THE INFLUENCERS

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THE INFLUENCERS

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Finally, I thank all influencers, for giving me the opportunity to discuss through the analysis of this phenomenon some of the deepest roots of Human’s Nature: the common need of involving others in generating and destroying awareness and identity and culture, both at the individual and collective level; which highlights, in all its magnificence and terrificness, the copoietic nature of Humans and of their societies, putting us before the immensity of our liberty in choosing where and how to accompany our “Human” world to its becoming.
"The difference is slight, to the influence of an author, whether he is read by five hundred readers, or by five hundred thousand; if he can select the five hundred, he reaches the five hundred thousand."

Henry Adams
Introduction

It is about influencers, which can be both individuals and groups, inasmuch lobbying, advocating and governance advising actors, involved in governance, policy and law making issues; and, more generally, engaged in inter-agent and inter-group deliberating and decision making processes, agreement and compromise negotiation, representation and intermediation of/between interest-groups -both online and offline- that we will discuss in the following dissertation.

We will outline the modern origins and characteristics of the influencing phenomenon, describing in their conceptual and practical implications corporatism and syndicalism, we will link corporatist and syndicalist interest-group engagement instruments and semi-institutionalized influencing mechanisms to their contemporary versions, describing the functioning of unions, associations and other group-based influencing mechanisms (like lobbying and advocacy). We will first illustrate and then demystify the conceptual “opposition”, identified by the mainstream academic literature on participative governance (i.e. participated democracy and management), between group-based and individual-based participative mechanisms and decision making instruments, both offline and online. Through these arguments, we will try to bring out the reasons of the growing importance of influencers, for our contemporary business and public governance processes.
We will try to highlight the way and means by which influencers’ role has evolved in the “internet” era; and to understand how, through the exercise of non-institutionalized or semi-institutionalized lobbying, advocating, (interest-group) coordinating, intermediating, policy advising and assessing roles in governance processes, contemporary influencers have progressively acquired an exclusive capacity to infer and lead governance debates, first offline and now also online.

In addition to the above mentioned general objectives, we will try to demonstrate how, contemporary influencers – legitimated and sustained by the number and variety of relational links they possess, by their ability to coordinate information flows and to intercept this huge amount of information that incessantly crosses the World wide Web, with the purpose of capturing and then interpreting people’s opinions, feelings, ideas, beliefs on cultural, social, political matters, or on other governance and business related problems- use their capacities, their countless weak ties, their carefully chosen strong ties, and, their private information and knowledge as strategic resources to become indispensable advisors, advocates or lobbyists for three groups of social actors, which have key roles in the political, the scientific and the business environments, respectively:

- The policy actors and stakeholders, helping them supervising, interpreting and guiding the online as well as the offline governance debates and decision-making and telling processes. By using data conveying, gathering and interpreting artifacts (ICTs like big data) and medias as echoes of people’s and interest-groups’ opinions and requests,
which can be used to cleverly build mass-identifying and mass-inspiring policy proposal narratives and story-telling, for the influencing of public opinion, inter-group dynamics, and, in decision-making as a motivation or justification of a policy proposal/outcome.

• The technicians and academics, acting as managers and banner-men of academics’ ideas, models, instruments and organizational myths vis-à-vis elected politicians and public institutions.

• The corporates, acting as promoters, lobbyists or advocates of firms’ socio-political positions and policy related interests; through the influencing of online and offline policy discussions, deliberations and opinion gathering processes, generally for the seeking and maintaining of rent positions. Acting as employees’ referents, coordinators and spokespersons towards corporate executives; by mediating between the interests of the production line and the ones of the upper management, from within or without a union framework.

Frequently, corporate “political activity” (influencing of public governance processes) is regarded under the perspective of financial contributions to candidates, representatives and political parties. However, here we will try to overcome this reductionist vision of corporate influence on public governance processes mediated only by funding, hence we will analyze other corporate influencing mechanisms, mediated by social and cultural (knowledge and belief
mediated) influence, like advocacy, lobbying and other corporatist group-interest representation and intermediation mechanisms, hence illustrating the influencing phenomenon in a more comprehensive way.
Diagram on the conceptual organization of the thesis
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1. **An introductory outline of socio-political influence**

1.1. *The concept of influence*

When the word “influence” first appeared, in France during the Middle Ages, it meant an “emanation from the stars affecting one's fate” (Wiktionary), accordingly influence was a mystic and mythic power affecting one’s life, a sort of celestial favor or curse that could change the destiny of individuals. Nowadays, the concept of influence has been rationalized and humanized, both in its effects and origins; accordingly, it can be summarized as “a power affecting a person, thing, or course of events. [...] Based on prestige, wealth or ability” (Dictionary). In view of this definition, we can affirm that in the broadest sense of the term, influencers are all those individuals who have the capacity and willingness of changing/affecting others’ life, by altering their valuations, intentions or decisions, without the need of using coercion or threats.

---The ambiguity of the influencing process and its medium---

The two above-mentioned senses of influence appear very distant from one-another; yet, if we pay greater attention to the “old” and the “new” concept of influence there is one interesting parallel between the two, in both cases the medium through which influence is exerted appears to be undefined. Even when the pretended origin of such power is clearly mentioned (like prestige, wealth or
ability) the vehicle/instrument and the process through which this capacity is exerted and reveals successful appears indefinite. By being mutable in its form, the target of an influencing action appears defenseless towards this social interaction phenomenon. As a result, at a first look influence seems an overwhelming influx of information and stimuli, which once elaborated by the receiver, becomes a clear incentive to adopt a specific way thinking or acting. As a result, social influence can alter the proceeding of human activities by infiltrating other individuals’ decisional processes (Deci, 1971), apparently closed and self-governing.

The preview explanation of the concept and phenomenon of influence is the outcome of the methodological individualism and reductionism used to analyze and interpret such phenomenon. Individualism jointly to reductionism, focuses on associating specific powers, of a single over others, to specific characteristic he possess at the individual level; and does not consider social interdependencies between individuals in a community, due to the structural organization, codes, culture and the complexity of the relational networks which connect them. However, influence is founded both on social organization, social artifacts and individual level influencing abilities. Communication instruments and techniques can be used to submit information (accurate or voluntarily biased) and encourage its use in a specific decisional process in order to stimulate or manipulate the thoughts and actions of an individual, as for instance marketing and advertising campaign information and stimuli can be used to influence purchase decisions.
-The influence perspective: from individualism to holism-

If we abandon individualism and we consider influence from a holistic point of view, the influence concept can be summarized as a set of unidirectional connections (arcs) between center and periphery members (nodes) of a social network system; in which information and incitement to act or think in a specific way constantly flows from some information hubs or providers (the influencers), which are at the center of the information network, to some receivers (the influenced), which are at its peripheries. Clearly, this brief holistic explanation is also an extreme over simplification of what truly is social influence. But it can help us understand that the influence phenomenon is an emerging property of social networks, due to the characteristics of information and relational networks’ structure, jointly to the individual-level specific abilities.

By joining the two perspectives, we can summarize influence as the ability to drive others’ thinking and action, through symbolic interaction and communication (speech, visuals, signals, writing, or behavior). When one voluntarily creates an informational signal stimulus and other people respond to it, that’s influence.

-Direct and mediated social influence –

Generally, to increase the chances of being successful in an influencing tentative, individuals and organizations resort to the help of third parties, socially and emotionally closer and more trusted by their targets, to exercise the desired
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influencing action on their behalf, in exchange of financial, material or social reward. Such kind of mediated influencing process will be further detailed later on in this thesis. Here follows (figure 1) and extremely simplified, but certainly useful schematic summary of the differences between direct and mediated influencing:

Figure 1: Direct and indirect influence, of my production
1.2. *Code-mediated influence, persuasion, authority and other teachings on influencing mechanisms from the past*

Emotional intelligence (Goleman, *Leadership: The Power of Emotional Intelligence*, 2011) and social intelligence (Goleman, 2006), as well as cognitive capacities and the mastering of symbol/code mediated communication have always been critical for the influencing success in human deliberations and confrontations, both in public governance and business domain. Accordingly, the study of communicative processes’, in particular language pragmatics and semantics empirics jointly to the analysis of their changes through history and societies, is certainly a precious tool understand the mechanisms behind authority, rhetorical persuasion and social influence. Specifically, we refer to Wiles & Dartnall (1999) for the explanation of representationism and human false believes, to Chomsky & Herman (1988) for the illustration of mass medias propaganda, to Chomsky (2003) for the description of creative aspects of language use and media influence on the public mind under freedom, to Garsten (2009) for an analysis of the role of persuasion, rhetoric and judgement as fundamental mechanisms for participative policy making processes, and, to Lincoln (1994) for the analysis of authority as an individual empowerment, emerging from a specific relationship between a speaker, his pragmatic discourse, an widely recognized space for deliberation and the legitimization by the public to speak within it without being stopped or questioned.
In addition, although we regret not to devote more space to it in this work, we wish to outline part of the recently growing literature that links economic and managerial theory to cognitive sciences; specifically, the multidisciplinary literature that brings together the latest findings of behavioral psychology to that of management and economics. For instance agreement negotiation, business governance processes, employer-employee -and other- business relationships and executive hierarchical control mechanisms. A brief recapitulation of the literature on this research field can certainly help us in confining for the better the influencing phenomenon in its business governance version: Even though a general theory for the pragmatics of persuasion applied to business governance doesn’t exist, from the beginning of the eighties (Weingast, 1984) to nowadays, principal-agent theories have been progressively extended and integrated by recent cognitive science discoveries, mainly through the extensive use of game theoretical methods (Anton, Jager, & van Rooij, 2006) to comprehend pragmatic persuasion, leadership and authority building mechanisms and situations. Recent studies, like the one of Glazer & Rubinstein (2006) have demonstrated how optimal persuasion rule can be considered in some situations ex-post optimal, and how a principal who wishes to be obeyed can influence the behavior of an agent even after he has made his strategic moves. Despite the fact that game theory modeling has an extremely reductionist approach which over-simplifies the complexity of these dialectical processes, nerveless the findings of this new area of research can be easily used to simulate persuasion situations in politics and infer the possible outcomes of public governance processes in which pragmatic
persuasion and social influence can be exerted. For instance, we could use these situation modeling instruments in a principal-agent problem in which a group of voters or corporate lobbyers (the principals) want to influence the behavior of their sponsored or voted elected representative (agent) after his appointment.

-Testimonies from the past on the use of social influence -

Contemporary societies have preserved copious memories about dialectical confrontations between pragmatic and influential persons from the past, either for authority, legitimation or for people guidance. These memories were mostly transmitted through writings of testimonies or oral narrations, with the purpose of serving again, possibly to understand the past in the upcoming present, and sometimes recognize the present through the past. We want to use one of these historical memories, the “Apology of Socrates”, to appreciate how ancient is the social influencing phenomenon, which will be here discussed in relation to its more modern developments.

In the “Apology of Socrates”, a written discourse by Plato (IV century B.C), is narrated the ultimate dialectical dispute between the sophists and Plato’s mentor, Socrates, in the Athenian ecclesia. Despite appearances, as we will document by analyzing the content of the dialogue, when Socrates made his speech to demonstrate his innocence, everything appears to have been already decided for him: “In this short time I must try to dispel the slander that you have had so long to absorb”. According to Plato, the sophists had already accomplished
their influencing on the Athenians, and hence secured their political victory on
Socrates in front of the ecclesia. Socrates tells us that his fellow Athenians had
“been affected by [his] accusers”; accordingly, he anticipates that he would be
found guilty of “corrupting the young”, failing “to acknowledge the gods” and
“being a busybody, in that he enquires what is beneath the earth and in the sky,
turns the weaker argument into the stronger, and teaches other to do the same”.
The accused admits and discloses in front of the ecclesia that his opponents were
in fact blaming him for competing for influence over the people: “all I do is to go
about, persuading you, young and old alike”; but this was also what his detractors
did, for interests no more legitimate than his: “please tell the judges who
influences them for the better [...] speak up and tell the court who has an
improving influence”. Moreover, according to Plato’s text, it wasn’t the Athenians’
judgment but the sophists’ influence that had already decided his fate: “I am not
dismayed by this outcome [...] especially because the outcome has no surprise to
me”. Before even entering the ecclesia which would officially pronounce its
judgment on Socrates, sophists had already won, as influencers; through their
social ties they had shaped the political situation and public opinion necessary to
ensure the support of the Athenians assembly for the prosecution and death
sentence of Socrates: “I have been accused before you by many people; [...] it is
those people I fear more than [this] crowd”. Socrates considers the influencing
power of sophists even greater than the tyrannical power of the “Thirty” oligarchs
that had come to govern Athens few years before, after the coup of 411 BC and
the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnese wars of 404 BC: “powerful as it was, the
regime did not frighten me into unjust action”. In view of what said before, we can conclude the ecclesia’s judgment was only a formality through which the sophists influencing power had revealed its existence. Socrates’s destiny, decided by the sophists, would be finally pronounced in front of the public, in the -democratically legitimized- name of the Athenian people, and their law.

- Social artifacts and power structures as social influence bridling mechanisms-

Could this story that took place in the Greek State-city of Athens at the beginning of the IVth century before Christ, happen today in our modern “democratic” parliaments and assemblies? Even though social artifacts, institutions, language and fashionable words of the political and cultural debate can change, nevertheless the social influencing and authority exertion mechanisms that are described in countless textual memories and literary reconstructions by ancient Greek and Roman academics and politicians, are in many ways similar to those of the present. As a result of this ever-growing political and social Human experience, from the emergence of the Athenian deliberative democracy to nowadays, the dialectical structure of governance processes became increasingly sophisticated, as happens to almost all human conceptual constructions. Consequently, to restrain political representatives’ and governance officials’ power and freedom of institutionalized transformation of society, state and market organization, intricate regulations and organizational schemes were made within the institutions, through which social actors exercise and legitimize their political power in front of the people. Accordingly governance institutions also
became increasingly complex and rigid in their procedures. These large-scale public structures help in maintaining the social, cultural and political traditions and status-quo, especially in more complex societies. Accordingly, it is socially required, to those who want to exert a social and political power, to comply with the procedures of institutionalized action and change, or to markedly break with their contemporary social organization, acting as revolutionaries. As Walker and Schiffer (2006) point out, platform mounds, palaces, temples and burial sites of Early Ages, might be regarded as the social artifacts at the origin of mass media: “In having these structures built, priests and kings [and other elite groups], as selectors, placed heavy weight on certain visual performance characteristics, thereby prescribing what all members of a community and visitors had to view. Viewers of these political technologies were reminded of the immense structural social power of the elite, which contributed to the reproduction of elite-maintaining ideologies”.
1.3. **Brief outline of the foundations of contemporary power**

Confrontations through speak (dialectics) exist since the invention of spoken language. However, as alleged previously, the range and influence of language and other communication techniques derives from social artifacts, and from the structure of, social and institutional, networks in which information spreads. “Modern industrial societies are increasingly rich of social artifacts: factories, skyscrapers, houses of worship, sports arenas, capitols, statues, and other monuments similarly function as mass media (in addition to other utilitarian and symbolic functions they might perform).[...] These large and visually distinctive structures reinforce and perpetuate social inequalities by imposing, on all who pass by, particular visual interactions that intone structural social power; in other cases, the impositions are more benign, serving as symbols of community pride and contributing to its integration. And, of course, the same structure or monument may comfort some people while also oppressing others.” (Walker & Schiffer, June 2006) Accordingly, in contemporary times, dialectical confrontations (conflicts through language), have increasingly become organizational and social confrontations (conflicts through social artifacts and networks). Moreover, as we will document and explain in detail in the first chapter, the progressive and joint diffusion of capitalism -intended as private ownership of assets and market coordination of all activities that are not organized within firms with ensuing social relationships between differently endowed owners of material and immaterial production factors- jointly to
democracy, as preferred and dominant system of economic and socio-political organization, favored a progressive revolution of the foundations of social power in Human communities, gradually shifting from a power of individuals and organizations based on control (property rights) over land and physical resources, and subsequently on people whose life/work depends on the existence or possibility of using this land and resources; to a power based on social authority (influence and standing in social networks) and control (property rights) upon immaterial goods, like industrial knowledge, private information and symbolic meanings (like brands), jointly to the means by which these immaterial goods are produced (like R&D and marketing) and circulate (social artifacts and networks).

-On our democratic social environments-

“One of the [theoretical] bedrock principles in a democracy is the equal consideration of the preferences and interests of all citizens. This is expressed in such principles as one-person/one-vote, equality before the law, and equal rights of free speech. Equal consideration of the preferences and needs of all citizens is fostered by equal political activity among citizens; not only equal voting turnout across significant categories of citizens but equality in other forms of activity. These activities include work in a political campaign, campaign contributions, activity within one’s local community, direct contact with officials, and protest. Equal activity is crucial for equal consideration since political activity is the means by which citizens inform governing elites of their needs and preferences and induce them to be responsive. Citizen participation is, thus, at the heart of
political equality. Through their activity citizens in a democracy seek to control who will hold public office and to influence what the government does. Political participation provides the mechanism by which citizens can communicate information about their interests, preferences, and needs and generate pressure to respond” (Verba, 2013).

This idea of democracy, resumed through the words of Verba (2013), might appear commonsense for us; however it implies a break with a millennial tradition of thought in political theory. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, democracy was rather unpopular, because considered logically incompatible with governance stability, effectiveness and rule of law; by almost all philosophers from Antiquity to Renaissance. Plato and Aristotle, who set the theoretical foundations of political theory, viewed democracy as a degeneration of oligarchy.

Of five possible types of political regimes democracy was, for its socio-economic implications, considered by them the fourth worst (Cahn, 2002). Plato considered democracy a “charming form of government, full of variety and disorder; and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike” (in *the Republic*). Moreover, distrust in democracy was also widespread in more modern times - XVIIIth and XIXth century-, among the uneducated as among the most knowledgeable and open-minded men. The Kantian critique to direct democracy is probably the best Historical illustration of such disbelief in the power of (entrusted to) the people. Democracy is considered by Kant as a “form of despotism” of the voting majority, which engenders a “badly organized society”.
According to Kant, “despotism is nothing other than a paternalistic power which, like a master imposes what he considers right according to his own individual will neglecting human liberty. Furthermore, despotism changes into a private will the public will, denying the state as public entity” (De Federicis, 2012). If “in democracies we are ruled more often by speech than by force” (Garsten, 2009), in what does democracy and democratic social organization differ from other forms of “ruling by speech” -like oligarchy-?

Without any doubt, individuals’ power to participate through speak to the public governance debate in their community, is not due to the invention of the democracy concept and neither to the existence of democratic institutions or to their voting systems; it Historically emerged from the diffusion among the greatest number, of both, similar interpersonal capacities, knowledge and equal liberty in formulating, expressing, maintaining and changing, each at his liking, thoughts and opinions. This concept of equal right to deliberate in socio-political processes, which is a dialogical activity, is summarized in the Greek concepts of “isonomia” and “isegoria”. As H. Arendt (2007) points out, “words are a surrogate of actions, actions which presuppose the power to force and being forced. By defining the slaves and barbarians aneu logou, deprived of the right to speak, Greeks wanted to say that these slaves were in a condition in which it was not possible to speak freely. In the same condition is the tyrant, who knows only how to command; to be able to speak he would need people in his same situation”. Accordingly, democratic institutions and law can only legitimize and protect the
“isonomia” and “isegoria” amongst people; but never democracy alone can create any effective an “isokratia”: equal power and equal capacity to resist to others power, between the people.

In our modern democracies the right to vote, as the right to demonstrate, as the right to go on strike, as the right to stand for elections are only a part of the almost infinite set of instruments and social mechanisms that can be used in contemporary times for founding ones social and political power, originated by, but certainly not limited to, the freedom of expression, listening and association. Democratically protected means and rights, of social and political participation and power exertion, are often in antagonism with these other influencing means, like mass media, working hierarchies and supervision, relationships and associated social capital, individual possession of artifacts and knowledge, capacities of using and producing artifacts and private financial capitals. Accordingly, only in the utopic situation in which there is a diffused capacity of jointly and freely exerting -and resisting if desired- to all the above alleged influencing forces, gives to people the chance of truly partaking to a, rather utopic, equitable process of co-governance of their society; in which everyone can try to influence other -equally power endowed- members of the community, with whom they are connected through institutional, relational and information networks.
- Democratic values: equity and liberty? -

Since in modern democratic countries “political equality is a valued good per se” (Verba, 2013); we could consider the modern concept of democracy as an organizational myth associated to a participative and apparently equitable system of legitimated -by the voting majority- influencing processes; seemingly governed by a power originated by the freedom of expression, listening and association among the people. The widespread believe that a “democratic” socio-political organization leads necessarily towards an increasingly equitable and equally distributed capacity of influence between citizens, engenders an over-reliance on spontaneous social power balancing mechanisms and liberty of the people in democratic states, in which social equality appears to be the result of free expression and other democratic rights. Such relying on the power of the people in democracies can be straightforwardly used, as cultural and ideological establishment, to legitimate the idea that every individual has the right and duty to try to guide the governance processes by all non-illegal influencing means he possesses or he can have access to. According to this perspective, each individual should choose for which purposes and how extensively use his influencing capacity, skills, social relations, ICT instruments or other social artifacts, and, information and knowledge about social networking mechanisms, to exert a communication mediated control (influence) on other social and economic actors, governance organizations and institutions; legitimized by the above alleged democratic value and axiom, which says that in democratic societies the more
each-one tries to stimulate debate and tries to participate to governance processes, the more the policy and society outcome will be participated and therefore politically “equitable”, and morally “just and fair”.

As previously clarified, social influence is no new phenomenon in human communities. The above described, is only a brief review of the characteristics of the social environment in which, as we will see, the figure of the influencer re-emerged more socially empowered and legitimated than ever.
1.4. Delineation of the research field and time span of the analysis

As previously exemplified, History is full of examples of individuals and organizations able to exert a non-codified or non-institutionalized social and political influence. From the Bronze Age to the Age of Enlightenment, people like Marcus Tullius Cicero (Narducci, 2009), Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli (Vivanti, 2008), Girolamo Savonarola (Ridolfi, 1974), Armand Jean du Plessis de Richelieu (de Waresquiel, 2009), Grigori Efimovič Rasputin (Fuhrmann, 2012), as many other individuals, exerted social and political influence on the governance processes and outcomes of their times, and, on the lives of their contemporaries. Accordingly, there would definitely be abundant material on the History of social influence to carry out an analysis with multi-millennial perspective. However, given the nature and purposes of this writing, which is a final dissertation for a Bachelor degree in Economics and Management, hereafter we will limit the timespan of our analysis of the influence phenomenon, to the features and trends of the previous and the current century. In particular, we will be interested in the developments of the social influence, in the market and the political systems, from the 20s of the XXth century to our contemporary times.

