetration: France 109%, N. 117%.
- Mobile broadband penetration: Fr. 52%, N. 61%.
- Mobile Social penetration: Fr. 30% (20M), N. 44% (7.4M).

2. Central Europe: Poland⁸⁶.

The total population is about 167,844,786 million people, of them 78% are Internet users, and 131% is the percentage of mobile subscription penetration. Just 36% has an active Facebook account, 60,412,000 million people, and the percentage of mobile social users is 26%.

- Internet penetration: 65%.
- Internet users: 25 million people.
- Social Media penetration: 31%.

⁸⁴All data in DESI Country Profile: France

⁸⁵ All data in DESI Country Profile: the Netherlands

⁸⁶ All data in DESI Country Profile: Poland

- Social Media users: 12M.
- Mobile subscription penetration: 132%.
- Mobile broadband penetration: 49%.
- Mobile Social penetration: 19% (7.2M).

3. Southern Europe: Italy⁸⁷, Portugal⁸⁸ and Spain⁸⁹.

Out of 120,240,738 million people, 76,724,809 are Internet users, 68%, while 138% is mobile subscription penetration. Active Facebook users represent the 43% of the whole population, with 32% of people active on mobile social.

- Internet penetration: Italy 58%, Portugal 64% and Spain 72%.
- Internet users: Italy 36 million people, Portugal 6.9 million people, Spain 34 million people.
- Social Media penetration: Italy 42%, Portugal 48%, Spain 41%.
- Social Media users: Italy 26M, Portugal 5.2M, Spain 20M.
- Mobile subscription penetration: It. 158%, Portugal 114%, Spain 118%.
- Mobile broadband penetration: It. 52%, Portugal, 32%, Spain 32%.
- Mobile Social penetration: It. 32% (20M), Portugal 30% (3.2M), Spain 33% (15M).

4. Baltic States: Lithuania⁹⁰.

The total population is 6,960,676 million people. Of them, 72% are Internet users. Active Facebook users are 33% of the population, while mobile subscription penetration is 135%.

- Internet penetration: 68%.
- Internet users: 2.4 million people.
- Social Media penetration: 35%.
- Social Media users: 1.2M.

⁸⁷ All data in DESI Country Profile Italy profiles

⁸⁸ All data in DESI Country Profile Portugal

⁸⁹ All data in DESI Country Profile Spain

⁹⁰ All data in DESI Country Profile Lithuania

- Mobile subscription penetration: 142%.
- Mobile broadband penetration: 9%.
- Mobile Social penetration: 20% (720K).

5. Southeast Europe: Romania.⁹¹

Of the total population, 53% are Internet users and 117% is the percentage amount of mobile subscriptions. 38% of people are active on Facebook and 24% are mobile Social Media users.

- Internet penetration: 50%.
- Internet users: 11 million people.
- Social Media penetration: 32%.
- Social Media users: 7M.
- Mobile subscription penetration: 104%.
- Mobile broadband penetration: 24%.
- Mobile social penetration: 21% (4.6M) .

European Average:

- Internet penetration: 68% (Iceland 95% - Ukraine 34%)
- Social Media penetration: 40% (Iceland 70% - Moldova 10%)
- Mobile subscription penetration: 139% (Russia 184% - BiH 86%)
- Mobile broadband penetration (3G): 48% (Finland 106%-Moldova 5%)
- Mobile social penetration: 26% (Norway 55% - Moldova 5%)

⁹¹All data in DESI Country Profile Romania

3.6 THE EUROPEAN GENDARMERIE FORCE MEMBER STATES

In the paragraphs below, more detailed information are shown for each European Gendarmerie force Member State⁹². Then, I elaborated the most significant results⁹³ in charts that summarise the usage of Social Media at a national level. This analysis is instrumental to measure the response to Social in each Member State.

FRANCE.

The total population is 65,951,611 million people, of which 83% are Internet users, while 109% is the datum for mobile penetration. 28,000,000 million of people are active Facebook users, 42%.

French people spend on average four hours per day surfing the Internet on their computer, while almost one hour and a half using mobile Internet - the percentage of mobile Internet penetration is 51%.

Social Media penetration involves 69% of the total population, which spends on average one hour and forty minutes every day on Social Media. 44% of French people use Social Media apps.

Other important data: 42% of the population have a smartphone. 74% of people research products via their phone. About 52% of the population has a 3G connection.

LITHUANIA.

Lithuania⁹⁴ has three and a half million people. 68% of them are Internet users, while 35% of the population use Facebook. Mobile subscription penetration is 142%. Just 9% of people are subscribed to mobile broadband, which means 301,000 people. 720,000 people are the Lithuanians active on Social Media via mobile phone, so just 20% of the population use mobile social. 3G subscriptions: 33%.

⁹² All data are in DESI Country Profiles <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/desi-2015-country-profiles/France>

⁹³ Data are elaborated in charts on the base of previous results, adapted from One Europe and Eurostat, <http://one-europe.info/eurographics/social-medias-in-europe> - http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Social_media_-_statistics_on_the_use_by_enterprises

⁹⁴ All data are in DESI Country Profiles <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/desi-2015-country-profiles/Lithuania>



ITALY⁹⁵.

The total of the population is 61,482,297 million people. 58% of them are Internet users, while 42% are active Facebook users. Mobile penetration in 158%.

Italian population spend almost five hours a day using the Internet on their computer, while little more than two hours using mobile Internet. Mobile Internet penetration involves 47% of the population.

Social Media penetration regards some 52% of the entire population, with an average of two hours spent every day on Social Media. 46% of Social Media users use apps.


41% of Italians own a smartphone, 92% of them search for local information and 84% research products. 52% of people use 3G.



⁹⁵ Iidem

THE NETHERLANDS.

16,805,037⁹⁶ million people is the total population of the Netherlands. Of which 93% use Internet, while Facebook penetration corresponds to 52% of the population. 117%: mobile subscription penetration. Dutch people spend on average almost four hours each day surfing the Internet on their computer, while, one hour and a half using mobile Internet. About 66% of the population have access to mobile Internet. Social Media penetration corresponds to the 78% of the total population and users spend on average one hour and a half every day on Social Media. Of the 78% of Social Media users, 44% use Social Media apps. 44% of the total population use mobile Social, while 52% of Dutch citizens use 3G.



PORTUGAL.

The total population of Portugal⁹⁷ is 10,799,270, of whom 64% are Internet users. 48% of Portuguese use Facebook and 114% is the rate of mobile subscription penetration.

32% of the population owns a smartphone, which is used to search for local information, 90%, and for products 79%. 3G is used by 59% of the population.


⁹⁶ All data are in DESI Country Profiles <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/desi-2015-country-profiles/theNetherlands>

⁹⁷ Ibidem

POLAND.

38,383,809 million people compose the population of Poland⁹⁸. Of them, 65% are Internet users and 31% are on Facebook. Mobile Internet penetration rate is very high: 132%. Polishes spend on average five hours a day using the Internet on a computer, and almost two hours using mobile Internet - mobile Internet is used by 44% of the population.

59% of Polish population is active on Social Media and spend there more that one hour and a half a day. 32% of Polishes use Social Media apps. Smartphone penetration is some 35%, of whom 90% search for local information via their phone and 78% research products. 44% of the population have 3G.



ROMANIA.

Romania⁹⁹ total population is 21,790,479 million people and 50% of them are Internet users. 7,000,000 are active Facebook users, 32% of the population, and 104% of mobile subscription penetration. 28% of Romanians own a smartphone, of them 90% use it to search local information and 84% to research products. 3G is used by 37% of people

⁹⁸ All data are in DESI Country Profiles <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/desi-2015-country-profiles/Poland>


⁹⁹ Ibidem

SPAIN.

In Spain, of a total of 47,370,542¹⁰⁰ million people, 72% are Internet users and 41% Facebook users. 118% is the rate of the mobile subscription penetration. Spanish people spend on average four hours a day surfing the Internet in a computer, while about two hours using mobile Internet (61 is the percentage of mobile Internet penetration).

Regarding the use of Social Media, 66% of Spanish people are active users, by almost one hour and a half each day using them. 44% of Social Media users use Social Media apps.


More than half of the population (55%) owns a smartphone that use to search local information (89%) and to research products (80%). 56% of Spanish use 3G.



¹⁰⁰ All data are in DESI Country Profiles <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/desi-2015-country-profiles/Spain>

3.7 DIGITAL AGENDA SCOREBOARD: A CLOSER PERSPECTIVE

The European Digital Agenda Scoreboard measures progress of the European digital economy, by taking into consideration each country in Europe, both members and non-members.



As shown in the graph¹⁰¹, the Netherlands is the first European Gendarmerie Force member we encounter, which is the fourth most digitalised country in Europe.

Thus, in this part I will analyse the DESI of each EGF members.

The Digital Economy and Society Index is a combined index that analyses Europe digital performance and it follows the evolution of European Member states in digital competitiveness.

Variables taken into considerations are: Connectivity, Human Capital, the Use of Internet, Integration and Digital Technology and Digital Public Service.

Although, digital competitiveness has very relevant aspects, foremost the development of a digital economy, probably one of the most appealing economical possibilities of recovery right now, I will analyse general traits of the use of Internet.

¹⁰¹ Retrieved from DESI 2016, Digital Economy and Society Index at <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/desi>

THE NETHERLANDS.

The Netherlands¹⁰² ranks fourth within the Digital Economy and Society Index, with an overall score of 0.64 on 0.48 points.

What make the Netherlands so strong within the Digital Agenda?

Firstly, connectivity (n.2) is where this country performs better, with 0.73 points, which means that fast Internet is available for 98% of people. The average in Europe is 0.56, this is 68% of Next Generation Access networks. Human capital (n.5) score is 0.67, EU average 0.54, this of course increase the competitiveness of Dutch economy. Moreover, the Netherlands is the third country in Europe for the use of Internet, with 0.56 on 0.43. Online banking is the most used Internet feature, 90%, followed by online shopping, 75%, and films and games online, 65%. Video calls are the less used feature with 35%. Social networks are used by 63% of people.

Regarding Integration and Digital Technology, it just scores 0.42 on 0.33. The Netherlands should improve the use of technology by taking advantage of every tool offered by it, to create a true digital economy.

The fifth analysed sector is Digital Public Service, in which the Netherlands ranks third with 0.79 on 0.47 points. This datum tells us that Public Service is very efficient, with 69% of pre-filled forms available online and 61% of Internet users among the population, aged 16 to 74.

LITHUANIA.

Lithuania¹⁰³ is ranked eleventh, with an overall score of 0.52 on 0.48 points.

Connectivity: Lithuania has 0.68 on 0.56 points. Fast connection is in 98% of homes, but the shares of households actually subscribing to fixed broadband is one of the lowest in Europe, 58% on 70%.

Lithuania ranks seventeenth in Human Capital, 0.5 points, gaining two positions the previous year.

Here data are interesting, on the one hand this country has one of the lowest share of ICT Specialists, and on the other one it has the highest number of STEM, Science,

¹⁰² DESI 2015, Digital Economy and Society Index at <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/scoreboard/netherlands>

¹⁰³ DESI 2015, Digital Economy and Society Index at <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/scoreboard/lithuania>

technology and mathematics, graduates in Europe. The use of Internet is properly appealing, 0.53 on 0.43. Reading news online is the most used feature, 94%, followed by video calls, 79%, and banking 74%. Video on demand is the less used feature, 11%, while social networks rank at 65%. In Integration of Digital Technology, Lithuania is eight, 0.39 on 0.33 points, while, regarding Digital Public Service is seventeenth with 0.41 on 0.47 points.

SPAIN.

Spain¹⁰⁴ is ranked fourteenth, with an overall score of 0.49 on 0.48 points.

Year by year Spain is improving its performance in all areas measured by DESI, particularly regarding connectivity. Indeed, 73% of households have access to fast broadband.

Regarding Human Capital, Spain is sixteenth, 0.5 points, gaining one position since the previous year. The use of Internet makes Spain nineteenth, with 0.42 on 0.43 points. News online is the most used feature, 78%, followed by social networks, 67%, and music, videos and games 52%, while video on demand is the less used feature, 27%. In Integration of Digital Technologies, Spain ranks fourteenth, 0.36 on 0.33 points. Regarding Digital Public Service, Spain is sixth, 0.65 on 0.47 points. Pre-filled forms are 56 (0 to 100) and eGovernment users are 37%.

FRANCE.

France¹⁰⁵ ranks fifteenth, with an overall score of 0.48 on 0.48 points. 74% of households are subscribed to fixed broadband, but just 43% of them have access to fast broadband. Regarding Human Capital, France is eleventh, 0.58 points, gaining one position since the previous year; Internet users are 80% of the population.

The use of Internet makes Spain fourteenth, with 0.44 on 0.43 points.

While, Video on demand is the most used feature, 79%, followed by shopping online, 73%, and banking 63%. Social Networks are used by 46% of the population. In Integration of Digital Technology, France ranks twenty-first, 0.28 on 0.33. Regarding

¹⁰⁴ DESI 2015, Digital Economy and Society Index at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single_market/en/scoreboard/spain

¹⁰⁵ DESI 2015, Digital Economy and Society Index at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single_market/en/scoreboard/france

Digital Public Service, France is eighth, 0.53 on 0.47: Online Service Completion in 80 (0 to 700) and eGovernment users are 52%.

PORTUGAL.

Portugal¹⁰⁶ is ranked sixteenth, with an overall score of 0.48 on 0.48 points.

Fast Internet is available to 89% of people, but 30% of them have never used the Internet. Connectivity is 100%, indeed broadband connection is present in every home. Regarding Human Capital, Portugal is twenty-second, 0.43 points, gaining one position from the previous year; Internet users are 80% of the population.

The usage of Internet makes Portugal thirteenth, with 0.44 on 0.43 points. Reading news online is the most used feature, 74%, Social Networks, 72%, and Video on demand 62%. In Integration of Digital Technology, Portugal ranks twelfth, with 0.37 on 0.33 points. Regarding Digital Public Service, Portugal is seventh, 0.55 on 0.47 points. Online Service Completion in 98 (0 to 700) and Prefilled forms 76 (0 to 100).

POLAND.

Poland¹⁰⁷ is ranked twenty-third, with an overall score of 0.39 on 0.48.

Poland is improving its performance in each DESI dimension; thus, it is sixth in Europe for mobile broadband and seventh in making open datasets available.

Nonetheless, only 60% of homes subscribe to a fixed Internet connection, making Poland ranks twenty-fourth in Connectivity.

Regarding Human Capital, Poland is twenty-first, 0.43 points, gaining one position since the previous year; Internet users are 63% of the population.

The use of Internet makes Poland twenty-third, with 0.4 on 0.43 points. Reading news online is the most used feature, 71%, followed by Social Networks, 55%, and Banking 49%. In Integration of Digital Technology, Poland ranks twenty-sixth, with 0.21 on 0.33 points. Regarding Digital Public Service, Poland is fourteenth, 0.43 on 0.47 points.

Online Service Completion is 78, from 0 to 700, while eGovernment users are just 21%.

¹⁰⁶ DESI 2015, Digital Economy and Society Index at <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/scoreboard/portugal>

¹⁰⁷ DESI 2015, Digital Economy and Society Index at <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/scoreboard/poland>

ITALY.

Italy¹⁰⁸ is ranked twenty-fifth, with an overall score of 0.37 on 0.48 points.

Connectivity: Italy ranks twenty-seventh, indeed fast Internet is used by just 36% of households and subscription to fixed broadband are 51%, the lowest percentage in Europe.

Regarding Human Capital, Italy is twenty-fourth, 0.41 points, Internet users are 59% of the population, therefore 31% of Italians have never used the Internet. The use of Internet makes Italy twenty-sixth, with 0.34 on 0.43 points. Reading news online is the most used feature, 60%, followed by **Social Networks, 58%**, and Music, Videos and Games 52%. In Integration of Digital Technology, Italy ranks twentieth, 0.29 on 0.33 points. Regarding Digital Public Service, Italy is fifteenth, 0.42 on 0.47 points. Online Service Completion is 78, from 0 to 700. EGovernment users are just 18%.

ROMANIA.

Romania¹⁰⁹ is ranked twenty-eighth with an overall score of 0.32 on 0.48 points.

Connectivity: Romania ranks twenty-third, fast Internet is used by just 60% of households, this makes the country second in Europe. Regarding Human Capital, Romania is twenty-eighth with 0.27 points, Internet users are 48% of the population, and therefore 52% of Romanians have never used the Internet. The use of Internet makes Romania twenty-eighth, with 0.31 on 0.43. Reading news online is the most used feature, 70%, followed by Social Networks, 67%, and Music, Videos and Games 46%. In Integration of Digital Technology, Romania ranks twenty-seventh, 0.19 on 0.33. Regarding Digital Public Service, Romania is twenty-fourth, 0.31 on 0.47.

Online Service Completion is 51, from 0 to 700, eGovernment users just 5.8%.