- The XXth century -

As detailed in UNESCO (2008), the past century might be remembered as the century of the growing socio-political pressure of the masses on the political system, and, the growing pressure of private enterprises and business activity on
the masses. Collective interests’ representatives, of both professional groups of workers and business sector stakeholders, progressively became increasingly legitimate and effective forms for political influence on governance institutions, nowadays called lobbies and unions. Such phenomenon was initially concretized in the culture of syndicalism, which spread from France to other European countries at the turn of the XIXth century. After World War I, emerging nationalist regimes – of the 20s, 30s and 40s- tried to convey to the corporatism philosophy these interest groups, by designing new mechanisms of political representation of these collective interests and group actions in the governance institutions. Finally after the physical and cultural devastations of World War II, corporatism had to be in turn revised. In Italy it was culturally replaced by the concept of consociativism. More generally, the expression of group interests through collective action was associated to advocacy, unionism and corporate lobbyism, with an ensuing worldwide diffusion of those practices and behavioral models of political and social influence.

During this period of conceptual and socio-political turmoil, academics progressively came to consider patterns and tendencies within, and organization of, societies as a structured and collectively organized phenomenon, due to the spontaneous emergence of collective awareness, intelligence, willpower and coordinated action of the people within their social groups (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). In the first half of the XXth century, it was a shared belief that the origin of such commonality could only be nationality, socio-political
ideology (the –isms), religion or civilization, as unique cohering and cohesing factors within these social systems. Accordingly cultural, social, politic, economic phenomenon could be scientifically discovered, mathematically modeled; and, when possible, formally controlled or steered through economic, politic social and cultural levers. Hence, until the 50s, it was commonly thought that those governance “levers” naturally and exclusively belonged to nationally centralized institutions; few thought that so complex and organized social systems could have little or no centralized communication or control. Moreover, the possibility that social artifacts, like Medias, could become a private business tools seemed even more absurd.

But time denied this collective belief; industrial mass production organization, acknowledged as Fordism, could not continue to be at the mercy of the spontaneous volatility of consumers’ demand, which during whole the Great Depression acted as pro-cyclical economic forces that increasingly accentuated the industrial and employment crisis. Accordingly, from the 30s on, a new discipline for the study of consumers and the analysis of their cognitive processes of formulation, expression and fulfillment of desires and needs rapidly developed under the name of marketing and advertising (Gifford, 2010). This new discipline progressively became one of “the greatest art form of the 20th century” (McLuhan), both for its social and cultural impact and influence on consumers’ consumptions, lifestyles and cultural trends and modes.
At the turning of the XX\textsuperscript{th} century, the absolutisms of the socio-political and economic ideologies which carved the worldwide organization of national States, during the tumultuous History of the XX\textsuperscript{th} century -mainly Capitalism, Corporatism, Communism, Nationalism and Socialism-, which were initially considered conceptually isolated milestones, have been widely associated to failure and instability; hence their institutional instruments and socio-economic mechanisms were recomposed in new mixed forms of society organization.

\textit{-The XXI\textsuperscript{st} century-}

In more recent times, an increasingly wide range of scholars, specialized in the analysis of social networks and complex human-interaction systems (Weber, 1978), have tried to explain the online networking phenomenon (List of social networking websites, 2013) that followed the ICT revolution. These scholars, coming from the most diverse disciplines (Wasserman & Faust, 1994), tried, with the most diverse approaches, to model the dynamics of online interactions and deliberations (Bishop, 2006), information cascades (Dotey, Rom, & Vaca, 2011), authority accretion mechanisms and, finally, online influence and power exertion. Their analysis was generally focused on empirical case-studies (Réka, Hawoong, & Barabási, 1999). Researchers mainly examined four sorts of online information exchange platforms: forums, social networks, online mass medias and deliberation systems, trying to understand the different ways through which the functioning mechanisms and characteristics of these systems determined the online information/opinion distribution and diffusion outcomes. Another major
issue, consisted in evaluating the origins of the impact dissimilarities of these networking instruments, both in terms of the capacity of drawing attention and penetrating individuals’ opinion forming mechanisms, and successively inducing changes in their views, feelings, ideas, beliefs, identity and choices, in matters ranging from religion to science passing by business, economics and politics; these last three are the matters of our concern of this study.

If on one hand, researchers paid great attention to how the complexity and relevance of connections within these network systems determined the online information diffusion and distribution, in terms of overall performances; i.e. how rapidly and uniformly messages and opinions contaminated other online users. On the other hand, poor relevance was given to the study of the revival phenomenon of an ever-existing but now transformed social actor, which was carving out for itself an ever-most key role within our worldwide expanding ICT systems. We call them online influencers, individuals who are willingly assuming the role of online hubs, information gatherers, coordinators, distributers and interpreters of social tendencies.
2. From the modern to the contemporary governance influencing phenomenon

- Business and Political competitions’ distortion by relational networks, interaction codes and organizational structures-

Perfect competition theory has been extensively constructed around an atomized, idiosyncratic and under socialized conception of human agents, both when they act on their behalf or as executors of organizations’ purposes for which they perform in exchange of physical, informational or social benefits. This perspective of analysis is embodied in the concept of utility. By the principle of utility Bentham meant “that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever, and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government” (Bentham, 2009).

Neoclassical preference axioms, pioneered by Cantor, Frisch and Samuelson, and ensuing neoclassical theoretical modeling of economic phenomenon also followed these utilitarian behavioral assumptions. By shifting from the concept of utility to that of preference, neoclassical economists have only weakened the utility measuring assumptions of utilitarian theory, as formulated by Bentham and Mill. Still, while passing from the concept of cardinal to ordinal utility, economists
THE INFLUENCERS

maintained the basic hypothesis that personal benefits and preferences are respectively the incentives and regulators of human action, both in the interpretation of market (labor, production, exchange and consumption choices) and non-market activities (voting, advocating, etc.). “Much of the utilitarian tradition, including classical and neoclassical economics, assumes rational, self-interested behavior affected minimally by social relations, thus invoking an idealized state not far from that of these thought experiments” (Granovetter, 1985).

The above mentioned theoretical arguments disallow by their premise any impact of social structure and social relations on production, distribution, or consumption: in perfect market competition theory, political and social structures should be “rendered unnecessary by competitive markets that make force or fraud unavailing. Competition determines the terms of trade in a way that individual traders cannot manipulate. If traders encounter complex or difficult relationships, characterized by mistrust or malfeasance, they can simply move on to the legion of other traders willing to do business on market terms; social relations and their details thus become frictional matters” (Granovetter, 1985).

Yet, as each one can notice in his daily life, market trades and competitions rarely respect the stringent assumptions on perfect competition used to deduce the allocative and productive efficiency outcomes of these theoretical perfect competition systems. Asymmetric or imperfect information, transaction and decision costs are the norm in almost all decisional processes within human
environments. Interactions and relationships among agents (individuals or organizations) are ordinarily structured according to behavioral and relational structures made of codes and rules, some obvious other tacit and difficultly recognizable, which can be either imposed by one agent in a particularly empowered position or codetermined by group dynamics of interaction between several agents, the degree of respect or violation of these rules and social codes can change the outcome of market and non-market interactions between agents. Accordingly, in factual business competition, “social capital is as important as competition is imperfect and investment capital is abundant. Under perfect competition, social capital is a constant in the production equation. There is a single rate of return because capital moves freely from low-yield to high-yield investments until rates of return are homogeneous across alternative investments. When competition is imperfect, capital is less mobile and plays a more complex role in the production equation. There are financial, social, and legal impediments to moving cash between investments. There are impediments to reallocating human capital, both in terms of changing the people to whom you have a commitment and in terms of replacing them with new people. Rate of return depends on the relations in which capital is invested. Social capital is a critical variable. This is all the more true when financial and human capital are abundant -which in essence reduces the investment term in the production equation to an unproblematic constant” (R. Burt, 1995). The influencing power of an agent over its social environment can be resumed as a combination of:
1. **Centrality**: that is a measure of the interaction activity and capability of an agent; it grows together with the quantity of relations (links) and the centrality of directly linked interlocutors (peers and neighbors).

2. **Standing and reliability**: agents’ –and agents’ messages- capability of being distinguished (recognition of uniqueness and authorship) and thus recognized by other agents within their network and environment; which gives to the agent the opportunity to create and maintain personalized interactions and relations with others and have devoted by peers and contacts more time and attention for the interpretation, evaluation and approval of his expressed ideas and requests.

Accordingly, structures of interaction govern – as incentives, restrictions, controls and instructions- the means by which agents’ actions and decisions can/should influence other individuals’ decisions and actions. Consequently, agents’ possibilities are both empowered and confined by their links within their social and business clusters and networks, and their adherence to the behavioral rules that ought to be respected within them. Moreover, human systems are subject to hysteresis: since agents have a subjectively shaped memory of past interactions and past experiences, memory shapes and distinguishes the way in which agents react to other’s decisions, in order to prevent or facilitate them in reaching their
objectives. Rules and memory of past experiences have therefore a direct impact on ones’ future possibilities of succeeding in his tasks and influencing his surrounding environment for whatever purposes.

Socio-political environments, in which individuals are embedded, set up the lively arena in which any human activity takes place. Legal, institutional, political, cultural, social, technological and demographic systems’ trends are powerful and often relentless forces, which persistently guide and inspire the actions and decisions of agents that therein live and operate, both at the local and global level. If on one hand, trade standards, intellectual property rights protection, business regulation, public policies and investments, administrative and registry offices’ efficiency, tax and tariff regime, contract enforcement, trade union power, labor law, official corruption, consumers’ culture and education, labor force training, productivity and vision of life jointly shape the mechanisms and boundaries of agents’ actions and interactions and their horizon of possibilities. On the other hand, each agent within these systems can try to steer or exploit in its favor these collective trends and the social levers, and the mechanisms through which they are enacted. As a result, as we will see in detail in the following sections (1.1 and 1.2), policy and market demand influencing dynamics are strongly affected by surrounding environmental forces, which in turn are affected by the behaviors of and relationships between agents that operate within them.
-From policy community to governance influencing-

The notion of governance process influencing lies at the heart of the analysis of policy networks, communities and interest groups. “The very constitution of a policy community involves an exercise in power because some societal organizations are included in policy-making while others are excluded. Presumably, those included in the policy community will have a greater likelihood of placing their concerns on the policy agenda, of fighting against consideration of other concerns, and of receiving a response to their political demands. Second, once a policy community takes shape, those interests on the inside will have a greater opportunity to participate directly in the design of policies and to receive a delegation of state authority to implement some policies. These activities are inherent to corporatism, suggesting that inclusion in policy communities with corporatist decision-making rules enhances social actors’ capacities for exercising power” (Coleman, 1994).

- Combining the theories of governance influencing-

Here follows a summary on governance influencing concepts and phenomenon. We will start our enquiry with a conceptual and historical outline of corporatism and syndicalism, intended as mechanisms of functional association of interest groups. Then, we will describe key concepts and mechanisms of modern to contemporary systems and processes for influencing governance processes and policy, law making. This will be done through an overview of the literature on
advocacy, lobbying, rent seeking, interest intermediation, collective bargaining, technical advising, participatory policy deliberation and participatory business governance; as well as other, to the above mentioned related, “open” governance questions and associated phenomenon, which will serve us to reconstruct the conceptual framework of socio-political influencing. For the sake of brevity, the ensuing literature review will cover only most relevant works on the influencing of governance processes from the end of the First World War to more recent times. However, given the size and amount of documentation on these topics, the following review and historical summary of the political influencing phenomenon is not intended to be exhaustive. The main thematic areas of research that will be expounded in this chapter are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporatism (p.49)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Syndicalism (p.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy (p.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbying (p.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent seeking (p.94)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
We will try mentioning both, the literature and handbooks on empirical phenomenon and theoretical inference, generalization and modeling of influencing phenomenon. When possible, thematic areas will be linked one-another for an integrative approach and understanding of systems and methods for governance influencing.

-On the similarities and differences between Corporatism and Syndicalism-

As we will hereafter explain “corporatism and syndicalism have a certain family resemblance as political philosophies and political projects committed to functional representation, but they also differ in other, more fundamental respects. Viewed as forms of economic and political interest intermediation their crucial common feature is their explicit and self-conscious organization in terms
of the function performed within the division of labor by those represented through such organizational forms. But such forms of functional representation can be organized in various ways and these in turn enable one to distinguish syndicalism from corporatism and differentiate the variants of each. Whether seen historically or comparatively, syndicalism is a less complex phenomenon than corporatism and is correspondingly easier to define. Essentially it comprises an economic and political movement of the working class which is avowedly both anti-capitalist and anti-statist; its ultimate goal is to abolish capitalism and the state in favor of a loose decentralized federation of worker-owned and worker-managed production units. Corporatism is a much more heterogeneous phenomenon and thus less amenable to encapsulation in a sentence or two. None the less there would be a broad consensus that most corporatist projects accept the legitimacy (or, at least, the inevitability) of market forces and the state” (Jessop, 1995). As we will show throughout this section, both theories, corporatism and syndicalism, link the economic organization of a community to its social structure and to its public governance and policy formulating processes, through functional interest groups’ representative mechanisms, generally called unions, these representatives are responsible for collective bargaining and influencing actions on business and policy/law making processes.
2.1. Corporatism

-The origins: guilds, confraternities and general assemblies-

We could probably identify the origin of corporatism - and to a lesser extent of syndicalism - in the medieval and renaissance artisan or merchant guilds and confraternities, which were created to protect and regulate the access to, and organization of, specialized professional careers and trades within urban environments. By selectively extending membership and privileges to new entrants, guilds and confraternities could formalize and standardize a “meritocratic” professional career advancement process, through which most profitable rent positions and roles (for instance artisan masters and grandmasters), that were positions theoretically accessible to all, could be obtained and preserved only by local

A case study on medieval guilds’ corporatist organization:

Guilds, Efficiency, and Social Capital: Evidence from German Proto-Industry

&

State Corporatism and Proto-Industry: The Württemberg Black Forest, 1580-1797

By Ogilvie (2002 and 2006)

workers and traders who had achieved specific professional requirements, which where verified by those who were already locally entitled of those privileged positions (for details on guild organization we refer to: Epstein & Prak, 2010).

Between Renaissance and the Age of Enlightenment, in several countries across Europe, progressively emerged a small number of quasi-representative, yet undemocratic, interest groups representatives’ assemblies (Kagan, Ozment, & Turner, 1998). Interest groups and social categories (or classes) were established on the basis of life vocation or professional occupation. Cases of such assemblies were: the States-General in France and Netherlands, the Parliament of England, the Estates of Parliament of Scotland, the Imperial Reichstag of the Holy Roman Empire and the “Standische Landtage” of the federated states in Germany (von Mises, 1998).

General assemblies, that represented major interest groups entitled by the local sovereign to participate and suggest their views before lawmaking and policy formulation, were strongly hierarchized and class discriminatory. The clear distinction between social groups and their distinct advisory role was facilitated by cultural class segregation and was the product of a social stratification process established on aristocracy by “divine will” and its military hierarchical leadership, jointly to roman Church Catholic socio-cultural organization dogmas, which, in most of Europe lasted unchanged for almost a millennium. Through these assemblies, the ruler (generally an aristocratic leader holder of the executive and legislative power) was, upon request, advised of the opinion and
demands of his subjects, which were communicated by selected spokespersons of each social class that were authorized to attend the assembly. Representatives were generally selected or designated leaders within an interest group, among the most influential and widely acknowledged of their class by the sovereign. These assemblies into which flowed the interests of aristocracy, clergy, and, to lesser extent merchants, artisans and “populace”, were conceptually close to the notion functional representation of corporatism.

-On the notion of corporatism-

Corporatism is conceptually founded on the premise that “man's nature can only be fulfilled within a socio-political community. The core of the corporatist vision is thus not the individual but the political community whose perfection allows the individual members to fulfill themselves and find happiness” (Watkins, 2014). The notion of corporatism refers to a system wherein possessors of production-factors (human, financial, intellectual, social and physical capital) are organized into unions which jointly organize and plan production processes in a manner which is supposed to satisfy similarly all economically active and resource endowed parties. Accordingly, a union is a continuous association of production-factor earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving their living conditions (Clarke & Clements, 1978). Corporatism is a social, political and economic system founded on “associative action, in contrast to individual or commanded action” (Pekkarinen, Pohjola, & Rowthorn, Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System?, 1992). In a corporatist system, political institutions and officers govern
by mediating between the divergent positions of functional interest groups’ representatives. Acting as arbitrators and coordinators whatever disagreements between social groupings may arise during the policy formulating and approving processes; thereby ensuring collaboration between different functional categories of policy and business stakeholders, none of which interests’ should have systematic precedence over all else. In its current use, the concept of corporatism is typically interpreted as a particular form of policy negotiation and centralized wage bargain, between the government institutions (state agencies and bureaucracies) and the economic interest groups of both employers and workers.

The advent of Fordism and Taylorism (scientific management), and ensuing organization of industry in large scale production units with standardized and semi-mechanized assembly lines, in which workers were required to carry out extremely simple but repetitive tasks, worldwide determined an increase of business concentration -to exploit scale economies- and a flattening of workforce hierarchies (Waring, 1994). The minimalism of manual tasks in assembly lines had rendered the better trained and more qualified workers like all others, both from the point of view of the output per worker and the ability to perform specific tasks in the assembly line. Therefore, the salaries and duties of these previously distinct categories of workers became increasingly homogeneous. Subsequently, the “obsolescence” of manual craft and expertise led to the convergence and political unification of the workforce in a single interest group, which favored the development of unions and ensuing corporatist tripartite organization of
production relations (Nadworny, 1955). In countries where this tripartite organization of production relations was adopted, the constant confrontations - cooperation or constructive conflict- between governments, associations of employers, and trade union confederations determined the progressive -domestic- harmonization of wages and working conditions (labor rights and safety regulation).

- Corporatism as a tripartite representative mechanism for centralized bargaining-

If on one hand, corporatist interest groups, and their political representatives, can be regarded as “labour market parties whose autonomy and conflict rights are respected and not violated. Using economists’ terminology, this means that their property rights are well defined. [...] organizing labour market relations on conflict bases is a way to institutionalize the non-exclusive and egalitarian feature of corporatism. [On the other hand,] the institutionalization of partnership or consensus is different in the sense that industrial peace may be achieved [and collective gains may be obtained] at the expense of groups which are either economically or politically too weak to have any considerable bargaining power, that is by excluding them from the bargaining table” (Pekkarinen, Pohjola, & Rowthorn, 1992).

Accordingly, in recent studies (Calmfors, Drifill, 1988), tripartite bargaining institutions, have been analyzed for a better understanding of the economic successes of so-called new corporatist economies, for example Sweden. The
starting-point of these enquiries is that markets are dominated by the behavior of rent-seeking organizations which waste resources in influencing other agents’ decisions and try to distort allocations so as to generate outcomes with distributive effects favorable to themselves. Consequently, markets do not consist of atomistic agents but of a large number of small and influential interest groups whose uncoordinated non-co-operative behavior can be responsible for the drop of economic performance (Olson, 1965).

Hence, tripartite bargaining institutions do not have only the role of meeting and negotiating institutions, in which partisan-interest representatives gather for the negotiation of the distribution or re-distribution of business activity revenues; they also operate as pluralism mediating channels of self-interested behavior of groups and individuals, whether employers, employees or others. Encouraging these parties to overcome, and look beyond from their purely redistributive and rent-seeking activities, and trying to involve these special interest groups and convey their rent-seeking activities into well-coordinated and socially productive ones. Hence the success of an economy’s bargaining structure in achieving this objective can be regarded as a major determinant of its employment, income, and inflation performance and, therefore, of social welfare. Its role in this task can be considered as equal in importance to well-designed economic policies on the part of the government (Pekkarinen, Pohjola, & Rowthorn, 1992).

This form of institutionalized tripartite corporatist organization of the negotiating and influencing processes between workers, policy makers and production factor
owners/managers (government, employers, and labor unions) can be summarized by the institutionalized connections and interactions between the above-mentioned three distinct interest groups of social actors. As Archer (1992), points out, in corporatist systems the “relationships both within and between these actors can be organized in different ways. [...] the different combinations of these intra- and inter-actor relations define different industrial relations systems. Three of these dimensions concern the degree of centralization of each of the actors. The fourth and fifth concern the degree of public involvement in relations between the government and the two class actors [unions’ representatives and owners/managers of production factors]. Public involvement concerns both class involvement in public affairs and public (i.e. government) involvement in class affairs. The sixth dimension concerns the degree of class cooperation. Corporatism is an industrial relations system which combines a high degree of all of these: centralization, public involvement, and class cooperation.” Here follows a schematic representation (figure 2) which illustrates the six dimensions which define business-governance relations of corporatist systems:

Fig. 2: “The six dimensions of an industrial relations system”, from fig. 1 in (Archer, 1992)
It is interesting to note that “the Walrasian ideal of full employment with approximately equal wages seems to be best achieved by countries having either completely centralized or extremely decentralized bargaining structures, while the intermediate economies are likely to do much worse. The basic explanation is the following: If labour markets are dominated by a moderate number of medium-sized organizations, each big enough to enjoy considerable market power but small enough to pass the costs of their actions on to the others, then they all face a kind of prisoner’s dilemma. Although all employees would benefit from wage restraint in some circumstances, any individual group might be significantly worse off if it were to accept wage moderation while other groups were able to obtain large pay increases. Aspects of the public goods problem are also present: benefits of nominal wage restraint do not flow only to the employees bearing its costs but also to the whole society in the form of a reduction in inflation and an increase in output and employment” (Pekkarinen, Pohjola, & Rowthorn, 1992). Moreover, collective bargaining solves an additional bias of decentralized labor market economies, namely wage dispersion: “Some workers earn very high wages and enjoy a high degree of job security, whilst others -mostly female workers- are crowded into low-paid, low-productivity, and often insecure forms of employment. [...] The resulting allocation of labour is inefficient and much of the employment in low-paid jobs should properly be described as underemployment or disguised unemployment. [...] Under centralized wage bargaining this inefficiency and injustice could be avoided by establishing broadly uniform wages across the whole economy with some allowance for skills, unpleasant working conditions, and the
like. [...] [However] while centralized wage bargaining may be a necessary condition for good performance it is not sufficient” (Pekkarinen, Pohjola, & Rowthorn, 1992). According to the above cited scholars, to solve the problem of wage dispersion, collective bargaining has to be integrated in a “non-exclusive and egalitarian” corporatist system.

To conclude this theoretical introduction on the concept of tripartite corporatism, we propose an modern explanation for the wide variation in rates of taxation across developed economies, based on differences in labor market institutions, which was developed in Summers & all. (1993). The authors of the above mentioned paper demonstrate that “in corporatist economies, which feature centralized labor markets, taxes on labor input will be less distortionary than when labor supply is determined individually. Since the level of labor supply is set by a small group of decision-makers, these individuals will recognize the linkage between the taxes that workers pay and the benefits that they receive. Labor tax burdens are indeed higher in more corporatist nations, while non-labor taxes are actually lower. There is also some evidence that the distortionary effects of labor taxes are lower in more corporatist economies” (Summers, Gruber, & Vergara, 1993).

-Brief history of modern to contemporary corporatism-

As for almost all -isms, a pure application of the abstract models of corporatism doesn’t exist. “Although the varieties of corporatist theory are many, the common
premise was that class harmony and organic unity were essential to society and could be secured if the various functional groups, and especially the organizations of capital and labor, were imbued with a conception of mutual rights and obligations somewhat similar to that presumed to have united the medieval estates in a stable society. Accordingly, corporatist programs advocated a universal scheme of vocational, industrial or sectorial organization, whereby the constituent units would have the right of representation in national decision-making, and a high degree of functional autonomy, but would have the duty of maintaining the functional hierarchy and social discipline consistent with the needs of the nation-state as a whole. A limited organizational pluralism, generally operating under the aegis of the state as the supreme collective community, would guarantee the major value of corporatism-social harmony” (Panitch, 1977).

Corporatism was introduced, as term referring to a political system and ideology, in the late XVIIIth century, among European countries’ Conservative party intellectuals and German Romanticists, like Friedrich von Hardenberg -Novalis-(1772-1801) and Adam Heinric Müller (1779 –1829), which embraced an organicistic approach to State and Market organization. This political movement openly opposed to the liberal and individualistic approach by Adam Smith and liberal economists, which opted for a minimalist State and a free Market organization (non-centralized and non-planned); the extent of conservatives was giving functional political representation to industrial production interest groups, through union representatives of major industrial society stakeholders.
In Germany, under the name of “Practical Christianity”, Bismarck tried to implement State coordinated welfare programs for proletarians, which included sickness insurance, accident insurance, disability insurance, and old age insurance (Hollyday, 1970). Since Bismarck desired to have the support of the conservative party, he untamed the policy negotiations through an open debate between major industry stakeholders and organized interest groups; as described in “The Corporatist Character of Bismarck’s Social Policy” (Paur, 1981), this early practice of interest group mediation and cooperative policy negotiation was clearly corporatist.

An alternative theoretical model of corporatism, affiliated to liberal political parties, then called liberal corporatism (Gregg, 2007), was pioneered by the British liberal political philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Dissimilarly form other theoretical formulations of corporatism, liberal corporatism does not reject capitalism or individualism, but believes that the capitalist private corporations are social institutions that should require their managers maximize income and profits, but also recognize and try to fulfill the work-place requirements of their employees.

When corporatism was attempted to be officially established and institutionalized, in many well-known cases, it turned out to be its dystopian backhand, in which the political opposition was oppressed or suppressed through censorship, intimidation, imprisonment and violence. These despotic deviations of corporatism were liberty restraining, both from the point of view of the
individuals’ freedom of expression and of association. At the beginning of the XXth century great importance was placed on “the roles of semi-autonomous bodies representing all occupations in the organization of economic activities and the making of parliamentary policy” (Pekkarinen, Pohjola, & Rowthorn, Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System?, 1992). The list on the following page (figure 3) of philo-corporatist systems of the first half of the XXth century, reminds us of the deviancies and technical inches of the corporatist functional representation mechanisms implementing:

**List of Corporatist Regimes of the Early Twentieth Century**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Frontrunner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Corporatism</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1922-1945</td>
<td>Benito Mussolini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country, Religion, Monarchy</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1923-1930</td>
<td>Miguel Primo de Rivera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Deal</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1933-1945</td>
<td>Franklin Roosevelt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Socialism</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1933-1945</td>
<td>Adolph Hitler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Syndicalism</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1936-1973</td>
<td>Francisco Franco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1932-1968</td>
<td>Antonio Salazar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1933-1945</td>
<td>Getulio Vargas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Hellenic Civilization</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1936-1941</td>
<td>Ioannis Metaxas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Party</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1943-1955</td>
<td>Juan Peron</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 3: from table 1 in Watkins (2014)*
For instance, in the Fascist Italy, the state acted as an autocratic regime at the behest of its industrial bourgeoisie. Fascist intellectuals, like Alfredo Rocco, Gabriele D'Annunzio and Alceste De Ambris; who articulated and technically formulated, in the Charter of Carnaro and successive works, the fascist institutional organization to enact their idea of corporatism, understood that class conflict was an emerging feature of capitalist societies with market economies. Accordingly their aim was to construct a model which could solve class action conflicts without necessarily undermining the fundamental characteristics of capitalism, namely, private ownership of the means of production, salaried labor, and privately managed commodity production organizations (Luebbert, 1991). To do so the Italian Fascists banned preexisting free trade unions and set up a new compulsory union system involving the representation of the three major interest groups for each industry - the employers, the employees and the Fascist Party. These three categories of unions -called "corporations"- sent their delegates to a National Council of Corporations. In 1938, the National Fascist Council was merged with the Council of Corporations to form a new and unique legislative body, with the old Chamber of Deputies being dissolved (Payne, 1996). Italy was, officially, a fully corporative state, in the fascist sense of the term. However, this alleged “tripartism” of industrial represented interests was fictitious, because the three groups and their representatives’ activity were subject to control by the fascist industrial bourgeoisie, and its monocratic regime, which used coercion, threats and violence to eradicate all nonaligned opinions (Adler, 2002).
As pointed out by Pirou (1938) and Neumann (1942), in relationship to Italian and German National Socialism, “corporatism in these countries is not, and could not be, much more than a decorative façade for force. For the harmony which it is assumed is intrinsic to society—if the squabbling cabals can be swept away—can in practice only be reproduced by the use of force. And the use of force directly contradicts the assumption of intrinsic harmony. In Vichy France and in Salazar’s Portugal, overtly corporatist societies, the same comment is appropriate. Corporatism assumes what it is designed to create, and destroys what it seeks to create by perusing the only practicable means available: coercion” (Harris N., 1972). However, if in those countries radical “ideology is an important factor, it is primarily a facilitating one, rather than a creative one. To understand how and why ideology becomes operative, we have to understand the deeper structural factors that have impelled corporatist developments in liberal democracies” (Panitch, 1977).

In the years between the two World Wars “liberal democracy, social democracy and fascism [corporatist national socialism] were alternatives in ways so fundamental as to be defining characteristics of the three regimes. Interwar liberal democracy rested on a coalition of the center right. This was a coalition of middle-class consolidation. It was a coalition that broke with an historic tradition of liberal-labor cooperation in these societies and was aimed against the socialist working classes and by the ineffectiveness of trade union organizations in liberal societies” (Luebbert, 1991). However, “in countries where liberal-democratic
political institutions continued to function [...] appeared signs of a growing awareness that in modern industrial society certain fundamental tendencies which might be described as “corporative” had for some time been at work. Economists and historians found one such tendency to be the decline of atomistic competition in economic life, a sphere in the free play of individual forces was increasingly being superseded by the operation of collective agreements concluded among solidly organized communities of interest. Jurists and political scientists observed a parallel decline of atomistic individualism in politics, noting that private bodies claiming to represent the group interests of labor, of employers, of farmers, of consumers, of particular branches of industry and of other economic and social groups tended to become more inclusive and more highly integrated with a view to increasing their direct influence upon governmental policies” (Bowen, 1947).

The aftermath of World War II: the defeat and occupation of the Axis powers; the discovery of the mass genocides by the Nazis, with the complicity of other member States of the Axis alliance; the post-war cultural, political and ideological
opposition of the Soviet Union to the United States, the diffusion of the Keynesian model of Welfare State, and the new international economic, monetary and military order, which emerged after Bretton Woods (1944) worldwide conveyed social-political movements towards the shrinkage of the range of market and state organization options. In Western countries the assortment of possible organizational systems “collapsed to a continuum embracing of social democracy and liberal democracy” (Luebbert, 1991), whereas, in the majority of Eastern Europe, Asia, South America, Middle East, North Africa, Indonesia were adopted corporatist organizational approaches that ranged from collectivism to national socialism, in which -generally- the industry organization and workers-employers relations were directed by the State and economic activity was planned.

After World War II, the new political and cultural vanguard, called New Left (or “nouvelle gauche”) headed by writers (like Claude Bourdet), liberal art academics (like Ernst Bloch) and socio-political theorists (like Herbert Marcuse), progressively developed in the United States, France and the United Kingdom, and initiated a worldwide participated political movement, friendly to, but distinct from, the Hippie pacifist movement. This liberal party movement endorsed a softer version of “democratization” of private corporates -respect to social corporatism- thrugh the consideration of workers’ organizational advices and working necessities (Lehmbruch, 2003). The conceptual architects of this form of corporatists believed that the participation of all working members in the election of the executives (at least of the foremen and the lower management)
could reconcile ethics and efficiency, freedom and order, liberty and rationality in the working place. This “corporatism of the liberal center was based on a belief in the desirability of promoting economic planning and coordination through government assistance to, and promotion of, non-competitive, role-ordered occupational or functional groupings” (Gerber, 1995), their view of economic phenomenon and State -legislative and fiscal- intervention in the market embraced the Keynesian Welfare State concept of Industrial and Employment Policy (Appleton, 2013). Hence, under the flag of the “New Left”, corporate liberalism was re-formalized and re-branded as a non-authoritarian private-ownership economy based on functional representation of interest groups and labor law consociative negotiation. During the Cold War, especially in the NATO countries, this re-branding of liberal corporatism by the New Left, facilitated it’s a clear distinction from Italian social corporatism and Russian or Chinese collectivism, and therefore revealed to be culturally more attractive of than the above mentioned socio-political organizational models.

Likewise, in the second half of the XXth century, Scandinavian countries (Sweden and Norway first, Finland later in the seventies) adopted, with some important differences between them, a corporatist tripartite organization, with a “combination of centralized bargaining, heavy government involvement, and a high degree of solidarity” (Pekkarinen, 1992). It is interesting to note that, in the moment in which each of the three Scandinavian countries shifted towards a democratic social corporatist organization of industrial relations, they were
experiencing an export-led mass-production industrialization. Accordingly these countries met Katzenstein’s criterion of external vulnerability (Katzenstein, 1985) which is considered, by the aforementioned author, as a fundamental requirement for the adoption of one of the three dominant forms of contemporary capitalism: i.e. democratic social corporatism, which is described by Katzenstein as an ideal organizational system in small, advanced capitalist, countries, to ensure an export-led industrial and economic growth with low levels of unemployment.

- Neo-corporatism? -

In contemporary times, corporatism is not a familiar and fashionable concept to global publics. Regularly, the notion corporatism is subject to conceptual stereotyping and ideologically biased misconceptions. As Thelen (1994) points out, scholars too have “misunderstood the genesis of corporatism, a fact that became painfully clear in the dynamics of corporatism's breakdown [, at the end of the past century]. It turned out that some of labor's most stunning successes (the centralization of bargaining and the pursuit of egalitarian wages in some countries) were not,
as we had thought, accomplished through the efforts of strong and self-conscious labor organizations against employer resistance. Rather, these outcomes were vigorously promoted by employers themselves, who had their own reasons for seeking centralized bargaining arrangements with unified labor movements. This we learned just when employers were withdrawing support for the institutions they had earlier helped to construct”. Hence, at the turning of the XX\textsuperscript{th} century, corporatism, which few years before appeared to be culturally surpassed and organizationally obsolete, is reborn from its ashes as a “variety of capitalism in which specific structural prerequisites such as unionization, centralization, and strong states combined with bargaining and concertation produce certain legislative and economic outputs” (Christiansen, Nørgaard, Rommetvedt, Svensson, Thesen, & Oberg, 2010), like redundancy payments, flexible contracts but without a time limit, unemployment benefits, working place safety measures and other industrial and labor welfarist policies negotiated between employees’ and employers’ representatives.

At the present time, “most of the economies of the world are corporatist in nature. The categories of socialist and pure [perfect] market economy are virtually empty. There are only corporatist economies of various flavors. These flavors of corporatism include the social democratic regimes of Europe and the Americas, but also the East Asian and Islamic regimes such as Taiwan, Singapore and Iran. The Islamic socialist states such as Syria, Libya and Algeria are more corporatist than socialist, as was Iraq under Saddam Hussein. The formerly communist
regimes such as Russia and China are now clearly corporatist in their economic philosophy although not in name” (Watkins, 2014). This multifaceted and version of the corporatist phenomenon is middle way between -or a mix of- new-left liberal corporatism and Scandinavian democratic social corporatism. This chameleonic form of new corporatism can therefore fit to almost all socio-political and economic contexts. Usually, in neo-corporatist societies, “private property is not nationalized, but the control [of business and working activity] through regulation is just as real” (Watkins, 2014).

-Democratic corporatism as a mechanism for the empowering of policy stakeholders -

Yet, neo-corporatism is not only a “plug-in organizational device” for the resocialization of economic relations within an advanced capitalist globalized business environment: to survive and thrive in our contemporary environments, neo-corporatism has molded itself, to fit our political institutions and cultural establishments, as a “variety of democracy in which interest groups are integrated in the preparation and/or implementation of public policies” (Christiansen, Nørgaard, Rommetvedt, Svensson, Thesen, & Oberg, 2010). By reshaping itself as a variety of democratic organization, corporatism re-acquired one of its most debated theoretical features, its all-inclusive and egalitarian nature: “By this we refer, first, to the non-exclusion of any social group from the labour market and, second, to a high degree of equality in sharing both the benefits of increasing economic welfare and the miseries of recession or the burden of
adjustment. This feature can be seen as an extension of citizens’ political rights to cover economic activities in order to achieve social order in industrial and labour relations. Solidarity is its natural concomitant” (Pekkarinen, Pohjola, & Rowthorn, Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System?, 1992). One could argue that solidarity, the sharing of benefits and miseries, in so-called “neo-corporatist” democracies might not be the causal outcome of their corporatist policy making organization, but more simply, could be a policy outcome due to a new utopic vision of society, conceptually close to the principles of free association and opportunity equity seeking, which are also theoretically akin to the corporatist philosophy. Consequently, corporatism organization and accompanying corporatist values may be considered prerogatives for a consensual and consociational socio-political system, for the institutionalization and legitimate expression of organized interest groups, in democratic policy and law making negotiations (Lijphart, 1999). Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to consider the concept of co-governance and participatory democracy as a neo-corporatist extension of the organization of policy, law making and administrative processes. It is interesting to note that an almost equivalent neo-corporatist phenomenon is happening within firms, under the name of “participatory/participative management”. But on this argument we will argue further in this work.
2.2. **Syndicalism**

*On the notion of syndicalism*

Syndicalism is a corporatist system, in which industrial and businesses activities are managed and planned by confederations of workers, called syndicates, technically akin to the trade or labor unions of corporatism. Thus, syndicalism is a form of worker egalitarianism, or, in other words a democratization of production places, which advocates the interest aggregation of multiple non-competitive categorized units, composed of technicians and representatives of workforce from each business field, to negotiate and manage corporate systems, and, design the content of industry and labor regulation. Syndicalism can be also called trade “union democracy” (Oppenheim, 1951), which is a term referring to the governance of a socio-economic system through trade unions, the word democracy refers to the method of selection of unions’ representatives by elective procedures, to make it look like that these union executives represent the interests and wills of their members. Under this perspective syndicalism can be considered a corporatist theory of representative democracy governance, based on functional rather than territorial representation of group interests, which in syndicalism are groups of workers.

In syndicalism, the main organizational unit of production is the syndicate [from the French syndicat] which is a free association of “producers”, i.e. a local union of workers, which should be in touch with other organized groups of workers.
through a local “bourse du travail”, i.e. a market for production factors exchange, which would function as a combination of employment and economic planning agency (Encyclopedia Britannica). According to syndicalist theory, when all the producers would be linked together by these bourses, elected representatives of the unions would be able to estimate the capacities and necessities of a given socio-political territory, and, by being in touch through confederations and bourses with the whole industrial system, unions’ and confederations’ elected representatives should coordinate production and arrange transfers of materials and commodities inward and outward a socio-political community.

Even though few contemporary States have instituted a “bourse du travail”, syndicalist-like network system for –local, national and international- cooperation between workers, collective political representation and organized class action and influencing of social and economic policy and law making, have been effectively implemented in several advanced capitalist, democratic countries.

Here follows (figure 4) an archetypal diagram on workers’ union organization:

Fig. 4: Example of union organization, personal revision of Australia case study from fig. 2 in Archer (1992)
Concentration of power refers to the extent to which a union/confederation is able to control/influence the industrial activities of its affiliates and the affiliates are able to influence the representation activity of their unions’ and confederations’ representatives, whereas membership density refers to the extent to which unions/confederations have succeeded in organizing and representing the interest of workers, both affiliated and non-affiliated to the union system (Archer, 1992).

-Brief history of modern to contemporary syndicalism-

Syndicalism was originally a revolutionary movement that advocated for “direct action by the working class to abolish the capitalist order, including the state, and to establish in its place a social order based on workers organized in production units. The syndicalist movement flourished in France between 1890 and 1914 and had a considerable impact in Spain, Italy, England, the Latin-American countries, and [to a lesser extent] elsewhere. […] Syndicalism developed out of strong anarchist and antiparliamentary traditions among the French working class. […] Syndicalist tendencies manifested themselves with increasing strength during the 1890s in the two main French labour organizations of the period—the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) and the Fédération des Bourses du Travail. […] When these two organizations joined forces in 1902, trade unionism, and syndicalism in particular, gained an immense accession of strength. […] During the early years of Soviet power, in 1920–21, quasi-syndicalist ideas were prevalent among the trade-union communists’ opposition movement, which acquired the name of Workers’ Opposition (Encyclopedia Britannica).
- Social Myth conceptualization as the major legacy of Syndicalism-

Georges Sorel (1847-1922), a leading theoretician of syndicalism, developed through his numerous writings, primarily in his book titled “Réflexions sur la violence” (1908), one of the most conceptually refined theory on Human's myths and myth-building as powerful social influencing instruments, capable of ascribing virtues to violence. Sorel considered myths and myth-building as self-diffusive intangible “social-engineering” instruments, that could be used to encourage and push specific groups of individuals to collective action and social uprising or revolution: “the social myth” and the emancipating “virtue of violence”, which can be considered precursors of contemporary media influencing through story-telling mechanism-, are, according to Sorel, rapidly spreading beliefs, disseminated through a convincing and plausible (but not necessarily true) “narrative” mechanism followed by an auto-reinforcing popular hearsay process.

Through parables and references to real events, the “popular” story (which should become a “social myth”) constructs a dystopian caricature of the existing social order that it aspires to overturn. Generally, in a Social Myth, existing social tensions are voluntarily amplified and represented as the consequence of an unequal, unchanging, group submissive and hereditary organization of economic and social relationships, between stereotyped and symbolical (but recognizable) categories individuals or functional social groups. In the social-myth story-telling process the emancipating “virtue of violence” is the collective action and uprising
mechanism through which social order is overturned or social parity is restored by the apparently “oppressed”.

Therefore, to be so called, a social myth must enclose all the strongest human inclinations, social images and sentiments of a people, of a party, of a class, a category, or of persons that self-identify themselves as a group. The concept of emancipating “virtue of violence” is (voluntarily or involuntarily) allegorically analogous to the Christian dictum “he who is without sin among you, let him be the first to throw a stone” (John, 8:7, in the New American Standard Bible). According to Sorel, violence, intended as a physical coercive power, appears to have no “virtue” when it is used by the “oppressed” to deliberately harm or overwhelm the oppressors; violence will appear to have “virtue” when it is used undertake an “heroic” resistance and struggle to accomplishing a particular revolution aforethought through the construction, disclosure, circulation and social loyalization process towards a Social Myth, which hence will appear to be at the service of the "immemorial interest of civilization" (Sorel, 1908). Thereby, uprising and violence will give the impression of being enacted only to abolish the institutional structure, the culture, the organization and the artifacts (both material and immaterial) through which the dystopianly stereotyped -by the social myth- “dominating” social group, apparently maintains and protects the existing social, cultural, legal, institutional and economic order.

Sorel makes no justification of violence by philosophical or moral arguments, he simply uses Historical chronicles to demonstrate that ethical, moral and legal
codes are valued “good”, “fair” or “just” only in relation to time, place and subjectively perceived and lived situations. To Sorel the stories and tales of class seizure of power (like Maxist proletarian upheaval), of spiritual quests (like early Chrisitian militantism), of oppression freeing revolutions (like the French “Spirit of the Revolution”), are all carefully constructed social myths that had been used, and could still be used, to move men to collective action and uprising in specific situations, independently from their historical authenticity and truthfulness.

In view of what previously said, Sorel considers that the concept of general strike could contemporaneously become the story, the story-telling and the uprising mechanism necessary to enact "the myth in which Socialism is wholly comprised" (Sorel, 1908), i.e. the emancipation of workers from the situation waged employment. In his subsequent construction of this social myth, Sorel illustrates a tragic conception (in the theatrical sense of the term) of employee-employer relationships in modern industrial society, which should reveal the essence of the modern “Social Myth” of working class oppression. In such system general strike is destined to become the “violent” but “virtuous” mean of struggle to enact a syndicalist re-evolution.

The general strike, as preeminent syndicalist uprising tool, is hence conceived by Sorel in these terms: If successful, the strike should give to workers the sense of having been empowered by their uprising, this should further inspire them to emancipate themselves from their subjected role of employees; if unsuccessful, the strike should impress upon them the sense of living an inhuman situation of
oppression, in which the “empowered” are unresponsive and blind to the needs of the “oppressed”, and show them that the first want the servility of the workers to be maintained just as it is, this should push workers to a better union organization and broader uprising.

Between the two World Wars, the Italian Fascist movement and the German Nazi movement sought to use syndicalist sentiment and credit to gain support for enacting their corporatist State organization. In the United States another syndicalist movement called the Industrial Workers of the World embraced a more extensive and large-scale form of syndicalism which aimed to build an industrial system based on large and centralized unions of workforce rather than on local and voluntary associations.

-Syndicalism as an ideal non-party system for proletarian class action-

Several pioneers of union based collectivist systems, like Daniel De Leon and Auguste Blanqui, have considered syndicalism, and the ensuing organization of workers in trade unions and confederations, as workers’ most (socio-politically) empowering, collective achievement in Human History. Unquestionably, the diffusion of syndicalism increased the organization of, and mutual support between workers and therefore extended their representatives’ negotiating and influencing power vis-à-vis the owners and managers of business organizations, and public officers. However, since the syndicalist movement aimed to institute, through collective action, a corporatist system in which only one class, the
workers, should have their functional representation, syndicalism (as fascism) was by its very nature a classist and autocratic corporatist political movement that accentuated preexisting social conflict and class based socio-cultural segregation.