Countries here analysed, the European Gendarmerie Force presents one high-performance country, the Netherlands; four medium- performance, Spain, France, Portugal and Lithuania, and three low- performance countries, Italy, Poland and Romania. Portugal is the most Social country, with 67% of people on Social Networks, while France is the less Social with only 46%.

¹⁰⁸ DESI 2015, Digital Economy and Society Index at <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/scoreboard/italy>

¹⁰⁹ DESI 2015, Digital Economy and Society Index at <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/scoreboard/romania>

As results from the analysis here reported, International Organisation as well as any governments should take advantage of Social Media to improve their appeal among citizens, not only at a National level but also at a European or International one.

Digital communication could help institution in the policies making process, by directly involving people in the procedure. The digital way of connecting authorities and people could reduce the traditional gap present between the two, intensifying the level of satisfaction among citizens, due to the central role that they can now have.

By being inclusive and democratic, Social Media could establish a positive attitude toward a military institution as the European Gendarmerie Force is; often associated by people with violence and warfare. Digitalisation could also support the Organisation in gaining new follower, becoming more and more known and recognisable. In order to achieve these goals, a specific and meticulously planned communication strategy is instrumental; always remembering that in the Social Media dimension every fault, inattention or thoughtlessness can be destructive.

This chapter offer an extraordinary support to the research, indeed, a precise analysis of the diffusion and the use of the Internet and Social Media trough Europe is fundamental when considering the digitalisation of the European Gendarmerie Force; indeed these data allow the Organisation to better focus its communication strategy, deciding whether to publish contents more focused toward a particularly social country, or to take advantage of social Member State as guidelines for its own.

Undoubtedly, these data are instrumental not only to have a general overview on the use of the Internet in EGF Member States, but also to set a precise analysis of the development of a solid communication strategy, as shown in the following chapters.

IV

COMPETITOR ANALYSIS

While introducing this first section, it is important to better clarify the meaning of the title *Competitor Analysis*. As a Military Institution, the European Gendarmerie Force has no competitors, but, in this specific case, we are going to analyse its behaviour as it was a company, comparing it to the behaviour of similar institutions. This enables us to deal with this research, as it was a market analysis. Thus, this chapter is focused on the online presence of other national and international institutions, which is functional to the paper, because all of them are rooted in the same ground: common defence and security.

The way I used to select institutions depends on the degree of closeness that these organisations have toward EGF. In each case we will analyse four categories: Twitter followers, Facebook likes, the presence of a YouTube channel, Instagram followers.

At the end I will try to summarise information, understanding what is the best strategy for EGF to embrace. I will consider national and international institutions in two different moments, hence numbers generally demonstrate that it would be useless to analyse everything together – with the only exception of Guardia Civil Twitter page that has over 198.000 more followers than NATO's Twitter account.

I will try to understand their strategies, underlining what is successful and what is not.

4.1 THE ANALYSIS: EGF MEMBERS, PARTNER AND OBSERVER

France- Gendarmerie National.

Twitter: 211.000 followers (verified)

Facebook: 545.337 Likes (verified)

YouTube:
3.870 subscribers • 2.401.667 views

Instagram: new. 1.156 followers.

Spain- Guardia Civil

Twitter: 553.000 (verified)

Facebook: 67.236

YouTube: 15.319 subscribers •
6.645.198 views

Instagram: nay

Portugal- Guarda Nacional Republicana

Twitter: 4.330 followers

Facebook: 260.071 likes (verified)

YouTube: 1.619 subscribers • 580.942
views

Instagram: 1.598 followers

The Netherlands- Koninklijke

Marechaussee

Twitter: 9.376 followers

Facebook: 15.171 likes

YouTube: Defensie channel 19.487
subscribers • 14. 302,663 views

Instagram: 6.017 followers

Romania- Jandarmeria Romana

Twitter: 40 followers

Facebook: 20.713 likes

YouTube: 48 followers

Instagram: nay

Italy- Arma dei carabinieri

Twitter: 11.200 followers

Facebook: 436.847 likes

YouTube: 847 subscribers – 58.622
views

Instagram: 5.335 followers

Poland- Zandarmeria Wojskowa

Twitter: nay

Facebook: 8.578 likes

YouTube: 120 subscribers • 42.082 views

Instagram: nay

Lithuania- Viesojų Saugumo Tarnyba

Twitter: nay

Facebook: 909 likes

Youtube: nay

Instagram: nay

Turkey- Jandarma

Twitter: 99 followers

Facebook: 17.294 likes

YouTube: nay

Instagram: nay

As a result of this analysis, Spanish Guardia Civil and French Gendarmerie National are the most followed social nations among EGF members. Out of them, Italian Arma dei Carabinieri embodies the most stunning results, in fact its digital pages, except for Facebook, were launched just over a year ago, as explained in paragraph 4.3. The corps' result is excellent, particularly if compared to poor results Italy has in the aforementioned Digital Economy and Society Index.

On the opposite side, there are Turkey and Lithuania, the less social countries.

Therefore, from this examination it is possible to determine the most interesting cases to study for the European Gendarmerie Force.

A deeper analysis will follow, as a suggestion for the Organisation, in order to grow on Social Media in the same way these corps did, always increasing the audience.

4.2 THE SPANISH CASE.

As shown in the analysis columns, Spain has the greatest results on two Social Media out of four: Twitter and YouTube, therefore they are analysed in the next paragraphs, along with Instagram.

1. Twitter: GUARDIA CIVIL.

The Twitter page of Guardia Civil, is a verified account with an open profile, thus it is easily findable by users, indeed in this way they know they are consulting the right page without the need to request and be accepted to a restricted group; the page is open, therefore whether people decide to follow it or not, they are going to see the contents of the page.

An open profile in these cases is always a good decision, because it reassures users and makes them feel part of the Guardia Civil Corp, involving them in their daily activities, which is one of the most important concepts that are to be considered when approaching a Social Media strategy.

What is on the page?

- It is possible to find numerous information about different topics: from how to deal with hot weather, to missing people, to giving blood, to safe driving;
- It presents original and ironic contents, often including videos and photos, feature that increase visibility.
- Various #, here few examples:
 - #ViajeSeguro** (summer # for drivers),
 - #TerrorismoGC**,
 - #Seprona** (# of the Servicio de Protección de la Naturaleza, realised to safeguard animals and the environment),
 - #DENUNCIA** and **#Colabora** (# used for different purposes: terrorism, missing people, bullism, abandoned dogs...).

Another significant issue is that on average Guardia Civil tweets 20 times a day. This is a very competitive result, because it shows how Guardia Civil Manage to always be in contact with the population.

Suggestions:

- When deciding the name of a @ or of an #, capital letters are always important, for that, @GuardiaCivil would be more appropriated.
- The European Gendarmerie Force does not need to tweet as much as Guardia Civil does, because the two Police Units provide two different services to the population. In this case, an average on 5 tweets per day would be suggested.

2. YouTube¹¹⁰: GUARDIA CIVIL.

The YouTube channel contents are explicative of Guardia Civil mission, indeed, on the platform is possible to watch short videos about operations and assistances to the population.

Despite the huge number of views, the YouTube account does not underline any feature particularly engaging, presented products are very traditional. However, Guardia Civil's YouTube channel presents an important detail, in the playlist section it is possible to find videos translated both in English and French.

Thus, given the ordinary nature of this feature, it is possible to affirm that the extraordinary number of subscribers and views largely depends on the visibility that the organisation has on other Social Media, and, of course, on the success that Guardia Civil has in Spain¹¹¹.

The case of this specific country is very interesting, because it is the perfect explanation of the reciprocity that Social Media and institutions should have.

¹¹⁰ <https://www.youtube.com/user/guardiacivil/featured>

¹¹¹ Data available on CIS, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológica. Estudio 3021, Barómetro de Abril 2014. Question 9: How much trust do you have in institutions on a scale from 0 to 10? (A continuación, me gustaría que me dijese el grado de confianza que tiene Ud. en una serie de instituciones, utilizando una escala de 0 a 10 en la que 0 significa que no tiene Ud. "ninguna confianza" en ella y 10 que tiene "muchísima confianza"). Guardia Civil obtained the first place with an average of 5.78, followed by police 5.70. While, in this year survey, it is possible to state that the majority of people trust the organisation. (Estudio 3080 Barómetro de Abril 2015).



3. Instagram: GUARDIA CIVIL.

Guardia Civil has no official Instagram account. However, there are many unofficial pages that post particularly engaging pictures.

In this regard, I would like to underline the page @guardiacivil_, which is a very-well stocked page, with engaging photos. Moreover, it is possible to find a huge amount of attractive pictures on the two official Guardia Civili's Tumblr¹¹² and Flickr¹¹³ profiles.

4.3 THE ITALIAN CASE.

It is important to dedicate a deeper analysis to the Italian Arma dei Carabinieri, because of its improvement on Social Media, particularly regarding Twitter, Instagram and YouTube. At the same time, it is necessary to consider the question of the unofficial Facebook profile associated with the Corps and the possible poor consequences it can generate in terms of web reputation if not removed.

Generally, it is possible to affirm that the Arma dei Carabinieri has strongly improved its online presence.



1. Twitter: ARMA DEI CARABINIERI.

The Carabinieri official Twitter account has been activated on September 28, 2015.

Less than a year later, it counts about 11.200 followers and more than 200 tweets.

The profile is particularly engaging, offering a wide variety of pictures and messages for the population. The Prime Minister of Italy has a strong presence on it, as well as the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Defence. Their presence, together with the collaboration with other Italian forces as Polizia di Stato, Marina Militare and Esercito, is aimed to create a new and appreciated atmosphere of cooperation and balance within the Nation.

¹¹² <http://canalguardiacivil.tumblr.com/>

¹¹³ <https://www.flickr.com/photos/guardiacivil/>

On their first appearance on Twitter, Carabinieri launched the #PossiamoAiutarvi, also used in English #WeCanHelpYou, which is the most used hashtag. Considering the choice of using one recurrent #, I would like to state that this is a winning idea. It depends on the fact that this repeated # creates a strong identity based on the idea of trust, historically related to the Carabinieri Corps, but partially lost within the last years of institutional crisis in Italy.

In this sense, it is possible to compare the Italian case to the Spanish case, in the regard of the renewed trust in military organisation. For sure, for Italian Carabinieri Social Media presence can represent the right solution to overcome the above-mentioned institutional crisis.

Moreover, as Guardia Civil, Carabinieri are bounding with the population by promoting engaging activities, like their commitment to preserve and safeguard Italian artistic and cultural heritage.

2. YouTube: ARMA DEI CARABINIERI.

The Carabinieri YouTube channel was launched on July 23, 2015 and has rapidly grown since then.

The channel presents interesting feature. The first one that I would like to underline is the existence of a section dedicate to children and teenagers, focused on online risks. Therefore, Carabinieri aim youngsters to be aware of dishonest people out in the web.

Secondly, there are four short films on different topics, stalking, violence against women, drugs and bullism. Thirdly, it is important to mention commercials and operations.

Almost every video is watermarked with the Twitter #PossiamoAiutarvi, to create a continuum within the two digital platforms.

3. Facebook: ARMA DEI CARABINIERI.

On this regard, the Carabinieri Facebook page would be the most followed one, with 436.847 followers, if there was not presenting a problem: the page is neither official, nor verified, therefore it is a fake profile created by users and not by the Corps.

Secondly, the fake page, which is significantly followed, has not been shut down yet. Consequences to this kind of digital negligence are unpleasant; indeed, a not updated page lives room for every kind of poor comment and

In these case the suggestion is to dissociate from the false profile, in order to keep brand reputation undamaged, while opening an official and verified page. This should be mandatory even for an unofficial profile, especially if, as in this case, it has such a number of followers, considering that a National Organisation, as much as an International one, has the possibility to control unofficial accounts. This is instrumental to maintain the ephemeral web reputation balanced.

4.4 THE DUTCH CASE.



1. Facebook: KONINKLIJKE MARECHAUSSEE.

It is important to dedicate a paragraph to the Facebook page of the Koninklijke Marechaussee, because the Dutch Royal Military Police online presence is mostly represented here.

This Facebook account is particularly engaging, presenting many interesting and colourful pictures that describe everyday activities. The page definitely represents a pleasant example to follow for the European Gendarmerie Force.

The aim of the Dutch Royal Military Police is to involve citizens attention by making them part of the activities, an always-winning tactic, particularly when it comes to digital communication.

Concluding, at a national level, Spanish Guardia Civil and Italian Carabinieri are the gendarmerie forces that have better improved their presence on Social Media. Moreover, this analysis also permits to discover very interesting facts as the winning correlation between Social Media and institutions, that, in the case of Guardia Civil, has permitted to the Corps to become the most trusted institutions by people; indeed, a stunning digital strategy supported by traditional offline assistances to the population, contributed to the impressive result obtained by Guardia Civil, although the eventuality of the economic crisis.

Henceforth, the advice the European Gendarmerie Force should take from the nations analysed in this paper, is to create engaging Social Media profiles, by posting or tweeting photos and posts of everyday activities and ironic pictures, remembering freshness and transparency, the most crucial and rewarding qualities to go social, aimed to both inform and captive users.

4.5 THE ANALYSIS: EGF INTERNATIONAL ENDORSEMENT

United Nations	Twitter: 7.17 ml likes	NATO	
		Twitter: 356. 000	
Facebook: 1.982.571 l		Facebook: 1.116.132 likes	
YouTube: 97.942 subscribers • 21,805,773 views		YouTube: 10.536.698 subscribers • 8,023,114 views	
Instagram: 628.000 followers		Instagram: Nay	
OSCE		European Union: the European Parliament	
Twitter: 69,900 followers		Twitter: EP: 127,000 EC: 420,000	
Facebook: 54, 185		Facebook: EP: 1.828.978 EC: 459.148	
YouTube: 1,379 subscribers • 419,388 views – BUT, organization for security and cooperation in Europe		YouTube: EP: 16,768 subscribers • 30,270,180 views EC: 31,130 subscribers • 24,497,870 views	
Instagram: 1019		Instagram: EP: 6808 (unverified) EC: 2154 (unverified).	


4.6 THE NATO CASE.

The NATO Case is particularly engaging thanks to the attention that the North Atlantic Organization puts into the communication sector. Indeed, NATO has a Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency) that also includes a small Social Media Team. The stunning capability of the Agency enables NATO to have a powerful Social Media structure. One of the main aims of NATO social strategy is the will to combine NATO mission and society.

This is a winning idea, because it is helping rebranding the organisation, from the role it played since the Cold War as a totally military organisation, to the new NATO.


We can find an example of this aspect of a Social Media strategy, in the Information section of the Facebook page:

Elucidated in the information page, it is possible to find the main aim of the organisation, the *mission*, followed by many cross-references to official websites, and a very important explanation on how comments left on the page do not represent NATO official opinion. The European Gendarmerie Force should take the latter feature into consideration, because not having proper responsibilities on what users say is crucial for any organisation, particularly for an institution that could appear controversial to some. Indeed, in these cases, it is important to



About NATO

Page Info	MILESTONES												
Milestones	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>2009</td> <td>Croatia and Albania join NATO</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2004</td> <td>Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania join NATO.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1999</td> <td>Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland join NATO</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1982</td> <td>Spain joins NATO</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1965</td> <td>West Germany joins NATO</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1952</td> <td>Greece and Turkey join NATO</td> </tr> </table>	2009	Croatia and Albania join NATO	2004	Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania join NATO.	1999	Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland join NATO	1982	Spain joins NATO	1965	West Germany joins NATO	1952	Greece and Turkey join NATO
2009	Croatia and Albania join NATO												
2004	Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania join NATO.												
1999	Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland join NATO												
1982	Spain joins NATO												
1965	West Germany joins NATO												
1952	Greece and Turkey join NATO												



About NATO

Page Info	PAGE INFO
Milestones	<p>Short description</p> <p>This is the official Facebook page of NATO - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - http://www.nato.int</p> <p>Comments posted by fans do not necessarily represent official opinion or policy of member governments, or of NATO.</p>
	<p>General Information</p> <p>The NATO Facebook page is meant to provide an environment for people to discuss NATO. Although NATO does not monitor every F... See more</p>
	<p>Mission</p> <p>Peace and Security</p>
	<p>Awards</p> <p>Shorty Award 2015 Honourable Mention</p>
	<p>Website</p> <p>http://www.nato.int, http://twitter.com/NATO, http://youtube.com/NATO, http://flickr.com/nato, http://google.com/+nato, http://linkedin.com/company/nato</p>

consider the fact that many followers will be more attracted by the divisive nature of the subject, more than the values of the organisation itself. Similar behaviours could conduct to strong debates disputed online, comments that will be there, ready for anyone to see. In order to not compromise its reputation both online and offline, the European Gendarmerie Force should follow NATO example, that is to state the Organisation non-responsibility in users' comments and posts.

Moreover, users can consult the Organisation goals, which under a marketing point of view is instrumental; indeed, it allows followers to grasp the crucial information that the institution they are exploring has won important prizes for its actions; rewards are a crucial feature of involvement, in customers it creates a feeling of protection and success.

NATO Social Media strategy is, among the International Organisations here considered, the most accurate and detailed one. The suggestion for the European Gendarmerie Force is to take into consideration the NATO example.



1. FACEBOOK: NATO.

NATO Facebook page is particularly engaging, due to the conspicuous number of posts and photos.

This is why it has such a great number of followers, which are attracted by the originality and the efficiencies of the contents, the presence of colourful pictures and the existence of short videos that mostly represent NATO military and social activities. Social involvement is part of the change in the organisation, indeed as the majority of national military organisations, the trend is to readapt to nowadays situation. The focus is now on people and habits, e.g., one of the topics of the short videos NATO proposes is the strong crucial role of women in different parts of the world.

Therefore, two main aspects are particularly significant about NATO Facebook page: information and visual contents.

Colourful pictures that include almost every activity of the Organisation compose the photo section: political meetings, visits, history, life abroad and general society related aspects. All the photos are organised in albums, with short and descriptive titles. Frequently, pictures with quotes by the Secretary General are posted. Obviously, this is the best modus operandi to create values and, probably even more importantly, to refresh the Organisation values.

2. YOUTUBE: NATO.

NATO marketing capabilities are well proved also within the YouTube channel.

Indeed, the graphic is finished and organised. Videos are gathered in playlists, with short and descriptive titles. On the YouTube channel, there is a higher number of videos¹¹⁴, as well as plenty of society-orientated videos.

We can find a relevant example in the Women, Peace and Security section, but also in the hilarious My Big Fat Pricey Afghan Wedding documentary, which follows the format of a famous wedding-related reality show.

¹¹⁴ May 2016, 2286 videos on YouTube.



3. TWITTER: NATO.

Once more the strategy is confirmed: NATO Twitter account is almost perfect. Essentially, it includes all the features that a Twitter page should have.

The majority of Tweets include photos or short videos, which increase visibility of the 18%¹¹⁵ than those without and 150% more retweet¹¹⁶.

Furthermore, on the NATO Twitter page users can follow live streaming sessions, a great opportunity to involve users.

NATO CHALLENGES.

NATO has another very stimulating way to involve its audience, indeed, it organises numerous challenges.

For example, the 2014 “What is NATO” Infographic Contest¹¹⁷ was aimed to a visual representation of NATO. While, the 2015 NATO’s Logo Contest asked users to create a logo for the new NATO HQ in Brussels. In this case, winners were announced on Twitter¹¹⁸ and both the campaign had complete Social Media Coverage.

¹¹⁵ <https://support.twitter.com/articles/20156423>

¹¹⁶ Analytics from Buffer, 2013.

¹¹⁷ <http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/call-for-submissions-what-is-nato-infographic-contest>

¹¹⁸ <https://twitter.com/nato/status/614392836096589824>

4.7 REFERENCES TO SOCIAL MEDIA

France- Gendarmerie National.

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/Gendarmerie?lang=it>

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/gendarmerienationale/?fref=ts>

YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCqxXM5u3U1jwrI36fSB9VuA>

Instagram:

Spain- Guardia Civil

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/?lang=it>

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/GuardiaCivil.es>

YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/user/guardiacivil>

Instagram: NO [unofficial @guardiacivil_ https://www.instagram.com/guardiacivil_/]

Portugal- Guarda Nacional Republicana

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/GNRepublicana?lang=it>

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/GuardaNacionalRepublicana/>

YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/user/GuardaRepublicana>

Instagram: <https://www.instagram.com/guardanacionalrepublicana/>

The Netherlands- Koninklijke Marechaussee

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/marechaussee?lang=it>

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/KoninklijkeMarechausseeOfficieel/>

YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/user/defensie/about>

Instagram: <https://www.instagram.com/kon.marechaussee/>

Romania- Jandarmeria Romana

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/JandarmeriaRo?lang=it>

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/Jandarmeria-Rom%C3%A2n%C4%83-814952568554378/?fref=ts>

YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCLBeqwN3qN6GsDqDvyxRusA>

Instagram: NO

Italy- Arma dei Carabinieri

Twitter: https://twitter.com/_Carabinieri_?lang=it

Facebook: unofficial https://www.facebook.com/arma.dei.carabinieri/info/?tab=page_info

YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCUDqf6fFfavY5bVw14358PA>

Instagram: <https://www.instagram.com/armadeicarabinieri/>

Poland- Zandarmeria Wojskowa

Twitter: NO

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/ZandarmeriaWojskowa/?fref=ts>

YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCORHIIlnAEYrigLmoh2hV8A/about>

Instagram: no

Lithuania- Viesojø Saugumo Tarnyba

Twitter: no

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/viesojosaugumotarnyba>

YouTube: no

Instagram: no

Turkey- Jandarma

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/jandarmauzman1>

Facebook:
<https://www.facebook.com/KanunOrdusuJandarma/timeline>

YouTube: no

V

THE EUROPEAN GENDARMERIE FORCE STRATEGY

A Social Media campaign is necessary to reach the desired audience and spread the European Gendarmerie Force identity and culture virally.

Competitor analysis results analyse the fundamental importance of improving the brand presence on Instagram, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Social Media are the new advertising reality, so it is very important for EGF to get involved in it, possibly by being sponsored on national and international partners' pages in the first place.

Here is strongly recommended to enforce the usage of the four mentioned Social Media, by constantly updating them with new posts, photos or short videos regarding activities and values the organisation wants to transmit to the followers.

Moreover, it would be important for the brand to participate to both online and offline events, organised by national and international members and partners, always publicizing the hashtag of the on-going Social Media campaign or generally the hashtag of the organisation itself, it would give massive visibility to the Gendarmerie Force.

5.1 TWITTER VIRAL CAMPAIGN

A viral campaign is a marketing strategy that aims to promote brand visibility by using unconventional tools like the Internet and Social Media. In the last years, viral campaigns have partially overthrown classic advertisement campaigns, due to the fact that generally, they have relatively low costs and are easier to arrange, when compared to classic advs.

Moreover, viral offer the possibility to reach a campaigns vast variety of people, globally.

TABLE I

Twitter users		
<i>Among online adults, the % who use Twitter</i>		
	2013	2014
All internet users	18%	23%*
Men	17	24*
Women	18	21
White, Non-Hispanic	16	21 *
Black, Non-Hispanic	29	27
Hispanic	16	25
18-29	31	37
30-49	19	25
50-64	9	12
65+	5	10*
High school grad or less	17	16
Some college	18	24
College+ (n= 685)	18	30*
Less than \$30,000/yr	17	20
\$30,000-\$49,999	18	21
\$50,000-\$74,999	15	27*
\$75,000+	19	27*
Urban	18	25*
Suburban	19	23
Rural	11	17

Source: Pew Research Center's Internet Project September Combined Omnibus Survey, September 11-14 & September 18-21, 2014. N=1,597 internet users ages 18+. The margin of error for all internet users is +/- 2.9 percentage points. 2013 data from Pew Internet August Tracking Survey, August 07 - September 16, 2013, n= 1,445 internet users ages 18+.

Note: Percentages marked with an asterisk (*) represent a significant change from 2013. Results are significant at the 95% confidence level using an independent z-test.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Why would EGF choose Twitter? On this point statistics are clear, as Pew Research Centre stresses, Twitter is the perfect tool to reach a specific target. In the year between 2013 and 2014, the usage of Twitter has increased by 5%, a great result especially if compared to other Social Media¹¹⁹.

Another decisive data, is the growth in the last year of adult users, college-educated, who live in urban realities and with an annual income of \$75,000 or more.

In numbers it means that adult Twitter users in the United States are 34.7 million of people¹²⁰, of these 51% follow companies and products, as shown in table II¹²¹.

TWITTER USERS BEHAVIOUR - BUSINESS	
51%	follow companies, brands and products
3 times	more likely to follow brands than Facebook users
42%	learn about product and services via Twitter
67%	more likely to buy from brands they follow on twitter
37%	purchase from brands they follow
79%	follow a brand to get exclusive content
85%	feel more connected with a small business after following them
60%	follow a brand to get customer service support
29%	growth of offline sales when using a promoted tweet.

¹¹⁹ Facebook, the most used Social Media has not increased the number of users in the year between 2013-2014, Pew Research Centre.

¹²⁰ In 2014

¹²¹ Table 2 has been created by using different websites: Twitter, Hubspot74 and Edison.

As a result, table II shows that firms involvement in Twitter has a positive influence on the brand reputation and visibility, and it is possible to notice that brand interaction is a big part of Twitter.

How can the European Gendarmerie Force implement a Twitter strategy?

Twitter has a section completely dedicated to firms who want to run a Twitter campaign, here are explained all the necessary steps a company needs to take in order to succeed¹²².

Twitter allows users to promote their Tweets in the Twitter Ads section, what is very helpful about this feature is that the firm can select the target it wants to reach, by keywords, interest and profile, and of course the firm can geo- target the audience of the campaign.

Once set all the information, and chosen a name, the campaign will start running.

Regarding the launching of the campaign, it is important to consider both the Business Twitter¹²³ section and the Ads Twitter¹²⁴ section.

The Business Twitter section is created to help companies improve their visibility, by selecting what is necessary for it. For example, you can expand your follower base or increase Tweet engagement¹²⁵. The Business Section also offers a blog, where successful twitter campaigns are reported.

The Ads section permits to create your own campaign by increasing the Internet trafficking and the number of followers, plus by setting a budget it permits to increase the visibility of your Tweets related to the campaign you are running.

What is particularly engaging about this part is that the firm can decide the budgeted daily, and once it is reached, Twitter is not going to charge you more than what you set. Twitter offers the possibility to get in touch with their Ads experts, to make you optimise as much as possible your budget.

Moreover, with the Ads section¹²⁶ and the Marketing section, it is possible to have statistical analyses of consumers' behaviours and therefore optimise the firm actions.

¹²² - <https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169567>-creating-a-campaign-promoted-tweets-targeting-your-profile

- <https://biz.twitter.com/ad-products>

¹²³ <https://business.twitter.com/en-gb/basics>

¹²⁴ <https://biz.twitter.com/ad-products>

¹²⁵ <https://business.twitter.com/en-gb?location=emea> 10

¹²⁶ <https://biz.twitter.com/marketing-twitter> 11

Within the Marketing section a firm can access to the Marketing Platform Partners, which includes a variety of Twitter partners that can help in reaching marketing goals¹²⁷.

The Business Section also offers a blog, where successful twitter campaigns are reported¹²⁸. The Ads section permits to create your own campaign by increasing the Internet trafficking and the number of followers, plus by setting a budget it permits to increase the visibility of your Tweets related to the campaign you are running.

5.2 FACEBOOK ADVERTS CAMPAIGN

Facebook also represents a relevant tool to our purposes, presenting features completely dedicated to business, that I am going to analyse in this section. Facebook Adverts gives the possibility to reach different audiences and get your business goal by choosing your audience with targeting options such as location, demographics, interest and behaviours.

The Lookalike Audiences is another helpful tool that helps firms and organisations to find more people who have common features with best customers.

Once ready and launched, the advert is shown alongside people posts and can direct them directly to the main website.

EGF is going to be in complete control of the budget; indeed, it can be set daily and stopped at any time.

The cost model of a Facebook Adverts campaign is based on two different features:

- CPC¹²⁹ (Cost per Click): you pay when someone clicks on your ad
- CPM¹³⁰ (Cost per 1,000): you pay for each 1,000 people who have seen it.

The cost depends on what other advertisers are willing to pay for clicks from same demographic.

¹²⁷ <https://biz.twitter.com/partners/list/marketing-platform-partners>

¹²⁸ <https://business.twitter.com/it/success-stories.html>

¹²⁹ Joseph Sassoon, *Web Storytelling*, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2012, p 72

¹³⁰ *Ibidem*

The principle is that bigger is the firm, higher is the competition and so the cost.

In EGF case we can estimate an average cost of approximately €5 daily, which means that a 3 months campaign would cost about €450. Thus, in €5 there are 21 clicks (daily) and 7,5 CPM.

The best way to understand what method better fits your business, is to try them both, minding that usually CPC gives a higher click through rate, while CPM creates fewer but cheaper clicks.

The ideal tool would be Twitter, because of its better understanding of business requirements. At the same time Twitter disable the possibility for users to create a huge debate by answering.

Regarding Facebook, we have to recognise that it is much more used than Twitter for what concerns private use, thus, probably at first it would be easier, and less time-consuming, to use Facebook, while understanding the functioning of Twitter for business. As we saw both tools offer great possibility for firms and organisations that want to spread their voice into the Internet.

Nevertheless, it is important to remember in every step of the process that the only Social Media campaign that it is worth running is a planned and well- finished one. Otherwise, as said at the beginning of this work, it would be better not to use Social Media, because the audience is going to remember every single mistake we make.

VI

THE SURVEY

This section is dedicated to the survey on values, which I conducted at the European Gendarmerie Force.

The aim of the survey is to gather information on values and principles about EGF from the inside. This enables us to collect ideas for rebranding the Organisation concept of identity by using a bottom-up approach, which is suggested as mostly succeeding. Indeed, storytelling is the best tool to conquer every Social Media audience: the secret lies in the creation of a story. It is important to underline that within the web stories spread horizontally, thus, to arrive to people and be catching, they have to be originated by people. Storytelling enables firms and organisations to create a special bond with costumers and followers by defining personal style and contents; peculiar signs able make any firm and organisation recognisable to the audience.

In this way, it is possible to create a targeted audience willing to follow you.

Here is the survey followed by its results.

SURVEY: HOW WE CREATE OUR VALUES?

I. THREE WORDS THAT DESCRIBE EUROGENDFOR IDENTITY.

II. THREE WORDS THAT DESCRIBE EGF IDEAL TEAM CULTURE.

III. ACCORDING TO YOU, WHAT IS THE GENERAL OPINION ABOUT EGF?

IV. WOULD YOU LIKE TO HAVE A FEEDBACK FROM THE GENERAL AUDIENCE? IF YES, WHY?

V. WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE PEOPLE TO THINK ABOUT EGF?

VI. WHAT PEOPLE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT EGF?

VII. DO YOU THINK THERE IS A MISCONCEPTION ABOUT EGF? IF YES, COULD YOU EXPLAIN WHY?

VIII. IS PUBLIC OPINION IMPORTANT TO YOU? OR, YOU DO NOT REALLY CARE ABOUT WHAT PEOPLE AND THE PRESS THINK?

IX. HAVE YOU EVER FELT YOUR ROLE AS AN EGF MEMBER DIMINISHED BY PUBLIC OPINION?

6.1 RESULTS

1. THREE WORDS THAT DESCRIBE EUROGENDFOR IDENTITY.

Here are the most used words:

GENDARMERIE	3	DEPLOYABLE	2
ROBUST	3	COMMITMENT	2
MILITARY	3	POLICE	2

Followed (all in the order of 1) by: Aid – Availability -Brand – Cohesion – Concreteness – Desirable – Efficient – Engagement – Europe – Flexible – Generosity – Integrity – International – Interoperability – Law enforcement – Misunderstood – Quick reacting – Reactivity – Stability – Vague – Wide Approach.

Negative words: Vague (1) + Misunderstood (1).

2.THREE WORDS THAT DESCRIBE EGF IDEAL TEAM CULTURE.

Here are the most used words:

COMMUNICATION	2	FRIENDSHIP	2
COOPERATION	2	HONOUR	2
FLEXIBILITY	2	PROFESSIONAL	2
TEAM	2	UNITY	2

Followed (all in the order of 1) by: Accountability – Compatibility – Confidence – Coordination - Credibility – Durable – Effectiveness - Generosity – Interaction – Multicultural – Mutual respect – Open-minded – Pride – Respectful – Sincere – Strong – Together.

Common words between Q. 1 and Q. 2:

COMMITMENT	2+1	LOYALTY	1+1
FLEXIBILITY	1+2	MULTINATIONAL	1+1
GENEROSITY	1+1	RELEVANT	1+1
DEPLOYABLE	1+1		

3.ACCORDING TO YOU, WHAT IS THE GENERAL OPINION ABOUT EGF?

Out of 13 interviewed:

Opinions: 1 Positive • 1 Average • 11 Negative

1 POSITIVE	“SUPPORT MISSIONS ABROAD”
1 MEDIUM	“LOVE IT OR HATE IT”
11 NEGATIVE	ALMOST UNKNOWN IS THE COMMON OPINION
	<p>RELEVANT NOTES:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UNKNOWN ALSO BY MOST OF COLLEAGUES; - NO IDENTITY, NO VISION, NO VALUES.

4.WOULD YOU LIKE TO HAVE A FEEDBACK FROM THE GENERAL AUDIENCE? IF YES, WHY?