On this matter, in 1869, during a speech to a German Confederation of workers, Karl Marx said the following: “If they wish to accomplish their task, trade unions ought never to be attached to a political association or place themselves under its tutelage; to do so would be to deal themselves a mortal blow. Trade unions are the schools of socialism. It is in trade unions that workers educate themselves and become socialists because under their very eyes and every day the struggle with capital is taking place [...] The great mass of workers, whatever party they belong to, have at last understood that their material situation must become better. [...] however, every movement in which the working class comes out as a class against the ruling classes and tries to coerce them by pressure from without is a political movement. For instance, the attempt in a particular factory, or even a particular trade, to force a shorter working day out of individual capitalists by strikes is a purely economic movement. On the other hand, the movement to force through an eight-hour law is a political movement. And, in this way, out of the separate economic movements of the workers there grows up everywhere a political movement, that is to say, a movement of the class, with the effect of enforcing its interests in a general form, in a form possessing general socially coercive force.” (McLellan, 1980).
The aforementioned essential (according to Marx) separation and independence between political parties and unions, is extremely uncommon in contemporary “western civilization” societies. Usually, the ongoing “impact of political parties on union growth depends on how well unions can influence party policy and how successfully parties advance the policy through government. Despite the great variability in party-union relations, one generalization stands out: unions retain an important influence over parties where the parties were originally formed for the parliamentary representation of union members. Elsewhere, where parties developed independently of unions or where political leaders gave unions a narrow industrial role in a programmatic division of social labor movement, partisan support of unions has been more tenuous” (Western, 1999). Here follows (figure 5) a summary table on contemporary links between parties and unions (dated 1999) in major advanced capitalist countries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party-Union relationships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Three unions – the General Federation of Labor (CGT), the Reformist Federation of Labor (CGT-FO), and the French Federation of Christian Workers (CFTC)- support the French Communist Party (PCF), the Socialist Party (PS), and the Union for French Democracy (UDF); PCF and CGT are most closely connected, with the CGT general secretary holding a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Japan Socialist Party (JSP) closely tied to major union confederation, Sohyo; during campaigns, confederation provides JSP with organizational help, financial contributions and candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Unions and democratic party are formally independent; AFL-CIO and unions financially support Democratic and Republican candidates; AFL-CIO generally endorses democratic presidential candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Unions founded Labour party (1906); national unions and TUC have collective affiliation in the party, liaison committees also link the TUC to the party at the national level; unions regularly supply Labour candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Parties created single union confederation at the end of war; split in 1948 left three confederations aligned with three major parties; unification of unions in 1970s loosened party ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) formally independent of political parties, but German Social Democratic party (SPD) leadership often drawn from DGB, and union leaders advise SPD governments; Christian Democratic Union (CDU) also has small representation in DGB leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Australian Labor party (ALP) founded by unions (1891); unions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CARLO R. M. A. SANTAGIUSTINA

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<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td>Unions involved in Swedish Social Democratic party (SAP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>founding (1889), high rate of collective affiliation among local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unions; high rates of party membership among union members;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>party leadership typically drawn from unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Switzerland</strong></td>
<td>Major confederation, SGB, is formally independent but closely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tied to Swiss Social Democratic party (SPS); union leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>often contest cantonal elections of the SPS slate; SPS and SGB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>have collaborated in campaigns for constitutional amendments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig 5: selective reproduction of content from table 5.1 in Western (1999)

As we can see from the table above, in the majority of the above mentioned countries “political parties were formed to secure the parliamentary representation of the unions, unions were given collective affiliation in party. Through collective affiliation, the unions were represented in party congresses, and the parties received large financial contributions in return” (Western, 1999)
2.3. Advocacy

-The advocacy concept-

Originally, the idea of advocacy embraced almost all civic engagement activity that a person, group or organization undertook to influence institutional policies and actions of its community fellows, leaders, public administrators and officials, politicians and other individuals in decision-making empowered positions. However, as Prakash & Gugerty (2010) point out, nowadays “the concept of advocacy goes well beyond the notion of advocating for, championing, or supporting a specific viewpoint or cause. Often applied in the political context, the term suggests a systematic effort by specific actors who aim to further or achieve specific policy goals”. Hence, we can consider advocacy to be a sub-category of political and civic engagement through frequent, planned and structured socio-political influencing initiatives. Advocacy campaigns make use of, but are not limited to, lobbying, public demonstrations, sit-ins, protests, deliberation in public spaces, donation, sponsoring and other activities with a strategic use of resources and information, to influence the policies and actions of those in decisional positions and through thereof achieve the desired legal, political and social changes.

-Literature on advocating processes design-

Increasing academic attentiveness, to the use of advocacy techniques and instruments in social change processes, is commonly dated back to the end of the
1960s and beginning of the 70s. Literature on advocacy thematic is largely based on the work of South American pioneers of participatory advocacy approaches to social transformation, most notably the early writings of the Brazilian political philosopher and pedagogist Paulo Freire: “Cultural action for freedom” (1970), “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” (1970), Education for critical consciousness (1973).

This initial work on advocacy generally took the form of popular education to civic engagement and political action. Accordingly, advocacy was considered “a means of engaging the excluded and disempowered in processes of learning and social transformation that would enable them to become aware of and able to overcome the structures of oppression that shaped their lives. In one of its earliest incarnations then, participation was seen as holding potential for radical social change by empowering people to become conscious agents of change. These approaches resonate strongly with contemporary initiatives in the field of human rights education. However, while such experiments in social change were taking place in some quarters, participation remained largely absent from the mainstream development project” (Institute of Development Studies, 2010).

In a recent book called “A New Weave of Power, People & Politics: The Action Guide for Advocacy and Citizen Participation”, VeneKlasen & Miller (2007) identified the various schools of thoughts regarding social-political change through advocacy, including: public interest advocacy, policy advocacy, social justice advocacy, people-centered advocacy, participatory advocacy, and activist advocacy; and exposed a joined action model for the practice of socio-political
change through advocating processes. On the other hand, literature that focuses on specific communicative problems and advocating methods associated to specific causes -each of which implies a particular communicative approach and emphasis, suited to different kinds of issues, contexts and objectives- is also rapidly growing; for a literature review on human rights related advocacy issues we refer to Institute of Development Studies (2010).

-Advocating in the name of others -

According to the above mentioned works, advocacy campaigning and communication messages are generally based on the dissemination of knowledge and awareness on the living experience of the community it aims to support, but the viewpoint or objectives of advocating group mustn’t necessarily be coherent and aligned with the perspectives of the supported community, which is mostly concerned by the decision. However, advocacy, if successful, ought to be socially empowering for supported individuals and communities and should improve their wellbeing.

-The assessment of advocacy campaigns-

Another rapidly expanding branch of research is the one on advocacy processes evaluation, which refers to the quantitative and qualitative assessment of advocacy initiatives’ performance. As resumed in in the following page (figure 6), the advocacy processes assessing aims to identify the causal relationship between advocacy efforts and policy changes results:
This branch of research was born from the need of financers of advocacy campaigns to know what difference their money made. Though, the cloudy world of public policy formation and decision making involves many players, pondering the single impact of any one organization or initiative is extremely difficult and in most cases, given the reserved nature of influencing activity on officials’ decisional process, it is almost impossible to correctly estimate the role and power of the different actors that take part to the policy shaping process (Guthrie, Louie, David, & Foster, 2005).
Nevertheless, during the last years things have been moving very fast in the advocacy evaluation research branch. For instance, the Innovation network (http://www.innonet.org/), has an online bibliography that now contains more than 200 articles, tools and reports of relevance on the field of Advocacy Project’s Evaluation (Innovation Network). It is interesting to note that the emerging literature is largely driven by U.S.-based philanthropic organizations and social innovation research centers, not by advocacy groups or NGOs (Whelan, 2008).

As we can see from the data here below (figure 7), obtained from a survey on a sample of 534 US charities (Innovation Network, 2012), quantitative evaluation practices like compiling statistics ad feedbacks forms are widely diffused among charitable organizations of all sizes, whereas qualitative assessment practices like advocacy case studies analysis is still very limitedly used:

![Quantitative and Qualitative Practices](image)

Figure 7: Evaluation practices of US charities (Innovation Network, 2012)
Still, in 2012, 90% of the surveyed charities evaluated -with at least one of the above mentioned instrument- the impact of their work, versus 85% in 2010 (Innovation Network, 2012). As the adoption and sophistication of advocacy evaluation tools grows and spreads worldwide thanks to large international advocacy organizations which disclose their best practices to public -like Save the Children, WWF, Red Cross and others-, campaign funders –like Foundations and Firms- begin to explore new ways of supporting and designing advocacy campaigns through outcome-oriented policy grant making mechanisms. These mechanisms are often based on performance in terms of supported community satisfaction/wellbeing and political, cultural or social changes objectives fulfillment. By doing so campaign founders can more efficiently plan and achieve long-term and large-scale changes in the socio-political ad cultural landscape.

Moreover, funders can currently use available advocacy assessment information to guide conversations with advocacy grantees. On the other hand, Advocates can use the benchmark frameworks and assessment techniques “to identify more useful and change-oriented interim outcomes that they can include in grant proposals. […] Evaluators can help funders and grantees clarify their assumptions—how their

An example of advocacy evaluation:

“Evaluation of Oxfam GB’s Climate Change Campaign”

By Cugelman & Otero (2010)

activities will lead to policy change, how policy change will lead to social change, and how an individual grantee’s work fits into a larger initiative or funders’ larger action plan” (Guthrie, Louie, & Foster, 2006).

For a brief overview of current advocacy evaluation practice, we refer to Coffman (2009), which offers a concise summary of current practice in the rapidly growing field of advocacy evaluation, highlights the different evaluation approaches being used, identifies the advantages and disadvantages of most popular approaches and exposes them through specific case studies and links to other online advocacy evaluation resources. For an analysis of the main differences between advocacy and policy evaluation perspectives we refer to Coffman (2007).

More recently, the concept and techniques of advocacy were modernized to fit the new communicating functions jointly offered by digital information, internet and new Medias. Obar, Zube & Lampe (2012), have demonstrated -through opinion surveys- that people widely believe that social Medias will enable them to accomplish their -personal and organizational- advocacy goals across a wide range of socio-political instruments and activities. However, the authors note that the relationship between this common opinion and real political and social change is still speculative, but suggest that future studies can build on their research.
2.4. Lobbying

As alleged previously, lobbying is one of the influencing systems that can be used for advocating specific group/category interests to public governance and legislative bodies or officials.

-The lobbying concept-

Lobbying takes its name from the lobbies or hallways of collegiate assemblies where public officials of governance and legislative institutions gather before and after official deliberation and decision meetings. Accordingly, at the origins, lobbyists occurred to places of political assembly, in which they, as bearers or promoters of special interests, could take an ultimate influencing opportunity to change the mind and voting prospects of public officials, before these lasts entered in the assembly institution and doors were closed, thereby isolating the assembly from external influences. “Nowadays, the term lobbying refers more specifically to the work of private companies known as lobbyists who are employed by organizations to represent their views to institutions officials in a variety of ways” (BBC News, 2008).

The mode of action of these pressure groups called lobbies may be more or less legitimate and socially permitted, this depends largely on the fact that lobbying activities are regulated at the institutional level or instead take place without any regulatory control. The actions of the lobbyists may be limited to a series of communications and contacts with political representatives – to provide them
data and reports in support of their position - or can be organized in large-scale advocating and lobbying campaigns to influence representatives’ opinion, finance election campaigns, organize, promote and lead strikes or protests.

-Assessing the power and instruments of lobby groups-

The power of a lobby and level of influence that lobbyists are able to exert, are mostly determined by the amount of financial capital (Sunlight Foundation, 2012) and peer contacts they can push to action (see: www.retionline.it/un-caffe-con/), to support a given cause. Besides this, academic research is increasingly becoming a critical resource for lobbyists to support their arguments (Leach, Scoones, & Wynne, 2005), as well as access to exclusive media channels and cultural institutions through which they can spread their perspectives and arguments in the civil community (Hall J., 2012), this kind of indirect lobbying technique is called “grassroots lobbying” (Maskell, 2008).

Hence lobbying is a multifaceted influencing activity, related to the protection, establishment or elimination of economic, social or legal privileges and rents; which involves regular dealings between legislators or governors and lobbies, to
continuously support a given position on a specific thematic, generally in exchange of political and financial support by the lobby.

-On the growing literature on lobbying mechanisms and effects-

From the end of World War II on, a great deal of interest has progressively risen for the analysis of lobbying activities and their legislative, social, political and economic effects, specifically for the assessment of the impact of lobbying on consumers’ and interest groups members’ welfare (Lagerlof, 1997). Much of this attention probably resulted from the general feeling that economists, politologists, legal theorists from mainstream social research areas, had traditionally underestimated the overall impact on society and governance institutions decision making due to the protection of industry and business special interests; ensuing from lobbying, but also from corruption, ruling class cronyism and abetment by institutions’ officials. Accordingly, the entire lobbying process that accompanies the rise and fall of such privileges and advantages has increasingly been analyzed and modeled in academic research.

In the fifties, Truman (1951), followed by Dahl (1961) developed a pluralist theory of politics explaining why individuals and market organizations naturally come together in interests groups to lobby in response to disturbances in the policy environment. Hence lobbying was, according to the above-mentioned authors, a political influencing mechanism that supported rather than threatened the democratic organization of politics.
-Lobbying as a mechanism for political influencing by small but active interest groups -

In 1965, Mancur Olson, an American social scientist and Professor at the University of Maryland, published “The Logic of Collective Action” (1965) a book in which is exposed a general theory of special interests groups and lobbying of policy based on transaction costs, strongly supported by empirical evidence and examples. Such theory, centered on the idea that individuals join interest groups to seek private welfare advantages, shows how small but active interest lobbying groups can prevail on large but latent interest groups. According to Olson, no one will voluntarily make any sacrifices to help a group attain its political (group or collective) goals unless he has a prospect of obtaining a personal benefit by doing so. Hence, interest groups are organized around individuals’ personal incentives to action, even when individuals seem to perform for the fulfillment of collective and culturally, politically and morally relevant and shared objective within their social groups. Starting from the above mentioned assumptions on individuals’ selfishness in group behavior, the author demonstrates that in large interest groups, because of the too small individual incentives for active participation in large group lobbying activities, defection and free-riding are the dominant strategy for individuals, in one-shot prisoner’s dilemma lobbying games. Whereas, in small and intermediate groups with higher potential benefits per-individual collective action and lobbying is often the dominant strategy. As result of his demonstration and empirical evidences exposed to sustain both his assumptions
and deductions, Olson (1965) concludes that “the smaller groups -the privileged and intermediate groups- can often defeat the large groups -the latent groups- which are normally supposed to prevail in a democracy. The privileged and intermediate groups often triumph over the numerically superior forces in the latent or large groups because the former are generally organized and active while the latter are normally unorganized and inactive”.

_Legislation as the outcome of interest groups’ lobbying collusion-

In the seventies, Stigler (1971) started mathematically formalizing a positive theory of regulation based on rational maximizing behavior by members of interest and lobby groups, which rapidly became a new branch of research for public governance scholars. Stigler’s theory was especially successful among legal theorists and economists; many followed him and committed to this new branch of research, like Peltzman (1976), Rubin (1975), Posner (1974), which provided extensions of the theory to specific cases of interest group lobbying of governance institutions through their officials. In more recent times, Damania & Fredriksson (2000) provide additional steps towards a more complete theory of lobbying. By extending the menu-auction model of Grossman & Helpman (1994), Damania & Fredriksson demonstrate that more concentrated industries more easily overcome the free-rider problem inherent in political collective action and lobbying. In addition they deduce that more collusive industries with higher collusive profits have a greater incentive to form lobby groups and to contribute to industry lobbying.
Lastly, a working paper by Bernhagen (2011) provides an empirical model predicting when lobbyists deliver useful information to policymakers and when policymakers follow lobbyists’ advice: “The predictions are assessed against data on the policy positions and lobbying activities of firms and other organized groups in the context of 35 policy proposals advanced by UK governments between 2001 and 2007. The results suggest that the behavior of policymakers and lobbyists is driven mainly by the expected policy costs for policymakers. This provides lobbyists with strong incentives to either provide accurate advice to policymakers or abstain from costly lobbying.

-Lobbying in Italy and in Europe-

In a judgment by the Italian Constitutional Court, of 2004, is stated that “lobbying is aimed at improving and making more transparent the linking procedures between the representative bodies and those most affected by the different public policies” (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2012). As in the U.S., lobbying is slowly becoming a legally defined activity also in the European Union, with the introduction of an official lobby transparency register (European Commission, 2009).
2.5. Rent seeking and sitting

-The concept of rent seeking and rent sitting-

Rent seeking is the process through which economic agents commit energy and resources to create or transfer rent positions; while, rent sitting is process through which economic agents maintain and exploit (extract profits from) these rent positions. “In many market-oriented economies, government restrictions upon economic activity are pervasive facts of life. These restrictions give rise to rents of a variety of forms, and people often compete for these rents. Sometimes, such competition is perfectly legal. In other instances, rent seeking takes other forms, such as bribery, corruption, smuggling, and black markets” (Krueger, 1974). Accordingly rent seeking is often the ultimate objective of individuals’ and groups’ lobbying initiatives and advocacy campaigns. It is the case of rents obtained through lobbying legislators for the protection, through duties, of a specific product or industrial sector.

-Rent seeking as a social mechanism to selectively protect and facilitate the existence of organizations and individuals-

The seeking of rent positions is, knowingly or unknowingly, pursued by individuals and organizations that, in order to protect their own existence, are spontaneously incentivized to seize rent opportunities that could possibly allow them to obtain and secure long-term privileged situations of existence, established through the exploitation of natural or artificially built market
competition distortions, information asymmetries, or other biased or asymmetrical competing/trading situations ensuing from the social and cultural embeddedness of individuals and organizations in extra-market systems. Accordingly, the tendency of individuals and organizations to use subsidiary or alternative to free market mechanisms for the allocation of scarce resources and possibilities, can be considered a manifestation of the current theoretical incompleteness, or enforcement failure, of the free market organization, which is unable to impose itself as the one best allocation mechanism in human societies. This socio-cultural non-acceptance of the free market organization is possibly due to the willingness of securing, with the smallest competitive effort as possible, long-term rent positions, or to overcome free market competing dynamics based on the selection through the comparison of production efficiency or exclusive capabilities. As a result, alternative allocation mechanisms, like influencing of regulation, are used to bypass and overcome perfect market competition axioms and mechanisms. If the legal system permits these practices, distortions can be exploited to ensure socially legitimate benefits or profits at the expenses of others. For instance, permanent employment contracts or long-term public service concessions and procurement are legal means, respectively used by individuals and firms, to seek and ensure long-term privileged positions respect to competitors, with exclusive advantages and barriers to symmetric competition.
-On illegal rent positions-

On the other hand, if the legal system of a country prohibits the exploitation of specific rent positions without having the ability to effectively limit their presence by eradicating or penalizing such practices, these distortions become illicitly exploitable, and can ensure illegitimate but nevertheless enduring advantages and profits to individuals and organizations which seize these rent-seeking opportunities by acting outside the legal order. For example mafias’ extortion of money for protection from other racketeers, or earnings of traffickers that provide weapons to countries under embargo at prices much above those of legal weapons markets, or corrupted public officials that receive bribes from firms in exchange of public authorizations or other kind of “privatization of valuable aspects of public life” (Lambsdorff, 2002); or, more generally black market firms, financers, entrepreneurs, workers and clients that acquire benefits or avoid to support otherwise explicit costs, thanks to an illicit rent sitting situation.

A case study of legal and illegal rent positions in Italy:

“Rent seeking e questione meridionale”

Pugno (2000)

http://ideas.repec.org/a/mul/je8794/doi10.1429-1502y2000i3p387.html
The overcoming of a neoclassical research paradigm on economic distortions’ assessment—

“It would appear that the concept of rent seeking was a key log in certain areas of economic research. In these areas, progress was retarded by the existence of a log-jam. Once the concept of rent seeking was discovered - and defined as the outlay of resources by individuals and organizations in the pursuit of rents created by government - there followed a flourishing of research as relevant ideas began to disseminate throughout economics. It is now rare to find an issue of an economics journal that does not refer at least implicitly to the concept of rent seeking. All this came from an ill-received article that dared to suggest that the social cost of monopoly was as high as first year undergraduates believed it to be despite exhortations to the contrary by almost all mainstream professional economists” (Tullock, 1998).

Until the sixties, mainstream microeconomists were generally engaged and absorbed by two dimensional graph representations of economic phenomena, a true paradigm of neoclassical economic theory. On the overcoming of this paradigm was based the theoretical milestones on the assessment of the effects of economic distortions by Tullock (1967, 1971, 1975), a precursor of rent seeking theory. Before that, neoclassical microeconomic theory on perfect competition distortions’ effects, pioneered by Harberger (1959), had graphically established that welfare cost of monopoly and special market privileges, were represented by the deadweight loss triangle (see figure 8). This deadweight loss triangle (area A)
constituted the net loss of welfare in a rent seeking situation, due to the rise in price above the competitive level. According to this argumentation, the remaining producer's rent sitting surplus gain (area B), at the detriment of consumers' surplus, did not constitute a loss of welfare but was rather a transfer of welfare from consumers to producers. If the entity of producer's surplus gains, due to perfect competition distortions (like monopoly or oligopoly cartel) could be measurement, then the distortion effect could be fixed through a re-transfer from the rent-seeking firm/s to consumers, through appropriate taxation systems. This could theoretically be done without any further economic distortions or losses of welfare.

Tullock (1967), in his paper titled "The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft", demonstrated that the welfare loss due to market distortion and associated adjusting mechanisms, were highly underestimated by the graphical representation of the deadweight triangle loss. In an ensuing paper, dated 1971, Tullock focused on the effect of market distortion from the perspective of resource
cost of competitive lobbying on politicians and bureaucrats, both by those who seek to extract government transfers and by those who seek to prevent such transfers. He then demonstrates that whichever party wins the struggle, the resources invested in the lobbying struggle are unproductive and hence society as a whole is worse off. Even though the concept of business strategic positioning and appropriation/protection of a privileged monopolistic/monopsonic competitive position had already been developed by managerial literature, the term “rent seeking” was first used by Krueger (1974), in a –now- renowned paper titled: “The political economy of the rent-seeking society”, in which the concepts of competitive and non-competitive rent-seeking activities were mathematically and graphically modeled and related to the alternative systems of restrictions on international trade. Successively, Tullock (1975) extended this analysis to rent transfers, and demonstrated that wasteful competition over the transfer and conservation of rent positions is not restricted to individuals and organizations, but also occurs among the various levels of government. Rent seeking has been lastly been studied from a socio-economic point of view, under this new research perspective rent seeking and sitting phenomenon has been has been analyzed for the assessment of collateral and indirect welfare effects (redistributions and losses) for society.

We can conclude that, in our contemporary world, the capability to secure rent positions based on economic distortions and information asymmetries(natural or artificially built by Human organizational structures and rules), has revealed to
be a key asset for the prospects of survival and ease of existence of those individuals and organizations that have been able obtain, preserve and exploit them, especially in the long run. Clearly, both legal and illegal rent seeking and sitting require explicit skills to strategically manage interactions and, -for legal rent seeking/sitting- to carry out contractual negotiations with legislators and institutional interlocutors which can give access to or protect these rent positions. Accordingly, socio-economic environments rich of legitimate rent positions have favored the survival, selection and proliferation of best performing organizations, from the point of view of their rent seeking and sitting capabilities.
2.6. **Interest-groups intermediation**

*From political parties to interest-groups voluntary and temporary association*

“Modern democracies are determined by a great number of diverse interests. That is why structures and actors that show and assert individual social interests are necessary. Nevertheless, although interests can be articulated individually, a collective and organized representation of interests, called interest intermediation, promises greater success. Because of this, organized interest intermediation plays an increasingly decisive role in the political process. It belongs to democracy like the piston belongs to the cylinder because without organized aggregation and articulation of interests, modern societies and democratic forms of government would not be able to act. Modern democracies show very different structures of interest intermediation. Corporate and pluralistic systems of interest intermediation can be distinguished. The interest of political science in this process lies, in particular, in the identification of regular patterns of interest intermediation and conflict resolution.” (Badie, Berg-Schlosser, & Morlino, 2011)

The contemporary existence of multitude of functionally specialized, highly differentiated and segmented interest-intermediation organizations is one of the distinctive elements of advanced industrial and democratic societies. As Schmitter (1979) points out, interest-group intermediation might be conceptualized as a system of representation in many ways similar to the party
system, but more “fluid” and easily adjustable to social change than the latter; the semi-institutionalized nature of interest-group association favors the expression of heterarchical and non-yet codified social movements, and, ensuing organizational elasticity of interest-groups formation, association and dissolution. Group affiliates turnovers are generally quicker than those of political parties. Usually the barriers to the entry and exit to interest-groups are not ideological, religious or moral, but functional and relational. Interest-groups are the conceptual counterparts of (“cultural” and “religious”) foundations, their scopes and codes are mutable and adaptable to members’ needs, their actions and partners are heterogenic and continuously redefined via the entry and exit of new members, their organization is mission-oriented, the internal executive roles are generally conditional to a mandate and objective-fulfillment conditions, decision-making processes are subject to deliberation and control by the affiliates.

- When what is old appears as new-

In 2007, Mark Bevier, a renowned and highly qualified Professor of Public Governance, who teaches at the Berkeley University and at the Graduate School of Governance of the United Nations University (MERIT), published his Encyclopedia of Governance, in which is written that “one of the central pillars in theories of governance is that during the past thirty years, the relationship between the state and civil society has undergone significant change. More precisely, it is claimed that instead of the state imposing its government on the economy and society, public bodies now govern with and alongside groups who
represent varying collective interests and, thus, engage in interest intermediation. In short, changes in interest intermediation are strongly linked to a conception of governance as a form of politics where public and private actors are more interdependent and equal than was previously the case” (Bevir, 2007).

However, although in Bevier (2007) is claimed that “close relations between states and interest groups are new”, in this work, when we have described the corporatist phenomenon (in section 2.1), we have clearly established that strong relations between functional interest group representatives and the State already existed more or less a century ago. Hence, when talking about interest intermediation, we are not facing a new phenomenon as many scholars believe or would have us believe, but a re-branding and re-theorization of the concept of participated governance that had already been implemented several times in the modern era. We could hence consider this academic re-theorization and cultural re-branding of interest intermediation as a voluntary renaming and reframing for a strategic redeployment of long-standing socio-political theories, which were previously headed by the concept of corporatism (Lehmbruch G., 1983).

By doing so interest intermediation is being dissociated from pre-existing cultural and ideological connotations inherent to the words corporatism and syndicalism, and is being reinterpreted under an innovative socio-cultural perspective, with a new theory-building and theory-telling approach which places interest intermediation on the fertile ground of democracy and active citizenship, corporate social responsibility and stakeholders’ (business organizations, NGO,
associations and other) contribution to policy formulation and to the co-
governance (through face-to-face or internet-based deliberations and negotiations) of institutionalized public/corporate decision-making processes. With such coupling of old concepts to the new technological and business global situation, who knows which are the incoming social-myths, and which are the social groups that will be shaped and put into action by this new “vague” and “vogue” (in the French sense of the terms) of academic interest for interest intermediation, and for its tendency of becoming a “fundamental part of every democratic polity” (Bevir, 2007). At the present-day, interest group consultation and subsequent intermediation “only supplements bureaucratic decision-making, [because] central governments [still] have considerable room for manoeuvre to escape pressures put on specific policy proposals. However, civil society groups do take part in the implementation of policy projects and contribute to the atmosphere in which the objectives become defined. Indeed, associations increasingly take over functions that were previously the domain of political parties. They are the pillars of policy communities and create allegiances that allow for issue-specific identity politics. As such, the semi-institutionalized forms of associational participation are part of the particular equilibrium that is slowly establishing” (Woll, 2009) probably as responses to the representational crisis that has affected national State democracies during the contemporary era of global awareness, in which, generally, problems are identified and solutions are negotiated in international boards, by a “bunch” of elected representatives, leaders and technical advisers (academics), on the behalf of more than 7.000.000.000 individuals.
Case study:

**BusinessEurope** - [http://www.businesseurope.eu](http://www.businesseurope.eu)

Launched in 1958 as the “Union des Industries des pays de la Communauté européenne” (UNICE), with the objective of intermediating and coordinating the interests of national industrial federations of European Community member states (from 1993, European Union members). In 2007 it became BusinessEurope, The Confederation of European Business. Alongside the national federations BusinessEurope started offering specific advisory and lobbying support services to a small group corporates, called ASGroup partner companies. The motivations for collective action and lobbying, by BusinessEurope are the following:

- Centralizing the supra-national lobbying effort of national industrial federations;
- Fostering solidarity and mutual-support between national industrial federations and combined lobbying action at national level governance institutions;
- Encouraging a common Europe-wide export industrial and monetary policy, and protection of internal market for industrial interests;

by acting as spokesperson body, advocate and lobbyist of European industrial interests to the European institutions; to supra-national and international organizations (WB, ILO, IMF, ISO), for orienting the outcome of major governance forums and meetings for the benefit of European manufacturers. Accordingly BusinessEurope strives for permanent and direct liaison with, and listening by, European governance institutions officials. For additional information and analysis on major BusinessEurope advocacy issues and recent-past lobbying achievements see:

- “Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, Actors, and Issues” by Coen & Richardson (2009)
“Whether interests groups will close the gap between [policy and law making stakeholders] and government depends on whether such groups will speak for their own members rather than their bureaucrats, whether those who need representation get it, and whether the balance of power among all these contenders improves or worsens defects in the entire system” (Wildavsky, 1979).
2.7. **Technical policy actors and advisors**

*From scientific research to technical policy advising.*

The advances in science and technique made during the XX\textsuperscript{th} century have deeply transformed the interdependence relation between science, society and governance, if once academic scholars were used to assess the impact of business, social and political factors as drivers of scientific and technological progress, nowadays it seems more reasonable to value this relationship the other way round, or has a circular process. New social technologies and artifacts have become major causes of social, economic and political change. Accordingly, through its applications science has become a dominant element in our daily social existence.

If on one hand the application of science has created the greater opportunities of social change and improved the quality of life for many of us, on the other, science has insomuch empowered men -not every men but the ones who have been able to appreciate and take control/ownership of these social artifacts and technologies—that it has rendered the influence that a single can exert over the multitudes, through the mere disposal of high-tech artifacts (like mas medias and other ICT technologies), almost unlimited; often merging within a unique artifact the possibility of generating (or conveying) both the most virtuous and nefarious happenings to surrounding Humanity. Hence, science has become a symbol of, and an instrument for, governance and power exertion. Applied scientific
disciplines, like information theory (which is a branch of applied mathematics), network and complex system analysis (which is a branch of physics) econometrics and behavioral economics (which are respectively applied branches of statistics and economics) have become functional to social influencing and engineering projects (Swirski, 2011). It is clear that applied scientific knowledge and social artifacts are nowadays essential to succeed in almost all business and political competitions, and can be considered empowering factors for the most diverse uses and political or social purposes.

As a result, despite some scientists still hang to the ideological ivory tower of science's neutrality (Rotblat, 1999), the majority of them have clearly understood that their applied work and researches have as much to do with Science that they have to do with Human’s wellbeing or unwellness, at the individual, group and collective level (the case study at the end of this section draws us to the same ends). Some scientists have understood to such an extent that their work could be used to transform their lives and those of their fellows that they directly involved themselves in processes of social and political change (see Peters, 2013, in case
study box), arguing or justifying their positions and decisions with scientific method (rational and systematized inference of deductions from plausible assumptions), as advocates, science communicators or policy advisors. This wide-reaching phenomenon and trend of marketization and socio-politicization of applied sciences and its actors, is pushing “towards a scientistic conception of policy making, based on the idea that desirable rational and effective policy could be achieved through the application of scientific knowledge to the development of the appropriate technical tools: social indicators, relevant information systems, decision support and so on. This policy elite, which mostly comes from privileged social backgrounds, is self-assured and fully confident of knowing what is good for people and what people really need, especially when social needs (to quote a typical phrase of this humanist technocracy) have been scientifically established. All of this could lead to the explicit call of the policy elite for the knowledge of social scientists required to implement this scientistic policy. This call was, of course, addressed [also] to economists. But it was aimed at sociologists too, especially for matters with a high degree of uncertainty (to use a typical technocratic phrase once again), such as cultural issues” (Dubois, 2011).

Moreover, information, communication and transportation technological progress led to an ever-growing interdependence of the world community (from a socio-political and economic point of view), and rendered contemporary governance processes extremely complex and multifaceted. When the complexity of these open governance environments is ignored decision-making outcomes and
initiatives misleadingly appear as outcomes of the local institutionalized powers and their internal balancing through official interactions between institutionally invested actors (governance officials and executives). However, as we have confirmed previously in this work, there are other informal pressures from the social environment, and countless influencing activities undertaken by “non-institutional” policy-actors. These lasts can be unidentifiable, unacknowledged or unlegitimized by the other policy stakeholders, and can influence official decisional-processes without any transparency, under undefined roles, without any accountability or responsibility for their persuading and influencing actions. These “non-institutionalized or semi-institutionalized” policy actors are particularly suitable for operating under specific circumstances (like information and knowledge asymmetry, private-relation based decision-making, preferential acknowledgement, patronage within governance and institutional networks). They can influence the proposals and outcomes of both, the decisional processes and their story-telling, by elaborating rational motivations or technical justifications of a policy decision and its outcomes to the public.

Specifically, the ones which use their technical acknowledgement and expertise, their social status of “Men of Science”, and, their high consideration and deliberative legitimation within academic and research networks, to suggest policy solutions in decision-making process, through the selective disclosure to decision-makers of their private information, decisional models and knowledge, are what we will call technical (or scientific) policy advisors.
-The technical policy advising phenomenon-

When an opinion, a report, a model, an estimation, a technical enquiry, is required by, or submitted to, governance executives and officers (deliberating authorities) by an individual or an organization which is considered technically knowledgeable and specialized in a particular field of scientized knowledge or expertise by specialized publics, we are facing the phenomenon of technical advising. These advisors are usually engaged by decision-making institutions to provide decision-making information on actual situation, provisional models and instructions required by governance officials or executives to knowingly and motivationally select between policy alternatives or to argue/defend a prior choice not yet justified to stakeholders. By doing so advisors lend to policy-makers their “epistemological authority” (Davies, 2011). Typically, technical advisors are not officially legitimized as decision-making actors, accordingly they generally answer only to the policy officials (principal/s) that asked for their advice and gave them a consultative mandate.

However, before being chosen as advisors by deliberating authorities and receiving mandate to propose and expose policy or governance propositions, these agents (individuals and organizations) must be acknowledged by the “scientific community”. Generally this is done by reaching a wide agreement among the already acknowledged agents that operate within a research or policy-thematic field, and, with whom they compete and collaborate for/through knowledge production and diffusion.
Case study on policy advising:

MARIA HIJMAN (Women’s studies coordinator)

Selected extracts drawn from the web-article: “From student activity to university policy advisor”

<< When I started scientific biology research two issues became very clear to me. First, that the results of my own research could be manipulated in many different ways. Among the main factors affecting these results were: the kind of questions I asked, the sort of assumptions I worked on, and the type of fellow researchers I allowed myself to be influenced by. Second, I was struck by the cultural values that were dominant in the scientific world. [...] 

At this point I joined some colleagues in the “women’s biology group” and the “women in the natural sciences group”. We read the scientific works of biologists who were researching sex differences between males and females. We concentrated on analyses of the sexist nature of the basic assumptions at work in these projects; we criticized as well the central hypotheses and research methods employed. [...] 

In 1982, I was employed at Utrecht University to string together the many widespread activities in the field of Women’s Studies and to organize them in a coherent program. I decided that the best way to do this was by training myself to become perfectly familiar with the policy and decision-making processes of the academic world. [...] 

I had to learn to assess personal interaction and to cope with human relations in an open and fair way, and this includes conflicts and other unpleasant occurrences. At every stage of any decision-making process, the human [socio-relational] element is the most important aspect. The management of this human and social capital means that you have to find ways to harmonize differences in interests, feelings, and ideologies. [...] 

By 1986 I had succeeded in convincing the university board to recognize a structured program in Women’s Studies. [...] >>
After the end of World War II, an ever-increasing number of international organizations (IOs), like the UN agencies, the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and many other IOs, were explicitly established for, or gave themselves the mission of, promptly providing informative feedbacks, suggestions, guidelines, warnings and opinions on an extensive range of local governance issues (for a state of the art see: Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986), ranging from social security to fiscal and monetary policy, both to national and regional governments.

Formal models of IOs policy influencing usually assume that dissimilarities between the optimal/preferred policy of IOs and the one of local governments are due to the fact that local government preferences are “undemocratically” biased by strong political elites: decision-making is under the control of political leaders which represent dominant interest-groups (Fang & Stone, 2012). According to this perspective, IOs can solve this local governance bias problem by referring directly to publicly legitimized local policy stakeholders’ (citizens’ and consumers’
associations, unions, etc.), and then by presenting to local governments their policy reformulations specifically tailored to the local preferences and interests of the local majority -assuming that IOs can objectively assess these preferences/interests, and, aware of the fact that rarely stakeholders are unified in compact majorities when possible policy solutions to a problem are multiple-. Legitimized by their bureaucratic transparency, by their sophisticated mathematical and quantitative data-based modeling methods, by the scientific community faith on their technical expertise, and by their support and credit among the international community -worldwide exhibited in Mass Medias-, IOs can pressure local governments to follow their policy advices (Barnett & Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, 2004). However, the previously cited IO action models do not take into account that IOs could, and may have incentives to, misrepresent their private information and knowledge in their advising and opinion-giving. This can happen either because IOs are unable or not willing to recognize/legitimate local socio-political situations and decision-making dynamics, or, because they pursue a self-directed agenda and wont to enforce their own cultural, political and economic ideals (organizational systems). Therefore, under specific circumstances, IOs have the possibility and ability to disguise and defend, through technical justifications and Media storytelling, their policy goals which are not necessarily those of local governments and stakeholders. Hence, IOs might -voluntary or involuntary- give to local governance institutions a non-optimal advice (from the point of view of the effects on local stakeholders’ situation and wellbeing) or an ad-hoc built negative
feedback on a policy proposal elaborated by local government, to delegitimize local
government members/constituents in the eyes of the public opinion or
international community.

-In IOs still we trust?-

After the Sub-prime crises and Euro-Debt crisis, especially in European and
Western-culture countries, local governance institutions and public opinion is
increasingly skeptical about the legitimation and impartiality of IOs policy
advises: Governments are skeptical because IOs do not bear the (financial, social
and political) costs of the policy changes they propose or want to avoid. Whereas,
public opinion is skeptical because there are inherent conflicts of interest between
IOs and local governance institution, and the fact that policy making of local
governance organizations is persistently subject the technical policy assessing
and reviewing by IOs, appears as a challenge to local government independence
and to the self-determination right of its people. Moreover, since the opinion of
these technical “examiners” are essential to be accredited by financial markets,
rating organizations and investment institutions, if the IOs send a negative
feedback on the effectiveness or feasibility of a policy proposal or outcome, to
avoid a debt crisis or rising yields on government bonds (phenomenon which
recurrently happens), which could rapidly become an economic, political and
social crisis, local governments are mediatically urged to conform to external IO
requests and align their actions to the requirements ad views of these policy
advising organizations.
Case study on: World Bank’s policy advising in Ghana

Excerpts drawn from the web-article by Decker (2012):


<< Ghana has recently been in the vanguard of economic advising experimentation. [...] From the 1950s to the 1960s advisors were individuals directly appointed by political leaders. [...] Ghana had been guided by a development strategy formulated by Dudley Seers, Arthur Lewis and Nicholas Kaldor. Their strategy, which emphasized total dependence on foreign capital to industrialize the country, brought nearly complete disaster. [...] In the early 1970s the World Bank reinvented itself as a development agency and began to provide economic advice on a large scale. [Since it was a logistically enormous IO], the World Bank could create organizational structures and practices to overcome the dichotomy of the local and international, the theoretical and the practical. WB’s knowledge factory in Washington sent out visiting missions to harvest the necessary raw material, with little interest or sensitivity to local context. WB’s representatives [in Ghana] sent letters detailing local state of affairs; but superiors did not seem to grasp the practical implications of shortages and political instability. [...] [As a result] World Bank-advocated policies brought populations to the point of starvation while destroying local industries and legitimate employment opportunities. WB’s financial clout, and its lack of organizational memory severely limited social learning and reflection. Problems not hard to identify, nor extremely difficult to analyze, remained unresolved for decades. >>
2.8.  *Participatory and deliberative democratic governance*

If on one hand, Globalization intended as a worldwide phenomenon of increased mobility (of goods, people, businesses, opinions and knowledge) fostered the interaction (not yet the harmonization) between ethnically, ethically and culturally inhomogeneous groups of individuals; on the other hand the above-alleged accrued mobility rendered local governance institutions that once were called “national” democratic States inconsistent from the point of view of the political representativeness of the minorities that live in these territories. Inasmuch, nowadays these lasts have become socially disjoint multi-national and multi-ethnical systems of enforced pacific cohabitation of incompatible culturally and ethically realities. As a result the question of whether, and how, representative democracy can survive in these fragmented societies has become increasingly important, both from a socio-cultural and governance perspective (Cassese, 2006).

Contemporary “democracy” theorists, especially researchers from the fields of institutional-design and public-choice (branch of economics), “increasingly drew distinctions between rationalistic, utopian, idealistic definitions [and models] of democracy, on the one hand, and empirical, descriptive, institutional, and procedural definitions on the other, and concluded that only the latter type of definition provided the analytical precision and empirical referent that make the concept an useful one” (Huntington, 2012):
From an utopian/idealistic point of view: “voting and bargaining [democracy] encourage strategic behavior based on individualist and economic incentives [...] public policy and other governmental decisions are seen as a zero-sum game where majority rules. In [ideological] contrast, deliberative democracy moves away from competitive pluralism by encouraging the distinctive rationality of the forum as opposed to the rationality of the market” (Bohman, 1998). Accordingly “the primary purposes of [participatory] democratic discussion and deliberation are to enhance our understanding of the interests of all the members of society and how to advance those interests in a just and equitable way. It does this with an eye to making collective decisions, which have as their aim the equal advancement of the interests of the members of society. [...] this process of discovery must be pursued in an egalitarian way [...] all have the opportunity in influencing the process of discussion and the interests of all are properly taken into account” (Christiano, 2012).

From an institutional/empirical point of view: “the most important feature of [participatory] deliberation in a democratic state is that it is differentiated. That is, discussion on matters of policy and law, with the ultimate intention of influencing the making of law and policy, takes place in very different settings. These different settings are meant to make contributions to a process of collective decision-making. [Hence] one reason for differentiation is intellectual division of labor with respect to matters of discussion of policy. The evaluation of policy includes many different elements such as expert knowledge in the sciences,
expertise in the current state of play in law and policy, expertise in how to achieve the compromises necessary to make legislation, the local knowledge of those who are especially affected by legislation and the participation of ordinary citizens in the choice of the aims of policy. All of this takes place within a context of substantial and reasonable disagreement in all of these areas. [Therefore] the major scientific questions about this differentiation of democratic discussion and deliberation concern how the parts fit together and whether the division of labor can be made with the kind of equality that is thought [believed] to be the basis of democratic rule” (Christiano, 2012).

Through this distinction we have highlighted the un-specular relationship between the collective-idiosyncrasies (idealistic shared views and utopian models) and the scientific-materialisms (procedural and technical definitions, problematics and empirical justifications) on the concept of participatory deliberative democracy, which puts in evidence the duality of human’s consciousness: what is intuitively thought and what can/must be rationally justified by/to-be thought (Kuo & all., 2009).
In the last three decades the deliberative and participatory concept has been culturally tailored and branded (Laidler-Kylander & Shepard Stenzel, 2013) by political associations, citizen movements, IOs and other interest-groups concerned by the theme through its symbolical association to the ideals of openness, fairness, anti-authoritarianism, non-coercive conversation and confrontation of thoughts through argued discussion, with additional context-specific references to local preferences and situations. As a result of this promoting effort, civil participation and deliberation has achieved a high degree of popularity and public support (Everyday Democracy, 2014). Probably, (also) because participatory deliberation urges to worldwide publics the remembrance and sentimental revival—Memorial or Historical—of egalitarian and collectivist utopias from the past centuries (Hansen A. D., 2008), which can appear somehow implementable through a participatory and deliberative organization of governance processes.