Out of 13 interviewed.

Opinions: 10 POSITIVE • 1 Average • 2 Negative

RELEVANT NOTES:

Positive: The general opinion among those who said that having a feedback from the audience is important is that it would both help EGF to RESOLVE public opinion DOUBTS about the Organisation, and also “to be more EFFICIENT in the DIALOGUE with people”. Moreover, it would be helpful to “feel the SUPPORT of the public, so it would act like a SOURCE of LEGITTIMACY”, and to “[to] improve, to be more EFFICIENT, transmit the citizens what we are doing with their MONEY. Be able to

SOLVE MISUNDERSTANDING”.

Average: not relevant for people in EGF, but instrumental to open a political debate.

5. WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE PEOPLE TO THINK ABOUT EGF?

Here are the most used words:

HELP	3
CRISIS MANAGEMENT	3
PEACE	3

RELEVANT NOTES: “[...] close to the most vulnerable people who suffer the consequences of a crisis”; “We are a link between people and governments”.

6. WHAT PEOPLE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT EGF?

Out of 13 interviewed:

HELP	3
CRISIS MANAGEMENT	3
PEACE	3
5 INTERVIEWED	PRINCIPLES AND VALUES
4 INTERVIEWED	SIMILAR TO THE U.N.
3 INTERVIEWED	JURIDICAL FRAMEWORK
2 INTERVIEWED	WEBSITE INFORMATION ARE
	ENOUGH
1 INTERVIEWED	NOT ANSWERED

7. Do you think there is a misconception about EGF? If so, could you explain why?

Out of 13 interviewed:

11 POSITIVE 1 No idea 1 Not answered

RELEVANT NOTES:

“EGF does not have a proper identity, a vision, a mission. This is why it cannot transmit the right message to society because there is no message to disseminate”.

“There are many who are against military in general, especially military involved in civilian affairs. These people voice their opinions and EGF does not put efforts in countering this largely untrue information strategy”.

8. Is public opinion important to you? Or, you do not really care about what people and the press think?

Out of 13 interviewed:

11 POSITIVE • 1 Do not care • 1 Not answered

RELEVANT NOTES:

Among those who answered that public opinion is important, 2 said that it is vital, while, 4 said that it is extremely important to be successful.

9. Have you ever felt your role as an EGF member diminished by public opinion?

Out of 13 interviewed:

4 POSITIVE • 2 Not answered • 7 Negative

RELEVANT NOTES:

Results to the four positive answers are particularly interesting to explore, because they

present all different standpoints.

Among the interviewed, there is who has felt diminished in its role by extremist groups instead of public opinion, as suggested by the survey, or there is who point to the amount of untrue information on the Internet.

Moreover, a part of the interviewed said that the majority of people do not have an idea of what the European Gendarmerie Force is.

Lastly, a part of the interviewed affirms that their role has been diminished since their first day in EGF, because of the negative behaviour public opinion had.

Nevertheless, among these non-positive responses, there is an answer that stands out because of its countertrend nature: despite the presence of some hostile minorities groups, the general opinion is in favour of EGF.

6.2 THE EUROPEAN GENDARMERIE FORCE ON SOCIAL MEDIA

As results from the survey, the values that the European Gendarmerie Force has to transmit to the audience are the main characteristics of the gendarmerie itself: the ability of being rapidly ready and efficient in case of crisis, the capability to solve problems.

Essentially, to spread these information, features like friendship, cooperation, communication and unity are essential.

These principles are going to be the foundation of the EGF digital strategy. Indeed, these are not only the most used words to describe EGF ideal team, as the surveys question says, but are also the perfect results for storytelling.

Starting from these words, we can create a story in which people can actually identify, indeed, who dislikes friendship or cooperation?

Moreover, these words also have a common background in everyone's life; we all have experienced friendship, cooperation, communication and flexibility.

Thus, regarding concept like honour, everyone has at least once aspired to feel pleased for belonging to an organisation or a particular group. Therefore, the European Gendarmerie Force will provide this unique opportunity to its audience: experience the feeling of belonging to a gendarmerie force that helps a European based society.

As this paper underlines, Social Media and more generally digital communication, are not optional anymore to an organisation, but compulsory.

The European Gendarmerie Force should embrace new communication tools to empower its online presence.

Concluding this chapter, I would like to state out few last important advices on how to run a successful digital campaign.

Keep it simple is the first one. The easier, the better.

The European Gendarmerie Force should constitute a proper Communication Team that should always remember to meticulously plan every step of the strategy before make it becoming digital reality.

Ideas should never result from a political compromise; instead they have to be free and able to develop in their own shape.

At the same time, defending an idea at any cost can be deleterious for the campaign and consequently for the organisation, which is why the EGF Communication Team should brief daily.

Finally, fail fast, fail cheap¹³¹, fail good, because creativity can only increase.

¹³¹ Rob Asghar, *Why Silicon Valley's 'Fail Fast' Mantra Is Just Hype*, Forbes, 2014.
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/robasghar/2014/07/14/why-silicon-valleys-fail-fast-mantra-is-just-hype/#4261e2302236>

VII

INTERNATIONAL PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Due to its short existence, its relatively low rate of engagement abroad and mostly the lack of external communication, the European Gendarmerie Force is generally a not well-known International Organisation. These three main statements led the European Gendarmerie Force to experience heavy waves of negative interactions with public opinion and international press and blogs.

The establishment of EGF intensely provoked the opinion of extremist groups throughout Europe, involving the majority of European States.

Notwithstanding the complexity of the subject, it is important to investigate how and why public opinion reacted in such a way toward the European Gendarmerie Force¹³², therefore two main enquiries are to examine. Firstly, the Italian scenario, at both a local and a National level. Why did Italy, the host country hostilely reacted toward EGF? What reasons lies behind Italian public opinion behaviour?

Secondly, the European level. Why did extremist groups throughout Europe responded with resentment? Where did they found room to nourish the myth of a new Gestapo?

To answer these questions, is essential to address what the general idea of the European Gendarmerie Force is, what are the most common critiques toward it, who are its main critics and why it is criticised.

The third section of the second paragraph, analyses the European Gendarmerie Force faults and how they contributed to the development of the quarrel, to understand how such a small reality can lead to so many misunderstandings and misconceptions. The last section of this paragraph shows how EGF difficulties mostly depend on lack of communication and the absence of a strong concept of identity within the organisation itself.

¹³² In 2006, the first demonstration held against the European Gendarmerie Force, was joined by more than fifteen-thousands people. In 2007, forty-two protests took place toward the Organisation. Loris Caruso, *Il Territorio della Politica. La Nuova Partecipazione di Massa nei Movimenti No Tav e No Dal Molin*, Franco Angeli, 2011, p.86-89

7.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF A SOLID OFFLINE PRESENCE: PROTESTS AND FAULTS

This section analyses opinions and critiques spread on online blogs and articles, which is fundamental to understand how important digital communication is for an International Organisation, particularly if, as in this case, it is a military institution.

In the case of the European Organisation this datum is strictly linked with three main reasons here explained.

Firstly, the general but central thesis that opinions expressed online gather the actual feeling of the public. In this sense, it is possible to talk about not only the national feeling of people living in the country or town where the organisation is, but without any doubt the internet permits a gathering of ideas and sensations at an international level.

Secondly, the fact that EGF is a military Organisation established in an era in which military organisations were not well embraced and, as Michael Walzer emphasises, territory is a very important notion to consider because *it specify the rights of its inhabitants, and recognise the collective right of admission and refusal*¹³³

In fact, due to the brutal experience of international conflicts occurred in the last years, expressly after the scourge of September 11 attacks¹³⁴ and the following harsh Western response, International public opinion started reconsidering the concept of armed attack, preferring instead opposite ways of resolution. Indeed, in such a violent situation, humanitarian response begin to seem a much more appropriate response.

It is in this background that we can collocate the third point, which is connected to the establishment and the development of the European Gendarmerie Force.

The military organisation has been placed in Vicenza, a town in North East Italy, which hosts many other international military institutions, as NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence¹³⁵ and the American Camp Ederle¹³⁶.

At the outburst of the Afghan war¹³⁷¹³⁸, Vicenza public opinion heated in an escalation of events, from the Afghan War, to the Iraqi Intervention¹³⁹, to the enlargement of Camp Ederle with the construction of a second U.S. Military base, Camp Del Din.

¹³³ Michael Walzer, *The Distribution of Membership*, in *Global Justice: Seminal Essays*, Paragon House, 2008, p. 159

¹³⁴ 9/11 Memorial, <https://www.911memorial.org/faq-about-911>

¹³⁵ NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence, <http://www.nspcoe.org/about-us/history/nato-sp-coe>

¹³⁶ Camp Ederle, <http://www.italy.army.mil/>

¹³⁷ 2001-2002. Alan Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, Oxford University Press, 2013, p 242

¹³⁸ Anna Caffarena, *Le Organizzazioni Internazionali*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2009, p 143

The latter issue is instrumental to the development of the critiques toward the European Gendarmerie Force, therefore, it is important to analyse it.

The reported escalation of events led to the creation of a large movement in Vicenza, the No Dal Molin Movement, an association created by citizens opposed to the American presence in the city.

The Movement moved its first steps in 2004¹⁴⁰, when the Italian Government authorised the construction of Camp Ederle detachment, Camp Dal Din. The reasons that favoured the creation of the No Dal Molin Movement lie in the ideological opposition toward an over-militarisation of the city and toward the presence of a large number of American soldiers.

At first the No Dal Molin, whose main aim is political opposition, was a reality of the city. Participants organised the first demonstration on August 2006¹⁴¹, to protest against the American barracks. But, within a short time, the Movement gained National resonance. On December 2006, the first National demonstration took place in Vicenza. More than thirty thousand people participated, for the large part dissident cells belonging to other extremist Italian groups, as the one created in Val di Susa to halt the construction of the High-speed.

The protests of the Movement continued throughout the following years, reporting cases of Environmental Pollution in Vicenza attributable to the U.S. Camp and law violations committed by American soldiers, sadly remained unpunished¹⁴²¹⁴³.

As stated in interviews, the history of the No Dal Molin Movement crosses the history of the European Gendarmerie Force on January 19 2006¹⁴⁴, when five dissident groups, Nuovo Capannone Vicenza, Associazione Ya Basta! Vicenza, Coordinamento Studentesco Vicenza, Coordinamento Liberazione Altovicentino and Cantieri, gathered to demonstrate against the European Gendarmerie Force in the day of the Opening Ceremony.

¹³⁹ 2003-201. Ibidem

¹⁴⁰ No DalMolin, <http://www.nodalmolin.it/Storia-del-movimento-vicentino#.V1VKEZN95WM>

¹⁴¹ <http://www.nodalmolin.it/Storia-del-movimento-vicentino#.V1VKEZN95WM>

¹⁴² Due to the fact that American Criminal Law can only be apply within American territory. Charles Doyle, *Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law*, Congressional Research Service, 2012. <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-166.pdf>

¹⁴³ Salvatore Zappalà, *La Giustizia Penale Internazionale*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2005, p 79

¹⁴⁴ In April 2011 and in September other two important demonstrations toward EGF took place. In these cases the use of digital devices was already a common habit, thus, demonstrators from other European Countries took part into the protest. With permission of The European Gendarmerie Force HQ

The aim of the protest, as aimed in the leaflet¹⁴⁵ of the event, was to halt global war as well as to revenge previous events occurred between Italian Armed Forces and Italian dissidents.

These two main aims, with the addition of the fight against U.S. Military power, will consolidate to be the basis of the following contestations toward the European Gendarmerie Force.

This point is particularly relevant to this research, because it perfectly summarise how poor offline communication can limitless compromise the future of an organisation.

In 2006, when the EGF question begun, Social Media were not the widely extended phenomenon we know today and the use of the Internet was a developing reality. The majority of communication was still an in person experience; indeed, online communication was mostly reserved for formal statements and news as well as for niche windows of dialogue, of which only people involved were aware.

Therefore, it is out of confusion that the most of the European Gendarmerie Force contestation took place. This thesis is composed of two statements, which appears to be perfectly interconnected and exchangeable.

On the one hand, there is the fact that the protesting groups largely confused the levels of the question regarding the European Gendarmerie Force, mixing different argumentations not properly related to the organisations. On this aspect, many variables are to take in consideration, e.g., as suggested by Alan R. Posner of Cambridge University, firstly Italian political fragmentation¹⁴⁶, particularly concerning extremist and anarchist groups. Antimilitarism is strongly rooted in Italian history, as much as the lack of proper National cohesion. These assertions, combined with the raising disappointment toward Afghan and Iraqi War and often a lack of information regarding the actual role of Italy in abroad missions, led to the harsh waves of aversion toward military institutions in the years between 2004 and 2011¹⁴⁷. Indeed, approximately after this date, which signs the commencement of the withdrawal of both American troops from Iraq and international contingents from peacekeeping missions¹⁴⁸¹⁴⁹, also the amount of demonstration in Vicenza, and generally in Italy, has diminished.

¹⁴⁵ www.laboratoriopoliziademocratica.org/PRC/19%20gennaio.doc

¹⁴⁶ Alan R. Posner, *Italy: dependence and political fragmentation*, Cambridge University Press, 2009.

¹⁴⁷ In 2011 President Obama decided and commenced the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-withdrawal-idUSTRE7BH03320111218>

¹⁴⁸ 2011 also mark the beginning of the end of many International Peacekeeping Missions abroad <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf>

In interviews another relevant element appeared, citizens feared to lose control over their hometown. There are two most explicative examples, the first one the expropriations of green areas from the city to construct the new military base, in fact, the predisposed area was partly used as the city rugby club, surrounded by fields.

The second reason is related to the city water supply system¹⁵⁰. The fear of the Movement was that the establishment of the barracks would have stolen drinkable water from the city. Nevertheless, this second question was not supported by strong scientific statements, and was suddenly discharged. While, on the first point, citizens particularly felt the expropriation of common land, notwithstanding their political views. Negotiations between the Italian Government and the United States were carried out without including the population that discovered the whole fact once already decided.

Interviews confirmed that the Movement formally does not exist anymore but is still working in an unofficial way, composed by two different part, a citizens' assembly, gathered by social reasons rather than political, indeed it is the less radical participation, composed by people with different political views, united by the common aim of city preservation. While, the second part of the former Movement is still composed by extremist fringes that fight against constituted power in all its forms.

Symmetrically on the other hand, there is the European Gendarmerie Force, its potential and its lack of communication.

In the first place, when the High Level Interdepartmental Committee, CIMIN, decided for the creation of EGF, it took into consideration the strategic relevance of Vicenza, to place the organisation HQ, but it did not measure the psychosocial impact the European Gendarmerie Force could have had in the thorny atmosphere of the town.

This question happened at the decisional level, the one composed by Ministers and High Representatives of each Member State, but it of course collided on the operational one, indeed on EGF personnel. At the same time, EGF personnel, however extraneous to the organisation creation process, did not actually come to terms with local population.

This has been a fatal mistake for EGF, for six reasons shown below.

Firstly, the CIMIN should have taken into account the general atmosphere in the city, not only on the extremist's side, but mostly at a balanced citizens' level.

¹⁴⁹ United Nations, Basic Facts about the United Nations, New York, UN Department of Public Information, 2011, p 280

¹⁵⁰ Cristina Giacomuzzo, Dal Molin: Falda, Polemiche sulle Analisi, in Il Giornale di Vicenza, (2011) <http://www.nodalmolin.it/Giornale-di-Vicenza>

Secondly, if not fully considering the first point for political and strategic motives, the epoch was however delicate due to the involvement of many European national armies in abroad conflicts.

Thirdly, the European Gendarmerie Force has a non-violent aim, mostly focused on assisting and helping populations and governments in need. Without explaining their purposes they failed to be associated with the violent concept of war.

Fourthly, the European Gendarmerie Force is an International Organisation and in its institutional role it should have had addressed its presence to people, in order not only to avoid unconstructiveness, but also to make people aware of international problems and possibly creating a solid inclusive dialogue.

Fifthly, an open and inclusive dialogue with the population would have facilitated people to form an opinion on the organisation actions, creating a wave of consensus.

Sixthly, CIMIN has never given its agreement for the creation of an external communication plan, creating a lack of information not only at a national level, but also at a European one.

The six arguments exposed above, directly involve CIMIN presence and actions. Indeed, it is the designated authority to legislate for the European Gendarmerie Force. Any action not decided by the High Level Interdepartmental Committee cannot be put into force.

The majority of the hypothesis here advanced, has been taken into consideration by EGF personnel, and often proposed to the CIMIN, but have never been authorised. During my internship at the organisation, I have been informed that the majority of Member States agreed with the possibility of an external communication campaign, except for the Italian Government, often bashful with this kind of initiatives.

Nevertheless, if these suggestions would have been carried out, it could have been a great possibility to reduce the gap between military organisations and civilian.

Furthermore, in 2006 traditional forms of communication were more diffused than digital communication; notwithstanding, a traditional advertisement campaign as well as a communication campaign could have been useful solutions to the problem, particularly by being an organisation composed, at the occurrence, by both military and civilian personnel, the right incentive to create positive interaction with local and international population and possibly to sort out negative information that have grown through decades.

That depends on the fact that if it is true that deleterious comments can come at any moment, it is also true that as long as there is room for negativity to develop, they are not going to diminish.

Therefore, the aim of this paragraph is that a strong offline presence is instrumental for the purposes of an International Organisation, on two different levels.

On the one hand, the socio-psychological level. Indeed, the establishment of a new organisation is for sure going to have an impact on the place in which it is placed, especially if it is a military organisation. In this sense, it should be a responsibility of the organisation to create a positive environment in which create a friendly dialogue with the local population.

On the other hand, the communication level. Once established a fair offline presence, the possibility of success in digital communication will increase, because a trustworthy relation is still there, therefore a part of public is still targeted¹⁵¹. The offline-online process would facilitate the presence of the Organisation on Social Media, by reducing the time used to conquer the public and leaving more time to build a dialogue.

7.2 NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL HOSTILITIES

As the European Gendarmerie Force was established, a wave of hostility raised through Europe. This behaviour particularly involved Italian and German extremist groups, which animated by political and antimilitarist reasons, stocked the argument of EGF as Gestapo and of its alleged right to kill.

But, how this quarrel developed?

In 2006, when the European Gendarmerie Force was established, the most radical part of public opinion began to associate the corps to a secret repressive police, decided by European Governments to oppress the unprivileged part of the population¹⁵².

¹⁵¹ Laurita G., Venturini Roberto, *Strategia Digitale: comunicare in modo efficace su internet e i Social Media*, Milano, Hoepli, 2014 p 97

¹⁵² International examples of this theory can be found all over the Internet, particularly concerning Italian blogs (Altervista). Therefore, examples here reported are representative of many.
Regarding Italy: *EUROGENDFOR La Nuova Gestapo* <http://dannicollaterali.altervista.org/eurogendfor-nuova-gestapo/>

Regarding this point, the Internet proposes a vast variety of blogs from all over Europe that sustain the fascist nature of EGF. In order to do so, these blogs propose defective versions of what should be told, i.e., modified parts of the Treaty of Velsen, created *ad hoc* to support the purpose.

In 2011 the Greek blog Keep Talking Greece¹⁵³ reported the news that the European Gendarmerie force brutally intervened during a riot in Athens. The news was then rapidly spread through European blogs, contributing to make the episode real. However, EGF internal sources confirm that this event never took place, namely the Organisation never partook to that demonstration¹⁵⁴.

Nevertheless, the idea that EGF acts in violent ways is steadily confirmed also in other circumstances, especially regarding the concept of it being a paramilitary force. A long essay posted on the UK online magazine *Statewatch*¹⁵⁵, adapted version of the German article *Lex paciferat - Das Gesetz wird Frieden bringen. Ein Blick auf die europäischen Gendarmeriekräfte*¹⁵⁶ explains the Organisation modus operandi, based on population control imposed with armed force and violence.

To sustain the argument of the New Gestapo, other blogs and magazines propose the theory according to which an important component of influence is also constituted by financial institutions power, among other sources, this thesis is corroborated by videos that are possible to find online. In the video uploaded on YouTube *EUROGENDFOR (EGF) la Gestapo dei Banchieri in Europa*,¹⁵⁷ a complicated framework is presented. The video explains the correlation that intercourses between the failure of the European Economic System and the advancement of a European Dictatorship imposed by bankers to not lose their power.

This argument was one of the main topics carried out by dissidents during the demonstrations toward the European Gendarmerie Force.

Regarding France: *EUROGENDFOR, la police européenne arrive. Preuve d'une dictature de l'UE* <http://lesobservateurs.ch/2014/11/21/arriva-eurogendfor-gestapo-al-soldo-dei-burocrati-di-bruxelles-prove-di-dittatura-ue/>

Regarding Norway: *The Armed Enforcers of the Fascist European Superstate*, <http://gatesofvienna.net/2010/03/the-armed-enforcers-of-the-fascist-european-superstate/>

¹⁵³ Keep Talking Greece <http://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2011/10/14/thriller-with-rumors-on-eurogendfor-hit-men-in-greece/>

¹⁵⁴ With permission of The European Gendarmerie Force HQ

¹⁵⁵ Tim Schumacher, *EU: "The law will bring peace" - a view on the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF)*, by Tim Schumacher (2010), <http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=30434>

¹⁵⁶ Tim Schumacher, *Lex paciferat - Das Gesetz wird Frieden bringen. Ein Blick auf die europäischen Gendarmeriekräfte*, Informationsstelle Militarisierung (2010), <http://www.imi-online.de/2010/08/02/lexpaciferatdas/>

¹⁵⁷ *EUROGENDFOR (EGF) la Gestapo dei banchieri in Europa, Trattato di Velsen*. On YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9LYP_dUhrI

It appears clear that the idea of the European Gendarmerie Force as the new Gestapo, firstly originates in the most extremist factions, to become central on the Internet through less dissident groups.

Certainly, it is important to underline how both these types of audience are generally much more oriented on an antimilitarist point of view; however, to the aim of this research, the engaging part of the phenomenon comes with the wide diffusion of the Internet.

Indeed, in 2006, at the beginning of the European Gendarmerie Force question, the parts involved were citizens of the host town already connected to political movements, national niches of citizens part of extremists groups related to smaller movements present in Vicenza or in rare cases, European citizens belonging to EGF Member States. The increased participation that occurred between from 2009¹⁵⁸ on is strictly related to the diffusion of digital tools in the form of Social Networks and blogging.

With higher possibility of contacting and talking to other people across Europe, and with higher possibility of finding material, the news of the establishment of the Organisation spread rapidly, as much as rapid was people capability to associate the European Gendarmerie Force with other military scenarios, namely the U.S. engagement in Iraq.

As Facebook has been the most popular Social Media in the period of time taken into consideration, it is instrumental to analyse the behaviour of opposition groups on this Social Network.

At date, there are still a conspicuous number of hostile Facebook pages, shown below are the most significant examples.

On a national level, it is important to enlighten the presence of an Italian page that was created in 2012 and that presents quite strong contents. Indeed, the name chosen by the group¹⁵⁹ compares the European Gendarmerie Force and the Gestapo. The logo presents the German Nazi eagle completed with the most unpleasant symbol related to the epoch, while the motto of the group is “European new armed hands”. The page counts four hundred and seven followers and presents the link of the group’s website, accessible on request.

¹⁵⁸ Average monthly mobile data per user (900MB) increased from about 170MB at the beginning of 2009, to almost 300MB in 2010. Since 2011 on, the increase has been exponential, passing from almost 400MB per user in the first semester of 2011 to more than 2.800MB in 2014. We Are Social (2015). Mobile Data Growth. Retrieved from <http://wearesocial.com/uk/special-reports/digital-social-mobile-worldwide-2015>

¹⁵⁹ Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/Eurogendfor-Gestapo-313294408707885/>

Contents proposed on the page are strongly opposed to the existence of the Organisation, presenting diminishing articles and photos showing images of violence perpetrated by police forces that visibly are not EGF personnel.

At an international level, the most explicative example is the *Die Europäische Gendarmerietruppe*¹⁶⁰, a German page founded in 2011.

The page is currently followed by one hundred and eighty seven people and presents contents similar to the previous page. Subjects are also focused on the Gestapo nature of the organisation, mostly summarised by articles and posts, due to the lack of visual contents.

Therefore, both at a national and at an international level opposition expressed through Social Media toward EGF presents contents also available on blogs and online magazines.

Currently, it is possible to find very few hostile pages toward the European Gendarmerie Force. It depends on the fact that the most insulting pages created through the years, have been permanently deactivated starting from July 2015¹⁶¹ due to copyright infringements¹⁶².

This decision, advanced by the European Gendarmerie Force comes with great lateness since the beginning of the query, allowing the development of the abovementioned circumstances and represents a vast EGF fault.

There is a fundamental elucidation to state in order to better explain this crucial point; indeed, the following analysis is a comprehensive explanation of the mistakes and the repercussions that involve the European Gendarmerie Force, not only on Facebook, but also on every digital platform implicated.

The thesis here exposed lies on the fundamental assumption treated through this research, that nowadays an International Organisation as well as any other form of public oriented institution, cannot overlook the importance of external communication, regarding its dual offline and online nature.

What was not considered during the European Gendarmerie Force establishing process was the delicate environment, on both a micro and macro level, in which the Organisation was going to be released. The mistake could have been potentially later

¹⁶⁰ Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/Eurogendfor-Die-Europ%C3%A4ische-Gendarmerietruppe-145462492199711/timeline>

¹⁶¹ With permission of The European Gendarmerie Force HQ

¹⁶² The process is explained in Facebook Terms Of Use, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, article 5. At <https://www.facebook.com/terms>

sorted out, with the finalisation of a communication strategy in a second moment. Indeed, even if the communication policy clearly appeared to be erroneous since the very beginning, the slow diffusion process of Social Networks could have been a quick fix to the development of negative information.

Digital platforms can positively help the launch and the survival of an organisation if correctly used, in the same measure in which they can contribute to create a wrongful image, successively difficult to reverse.

The European Gendarmerie Force left open the possibility for public opinion to express disturbing and unpleasant judgments.

As a result, the right attitude for an organisation to have would be as following.

In the first place a conspicuous study of local environment, in order to be acknowledged of the situation in which the personnel is going to work.

This initial feature permits the adjustment of an offline communication plan to be carried out with local population; institutions hold a crucial role in addressing their audience about social issues and relevant questions. In this sense, the European Gendarmerie Force could have had involved local citizens in the creation of a debate on the Organisation actual roles and tasks, and then, once established a trustworthy and mutual relation, a second moment could have followed to explain EGF involvement abroad due to increasing unstable International scenarios and answer to citizens questions and doubts.

Henceforth, it is possible to switch the offline structure to an online strategy, based on Social Media, which is instrumental to target the audience the Organisation wants to embrace, based on previous offline experience; secondly, to accelerate the process of involvement of new followers and thirdly, Social Networks are the best way to talk to the audience, engaging it.

Therefore, an International Organisation is not supposed to reply to comments posted on Social Media and Platforms for two main reasons. On the first place, reply to comments, particularly to negative comments could make an organisation run the risk of being involved in arguments with the audience, even when replies are neutral. At the same time, to reply uniquely to positive comment could give the impression to favour a part of the audience over another; this would create disparity and possibly worsen the dialogue. Thus, the suggested strategy is to do not reply to comments posted on unofficial platforms, whether it is Social Media or a publishing platform. While, on

official pages an official schedule for answers to users post should to be planned, it would guarantee a continuum in the dialogue within a authorised framework of communication, which allows both the organisation to be present and take care of its audience and to the audience to participate and be involved.

As described in the next chapter, a well-actuated strategy should reduce the eventuality of proliferation of hostile measures, whether it is an article in a magazine, a demonstration, a fake Social Media page or an entire dedicated blog.

In a wider perspective, EGF lack of interest in negative and hostile interaction from the audience indicates the absence of a common and strong identity within the Organisation, rather than the lacking will of going social. Indeed, the proper use of Social Media directly depends on the message the institution wants to deliver to its audience, based on its identity, the feature the audience should identify with.

VIII

CREATING IDENTITY

When considering the creation of a corporative identity there are some significant aspects to take into consideration that depends on the new asset created by Social Media. Nowadays, Advertisement and communication are not anymore an univocal rule imposed by a company over its buyers or followers, rather they are situated in a mutual and open dialogue in which the process of creation of contents depends on both participant. The involvement of customers is vital in order to succeed; with their contribution outline the future of a company, redefining the relation among the two: within the Social Media world, customers choose and elect companies and organisation. In this sense, it is clear how traditional forms of engagement do not work anymore; therefore, Social Media have transformed users from content-readers to content publishers¹⁶³, gaining the leading role of critics and advertisers of a brand. Indeed, not only customers are generally numerically more than the communication team of a company, they have the possibility to review products, a feature that is more important than advertisement itself.

Thus, four considerations are to explore in order to create a winning strategy.

Firstly, the complexity that the notion of identity itself is assuming and how to deal with it in a world obsessed with distinctiveness.

Secondly, corporative identity as the basis on which developing a solid online reputation; on identity depends the success of the Organisation.

Thirdly, the importance of the Organisation online behaviour, necessary to spread values globally.

Fourthly, audience participation. The creation of a corporate identity is a constantly evolving process, a continuous creative exchange between the Organisation and its followers.

These three main assumptions are instrumental to the creation of a corporate identity for the European Gendarmerie Force, in the process of perfecting its digital strategy.

¹⁶³ Joseph Sassoon, *Web Storytelling*, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2012, p. 1

8.1 IDENTITY

The most complete mode to entirely acquire the complex assumption that the concept of identity is assuming, is by examine the explanation elaborated by Amartya Sen.

In *Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny*¹⁶⁴, the Nobel laureate expresses the multidimensionality of identity, within the context of multiculturalism, an feature here extremely important, not only because of the multinational composition of the European Gendarmerie Force, but also because multiculturalism is the natural configuration of every Social Media audience. Therefore, an analysis of the author is instrumental to better approach the question; indeed Sen explanation perfectly fits the Social Media subject.

The author affirms that there are two approaches to multiculturalism, one that promotes diversity as a value itself, the other that figures full decision-making autonomy to decide in which categories we belong to¹⁶⁵. The two groups are composed by different category of people corresponding to those who are free to choose and those who are oppressed by others, generally those who believe to be free to choose.

Within this framework is collocated the multidimensional level of identity, according to which every individual simultaneously belongs to a plurality of groups. Is this condition that shape identity. However, people's ability to choose belonging categories, is often halted by negative aspects, as fear, marginalization and discrimination. The latter assumption is the point in which free and oppressed meet, in the intersection of different groups.

Therefore, people belong to different identities at the same time, from basic categories depending on culture, gender, race and so on, to more elaborated one. At the same time, belonging to different groups give people freedom when they have the possibility to choose, and oppression when they are forced to fit in forced categories, sometimes as a personal imposition, more often as a social obligation that can lead to violence.

This plural identity theory frequently used for the globalisation issue, appear to be perfectly adaptable to Social Media, due to its greatness and versatility.

The aspect that I would like to stress the most, is the importance it could have in the

¹⁶⁴ Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny*, New York – London, W.W. Norton and Company, 2007

¹⁶⁵ In the book explained through the Sen's experience as a Commonwealth citizen. Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The illusion of destiny*, W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. Pp. 149-150.

redefinition of police institutions organisations.

Indeed, a part from a specific part of audience that follow police institutions on Social Media and sustain them offline, the majority of customers prefer to follow other types of brand, for many reasons. Regarding EGF, the consideration could be related to the diffused misconceptions originated through the years, which contributed to the creation of new categories directly related to the Organisation in which people had the possibility to corroborate their ideas.

In this sense, Military Organisations on Social Media have a great role of restoration of values and categories. Indeed, by spreading renewed principles they can be joined by those people that for social obligations had to belong only to certain identity groups and not other, notwithstanding their personal inclination in participate.

As reported in a British governmental report entitled *Future Identities. Changing Identities in the UK: the Next Ten Years*¹⁶⁶, individual identity is mostly influence by social features, place attachment, community, family, hobbies, in this sense individual could elect a certain set of identities over others to fit in a particular group.

Online identities represent the opportunity to impersonate as many different identities as someone can imagine. For expert users this can signify the actual possession of different self often in contrast with each other. But, for average users, those taken into consideration in this research, cultural identity is too strong to be dismissed online, therefore they tend to behave online not very differently from how they behave offline, undoubtedly, in both cases liberty of speech and expression is assured.

Moreover, within the context of Social Media identity has assumed commercial values, besides personal and psychological¹⁶⁷. This is instrumental to companies and organisations that, by gathering their data can better target and promote their activities. Lastly, what the governmental report also underlines is that the general tendency is for people to have less trust in authority.

¹⁶⁶ Foresight Future Identities, Final Project Report, The Government Office for Science, London, 2012

¹⁶⁷ Ivi, p. 61

8.2 CORPORATIVE IDENTITY

Now that the concept of identity is defined and we can understand the implications it has when considering Social Media, it is possible to define the notion of corporative identity.

The main aim of corporative identity is the perception users have of a company, or as in this case an organisation, therefore it is composed by the values and the principle the institution wants to spread through its users.

Corporative identity is extremely important, for two main reasons. On the one hand, the fact that it permits to stand out among competitors, defining differences and peculiarities.

On the other, the fact that everyday life is a constant reminder of adverts, photos, videos and different brand experiences of a numerous amount of different companies; therefore the actual ability if a company is to create such a strong set of values that it can become what people want to identify with, what customers want.