In China this idealistic conceptual association between participative deliberation and political egalitarianism has facilitated the transition from communist party-centered decision-making towards new “collectivist” organizational models of citizen-participated policy-making initiatives (Leib, 2005). More generally, citizens’ participation and collaboration in governance processes are posited by medias and academics “as the antidote to a range of malaises, for instance: the elitist and technocratic nature of most policy making processes, which exclude alternative voices and ways of knowing (e.g. local, social, experiential, emotional);
and the loss of public legitimacy of electoral democracies based on party politics and shallow mediatized debate. In other words, there is a growing belief that ‘government’ and ‘politics’ cannot longer be left to an elite cadre of leaders and experts. [Hence] there is a growing appetite to reclaim and recast politics and policy as a people’s business” (Escobar, 2012).

Through the worldwide spreading of participatory deliberation initiatives, these concepts have attracted an ever-increasing political and academic attention (The Economist, 2010). Both concepts have been ideologically idealized and utopized by the public and in academic discourse (the following statement is a brief illustration of what alleged): “Deliberative democracy begins by turning away from liberal individualist or economic understandings of democracy and toward a view anchored in concepts of accountability and discussion. [It] focuses on the communicative processes of opinion and will-formation that precede voting. Accountability replaces consent as the conceptual core of legitimacy. A legitimate political order is one that could be justified to all those living under its laws. Thus, accountability is primarily understood in terms of “giving an account” of something, that is, publicly articulating, explaining, and most importantly justifying public policy” (Chambers, 2003). Accordingly, also the popular story-telling of participatory and deliberative initiatives starts through an open attack to the faults of the “apparently” dominant “voting-centered model” of democratic political organization. Consequently, the “public proposal” of participatory and deliberative organization often complies with the Social-Myth building process.
described by Sorel (1908). In which, the caricatured portrayal of the virtues of deliberative systems and of the weaknesses of voting-based systems appears clearly biased in favor of the adoption of the firsts (Nabatchi, 2007). In a great number of works on the theme, praises for participatory democracy and deliberation initiatives, and, critiques to the actual policy-making organization and outcomes in western countries (whose faults are attributed to representatives elected through voting mechanisms) are ethically grounded. This ad-hoc justification of deliberation as the one-best solution to the crisis of contemporary democracies is clearly instrumental to the creation of popular support, necessary for legitimizing any implementing of a participatory and deliberative organizational model.

Since the above-cited utopic and idealized models of participatory and deliberative democracy were broadening the gap between the normative/idealistic and the quantitative/empirical approaches up to an unsustainable breaking point, a significant amount of research and scientific communication was initiated to try to reduce this dualistic tension between what ancient Greeks called the phenomenon -which in this case is the collective idiosyncrasy on the concept of participatory democracy- and the noumenon -the rationalization and physical
implementation of these collective idiosyncrasies. Justified by the fact that both sensitivities are critical for the understanding and driving of the democratic forces at work in our social reality (Habermas, 2006), over the past decade, this quantitative/empirical research agenda has advanced so rapidly that many academics now claim that we are living an empirical and quantitative turn in deliberative global politics (Dryzek, 2006).

In addition, political scientists, like Habermas (2006), Deflem (2007) and others, have claimed that the sociological duality of the deliberative concept must be considered jointly if we want to gain the insights necessary for an accurate and successful formalization and implementation of the participatory deliberation approach into institutionalized policy-making frameworks. As if, studying how deliberation came-to-be in the mind of people and how it was actually implemented in the lives of people is jointly necessary for building objective awareness and useful knowledge on the issue.
Deliberative democrats and talk-centric models of collective decision-making.

In a book on rhetorical persuasion, which by logic should be considered one of the basic elements of face-to-face conversational decision-making, Garsten (2009) affirms that “in democracies, quiet people rarely enter politics. Democratic political life is dominated for the most part by people who like to talk”. If the assertion by Garsten is correct, then: Either deliberative initiatives are participated by mini-publics because all “politically quiet” people do not want to be involved in decision-making. Hence the lack of public involvement and representativeness of the community concerned by a given issue would make these initiatives look poorly participated and therefore un-democratic. Or, if these deliberative governance projects are massively participated by citizens concerned by the policy-outcomes, then current deliberative and participative phenomenon is nothing but a common interest for collective action on political matters. Action is pursued through a talk-centric decision-making paradigm, which is certainly a rare (but not new) social-occurrence that should be investigated more in depth in its origins and explanations.

One possible explanation of this seemingly spreading desire of public involvement on governance and political issues could be the emergence of a new socio-political philosophy, and associated movement, advocating for the implementation of a participative and deliberative organization of decision-making in governance institutions: These so-called “deliberative democrats” argue that “there are two kinds of power at play in democratic politics. One is the strong but inauthentic
power that is created by the forces of money and political authority. The other is
the more modest, but more authentic, power that is created in the communicative
arenas of civil society and the public sphere. To minimize the second kind of
to protect the spaces in which deliberation takes place from the
intrusion of money and authority. According to deliberative democrats,
contemporary democracies have become prey to two opposite but equally
damaging tendencies: a pull towards bureaucratization and rationalization on the
one hand, and a pull toward irrationality and fanaticism on the other. It is the
rationality of democracy that has been lost. To counterbalance these trends, the
theory wants to replace the contemporary concept of power—one that links it with
economic or ideological domination—with a viable conception of communicative
power that is based on the empowering effects of rational dialogue and
discussion” (Casullo, 2009). Hence, according to deliberative democrats’ viewpoint
“power is collective action performed by people who come together to constitute
their manner of living together” (Tesman, 2009), this conception of power is no
new, it was first formulated by Arendt in the sixties. “Arendt conceives power as a
constructive element that enables a collective to act in concert. The power of a
collective has an empowering effect on the group that exercises integrative action
(power to) rather than the instrumental power single actors can use at the
expense of another (power over). […] Association holds parties together in the
pursuit of their agreed common ends. power, can be conceived is embedded within
a collective without being attributed to any individual” (Haran, 2010).
Case study: **Building a philosophy and a socio-political role for the “deliberative democrat”**

Reconstruction through excerpts from Fishkin & Laslett (2008):

1) The deliberative democrat agrees with the activist’s exposure and critique of the way structural inequalities effectively limit access of some people to formally inclusive deliberating settings. […]

2) Protesting and making demands from the outside may be an effective way to bring attention to injustices that require remedy says the deliberative democrat, but on their own they do not propel the positive institutional change that would produce greater justice. […]

3) The deliberative democrat thinks that the responsible citizen should engage and argue with those who design and implement this settings to persuade them that they should devote thought and resources to activities that will make them more inclusive, representative of the interests and perspectives of those affected by the policy outcome. […]

4) The deliberative democrat tries to insert practices of deliberation into existing public policy discussions, he is forced to accept the range of alternatives that existing structural constraints allow. [He] has to accept the activist’s suspicion of implementing deliberative processes within institutions that seriously constrain policy alternatives. […]

5) The deliberative democrat should help create a deliberative setting in which social and economic structure can be examined. […]
-Participated deliberations and Media-

In a book titled “Deliberation, the media and the political talk”, Rousiley (2012) elucidates the influencing power of Mass and New Medias on deliberative and participated governance processes. He does so by answering to the following four questionable aspects of deliberations, mostly related to communicative/social aspects:

1. **Accessibility and social characterization of participants**: Who gains access to Media arenas and how? What are the inclusion criteria, and how much space or time is allocated to diverse participants?

2. **Use of influence**: How do participants find/gather support for their views, preferences, recommendations, and commands? Is persuasion attempted through the expression of rational reasoning, technical and linguistic sophistication, authority, social-role, interest-group principles and solidarity between group members?

3. **Reciprocity and responsiveness**: Is there a fair and open dialogue and an equal possibility of reply among participants during deliberation and before/after in the Media arena? Who is legitimized to intervene/respond to who and when?

4. **Reflexivity and reversibility of opinions**: Are changes in position or preferences observable? Do they follow collective patterns? Is there a radicalization or a convergence of opinions?
For brevity we will mention only final deductions, for a detailed discussion and arguing on the above questions we refer to the original source: Rousiley (2012). The conclusions are the following: “mass media may hinder and even preclude [deliberative] democratic practices in many circumstances, by producing inaccurate and misleading information, or even expressing outright lies; by being obsessed with personalities, dramatization, and scandal-mongering; and by concentrating power, privileging elites, and excluding many voices, particularly those of marginalized groups” (Rousiley, 2012). Moreover, on the same issue Bottger (1984) shows that thanks to their social-role, their media visibility or their academic endorsement, some participants have greater authority and legitimation to express themselves on specific subjects during deliberations, these individuals have spontaneously acknowledged more talk-space (time in which they are listened to without being interrupted) and are more often chosen as debate coordinators/moderators or schedule-setters during deliberations. Consequently they are more likely to be influential in deliberations, especially in small and medium group decisions. Finally, deliberating groups tend to use information that is already commonly shared (which generally comes from Mass Media), because only in this case they do want to verify the reliability of the fonts and the procedure through which it was collected and proved. Therefore they generally focus less on distinctive information/knowledge held by one or few individuals -that could arguably improve the outcome or decision-, especially if those lasts are not socially recognized as experienced experts/specialists on the issue (Wittenbaum, Hubbel, & Zuckerman, 1999).
Focus on: The role of emotions, sociality and morality in deliberation initiatives

Reconstruction through excerpts from Neblo (2014):
http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/mneblo/papers/Impassioned4We b2.pdf

<<The world of deliberation phenomena can be grasped only in the performative attitude of participants in interaction [...] personal emotional responses in general point to suprapersonal standards for judging norms and commands [...] moral-practical justification of a mode of action aims at an aspect different from the feeling-neutral assessment of means-ends relations, even when such assessment is made from the point of view of the general welfare. Feelings seem to have a similar function for the moral justification of action as sense perceptions have for the theoretical justification of facts. [...]>

When we examine dis/agreements, we must include affective reactions in the class of moral utterances, the critical and self-critical stances we adopt toward moral transgressions find expression in affective attitudes: from the third person perspective, abhorrence, indignation, and contempt, from the perspective of those affected, in feelings of violation or resentment, and from the first person perspective, in shame and guilt. To these correspond the positive emotional reactions of admiration, loyalty, gratitude, etc. Because they express implicit judgments, these feelings in which actors express their pro and con attitudes are correlated with practical evaluations [rationalized justification of agreements and disagreements]>>
Efficacy, limits and pitfalls of participatory deliberation mechanisms and initiatives

Political efficacy refers to the extent to which people feel they have an impact on, or exert some influence over, public affairs (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954). According to Craig & all. (1990) political efficacy is a mix of two factors:

- **internal efficacy**: the belief that one can understand and influence policy and politics;
- **external efficacy**: the belief that the governance institutions will respond to the shared requests and opinions on policy matters;

Internal and external political efficacies are among the most frequently used measures of general political attitudes and are highly correlated with political participation, deliberation and mobilization (Conway, 2000). “Moreover, internal and external political efficacy, are thought to be key indicators of the overall health of democratic systems” (Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990). In a deliberative case study (UAC Town Meetings) examined by Nabatchi (2007) “external efficacy increased in a statistically significant way following participation. Internal political efficacy also increased after participation, although not in a statistically significant way”. These results provide some support for the claims that deliberative initiatives can come through the efficacy effect; however, “the results also suggest a need for additional theorizing and testing”.
Sociological and psychological researches have revealed further potential pitfalls of deliberative mechanisms: “research suggests three limits to participation: risky shift, the Abilene paradox, and groupthink: Risky shift describes the phenomenon that group discussion can lead members to make riskier decisions than they would have made as individuals. The Abilene paradox reflects the experience of groups who make decisions and take actions that contradict their wants and interests in order to alleviate the anxieties and tensions of individual members. Groupthink refers to the replacement of independent critical thinking with irrational and dehumanizing actions against out-groups” (Mendelberg, 2002). Moreover, as Hibbing & Theiss-Morse (2002) point out “real-life deliberation can fan emotions unproductively, can exacerbate rather than diminish power differentials among those deliberating, can make people feel frustrated with the system that made them deliberate, is ill-suited to many issues, and can lead to worse decisions [from the point of view of cost-efficacy] than would have occurred if no deliberation had taken place”.

As we have seen, at the moment several interrogatives on participatory deliberation remain unresolved. Research has till much to enquire on issues related to the unequal influencing power of deliberating actors. Moreover, discussion inclusion and exclusion psychological, social and linguistic factors are not treated with the urgency and attentiveness that they deserve. Hence, if “correctness or truth in any kind of discourse is that which would be the upshot of unlimited deliberation and inquiry, [then, our pragmatist deliberative democrats
that want to] “bring moral and political judgments under the scope of correctness, truth, falsity, knowledge, error, and reason” (Misak, 2004) still have much to deliberate.
2.9. **Participative management**

*From the social role of managers to the social myth of career advancement*

More than fifty years ago, Henry (1949) had established through his empirical researches that: “persons of unquestioned high intelligence often turn out to be ineffective when placed in positions of increased responsibility. The reasons for their failure lie in their social relationships. [...] Social pressure plus the constant demands of the business organization of which he is a part direct the behavior of the executive [managers] into the mold appropriate to the defined role. Success is the name applied to the whole-hearted adoption of the role. The individual behaves in the manner dictated by the society, and society rewards the individual with success if his behavior conforms to the role. It would punish him with failure should he deviate from it”. Through the above-cited and ensuing studies (Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002), it became increasingly clear that causes of successes and failures of decision-makers in business environments have social and psychological roots. By empirically identifying the common psychodynamics associated to decision-making social roles, social researchers, have shown that to be potentially considered “successful”, business executives must possess some performing characteristics psychologically and socially associated to business governance positions, which are required by the business environment to be legitimated and not be put incessantly in question for the preservation of one’s managerial/executive position and authority. Here follow the traits and attitudes
socially requested to those charged of decision-making functions to maintain and legitimize their executive-role (as identified by: Henry, 1949):

- **“High success desire:** managers should conceive themselves as hard-working and mission oriented persons who must accomplish their objectives in order to be happy. These men should struggle for increased responsibility and derive a strong feeling of satisfaction from the completion of a task.

- **Strong mobility drive:** managers should feel the necessity of moving continually (hierarchically) upward and desire to accumulate the rewards of increased accomplishment. Finished work and newly gained competence should provide them with their sense of continued mobility.

- **Authority and interpersonal-relation focused:** The successful executive should conceive authority as a controlling but helpful relationship to functional superiors and subordinates in the working place. He should look to his superiors as persons of more advanced training and experience, whom he can consult on special problems and who issue to him certain guiding directives. He should not see the authorities in his environment as destructive or prohibiting forces. The crystallization of attitudes towards authority should be vis-à-vis superiors and subordinates, rather than between one and his equals. This implies that the concept of authority is the view of being a part of a wider and more final authority system. He should juxtapose authority respect to the feeling of personal attachment.
and identification with his superiors, for him a symbol of his own achievement and desires.

- **Organizational elasticity in unstructured situations:** This implies that executives should have the ability to take several seemingly isolated events or facts and to see or rebuild the causal relationships that exist between them. Further, they should be interested in looking into the future and be concerned with predicting the outcome of their decisions and actions.

- **Decisiveness:** executives should have the ability to come to a decision among several alternative courses of action—whether it be done on the spot or after detailed consideration. Nothing should appear too difficult for them to tackle and at least try to solve.

- **Aversion to failure and prompt reaction:** When failing in his assignments the executive should express high interpersonal dissatisfaction jointly to a rationalized introspective elaboration of personal and organizational causes of failure, to rapidly revamp and redirect energies and effort (personal and surrounding) towards new reachable objectives.”

The above mentioned executive-role traits, “socially required” for being charged of a managerial function are so widespread and silently recognized by people in the business context (Uskavitch, 2011), that they have become the foundations of the social-myth of meritocratic professional career advancement through hierarchical ascent, which is considered the main social ladder mechanism in business systems (Nicholas, 1999).
-From the social-myth of career advancement to the “democratization” of management-

The abovementioned executive-role socially required traits, are daily and worldwide used by HR managers to select and hire new candidates for managerial positions and to assign hierarchical advancements of career to low and high grade employees. Nowadays, these executive role traits are to such an extent collectively shared or given for granted by people, all around the world, that Business Schools were founded (Harvard Business School, 2014) and Masters in Business Administration were established (Wharton University of Pennsylvania, 2014) and business books were written (Yukl, 2001), to develop and learn how to publicly exhibit these traits, and, behaviorally adopt/respect these social codes and role-models. As a result, given the incessantly increasing rate of qualified and cultured workforce, especially in developed countries, the social-myth of career advancement has become one of the greatest and most common aspirations of individuals in the contemporary world. The incoming workforce generations, highly educated, but

A symbolic case study on the search for the “ideal” executive:

“Recruiting, selecting and training entrepreneurial managers: An Arcadia case study”

The Times (2013)

http://businesscasestudies.co.uk/arcadia/recruiting-selecting-and-training-entrepreneurial-managers/
also spoiled by their freedoms of expression and consumption, have been driven by the social myth of career advancement to an ambition not compatible to their surrounding socio-economic reality. The unjustified confidence in their chances to aspire to the best of what is put on display by our contemporary society of the spectacle (Harris J., 2012), collides with a business environment overcrowded by qualified human capital, but -when compared to the number of potential role contenders- poor of career advancement opportunities (Ivankovic, 2012).

This imbalance between working career opportunities and expectations, jointly to high rates of juvenile unemployment, created enormous migratory and socio-cultural pressures within the worldwide business environment (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007), in some ways this phenomenon id similar to the one that, at the beginning of the past century, led to the birth of the syndicalist movement and to the formulation of its trade-union centered organizational model, alternative to the governance of business through professional executive hierarchies. This time, the alternative organizational model to professionalized executive hierarchies has been called participative management. If we exclude virtuous violence and revolutionary/anarchic components, participative management could appear in its desired outcomes akin to syndicalism. However, as we will see, this private sector socio-political movement, for the reorganization of governance processes within business organizations is technically different from syndicalism, in its storytelling, justifications, and implementation mechanisms.
We could view participative management (also called corporate co-governance) as a structured multi-agent decision-making system, set up by the upper management, the Board of Directors or by the ownership of a corporate. In which the internal communication and coordination among employees gives cohesion and coherence to participative networked management processes and to their outcomes. Participative management “emphasizes the importance of interdepartmental communications and coordination in modern production systems [and] points out the significance of non-hierarchical, horizontal communications, and coordination networks in adjusting to change. Essential to the successful creation and functioning of such networks are worker communicative abilities, information flow, and an organizational learning view of the firm. Information and coordination play key roles [in] horizontal coordination that occurs through information exchanges substitutes for the hierarchical control systems. [...] Lateral coordination and information sharing are encouraged by organizational design features and human resource practices that break from the [...] legal and managerial tradition of separating planning and supervision from those who execute the work. Among these features are job rotation, enterprise unions that include blue-collar, white-collar, and managerial employees, extensive use of teams, and other problem-solving processes that support the sharing of knowledge that is essential to improving work unit and organizational
performance. [...] this conception of the firm may fit environments in which markets demand product variety, where the technology can be informed by and made more productive with worker knowledge, where the market conditions support a premium on quality, innovation, and rapid response to changing consumer preferences, and where the regulatory environment supports those organizational features. High-performance manufacturing requires greater levels of internal coordination upstream and downstream in the production process, in which each unit is treated by the others as a customer or supplier. This form of organization provides the capacity to solve non-routine problems, improve quality, and lower costs. It requires, however, extensive information sharing, decentralization, and rapid mutual adjustment” (Rubinstein, 2000). This conception of intra-organizational networked corporate governance is based on the assumption that the structure of relationships between members of an organization, and resulting role attributions, affects both the behaviors, beliefs, performances and situation assessments in collective decision-making processes. All employees (blue and white collars as all other employees) are thought to make choices not as autonomous self-determining individuals but as mutually influencing components of a social and relational context, i.e. the corporate social environment. Hence, ideally, participatory management should facilitate the flow of information from the production level to upper management by delayering vertical management hierarchies and creating a by-passing mechanism between low and upper level managers, and create a variety of organized social pressures designed to deter executives’ shirking (Bainbridge, 1997).
Case study on participative management:

The Saturn Corporation - [http://www.saturn.com/](http://www.saturn.com/)

Saturn was a subsidiary corporation of General Motors, in the business of car construction, founded 1985 as a response to the success of Japanese automobile manufacturing and retailing organization. The company marketed itself as a unique kind of “Car Company”, and operated almost independently from its parent company. Its most overt motive of uniqueness was the fact of being established through a labor-management partnership between the GM and the United Auto Workers (UAW). The Saturn experiment can be considered one of the bravest participative management tentative in the U.S. industrial relations until nowadays.

In 1988, General Motors and United Auto Workers (UAW) developed a system of co-management, through which each module of Saturn (averaging 100 employees), was jointly managed by a union-represented and a non-represented advisor; union-represented advisors were assigned by a UAW local board after the consultation of Saturn’s employees. Each partnering of two advisors (a represented advisor with a non-represented one) was charged of building a dense communication network throughout Saturn's management system and within their modules and working groups; advisors were also responsible for production operation (working line processes) and staff middle management, and supervised the self-directed work teams in day-to-day production activities. As pointed out by Rubinstein (2000), “compared to non-represented advisors, union advisors showed greater levels of lateral communication and coordination, which had a significant positive impact on quality performance. Also positively associated with quality outcomes at the module level were balanced time use, with each advisor engaging in both production and people management, and alignment between union-represented and non-represented advisors regarding their priorities, responsibilities, practices, and job definition”.

- The limits and drawbacks of participative management-

Participative management initiatives generally do not decentralize all the decisional processes within the corporate, non-operational managerial positions and higher-rank executive roles are generally preserved. Usually also the middle layer of executive positions is maintained but “rationalized” through some responsibility entrustments to the lower (operative and micro) management levels that become participated by workers (Heckscher, 1995). Hence, the majority of the previously identified social-role traits required to executives are still respected, and, under an organicistic perspective, participated management decision-making collectives also respect these socially-requested traits.

Consequently, the phenomenon of participative management doesn’t imply a rupture with the above described social-myth of career advancement, but, especially for low grade employees, their requests of decisional power appears to be met, and, the career social-myth is somehow accomplished through transversal organizational instruments, like job rotation, teamwork and temporary assignments of coordinating/leadership roles. Operational decision-making is decentralized, workers are made more autonomous and empowered by participated decision-making; however, the pay, tasks, social prestige, life-style are generally the same as before, and, are not closer to the ones of the business executives. Moreover, the lower management positions, the ones generally sought by new employees and less-qualified workers are removed; career advancement
“jumping” from non-executive to executive positions becomes less frequent, and thus more-and-more coveted by workers.

To conclude, we must say that in a participative management framework, decisional power imbalances among employees can (and often do) persist. Because, even though the networked governed or self-organized operational processes are flexible hieterarchies, in which operational decision-making roles are no longer entitled by official hierarchical positions and pre-established responsibilities; however, there is evidence that in participative governance processes decision-making influencing capability is still biased by (based on) social-prestige, culture-originated hysteresis of social-power, legitimation of former authority-systems, admiration deriving from social-consideration of individuals’ based on their study/working accomplishments and experiences, individuals’ exclusive knowledge, private-relationships, and finally, by the capacity of persuading others in deliberating and decision-making processes. Hence, instable and unbalanced influencing dynamics in business decision-making systems is a (socio-culturally founded) intrinsic characteristic of Humans’ self-organization (Crumley, 1995).

A comparative study on competing influences in participative and non-participative management processes:

“The Appeal and Difficulties of Participative Systems”

3. Technocentric networked governance artifacts and influencers

In this final chapter, we will deal with the use of ICTs and resulting socio-political artifacts (like new medias, online deliberation systems and big data) for the automated gathering, filtering, exchanging, interpreting and organizing of information for networked governance and policy/law making purposes (ICT enabled or supported technologies).

In recent times, these “socio-political” artifacts have been widely acclaimed by governance institutions, informatics, computer science academics, and, “technology friendly” publics. Thanks to a diffused “open governance” and “innovation society” doctrine, induced through techno-progressivist rhetorical Media discoursization, to explain and sustain a technocentric (Carrico, 2006) and pseudo-transhumanist (Hughes, 2002) way of employing and developing of ICTs for governance and democratic citizenship purposes, hi-tech artifacts have been promptly implemented by several local and international institutions and governance organizations to “rejuvenate our old democracy” (E-dialogos, 2009).
Governmental and administrative public institutions could in such a way legitimate their actions via the much acclaimed “visibility and transparency” of online endorsement and approval systems, by following what we could call the “I like, I rate and I comment” perspective, aimed at giving to the multitudes of governance stakeholders ways expressing their opinions, ideas and feelings on social, cultural, economic and political matters in an apparently easily decodable form, by governments. As their conceptual-creators and promoters anticipated, these socio-political ICT artifacts have hence been branded and promoted –both, by public institutions that adopted them and by business organizations that developed and sold them-, as inclusive and groundbreaking instruments for expression and deliberation, indispensable for the diffusion of political power among “ordinary citizens”. This Media branding process has been almost certainly be done with aim of presentation these technologies as a way of surpassing the partisan and interest-group based existing systems for the political participation of stakeholders in governance processes.

A case study on the Media branding and promotion of online deliberation and governance instruments:

“Promoting E-Democracy and Citizen Participation through ICT Initiatives in Parliament: The Malawi Case”

Kanjo (2012)

http://www.irma-international.org/viewtitle/60646/
A technocentric perspective: ICT driven socio-political innovation, the result of a global meta-crisis?

Reconstruction through excerpts from Lane & all. (2014):

Our society is increasingly beset by what it interprets as global crises. All contemporary crises share a common origin in what may be described as a social meta-crisis, induced by the way in which our society organizes its processes of innovation. [...] By innovation, we refer to the processes through which new artifacts are conceived, designed, produced and integrated into patterns of use. These processes necessarily involve the construction of new patterns of interaction among agents, and hence transformations in the organization of what we may call agent space. Thus there is an inextricable linkage between the dynamics of change in the space of artifacts and in the space of agents. These dynamics are mediated by the way in which the relevant agents represent the contexts in which they act: in particular, their attributions about the identity of the other agents with whom they interact and the functionality of the artifacts around which their interactions are organized. The incorporation of artifacts instantiating these new attributions of functionality into patterns of use by agents can lead to new values and, eventually, new needs on the part of these agents. [...] Our society’s dependence on innovation is expressed in, and sustained by, an increasingly widespread way of thinking, which we will term the Innovation Society ideology. [...] The Innovation Society ideology guarantees that innovation policy is a high priority for governments at all levels. [...] The political response to crises, once detected, is to try to support the processes that will bias the pump-priming towards the invention of new artifacts whose functionality will ameliorate in some way the crisis’ negative consequences.
In view of what said before, our analysis will closely follow the phenomenon, storytelling and concept theorizing trajectories of e-democracy, e-deliberation, e-participation, e-citizenship and e-government, but without shielding itself under the appealing, but still unlikely actual extropian ambitions, suppositions and proclamations of revolutionary social and cultural emancipation breakthroughs through technology, and digital social artifacts.

We will hence try to understand if these information gathering or deliberating instruments and platforms are effectively participative, inclusive and fair, from the point of view of the influencing capacity granted to their users (citizens and other stakeholders) in policy/law decision-making; as their theorizers, promoters, creators and institutional adopters would have us believe.

We will also try to understand if their functioning mechanisms stimulate and facilitate the expression and exposure of the political views through rational, moral or socio-cultural identity and role related/dependent arguments. Within the limits of short space that we will dedicate to this topic, we will try to understand if the online governance contents and methods are just a justification, a façade,
decision-making processes based on the exchange of social/relational capital (reciprocal favoritisms) between well organized and politically active agents/groups, which their social capital as if it was an exchange and value preservation currency that can be spent and accumulated by participants (both external interlocutors and public institutions) through their online activities and interactions.

These systems are organized through specific functioning principles, mechanisms and rules, determined by complex encoding architectures, which enable or limit users’ range of possibilities, in the: information processing, exchange, decision making and coordination of collective action. As a result, encoding architecture defines the kind of formats (and limits/requirements) of inputs and outputs in these semi-automatized processes. Hence there is “a clear requirement to look toward the potentially unanticipated impacts of the use of (existing social-order) “disruptive” technologies, such as the Internet, on governance structures and processes” (Marche & McNiven, 2003). Because a new socio-political geography and organization of influencing forces is deployed through the internet, and, its potential effects are not limitable to the virtual-world.
3.1. **Online political engagement and deliberation systems**

In recent years, there has been a radical reinterpretation of the role of citizens’ online engagement in all the spheres of public live and public service design, delivery and assessment (Meijer, 2011). As Bovaird (2007) observed governance “is no longer seen as a purely top-down process but rather as a negotiation among many interacting policy systems”. Online agents can willingly or unwillingly influence online political debates through their content-producing, content-commenting and content-sharing activity. This networked governance approach does not involve only a process of dispersion of decision-making and decision-influencing power towards previously marginalized political actors and stakeholders; it also determines the appearance of unpredictable online social network patterns (for the informal but still real) redistribution of influencing power, through collective dynamic interactions and ensuing information cascades, involving a hypothetically all-comprehensive range of actors and groups from the surrounding social environment (Paquet, 1997).

**Online social networking as a political engagement activity:**

“**Civic Engagement in the Digital Age**”

Smith (2013)

Case study on the online social networks for political activity:

**Using of Twitter for Political Information Sharing in South Korea**

*Reconstruction through excerpts from Lee & all. (2013):*

[https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/38389/210.pdf?sequence=4]

<< The purposes of conducting this study are twofold: to explore re-tweeting (RT) information behavior for political messages on Twitter by citizens in South Korea, and to compare the number and types of re-tweeted messages, and the sentiments captured from these messages with the results of public opinion polling about leading political figures. [...] 

Social media tools such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube are now considered as politically transformative communication technologies as radio and television. [...] In considering the impact of social media in the political sphere, many researchers have explored how using SNSs such as Facebook and Twitter influences elections and public opinion poll results. [...] 

A total of 556,675 re-tweeted messages including the three keywords [Leaders’ Name] were collected for six weeks [...] The magnitude of the re-tweeted messages including the three keywords varied, and might depend on public awareness of the three leaders. [...] The extent to which the three leaders appeared in the Twitter timeline over the six weeks was not consistent with the percentages shown in public opinion polling results over the same period. [...] 

Rankings of message magnitude differed from the rankings of public opinion polls. The magnitudes also appeared vulnerable to changes in political issues and events in real life. [...] Contents in tweeted messages were highly subjective, complicated and contextual as a representation of political communication. [...] Sentiments in tweeted messages, while subjective and contextual as well, did show a correlation with public opinion polling results. This implies that capturing sentiments from tweeted messages dealing with broader political issues can be useful in gauging public opinion. >>
Online social media platforms (like online video/text sharing sites; online social networks and status/news update services) are used as “social homes” (deliberating spaces) by flexible amalgamations of users (organizations or individuals) that join forces in short-term interaction groups, which share a moral/social/cultural/political interests or missions. Users join these internet groups either through tacit consent (by simply commenting, discussing or disseminating group provided-created content/information, for example by retweeting), or through explicit commitments to collective action and mutual support (online advocating and other forms of team worked influencing activity, like Avaaz’s petition signing).

Moreover, these online social groups are constantly subject to membership and internal social structure reshaping dynamics, their tacit or formal missions/objectives are continuously renegotiated, and generally change in function of: the surrounding mediatic environment, major events and happening narrated and assessed by the online social communities, surrounding information and awareness on socio-political contexts and situations, online relationships among agents, and last but not least, online users’ interests and priorities.

- Bilateral and multilateral online interaction systems -

As alleged in the introduction of this chapter, ICTs and social artifacts established on these information and communication infrastructures (like New Medias and Online Social Networks) have led the way to the development of an
increasingly wide range of architecture systems for the structuring the online interactions, information-exchanges and decision-making through online user-friendly interfaces; which can be bilateral (like certified electronic mail), i.e. when interactions take place between Citizen and Public-Institution, Interest-group and Public-Institution, Interest-group and Interest-group, Citizen and Citizen, and, Citizen and Interest-group; or multilateral, i.e. when it contemporaneously involves in an open information exchange system a great number of users (like deliberation platforms, social networks, and other web-sites with information commenting and sharing mechanisms). This second multilateral approach follows a structural functionalist concept of online social networked governance, which is a framework for building a socio-political model that considers online peer-to-peer and peer-to-platform (“virtual space” in which user-created content is openly visible and freely accessible to other users) interactions as the elementary building blocks of a multilaterally generated complex system, whose parts and organization spontaneously emerges and becomes more sophisticated via continuous interactions between the single parts of the system, ideally, this social-network based multilateral organization of interactions should...
(theoretically) favor locally informative coherence and cohesion. As Smith (2009), confirms through data, these online social interactions are increasingly intensive “51% of [U.S. located] internet users now post content online that they have created themselves. On a typical day, 15% of internet users - that’s more than one in ten Americans - post something online for others to see”, and, these ratios constantly grow.

This social network approach to online political engagement looks to online relationships through a macro-level orientation, which focuses on the architecture and liaison structures that outline these online information systems, and considers communication flows within the internet organized as a “neural network” (Auld, Moore, & Gull, 2007). Users can relocate themselves - thanks to hyperlinks and search engines -, from one information hub/platform to another. These informational and social positioning re/configurations and functioning deliberative outcomes are co-shaped by the social norms, meta-norms, regular patterns, and organization of communication processes. The quantity/ quality of information (provided by users and public/private organizations) is also a determining factor of the outcome of online socio-political and civic engagement and deliberations.
Analysis of the online social networking activity due to:

“Open Government” information in the U.S.

Reconstruction through excerpts from Smith (2010):


<< Government agencies have begun to open up their data to the public, and a surprisingly large number of citizens are showing interest. Some 40% of adult internet users have gone online for raw data about government spending and activities. 23% look online to see how federal stimulus money is being spent; 22% read or download the text of legislation; 16% visit a site such as data.gov that provides access to government data; 14% look online to see who is contributing to the campaigns of their elected officials.

Government interactions in the information age are often fueled by data. [...] Online citizens can—and often do—'go to the source' in their efforts to monitor government activities, evaluate the impacts of new legislation, and track the flow of their tax dollars. [...] 

31% of online adults have used social tools such as blogs, social networking sites, and online video as well as email and text alerts to keep informed about government activities. Moreover, these new tools show particular appeal to groups that have historically lagged in their use of other online government offerings—in particular, minority Americans. Latinos and African Americans are just as likely as whites to use these tools to keep up with government, and are much more likely to agree that government outreach using these channels makes government more accessible and helps people be more informed about what government agencies are doing. [...] 

Just as social media and just-in-time applications have changed the way Americans get information about current events or health information, they are now changing how citizens interact with elected officials and government agencies,” said Smith. “People are not only getting involved with government in new and interesting ways, they are also using these tools to share their views with others and contribute to the broader debate around government policies. >>
Hence, in a governance environment overcrowded by information, source reliance becomes a critical factor for the diffusion and endorsement of online information. Recent studies have shown that, for governance issue related information (non-entertainment), civically engaged web users still rely on traditional and mass media and historic news providers: like newspapers, television news, news-magazines, specialized literature, and their new online versions, other new-media sources of information or user-generated/deliberated content is considered less trustworthy even when the form and informational content of news’ storytelling is very similar (Johnson & Kaye, 2000).
3.2. Online participatory governance systems

In recent times, at a worldwide level, several democratic States’ institutions experienced a profound legitimacy crisis. Their governance systems revealed many of the drawbacks and limits of representative democracy and elected political representation; like corruption, technical incompetency, inability to dialogue with competing parties and interest groups, inability to coordinate governance at a supranational level, incapacity to limit the growth of governments’ expenditure and public debt, non-representativeness of the local constituents opinions, other. Some of these institutions, have claimed that the solution could be deliberative and participatory hi-tech artifacts, which could enhance citizens’ legitimation of public decisions, by allowing them to express their opinion, and, more rarely by empowering them from a political influencing perspective by making them active e-citizens from a political decision-making/partaking point of view. These online participatory initiatives, could seemingly give-birth to a participative, impartial, equitable, non-centralizable, and potentially all-inclusive networked governance, devoted to the listening of stakeholders. However, “technology is just an enabler not the solution. [Hence] the barriers to greater online citizen engagement in policy-making are cultural, organizational and socio-political (not merely technological). [...] Overcoming these challenges will require greater efforts to raise awareness and capacity both within governments and among citizens. information, consultation and public participation in policy-making is needed to make the most of ICTs” (OECD, 2003)
A case study on EU commission’s online participation story-telling and projects:

“Going from e- to we-government”


<< Faced with tough economic choices and the complex social dynamics in Europe today, more than ever, citizens need simple and smart ways to interact with their governments. ICT can actually transform and improve public services while materially reducing government debt burdens. [...] 

The 'Smart open services for European patients' (epSOS) pilot project is making it easier for people to receive medical assistance anywhere in the EU by removing linguistic, administrative and technical obstacles. [...] The 'Simple procedures online for cross-border services' (SPOCS) [...] is working to remove the administrative barriers that European businesses face before offering their services abroad. [...] It has developed a platform that smoothes access to the Single Points of Contact set up to assist businesses in dealing with administrative burdens in cross-border commerce. [...] E-CODEX's tools help you make a claim against a seller just by sitting at your computer and all in your own language. [...] 

The EU Digital Agenda seeks to tear down the barriers blocking second-generation e-government services. [...] The goal is to harness the contributions of the millions of switched-on citizens, 'a massive pool of skills and talent' that can help administrations improve the way services are designed and delivered. For its part, the Commission will redouble its use of e-procurement, clean up its web presence, adopt a more 'open data' approach, and move towards paperless administration where possible, according to a statement. The Commission is also funding a raft of innovative projects, including Large-Scale Pilots funded by the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP), to lay the groundwork for further e-government progress. [...] We need to match this success in new areas like eJustice and eParticipation. [...]>>
-The drawbacks of social visibility in online participatory governance initiatives-

If on one hand openness and transparency have been considered desirable features for online participatory and deliberative initiatives. Because public administrations and institutions want citizens to be able to evaluate others’ needs, ideas and opinions; to collectively build, through deliberation, solutions to social problems and collective needs; and, only subsequently, give the possibility to citizens to choose between deliberated policy/law alternatives. On the other hand, with these open systems citizens, organizations and interest-groups become recognizable through the participatory/deliberating activity by other members of the community. As a result, participating agents can be tacitly blackmailed or induced to change opinion or to conceal it with others’ requests, especially if they know/belief in advance that the expression of a given idea, opinion or need would cause them losses of social capital (relationships with other actors and accompanying access to resources, information, influence and control) and relational opportunities of future collaboration with individuals, groups, organizations and institutions that appear to be averse to a given idea/opinion or its potential consequences, if adopted as policy/law. The above mentioned emerging attribute of online participative governance systems, that is particularly apparent when using small platforms for e-democracy, e-governance, e-citizenship is very similar to the social embeddedness of good/service markets.
Case study on an online participatory law-making instrument:

CORO (TERZO VENETO) - [http://www.coro.terzoveneto.it/coro/](http://www.coro.terzoveneto.it/coro/)

The “Terzo Veneto” project by the Veneto Region invites governance stakeholders to gather together in functional interest intermediation organizations and groups: like associations of citizens, consumers, professionals, businesses, trade unions, chambers of commerce and crafts and other systems of organized interest-group intermediation; to discuss and debate on Regional law and policy making through an online Regional law proposal and discussion platform, called “CORO”.

Within CORO’s online platform, the Regional Council’s (Legislative Assemblies) projects of law are subject to comments and revision proposal by interest groups, article by article. The process is structured in several rounds (generally from 2 to 4) of assembly proposal, interest-groups review and reformulation, and, subsequent assembly’s reformulation and re-proposal.

The entire process of law proposal and revision is publicly visible to all; documents sent from the interest-groups to the assembly, and the other way round, are also open-access. Hence, this platform offers a new direct channel of communication between local functional interest-groups representatives and Regional law-making assembly, the organization and mechanisms of law negotiation are technically akin to the corporatist model. Moreover this platform fosters inter-group networking on each thematic field of law proposal, through an open and transparent online interaction, debate and negotiation.

For more details on CORO and TERZO VENETO projects we refer to documentation and studies available at the following LINK:

Towards a struggle for the control over public governance information-

Nowadays, within several public institutions, there is an unseen struggle for the control over “information contained inside computers and servers, which can often determine which organizational factions [functional or moral interest-groups] will gain or lose power relative to others. [Moreover, since these] computing infrastructures are expensive, those who control them govern a large portion of the investment of the organization’s resources. Finally, many people perceive those who are engaged in computing [and managing information systems] to be sophisticated and professional; hence, computing brings some extra (effective) power to those who own it” (Paquet, 1997). As a result the information control ensuing from this socially- legitimating technical/managerial expertise, can be used to oversee the processes that happen within these participatory governance systems, and, influence their outcomes through the definition and modification of the systems’ architecture and functioning mechanism. The coordination of information flows between agents has a great importance within these decision-making processes because through the systematic or ad-hoc creation of information asymmetries, participative initiatives and deliberations can be manipulated towards potentially suboptimal decisions and outcomes. This power can hence be “spent” to influence public decision-making for the interests of the professional categories that gain importance through their control creation of these governance information systems, at the detriment of other stakeholders” interests.
The above alleged “well-established bureaucratic politics perspective, conceives large organizations (and networks) as consisting of a range of competing individuals, interests, and constituencies, each seeking to control power resources to further their own ends. As government becomes informatized, control over how information may be managed and manipulated becomes increasingly central to power struggles. It may be objected that the politics of convenience have nothing whatsoever to do with democracy, electronic or otherwise; that choice should not be confused with voice. It may depend in large part on the extent to which one is convinced by broader postindustrial arguments about the proliferation of nontraditional repertoires of political activity and whether they can be stretched in this way. But these problems aside, it does seem perverse to ignore one of the central claims of e-democracy itself: a very old but important argument about scale in a democratic polity. E-democracy renders political participation and influencing the delivery of public services more convenient by shrinking time and distance, enabling large numbers of stakeholders to deliberate and feedback opinion almost simultaneously.” (Chadwick, 2003).
3.3. **Dig Data for governance and policy issues**

In the last two decades, all around the globe, business corporates have experienced a digital information systems revolution which is both instrumental and organizational (for details see box at the right). In recent times, international front-running corporations operating in the Media sector, “like the New York Times and the Guardian hired data crunchers, modeling experts and infographics specialists to spur a new genre, data journalism; the transparency movement spawned an open data movement, primarily directed towards demanding the release of all data collected by the government in free and open form; health awareness has given rise to a quantified self-movement, whose enthusiasts pursue goals of health, beauty or athletic performance by closely monitoring and sharing data generated by their very bodies. These cultural artifacts come with their own cloud of physical artifacts powering them; software to crunch and display the data, publications, educational institutions, conferences, sensors and standards” (Ponti & Cottica, 2013).
Progressively, the online publication, storage, exchange, stating and assessment of information has become part of mainstream socio-cultural costumes in developed and developing countries, the following graph illustrates this trend:

![Figure 10: Global internet users and growth rate, by world regions, in percentage of total population, from “Global Internet usage Infographic” (HB Administrator, 2012)](image)

If on one hand, thanks to digital technologies and new medias, nowadays policy-making takes place in an environment increasingly rich of (online) data-empowered governance stakeholders, and, digitally-organized groups of policy interlocutors -fact which poses both promises for their involvement in governance decision-making, and threats to policy-makers’ decisional autonomy-. On the other hand, the widespread use of the Web for the exchange, storage and showcase of knowledge, information, news and opinions, means also that, currently, through these online activities, willingly or unwillingly, each of us leaves informational traces and online-action feedbacks in the systems which support and enable these processes.
Once data is online, it makes certainly sense, for companies and institutions which daily transfer and store (at the will of their users) huge amounts of data through their servers, to look for any valuable information that can be extracted from within that mass of chaotic data, without violating privacy-laws if possible. Consequently, since the availability of data has expanded at such an incredible speed, so has the opportunity of massively harvesting and interpreting this data for the most diverse purposes of private and public organizations. As Clive Humby asserted, this data could become the “new oil” (Arthur, 2013) of the XXIst century. Business executives and marketers have been the first to understand how this “new oil” could be exploited; and which business and public governance trends would have been set in motion by the emerging mass internet-data recycling phenomenon, through Big Data. Business pioneers were followed by social and informatics science academics, which formalized these techniques and modeled the phenomenon, both from a social and technical perspective.

Nowadays, all data publicly made available or exchanged through the internet - by political parties, organized interest-groups, citizens, corporates and policy-makers- is (with some technical and legal limitations) collected through server “harvesting”, to generate Big Data. “Big Data refers to datasets whose size is beyond the ability of typical database software tools to capture, store, manage, and analyze. This definition is intentionally subjective and incorporates a moving definition of how big a dataset needs to be in order to be considered Big Data, i.e. we don’t define big data in terms of being larger than a certain number of
terabytes (thousands of gigabytes). We assume that, as technology advances over time, the size of datasets that qualify as big data will also increase. Also note that the definition can vary by sector, depending on what kinds of software tools are commonly available and what sizes of datasets are common in a particular industry. With those caveats, big data in many sectors today will range from a few dozen terabytes to multiple petabytes” (Manyika, et al., 2011). Thanks to constant lowering of the prices of physical memory storage devices and processors (compared to their capacity and speed) the gathering, storage and interpreting costs of Big Data have rapidly fallen. As a result online data has acquired an increasingly central role in everyday life and decision-making.

However, as Gantz & Reinsel (2011) point out, “big data isn’t new. Instead, it is something that is moving into the mainstream and getting big attention, and for good reason. Big data is being enabled by inexpensive storage, increasing connections to information via the cloud and virtualized storage infrastructures, and innovative software and analysis tools. Big data is not a "thing" but instead a dynamic/activity that crosses many IT borders. [...] Big data technologies describe a new generation of technologies and architectures, designed to economically extract value from very large volumes of a wide variety of data, by enabling high-velocity capture, discovery, and analysis. [...] Big data is a horizontal cross-section of the digital universe and can include transactional data, warehoused data, metadata, and other data residing in ridiculously large files. Media/entertainment, healthcare, and video surveillance are obvious examples of
new segments of big data growth. Social media solutions such as Facebook, Foursquare, and Twitter are the newest new data sources. Essentially, they have built systems where individuals and organizations (consciously or unconsciously) are providing near continuous streams of data about themselves, and thanks to the network effect of successful sites, the total data generated can expand at rapid logarithmic rates. [Hence] big data is not only about the original content stored or being consumed but also about the information around its consumption. Smartphones are a great illustration of how our mobile devices produce additional data sources that are being captured and that include geographic location, text messages, browsing history, and even motion or direction.”

-Cloud providers as dig data gatherers -

We can reasonably expect that, in a recent future, cloud service providers (like VMware) “will play a key enabling role in nearly every facet of the big data space. First, they will be among the most important collectors of data streams and content. Second, they will be among the most aggressive users of big data systems to run their own businesses. Third, they will also be in a position to enable big data use by technically savvy, but resource constrained, organizations (through simple, temporary provisioning of large compute and data pools). [Moreover] cloud-based big data platforms will make it practical for smaller engineering and architectural firms to access massive compute resources for short, semi-predictable time periods without having to build their own big data farms” (Gantz & Reinsel, 2011).
Case study on Big Data use for political and story-telling issues:

Obama’s 2012 Presidential re-election Campaign

Reconstruction through excerpts from the following Web-pages:

http://digitalcommunity.mit.edu/community/featured_content/big-data/blog/2013/12/16/analytics-at-work-a-political-case-study

In 2012, “the Obama campaign was about creating an analytics culture so that everyone—from tens of thousands of field workers to more than 100 data analytics experts—collected data, measured outcomes and refined marketing, communications and fundraising programs to achieve results”. (Goldberg, 2013) Analytic experts “were divided into two primary groups: techs who ran tests and developed algorithms for the data analysis, and problem solvers who worked with those in the field—media, finance and communications, for example—to make the data actionable for those in charge of the campaign” (Klein, 2013). “Megafile [Big Data] didn't just tell the campaign how to find voters and get their attention; it also allowed the number crunchers to run tests predicting which types of people would be persuaded by certain kinds of appeals. Call lists in field offices, for instance, didn't just list names and numbers; they also ranked names in order of their persuadability, with the campaign's most important priorities first. About 75% of the determining factors were basics like age, sex, race, neighborhood and voting record. Consumer data about voters helped round out the picture.” (Scherer, 2012) The new “It wasn't only the size of the data that helped President Obama win; it was the accuracy and strength of the analysis and the superior skills of the strategists. (Baker, 2014)
A case study on Dig Data use for Governance issues: Citizens’ security


<<The PredPol is a Big Data elaboration system on criminal activity, developed by a team of PhD mathematicians and social scientists at UCLA, Santa Clara University, and UC Irvine. The mission of PredPol is simple: place officers at the right time and location to give them the best chance of preventing crime. To accomplish this, PredPol incessantly processes crime data in order to:

- Assign probabilities of future crime events to regions of space and time;
- Present estimated crime risk in a useable framework to law enforcement decision makers;
- Lead to more efficient & more accurate resource deployment by local law enforcement agencies;

In contrast to technology that simply maps past crime data, PredPol applies advanced mathematics and adaptive computer learning. Based on models for predicting aftershocks from earthquakes, PredPol forecasts highest risk times and places for future crimes. It has resulted in predictions twice as accurate as those made through existing best practices by building on the knowledge and experience that already exists. The program complements officers’ intuition by targeting place-based prediction “boxes” as small as 500 by 500 feet. When PredPol has been used by Los Angeles’ Foothill Division, crimes were down 13% in the 4 following months, compared to an increase of 0.4% in the rest of the city.>> At this point one could/should ask, did crime dissolve from Foothill or did it simply change district?
3.4. The governance influencers of the digital era

To begin this final section, it's worth remembering that, through this whole work we have argued that governance decision-making is rarely carried out by - perfectly isolated and personal-interests detached- institutionally legitimized public officers, which utopically act for the well-being of society as a whole. On the other hand, we have shown that governance decision-making process is an intricate phenomenon originated through a networked interaction within complex networks and environments -made of agents, relational structures, organizational rules/codes, artifacts, information/knowledge, beliefs and interests-. Hence, the before alleged, online governance process connective complexity, appears more clearly from our influencing perspective which emphasis on networked social interaction, and, which examines the properties of a governance system as collective/network patterns emerging from the links between, and relative positioning of, the single elements/agents forming those systems, but not reducible to the proprieties of single elements/agents: “It is the kind of relationship that links the elements of the system to one another that shapes their
behavior, and it is the changes in such relationships that cause the system to evolve. The hallmark of this kind of complexity is the emphasis on forces that act to maintain the order of the system and on countervailing forces that drive it towards disorder. The struggle between the two generates novel elemental kinds and relations, and leads to the disappearance of other structures” (Fontana, 2009).

Social contagion theory, a branch of social network research, has suggested, and partially demonstrated through case-studies, that human behavioral patterns, beliefs, ideas, awareness and trust/reliance circulate in social systems through face-to-face interactions. However, until very recent times, we could not tell if this social contagion phenomenon could also happen in online social networks (with the same or different mechanisms); however, the results of a recent study would make opt for this hypothesis: “During the 2010 US congressional elections a political mobilization message was delivered to 61 million Facebook users. [...] The results showed that the messages directly influenced political self-expression, information seeking and real-world voting behaviour of millions of people. Furthermore, the messages not only influenced
the users who received them but also the users’ friends, and friends of friends. The effect of social transmission on real-world voting was greater than the direct effect of the messages themselves, and nearly all the transmission occurred between ‘close friends’ who were more likely to have a face-to-face relationship. These results suggest that strong ties are instrumental for spreading both online and real-world behaviour in human social networks” (Bond, et al., 2012).

In online networks agents tend to interact more intensively, and collaborate more spontaneously and pacifically, with agents similar to them (generally the similarity is assessed under a mix of social and personal ascription of traits, morals and roles). We word “homophily expresses the degree to which individuals interact based on similar characteristics and attitudes. This similarity or dissimilarity can either lead to segregation or differentiation between individuals and has been found to be related to network closeness or network distance – expressed as the number of relationships through which a piece of information must travel to connect two individuals. The network structure and opportunities embedded in the structure have an influence on the outcome of social processes: the probability of a newly established or existing tie is higher among individuals who are similar to each other or homophilous” (Mergel, Huerta, & van Stelle, 2005).
A case study on: *Homophily in the Digital World*

Reconstruction through excerpts from Lauw & all. (2010):


<<The case study looks at two central questions regarding homophily in the digital world:
1) Are two users more likely to be friends if they share common interests?
2) Are two users more likely to share common interests if they’re friends?

To answer these questions, we analyzed numerous User Info pages collected from Live-Journal (www.livejournal.com), a popular blogging and social networking platform. Live-Journal users identify each other as friends and express their interests in two ways. […]

First, each user has a list of self-proclaimed interests on his or her User Info page. Second, users can subscribe to communities or group blogs oriented around a given topic. This presence of friendship links and expression of interests makes Live-Journal an appropriate experimental vehicle to investigate the questions we’re asking. Moreover, because we observed that some users have several friends and interests, whereas others have few, we conducted our study across groups with varying involvement levels. The data we use in this study consists of Live-Journal users’ lists of friends, interests, and communities as specified on their User Info pages. […]

This study of homophily using LiveJournal data shows that online “friendship” and interests are strongly interlinked; having even a few common interests makes friendship significantly more likely. Equally important, being friends also makes a pair of users more likely to share common interests. It would be interesting to conduct a similar study on other social networks, such as Orkut or Facebook, assuming available data. Doing so would not only let us see how generally our conclusions hold in the digital world but would also enable a study of structural differences between the networks and how those might affect the role of interests in friendship.>>
Hence, meanwhile information creation and knowledge deliberation processes -in all fields of knowledge- were moving online, people and organization started systematically undertaking homophile wide-reaching searches for identifying actual or potential partnering peer influencers, that could prospectively become useful cooperators/facilitators/sustainers of ones objectives; i.e. individuals, organization highly interconnected within/between groups (cluster composed by both individuals and organizations), socio-politically active for related, morally and culturally compatible purposes or common-interests. These sustainers/facilitators might also be physically located on other geographical side of the world. However, a heavily discriminating factor for their selection as potential partners is the concrete possibility of using these relations to access new information, knowledge and contacts through this cooperation. Ideally, homophilously selected influencers should be willing and able to pursue the influencing activities of their network partners with the utmost involvement and effort, for exploiting all opportunities for succeeding in these collective-actions; undertaken through both online and offline communication channels, for the achievement of shared purposes/interests.

Case study on online group interaction influencing mechanisms:

“Normative and Informational Influences in Online Political Discussions”

Price & all. (2006)

http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1099&context=asc_papers
The publicness of preferences, ideas and opinions in our “Netpolitiks” (Bollier, 2003), encourages, by means of positive social capital incentives, more skilled individuals to openly and selectively govern online information flows that would help them the most to build and improve their relational positioning within their socio-political community, groups, clubs and with other individuals/organizations with whom they want to tighten a social relation, creating and accumulating by those means new social capital, that could be in future spent (exchanged for informative, support favors) in the same way that nowadays we spend money for goods. As a result, “there is a sense that the old (political) rules do not apply anymore. This is a period of blurring borders, flattening hierarchies, and heightened ambiguity. Those who are competitors and enemies one day are collaborators and allies the next. Those who stand alone, no matter what their strength, find even the smallest networks in opposition to be daunting. Something is different: the emergence, significance, and importance of the network structure within a world of complexity. The life form and organizational structure that is most in evidence in this new world of ideas and media is the network—social networks, electronic networks, media networks, to name a few” (Bollier, 2003).
Perspective: Do individuals become influencers because widely considered “ideal online peers” from a political hemophilia point of view?

Reconstruction through excerpts from Huber & all. (2013):

<< 1) Individuals seek out relationship partners who share their political identities and degree of engagement with politics, and that this preference for political homophily can be distinguished from either induced or conversion homophily, as well as simply sorting on other factors that are correlated with shared political characteristics.

2) People react more positively to ideologically congruent profiles as well as to those that exhibit similar levels of political interest. Shared political preferences precede relationship formation rather than follow from it.

3) Shared political beliefs are not a consequence of those relationships or induced by the range of available partners. Instead, a preference for political homophily explains which social relationships form. […]

4) Social environments’ individuals are not haphazard and are instead inclined toward shared political characteristics. […] People do seem to construct their social lives around politics, and such sorting appears to be more than the result of selecting on common and publically revealed demographic and social characteristics.

5) The above cited findings may help explain the polarization and increased homogenization of political beliefs within social networks.>>
-Assessing the online influencing power determined by the structural positioning of agents in online socio-political information flow networks-

To assess at which scale (influencing magnitude) an agent can propagate to other online agents trustable information we need to recognize how people behave and interact within the “internet community”. Mapping the online peer neighbors (direct strong ties of an agent) is the first thing to do when evaluating online influence, this because peer neighbors are crucial to maximize the initial diffusion of an online information desired outcome, whether to reach audiences, engage for the first time or deepen an existing relationship.

Three categories of relational-structure (online networking social architecture) originated influencing roles can generally be distinguished:

- **Bridge Influencers**: tie together two or more -otherwise separated, distant or poorly connected- online clusters of agents (intensively interacting social groups). They can be recognize by the intensiveness by with which they are brought into play to pass information between members of distinct cluster, these agents can have a relatively low number of direct connections but these connections are key (because intensively exploited) to chain information between distinct or poorly connected online clusters. Bridge Influencers are therefore extremely significant for the determination of the potential diffusion range of information cascades. Moreover, bridges influencers can chose which information convey from a cluster to another,
and, which filter, distort or block. Hence they have a great selective/intermediating power by being boundary members of various online clusters.

- **Central influencers:** are positioned at the core of communities, they are central information Hubs, they possess the highest number of connections within a single cluster. Their long-standing centrality in local information flows confers them legitimation and reliability. They are considered within their cluster socio-political information references, and therefore they are often attributed the role of symbols for collective socio-political identification and representation, they have countless followers but many of these lasts may have very low socio-political engagement levels.

- **Peripheral influencers:** are online deliberation listeners, information interpreters, typically connected to numerous peers on the outer reaches of a cluster, in terms of information production and intermediation activity (received and redirected). While from the point of view of their informative output they tend to be quite passive they are nevertheless in a key position to interpret the diverse trends and collective patterns happening within the cluster thanks to their peripheral position that makes them sensible to new and borderline information which is generally marginalized by central influencers and information consumers.
-When online influence goes beyond the strategic positioning on social networks-

However, these structural properties of online networks which give to agents in specific positions particular intermediating powers on online information flows, are only influence enabling or empowering factors. But, almost never, these lasts become the primary source of the influencing power and recognition of a social-role of political guidance through the control and strategic intermediation of information flows (through the collection, selection, distribution, transmission, interpretation, story-telling, sensibilization to/of specific information). This because few online influencers are able to build a solid reputation (capacity of being recognized and acknowledged as reliable source of information), only through a silent networking efficiency and cogency.

The quintessential online influencer is a captivating and seemingly easy to understand New Media communicator and story-teller of social, political, economic or cultural issues, capable of persuading and inspiring online masses through the selective and creative use of information and knowledge; able to convince the most skeptical of his peers that he assesses and refers of what/whom he comes to know with impartiality (and interest-independence) to his public. He must seem like an honest social-reality chronicler and renderer, with a sharable morality and passion for the themes treated. But this does not mean that concretely he will not use his influencing power and role for manipulating online information and ensuing awareness flows for his own, or his mandator’s purposes.
Influencers are experienced, attentive observers, adept with praises and blames, able to discern the emotions, morals and interests of their peers and ad-hoc shape their messages to the specific issue, form receptivity and responsiveness of their interlocutors. On the strength of these talents, they enjoy the popularity of a successful general without having mastered the art of politics. They have mastered a different art, a certain way of communicating to their fellows. [...] They exchange information to make people reach their own conclusions, both rational and emotional. It is one who knows how to use his relationships and knowledge as a means of influence and a technique of information/knowledge mediated power. Hence, the creativity of socio-political influencers stands on their ability in connecting specific persons to selected informational content.

-The difference between media visibility and online information flow influencing roles-

If in on one hand, never before in Human History participating and deliberating to/on governance processes/issues, in the broadest sense of the term, appears to be an easily reachable achievement for ordinary citizens, through mass and new medias. On the other hand, the worldwide diffusion of multinational and multimedia information providing companies, as privileged information and popular knowledge disseminating tool, rendered in most cases the influencing power obtained through these ICTs extremely volatile, because subject to the Media company information prioritizing, filtering and content control.
As a result, many -but not all- contemporary influencers risk to raise and fall from dawn to dusk. To confirm the above-mentioned trend, it is sufficient to look to the stories of many of the activists from the Arab Springs, which by posting political messages and revolutionary slogans on social networks, apparently pushed people to gather in the streets to demonstrate (NewsGroup, 2011); by doing so they emerged, on worldwide mass medias, as the new leaders of the XXIst century revolutions.

Unfortunately, for most of them, the diffusion of their content, that led them their influencing-role, was actually based on the intervention of “influential” Mass and New Media content intermediaries and TV providers, which undertook an information disseminating and promoting process on the behalf of these “revolutionaries”, this wide-ranging media support lasted for few days in which the social rumor was in the top News of the day/week, and highlighted for its actuality and novelty; but it was then left behind as all news by medias, making these individuals fall back into the Media oblivion.

The problem was that these individuals weren’t influencers even though the

A social media analysis of the Arab spring influencers:

“False Promises? The Social Media and Arab Political Change”

Gonzalez-Quijano (2011)

THE INFLUENCERS

informational content they provided was for a certain time influential. These information cascades is not made by a cascade that started the followers of the weren’t their but the ones of the the broadcasting company. This provisional nature of content-based fame, and, ensuing temporariness of media visibility is mainly due to the extreme fluidity and fragmentation in the production and consumption of informative content, and, to the fragmented creation of socio-political consent, both through Mass and New Medias, which sometimes generate temporary, sudden and unforeseeable information cascade processes which auto-dissolve even more rapidly than they appear.

Since information network mechanisms are very complex, most people are unable to replicate the information cascade influencing process, from the situation, positioning that once led them to, a willed or unwilled, success. If the diffused feeling about these fleeting moments of success and celebrity are for some aspects very similar to those of winning a gamble or a lottery, however, their causing mechanisms are very different.

Because, as we have seen, there is almost no randomness in being an influencer, and, even less in maintaining in the long-run such a social-role. Yet most people are unable to understand the recurrent mechanisms of influencing structures and information network patterns; which determine the recurrent possibility of achieving an influencing process; accordingly, knowledge about these social mechanisms can be used to increase the probability of being successful, by who understands and implements them.
To conclude, we desire to point out some recent findings (made by a research conducted by the Princeton Survey Research International) that argue that in the U.S. the involvement in online participatory and deliberative initiatives is positively correlated with income and education. Hence online civic and political engagement, apparently, “is not changing the fundamental socio-economic character of civic engagement in America. When it comes to online activities such as contributing money, contacting a government official or signing an online petition, the wealthy and well-educated continue to lead the way. Still, there are hints that the new forms of civic engagement anchored in blogs and social networking sites could alter long-standing patterns. Some 19% of internet users have posted material online about political or social issues or used a social networking site for some form of civic or political engagement. And this group of activists is disproportionately young” (Smith, 2009).
Final remarks

In this work we have revealed that contemporary participatory and deliberative governance and management instruments, both online and offline, are in many ways a conceptual and cultural/ideological reframing of pre-existing mechanisms for coordinating collective action and influencing policy and law making processes (like corporatist tripartitism and syndicalist social-myths). We have also seen that the major aim of organized interest-groups’ collective actions, through advocacy, lobbying, technical advising, interest intermediation and deliberation initiatives, is for the construction, the seeking, the sitting or the abolition of rent position, which can be both natural or artificial (originated by law, policy institutions, culture, science, relational networks and artifacts).

We have seen that influence can be considered a way of exerting a non-coercive control –generally mediated by a knowledgeable and trusted information intermediation role within a social network (online or offline)- which stimulates the adoption of a particular way of thinking and acting in a decision-making processes, without being necessarily in charge of those who follow (citizens, corporates’ employees/employers and interest-groups, unions or associations formed by the aforementioned or other groups of individuals and organizations), and, without being accountable for the decisions of those who head (public officials, elected representatives, administrators and executives), which still have the ultimate choice-responsibility vis-à-vis the legitimate policy stakeholders.
(citizens or others). We have also revealed, through several case-studies, how contemporary influencers (individuals or organized groups) are able to enter participative governance institutions’ decision making processes from the “side door”, as advisors, coordinators, mediators, interest-group representatives and spokespersons; generally, without any direct and officially recognized accountability and responsibility towards their contribution in the policy outcomes.

We have examined, by what means, contemporary influencers have emerged as outsized information hubs within research, business and governance networks; we have recognized how they acquire and use their knowledge about individual’s and groups’ opinions and tendencies, to become excellent persuading, lobbying, story-telling actors, inventors and promoters of social myths, vis-à-vis the citizens; but also, vis-à-vis the administrators, the bureaucrats and other technicians that operate within private and public governance institutions and administration systems, who often lack direct contact-with/investiture-from the people. Finally, in chapter 3 we have been able to point out why, and in which measure, the online influencing phenomenon, is a conceptual adaptation of old “corporatist” influencing processes, to the new ICT social artifacts. Like in many other conceptual bubble cases, the suggestion of sudden newness is aimed to draw the attention of potential investors, from the political, academic and business environment, or, to reformulate the corporatist model, to use some of its interest representation mechanisms, in a culturally and ideologically acceptable way,
because our advanced capitalist democratic society, is imbued of individualist, anti-centralist values, but still, the social-myths of mass participation and open governance are flourishing.

We would henceforward like to introduce, and relate to our work, a famous quote by M. Gandhi, which says: “be the change that you wish to see in the world”. This saying appears to be a virtuous incarnation of the commonly recognized features and values of participative democracy and management, as social-myths that push for the empowerment of the masses through the participation to governance decision-making processes, this myth of equitable empowerment via participation has been recently put on display in almost all spheres of social life, from work activity to civic engagement. However, at a closer look, within Gandhi’s aphorism are implicitly contained some extropian principles. That are nowadays so widespread (maybe because assimilated through education) that they have become collective beliefs and socially-required traitsthe individualistic and the eccentric need of self-determination and standing-out from the multitudes conveyed through the “be”; the stereotyped positivist vision implied in the specific use of the word “change”; the utopist belief that personal “wishes” are abstract visions implementable to our social and material realities; the boundless ambition of individuals of extending the implementing of their “wish” not only to their surrounding environment but to the whole world, and hence to all Humanity.
In my opinion the above described traits and beliefs are modeling our contemporary Human world. Hence, the above mentioned aphorism could be considered a summarizing maxim on the socio-political magnitude of the contemporary governance influencing philosophy and associated phenomenon. According to the author, in recent times, this myth of empowerment through participation has been used to convey socio-political and academic forces towards a structural (in many aspects techno-functionalist) reframing and reshaping of our governance institutions and influencing power mechanisms, despite peoples’ blameless wish of building inclusive and equitable governance processes, in my opinion, the participative decision-making phenomenon has been used to mask and pass unobserved some monocratic tendencies of governing through technical advising and scientized and mediatized knowledge, especially in the economic, financial and monetary fields of public governance and policy making. Additionally, it appears from our analysis that most influencers are not simply aiming to “be the change that they wish to see in the world”, they also want other people to embrace and cognitively absorb their emotional and moral “vision of things” and become instruments of collective action, which influencers suggest and initiate. Influencers somehow are, or at least pretend to be, social senses and instruments of common awareness of the people; to which is due the collective intelligence that guides the organizational and behavioral group-patterns which apparently “spontaneously” emerge within human societies. Accordingly, for the greatness of their aspirations influencers are more than opinion leaders or trend setters.
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