As a summary of this research, it is now possible to list an inventory of rules to follow in order to succeed with the creation of a corporate identity.

First of all, the audience.

Audience is the engine of every digital communication campaign; therefore, once targeted and defined, it is important to always involve it in the process of creation of identities and activities to propose on Social Media. Moreover, user-generated content could be a precious resources, consequently it would be better to never underestimate it. Secondly, the offline-online binomial.

The two notions are perfectly interrelated, especially in the case of a police organisation. For that it is important to cure both realities with the same attention. The storytelling the Organisation decides to use online, should agree with offline storytelling.

Thirdly, critiques and hostilities.

Negative comments are part of every type of communication, online as it is offline. Thus, there is no reason not to use Social Media; digital communication cannot represent an adverse form of interaction.

Fourthly, be there.


As previously shown, participate in conversation online is not always a good choice. However, when comments are not disturbing or illicit, direct participation of the Organisation in a conversation can only increase trust among users, indeed, it is a demonstration of interest toward the audience.

Online presence is always recommended, the opposite could prove destructive to the organisation web existence.

Fifthly, planning.

Planning is the key of success. On Social Media there is no place for improvisation or repetitions. In this case, the creation of an archive can represent the best support to a well-organised strategy.

8.3 BRAND IDENTITY PRISM



The Prism¹⁶⁸, elaborated by Kapferer, take into consideration every aspect that composes brand identity, in order to create a homogeneous culture to publicise among users.

The prism is composed by two dimensions: *externalisation*, physique relationship reflection, the external aspects of the brand; and *internalisation*, personality, culture, self-image, internal aspects of the brand.

¹⁶⁸ Retrieved from EURIB, European Institute for Brand Management, *Kapferer's Brand-Identity Prism Model*, EURIB Library, 2009

Constructed source, physique and personality, that personalise the brand and *constructor receiver*, reflection and self-image, to put the brand into categories that users can easily identify.

Moreover, there are six variables taken into consideration: *physique, personality, relationship, culture, reflection and self-image*.

A closer analysis of each variable is instrumental to understand the actual importance of this scheme in association with the use of Social Media.

Physique. Tangible characteristics of a brand. Usually, these share a common base with other organisations that have similar outcomes. The challenge on Social Media is to differentiate the message so much that the brand can always be recognised.

Personality. Social Media offer more time and space to a brand in terms of diffusion of its corporative identity, therefore digital communication leave more room to construct the perfect corporative identity dialogue.

Relationship. Social Media have created a multidirectional communication process in which the possibility of customers' empathy with the brand is higher, as much as higher is the risk of failure for the company or the organisation. In his sense, language is instrumental; indeed the organisation has to find the right style to use with its users.

Culture. Corporative culture depends on both brand identity and its history, thus, the possibility to export a peculiar lifestyle. On this point, the brand can diffuse its own traditions and practices and strengthen the group identity.

Reflection. The brand representation of its stereotypical user. Due to the need for transparency and originality requested by Social Media, the brand should create realistic reflections, not too different from the actual audience; otherwise the risk is to create inadequate contents that users will not appreciate, generating negative consequences for the brand.

Self-image. The idea the user creates of himself in association with the brand. Therefore, the consideration of what other people could think of him belonging to a certain organisation, embracing its values and culture. This is extremely important when creating corporative identity; therefore it should always be taken into account.


I would like to suggest the use of the Prism to the European Gendarmerie Force, particularly in the first phases of the creation of its digital communication strategy, because of the extraordinary importance that this model has in making and maintaining a well-balanced corporative identity.

8.4 ONLINE BEHAVIOUR

Corporate identity is the solid base on which the European Gendarmerie Force is going to create its own digital strategy and it is created by the above-mentioned assumptions.

Compulsorily, identity should be related to a proper online behaviour, indeed, if not observed the Organisation online reputation will be damaged, with poor consequences on visibility too.

A proper online behaviour is explained by Aaker and Smith' *Dragonfly Effect scheme*¹⁶⁹. The model, instrumental to develop succeeding communication, is composed of four main assumptions: focus, grab attention, engage and take action.



Firstly, *focus*, the ability to find a main goal and pursue it.

Secondly, *grab attention*, to tell users original stories and engage them.

Thirdly, *engage*, to make customers feel significant emotions.

Fourthly, *take action*, involve people so much that they feel they can take action.

When these four skills work together, as the wings of a dragonfly, success¹⁷⁰ on Social Media is assured.

In this sense, the European Gendarmerie Force should use this scheme to organise the suggestions advanced in through this research. In this case, the *focus* would be the will of digitalisation along with the creation of a dialogue with the audience; *grab attention* would be represented by the results of the survey analysed in Chapter IV, therefore

¹⁶⁹ Retrieved from Joseph Sassoon, *Web Storytelling*, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2012, p. 46

¹⁷⁰ The scheme is elaborated from firms, but it can perfectly suit International Organisation needs.

involving users in the experience of participating in the Gendarmerie activities and support citizens; *engage* would be represented mostly by video contents. Lastly if all the tasks are well-executed, the audience would take action in EGF Social Media.

8.5 AUDIENCE PARTICIPATION

The power of Social Media lies in the fact that it gives users the possibility to express themselves, their opinion, their ideas gaining attention. This is something completely new if compared with traditional forms of communication, accessible only to people working in the advertisement field or journalism or broadcasting and so on.

Nowadays, it is possible not only to get in touch with people and information from all over the world, but also to create a personal space of expression and creativity.

In this extent, Social Media are a form empowerment because they give people the opportunity to shine. On this point Liana Evans¹⁷¹ underlines how people avidly use Social Media because it can satisfy their need to talk to other people.

This is of course true, especially when considering that on the web users can participate in groups specifically related to a topic rather than another, having the possibility of creating their own sphere of action, in which they can express their interests and share contents with similar people.

Therefore, users aspect to find well defined and engaging stories online. Here again Evans, in the introduction of its work, suggests the use of four clusters. Firstly, an organised study of the audience. It permits to always calibrate the aim of the strategy, for instance, if, as in the case of the European Gendarmerie Force, the target belongs to different nations and cultures, is aged 15 to 45 and speaks different languages, the best way to involve it would be mostly via visual contents and via posts written in a not too formal English, allowing not only everyone to understand, but also involving the youngest parts of the population.

Secondly, strategy. As already mentioned in this research, Social Media are often seen not as a serious working tool, therefore the general tendency is to consider them as a box in which is possible to throw every idea, without a scheme. That is not true. Indeed,

¹⁷¹ Liana Evans, *Social Media Marketing. Strategies for Engaging in Facebook, Twitter & other Social Media*, Que Publishing, Indianapolis, p. 59

as any other form of external communication, Social Media need to be organised and nourished. They need the right style, the right tone, the right contents related to the specific audience they have to capture.

Thirdly, measurement. There are different ways to measure success, as there are different ways to measure failures. It clearly depends on the subject that is measuring. At general level, it is important to remind the online presence of analytic tools to measure the volume of consumption, every Social Media offers its own.

However, in the case of the European Gendarmerie Force, a first Index of success would be the tangible involvement of followers, with positive comments and active participation online.

Fourthly, involvement. Customers that are keen on a certain argument have great expectations on its online reality. Indeed, people expect to find an engaging website of Social Media profile regarding the entity they are researching. Delusion can be extremely high in these cases, with their consequent reaction of looking for something similar better than what you proposed. Indeed, as stated by the author, the conversation occurs whether you are there or not.

That is the reason why being present is always the best first part of the strategy.

By being present an Organisation transmits its interest toward the audience and, at the same time, it has the possibility to understand what competitors and even users are saying about it. Understanding the level of satisfaction among people is a key of success, because it permits the Organisation to better its online actions, by adapting them to new customers needs.

8.6 MARKETING AND STORYTELLING

As Joseph Sassoon underlines, there are new rules¹⁷² to marketing and communication, like the fact that marketing is not anymore an autonomous feature of the organisation, now it is a relation between consumers and the company. Interaction has more levels of engagement; indeed, as we have seen it can cross every sphere of life.

Moreover, communication is not synonym of manipulation anymore; rather it means ethic and authenticity. On Social Media reativity comes with the audience, in the same way as the majority of stories have no end, and they are always developing.

Thus, storytelling is based on participation. In these sense, the European Gendarmerie Force can find a great example in NATO Challenges, as explained in Chapter IV of this research, due to the fact that the possibility of designing the official logo of the Organisation makes the institution close to its audience, in a way that have never been experienced before.

Customers are becoming more and more autonomous in the definition of their preferences and this is crucial to them to take part in the process of development of a brand, they want to participate in the story that can be created surrounding a certain issue. For that, they need to have the possibility to talk to the Organisation and get more information to share with other users and so on.

This process contributes to the creation of awareness among users; in this case, the European Gendarmerie Force can launch a new way of discussing International Affairs with people. It would be extremely interesting to create a transparent and open dialogue with users about the most important international events and facts.

A first suggestion, regarding an engaging storytelling solution would be to give users the possibility to be part of a Gendarmerie Force.

This is the unique opportunity to feel part of a multinational Corps and to honour its tasks.

With the support of the survey presented at Chapter IV, it has been possible to define the right atmosphere to engage users, based on these values: friendship, honour and cooperation.

The story in which users should be involved is developed on the idea of serving national and international citizens, contributing in the diffusion of justice.

¹⁷² Joseph Sassoon, *Web Storytelling*, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2012, p. 25

Another idea for EGF to develop could be related to cultural differences among Member States. In this sense, customers can be asked to describe best aspects of their countries, which can be gathered to create a positive interaction regarding the uniqueness of cultural differences, a great occasion toward European integration that the Gendarmerie can contribute to facilitate.

There are many examples that can fit the task, however the most important feature for the Organisation is to remember the above-mentioned rules, in order to succeed and be a pioneer in this field.

Concluding this chapter, it is important to remark the importance of a positive and involving dialogue with the audience, so that the European Gendarmerie Force can achieve online visibility.

CONCLUSION

At the outset, this thesis posed the question of the implementation of a digital communication strategy for the European Gendarmerie Force, in order to demonstrate the crucial importance communication can have for International Organisations.

The aim was to prove that new forms of interaction should not represent uniquely a prerogative of business, as it currently is; thus, is it possible to extend the application field of this subject?

Therefore, it is fundamental for the Organisation to upgrade its methods of communication in a broader digital sense, passing from traditional forms of interaction with the audience, to Social Media.

As shown, Social Media are becoming a natural and significant part of everyday life; as noted by Bargh and McKenna¹ the quantity of time spent online is proportional to the quantity of time dedicated to offline activities. This depends on the fact that on the Internet users have the possibility to organize groups of interest and shared experiences, in which everyone can fit and succeed, resulting in a positive attitude among users, that are in this way encouraged in taking part in similar offline activities.

This assumption corroborates the importance of the offline-online binomial, instrumental when considering the development of a communication strategy. In fact, as reported in this work, the right set of values spread through Social Media can only result in positive outcomes regarding both online and offline visibility, essential to invert the negative trend of critiques EGF has experienced over the years.

Moreover, Social Media allow the global spread of news and ideologies, connecting users with shared interests. Through Social Media new trends are set, boundaries are broken and ideas run faster than ever. This new phenomenon can prove difficult for traditional organisations like governments and military institutions, often representing a difficult place in which communicate.

Nevertheless, International Organisations need to achieve digital communication goals, by both involving their own personnel and by serving citizens in this new online reality. For police forces Social Media not only represent the unique opportunity to get in touch with global audience and creating a new dialogue based on different parameters; it also

¹ John Bargh, Katelyn McKenna, *The Internet and Social Life*, in Annual Review of Psychology, 2004

represents the challenge to counter adversities in a world where threats generated online² are becoming ordinary.

Hence, it is essential on this point to state the interrelation existent between the development of identity in relation to Social Media and new global threats.

In fact, various forms of radicalisation are rapidly increasing and their development is often linked to the Internet. A possible answer to this statement can be represented by the distortion of identity generated in the context of the web. It depends on two assumptions, extensively described in Chapter VIII. On the one hand, the fact that those online realities give users the possibility to develop an infinite number of identities, as much as necessary to be satisfied. On the other, the possibility to deeply involve in any form of environment, completely released from social boundaries and with the possibility of being extremely successful, to become a leader, within the new reality.

By developing security strategies, the European Gendarmerie Force can be a pioneer within the urgency of the latter assumption, bounding strategic capabilities of police forces and the importance of digital tools in terms of global security.

Moreover, as presented in the dissertation, Social Media offer plenty of opportunities for police forces to showcase a more attractive image, aimed to establish renewed trustworthy relations with citizen. To deal with these new challenges, the European Gendarmerie Force needs to create a proper digital strategy in order to be perceived as determined and steady by users, consistent and coherent in its contents, both offline and online, by applying the recommendations here suggested.

Concluding this research, I would like to state the innovative impact that a digital communication strategy can have for the European Gendarmerie Force in the scenario of International Organisation.

² Brian Knowlton, *Digital War Takes Shape on Websites Over ISIS*, *The New York Times*, September 26, 2014

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Annex A

DECLARATION OF INTENT

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1.SCOPE

In order to contribute to the development of the European Security and Defence Policy and the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, all of whom possess police forces with a military status capable of carrying out, in accordance with the Nice European Council conclusions, police missions through substitution and/or strengthening of local police, propose the following:

- to provide Europe with a full capability in order to conduct all police missions in crisis management operations within the framework of the Petersberg Declaration, with particular regard to substitution missions;
- to offer a multinational operational structure to those States which intend to join EU operations;
- to participate in initiatives of international organisations in the area of crisis management.

To that end, the above-mentioned countries have decided to create a gendarmerie force, called EUROGENDFOR (EGF) which will be operational, pre-organised, robust and rapidly deployable, in order to perform all police tasks.

In crisis management operations, the EGF will ensure an effective presence with other actors, including the military component, and with the local police. This in order to facilitate the reactivation of security facilities, particularly during the transition between the military and the civilian operational environment.

EGF Operations are open to the participation of third countries with appropriate police skills.

2. MISSIONS

Units of the EGF must be placed under a defined chain of command that can be changed during the mission according to the phases of the operations. These units can be put either under military command or civil authority, in order to guarantee public security, public order and to fulfil judiciary police tasks.

The EGF must be capable of covering every aspect of crisis response operations:

- during the initial phase of the operation, the EGF could enter the theatre along with the military force in order to perform its police tasks;
- during the transitional phase, EGF could continue its mission alone or together with a military force, facilitating co-ordination and co-operation with local or international police units;
- during the military disengagement phase, this force could facilitate the handing over of responsibilities to civilian authorities and agencies taking part in the co-operation efforts, if necessary.

During crisis prevention, the EGF could be deployed on its own or jointly with a military force.

In accordance with the mandate of each operation, the EGF will perform a broad spectrum of activities related to its own police capability, such as:

- performing security and public order missions;
- monitoring of and advice for local police in their day-to-day work, including criminal investigation work;
- conducting public surveillance, traffic regulations, border policing and general intelligence;
- performing criminal investigation work, covering detection of offences, tracing of offenders and their transfer to the appropriate judicial authorities;

- protecting people and property and keeping order in the event of public disturbances;
- training of police officers as regards international standards;
- training of instructors, particularly through co-operation programmes;

3. FRAMEWORK

The EGF will be mainly composed of the same forces as those included by the Party States in the Helsinki Headline Goal catalogue and the capacity of civilian crisis management, stemming from the conference held in Brussels on November 19, 2001. For this reason it will be, first and foremost, at the disposal of the EU. When deployed for the EU, the PSC assumes the political control and the strategic direction.

The EGF could also be put at the disposal of the UN, OSCE, NATO, other international organisations, or an *ad hoc* coalition. Planning of EGF operations must take into account the need for close co-ordination with the military and/or civilian bodies. When the EGF is an integrated part of the military force, it has to maintain a functional link with local or international police authorities and forces present in theatre.

The EGF operational deployment requires a unanimous decision to be taken by the Party States.

4. COMMAND STRUCTURE

A High Level Interdepartmental Committee, composed of representatives of the responsible ministries of each country, assures the political-military co-ordination, appoints the EGF Commander, provides him with directives and provides the guidance for employment.

Working groups will assist this Committee.

The structures and the procedures that will permit the implementation of the decisions adopted by the Party States, as well as the conditions of employment, will be worked out in detail in due course.

The EGF will have a **multinational, modular and projectable** HQ . This permanent HQ will be directed by the EGF Commander and consists of a multinational core that can be reinforced as needed and by agreement of the Party States. The EGF HQ deals with the operational planning and, on request, contributes to the strategic decision-making process. The permanent HQ will be based in Italy.

Its key positions will be manned by rotation criteria.

In the event of an operation the Party States will designate a Force Commander for an EGF mission. The permanent HQ of the EGF will act as a Parent HQ for the Force Commanders' HQ. The involvement of the permanent HQ in the chain of command must be defined according to the situation.

5. FORCE STRUCTURE

In the event of an operation the unit of the EGF may, in addition to the HQ, consist of:

- an operational component, dedicated to missions of general public security and maintenance of public order;
- a crime-fighting component, including specialists in criminal investigation missions, detection, gathering, information analysis and processing, protection and assistance of individuals, traffic control, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), fight against terrorism and other major crimes, and other specialists. The company consists of modules and specialists assigned to the EGF;
- a logistic support component, able to perform all activities related to supplies, restocking, maintenance, recovery and evacuation of equipment, transportation, medical and health care. If necessary, some of these functions will be provided by other actors.

The Party States will have to identify periodically the dedicated forces in terms of capabilities, carrying out the definitive nominal designation at an appropriate moment. The units will be assigned "on request" to the EGF.

The EGF will possess an initial rapid-reaction capability of approximately 800 persons within 30 days.

Each Party State will retain its full freedom to decide whether its units will participate in an EGF operation.

6. TRAINING

The operational standards for EGF units will be set by the High-Level Interdepartmental Committee.

The attainment and maintenance of that level will be a national responsibility. Training should take into account the annual objectives proposed by the Commanding Officer and approved by the high-level Interdepartmental Committee.

Multinational training organised by the EGF should make it possible to attain the required level of interoperability. This programme will be proposed by the Commanding Officer, and validated by a working group created for that purpose.

7. Administrative and Logistical Support for the Permanent HQ of the EGF

Each Party State will sustain the expenditures arising from its participation to the EGF.

Common costs will be divided proportionally between Party States.

Support for the permanent HQ structure will be provided by Italy and will be the subject of a technical arrangement between the Party States which will also set the modalities of reimbursement of the common costs.

Party States will provide a budget for the permanent costs of the EGF. The amount of the contributions of the budget will be set annually by the Party States.

The annual budget will be requested by the Commanding Officer of the EGF and has to be approved by the High Level Interdepartmental Committee. Each Party State will be able to designate a financial expert for advice on the budget and expenses.

Support during operations

Funding (for operational matters) will be provided by contributing States and, when appropriate, by EU, UN and other international organisations. .

Interoperability

The Party States will strive for an improvement of interoperability between their forces.

8. LANGUAGE

The official languages of the EGF will be those of the Party States. A common working language may be used.

9. ADMISSION

Full membership of the EGF will be open to EU Member States, possessing a police force with a military statute. At their request, they may be admitted to the EGF after agreement by the Party States and following acceptance of the terms of the present Declaration.

On their request, EU Candidate Member States possessing police forces with a military status can obtain an Observer Status by detaching a liaison officer to the HQ.

With due respect for the military status, conditions of admission can be reviewed, on request of one of the Party States and with the agreement of all the other Party States.

10. LEGAL ASPECTS

The Party States will conclude a Treaty to establish the precise functions and status of the EGF and of its members.

Before the entry into force of this Treaty, the Party States recognise the application of the provisions of the agreement between parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the status of their forces, done at London on 16 June 1951, to the EGF members.

11. SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS

The above-stated points and the measures that may be necessary to organise the concrete aspects of relations among the Party States will be the subject of specific arrangements.

Composition of the High Level Interdepartmental Committee (CIMIN)

COUNTRY	REPRESENTATIVE
France	Representatives of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs
Italy	Representatives of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs
Netherlands	Representatives of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs
Portugal	Representatives of the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs
Spain	Representatives of the Ministries of Defence, the Interior and Foreign Affairs

The Headquarters of the EGF

The EGF will count on a multinational, modular and deployable Headquarters. It will consist of a permanent core, located in Vicenza (Italy), that could be reinforced as needed by augmentees.

Rotational and proportional criteria. The officers' positions will last two years.

The party States will contribute to the permanent core of the EGF HQs as belowed listed:

	OFFICERS	WAR. OFF.
FRANCE	4	2
ITALY	5	6
NETHERLANDS	2	2
PORTUGAL	2	1
SPAIN	2	3
Total	15	14

These figures do not include the EGF Commander.

The EGF-HQ will be tasked of :

- Ø monitoring the areas of possible operational intervention;
- Ø contributing to the decision making process at a political/strategic level;
- Ø planning the operations of the EGF;
- Ø defining operational needs;
- Ø planning and direct exercises;
- Ø analysing the activities, learning from mistake and correct them;
- Ø following the training of the units involved and certifying them;
- Ø preparing suitable logistic support;
- Ø giving advice to the Party States to improve inter-operability between units;
- Ø deploying an HQs for the EGF Commander; in this case it will act as Parent HQs and, according to the situation, will be part of the Chain of Command and Control.

Annex B

TREATY

Between the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of The Netherlands and the Portuguese Republic,

establishing the

European Gendarmerie Force

EUROGENDFOR

The Kingdom of Spain,
The French Republic,
The Italian Republic,
The Kingdom of The Netherlands
and
The Portuguese Republic,

Hereinafter referred to as the “Parties”,

Considering the Declaration of Intent on EUROGENDFOR as signed in Noordwijk on 17 September 2004;

Considering the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington on 4 April 1949;

Considering the Charter of the United Nations signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945;

Considering the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces, signed in London on 19 June 1951;

Considering the Treaty on the European Union as amended by the Treaty of Nice, signed on 26 February 2001;

Considering the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, signed in Helsinki on 1 August 1975;

Considering the Agreement between the Member States of the European Union concerning the status of military and civilian staff seconded to the institutions of the European Union, of the headquarters and forces which may be made available to the European Union in the context of the preparation and execution of the tasks referred to in Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union, including exercises, and of the military and civilian staff of the Member States put at the disposal of the European Union to act in this context, signed in Brussels on 17 November 2003;

Contributing to the development of the European Security and Defence Identity and strengthening the common European Security and Defence Policy;

Have agreed as follows:

Chapter I

General terms

Article 1 *Object*

1. The object of this Treaty is to establish a European Gendarmerie Force, which shall be operational, pre-organised, robust, and rapidly deployable, exclusively comprising elements of police forces with military status of the Parties, in order to perform all police tasks within the scope of crisis management operations.
2. This Treaty defines the fundamental principles in respect of the objectives, the status, the modalities of organisation and the operation of the European Gendarmerie Force, hereinafter referred to as EUROGENDFOR or EGF.

Article 2 *Principles*

The terms of this Treaty are based on the application of principles of reciprocity and cost sharing.

Article 3 *Definitions*

For the purposes of this Treaty the expression:

- a. EUROGENDFOR means the multinational police force with military status composed of:
 - i) the Permanent HQ;
 - ii) the EGF Forces designated by the Parties following the transfer of authority.
- b. PERMANENT HQ means the multinational, modular and projectable Permanent Headquarters, located in Vicenza (Italy). The role and structure of the Permanent HQ and its involvement in an operation shall be approved by CIMIN;
- c. PERMANENT HQ PERSONNEL means the members of a police force with military status assigned by the Parties to the Permanent HQ as well as a limited number of civilian personnel designated by the Parties, permanently supporting the functioning of the Permanent HQ in an advisory or assisting role;
- d. EGF FORCES means the personnel of the police forces with military status assigned by the Parties to EUROGENDFOR to fulfil a mission or an exercise, following the transfer of authority and a limited number of other personnel designated by the Parties in an advisory or supporting role;
- e. FORCE HQ means the multinational headquarters activated in an area of operation to support the EGF Force Commander in exercising command and control for the mission;
- f. EUROGENDFOR PERSONNEL means the Permanent HQ Personnel and the members of the EGF Forces;
- g. CIMIN means the High Level Interdepartmental Committee. It is the decision-making body governing EUROGENDFOR;
- h. EGF COMMANDER means the officer appointed by CIMIN in command of the Permanent HQ and where appropriate EGF Forces;
- i. EGF FORCE COMMANDER means the officer appointed by CIMIN to command an EGF mission;
- j. SENDING STATE means the Party that supplies EUROGENDFOR with forces and/or personnel;
- k. HOST STATE means the Party on whose territory the Permanent HQ is located;

- l. RECEIVING STATE means the Party on whose territory EGF Forces are stationed or in transit;
- m. CONTRIBUTING STATE means a State that is not a Party to this Treaty but participates in EUROGENDFOR missions and tasks;
- n. FAMILY MEMBER(S) means:
 - i) the spouse of a member of the Permanent HQ Personnel;
 - ii) any other person who has contracted a registered partnership with a member of the Permanent HQ Personnel, on the basis of the legislation of the Sending State, provided that the legislation of the Host State considers registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the Host State;
 - iii) direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependents and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point ii);
 - iv) dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point ii).

Chapter II

Missions, Engagement and Deployment

Article 4 *Missions and tasks*

1. In accordance with the mandate of each operation and operating independently or jointly with other forces, EUROGENDFOR must be capable of covering the full spectrum of police missions, through substitution or strengthening, during all the phases of a crisis management operation.
2. EGF Forces can be placed either under civilian authority or under military command.
3. EUROGENDFOR may be used for:
 - a. performing security and public order missions;
 - b. monitoring, advising, mentoring and supervising local police in their day-to-day work, including criminal investigation work;
 - c. conducting public surveillance, traffic regulations, border policing and general intelligence work;
 - d. performing criminal investigation work, including detecting offences, tracing offenders and transferring them to the appropriate judicial authorities;
 - e. protecting people and property and keeping order in the event of public disturbances;
 - f. training police officers as regards international standards;
 - g. training instructors, particularly through co-operation programmes.

Article 5 *Framework for the missions*

EUROGENDFOR may be placed at disposal of the European Union (EU) and also of the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and other international organisations or an ad hoc coalition.

Article 6
Conditions for engagement and deployment

1. Conditions for engagement and deployment of EUROGENDFOR, decided upon by CIMIN on a case by case basis, shall be covered by a specific mandate for each operation and shall be subject to the necessary agreements between the Parties and the requesting organisation.
2. To prepare the missions assigned to EUROGENDFOR, the Parties may, under the direction of CIMIN, station and deploy their own forces and personnel on the territory of the other Parties.
3. Stationing and deployment on the territory of a third State shall be covered by an agreement between the Sending States and the third State specifying the conditions of such stationing and deployment, bearing in mind the fundamental principles of this Treaty.

Chapter III
Institutional and legal aspects

Article 7
CIMIN

1. CIMIN consists of representatives of the appropriate ministries of each Party. The choice of the representatives is a national responsibility. Specific details with respect to the membership, structure, organisation and functioning of CIMIN shall be defined by the rules to be adopted by CIMIN.
2. Decisions and guidelines shall be adopted unanimously by CIMIN.
3. The general tasks of CIMIN include the following:
 - a. exercising political control over and giving strategic direction to EUROGENDFOR and assuring political-military co-ordination among the Parties and, where appropriate, with the Contributing States;
 - b. appointing the EGF Commander and providing him or her with directives;
 - c. approving the role and the structure of the Permanent HQ and also the rotation criteria for the key positions within the Permanent HQ;
 - d. appointing the Chairman of the Financial Board and deciding on the criteria for rotating the chairmanship.
 - e. monitoring the implementation of the objectives stated in this Treaty;
 - f. approving the annual training objectives and programme proposed by the EGF Commander;
 - g. deciding on:
 - i) participation of EUROGENDFOR in missions;
 - ii) participation of Contributing States in EUROGENDFOR missions;
 - iii) requests for co-operation by third States, international organisations or others.
 - h. elaborating the framework for actions led by EUROGENDFOR or at the request of the EU, the UN, the OSCE, NATO, other international organisations or an ad hoc coalition;
 - i. defining the framework for each mission, where appropriate in consultation with relevant international organisations, namely:
 - i) designation of the EGF Force Commander;
 - ii) involvement of the Permanent HQ in the chain of command.
 - j. approving the structure of the Force HQ;
 - k. guiding and assessing EUROGENDFOR activities in case of deployment;

- l. deciding on the need to conclude the security agreements referred to in Article 12, paragraph 3.
4. CIMIN approves main actions related to the administrative aspects of the Permanent HQ, and to EUROGENDFOR deployment issues, in particular the annual budget and the other financial matters in accordance with Chapter X.
5. CIMIN, following its specific guidelines:
 - a. evaluates the fulfilment of the conditions for accession to the Treaty, in accordance with Article 42, and forwards its proposal for approval to the Parties;
 - b. decides whether to grant Observer Status within EUROGENDFOR, in accordance with Article 43;
 - c. decides whether to grant Partner Status within EUROGENDFOR, in accordance with Article 44.
6. Meetings of CIMIN will be held in accordance with the rules of procedures as adopted by CIMIN.

Article 8 *EGF Commander*

The EGF Commander shall carry out the following main tasks:

- a. commanding the Permanent HQ and establishing regulations for its functioning as needed;
- b. implementing the directives received from CIMIN;
- c. being expressly mandated by the Parties through CIMIN, and on its behalf, negotiating and concluding technical agreements or arrangements necessary for the proper functioning of EUROGENDFOR and for conducting exercises or operations carried out on the territory of a third State;
- d. taking all measures necessary, in accordance with the laws of the Host State, to maintain order and security within its installations and, as necessary, outside its installations with the prior consent and assistance of the authorities of the Host State;
- e. drawing up the budget for common costs of EUROGENDFOR and, after the end of the financial year, the final report related to the expenses of EUROGENDFOR for that year;
- f. commanding EGF Forces, where appropriate.

Article 9 *Legal capacity*

1. To achieve its objectives and accomplish its missions and tasks set forth in this Treaty, EUROGENDFOR has legal capacity within each of the Parties to enter into contracts. EUROGENDFOR may consequently appear in court, where necessary.
2. For the purposes set forth in paragraph 1, EUROGENDFOR shall be represented by the EGF Commander or by any other person expressly designated by the EGF Commander to act on his or her behalf.
3. The EGF Commander and the Host State may agree that the Host State acts in subrogation in all actions to which EUROGENDFOR is a Party before the courts in that State. In that case, EUROGENDFOR must reimburse costs incurred.

Chapter IV

Permanent HQ facilities

Article 10

Facilities granted by the Host State

1. The Host State undertakes to provide at no charge the Permanent HQ facilities required for EUROGENDFOR to carry out its tasks. Such facilities are identified in a specific document approved by CIMIN.
2. The Host State will take all reasonable measures required to ensure the availability of required services, in particular electricity, water, natural gas, postal services, telephone and telegraph services, waste collection and fire protection to the Permanent HQ. Conditions concerning the Host State support services will be further specified in implementing arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the Parties.

Article 11

Access permission

Upon receipt of a substantiated request, the EGF Commander must authorise agents of the competent service to inspect, repair, maintain, rebuild or move installations, electrical networks and pipes within the infrastructure of the Permanent HQ, provided that those activities present no obstacle to normal operations and security.

Chapter V

Protection of information

Article 12

Protection of information

1. The basic principles and minimum standards for the protection of classified information or material shall be set out in a security agreement between the Parties.
2. The Parties shall take all appropriate measures in accordance with their international obligations and their national laws and regulations to protect any classified information or material which is produced by or released to EUROGENDFOR.
3. The exchange of classified information or material with third States or international organisations shall be covered by specific security agreements that shall be negotiated, signed and approved by the Parties.

Chapter VI

Provisions concerning the personnel

Article 13

Respect for laws in force

EUROGENDFOR Personnel and their family members must respect the law in force in the Host State or the Receiving State. In addition, EUROGENDFOR Personnel must refrain from

carrying out any activities incompatible with the spirit of this Treaty while on the territory of the Host State or the Receiving State.

Article 14
Entry and residence

With respect to immigration regulations and the formalities of the law governing entry and residence, the Permanent HQ Personnel and their family members are not subject to regulations in force in the Host State applicable to foreigners.

Article 15
Legal and medical aspects in the event of death

1. In the event of death of military or civilian personnel, if the authorities of the Host State or the Receiving State request that an autopsy be performed in the context of a legal or administrative procedure, a representative of the Sending State is authorised to be present during the autopsy.
2. The authorities of the Host State or the Receiving State must authorise the transfer of the mortal remains to the Sending State in accordance with the transportation regulations in force on the territory of the Host State or the Receiving State that apply to mortal remains.

Article 16
Uniforms and arms

1. EUROGENDFOR Personnel shall wear their uniform in accordance with their respective national rules. The EGF Commander may establish specific procedures where appropriate.
2. EUROGENDFOR Personnel may possess, carry and transport arms, ammunitions, other weapon systems and explosives on the conditions that they are authorised to do so by their orders and that they do so in accordance with the laws of the Host State and the Receiving State.

Article 17
Driving licences

Military driving licences issued by each of the Parties are equally valid on the territory of all States that are Party to this Treaty and allow bearers to drive all EUROGENDFOR vehicles of the relevant category in the performance of official duty.

Article 18
Medical assistance

1. Medical assistance is guaranteed to EUROGENDFOR Personnel and their family members under the same conditions as it is provided to personnel of the same rank or equivalent category of the Host State or the Receiving State.
2. Medical care shall be provided in accordance with the terms agreed by the appropriate authorities of the Parties.

Chapter VII

Privileges and immunities

Article 19 *Tax and customs*

1. When used for official purposes, assets, income and other property, belonging to EUROGENDFOR, are exempt from all direct taxation.
2. The purchase for a substantial amount of goods or services by EUROGENDFOR for official use is exempt from turnover tax and other forms of indirect taxes.
3. The import of goods and merchandise necessary for official use by EUROGENDFOR is exempt from custom duties and other indirect taxes.
4. EUROGENDFOR vehicles intended for official use are exempt from road registration taxes.
5. The provisions of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall not apply to EGF Forces.
6. Purchases and imports of fuel and lubricants needed for official use by EUROGENDFOR are exempt from custom duties and other indirect taxes. That exemption does not apply to purchases and imports by EGF Forces on their own territory.
7. Purchased or imported goods and merchandise that are exempt or that qualify for reimbursement in accordance with the terms of this Article may only be transferred or placed at the disposal of a third party, either free of charge or for a price, in accordance with the conditions set by the Party granting the exemptions or reimbursements.
8. In any event, EUROGENDFOR is not entitled to any exemption from taxes and duties that constitute payment for public utility services.
9. No exemption from duties or taxes, of whatever kind, may be granted for the procurement of military materials and equipment.

Article 20 *Individual privileges*

1. EUROGENDFOR Personnel mentioned in Article 3 paragraph c, who are not permanently resident in or nationals of the Host State, at the time of their first arrival to take up service in such State, may - within one year from the time of their first arrival and for two shipments maximum - import from the State of last residence or the State of citizenship their personal belongings and furniture, including one motor vehicle, free of customs duties and other indirect taxes, or buy free of turnover tax such items for a substantial amount in the Host State.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall only apply if a member of the personnel is assigned for a minimum of one year.
3. For the provisions of this Article to apply, the member of the personnel concerned shall make a request to the authorities of the Host State within a year after his or her first arrival.
4. Goods which have been imported duty free referred to in paragraph 1 may be re-exported freely.
5. Motor vehicles referred to in paragraph 1 and those registered in another EU Member State, with the limit of one vehicle for each member of the above-mentioned personnel, are exempt from road registration taxes, for the term of service of such personnel in the Host State.

Article 21

Inviolability of the premises, buildings and archives

1. The premises and buildings of EUROGENDFOR shall be inviolable in the territory of the Parties.
2. The authorities of the Parties may not enter the premises and buildings, referred to in paragraph 1, without the prior consent of the EGF Commander, or where applicable, the EGF Force Commander. Such consent shall be assumed in the event of natural disaster, fire or any other event requiring immediate protective measures. In other cases, the EGF Commander, or where applicable, the EGF Force Commander, shall give serious consideration to a request for permission from the authorities of the Parties to enter the premises and buildings, without prejudice to interests of EUROGENDFOR.
3. The archives of EUROGENDFOR shall be inviolable. The inviolability of the archives shall be understood to apply to all records, correspondence, manuscripts, photographs, films, recordings, documents, computer data, computer files or any other data carrier belonging to or held by EUROGENDFOR, wherever they are located in the territory of the Parties.

Article 22

Immunity from execution

The property and funds of EUROGENDFOR and the goods which have been placed at its disposal for official purposes, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from any executive measure in force in the territory of the Parties.

Article 23

Aspects of communications

1. The Parties will take all reasonable measures to ensure the smooth flow of official communications of EUROGENDFOR.
2. EUROGENDFOR has the right to receive and transmit encrypted messages, as well as to send and receive correspondence and official packages by courier or in sealed cases, which may not be opened or held.
3. Communications addressed to or received by EUROGENDFOR may not be intercepted or interfered with.

Article 24

Domicile for tax purposes

With respect to income taxes and property taxes, Permanent HQ Personnel who, solely on the basis of their function in the service of the Permanent HQ establish residence in the Host State, shall be considered as maintaining their domicile for tax purposes in the Sending State that pays the salary for the services carried out in regard to the Permanent HQ. This term shall also apply to family members who do not engage in professional or commercial activities within the Host State.

Chapter VIII

Jurisdictional and disciplinary terms

Article 25

Criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction

1. The authorities of the Sending State shall have the right to exercise all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the Sending State over military and civilian personnel where such civilian personnel are subject to the law governing all or any of the police forces with military status of the Sending State, by reason of their deployment with those forces.
2. The authorities of the Host State or the Receiving State shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over military and civilian personnel and their family members, with respect to offences committed within their respective territories and punishable by the laws of that State.
3. The authorities of the Sending State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over military and civilian personnel where such civilian personnel are subject to the law governing all or any of the police forces with military status of the Sending State, by reason of their deployment with those forces, with respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the law of the Sending State, but not by the law of the Host State or the Receiving State.
4. The authorities of the Host State or the Receiving State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over military and civilian personnel and their family members with respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by its law but not by the law of the Sending State.
5. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules shall apply:
 - a. the competent authorities of the Sending State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over military and civilian personnel where such civilian personnel are subject to the law governing all or any of the police forces with military status of the Sending State, by reason of their deployment with those forces, in relation to:
 - i) offences solely against the property or security of that State, or offences solely against the person or property of military or civilian personnel of that State or of a family member;
 - ii) offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty;
 - b. in the case of any other offence, the authorities of the Host State or the Receiving State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction;
 - c. if the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of particular importance.
6. For the purposes of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, a security offence against a State shall include:
 - a. treason against the State;
 - b. sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to official secrets of that State, or secrets relating to the national defence of that State.
7. The provisions of this Article shall not imply any right for the authorities of the Sending State to exercise jurisdiction over persons who are nationals of, or ordinarily resident in, the Host State or the Receiving State, unless they are members of the force of the Sending State.

Article 26
Mutual legal assistance

1. The Parties shall assist each other in the arrest of members of a force or civilian component or their family members in the territory of the Host State or the Receiving State and in handing them over to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the above provisions.
2. The authorities of the Host State or the Receiving State shall promptly notify the military authorities of the Sending State of the arrest of any member of a force or civilian component or a family member.
3. The custody of an accused member of a force or civilian component over whom the Host State or the Receiving State is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he or she is in the hands of the Sending State, remain with that State until he or she is charged by the Host State or the Receiving State.
4. The Parties shall assist each other in carrying out all necessary investigations into offences, and in the collection and production of evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of objects connected with an offence. The handing over of such objects may, however, be made subject to their return within the time specified by the authority delivering them.
5. The Parties shall notify one another of the disposition of all cases in which there are concurrent rights to exercise jurisdiction.
6. The authorities of the Host State or the Receiving State shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the Sending State for assistance in carrying out a sentence of imprisonment pronounced by the authorities of the Sending State under the provision of this Article within the territory of the Host State or the Receiving State.

Article 27
Repatriation, absence and removal

1. When EUROGENDFOR Personnel are no longer in service of its forces and are not repatriated, the authorities of the Sending State shall immediately notify the authorities of the Host State or the Receiving State and provide all useful information.
2. The authorities of the Sending State shall equally notify the authorities of the Host State or the Receiving State of any illegal absence from duty exceeding twenty-one days.
3. If the Host State or the Receiving State requires the removal of EUROGENDFOR Personnel from its own territory or has issued an expulsion order for EUROGENDFOR Personnel or for their family members, the authorities of the Sending State shall either receive them on its own territory or allow them to leave the territory of the Host State or the Receiving State.

Chapter IX
Claims

Article 28
Waiver

1. Each Party shall waive all its claims against any other Party for damage to any of its property used in connection with the preparation and execution of the tasks referred to in this Treaty, including exercises, if such damage:

- a. was caused by EUROGENDFOR Personnel in the execution of their duties in the framework of this Treaty; or
 - b. arose from the use of any vehicle, vessel, aircraft, arms or other equipment owned by the other Party and used by its services, provided either that the vehicle, vessel, aircraft, arms or equipment causing the damage was being used in the framework of this Treaty; or that the damage was caused to property being so used.
2. Each Party waives all its claims against any other Party for injury or death suffered by EUROGENDFOR Personnel in the performance of their official duties.
 3. The waiver referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply if the damage, injury or death results from gross negligence or wilful misconduct of the personnel of one Party and consequently the costs of such damage, injury or death shall be paid by that Party.
 4. Notwithstanding the exception mentioned in paragraph 3, each Party waives its claims in any case where the damage is less than a minimum amount to be determined by CIMIN.

Article 29
Damage to third parties

1. In the event of damage caused to a third party or to the property of the third party by a member or property of one of the Parties in preparing and carrying out the tasks referred to in this Treaty, including exercises, the compensation of said damage shall be shared by the Parties as specified in implementing agreements or arrangements, referred to in Article 45 and in accordance with the following provisions:
 - a. claims shall be filed, considered and settled or adjudicated in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Host State or the Receiving State with respect to claims arising from the activities of EUROGENDFOR;
 - b. the Host State or the Receiving State may settle any such claims; the payment of the amount agreed upon or determined by adjudication shall be made by the Host State or the Receiving State in euros;
 - c. such payment, whether made pursuant to settlement or to adjudication of the case by a competent tribunal of the Host State or the Receiving State, or the final adjudication by such a tribunal denying payment, shall be binding and conclusive upon the Parties concerned;
 - d. every claim paid by the Host State or the Receiving State shall be communicated to the Sending States concerned together with full particulars and a proposed distribution in conformity with this Article. In default of a reply within two months, the proposed distribution shall be regarded as accepted.
2. If, however, such damage results from gross negligence or wilful misconduct of the personnel of a Party, the costs of any damage shall be borne by that Party alone.
3. A member of EUROGENDFOR Personnel shall not be subject to any proceedings for the enforcement of any judgement given against him or her in the Host State or the Receiving State in a matter arising from the performance of his official duties.
4. Notwithstanding any individual liability in the event of damages caused to a third party or the property of a third party by a person or property of one of the Parties not done in the performance of official duty, claims in respect of these damages shall be dealt with in the following manner:
 - a. the authorities of the Host State or the Receiving State shall consider the claim and assess compensation to the claimant in a fair and just manner, taking into account all circumstances of the case, including the conduct of the injured person, and shall prepare a report on the matter;

- b. the report shall be delivered to the authorities of the Sending State, who shall then decide without delay whether they will offer an *ex gratia* payment, and if so, of what amount;
- c. if an offer of *ex gratia* payment is made, and accepted by the claimant in full satisfaction of his claim, the authorities of the Sending State shall make the payment itself and notify the authorities of the Host State or the Receiving State of its decision and of the sum paid;
- d. nothing in this paragraph shall affect the jurisdiction of the courts of the Host State or the Receiving State to entertain an action against EUROGENDFOR Personnel unless and until there has been payment in full satisfaction of the claim.

Article 30

Examination of circumstances

Without prejudice to Article 31, in case of doubts as to whether the damages were caused in the performance of official duty, CIMIN shall make a decision after examining a report of the circumstances from the EGF Commander.

Article 31

Exercises and operations

In the event of an exercise or operation on the territory of a third State, the method of distributing any compensation among the Parties and, where appropriate, Contributing States may be specified in an ad hoc arrangement governing the exercise or the operation.

Article 32

Technical or scientific experts

The provisions of Chapter VIII and Chapter IX shall also apply to a citizen of one of the Parties, who is neither part of the military or civilian personnel, but who is carrying out a specific mission of a technical or scientific nature within EUROGENDFOR and solely for the term of the mission.

Chapter X

Terms in respect of finances and property rights

Article 33

Financial Board

1. A Financial Board, comprising a financial expert designated by each Party, is created.
2. The Financial Board is responsible for the following duties:
 - a. advising CIMIN on financial and budgetary matters;
 - b. implementing the financial, contracting and budgetary procedures and proposing, if necessary, modifications to the cost-sharing formula to be approved by CIMIN;
 - c. examining the draft budget and the medium-term expenses planning proposed by the EGF Commander, to be approved by CIMIN;
 - d. examining the yearly report on the final balance of annual expenses prepared by the EGF Commander and advising CIMIN on its adoption;

- e. in an emergency, approving extra expenses which may not exceed 10% of the Chapter concerned, by proxy for CIMIN. The Financial Board shall report to the next meeting of CIMIN;
 - f. settling financial disputes. If the Financial Board fails to settle a dispute, it shall be referred to CIMIN for settlement;
 - g. proposing CIMIN to perform an audit of the common expenses of EUROGENDFOR. CIMIN shall determine how the audit is to be conducted.
3. The Financial Board operating procedures and the timetable for presenting, examining and approving the draft budget of EUROGENDFOR shall be defined in a set of financial rules to be approved by CIMIN.

Article 34 *Expenses*

- 1. There are three kinds of expenses relating to EUROGENDFOR activities:
 - a. common costs;
 - b. expenses of the Host State relating to the Permanent HQ;
 - c. national expenses.
- 2. The different kinds of expenses and how they are financed shall be defined in the financial rules of EUROGENDFOR to be approved by CIMIN.

Article 35 *Budget*

- 1. The annual budget of EUROGENDFOR for common costs, calculated in euros, shall comprise receipts and disbursements.
- 2. Disbursements consist of, on the one hand, investment costs and operational costs for the Permanent HQ and, on the other hand, expenses approved by the Parties incurred in the course of EUROGENDFOR activities.
- 3. Receipts arise from the contributions of the Parties in accordance with the criteria to be defined by them in the financial rules of EUROGENDFOR.
- 4. The financial year begins on January 1 and ends December 31.

Article 36 *Audits*

To discharge their audit functions with respect to their national governments and to report to their parliament as provided in their statutes, national auditors may obtain all information and examine all documents held by EUROGENDFOR Personnel.

Article 37 *Public tenders*

- 1. EUROGENDFOR may put out contracts to public tender in accordance with the principles in force in the EU.
- 2. EU regulations with respect to public tenders apply under the following conditions:
 - a. the person responsible for putting out contracts to public tender is the EGF Commander;
 - b. an appeal may be filed against the award of a public tender, at no charge, to CIMIN, who will issue a ruling within one month.
- 3. Without prejudice to the terms in paragraphs 1 and 2, competitors are excluded from participating in public tenders if they:

- a. provide goods or services originating in a State with which one of the Parties does not enjoy diplomatic relations;
- b. directly or indirectly pursue objectives that one of the Parties considers to be contrary to its essential security or foreign policy interests.

Chapter XI **Final provisions**

Article 38 *Languages*

The official languages of EUROGENDFOR will be those of the Parties. A common working language may be used.

Article 39 *Settlement of disputes*

Disputes among the Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Treaty will be resolved through negotiation.

Article 40 *Amendments*

1. At the proposal of a Party, this Treaty may be amended at any time with the agreement of all the Parties.
2. Any amendment shall enter into force in accordance with the terms of Article 46.

Article 41 *Withdrawal*

1. Each Party may, at any time, withdraw from this Treaty by giving prior written notice to the depositary.
2. Withdrawal shall take effect twelve months after the date of receipt of the notice of withdrawal by the depositary, or on such later date as may be specified in the notice of withdrawal.

Article 42 *Accession*

1. Any EU Member State possessing a police force with military status may apply to CIMIN for accession to this Treaty. After receiving the approval of the Parties, in accordance with Article 7, paragraph 5, subparagraph a., CIMIN shall notify the applicant State of the Parties' decision.
2. Accession shall be effected by depositing an instrument of accession with the depositary of the Treaty, which shall notify each Party and the acceding State of the date of deposit thereof.
3. In regard to any State on behalf of which an instrument of accession is deposited, this Treaty shall come into force on the first day of the second month after notification by the depositary to all Parties.

Article 43
Observer Status

1. EU candidate countries that have a police force with military status may apply for Observer Status. EU Member States that have a police force with military status may also apply for Observer Status as a first step to accession.
2. Observer Status entails the right to second a liaison officer to the Permanent HQ in accordance with the rules approved by CIMIN.

Article 44
Partner Status

1. EU Member States and EU candidate countries that have a force with military status and some police skills may apply for Partner Status.
2. CIMIN shall define the specific rights and obligations of the Partners.

Article 45
Implementing agreements or arrangements

This Treaty may be supplemented by one or more specific implementing agreements or arrangements.

Article 46
Entry into force

This Treaty shall enter into force on the first day of the second month after notification by the depositary to all Parties of the last instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval.

Article 47
Depositary

The Government of the Italian Republic shall act as depositary and shall notify all signatory and acceding States of the deposit of each instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or withdrawal.

Signed at Velsen, on 18 October 2007, in a single original in the Spanish, French, Italian, Dutch, Portuguese and English languages, each text being equally authoritative, which shall be deposited with the Government of the Italian Republic. The Government of the Italian Republic shall transmit certified copies thereof to all Parties.

For the Kingdom of Spain:

For the French Republic:

For the Italian Republic:

For the Kingdom of The Netherlands:

For the Portuguese Republic: