

Biopolitics and Territoriality in The Old City of Jerusalem.

Materials for an analysis of the device.

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Introductory overview in Italian

La tesi '*Biopolitics and Territoriality in the Old City of Jerusalem. Materials for an analysis of the device*' è una tesi di ricerca sul campo nata dall'intenzione di rintracciare gli elementi necessari per analizzare la Città Vecchia di Gerusalemme come *dispositivo biopolitico*. Per fare ciò, è stato necessario prendere in considerazione la nozione di *dispositivo* sia da un punto di vista teorico che da un punto di vista prettamente politico. L'obiettivo è stato quello di costruire un apparato teorico attraverso cui leggere i dati raccolti sul campo. La griglia per riconoscere teoricamente il dispositivo è stata fornita da alcune nozioni fondamentali: quella di territorialità, quale utilizzata nella geografia politica di R.D. Sack; quella di governamentalità, così come indicata da M. Foucault durante le lezioni al *Collège de France* negli anni '70; quella di sicurezza, e nello specifico di sicurezza urbana e controllo, derivante dai due concetti precedenti. Lo studio, di natura multidisciplinare, è stato portato avanti seguendo due assi parallelamente: da un lato lo studio del dispositivo biopolitico e dall'altro il caso specifico delle relazioni di potere attive nella Città Vecchia di Gerusalemme. La ricerca sul campo si è svolta durante i mesi di Gennaio e Giugno 2012 presso il CNRS *Centre de Recherche Français de Jérusalem* e i primi risultati della ricerca sono confluiti in un *paper* all'interno del quale già si delineava lo scheletro del lavoro di tesi e la ricerca di metodologie complementari al testo scritto utili alla rappresentazione del dispositivo.

Nel primo capitolo dell'elaborato viene presentata la nozione di territorialità. La territorialità risulta essere un processo specifico strategico, all'interno del quale le relazioni di potere ricoprono una parte integrante. La territorialità, nella formula di Sack, è la base del potere. La territorialità è il tentativo da parte di un gruppo di individui di influenzare e controllare le persone, i fenomeni e le relazioni in una determinata porzioni spaziale su cui si esercita il controllo. E' propria della territorialità la caratteristica di includere persone e cose escludendone al tempo stesso altre. L'esclusione e l'inclusione, insite al concetto di territorialità, dimostrano quanto essa sia una costruzione socio-politica derivata da obiettivi strategici umani. Nel caso specifico, è quindi presentata la struttura territoriale della Città Vecchia e la sua configurazione sociale e urbanistica, attraverso la classica divisione per quartieri e una prima presentazione delle mappe autoprodotte. L'analisi del campo da un punto di vista socio-urbanistico fornisce i primi elementi attraverso cui la territorialità si realizza per entrambe le parti: amministrazione e gestione dello spazio urbano, politica e previsioni demografiche, sviluppo e costruzione di narrative identitarie (la giudaizzazione della città vecchia e l'uso della storia per fini strategici così come lo sviluppo dell'ethos musulmano e la *rootedness* palestinese). Considerate l'analisi e la previsione demografica quali strumenti alla base delle scelte politiche israeliane, una parte a sé è dedicata alla questione demografica. Se la politica dell'*establishment* israeliano, infatti, mira ad avere il minor numero possibile di palestinesi che vivano in Israele e a concentrarli in aree ben definite decise dallo stesso establishment, nella Città Vecchia tale processo avviene attraverso l'acquisizione di proprietà da parte di Israele nei quartieri cristiano e musulmano e attraverso il tentativo di riduzione del numero di abitanti palestinesi.

Il secondo capitolo prende le mosse dal concetto di governamentalità intesa come politiche e pratiche di governo, mirate ad un fine strategico, attraverso le quali i soggetti sono disciplinati dal potere che detiene il controllo sul territorio dato. In questa prospettiva sono analizzati il sistema della sicurezza urbana e del controllo israeliano nei quartieri della Città Vecchia. Sono presi in considerazione i metodi concreti attraverso i quali tale governamentalità si realizza, tra cui l'acquisizione di proprietà da parte delle associazioni di settlers, insieme alle metodologie in cui tale acquisizione avviene, e il processo di *zoning* e divisione urbana *top-down* attraverso il quale l'uso delle aree del territorio è determinato da chi detiene il controllo sullo stesso. Viene presentata un'ulteriore mappa autoprodotta raffigurante il sistema di telesorveglianza, la presenza di settlers, i checkpoint temporanei e le conseguenti zone di frizione. L'analisi del sistema di controllo apre le porte alla seconda parte del capitolo dedicata ad una descrizione del concetto di dispositivo e di biopolitica, questioni chiave nel dibattito della filosofia politica dagli anni '70 in poi. Il bio-potere è il potere che chi detiene il controllo può esercitare sulla vita degli individui disciplinati dalle pratiche strategico-governamentali. Con la biopolitica, il controllo della libertà e della vita degli individui si trasforma in un affare politico. Nel momento in cui il potere inizia a garantire la vita e la sicurezza del cittadino -momento individuabile nel passaggio hobbesiano dal diritto di morte al diritto alla vita/sicurezza-, il potere inizia anche ad influenzare definitivamente la vita e la libertà del cittadino stesso. Il dispositivo biopolitico è dato da territorialità, governamentalità e urgenza di sicurezza. La Città Vecchia di Gerusalemme è un dispositivo biopolitico nella misura in cui in essa si materializzano strategie governamentali che creano relazioni di potere mirate a direzionare, bloccare, stabilizzare ed utilizzare le formazioni sociali e territoriali.

Il terzo capitolo è stato pensato come un capitolo di passaggio, riguardante la storia dei negoziati di pace negli ultimi venti anni. Tale capitolo è servito sia per inserire la questione della Città Vecchia all'interno del macro-conflitto, sia per fornire una cerniera utile per approdare alla descrizione dei possibili scenari per il futuro della Città Vecchia descritti nella prima parte del quarto capitolo attraverso le ipotesi presentate dal *Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies* e dall'*International Peace and Cooperation Centre*. Tra quelle presentate, l'ipotesi a mio parere più realizzabile abbraccia la cooperazione e l'integrazione israeliana e palestinese sotto un regime internazionale. Una terza parte risulta infatti essere indispensabile e il coinvolgimento internazionale sarà una componente fondamentale nel futuro della Città Vecchia, mediando le istanze e i timori di entrambe le parti. L'Intervento internazionale non garantirà l'efficace attuazione di un accordo ma essa sarà solo uno dei fattori che influenzeranno l'attuazione. La forza internazionale dovrà avere anche funzioni aggiuntive, come la riabilitazione d'istituzioni pubbliche e l'equo controllo del sistema di sicurezza di entrambe le parti. Entrambe le parti dovranno accettare che un intervento internazionale limiterà necessariamente la libertà di azione che esse hanno nel giocare le loro politiche nella Città Vecchia. Le parti dovranno accettare, in vista di un risultato soddisfacente per entrambe, che le logiche dell'attuale dispositivo biopolitico non possono contribuire a nessun accordo.

Se è vero che rappresentare il dispositivo vuol dire, per dirla con Foucault, "prendere sul serio" le logiche di potere operanti così da non scambiare queste come qualcosa di dato e di casuale e così da fornire, piuttosto, valide alternative alle stesse, il capitolo conclusivo è animato dalla riflessione metodologica utilizzata sul campo per raffigurare le conformazioni biopolitiche del territorio. La creazione delle mappe

artigianali è nata da questa domanda ed è parte integrante del lavoro di ricerca. La psicogeografia conoscitiva è stata utile, non solo come metodologia di lavoro, ma anche come strumento personale per esorcizzare le dinamiche quotidiane del campo (affermando così la propria istanza 'soggettuale' davanti al biopotere). Da qui il desiderio di produrre il materiale in maniera artigianale e materica. Nel quarto capitolo sono presentate la ricerca sul campo e l'indagine dello spazio urbano attraverso il metodo psicogeografico. La convinzione che l'accessibilità pubblica dei dati contribuisse a "prendere sul serio" il dispositivo ha poi suggerito l'idea di costruire la piattaforma online, pubblicamente consultabile sul sito www.emiliomaroscia.com. Ho avvertito che il tradizionale strumento del testo scritto non era, nel mio caso, sufficiente per raffigurare la multi-linearità di fronte alla quale mi trovavo. Erano necessari altri strumenti da trattare testualmente che fossero complementari al testo scritto. Raffigurare il dispositivo, attraverso mappe interattive di audio-interviste e lucidi sovrapponibili, significava da un lato riscattare la 'soggettualità' di chi attraversava un territorio eccessivamente territorializzato ed era lì per analizzarlo, dall'altro domandarsi se la conoscenza di questo dispositivo, attraverso una comunicazione dei dati facilitata da più livelli testuali, potesse diventare un'informazione diretta ad un pubblico molto più vasto di quello propriamente rappresentato dall'ambiente di ricerca. La possibilità che il dispositivo venga riconosciuto è ciò che interessa realmente. E' la conoscenza del dispositivo che contribuisce a creare alternative valide al biopotere. Partendo dalla costruzione di una mappa di base, con l'avanzare delle interviste e della raccolta dei dati ho rintracciato e raffigurato cartograficamente i layers utili alla lettura del dispositivo territoriale: divisione per quartieri; percorsi divisi per etnia; zone turistiche e commerciali; sistema di telesorveglianza, presenza di settlers


e conseguenti zone di frizione. A completamento delle mappe, è possibile ascoltare la voce degli intervistati, attraverso ritratti fotografici 'parlanti', con l'indicazione della loro esatta posizione nella mappa. Durante il testo della tesi appositi riquadri inseriti nei paragrafi indicano come seguire il progetto multimediale online per integrare e posizionare nella mappa la porzione di testo che si sta leggendo. L'ultimo paragrafo della tesi è dedicato ad un esempio concreto di rappresentazione di dispositivo biopolitico – quello attivo in Al Wad Steet, nel cuore del quartiere musulmano - attraverso l'utilizzo del materiale fornito (mappe online, audiointerviste e testo). Da tale esempio è possibile prendere conoscenza del processo di colonizzazione israeliano attivo nel quartiere musulmano, delle metodologie con le quali tale processo si sta compiendo e degli attori principali di tale processo.

La conclusione dell'elaborato verte ancora su due linee parallele: da un lato l'ipotesi che la metodologia utilizzata sia uno strumento utile per la raffigurazione dei dispositivi biopolitici e per la conoscenza degli stessi (conoscerli vuol dire opporre il potere individuale al biopotere del dispositivo); dall'altro l'ipotesi che analizzare la Città Vecchia di Gerusalemme con lo schema del dispositivo biopolitico sia una delle lenti valide possibili attraverso cui approcciare allo studio socio-territoriale del conflitto.



Antoine is the child from my courtyard. He has never seen a mountain. He told me in Arabic, so I do not know if I understood it correctly. He has never been up one. Yet, he draws a mountain in each of his pictures: one as green as his grandma's lace robe, or as brown as the strip of ground between the counters and the door. We live in one of the last houses in the alley with the churches. Sometimes, at night, we do not close the doors, and in the morning you are woken up by the sound of bread, the angry old man, or the gas cart. I laugh, and I dash into the courtyard. Antoine laughs too. He asks me again to spin him like a spinning top. My head spins as we go round. I like it. My ancestors may have belonged to a tribe of nomadic Albanians, and when I turn to make him spin like a top, I can see them in the lands of Melfi, setting up their tents. The kids are playing. The women are preening themselves. Over the fantastic spaces, still with nothing made of them, a giant sun draws shadows that inspire talk of music and revelry. Then comes the evening, in summer. The night also comes here, and sometimes it rains at night. Aircraft and patrols occasionally cut through the silence. At the Institute, I met a woman dressed in a fard wearing French perfume. Sometimes she wears an amulet around her neck. She was a dancer in Paris, and says that the mountains are monotonous. I said that if you vanish into the mountains, you do not hurt anyone, and you can leave the countries behind and listen to the thrusts. I look. I am barefoot. I imagine the hard, brown prehensile feet of the Bedouin I met in the Sinai when I went there to renew my visa. I have to go back there again because of problems with it. Last night I had some pureed chickpea soup that Hirab offered me under the Damascus Gate. Hirab also removed his shoes, which looked to me like pieces of an abandoned boat on the ground, as if it were a beach. I wanted to give him a hammock. His mother looks like a rock. She doesn't go down to the street any more. Only sometimes, invoking Allah, does she face it, when it is already night, and there is not a soul to be seen. His mother has always been an Arab and has always lived in the old city. Now they have mounted the Israeli flag on a high window. She pretends it is nothing, but her eyes are lifeless. I saw poppies and a field of garlic in the midst of people. A dream in broad daylight. An enchantment.

*To the infinite capacity of man to obey,
to the infinite capacity of man to rebel.*



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Tesi di Laurea

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INTRODUCTION: THE RULES OF THE GAME

The aim of this dissertation is to locate and provide tools to analyse the territory of Jerusalem's Old City as a device, a set of knowledge and techniques for the control and construction of the subject ¹. In order to do so, it is important to identify the components that feed the machine and that are fed by the machine ². Subsequently, the idea is to use the nomenclature of the game theory ³. After giving instructions (explanation of the concept of territoriality and descriptive analysis of the field and the narratives of participants), it will be necessary to move on to the treatment of specific strategies through which the power governs the subjects (governmentality), exploiting the real characteristics of the territoriality. At this point, practices will be considered that determine the daily match and that take place on and throughout the territory of the Old City of Jerusalem. Before starting, it should be noted that, as opposed to a place, a territory is the result of a political act to force a sovereign dominion over a given geographical range. This makes each territory a story, and makes every territory human and perishable. It is also useful to keep in mind the English term 'territorialise', which indicates an action and a phenomenon that proceed step by step ⁴. Equally effective is the root of the word 'territory', from the Latin 'terrere' or 'terrorise'. "Territory is a land filled with violence"⁵. Each micro-social or macro-social subject has its own code and its own mythology. The creation of sacred values around places becomes the meaning of the territory. These values are subject to a continuous transformation. The symbols may be continually destroyed and lost. The fear of loss is the

¹ I assume that subjects are determined by the devices in which they are inserted, and, for this reason, it is possible to consider the notion of biopolitics. See: Simon Lemoine, *Le sujet dans les dispositifs de pouvoir*, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2013

² The device can be considered as a machine working for precise purposes. See 2.3.1 of this thesis.

³ The chapters are divided into *Instructions, First and Second Hand*. The idea of this nomenclature has been provided by O.Tourney during our meeting at the CRFJ.

⁴ If the territorialisation indicates an action that proceeds by gradual advancement and the dispositive is a machine with strategic purposes, you could create a link between the territoriality and the device.

⁵ Connolly W., *Tocqueville, Territory and Violence* in Spahiro M. and Alker H., *Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996, p.41

will to territoriality. The first objective of territoriality is to build a space with boundaries over which control is exercised in order to reproduce social structures and values shared by the power-agents. The history of the symbology of a place impacts the history of a territory and the motivations of the control. In that dispute, sovereignty requires a continual (re)affirmation of control. I will re-trace the controlling practices operating in the Old City to consider urban safety as a biopolitical device or, in other words, as an instrument for governing urban populations. The box of tools to assemble and disassemble the device theoretically will be provided largely by the works of Foucault, and especially those of the seventies⁶. Some data from the Foucauldian results will be taken as given and considered part of a collective intellectual heritage, a starting point from which to move towards the maps to come: power is not monolithic, it is not possessed, it does not start from a point of radiation and expand over its subjects; power or power relations are, rather, a set of unstable relationships among multiple points that interact and influence each other. The concept of 'device' will then be briefly considered, from a purely philosophical point of view, in order to locate the exact moment when the assumption of life enters the modern political project. The history of the Old City will not, on this occasion, be dealt with, nor will the specifically symbolic value of its religious places, a subject matter examined from various perspectives and in numerous works⁷. Instead, this is an attempt to provide some tools, of

⁶ Foucault M., *Nascita della Biopolitica*. Corso al Collège de France (1978-1979), Feltrinelli Milano, 2006; *Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews & Other Writings*. Random House, London, 2005; *Sicurezza, territorio, popolazione*. Corso al Collège de France (1977-1978), Feltrinelli. Milano, 2006.

⁷ For a historical analysis of Jerusalem: Anati E., *Palestine before the Hebrews; a history from the earliest arrival of man to the conquest of Canaan*, Knopf. New York, 1963; Clifford R.J., *The cosmic Mountain in Canaan and the Old Testament*, Mass Ed. Cambridge, 1984; Armstrong K., *Gerusalemme. Storia di una città tra ebraismo, cristianesimo ed islam*, Mondadori, Milano 1999; Mardam-Bey F., Sanbar E., *Gerusalemme. Il sacro e il politico*, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino 2002; Vecchia Vaglieri L., *L'Islam da Maometto al secolo XVI*, in Pontieri E., *Storia Universale*, Vallardi, Milano 1963; Gil M., *A History of Palestine*, 634 1099, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1992; Mustafa W., *Jerusalem. Population & Urbanization. From 1850-2000*, Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, Jerusalem 2000; Friedland R. Hecht R., *To Rule Jerusalem*,

a sufficient but not exhaustive number, to treat the territory as a device and recognise how it operates.

The first chapter presents the structure of everyday, public, social and institutional life in the two parts of the city. It then focuses on the plight of the Palestinians in terms of the legal and institutional framework. It also provides the basic elements for the theoretical analysis of the term 'territoriality'. Another issue considered in this chapter is the question of demographic. This is a crucial point because the balance of the population corresponds to the actual balance of power. The problem of the demographic balance between the two peoples remains open and is of great political importance ⁸.

The second chapter will examine some theoretical constructs related to the issues in question. The first is the concept of 'governance', investigated by Foucault, meant as the social and cultural effect of processes of political change. From Foucault's perspective, the construct of governance refers to the slide of governmental tasks towards a type of regulation in which the institutional mechanisms no longer have sovereignty. This type of analysis closely touches the problems of the thesis, in particular regarding the status of Jerusalem, the sovereignty of which is contested. As such, the theoretical tools relating to political philosophy will be provided for the analysis of the term 'governmentality'. In the light of Foucault's contribution, the chapter continues by examining the physical structure of the Old City of Jerusalem and its borders, considering them from an objective point of view, but also in terms of a historical development of social, cultural, economic, architectural, and

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996; Elon A., *Jerusalem, city of mirrors*, Little Brown, Boston 1989; Benvenisti M., *Jerusalem. The Torn City*, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 1976.

⁸ I will explain, in the first chapter, how the demographic analysis and forecasting has been certainly an instrument of political and strategic choices of Israel. It can be said that the "population issue" is the desire of the Israeli establishment to have the smallest possible number of Palestinians living in Israel and to concentrate them in well-defined areas decided by the same establishment. See: Della Pergola S., *Israele e Palestina: la forza dei numeri. Il conflitto mediorientale fra demografia e politica*, Il Mulino 2007

geopolitical life. Finally, a space is reserved for the concept of 'biopolitics', which has been a fruitful part of the historical and political debate since the seventies.

The difficult task of hypothesising solutions to the situation that appears to be unsolvable requires a full-bodied investigation of the roots of the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians. The historical themes of Jerusalem and Israel are therefore re-addressed as an introduction to what is to follow, with particular attention given to the macro-conflict aspects and the reasons for them. One of these is territoriality. The spaces of the city are the actual places where otherness, conflict, control and identity materialise. This leads to the need to analyse the territory as a 'control device'. The planning of a possible city must first undergo a new design of these spaces.

The third chapter provides a brief overview of the infinite attempts to conduct peace negotiations during the last twenty years, from the point of view of international relations, and continues by considering the various plans that have been developed with the intention of designing a solution for the geopolitical situation.

The fourth chapter of the work specifically concerns the issue of possible future scenarios for the Old City. A key part of this last chapter is dedicated to the field research.

The fieldwork was conducted between the months of January and June 2012. Geographical and audio evidence was collected with the aim of building an interactive map available online. Psycho-cognitive geography⁹ was used, attempting to reproduce the map electronically so as to

⁹ Psycho-geography, as discussed in the fourth chapter, is a cognitive technique, born out of the artistic avant-garde, which investigates urban space, passing through it on foot and then reproducing it. Over time it has become a trans-disciplinary practice into which are channelled various fields of knowledge focused on an understanding of the territory: sociology, economics, geography, anthropology, urban planning, literature, art, cinema, philosophy and, especially, pedagogy. The scale of the landscape is that where our understanding of reality is developed, in all its complexity and its contradictions. In the specific case of the present research, all the maps of the Old City (division by districts, checkpoints and friction zones, tourist and commercial routes, ethnic itineraries) were produced with the psycho-geographical method. Vazquez

provide the reader with the elements required to participate in field in the most synesthetic manner possible. Own personal maps were designed. Interviews, audio-strings, overlaps with paths, commercial zones, and friction areas were marked by the author.

During the text of the thesis, panels, suggesting possible reading lines to follow in the online project, will be positioned.

In the last paragraph, I will try to demonstrate how you can assemble a biopolitical device through the material provided. I will take into account an exact point of the maps, some interviews and some portions of the text to show how the power relations operating in the territory take the form of a device that can be represented. This would open to the possibility of new research methodologies where it is thus possible to unite map markers *ad infinitum* to hypothesise the lines to come, to map out possible relationships between the elements, saturate the device, and ravel and unravel the coil.

This methodology wants to show how the psychogeographical mapping, along with the research of audio-evidences and overlaps (friction zones and settlers, paths, neighborhoods, tourist areas), can be regarded as textual tools required to represent power relations created by the strategic governance.

D., *Manuale di Psicogeografia*, Nerosubianco Edizioni, Cuneo 2010; Coverley M., *Psychogeography*, Pocket Essentials, London 2006; Janicijevic A., *Psychogeography Now - Window to the Urban Future*, Toronto, June 2008.

Chapter 1
THE OLD CITY: INSTRUCTIONS

1.1 Territoriality and Territorialisation

Territoriality is to be understood in the following pages as the organisation of people and things in various areas defined by borders. Before proceeding with a specific analysis of the territory in question, some theoretical tools are provided that might be necessary to analyse the Old City from the perspective of a territorial analysis. Man divides the Earth into various units for an essentially political reason. The logic of the division, instrumental to the creation of the territory, inevitably produces a state of conflict. Various territorial units are autonomous units. Each unit is inserted in turn into another political sphere. R. Sack emphasizes the three dynamics that mark the transition from territorial conception of the pre-modern era to the modern. The first is the decrease in the number of autonomous territorial units; the second is the increase in the size of those that can be considered autonomous; and the third is the increase in the fragmentation of these territorial units through new processes of bureaucratisation inscribed in the birth of the modern State¹⁰. In the words of Sack:

*"territoriality is the attempt by an individual or a group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena and relationship by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area, called territory"*¹¹

I consider the use of the verb 'to attempt' to indicate that the process of regionalisation is attempting to achieve an extremely significant mission. Equally important are the verbs 'to affect' and 'to influence' to indicate the explicit and implicit sense of action of government. The territoriality is therefore a practice, a strategy, a process that aims to achieve an overall

¹⁰ Sack R., *Human Territoriality. Its Theory and History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p.52

¹¹ Ibidem, p.19

purpose. Territorialisation is political. Sack tells us that it can take place with variable intensity, taking the intensity of the control as a variable of the function. From this perspective, a maximum-security cell is more territorial than a provincial prison ¹². The variability of the intensity of control generates different levels of territoriality organized hierarchically. These levels of territoriality are placed in

"a dense matrix of multiple overlapping territories and territorial configurations. The meanings of each of these territories (and the power relations that these meanings imply) are established in relation to the order of territories across heterogeneous levels " ¹³

To think about Jerusalem and the current state of the Old City one must take a step further and see how the authority-State emerges from its territorial boundaries. In general, this phenomenon of overflow is connected to the new coordinates of globalisation, for which the characteristics of trespassing lead to a deformation of political geometries. The transformations of the political economy system tend to diminish the importance of static territories through a constant process of deterritorialisation ¹⁴. The actual sovereignty is no longer clearly territorialised. Often the de-territorialisation has a consequent process of re-territorialisation, through which power seeks to re-organise itself. If the territory is dynamic the sovereignty also chases the dynamism of the territory to legitimise the power over its portions again. The new territories are presented as geographic entities whose sovereignty is not clearly defined, in which strategies of territorialisation form part of a

¹² Ibidem, p.20

¹³ Delanay D., *Territoriality, a Short Introduction*, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2005, p.31

¹⁴ Newman D., Newman D., *The resilience of territorial conflict in Khaler M. and Walter B.F., Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.87

system of hegemonising control. These new territories can be defined as vague territories. The term 'vagueness' is used here in the sense proposed by T. Williamson to indicate a geographical entity whose boundaries are clear while the sovereign entity is not clear ¹⁵. The borders are clear but not fixed. The vague territories need to be reinforced and re-territorialised through facts on the ground. According to Sack's formula, those who territorialise are 'individual' or 'collective agents'. The main feature is that the agents have a cultural or identity attachment between them, shared with the territory. This identity attachment can be direct, indirect or constructed performatively. It is through territory that one's identity is confirmed. Amongst the agents of territorialisation, the State is key. It is the State that organises the other agents - the population - through governmentality, which becomes the effective force of the modern state ¹⁶ and guides the subjects of the population towards what is best for itself, i.e. the State. Territoriality is established through the delimitation and monitoring of a geographical area called the territory; the portion of the territory in question must be claimed by individual and collective subjects. The State defines its importance through the characterisation of borders. Territoriality strengthens the boundaries of the subject agent's power and is strengthened by them. The unbreakable bond that is theoretically built passes through the terms territory, territoriality, sovereignty and border (confine). The *confinem* ('cum' together and '*fines*' end, conclusion) is a geographical limit, *de re*, and/or politically established, *de dicto*. The notion of the border automatically creates diversity. The borders are a porous entity starting from Ratzel¹⁷, who, having an organic vision of the State, presents the confines as

¹⁵ Williamson T., *Vagueness*, Routledge, New York, 1994

¹⁶ Foucault M., *Sicurezza, territorio, popolazione*. Corso al Collège de France (1977-1978), Feltrinelli, Bologna, 2006

¹⁷ Ratzel F., *Politische Geographie*, Oldenbourg, 1893

temporary entities that evolve with the growth of the state's wealth. There are borders in a quiet state and confines in a dynamic state. The borders of a quiet state are general confines, where there is a potential possibility of reconfiguration but there are no triggering agents in place. A confine of a dynamic state, however, is a border. The border establishes vague territories where opposing forces actively press against a single point. Border-confines are permitted to (un)define the space of the state's territorial action in order to establish sovereignty. The term 'control' is repeated twice in Sack's formula. Control is the ability to intervene. Territoriality is the means to maintain power relations between power-population and the territory over which it exercises constant control. Since power cannot use direct coercion to gain omnipresent control of each subject and phenomenon, the subjects form institutions and strategies to work around the issue of control. These institutions and strategies are the disciplinary powers described by Foucault. Territoriality is part of the disciplining strategy since it works as a system of population control. Territoriality requires continuous reinforcement and a celebration of the power that it represents. The power over the territory becomes visible and intangible at the same time. At this point I feel it is particularly useful to complete the theoretical framework before we move on to a structural analysis of the subject. Let us return to Sack's text and proceed with what he calls 'tendencies of territoriality', tendencies and effects that help redefine and reinforce the territoriality. The effects are both products and producers of instances of territoriality. First of all Territoriality has a tendency to form classifications by area. The territory classifies what is contained within its boundaries, establishing the extension of a class or category. The second tendency is represented by the possibility of perceiving the territoriality, as on the territory there are elements that communicate its

presence. They can be flags, insignias, checkpoints or monuments. These elements, communicating its presence, strengthen the control. The third tendency is intensified by the power of control over access to area by things and persons contained therein. Territoriality, therefore, has a tendency to decide who and what may or may not enter a given territory. The power is not always visible, but through explicit signifiers it acquires a material reference in the world and becomes perceptible through the territory. The stronger the control, the more it crystallizes into the terrain – think, for example, of the monumentalism of the Fascist era. Territory is also used to shift the focus from the relationship between the controller and the controlled of the territory itself. Land embodies the functions of the controller. The expanse of the territory coincides with the extent of the controlling action. The territory allows control by employing less coercive governing forces and delegating the operation of the control to the strategic nature of the territory. The territory, furthermore, makes relationships impersonal through classification by area. The subject is reconfigured on the basis of a generic identity connected to the territory. The territory creates the idea of socially emptiable places, within which something that should be contained is defined as not present. This process is helped by urban planning strategies that empty or create artificially empty places where, though something is there, its presence is not recorded. Often the strategic establishment of green areas obeys the same logic. Territoriality, moreover, always generates new territorialities. Postmodernists emphasise the sunset of territoriality and the beginning of a post-territorial world. Globalisation seems to have lessened the impenetrability of territories rather than their importance. State territories are still at the heart of global politics. Kahler and Walter show how the mechanisms of globalisation have fundamentally favoured territorialisation processes and have influenced

people to assert their presence on disputed territories¹⁸. With the creation of a new spatiality policy that is less homogeneous and closed, the urgency of multiculturalism and the struggle for the recognition of minorities has become more visible. Sovereign nation-states are not yet an obsolete model but, rather, territories that are increasingly vague and separated. The old city has never been recognised as part of the nation-state. The Old City is, to all intents, an example of a vague territory subject to an ever-greater need for territorialisation on the part of the forces that act on it at the same time.

¹⁸ Kahler M. and Walter B.F., *Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. XI

1.2 Structure of the Field: historic perspective 1948-1967

History tells us that since 1948 Jerusalem was divided sharply into two parts, each of which developed in its own right. This saw the western part being involved in an elaborate process of urbanisation because the city had to become the capital of the new Jewish state. Following the approval of UN Resolution 181, the Jewish Agency had given consent to the international status of the city without a precise recognition of Israeli areas. Ben Gurion had already secretly prepared military plans for the capture of Jerusalem by creating a corridor to the coast¹⁹. There were unofficial agreements between the Jewish Agency, whose political leader was then Golda Meir, and King Abdullah of Jordan to block internationalisation. The Jewish Agency was interested in maintaining control of West Jerusalem to make it the capital of the Jewish state, fearing that maintaining control over the Old City would mean losing control over the western part. Jordan was instead concerned with controlling the Old City to increase its prestige and the legitimacy of its role. On 5 December 1948 Ben Gurion declared Jerusalem part of Israel and, only eight days later, the Knesset designated it as the capital of Israel²⁰. In 1952 the UN General Assembly recognised the authority of Israel and Jordan over the respective territories of the city, setting aside the notion of internationalisation. The need to extend Israeli jurisdiction became obvious and, according to a note from the Minister of Defence, the Knesset approved the *'Area of jurisdiction and Powers Ordinance N. 29, 5708-1948* which states that:

“Any law applying to the whole of the State of Israel shall be deemed to apply to the whole of the area, including both the area of the State of Israel

¹⁹ Gilbert M., *Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century*, John Wiley & Sons, New York 1996

²⁰ Gilbert M., *Jerusalem, rebirth of a City*, Viking Penguin, New York 1985

and any part of Palestine, which the Minister of Defence has defined by proclamation as being held by the Defense Army of Israel”²¹.

At the same time, they enacted laws regarding the abandoned areas²², the safety zones ²³ that enable the confiscation of land and the deportation of their inhabitants for reasons of military security. In addition, they enable the extension of military law in West Jerusalem²⁴ , planning ²⁵ and State property, in order to justify the possession of the territories both inside and outside Israel. According to *State Property Law*,:

“ownerless property situated in Israel is property of the State of Israel as from the day of its becoming ownerless or as from the 6th Iyar, 5708 (15th May, 1948), whichever is the later date [...] Property of the Palestine authorities, situated in Israel, is property of the State of Israel as from the 6th Iyar, 5708 (15th May, 1948)²⁶.

Furthermore, in paragraph 4 it is concluded that:

“The Government may, on behalf of the State, acquire by way of purchase or exchange or in any other manner, hire, take on lease or otherwise acquire rights in, property situated in or out of Israel, on longer available conditions as it may think fit”²⁷.

In the period 1948-1967 the big difference between the two parts was the political path and social unity among the inhabitants. If West Jerusalem

²¹ In *Official Gazette* dated 22.09.1948.

²² *Abandoned Areas Ordinance, N.12, 5708-1948.*

²³ *Defence Emergency Regulation 125-1948.*

²⁴ *Jerusalem Military Government - Validation of Acts - Ordinance. 5709-1949.*

²⁵ *Town Planning Ordinance Law, 5719-1959 and Planning and Building Law, 5272-1965.*

²⁶ *State Property Law 5711-1951.*

²⁷ *State Property Law 5711-1951.*

was struggling to take off as the administrative capital, but not as the symbolic capital, East Jerusalem was never an important political centre for the Jordanian state. Jordan did not help the development of the city, aware that part of the political elite was hostile to the Jordanian occupation. With the aim of weakening the leadership of Jerusalem, led by the family of the Husseini, Jordan supported rival families. On the economic front, the government distributed more resources to the cities of Nablus and Al-Khalil. The Palestinian Waqf and the Islamic Supreme Council represented a problem, being linked to the separatist cause of Palestine. The Jordanian government then appointed a council of the Uleama at the head of both institutions, the Waqf was moved to Amman and the Council was dissolved ²⁸. The Palestinian identity was not represented. In the sixties, the Palestinian National Movement resurfaced, driven by a nation-state ideal. Among the ranks of the movement there appeared personalities such as Yasser Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir, who then founded the Palestinian Liberation Movement in 1964. In East Jerusalem, the Palestinians, and especially the middle-classes, were especially close to Marxist and communist ideologies ²⁹. What interests us from the point of view of territorial analysis is that the political fragmentation - due to the split between the internal resistance and the union of the external forces united under the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation founded in 1964, re-founded in 1969 by Arafat) - prevented the Palestinian component from regaining control of the territory of East Jerusalem. The perspective with which to analyse the western part of the city in the period 1948-1967 however, is certainly the demographic one. The first census ordered by Israel in 1948 recorded 84,000 inhabitants in the city, already increased to 103,000 in 1949 and 197,000 shortly before

²⁸ Benvenisti M., *Jerusalem. The Torn City*, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 1976

²⁹ Pappe I., *A History of Modern Palestine. One Land, Two Peoples*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004

the events of 1967³⁰. The population of West Jerusalem was divided into distinct zones, each of which defined the social status of the families who lived there. West Jerusalem was not a cohesive territory. The least integrated districts were those of the *Haredi*, whose strengths were strong immigration from abroad and a high reproductive rate. In the rest of West Jerusalem there was enthusiasm for the new capital³¹.

In 1967 the city was reunified under the control of Israel and the Palestinians became the minority, such control changing the face of the city, bringing in a state of *de facto* supremacy³². The military power of Israel was politically sanctioned, and the religious read into this a rapprochement with YHWH that allowed them to regain possession of the Holy City³³. For the secular, a united Jerusalem took on a new importance and a new commitment that required an enhancement of territorial strategy and political sovereignty. They needed control of the territory to organise it through the militarisation of borders and defence. Geographical control was also control of the population within the territory and, therefore, demographic control³⁴. Initially, the Israeli political elite seemed to support the idea of peaceful unification with the Arabs. It was the time of the Labour administration of the municipal government with Teddy Kollek³⁵. The Palestinians, disarmed under Jordanian orders, had passively endured the invasion. The Palestinians of Jerusalem were in a triangular trap of external forces: PLO, Jordan and Israel. The Mughrabi quarter was destroyed in order to create a large square in front of the Western Wall. The Israeli state had in mind a non-extensive repressive model based on an effective system of control of the

³⁰ Benvenisti M., *Jerusalem. The Torn City*, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 1976

³¹ Gilbert M., *Jerusalem in The Twentieth Century*, John Wiley & Sons, New York 1996

³² Benigni E. - Marconi M. - Salemi D., *Studi su Gerusalemme, bibliografia ragionata* (Studies on Jerusalem), Ed. La Sapienza, Rome 2011, p. 114.

³³ With this prospect even the Haredi began to establish a dialogue with the army and the political parties.

³⁴ Benvenisti M., *Jerusalem. The Torn City*, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 1976

³⁵ Margalit M., *Discrimination in the heart of the Holy City*, IPCC, Jerusalem 2006; Bollens S., *On Narrow Ground. Urban Policy and Ethnic Conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast*, SUNY, New York 2000.

territory³⁶. This model was originally designed by the Labour Party, who wanted to give control to the military police, activate strict surveillance, and set up markers on the ground. At that point new political parties were born, alongside the classic Labour Zionist parties.

An important party in the ascendant was definitely Likud, which came to power in 1977, led by M. Begin and supported by A. Sharon. The policy of Likud was based on the institution of a *quiet deportation* (raids, arrests, expulsions, restrictions on movement, the slow erosion of people's lives)³⁷. Following the occupation in the Territories, the population in Jerusalem increased. During the seventies and eighties the quality of life in Jerusalem was not improved. Likud had promoted a Reaganite-Thatcherite capitalist model that entailed a Palestinian workforce³⁸. The new conditions contributed to the creation of a democratic movement for independence, inspired by Palestinian nationalism, using *sumud* (abstinence) to undermine the Israeli economy. During this time, soldiers returned to fill the streets of the Old City.

³⁶ Pappe I., A History of Modern Palestine. One Land, Two Peoples, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004

³⁷ B'tselem and HaMoked, *The Quiet Deportation. Revocation of Residency of East Jerusalem Palestinians*, Jerusalem 1997; *The Quiet Deportation Continues. Revocation of Residency and denial of Social Right of East Jerusalem Residents*, Jerusalem 1998

³⁸ Pappe I., A History of Modern Palestine. One Land, Two Peoples, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004

1.3 Structure of the Field: urban fabric

In reality, Jerusalem has been split into two distinct parts and the Palestinians have never accepted the legitimacy of Israeli sovereignty, thus creating a homogeneous *urban fabric*, which was also divided on the fields of daily life, such as housing policies or services provided by the State³⁹. We will see that the layout of the city dates back to the Ottoman period, when in 1542 the town walls were built by Suleiman the Magnificent in defence of the city. In fact, as already mentioned, full Israeli control spread, as seen in the various actions that mobilise all forces to act territorially, by means of certain bureaucratic procedures, military and urban planning ⁴⁰. The basic concept of such transition is found in the so-called “*Law of Return*” adopted in 1950 by the *Knesset* ⁴¹, which allows the Jews to take Israeli citizenship law, extending it also to relatives according to a biological principle ⁴². This benefit, however, was not extended for the Palestinians. The Israeli intention is to gain possession of Palestinian land in the belief of the sovereign and territorial rights Jerusalem imposes on Palestine. In 1967 the process of reunification of the city started, and as stated by Elon:

“Prior to 1967, Israel was a people with too much history and too little geography. After 1967, it was the opposite ... the area did not coincide with that of the historical homeland of the ancient Hebrews, but rather with that of the country of their enemies, the Philistines on the coast, the Edomites of the Negev and the kind of so-called Galilee. The war of 1967 suddenly put the Jews in front of the geography of their ancient history, and the cradle of

³⁹ Marconi M., *Nel groviglio delle etnie* [In the ethnic muddle], in *Geopolitica delle prossime sfide*, a cura di, Lizza G., Utet, Torino 2011, p. 83.

⁴⁰ Haler J., *Obstacles to Peace. A critical re-framing of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict*, The Israeli Committee Against House Demolition (ICAHD), Jerusalem 2005, in <http://icahd.org/eng/publications.asp>.

⁴¹ Israeli parliament.

⁴² The text may be consulted at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1950_1959/Law.

that story was not Tel Aviv, the ultra-modern city on the sea, but the Old City of Jerusalem, in the closed circles of its walls, the place where had raised the ancient temple of the Jews"⁴³.

On June 17, the Israeli government extended its jurisdiction over East Jerusalem, despite warnings from the U.S. and the UK not to include the Old City in this process. On June 27, the *Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment Ranked # 11-B) Law, 5727-1967* was published, according to which: "*The law, jurisdiction and administration of the State, Shall extend to any area of Eretz Israel designated by the Government by order.*" Soon after the release of this ordinance, the reunification of Jerusalem was defined by the *Municipalities Ordinance (Amendment No. 6) Law, 5727-1967*, which states:

"The Minister may, at His discretion and without an inquiry [...] enlarge, by proclamation, the area of a Particular municipality by the inclusion of an area designated by order under section 11B of the Law and Administration Ordinance 5727, 1967".

And on June 28, the municipal boundaries were extended in an area of 72,000 *dunumus* in the east, and the organisation of the administration of certain organs national, municipal services and ministries was transferred ⁴⁴. The international community, not satisfied by this action, called on Israel to withdraw its armed forces however, and Moshe Dayan responded to these pressures by stating that:

⁴³ Elon A., *Gerusalemme città di specchi*, [Jerusalem, city of mirrors] Rizzoli, Milano 2000, p. 125.

⁴⁴ Bovis EH, *La conquista israeliana di Gerusalemme est*, [The Israeli conquest of East Jerusalem] in *La questione di Gerusalemme. Profili storici, giuridici e politici*, a cura di P. Pieraccini, Il Mulino, Bologna 2005, p. 65.

"I said to America that the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations to make us give up Jerusalem as its capital were not enough. You would have to rewrite the Bible and delete three thousand years of our faith, our hopes, our desires and our prayers" ⁴⁵.

The legal validation of this amalgamation was adopted in 1980 with the *Basic Law* according to which: "1) Jerusalem, whole and unified, is the capital of Israel. 2) Jerusalem is the seat of the head of the State, the Knesset, the government and the Supreme Court" ⁴⁶. From this moment, the Israeli government adopted as a political aim the annexation of the whole city, working on the construction of the majority of population in the eastern part⁴⁷. The directives that were given to the committee in charge of setting geographical boundaries had to include "*the maximum of the ground with the minimum of Arab population*"⁴⁸. However, the total exclusion of the Palestinians who were in this area failed, and about 70,000 were in two different areas of the East, which was already populated by 266,300 residents; 197,000 Jews and 68,600 Palestinians⁴⁹. Furthermore, there were the areas that are not favourable to the annexation, for example villages and rural areas of the West Bank. In this area, a territorial process of judaisation was implemented, which was developed through a well-defined strategy that took advantage of the logic of the demographic and urban planning. In this sense, Jewish neighbourhoods were created outside the walls to encircle the Arab part of the city. In the Palestinian neighbourhood, the structure of the

⁴⁵ Dayan M., *Breakthrough. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations*, New York 1981, p. 177.

⁴⁶ Encel F., *Géopolitique de Jérusalem*, Flammarion, Parigi 1998, p. 147.

⁴⁷ Benigni E. - Marconi M. - Salemi D., *Studi su Gerusalemme, bibliografia ragionata* (Studies on Jerusalem), Ed. La Sapienza, Rome 2011, p. 130.

⁴⁸ Legrain JF, *Judaisation et dé embrement: israéliennes politiques du terroire Cisjordanie en-Gaza (1961-1995)*, in *Maghreb-Machreck*, 152 (1996), p. 43.

⁴⁹ Motoli of P. - Pallas F, *Morire per Gerusalemme - Storia delle guerre per la Città Santa dagli inizi del novecento ad oggi*, [Dying for Jerusalem] Datanews, Roma 2004, p. 91.

community sees the *waqf*⁵⁰ as a strong tool of resistance; it, along with the sharia courts, is among one of the most significant religious institutions and consists of inalienable pious rights that, in Islam, are created by individuals or institutions, the proceeds of which are intended for well-defined uses. They cannot only be used to keep hospitals, schools, mosques and markets, but also to help the less fortunate and support those who fight the enemies of the faith. In Jerusalem, since the thirteenth century, more than half of the territory of the Old City was made up of pious groups, and this led to the *waqf*, which administered them, exerting a strong political influence. Over time, the Israeli government, which attempted to gain full control without ever succeeding, resisted the political role of *waqf*. This is because the administration of *waqf* has control of a network of institutions, schools, mosques and hospitals to the point of enjoying significant political and social power⁵¹. The *waqf* has been widely used as a political tool, since the Mandatory period, when, to counter the sale of land to the Zionists and to make them unsaleable, many properties are converted into *waqf*. The *waqf* have grown even more since 1967, and many individuals, based on a clear justification for

⁵⁰ For a bibliography about waqf in Palestine: Abrahamovitch, *The Palestinian Waqf and the Supreme Muslim Council, Palestine and the Near East*, 1937; Anderson J.N.D, *Tge Dismemberment of Awaqf in Early Ninteenth-Century Jerusalem*, *Asian and African Studies*, 1979, 13; Baer G., *Jerusalem's Families of Notables and the Waqf in the Early 19th Century*, in Kushner D., *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period*, Jerusalem, Yad Itzhak Ben Zvi Laieden, E.J.Brill 1986; Barron J.B., *Mohammedan Waqf in Palestine*, Green Convent Press, Jerusalem 1922; Bilge M., *Awaqf of a Madrasa in Jerusalem*, in *Palestine*, vol 1:Jerusalem. Amman, 19-24 April 1980. Amman, University of Jordan, Yarmouk University, 1983; Dumper M., *Forty Years Without slumbering: Waqf Policies and Administration in Ghaza Strip*, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 1993, vol 20, n 2; Dumper M., *Muslim Institutional Development in Jerusalem: The Role of Waqf*, *Journal of Islamic Studies*, vol 2 n 1, 1998; Dumper M., *The Palestinian Muslim Waqf: A Study inTrasformation of a Religious Symbol*, M.Ph.Dissertation, University of Lancaster, UK, 1983; Goadby F.M., *Law and Jurisdiction in Palestine in Matters of Personal Status and Waqf*, *L'Egypte Contemporaine*, Cairo, Egypt 1926, vol 17; Khayat H.A., *Waqf in Palestine and Israel from the Ottoman Reforms to the Present*, PhD Dissertation, American University, Washington, DC, USA, 1962; Layish A., *The Muslim Waqf in Israel*, *Asian and African Studies*, 1966, vol 2; Layish A., *The Muslim Waqf in Jerusalem after 1967: Beneficiaries and Management*, *Le Waqf dans le monde musulman contemporain*, ed Faruk Bilici, Varia Turcica, Istanbul, Institute Francais d'etudes Annotoliennes, 26, 1994; Reiter Y., *The Administration and Supervision of Waqf Properties in 20th Century Jerusalem*, in Asfahani M.M., *Kunuz al Waqf*, Qum, 2002, vol 69.

⁵¹ Manna' A., *The History of Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: A New Reading*, Institute for Palestine Studies, Jerusalem 2003; Gavriely-Nury D., *The Social Construction of "Jerusalem of God" and Irael's Unofficial National Anthem*, in *Israel Studies*, 12, 2 (2007), pp. 104-120; Khamaisi R. and Nasrallah R., *The Jerusalem Urban Fabric*, IPCC, Jerusalem 2003

religious, political and social, register their property as *waqf*, and many public associations are converted into *waqf*. The main reason for this phenomenon can be observed in financial assistance offered to the Palestinians by some Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, aimed at the preservation of Arab-Islamic character of Jerusalem⁵². The Palestinians are ousted from the management and administration of resources and, in this sense, many NGOs on both sides try to develop common platforms and denounce discrimination of City Hall against Palestinian citizens. Discrimination is denounced by The Palestinian Al-Dameer ⁵³, a Palestinian NGO Network with a limited range of power due to the territorial divisions imposed by the Government, and the Israeli Com ir amim ⁵⁴ and Bimkom Planners for Planning Rights, which since 1999 has collaborated with designers and architects to redefine the urban landscape taking into consideration civil rights.

The aim of this NGO is to legalise all the buildings erected without authorisation within the Arab neighbourhoods, and to promote an ever wider citizen participation in the spatial planning process⁵⁵.

We shall see that the Palestinians, to be allowed within the boundaries of Jerusalem, must obtain a permit of permanent residence. They need an identity card known as the Blue ID, which differentiates them from the inhabitants of the West Bank. The permanent residence does not have the characteristics of Israeli citizenship because, while recognising the right to work in Israel, to use the services of the National Insurance Institute and to elect representatives to the town hall, it does not allow participation in elections for the *Knesset*, access to certain public offices

⁵² Reyter Y, *Islamic Institutions in Jerusalem. Palestinian Muslim Organization under Jordanian and Israeli Rule*, London 1997, p.51.

⁵³ <http://englishweb.aldameer.org/>

⁵⁴ <http://eng.ir-amim.org.il/>

⁵⁵ <http://bimkom.org.il/eng/>

and to the army ⁵⁶. Control of the residence permits allows a choice in the inhabitants of Jerusalem, and the law assigning this document is aimed at both reducing the number of Palestinians in the city ⁵⁷ and at controlling them, as permanent residency is not hereditary and can be passed to the children only if certain criteria are met (the law prohibits children, born in the Territories by a parent residing in Jerusalem and the other parent residing elsewhere, from living in Jerusalem. The reunification of a couple, if one is resident and the other not, requires authorisation by the Ministry of the Interior that can be requested only by male residents ⁵⁸). Anyone who is not able to demonstrate with substantial evidence (through property deeds, bills, payment of taxes) of having lived continuously in Jerusalem in the past seven years, and of having the necessary conditions to continue to live there, may have the Blue ID revoked. In this way, the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, as well as native, are treated, in all respects, as foreigners ⁵⁹.

⁵⁶ Cohre - Badil, *Ruling Palestine. A History of the Legally sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of land and Housing in Palestine*, Geneva 2005, p.128.

⁵⁷ Rohuana K. B., *The Reality of Jerusalem's Palestinians Today*, Jerusalem Media & Communication Center. Jerusalem 2001 p.61.

⁵⁸ B'tselem and HaMoked, *The Quiet Deportation. Revocation of Residency of East Jerusalem Palestinians*. Jerusalem, Jerusalem 1997; B'tselem, *Forbidden Families. Family Unification and Child Registration in east Jerusalem*. B'tselem, Jerusalem 2004

⁵⁹ B'tselem and HaMoked, 1997

1.4 Social and Territorial configuration

To proceed with the analysis, it is now necessary to consider the territorial configuration within the Old City from an urban point of view. The area inside the walls is 900 dunum, almost 1km². The classic configuration used is that of a division into four quarters: Muslim, Jewish, Armenian and Christian.



My artisan map of the Old City produced with the psychogeographical method based on direct observation and based on the comparison between the tourist map provided from the Information Centre of the Jaffa Gate and the one provided by the International Peace and Cooperation Centre. (See 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 of this thesis).

Breakdown based on districts. Red indicates the Muslim Quarter; the Jewish Quarter is in blue, Christian Quarter in purple and the Armenian Quarter in green. The dashed line indicates the Judaization of a part of the Armenian Quarter.

The Muslim quarter has a Sunni majority. The Jewish quarter is composed of religious and secular inhabitants. The Christian quarter is divided between the Greek Orthodox and Latin Patriarchate. The current configuration dates back to Ottoman times, the period in which the walls were built. The first municipality was located within the walls and from 1863 its administration began to include some of the areas built outside. During the British mandate, 1918-1948, the administration included the areas to the West and the Palestinian neighbourhoods to the South and East. In 1948, Jerusalem was divided physically into two municipalities, one Israeli and one Palestinian. The Palestinian area, under the control of Jordan, included East Jerusalem and the Old City. Most of the buildings within the walls date to the Ayyubid dynasty,

the Mamluk era, or to the Ottoman period. The only major change to the urban structure occurred in 1967 with the expansion of the Jewish quarter from 20 to 120 dunumus. Prior to 1967, the Old City consisted of 23 districts, appointed during the Ottoman period under the name of families or clans ⁶⁰. After 1967, the city within the walls was divided according to ethnic and religious classifications. The society is composed of three major religious groups: Muslims, Christians and Jews. There are subgroups within each group.

In the absence of a Palestinian State, the creation of a Palestinian identity is somewhat problematic. This is reflected significantly at an urban level ⁶¹. The Palestinians are organised primarily through additional identities: the family, the clan and the Diwan ⁶². In the Old City there are 13 mosques, 70 churches and 24 synagogues. Informal law and mediation are daily practices, and life is mainly based on social and family relationships ⁶³. Most disputes are resolved through the use of mediators. ; some mediators cooperate with the Israeli police, others do not. The clan is a very common social structure in the Old City. Private issues are resolved among families, however public issues require the official system. The traditional mediation system is part of the anti-governmentality techniques active in the Old City. Every family that resolves a dispute through the mediation circuit contributes to Palestinian sovereignty and the decline of the Israeli occupation.

⁶⁰ Duri A.A. – Gottschalk H.L. – Colin G.S. – Lambton A.K.S. - Bazmee Ansari A.S., *Lemma «Dīwān»*, in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. 1, Basset eds., 1913

⁶¹ Berlin University of the Arts, IPCC, Bezalel Academy, ETH Zurich, City of Collision (Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism), Birkhauser Publishers for Architecture, Germany 2006

⁶² Khamaisi R. and Nasrallah R., *The Jerusalem Urban Fabric*, IPCC, Jerusalem 2003; *City of Lost Peace*, Al Manar Modern Press, Jerusalem 2006; Bianca S., *Urban Form in the Arab World: Past and Present*, ORL Schriften, Zurich 2000.

⁶³ Khamaisi R. and Nasrallah R., *The Jerusalem Urban Fabric*, IPCC, Jerusalem 2003; Khamaisi R., Nasrallah R., Brooks R., Yunan M., Margalit M., Owais A., *Jerusalem The Old City The Urban Fabric and Geopolitical Implications*, IPCC, Jerusalem 2009. About Palestinian identity: Said E., *Palestine: Memory, Invention and Space* in Abu-Lughod I., Heacock R., Nashef K., *The landscape Palestine: equivocal poetry*, Birzeit University, Birzeit 1999; Sa'di A.H., *Catastrophe, Memory and Identity: Al-Nakbah as a component of Palestinian identity*, Israel Studies Journal Vol.7 N 2, 2002; Khalidi R., *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1997

Nevertheless, it is common practice for the Israeli police to be present during disputes as a reminder of its presence on the territory. Not all mediators have relationships with law enforcement officers because they do not accept money from Israelis and consider their role as a job offered by and for God. Many Palestinians are organized into Diwans. The Diwan is envisioned as an association or a forum created by the lack of a municipal representation within the official government structure in Jerusalem. In the Old City there are currently three main active family Diwans: the Qutteineh, Hijazi and Dkeidak. The Qutteineh claim to have 100 per cent Jerusalemite origins, while the other two have Hebronite origins. The Diwan is registered as a family association, a WAQF, and not as a public association. This is done with the intention of not having to request any kind of permission from the municipalities. Many of the members of the various Diwans do not want to have to deal with the Israeli authorities and consider themselves political activists in all respects.

* Using the interactive maps, at this point you can follow the online project with this line:



There is a natural social contamination between the various quarters. More than a few Christians live in the Muslim quarter, and likewise Muslims in the Christian quarter. Jews are a different case, as they are present in every quarter of the Old City through yeshivas and settlers. In the Muslim Quarter there are eleven Christian churches and eight Jewish schools. The Jewish presence in other quarters is different because, while the contamination between the Muslim and Christian quarters occurred naturally and historically, the Jewish presence was

imposed more recently and with more characteristics of force. The Christians and Muslims of the Old City see this as an attempt at colonisation. From 1967 to today the population has grown within the walls by almost 60 per cent. The most reliable data show an increase from 23,000 to 36,965 units⁶⁴. Consequently, population density has increased within individual houses, especially in the Muslim Quarter, and this has resulted in an increase in illegal constructions within private or semi-private housing areas. These illegal practices are also accompanied, however, by renovation activities sponsored by civic and humanitarian associations. In its report on the Old City UNESCO declares that more than 80 per cent of the houses and structures require rehabilitation⁶⁵. The municipality is responsible for the maintenance of the road network whereas inner roads and courtyards are the responsibility of the owners. Two companies bring electricity into the Old City, JDECO – a private Palestinian company with nearly 6100 registered customers - and IEC – the official Israeli company. The Israeli company Bezeq provides the main communications system inside the walls. Street cleaning is entrusted to the municipalities. Most of the Arabs in the Old City are permanent residents but not citizens; they can still officially benefit from the healthcare system. No National Insurance office is registered in the Old City: here are some municipal Health Agency offices in the Jewish quarter, where the language barrier, among other things, makes it difficult for the Arabs to actually make use of the service.

In terms of security, there is a network of cameras and sensors throughout the Old City, which is constantly monitored by the police. This aspect will be discussed in detail later. There are six permanent police stations, four of which are located in the Muslim quarter.

⁶⁴ Khamaisi R., Nasrallah R., Brooks R., Yunan M., Margalit M., Owais A., *Jerusalem The Old City The Urban Fabric and Geopolitical Implications*, IPCC, Jerusalem 2009, p.22

⁶⁵ Khamaisi R., Nasrallah R., Brooks R., Yunan M., Margalit M., Owais A., *Jerusalem The Old City The Urban Fabric and Geopolitical Implications*, p.26

* See the assembling of Al Wad Street security device in 4.4 of this thesis

* Using the interactive maps with the overlap of security device, at this point you can follow the online project with this line:



From an urban planning perspective, the only real changes that occurred within the walls were the gentrification of the Moroccan district in 1967 and the restoration works carried out during the seventies in various quarters of the Old City. In 1982, Jordan took the initiative to enter the city within the walls on the UNESCO list. After the Oslo agreements of 1993, Palestinian intervention in the organisation of urban planning seemed possible. However, the Palestinian intervention was effectively reduced to the creation of the Toqan and Khamisi plan in 2002. The Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000 certainly slowed down each subsequent decision-making process. Until 2000 Israeli presence seemed to have greatly reduced within the walls. Since 2000 the state policies have officially reverted to considering the Old City as part of West Jerusalem and improving control over it.

Let's think back to the 10276 schema proposed by the Municipality in 2000, whose goal was "to renew, preserve and protect the Old City" through the daily coexistence of cultures, the preservation of different architectural features and the development of tourism and the economy. The problem is that, as far back as 1991, the philosopher and sociologist H. Lefebvre⁶⁶ indicated that any urban revitalisation process would be successful only if based on the involvement of the local population. Most of the population does not have any decision-making power. While normally old cities deteriorate due to a declining population and the migration of inhabitants to residential areas, our case is totally

⁶⁶ Lefebvre H., *The Construction of Space*, Blackwell, Oxford 1991

opposite and sees a population density that grows every year. However, there is a significant difference among the population densities in various quarters. According to the Israeli Statistical Yearbook, the density in the Jewish quarter is a third of that in the Muslim quarter. Within the Old City, the average age of Muslims is 18.4 years, that of the Jews 19.1 and Christians of 31.6 ⁶⁷. The rapid increase in density occurred exclusively in a sector that is only forty per cent of the physical space of the Old City. The increase in density in the Muslim Quarter is also caused by the control over possible buildings outside the walls. Urban planning policies that have prevented Palestinian infrastructure development outside the walls have contributed to the inability of Palestinians to leave the old city. Moreover, the Old City provides cultural, religious and educational-pedagogical services for Arab quarters close to the walls. The Palestinians have bypassed Israeli control with the illegal expansion of their homes. The Palestinians, who represent the majority of the population in the old city, have neither legal authority nor political decision-making power in the government planning system. The Israeli authorities consider the Old City to be at the heart of the Jewish population and identity, and demonstrate this through governmentality practices and the daily control. In addition, each renovation work requires an archaeological examination by the Israeli authorities.

* Using the interactive maps, at this point you can follow the online project with this line:



The Israeli goal of excluding Palestinian neighbourhoods from the municipality of Jerusalem has contributed to the deterioration of the Old

⁶⁷ Israeli Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, No 22, Table C/14: 105-105, Municipality of Jerusalem and the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Research, Jerusalem 2007

City, which is a micro-privileged territory for observing the dynamics of the macro-conflict.

1.5 Demographics

Since the nineteenth century, with a clear warning that population growth also changes its allegiance on the basis of religion, the Jewish community has expanded, thanks to the arrival of new immigrants, and has reached the majority, unlike the number of Christians, which is in constant decline. Between 1884 and 1967, Jerusalem is transformed⁶⁸:

Table 1 - Population divided into groups in Jerusalem.

Year	Jewish population	Christian population	Muslim population	Total
1844	7,120	5,000	3,390	15,510
1876	12000	7,560	5,470	25,030
1896	28,110	8,560	8,750	45,420
1921	33,971	13,413	14,669	62,578
1931	51,200	19,900	19,300	90,053
1944	97,000	30,600	29,400	157,000
1948	100,000	40,000	25,000	165,000
1967	195,700	54,963	12,646	263,307

Source: Harrel, 1974.

It must, however, be pointed out that the sources of the period from the end of the Ottoman Empire until the First World War do not present the same data for both the numbering and the distribution of the inhabitants. In this regard Rochelle Davis states that:

“The Ottoman census figures of 1905 reveal a total of 32,400 Ottoman nationals in Jerusalem: 13,4000 Jews, 11,000 Muslims, and 8,000 Christians.

⁶⁸ Harrel M., *The Jewish Presence in Jerusalem through the Ages*, in *Jerusalem*, edited by Sinai and Oestericcher, 1974.

However, these numbers do not reflect those with foreign nationality living in the city which more than likely would raise the numbers of Jews and Christians. Jews sources for this year contend a much higher number, including one estimating 50,000 Jews in a total population of 75,000. The Ottoman sources for 1914 for the entire Qada' of Jerusalem, give the number of Jewish citizens to be 18,190⁶⁹.

In 2008, the *Statistical Year Book* prepared by the *Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies* published the following data, in thousands⁷⁰:

Table 2 - Population divided into groups in Jerusalem.

Arabs	Jews and others	Total	year
122.4	306.3	428.7	1972
130.0	327.7	457.7	1985
146.3	378.21	524.54	1990
155.5	401.0	556.54	1992
166.9	411.9	578.8	1994
184.6	426.9	613.6	1996
189.5	429.1	622.1	1997
196.1	433.6	633.7	1998
201.3	444.9	646.3	1999
208.7	448.8	657.5	2000
215.4	454.6	670.0	2001
221.9	458.6	680.4	2002
228.7	464.5	693.2	2003
237.1	469.3	706.4	2004

⁶⁹ Davis R., *Ottoman Jerusalem, in Jerusalem 1948. The Arab Neighbourhoods and their Fate in the War*, The Institute of Jerusalem Studies, Gerusalemme 2002, p. 17.

⁷⁰ [Http //jiis.org/?cmd=statistic.30](http://jiis.org/?cmd=statistic.30).

244.87	475.1	719.9	2005
252.4	481.0	733.3	2006
260.5	487.1	747.6	2007

Source: JIIS, 2008.

In 2005, the population calculated in the municipal boundaries had reached 724,000 and denotes the growth in the percentage of Palestinians who have gone from 25.50 per cent to 35 per cent of the population census, unlike the Israeli Jews who have fallen to 65 per cent. The only time in which the two ethnic groups have grown in a similar manner was between 1985 and 1990 (12.1 per cent and 13 per cent Israeli Palestinian), while the next one shows the growth of the Jews.

Based on the data shown in Table 3 relating to the annual growth, one sees that between 1990 and 1991 the overall growth rate is higher than 4 per cent annually, well above the average for the period 1967-2005, which stood at around 2.3 per cent per annum.

Table 3 - Annual growth compared to the previous year in Israel and Jerusalem for population groups (1978-2003).

Jerusalem			Israel			Year
Palestinians	Jews	Total	Palestinians	Jews	Total	
Growth Percentage						
3,4	2,6	3,3	3,5	2	2,3	1978
3,6	1,7	2,2	3,4	2	2,2	1980
3,5	2,4	2,5	2,8	1,3	1,5	1985
2,6	4,6	4	3,9	6,2	6,7	1990
3,4	3,9	3,7	4,5	5	4,9	1991
2,7	2,1	2,3	4,3	2,4	2,7	1992

3,4	1,3	1,9	4,1	2,2	2,5	1993
3,8	1,4	2	3,8	2,4	2,7	1994
4,5	1,2	2,2	3,8	2,4	2,7	1995
3,4	1,2	1,9	3,4	2,4	2,4	1998
4	1,1	2	3,5	2,6	2,8	1999
3,7	0,9	1,7	3,9	2,3	2,6	2000
3,2	1,3	1,9	3,3	1,9	2,2	2001
3	0,9	1,6	3	1,6	1,9	2002
3,1	1,3	1,9	3	1,5	1,8	2003

Source: JIIS, 2003.

The increase in the actual growth is caused by the mass immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union who settled in Jerusalem in 1990 ⁷¹. One must, however, take into account that many of them, coming from a lower socio-economic class, do not have the opportunity to reside in the city, and therefore head for the Occupied Territories, while the middle class, because of the increasing role of the *haredim* in public life, settled in villages far away. ⁷²

Between 1983 and 1995 the settlements of Pisgat Ze'ev and Neve Ya'akov reveal a population increase of over 200 per cent, as shown in Table 4. This growth is part of the strategy to strengthen the settlements in the occupied areas by taking hold of the facilities and structural plans⁷³.

⁷¹ Tolts M., Post-Soviet Aliyah and Jewish Demographic Transformation, Berman Jewish Policy Archive, <http://bjpa.org/Publications/downloadPublication.cfm?PublicationID=11924>, 12/12/13.

⁷² Lein Y., *Land Grab. Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank*, B'tselem, Gerusalemme 2002

⁷³ Ibidem.

Table 4 - Growth residents in East Jerusalem, by ethnicity (1983-1995).

	Area	Residents (x 1000)			Families (x 1000)			Average people per household	
		1983	1995	% Growth	1983	1995	% Growth	1983	1995
Palestinians	Beit Hanina, Kafr Aqab, Shu'fat	30,3	48,3	59,7	4,6	8,6	87,0	6,4	5,6
	Issawiah, Wadi al-Joz	19,8	28,0	41,5	3,4	5,2	52,9	5,8	5,3
	Sheik Jarrah	7,6	8,3	9,4	1,4	1,4	0,0	5,4	5,6
	Silwan, Ras al- Amoud	22,3	34,5	54,8	3,3	6,6	100,0	6,7	5,2
	Jabal al- Mukabber, Sur Baher, Beit Safafa	14,4	21,9	54,8	2,2	4,4	100,0	6,6	4,9
	Old City	23,5	26,6	13,2	4,5	4,9	8,8	5,2	5,4
Total Palestinians		117,9	167,6	38,9	19,4	31,1	58,1	6,0	5,3
	Neve Ya'aqov, Pisgat Ze'ev	13,3	49,9	274,9	3,5	13,5	285,7	3,8	3,7
	Ramot	11,7	37,1	218	3,2	8,3	176,6	3,6	4,5
	Franch Hill, Ramat Eshkol	14,8	15,7	5,9	3,8	4,2	10,5	3,7	3,5
	Jewish Quarter	2,0	2,3	13,3	0,4	0,4	0,0	4,0	4,3
	East Talpyot	9,7	14,0	44,9	3,0	4,2	40,0	3,2	3,3
	Gilo	17,5	29,3	67,3	4,8	7,5	56,2	3,6	3,9

	Har Homa	0,0	4,7	0	0,0	1,1	0,0	0,0	4,1
Total Jews		69,0	153,0		18,7	39,2		3,7	3,9
Total Residents East Jerusalem		186,9	320,6		70,3	58,1		4,8	4,6

Source: JIIS, 2003.

The data reveal that there has been a 50 per cent increase in Palestinians in East Jerusalem and an increase of 110 per cent of Jewish residents from 69 thousand to 153 thousand.

Table 4, then, shows an unusual trend in relation to the population density of the families, that for Palestinians drops from an average of 6 units for family to 5.3, unlike Jews, that go from 3.7 to 3.9. This peculiarity reflects the rise in wealth in Palestinian society and *haredim* in the colonies to the east.

The increased natural growth of Palestinian populations is also due to the decline in mortality in the nineties, which is in turn due to improved sanitation and medical care offered by municipalities and NGOs. This increase, however, is also related to a greater religious observance⁷⁴, the social and cultural structure of the suburbs and the immigration of young Palestinian families. The natural growth in the ideology of the first Intifada, considered fundamental to regaining Palestine, has impacted on the demographic question.

This does not happen among the Israelis, whose growth trend remains essentially unchanged.

⁷⁴ Khamaisi R. - Nasrallah R. (a cura di), *Jerusalem on The Map (II)*, IPCC (International Peace and Cooperation Center). Jerusalem, 2005, p. 120.

Analysis of data on migration from 1980 to 2003, integrated with those of natural growth, gives a clear picture of the demographics points emerges; Table 5, shows that since 1990, the migration of Jewish citizens has decreased, reaching an average net migration of -5000/-6000 Jewish Jerusalemites. The causes of this situation are to be found in:

1. the reduction of costs for the purchase of a home in the area of the outer belt of Jerusalem, which leads many Jewish Jerusalemites to settle in these areas;
2. the reduction in migration starting from 1989 because of the intifada and the subsequent increase of the terrorist attacks posing long-standing safety issues that lead many people to settle in quieter and more secure areas near Jerusalem;
3. increasing immigration of *haredi* in Jerusalem.

These data on the migration of Jewish citizens implies that policies to encourage immigration in Jerusalem do not achieve the purpose of balancing the strong natural growth of the Palestinians⁷⁵. In this sense, the Office for Strategic Planning of Jerusalem has modified the strategy to encourage immigration, and with the contribution of urban policy and governing techniques, has prepared plans related to *beautification* and economic development ⁷⁶.

The Director of the Division of Strategic Planning and Research, Dr. Uli Ullmann says: "*The first aim of the municipality is to attract Jews*" ⁷⁷. And for this reason, the Masterplan 2020 intends to strengthen the

⁷⁵ See Margalit M., *Discrimination in the heart of the Holy City*, IPCC (International Peace and Cooperation Center), Jerusalem 2006

⁷⁶ Gur O., *A vision for Jerusalem: Plan for revitalizing Jerusalem, the capital of Israel Executive Summary*, JIIS, Jerusalem 2009; Khamaisi R., *The objectives and policies of Israeli Urban Planning in Jerusalem and its environs*, The Journal of Palestinian Studies, no 72, 2007; Toqan S. Khamaisi R., *Jerusalem: Heritage and Life: The Old City Revitalization Plan*, The Arab Press, Lebanon, 193, 2002

⁷⁷ Ullmann U. and Ashkenazy S., *Jerusalem: facts and figures*. Statistical Data: 2002-2004, Municipality of Jerusalem division for Strategic Planning and Research, Jerusalem 2004

economy, which in recent decades has entered a phase of structural crisis⁷⁸. It is necessary to develop tourism, the service sector and the new economy and industry in areas such as hi-tech industrial parks and Atroth Mishor Adumim. The aim is to improve the safety, landscape, roads and transport system in order to facilitate migration of the wealthy classes, which usually flee from the city.

Table 5 shows that the migration of Palestinians is very close to 0, despite the fact that immigration is encouraged by the Palestinian Authority, particularly for those who possess the Blue ID (as discussed above - residence permit in Jerusalem), or a foreign passport and who are refugees in other states. The availability of labour and ideological motivations have led many to settle in the city, thus limiting emigration, but the state has imposed policies that prevent and contain a high input of Palestinians in the city and at the same time, invited them to settle in the villages around Jerusalem or in the main cities of the West Bank.

Table 5 Balance Migration Jerusalem from 1980 to 2003.

Balance Migration			
Year	Jews	Palestinians	Total
<i>Net -thousands-</i>			
1980	-0,80	0,10	-0,70
1984	-0,90	-0,10	-1,00
1986	0,60	0,10	0,70
1990	-2,80	-0,30	-3,10
1992	-5,70	-0,20	-5,90
1994	-5,90	-0,30	-6,20

⁷⁸ Bollens S., *On Narrow Ground. Urban Policy and Ethnic conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast*, SUNY, New York, 2000

1996	-5,70	-0,20	-5,90
1998	-7,30	-0,30	-7,60
2000	n.d.	n.d.	-8,20
2002	-6,40	-0,20	-6,60
2003	-4,90	-0,20	-5,10

Source: Khamaisi R. - Nasrallah R., 2003.

To date, the evolution of actual growth and the demographic ratio between Palestinians and Israelis remain open and of primary political importance; the demographics projections suggests certain assumptions for which the Palestinian population will increase in Jerusalem as natural growth will be always favourable to the Palestinians and the migration of the Jews will always be in progressive decrease ⁷⁹.

⁷⁹ Della Pergola S. *Terra in cambio di Terra*, Avvenire, 2/01/2006, <http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/44271>. See also: Riva G., *I muri del pianto*, UTET, Torino 2005; DellaPergola S., Rebhun U., Tolts M., *Prospecting the Jewish Future: Population Projections 2000-2080*, *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 100, New York, 2000, pp. 103-146; Della Pergola S., *Israele e Palestina: la forza dei numeri. Il conflitto mediorientale fra demografia e politica*, Il Mulino, Bologna 2007

1.6 Metanarratives of participants

The word territoriality has its roots in the Latin verb *terrere*, meaning 'to terrorise'. Those who belong to the territory are ideally identical to those who are not in the same territory or are excluded therefrom. Territoriality constructs narrative identity⁸⁰. The role of identity is "*to give a sense that one is safe in the world, physically, psychologically, socially and even spiritually*"⁸¹. Narrative identities are the product of a series of fundamental processes to create a sense of belonging to the territory in order to preserve the sense of security. Foucault points out that the task of the nation, through governmentality, is to produce the population, to ensure the controllable surface of subjects and keep them alive. The population, as a collective subject, does not exist a priori however. Sack has included communicating its presence in the tendencies of the territory⁸² - for example, flags, monuments, architecture and language⁸³. The stronger the attachment is to the territory, the more symbolically and physically difficult it is to share it with others. A population is a construction and in order to reproduce, it needs a general narrative. A shared past is a necessary element. According to R. Khalidi the Palestinian people bases its narrative since 1948 on the link between the agricultural transition (origin), the tragedy – nakbah - (the present) and the re-conquest, understood as the repopulation of Jerusalem and the return of refugees (future)⁸⁴. The

⁸⁰ Delaney D., *Territoriality a short introduction*, Blackwell Publishing, Malden 2005; Ardrey R., *The territorial imperative: a personal inquiry into the animal origins of property and nations*, Dell Publishing Co New York, 1966; Agnew J., *Mastering space. Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*, Routledge, London, 1995

⁸¹ Northrup T.A., *Intractable Conflicts in Kriesberg L., Intractable Conflicts and their Transformation*, Syracuse University Press, New York, 1989, p.64

⁸² Sack R., *Human Territoriality. Its Theory and History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p.33

⁸³ Sack R., 1986; Northrup, 1989; Balibar E. and Wallerstein I., *Razza Nazione Classe. Le identità ambigue*, Edizioni associate, Roma 1988

⁸⁴ Khalidi R., *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1997

Nakbah represents a receptacle of collective memories ⁸⁵. Narratives transform the defeated past into an eternal present. The narrative of the defeat is ambivalent. On the one hand it stresses the Israeli occupation and on the other is the basis for the reconstruction of Palestine. The main element of Israeli identity is the Jewish ethnic identity and the consequent ethnocracy that developed ⁸⁶. In 1948 Israel was formed as a democratic state, centralised and organised according to the Western model, but with one important distinction: Ethnocracy. Israel is an ethnocracy, i.e. a political system dominated by an ethnic group that is organised, according to O. Yiftachel, on three principles. It is a settler society characterised by a *frontier culture*, understood as an innate desire to expand, it exploits the mobilising power of ethno-nationalism and it is led by an ethnic logic in the capital⁸⁷. It was an Israeli thinker, B. Kimmerling, who recognised one of the characteristics of Israel in its "*historical inability to separate religion from nationalism and nationality that is built into the 'Jewishness' of the Israeli State*" ⁸⁸. The second identity principle is territory. People identify with the territory they inhabit. When the ideologues of the Jewish nationalist movement had to define the confines of the territory they identified with " *the religiously sanctified Zion or Eretz Israel ... despite many potential alternatives and despite their secularism*"⁸⁹. To understand the difference between Israeli territorial identity and Palestinian, we may consider the article *Rootedness versus Sense of place*, in which Yi Fu Tuan distinguishes between 'Sense of Place', attachment to a place built through knowledge of the history connected to the site, and

⁸⁵ Khalidi R., 1997; Said E., *Palestine: Memory, Invention and Space* in Abu-Lughod I., Heacock R., Nashef K., *The landscape Palestine: equivocal poetry*, Birzeit University, Birzeit 1999; Sa'di A.H., *Catastrophe, Memory and Identity: Al-Nakbah as a component of Palestinian identity*, Israel Studies Journal Vol.7 N 2, 2002

⁸⁶ About the concept of Ethnocracy: Yiftachel O., *Ethnocracy: The Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine*, in *Constellations*, Vol. 6, N. 3, 1999; Smooha S., *The model of ethic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state* in *Nations and Nationalism*, 8, 2002

⁸⁷ Yiftachel O., *Ethnocracy: The Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine*, in *Constellations*, p.364-367

⁸⁸ Kimmerling B., *Religion, Nationalism and Democracy in Israel*, in *Constellation* Vol.66, N. 3, 1999, p.340

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, p.344

Rootedness, membership not based on knowledge of the history of the place, but on living in the same way that it has been done for generations⁹⁰. The Israelis create a Sense of Place, whereas Palestinians find themselves involved in discourses of identity built on Rootedness. Specific places, museums, memorials, government buildings, shrines are an example of this construction. Priority is given to places where no one would think of doubting the validity of the narration. The more remote the facts are in terms of time, the greater the phenomenon of 'suitability', or 'appropriateness according to need'. Archaeology has become a political tool in Israel⁹¹. The anthropologist Nadia Abu El-Haj⁹² has declared that archaeology is the Jewish national hobby. Just think of the archaeological excavations that took place in Israel after 1967, in the southern part of Haram al-Sharif. The first studies were those carried out by the historian Benjamin Mazar⁹³ to resolve some issues related to the topography of the ancient settlement. Mazar's research started from textual sources, such as the Torah and Pliny the Elder, looking for evidence. In short, the findings were not intended to prove its splendour, but were rather the model to justify and give meaning to the finds. Abu El-Haj highlights the practice of the use of bulldozers used to excavate areas to reach the layers of interest faster, however, destroying finds from later times⁹⁴. The archaeological work makes only certain aspects of history visible in the contemporary urban landscape, which is clearly intended to create a link between the identity of contemporary Jerusalem and the Jerusalem of Solomon and Herod. The finds are reconstructed and

⁹⁰ Tuan Y., Rootedness versus Sense of place, in *Landscape*, Vol. 24, 1980, p.4/8

⁹¹ Geva S., *ha-Arkeologiya ha-Miqra'it be-Reshit Rarkhah (Biblical archaeology and its beginning)*, in *Zmanim* vol. 2, n. 42, 1992, pp. 92-103; Harif A., *Arkheologiya Yisraelit – Le'an? (Whither Israeli Archeology)*, in *Arkheologiya*, n.4, 1995, pp. 72-79.

⁹² Abu El-Haj N., *Facts on the Ground. Archeological Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001

⁹³ Mazar B., *The Excavations in The Old City of Jerusalem. Preliminare report on the first season 1968*, Israel Exploration Society, Jerusalem 1969; *The Mountain of the Lord*, Doubleday. New York 1975

⁹⁴ Abu El-Haj N., 2001, p.148

integrated into the urban architecture, with a resulting juxtaposition between past and future. The term 'invasive restoration' is applied to the type of restorations that favour dramatisation through the complete reconstruction of the object. A visit to the Archaeological Park at Dung Gate can be useful to help understand this. The Archaeological Park includes the entire section of the excavations of the Western Wall, i.e. the foundations of the second temple, the Byzantine and Ottoman structures, the section of the Western Wall and the excavations under the Esplanade of mosques. It is easy to see the difference between the manner in which the artefacts of the second temple and those of later times are exhibited. The Byzantine section is in a state of abandonment, whereas the central area has been rebuilt and is indicated by signs. In the nineties, the Israel Antiquities Authority issued numerous permits to invasively rebuild the various archaeological sites. Archaeology has turned into the basis for the creation of a Jewish urban landscape. In the Hebrew quarter there is a special relationship between simulacrum and simulation, between rediscovery and the ideal continuation of the ancient structure. A case in point is the David Migdal Museum, where the tour starts and ends with dramatised holograms of the first and of the second temples. The territorialising logic in the Jewish quarter is the simultaneous presence of ancient and modern ruins. The quarter is filled with an aura "of historical continuity and longevity while simultaneously insinuating a specific story of ancient destruction and rebirth"⁹⁵. The resignification of places through the dramatised image of the place itself is a very common procedure in Western capitalist society⁹⁶. The site is built through the juxtaposition of the dramatic image derived from myths. Unlike reconstruction, dramatising the history of a place is a

⁹⁵ Abu El-Haj N., *Facts on the Ground. Archeological Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society*, p.183

⁹⁶ Debord G., *La Société du Spectacle*, Champ Libre, Paris, 1971

second grade resignification, a resignification of the present through the dramatic reworking of the image of the past. Finding a 3D model of one's city's past creates yet more identification. The dramatisation produces an immediate and emotional connection with the place. The Israel Antiquities Authority, along with the Ir Dawid Foundation (cityofdavid.org.il), and the Jerusalem Foundation (jerusalemfoundation.org) has created multimedia products to integrate with archaeological museums. Most of these products are inspired by and inspire a *geo-pietist* type of spatial narrative that stresses the theme of land granted by divine right. In 1902, H.J. Mackinder spoke of the need to use panoramas and photographs to colonise by educating the geographic imagination of the young. The use of panoramas has always been a means of political propaganda. The panorama of Herod's Temple on display in extensive, immense format in the Tower of David is highly interesting in this regard. Following the same intentions, the virtual 3D reconstruction of the archaeological site of Ir Dawid gives an idea of the magnificence of Jerusalem at the time of David. The site of the Jerusalem Archaeological Park offers a 3D virtual reconstruction of the second temple. On the subject of the link between reconstruction and show, I would like to briefly mention another peculiar reconstruction, i.e. that of the cyber-architect Yitzhaq Hayutman from the Jerusalem Academy (www.thehope.org/academy.htm). He aims to build a hologram of the third temple on Haram al-Sharif and create a system called the Jerusalem Gaming System, a multiplayer online role-playing game the purpose of which is to build the third Temple and show the progress of the game with a floating hologram⁹⁷. Another very interesting visual product is the video presented during the visit to the Museum of the history of Jerusalem, David Migdal Museum. The museum route ends in a room

⁹⁷ Wired Magazine, 12/2004

where scales measure the variation of the population divided by ethnicity during different decades of the last two centuries. The national anthem plays and the flag of the people of Israel waves simultaneously, alongside the movement of the scales. The Haram Al-Sharif/Temple Mount is the site par excellence that epitomises the clash between the two peoples and strengthens the narrative identity.

* At this time, you can follow the online project with this line:



At the same time, we must stress that, in response, a new Islamic ethos has been created more and more in the Muslim world. This new ethos is identifiable with the trend towards the ever greater Holiness of Al-Aqsa and Jerusalem in general for contemporary Islam; with the denial of the theological-historical affiliation of the Jewish Other to the city and to the Holy places; with the imagining of a new history centred on Jerusalem as a central element of identity, in agreement with the idea that the ancient Jebusites who founded Jerusalem as 'Yevus' were Arab tribes that crossed the country thousands of years before the arrival of the Jews in Canaan⁹⁸. Arabic daily chaos becomes a "pedestrian enunciation ... a system of topographic ownership by a pedestrian"⁹⁹ and it is underlined and marked in every way. Walking and shouting become territorial claims, just as the order of the Jewish quarter appears to be built on the contrast against Palestinian disorder.

The past is interpreted as an affirmation of nationalistic key '*meiora tempores*', to be taken as an example of power and development; the time is used as the tool that connects the subject to the place in which it is

⁹⁸ Reiter Y., From Jerusalem to Mecca and Back The Islamic Consolidation of Jerusalem. JIIS (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies), Jerusalem, 2005, p.VI

⁹⁹ De Certeau M., L'invenzione del quotidiano, Lavoro Ed. Roma, 1991, p.151

located to explain the presence, the possession and the territorialisation. At this juncture, the *rebuilding of the past* is not of consideration and, as Eric Hobsbawm says, the "history of a nation" does not require a precise version of the story and "*if there is no suitable past, it can be invented*" ¹⁰⁰. A vision of this type makes it very functional as the historical narratives are aimed at reinforcing the sense of belonging. This action is developed by some specific institutions and divulged in specific locations, such as museums, shrines, memorials and government buildings, where it is believed that the objectivity of scientific and historical accuracy are carefully pursued and defended. It is in this sense that Israel uses archaeology as a political tool. However, one must not forget that these symbols can be the sign of the renewal of nationalism that is the basis of the birth of the nation, of the homeland understood as "the land of the fathers", and the sign of the so-called process of nation-building aimed at building a democratic state system. The flags and other symbols allow identification with the construction of the motherland for those who live there. In the process of nation-building, development in the political sense is accompanied by the so-called "invention of tradition", ¹⁰¹ since in the absence of building traditions, practices, and shared symbols one cannot move the masses to support the struggle for the independence or for the territorial and political unification. Hence, the need for new symbols that contribute to developing an awareness of national identity among citizens within the social fabric. The cult of the homeland and the cult of the tradition, which must be considered the assembly of public rituals that contribute to the celebration of the nation, are built concepts. The celebration of the nation is elaborated by devices that become symbols of

¹⁰⁰ Hobsbawm E., *On History*, Abacus, London 1998, p. 6.

¹⁰¹ Hobsbaem J.E., Rnger T., *L'invenzione della tradizione* [The invention of tradition], Einaudi, Torino 1994.

power¹⁰². We will consider this aspect and its implications, with both a political and philosophical point of view, in the second chapter.

¹⁰² Lasswell H., *Potere, politica e personalità*, [Power, politics, and personalities] Utet, Torino 1975.

Chapter 2
DEVICES: THE GAME

2.1 First Hand: Governmentality

The term "governance" became popular in contemporary political debate through the work of philosopher Michel Foucault, who introduced it to his college courses at the end of the seventies ¹⁰³. It refers to the more specific outcome of a transformative path of political action that never stops and is precisely the object of Foucault's investigation. The entire historical development of Western politics can be read from this perspective, i.e. as a more extensive process of governmentalisation. With the formation of national states, *governance* is first established in the administrative sphere, moving from the liberal society to the *welfare state* of the twentieth century, arriving at the current period of neoliberal policy, in which *governance* acts as an impersonal subject that continually redefines the relationship between the state, society and the market. As Rosenau clarifies:

*"Governance is not synonymous with government. Both [concepts] refer to purposive behaviour, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule; but government suggests activities that are backed by formal authority, by police powers to insure the implementation of duly constituted policies, whereas governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance. Governance, in other words, is a more encompassing phenomenon than government. It embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms"*¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰³ M. Foucault, *Sécurité, Territoire, Population. Cours au Collège de France 1977-1978*, Gallimard-Seuil, Paris 2004, (tr. it. *Sicurezza, Territorio, Popolazione. Corso al Collège de France 1978-1979*, a cura di P. Napoli, Feltrinelli, Milano 2005).

¹⁰⁴ J. N. Rosenau, *Governance, Order and Change in World Politics*, in J. N. Rosenau – E. O. Czempiel (Eds.), *Governance without Government*, Cambridge UP, Cambridge 1992, p. 4.

The actions of *governance* are therefore aimed at configuring a system that addresses, controls and regulates, which is based on the collaboration of different actors, such as government and non-government, political, economic and technical - scientific agencies, world economic organisations, NGOs, national governments etc. As evidence of this, it should be noted that in 1995 *the Commission on Global Governance*¹⁰⁵ drew up a report defining *governance* as

*“the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs [specifying that] it includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest ”*¹⁰⁶.

In this way, *governance* allows the state to survive in the context of power relations and, at the same time, to transform its primary regulatory role through a deep re-functionalisation. In substance, it is understood as the final result of what Foucault defines “*a long process of governmentalisation of the state*”¹⁰⁷. Foucault used the term *governmentality* to highlight the displacement of the task of government in a regulative sense, so that the mechanisms gradually are deprived of their sovereignty. This comes from the encouragement to critically evaluate sovereignty in favour of government superiority, carried out by the institutions through wide-ranging processes, analysis, reasoning,

¹⁰⁵ The Commission on Global Governance was an organization co-chaired by Swedish Prime Minister and former Commonwealth Secretary-General, that produced a report, *Our Global Neighborhood*, in 1995.

¹⁰⁶ *Commission on Global Governance* (CGG), *On our global Neighbourhood*, OUP, Oxford, 1995, cit. in A. Arienzo, *Governo, governamentalità, governance. Riflessioni sul neo-liberalismo contemporaneo*, in A. Vinale (ed.), *Biopolitica e democrazia*, Mimesis, Milan 2007, p. 268.

¹⁰⁷ M. Foucault, *Sécurité, Territoire, Population. Cours au Collège de France 1977-1978*, Gallimard-Seuil, Paris 2004, (tr. it. *Sicurezza, Territorio, Popolazione. Corso al Collège de France 1978-1979*, a cura di P. Napoli, Feltrinelli, Milano 2005, p. 89).

calculations and strategies ¹⁰⁸. For Foucault, 'governing' refers to a dimension that is more concrete than formal: *"To govern is to structure the possible field of action of others"* ¹⁰⁹ or, in other words, *to guide behaviours* ¹¹⁰ and therefore, not the political and institutional forms.

The governmental logic of the modern era allowed for a new reflection on the role of government away from the legal concept of sovereignty, especially in terms of the *"introduction of economics within political exercise"* ¹¹¹. Nevertheless, Foucault believes that while in the 1500s the economy was understood as a *"a form of government"* that tended to give the management of the state as much attention as a *"good"* head of a family gives to his property, two centuries later it was interpreted as the *"level of reality"* connected to the welfare of the country and the security of the *"masses"*. In this sense, *"thanks to the perception of the specific problems of the population"*, the *oikonomia* acquired its modern meaning, and the notion and practice of government are no longer rooted in the familial idea but assume a biopolitical prerogative¹¹². He reflects on the problem of the 'politics of life', which he understands as an *"internal function of the modern governmental rationality"* - and not a political doctrine or a legal theory - which, starting from society, raises the question of why there is a need for a government and what relationship it should have with society in order to justify its existence¹¹³. In the mid-eighteenth century, the problem *"of the population in new forms"*¹¹⁴ takes hold, and if this had previously been understood only in terms of the enrichment of the state, it is now seen as having a different relationship

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁰⁹ M. Foucault, *Come si esercita il potere*, in H.L. Dreyfus, P. Rabinow, *La ricerca di Michel Foucault. Analitica della verità e storia del presente*, Ponte alle Grazie, Florence, 1989, p. 249.

¹¹⁰ Ibidem.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 76.

¹¹² S. Chignola, *Sull'"epoca" della biopolitica. Un commento*, in A. Amendola, L. Bazzicalupo, F. Chicci, A. Tucci (a cura di), *Biopolitica, bioeconomia e processi di soggettivazione*, Quodlibet, Macerata 2008, p. 59.

¹¹³ Ibid, researcher's note, cit., P. 272 and V. Sorrentino, *Il pensiero politico di Foucault*, Meltemi, Rome 2008.

¹¹⁴ M. Foucault, *Sécurité, Territoire, Population. Cours au Collège de France 1977-1978*, cit., p. 256.

with the resources, leaving room for competition between private interests to develop a healthy balance for the market.

Therefore "*the population as a collection of individuals is replaced by the population as a set of natural phenomena*"¹¹⁵ which should not be modified, but included in a functional sense according to their nature. Another important change in the same direction is addressed with regard to the role of the state, which "*by transcendent synthesis of the happiness of its subjects [...] must be transformed into a regulator of interests*"¹¹⁶, since the general opportunity is given by the *natural mechanics* that can result from these abstract instances, or between the interests that are interposed between the action of the government and its subjects. In this regard, Foucault identifies a "*dual discontinuity [that is produced] in the history of governmentality*"¹¹⁷ and two forms of which can be distinguished: the first of a liberal kind and the second of a legal matrix, which is already evident at the time of the creation of states and assumed the presence of a system of interrelations between the inherent rights of each party and the power of the monarch. This situation changed with the advent of the "*economic constitution*" process that no longer develops through the transfer of rights but by the free growth of interests¹¹⁸, respecting the *naturalness* of economic and social processes. In this way the market came to assume a very important role. The market is assigned the function of connecting the practice of government, which takes into account the role played by the political economy within the science of *ratio status* and in view of the transition from mercantile governmentality to a free market culture. In this regard, Foucault states that "*it is the*

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 257.

¹¹⁶ A. Pandolfi, *La "natura" della popolazione*, in S.Chignola (a cura di), *Governare la vita. Un seminario sui Corsi di Michel Foucault al Collège de France (1977-1979)*, Ombrecorte, Verona, 2006, p. 98.

¹¹⁷ S. Catucci, *Foucault*, Laterza, Bari 2005, *Foucault*, p. 128.

¹¹⁸ M.Lazzarato, *Biopolitique/Bioéconomie*, in *Multitudes*, 22, 2005, in <http://multitudes.samizdat.net/> Lazzarato-Maurizio.

*market that dictates the rule of truth to the government", Becoming the "place of veridiction "*¹¹⁹.

Foucault defines governmentality as "the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this kind of power (the government of the sovereign state), which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security" ¹²⁰. The semantic link between the terms 'gouverner' and 'mentalité' is essential for understanding the definition and proceeding with the analysis. Control techniques are utilised for the purpose of security. Security, traditionally a matter of control of the territory for the territory -*sûreté*-, is today concerned with the safety of the population and those who govern them, i.e. population control through the territory and control of territory through the population - *sécurité*- . The security mechanism in the modern state is applied to physical processes without resorting to force, promoting the mechanisms of control. We shall see this in detail later when analysing the device. The range of control technologies includes disciplinary institutions, police, bureaucracy, architecture, planning and service management. The best-known control technology is panopticism.

* You can follow the online project with the overlap of cameras and military presence:



¹¹⁹M. Foucault , *Naissance de la biopolitique*, Cours au Collège de France 1978-1979, cit., p. 40.

¹²⁰M. Foucault, *Governmentality*, in Burchell G., Gordon C., Miller P., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991, p.102

The supervised subject is subjected to a perpetual state of visibility. The name is derived from the Panopticon, structure invented by J. Bentham to optimize the supervision of all institutions. The example is very appropriate in the case of Jerusalem in general, and the Old City specifically, where in order to confirm the power and control over the area there is a constant struggle to re-territorialise it. The Palestinians have the same goal but, unable to govern, they do not have the means to achieve their target. Governmentality offers the technology, the means, the knowledge for the purpose, and the opportunity to use strategic planning. We have already seen that territoriality is the continued attempt to retain control by certain subjects over people, things and phenomena in a given geographical area. We must bear this in mind throughout the reading. Israel has built its own political superiority through control of territory and through the strengthening of government practices, which Foucault calls technologies of governmentality. Technologies of governmentality are required to maintain control of the territory. In the words of Foucault, governmentality is *"the right disposition of things ... through a series of processes ... arranged by a state regime to serve convenient ends"* ¹²¹. Rational governing techniques are favoured by the same tendencies in territoriality previously discussed by Sack.

It would be very interesting at this point to reconstruct the genealogy of the Jerusalem conflict through Israeli bio-politics. We saw that the first effect of territoriality is classification, the need to allocate the life of each human being and each thing its rightful place, and in one convenient location. However, not only must each person be in one place but also, Foucault suggests, must be arranged in the right way. The right arrangement is established by whoever defines the territory, i.e. whoever

¹²¹ Foucault M., Governmentality, in Burchell G., Gordon C., Miller P., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991, p.22

organises the knowledge of control over the territory. The bio-political subject positions himself and disciplines himself through disciplinary institutions. It should be remembered that territoriality itself has a tendency to carry out the role of the police. Alongside governmentality, anti-governmentality strategies exist and are put into motion at the same time. The bio-power of the individual, of the body as a place of power, can even be a technique of anti-governmentality¹²². In Jerusalem all practices of everyday resistance¹²³ and conventional mediation systems can be anti-governmentality techniques. With the theoretical systematisation of governmentality and anti-governmentality the territory regains its depth. The Old City in the period from 1993 to 2008 saw an intensification of continued governmentality practices due to: the decline in Israeli population growth in the territory; the strategic design of new discriminatory practices together with the enlargement of the metropolitan borders; the change of regimes at the city council, from Olmert's era to haredi Mayor Lupolianski until 2008; an emergency represented by the presentation of the Palestinian political entity; the resumption of the Oslo II peace process, oriented towards the partition of sovereignty over the city; the intensification of the Messianic ideology towards the holy premises. The aim of this second chapter is to provide information to demonstrate that *"The Israel national government and the municipality have employed a variety of bureaucratic and administrative devices to stamp Jerusalem as a Jewish city"*¹²⁴.

Thanks to the structure of the territory, the more detailed the knowledge of it, the more you can plan its control. Planning processes are

¹²² Foucault M., Sicurezza, territorio, popolazione. Corso al Collège de France (1977-1978), Feltrinelli, Bologna, 2006

¹²³ Braverman I., Power of Illegality: House Demolitions and Resistance in East Jerusalem, Law & Social Inquiry, 32 2007, pp.333-372

¹²⁴ Klein M., Jerusalem, the Contested City, C.Hurst & Co., London, 2001, p.25

influenced by the legal framework and a top-down decision-making process that leaves little room for participation-oriented approaches. Border studies flourished particularly in the past decade¹²⁵. What the map does not say is that the boundaries are socially constructed institutions made through power relations. Despite being spatial entities for all intents and purposes, borders do not occupy space. The boundary on the map is the first technique of governmentality that is found in Jerusalem. The problem however, is that the result of the process of bordering contributed to the establishment of a wholly artificial municipality¹²⁶. Since 1968 the city planners have attempted to increase Jerusalem's jurisdiction by almost over 5 km to the East and to expand as much as possible to the West. Jerusalem expanded considerably to the West in the late eighties to adapt to the wave of Russian immigration. The enlargement project was approved in 1993¹²⁷. The next issue was to expand de facto sovereignty and justify the occupation of the Old City. The 1993 Oslo treaties had granted the NPC permission to map out the boundaries of the Jerusalem Governorate on the line of the green line. Even if East Jerusalem had remained under Israeli sovereignty, the area of the Governorate could have developed a continuous urban fabric between Ramallah, Abu Dis and Bethlehem. The Zionist right especially feared the strengthening of this metropolitan area. The solution was proposed by Likud in 1983 with the announcement of the creation of a metropolitan area called Greater Jerusalem. The project involved the development of settlements and infrastructure in the outer belt of

¹²⁵ Newman D., *Into the millennium: the study of international boundaries in an era of global and technological change*, in Boundary and Security Bulletin 7, 2000; *Boundaries* in Agnew J., Mitchell K., Tòal G., A companion to political geography, Blackwell, Oxford 2002; *On borders and power: a theoretical framework*, Journal of borderlands studies, 18, 1, 2003; Newman D. and Paasi A., *Fences and neighbors in the post-modern world: boundary narratives in political geography*, in Progress in Human Geography, 22, 1998; Varzi A., *Teoria e pratica dei confini*, in Sistemi Intelligenti, 3, 2005; Paasi A., *Boundaries as social processes: territoriality in a world of flows*, in Geopolitics 3, 1998; Neocleus M., *Off the Map: On Violence and Cartography*, in European Journal of Social Theory, 6, 2003.

¹²⁶ Klein M., Jerusalem, the Contested City, C.Hurst & Co., London, 2001, p.34

¹²⁷ Khamaisi R., Nasrallah R., Brooks R., Yunan M., Margalit M., Owais A., *Jerusalem The Old City The Urban Fabric and Geopolitical Implications*, IPCC, Jerusalem 2009

Jerusalem. The plan implied the expansion of municipal boundaries in order to enclose the metropolitan belt colonies within the municipal area. The implementation of the Greater Jerusalem Masterplan occurred during final works on the agreements and negotiations while the demographic statistics continued to see the Palestinians in the lead. Again, it is Foucault who draws attention to statistics as knowledge of governmentality. Statistics are functional knowledge of the economic effects that demographic changes produce¹²⁸. Demographic statistics are anything but objective. This creates and produces attitudes and ideologies.

"In the case of East Jerusalem ... is itself an important element in the practice of governance; as such when it 'reflects' the social order it is representing a social and political order that it's also in the process of constituting" ¹²⁹.

In the case of Jerusalem, the aim of statistics is to reproduce the ethnic division of the urban fabric. For Israelis, maintaining demographic superiority – an ethno-demographic principle - is a means to justify the de facto sovereignty over Jerusalem. Statistical facts become quantifiable proof of the right to occupy and govern the territory. The tendency towards natural growth is in favour of the Palestinians, especially since the 1990s, which saw a sharp decline in mortality thanks to the medical assistance provided by municipalities and NGOs present in the territory. The ideology of the first intifada also contributed to this phenomenon, as it placed emphasis on the importance of the demographic issue to regain Palestine.

¹²⁸ Foucault M., 2006, p.85

¹²⁹ Haj S., *The people of Jerusalem Reordered*, in Sorokin M., *The Next Jerusalem. Sharing the Divided City*, The Monacelli Press, New York, 2002, p.191

The 1990s saw a simultaneous growth in haredi immigration, driven by religious motives that favoured the election of the haredi Mayor Lupoliansky in 2003 ¹³⁰. In this context, It is interesting to mention what the demographer Della Pergola proposed in the 1990s. In his view, which seems to be the official view of the State of Israel, it is necessary to strengthen the development to the East and exclude the greatest possible number of Palestinians, in view of a possible partition of the city and vaticanisation of the Old City¹³¹. Planning in Jerusalem has clearly organised the territory for the purposes of power through dividing the territory into zones depending on their use. Bollens points out that in cities characterised by ethnic confrontation the act of planning is naturally led by the planning intentions of the government. In his opinion, planning can be neutral, partisan – it maintains these disparities and increases them - fair or decisive¹³². In Jerusalem the top-down control of planning action is clear.

The British Government, which based in this case its colonial power on a centralised authority, had issued the Town Planning Ordinance in 1936 to oversee all planning work. The law was incorporated into Planning and Building Law 5725 of 1965, which is still the basis of Israeli planning¹³³. The National Planning Office within the Ministry of the Interior is the primary regulator of any aspect of planning. The National Planning Office and the Ministry of the Interior establish the guidelines

¹³⁰ The new strategy of the Likud, during the years of the Prime Minister A.Sharon (2001-2006), was characterized by a new link between the religious parties and the right wing of the party. The haredim demographic development and the greater political participation had meant that they could occupy a more prominent place in Israeli politics. In addition, at the end of the nineties many haredim moved from Europe and America, and they became a crucial slice electoral useful to maintain the ethno-demographic superiority of Israel.

¹³¹ Della Pergola S. *Terra in cambio di Terra*, Avvenire, 2/01/2006, <http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/44271>. See also: Riva G., *I muri del pianto*, UTET, Torino 2005; DellaPergola S., Rebhun U., Tolts M., *Prospecting the Jewish Future: Population Projections 2000-2080*, *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 100, New York, 2000, pp. 103-146; Della Pergola S., *Israele e Palestina: la forza dei numeri. Il conflitto mediorientale fra demografia e politica*, Il Mulino 2007

¹³² Bollens S., *On Narrow Ground. Urban Policy and Ethnic Conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast*, SUNY, New York, 2000, p. 71

¹³³ Bollens S., 2000, p. 67

for infrastructure planning and set the parameters for demographic distribution. Meanwhile, the Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem works on policies relating to Jerusalem. Urban planning in Jerusalem takes place through classical planning sectors – zoning - and strategic planning aimed at addressing urban policies towards desired long-term results. Sack's formula for territoriality has the effect of emptying places, re-configuring their function and the occupants. In this regard we should remember the confiscation of property for reasons of public use, in accordance with British law dated 1943, never abrogated, implemented in 1964 through the Acquisition for public purposes Law 5274-1964.



Since 2002 the process of recognising property has become even more complex for Palestinian residents. The process is still often insolvent due to inconsistencies with the Jordanian law on property and inheritance¹³⁴. It is also worth mentioning the veto by the archaeological heritage authorities against building within the perimeter of the Abu Tor Holy Basin building and Mount Scopus. In response the Palestinians have made unauthorised development a veritable daily resistance technique. Unauthorised development creates a short circuit since it is an illegal means in an area that does not have de jure sovereignty.

Urban policies fall into Bio Power devices. The standard of living in the Old City is higher than that of the occupied territories. The Palestinians have acted at two levels, both denouncing the absence of services and the inactivity of the City Council, and rejecting government

¹³⁴ Margalit M., *Discrimination in the heart of the Holy City*, IPCC (International Peace and Cooperation Center), Jerusalem, 2006, p. 44

assistance as a resistance tactic. At the beginning of 2000, with the worsening of Palestinian institutions, residents began to rely more and more on Israeli institutions. Boundaries create social hierarchies and contain a powerhouse for creating inequalities. Urban policies create class A citizens and class B citizens. According to the NII, the National Insurance Institute established in accordance with the Health Insurance Law in 1995, to benefit from medical assistance you must be resident in Israel. To prove residency, you must show a document, bills, property deeds and a civil status certification. Being obligated to provide medical assistance, the NII does not recognise the person as a resident until proven otherwise¹³⁵. The NII usually takes several months over each request for approval. B'tselem has shown that over 70 per cent of investigations have a negative outcome. To all intents the NII has become a political tool of control. After 1967 the Palestinians annexed within the boundaries of Jerusalemite territory gained permanent residency through the issuance of a specific identity document, the Blue ID. Permanent residence offers the right to work in Israel, to benefit from social security offered by the NII, and to elect representatives to the City Council. Holders of a Blue ID card cannot vote for the Knesset or access certain public offices, nor be part of the army. Restrictive policies were later implemented from 1996, under Mayor Olmert's proposal, with the aim of containing demographic development¹³⁶. Anyone who was unable to demonstrate with substantial evidence (bills, acts of property, payment of arnona taxes) that he had continuously lived in Jerusalem for seven years immediately lost his ID.

¹³⁵ B'tselem and HaMoked, *The Quiet Deportation. Revocation of Residency of East Jerusalem Palestinians*, Jerusalem, 1997, p. 11

¹³⁶ Maariv 22/01/1996

* You can follow the online project with this line:



The policy was retroactively introduced in 1995. 3078 IDs were withdrawn between 1967 and 1995, and 5191 IDs between 1995 and 2005 ¹³⁷.

¹³⁷ www.btsalem.org, 05/2012

2.2 Second Hand: Control array

The physical structure of the Old City and its boundaries are the result of a historical development of social, cultural, economic and geopolitical life and migration factors, as well as the evolution of construction and architectural practice. When functional and administrative changes occur, the point of view of the analysis that needs to be calibrated for each part of the Old City must also change in order to understand the basis on which it was built, and to better determine what administrative tools should be used to develop the specific space to ensure its belonging and links with the surrounding area¹³⁸. The area within the walls of the Old City, as we saw in the first chapter, is about 900 dunums, or about 225 acres, and currently is divided into four ethnic/religious quarters - Muslim, Jewish, Armenian and Christian - within which there is a succession in the social structure.



¹³⁸ A report by the International Peace and Cooperation Center, *Jerusalem The Old City The Urban Fabric and Geopolitical Implications*, 2009, p.11



Fig.1 The Old City / Fig.2 Ethnic/religious quarters

(Muslim; Jewish; Christian; Armenian)

Source and details: http://www.emiliomaroscia.com/visions/jerusalem_quarters.html

The Old City is not presented as a homogeneous community. As already mentioned, during the British Mandate (1918-1948), the boundaries of Jerusalem included a Western area with a high concentration of Jews. In 1948, as a result of the war, the city was physically and geo-politically divided in two and the Palestinian side was placed under Jordanian control, which lasted until 1967. Originally, the Palestinian area of the city included East Jerusalem and the Old City, and during the era of Jordanian rule, it was further expanded with the annexation of villages and neighbourhoods to the east and north of the Old City. It is worthy to note that the current boundaries of Jerusalem took their configuration after the Israeli occupation of 1967. The only significant change to the urban fabric occurred as a result of 1967, when the Jewish Quarter was created on the destroyed area desired by

Moroccan Sharaf Ash and Al Maghariba. This operation effectively expanded the Jewish quarter from around 20 dunums to more than 120 dunums, thus conquering 13.6% of the territory of the Old City for the Jewish Community¹³⁹. This change reflected the far greater Israeli control and altered the social structure of the Old City. Before the Israeli occupation of 1967, the Old City was made up of 23 districts, as defined in the Ottoman era, most of which bore the name of the families or groups who lived there. Under Israeli control, however, it was strictly divided in relation to religious faith and ethnic groups, going against the mixed development that had taken place organically over the centuries. Over the course of history, the Old City has accumulated many layers as it has been demolished eighteen times.

Three types of area coexist in the Old City: a public space, used by visitors and citizens; a semi-public/semi-private space, used by the residents but not totally under public or private administration; a truly private space itself. In terms of authority over these spaces, there is a veritable confusion about responsibilities, roles and duties. The confusion comes from the conflict between the authority over public space – Israel – and the majority of its users – Palestinians. In terms of property, the Islamic Trust includes religious areas such as Harem al-Sharif, some empty spaces, some private and public areas and all private areas that have a public use – this is the case in some areas of the Souk and some schools. Religious areas are considered of divine possession and make up one third of the Old City. The state owns the public roads, goods confiscated or expropriated by the Confiscation for Public Order Law of 1948, the facilities confiscated by the Absentee Owner Law, and the goods that were under control of Jordan following the transition from the

¹³⁹ Khamaisi R., Nasrallah R., Brooks R., Yunan M., Margalit M., Owais A., *Jerusalem The Old City The Urban Fabric and Geopolitical Implications*, IPCC, Jerusalem 2009, p.11

British mandate. The Israeli Land Department is the official institution for managing properties and, under the law of 1960, has full decision-making authority. In term of private property, emphasis should be placed on the difficulty for Palestinians in proving possession of property, as many homes were inherited without any documentation. The militarisation of the Old City is justified by the need to preserve security on the one hand, and the status quo on the other. Jeff Halper calls this strategy the matrix of control: *"It works like the game 'Go', instead of defeating your opponent... you win by immobilizing your opponent"*.¹⁴⁰

The intense surveillance activities controlling access can be seen on a daily basis. There are seven permanent checkpoints in the Old City, concentrating around the Jewish quarter, the Damascus Gate and entrances to the Haram al-Sharif. There are also frequent temporary checkpoints, particularly on Fridays during the Jewish holidays, and less frequent temporary checkpoint put up without notice. Foucault insists on the term 'Surveillance'¹⁴¹ to indicate that control is carried out by viewing. The subject is aware of being watched constantly, both in cases where the controller is a human eye or an electronic eye. Active surveillance in the Old City is carried out through IDF patrols, police and private security agencies. Panoptic military systems are installed along all the walls of the Old City; a central monitoring system manages electronic surveillance. Since 2000 the AGM company and the Mer group have installed 350 CCTV cameras and different types of sensors within the walls. The firm's website defines the Old City as the "biggest historic centre with maximum security"¹⁴². For the purposes of our analysis it is interesting to note that at the same time, conversely, there are practices

¹⁴⁰ Halper J., The 94 Percent Solution. Israel's Matrix of Control, in Bein J. and Stein R.L., The Struggle for Sovereignty. Palestine and Israel, 1993-2005, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2006, pg. 62-67

¹⁴¹ Foucault M., Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Gallimard, Paris, 1975

¹⁴² AMG Co.Ltd., www.amgsystems.co.uk, 05/2012

of *sousveillance* from below, 'sous', mainly represented by all individual monitoring practices (videoactivism.org; ism.org).




Fig.3 Frictions in the Old City

Source and details: http://www.emiliomaroscia.com/visions/jerusalem_frictiones.html

Official State institutions – the Jerusalem Municipality, the Ministry of the Interior, the Court System, the police - work together with non-institutional bodies such as The Settler Associations, which receive public grants and sponsorship. With the failure of the Oslo agreements, the presence of settlers in the Old City has greatly increased as a result of the fear that sovereignty over the city will be divided. The strategy of settlers in the Old City is to construct a situation in which a future partition of the city is impossible through facts on the ground. The Ateret Cohanim website states: "Determination and collaboration with the authorities have proven to be the old method of Zionism – now it is the Jewish settlement that determines the border of the State". The Ateret Cohanim organisation is part of the Jerusalem Forum Coalition ¹⁴³. Various

¹⁴³ Johnson A., *A united Jerusalem. The story of Ateret Cohanim*, KTAV Publishing House American Friends of Ateret Cohanim, New Jersey 1992; Dumper M., *Israeli settlement in the Old City of Jerusalem*, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXI, 4, 1992, 40-53; Hasson N., *How the state helped right-wing groups settle East*

organisations working for the judaisation of East Jerusalem and some messianic groups (Messianic Bureau International –MBI-, Word of Messiah Ministries, Messianic Israel Alliance, Association of Messianic Congregations –AMC-, Union of Messianic Jewish Congregation)¹⁴⁴ that raise funds for the construction of the third temple on the Haram Al-Sherif also form part of this forum. The Jerusalem Forum Coalition controls 20 buildings in the Muslim and Christian quarters. Most of these buildings can be found along El Wad Street, where the best known is the home of A. Sharon in the Muslim quarter. They have recently purchased St. John's Hostel, close to the Holy Sepulchre, and the Hotel Imperial and Petra near Jaffa Gate. There are six yeshivas in the old Moorish quarter, including that belonging to Ateret Cohanim. In the leaflets for the yeshivas there are maps with associations and their properties. According to the Reports by the International Peace and Cooperation Centre, there are 43 Jewish properties in the Muslim and Christian quarters. The same report mentions the intention of a Settler organisation to add 33 housing units near Herod's Gate¹⁴⁵. According to the official register of the Ministry of Interior, 600 Jews are registered as residents of the Muslim and Christian quarters. Nir Hasson, the English edition of "Ha'aretz", mentions an Ateret Cohanim brochure that states: "The heart of Jerusalem is calling us ... to steady and strong Jewish presence in the Old City has become crucial to our ability as a nation to maintain and control this spiritual centre"¹⁴⁶. The seizure of property by settler organisations takes place through demonstrating that the property belonged to a Jew in the past, through

Jerusalem, Haaretz, 7/11/2010, Rapoport M 2007, *What is good for Ateret Kohanim is Good for the state*, Haaretz, 20/08/2007

¹⁴⁴ See www.wordofmessiah.org ; www.messianicassociation.org ; www.amaa.vpweb.com ; www.umja.net ; www.submessianic.net; umjc.net.

¹⁴⁵ Khamaisi R., Nasrallah R., Brooks R., Yunan M., Margalit M., Owais A., *Jerusalem The Old City The Urban Fabric and Geopolitical Implications*, IPCC, Jerusalem 2009

¹⁴⁶ Hasson N., *Settler marketing East Jerusalem homes for 22 Jewish families*, Haaretz, 27/09/2009, <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/settlers-marketing-east-jerusalem-homes-for-22-jewish-families-1.7142>

the Absentee Property Law or through the use of Palestinian collaborators. Some of these people come from Palestinian families who, especially after the second Intifada, found themselves in economic difficulty, and faced with the need to pay off accumulated debts and lawyers' fees. In return for financial support, the settlers gave the collaborators the opportunity to live in the transferred properties for a fixed period, after which the Palestinian would legally pass the same property to the Settler Associations.

* At this point you can see the representation of Al Wad Street Device in 4.4

* You can follow in the online project the line regarding the purchase of homes by settlers and the safety device:



The hotels mentioned above (St. John 's, Imperial and Petra) are a different case, as are a series of shops on Jaffa Gate, once property of the Greek Orthodox Church. In a petition to the Supreme Court in November 2005, as reported in Ha'aretz by Meron Rapoport, Patriarch Teophilos III declared that he received pressure from the Government and from various Ministers following his statement that he had not been consulted during the real estate property transitions. To help us understand what happens, we have another Ateret Cohanim brochure, whose ideological mission is clearly indicated as *"Buying, renovating and introducing new Jewish tenants into houses and properties in and around the Old City, plot by plot, home by home, step by step, a little at a time"*. The website of the same organisation, together with the declaration of the intention of an archaeological project in El Wad street, states: *"In the Old City the presence of dozens of dedicated, brave Jewish families and yeshiva students prevented the growth of nests of terrorists and drug dealers like in Gaza, Nablus and*

Ramallah"¹⁴⁷. We are at this point in the game and we begin to have many of the elements that animate the old city-device. However, there are two other fundamental terms, in both the Foucauldian definition of governmentality and in the discursive apparatus of control, and they deserve specific treatment from a philosophical point of view: device and safety.

¹⁴⁷ Margalit M., *Like a Thorn in the Heart: Settlements and Settlers in East Jerusalem*, Occupation Magazine, 31/10/2005, http://www.kibush.co.il/show_file.asp?num=9622

2.3 Third Hand: Bio-politics ?

The term biopolitics (consisting of "βίος" and polis "πολις") is widely used in the history of philosophy and political science. It is a discourse introduced by Hannah Arendt, who led the way to an articulate and complex philosophical reflection on the 'politics of life' that has been a focus of philosophical debate since the mid-seventies. The biopolitics investigation concerns the relationship between life and politics, which is to say between life and power. In this respect, power is considered as a force that actively enters all levels of life, through science, technology and politics. The object of biopolitics is the relationship between power and people's lives, both from the biological and institutional point of view, inherent to the status of individuals and citizens. Biopolitics therefore considers the ways in which power acts on "*bare life*"¹⁴⁸. Foucault investigates the way in which power relations unfold in the forms of social organisation, enabling the production of discourses and their effects in the social sphere. Traditionally, studies on power consisted of its institutional and formal aspects; it was believed that power had a universal sense and responded to a vision defined by Foucault as "*economistic*"¹⁴⁹. From the perspective of the French philosopher however, to analyse power it is necessary to examine the relationship between knowledge and power. Foucault uses the plural when speaking of the relationship between knowledge and power to emphasise the pervasiveness of this connection and its many forms. He recognises individual as a subject, and therefore as the subjective pole of power relations; however, s/he is a subject that goes in the dual direction of "*subject to someone else by control and dependence, and subject bound to*

¹⁴⁸ The highly evocative term "bare life" was coined by Walter Benjamin and then taken up by Giorgio Agamben in *Homo Sacer*.

¹⁴⁹ Foucault, M., *Il faut défendre la société*, Hautes Études Seuil- Gallimard, Parigi 1997, trad. it. *Bisogna difendere la società*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1998, p. 21.

his own identity by conscience or self-knowledge "¹⁵⁰. He feels the need to use a new cognitive method that allows him to analyse the subject and states:

"A theoretical shift had seemed necessary in order to analyse what was often designated as the advancement of learning; it led me to examine the forms of discursive practices that articulated the human sciences. A theoretical shift had also been required in order to analyse what is often described as the manifestations of "power"; it led me to examine, rather, the manifold relations, the open strategies, and the rational techniques that articulate the exercise of powers. It appeared that I now had to undertake a third shift, in order to analyse what is termed "the subject." It seemed appropriate to look for the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognises himself qua subject. After first studying the games of truth (jeux de vérité) in their interplay with one another, as exemplified by certain empirical sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and then studying their interaction with power relations, as exemplified by punitive practices-I felt obliged to study the games of truth in the relationship of self with self and the forming of oneself as a subject "¹⁵¹.

The concrete dimension of power acquires evidence if it is not reduced to a mere economic function, but, on the contrary, is rather considered in all its complexity, according to a vision of the same power that Foucault calls "*juridico-discursive*" or "*juridico-institutional*".

¹⁵⁰ Foucault, M., *Why study power: the question of the subject* , in Dreyfus, H., Rabinow, P., *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* , The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983, trans. en. *La ricerca di Michel Foucault. Analitica della verità e storia del presente* , Ponte alle Grazie, Florence, 1989, p. 249.

¹⁵¹ Foucault, M., *L'usage des plaisirs. Histoire de la sexualité 2*, Gallimard, Parigi 1984, trad. it. *L'uso dei piaceri. Storia della sessualità 2*, Feltrinelli, Milano 1984, pp. 11-12.

"By power, I do not mean 'Power' as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body. The analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are given at the outset " ¹⁵² .

The philosopher relates this idea of power to the emergence of the concept of sovereignty and *"legal monarchy"* ¹⁵³ , which he always perceives in a negative sense because the power

"would be [...] poor in resources, sparing of its methods, monotonous in the tactics it utilises, [...] a power that only has the force of the negative on its side, a power to say no; in no condition to produce, capable only of posting limits, it is basically anti-energy. This is the paradox of its effective-ness: it is incapable of doing anything, except to render what it dominates incapable of doing anything either, except for what this power allows it to do. It is a power whose model is essentially juridical, centred on nothing more than the statement of the law and the operation of taboos. All the modes of domination, submission, and subjugation are ultimately reduced to an effect of obedience. " ¹⁵⁴ .

His vision of power is confirmed with the development of the concept of legal-political theory of sovereignty dating back to the Middle Ages, true

¹⁵² Foucault, M., *La volonté de savoir. Histoire de la sexualité 1*, Gallimard, Parigi 1976, trad. it. *La volontà di sapere. Storia della sessualità 1*, Feltrinelli, Milano 1978, pp. 81-82.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 79.

to the power in the system "*exercised mainly as a means of deduction, a subtraction mechanism, a right to appropriate a portion of the wealth, a tax of products, goods and services, labour and blood.*" ¹⁵⁵ .

He also believes that the theory of sovereignty and that of the law have evolved since the Middle Ages, when Roman law was substantially reconsidered to "*establish the legitimacy of monarchical power*"¹⁵⁶. If, on the one hand, when the theory of sovereignty is confirmed, so too is absolute monarchy, on the other hand, the theory of sovereignty has been used as a critical tool for instituting monarchies because it has been considered as the basis of modern constitutionalism and democratic systems. In this sense, sovereignty is organised around the figure of the king and becomes the focus of the law in Western societies. Consequently, Foucault must deal with power in an analytical sense, thereby moving away from traditional interpretative schemas for defining the areas of intervention and to prepare the instruments of analysis. He applies a new way of thinking about power, understood as the specific power developed by modern civilisation ¹⁵⁷ . In this sense, the concept of power refers to a set of power relations: "*the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate*"¹⁵⁸. These relations do not have a point of irradiation but are formed and disperse with the struggles and conflicts that invade them; they spread out and become understandable with the methods they use and the results they produce. From this springs the idea of the pervasiveness of power and its expansion into the social fabric, or the

"omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 120.

¹⁵⁶ Foucault, *Society must be defended*, op. cit ., p.30.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. 30-31.

¹⁵⁸ Foucault, M., *The History of Sexuality*, op. cit ., p.82.

moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. " ¹⁵⁹.

A further characteristic of power is its productivity, or rather its reproduction and the relationships that are thus formed in consideration of the fact that power *"is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society. "* ¹⁶⁰. Power is peculiar and internal to its social relations, economic and cultural rights; it is necessary to examine it in its *"legitimate and regulated forms "* ¹⁶¹ and adopt a bottom-up approach by examining it

"at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary; [...] in its more regional and local forms and institutions. Its paramount concern, in fact, should be with the point where power surmounts the rules of right which organise and delimit it and extends itself beyond them, invests itself in institutions, becomes embodied in techniques, and equips itself with instruments and eventually even violent means of material intervention" ¹⁶².

"Power is delineated by connecting with bodies and does not extend to individuals but passes through them, constituting them as subjects" ¹⁶³ and, for this reason, it becomes the focal point of the investigation on the powers that force it and, at the same time, expand it. *"In power relations there are no dominant subjects or any governed in a totalitarian manner as the results of the power occur on both, giving rise to resistances that are*

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 76..

¹⁶¹ Foucault, *Society must be defended*, op. cit ., p.30.

¹⁶² Ibid. 30-31.

¹⁶³ Foucault, *Society must be defended*, op. cit ., p.30.

widespread and variable"¹⁶⁴. They characterise individuals, "*dismembering them and remodelling them, tracing irreducible reasons in them, in their bodies and in their souls*"¹⁶⁵. Foucault's method is created on the field and "*is composed on the field, induced by the very events it addresses, in an irreducible continuity with these on the one hand, and with theory on the other*"¹⁶⁶. Biopower should be regarded in the same way as the political technology that develops in multiple forms and which is also found in the political systems of the past and has progressed organically since the modern era.

Foucault establishes this investigation in 1975 during the course he held at the Collège de France. At the beginning he shows that biopower has different purposes and should be classified as a power capable of coordinating and guiding the biological life that characterises the body. This power has a pliable capacity to rebel and to conform to the activities of power and knowledge; however its scope also includes the so-called "*social body*" formed by the population. The population is directly produced by the government and, when it protects it, the power and the strength of the State are defended simultaneously¹⁶⁷; in this sense, biopowers act to allow the formation of man. The sphere of action of biopower is mobilised in view of what it has to strike. When the object (the body) is damaged, all the doctrines are exhibited and the doctrine of the power takes the life of the human species and its expressions as its reference. Biopolitics provides a solution to the question of control over demographic events and those relating to industrialisation, which form capitalism.

¹⁶⁴ Foucault, *Why study power: the question of the subject*, op. cit., p. 249.

¹⁶⁵ Foucault, M., *The Will to Knowledge*, op. cit., P. 86.

¹⁶⁶ Petrillo A., *Critica della verità e ricerca della vita in Foucault. Questioni di metodo*, in *Società e conflitto*, n. 7/8, 1993, p. 56.

¹⁶⁷ See: Foucault, *Sécurité, territoire, population*, op. cit.

Foucault states that biopolitics

*"would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes. [...] If the development of the great instruments of the state, as institutions of power, ensured the maintenance of production relations, the rudiments of anatomo- and bio-politics, created in the eighteenth century as techniques of power present at every level of the social body and utilized by very diverse institutions (the family and the army, schools and the police, individual medicine and the administration of collective bodies), operated in the sphere of economic processes, their development, and the forces working to sustain them. They also acted as factors of segregation and social hierarchisation, exerting their influence on the respective forces of both these movements, guaranteeing relations of domination and effects of hegemony. The adjustment of the accumulation of men to that of capital, the joining of the growth of human groups to the expansion of productive forces and the differential allocation of profit, were made possible in part by the exercise of bio-power in its many forms and modes of application."*¹⁶⁸.

There is a double arrangement in the operation of power: the first with the control of bodies "from below " and the second through biopolitics, with a validation of the populations "from above ". Biopolitics concerns the phenomena that affect the life of the species and the population and defines the tools to protect it from harm. Over time, Foucault's research into biopolitics is enhanced with the emergence of the problem of government, a new direction that shifts the issue of biopolitical power to the relationship between the population and the economy. A prescriptive

¹⁶⁸ Foucault, M., *The Will to Knowledge*, op. cit ., p. 124-125.

new logic is noted through this relationship that no longer relies on a specific prescription on which to act but on the normality that comes from the observation of collective manifestations¹⁶⁹. This new normative rationality is achieved thanks to the action of the safety devices that allow for the administration of the events of the community.

2.3.1 Bio-politics of urban safety

Foucault often uses the term device. The oldest meaning of the noun '*dispositif*' seems to be a legal one. A device is the delivery of a sentence or arrest made in writing¹⁷⁰. Only in 1932 was it first paired with a technical meaning. A device is a way to arrange the various parts of an apparatus¹⁷¹. The term continues to be literally faithful to the origin, indicating the ways in which the parts of an apparatus are arranged, or devised, for a precise goal. The term was recorded with a military character. The device is a collection of measures for a strategic purpose. Within the device there are many parts that work towards the result. All of these pieces come together to indicate the machine itself. The machine works mechanically for precise purposes. We should also remember the Latin meaning of the verb *dispono*¹⁷². 'Dispono' is to place by separating, to put in order, to regulate, to fix. As well as disposition, the term 'dispositio' indicates the meaning of tactics. It is starting with Discipline and Punish that Foucault begins to use the term device. Disciplinary techniques are "devices that respond to shameful economies without coercion or pursue greatness"¹⁷³. The device does not have any delusions

¹⁶⁹ Foucault, *Sécurité, territoire, population*, op. cit., p. 55.

¹⁷⁰ Dictionnaire de L'Académie française, 1st Edition 1694, p.286

¹⁷¹ Dictionnaire de L'Académie française, 8th Edition 1932-5, p. 405

¹⁷² Castiglione L., Mariotti S., "dispono" in *Vocabolario della Lingua Latina*, Milano, Loescher, 1990

¹⁷³ Foucault M., 1975, p. 151

of grandeur but operates through local tactics, which do not show their ability to reach the target but rather that they are effective. Regarding the surveillance device, Foucault writes:

"The exercise of discipline presupposes a device that coerces by means of allowing control be played; an apparatus in which the techniques that allow you to see induce effects of power, and where, in turn, means of coercion make those to which they apply clearly visible"¹⁷⁴.

A device serves as a prerequisite for the operation of other devices. As a whole, discipline, considered as the collection of devices that it uses, is itself a device. A device is not identified with a power but is organised as a container within which power relations may act. The container contributes to the production of its content. Continuing with *Discipline and Punish*, we read: "*Behind the disciplinary devices one reads the obsession of infections, plague, revolts, crimes, loitering, desertions, persons that appear and disappear, live and die in disorder*"¹⁷⁵. Here is an impersonal will that responds to a rational order. The analysis of panopticon devices found in the previous pages is another perfect example. In essence, Foucault asks the fundamental question of liability:

"In this central and centralized humanity, an effect and tool of complex relations of power, law, bodies and forces subject to multiple imprisonment devices, subjects for discourses that are in turn elements of that strategy, we must descend the prolonged thud of battle"¹⁷⁶.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.,p.187

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.,p.216

¹⁷⁶ Foucault M., 1975, p.340

What is crucial in a device is the network that binds together all items and uses them to an end. A device, to be such, must function, bind together, produce relations, and secrete rationality. A device is either strategic or it is not. A device is historically given strategic training. Its aim is to respond to an urgency. With the urgency the question arises regarding the genesis of the device. Once formed, the device exerts a force of inertia that relates to its functional supra-determination and its ability to fill the gaps left by the device. We are facing an extraordinary complex device that responds to a logic that, once activated, is automated and voluntarily and involuntarily produces effects at the same time.

2.3.2 Lines of the device

In his last public speech before dying, G. Deleuze posed the question: What is a device? ¹⁷⁷. The device is "a coil, a multi-linear collection, consisting of lines of different kinds"¹⁷⁸. It is a collection of elements that are tangled together, one coil. These elements are multiple lines. The action of these lines inside the device is uneven.

"The lines in the device do not outline or surround systems which are each homogeneous in their own right, object, subject, language and so on, but follow directions, trace balances which are always off balance, now drawing together and then distancing themselves from one another. Each line is broken, subject to changes in direction, bifurcating and forked, and subject to drifting"¹⁷⁹.

¹⁷⁷ Deleuze G., *Qu'est ce qu'un dispositif?*, in Michel Foucault philosophe. Rencontre internationale. Paris 9, 10, 11 Janvier 1988, Paris, Seuil, 1989

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.,p.11

¹⁷⁹ Deleuze G., 1989, p.11

Deleuze, as always, came immediately to the vital point of the discussion. "Visible objects, affirmations which can be formulated, forces exercised and subject in position are like vectors and tensors (of lines)"¹⁸⁰. Within this typically deleuzian perspective the feeling of restlessness and instability present in the device takes a fundamental role. "So the three great instances that Foucault will later distinguish as knowledge, power, and subjectivity, have no boundaries are defined once and for all, but are chains of variables that pull at one another"¹⁸¹. These scarcely homogeneous lines Deleuze calls now curves. "The first two dimensions of a device or, more precisely, those which Foucault outlines first are the curves of visibility and the curves of enunciation"¹⁸². The lines of light of a device characterize it as a machine. The device is in the first instance a machine that serves "to show and to talk about"¹⁸³. Visibility made of lines is discontinuous visibility. The figures that emerge from it are only illuminated. "Every device has its own system of light, the way in which it falls, it fades, it spreads distributing the visible and the invisible, giving birth to or hiding the object that does not exist without it"¹⁸⁴. In addition to the lines of light, a device consists of lines of force. The lines of force continually pass the curves visibility and enunciation, modifying them. The lines of force "operate the comings and goings from seeing to saying and vice versa, acting as arrows that continue to weave together the words and things"¹⁸⁵. "It is the dimension of power and power is the third dimension of space, internal to the device and variable with the devices"¹⁸⁶. This brings us to the third instance. The line of flight is a line that originates and develops from a crisis. The devices are not closed

¹⁸⁰ Deleuze G., 1989, p.11

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid.,p.12

¹⁸³ Ibid.,p.13

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.p.15

systems and the instance of subjectification introduces a dimension of self that enters as a crisis, which works to exceed the other lines of the device. This 'self' must not be regarded, as Deleuze points out, as something that already exists. "Even in this case a line of subjectivation is a process, a production of subjectivity within a device: it must be done, to the extent that the device leaves it and makes it possible"¹⁸⁷. The lines of flight are added to the coil of the device and exceed it.

"The components of devices are thus lines of visibility, of enunciation, lines of force, lines of subjectification, of splits, lines of cracks, of fractures, that all intertwine and tangle together, and of which the one reconstitutes the other or generates new ones through variations or mutations to the chain"¹⁸⁸.

Studying a phenomenon in its role as a device, as has been attempted minimally towards the Old City, is to "unravel the coil of a device ... every time to trace a map, to map out, to measure unknown lands... to arrange over those lines that not only form a device but cross it and move it from North to South, from East to West, and diagonally"¹⁸⁹. We are interested in the device because "we belong to the devices and act in them"¹⁹⁰.

"In every device we must distinguish what we are (what we no longer are) and what we are in the process of becoming: the part of history and the part of the actual. History is the archive, the design of that which we are and are ceasing to be, whereas the actual is the rough sketch of what we are becoming"¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁷ Deleuze G., 1989, p.17

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p.20

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p.12

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p.27

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p.27-28

2.3.3 Urgent Security

In the same land where they developed and powered the devices (of bio-political power) the notion of security emerges, inextricably linked to modern politics. The concept of the safety device takes a turning point with Hobbes ¹⁹². For Hobbes this device brings to light the meaning of man as a living being. Living makes man so. His peculiarity as a living being is no longer a natural sociability. The peculiarity of modern man is rather his egoistic and utilitarian rationality that makes him think of his sociability in terms of a constant danger. Only the safety of his life induces the individual to create a political bond. As such modern politics is founded on life and its assurance. The elaboration of society starting from the need for/natural right to safety makes the latter a device that forms an unbreakable connection between life and politics. At the same time, the safety device also places its action as its legitimating goal, and not only as the foundation of political power. The Hobbesian paradox lies in the taken politics of life. Life can do nothing but rely blindly on the absolute power that ensures it. When that power puts the very thing on which it is founded into play to ensure it and the sovereign threatens a life, the latter can do nothing but enforce its unavailable right to security. Hobbes is the artificer of a separation. He separates life and politics on the rational plane to then enter life in the foundations of politics through the social contract. What happens is an abstraction. Hobbes abstracts the individual from the world of concrete human relationships and absolutises the preservation of his life as an organising criterion for those same relationships that give rise to life. This abstraction is the central issue of modern politics. At the moment that

¹⁹² Hobbes T., *De homine*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1984; Hobbes T., *Leviatano*, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1976; Hobbes T., *De Cive. Elementi filosofici sul cittadino*, Roma, editori riuniti, 1979

fracture is being created, the abstraction of the life of the individual, which allows all the political thought to come to construct theoretical systems that take the issue of life as the key issue. The devices discussed by Foucault will bridge the gaps, and will take care of the concrete management of life and its control. From Hobbes onwards, safety has never ceased to be a central objective for each policy. The issue of the safety of goods and of persons is opening up as a fundamental policy issue in relation to the urban environment, especially if that environment is a space characterised by conflict and the absence of a *de jure* sovereignty: the problem of urban safety becomes fundamental. The question of safety is related to the life of the city or the city as a form of life. Urban safety calls for multiple forms of government: it must be produced discursively, adhere to the arrangement of urban spaces, concern the subjects living in those spaces and those who move around those areas to consume goods and services (pilgrims, tourists etc.) Thinking about urban safety as a bio-political device means taking account of the multiple effects it produces and are reproduced from it. The issue of urban safety in the Old City can be thought of as a government machine that binds together its components to regulate movements, to ensure some while preventing others, to manage the urban population and conflicts that cross it. The ability to control deployed by means of new technologies and their effective presence is exercised over the whole population, transforming public spaces in the Old City "into the interior of an immense prison"¹⁹³. Not only is the city controlled by widespread surveillance, but its physical structure is also being remodelled, with the establishment of temporary and permanent blocks to satisfy the dominant imperative of safety. The risk is that the Old City will polarise, the social divisions within it will heighten, its internal

¹⁹³ Agamben G., *Che cos'è un dispositivo?*, Rome, Nottetempo 2006, p.33-34

public spaces will become spaces for the swift and channelled passing of tourists, and their purchases, and displacement of those who already have a clear direction. A security device is a bio-political governmental device because its objective is to manage urban populations. When we talk about safety, in our case, it means neither a right nor a legal asset. Safety is understood as the government rationality, the immense bio-political device that uses its logic as the basis for laws, discourse – political, media, archaeological, etc.- administrative measures, social practices and individual attitudes.

Chapter 3

FROM LAND FOR PEACE TO PEACE FOR SECURITY

3.1 From 'land for peace' to 'peace for security'

In this chapter of passage, the addressed issue is international humanitarian law and peace. You could say that processes advance when they approach peace and recede when they distance away from it radicalising the conflict.

Now very briefly let's summarise the part of the historical framework necessary for reading geopolitics of peace talks. I'll do it just to provide the key feature to have in mind during the presentation of the plans division, which I will cover in sections 3.2 and 4.1.

The territories taken by Israel during the war of '67 are the ones that from now on we will define the 'Occupied Territories', which do not correspond to the allocation of the territories entrusted by the UN according to resolution n. 181 of 1947 ¹⁹⁴.

In 1967, following the Arab bloc in the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel launched a pre-emptive attack and took the West Bank (with the Old City) to Jordan, the Golan Heights to Syria, the Gaza Strip to Egypt. The UN asked in vain for the immediate withdrawal of Israel from the territories ¹⁹⁵. A large part of the schemes of peace in the Middle East goes through the return of the territories.

The Yom Kippur War in 1973, the combined attack of the Arab countries against Israel, was a war of military confrontation without winners or losers. It was the first war where there was a sort of balance ¹⁹⁶. It was the first war that led to negotiations ¹⁹⁷. It was already the time

¹⁹⁴ UN General Assembly Resolution 181, November 29, 1947. According to the plan of the UN General Assembly of 1947, which provided for the creation of two states on Palestinian land, one Arab and one Jewish, Jerusalem and its environs should be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime. Text of the resolution: <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/res181.htm> (4/01/2012)

¹⁹⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 242, November 22, 1967. Text of the resolution: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.pdf?OpenElement> (4/01/2012).

¹⁹⁶ C. Herzog, *The War of Atonement: The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War*, Greenhill Books, London 2003; E. O'Ballance, *No Victor, No Vanquished: the Yom Kippur War*, Presidio Press, November 1996; A. Rabinovich, *The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East*, Schocken Books, New York 2005.

of the energy crisis and the Arabs were in control of oil prices. This inserted the conflict in a different context that demanded immediate peace negotiations. If the geopolitics of the Cold War agreed that the conflict was continuing, during the Yom Kippur War the geopolitical needs would have changed ¹⁹⁸.

In the history of peace negotiations, there is a pivotal moment in which the leader al-Sadat as president of Egypt after Nasser's death in 1970 decided that it was desirable to move to a political solution rather than military ¹⁹⁹. Al-Sadat renounced the pan-Arabism and signed the Camp David Accords during the U.S. presidency of Carter. Camp David is the beginning of peace negotiations to come. Since the Camp David Accords, Egypt recognised the existence of the State of Israel.

The big problem was exactly the one derived from mutual recognition. Since when, in fact, the State of Israel was created in 1948, no Arab country recognised it. Israel was considered an intrusion, a spearhead of the West, even more manipulation than what already occurred when, according to the Arab perspective, the independence was stolen by the British and French after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The UN partition proposal was not even considered by the Arab side. The Palestinians did not see the Jewish community as the victim of a historic horror but rather as a product of geopolitics that manipulated the region ²⁰⁰.

When al-Sadat in 1978 signed agreements with Israeli Prime Minister Begin in front of U.S. President Carter, it was the first time since

¹⁹⁷ M.Maoz, *From War to Peacemaking*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995

¹⁹⁸ Q.William, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, Brookings Institution University of California Press, Washington 2005.

¹⁹⁹ R.Israeli, *Man of Defiance: A Political Biography of Anwar Sadat*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 1985; M.A. al Sadar, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography*, Collins, London 1978.

²⁰⁰ A.Bregman, *Israel's Wars. A History Since 1947*, Routledge, London 2002; C.Herzog, *the Arab-Israeli Wars*, Random House, 1982.

the creation of the State of Israel in the region that someone recognised the right of Israel to exist.

This was the beginning of peace. Al-Sadat can be considered to be the architect of the scheme 'land for peace'. Egypt recognised Israel (even Jordan recognised Israel) and Israel donated the occupied territories. Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt, which had been taken during the Six-Day war, and Egypt gave the Gaza strip to the Palestinians ²⁰¹.

The return of the occupied territories was a key part of the agreement but the issue became more complicated since the return was blocked with the establishment of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories.

With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. began to play a dominant and unipolar role. These were the years of George H. W. Bush USA presidency. To have a role in the region, there was a need to heal the region. Geopolitically the attainment of peace in the Middle East was converted into a strategic goal for the USA. Bush called on both sides to negotiate in Madrid. The first agreements that were made in Madrid in 1991 were not real, proper agreements. It was a conference, which already represented a great opportunity for the start of negotiations. It was already a first step of mediation. It was the first approach. ²⁰²

Then began the era of Clinton, who presented his policy as a conciliatory strategy that made the U.S. a guarantor of peace in the Middle East conducting both parties on a common negotiation. Thus was born the possibility of the Oslo Accords of 1993 (paragraph 3.2).

²⁰¹ K.Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace*, Taylor & Francis, 1999; A.Sela, *The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East*, Continuum, New York 2002; Full text of Camp David Accords: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/camp%20david%20accords.aspx> (22/01/14).

²⁰² The Madrid Peace Conference, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol 21, n 2, winter 1992, p. 144-146; L.Fawcett, *International Relations of the Middle East*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, p. 295

Getting to the possibility of a peace agreement, despite all the estrangement, is to imagine an output historic exit, to find a 'how to' that in the collective consciousness can then be recovered in moments of crisis. The most difficult thing in achieving a peace agreement is the 'how'. In war there is only the elimination of the other, in peace, on the other hand, the need for co-existence implies the need to identify with the other. It's harder to empathise with another than killing them.²⁰³

The general scheme of Oslo, which proceeded to the parties, was the same already proposed by Al-Sadat. The 'land for peace'²⁰⁴ implied Palestinian recognition of the state of Israel. It recognised the PLO as the legitimate ruler of Palestine, it recognised the independence of Palestine and flew the Palestinian flag for the first time. Arafat moved to Gaza in the Occupied Territories and the Palestinian Authority began to run. A gradual process was proposed in which Palestine began as autonomy and converted a little at a time into a nation state. The interim Palestinian government lasted for five years. The aim of the negotiations was to establish an authority of Palestinian interim self-government, a council elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period, with the aim of reaching a permanent settlement based on UN resolutions 242 and 338. In order to ensure the democratic principle, general elections were held to elect the Council. A transfer of authority from the Israeli Defense Forces to the Palestinians took place, concerning education, culture, health, social welfare, taxation

²⁰³ M.Anderson, L.Olson, *Confronting War: critical lessons for Peace Practitioners*, Cambridge, USA 2003; K.Bush, *A Measure for Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones*, International Development Research Centre, Working paper 1, Ottawa, March 1998; R.Fisher, W.Ury, *Getting to Yes: How to Negotiate Without Giving In*, Penguin Group, London 1981.

²⁰⁴ V.Lowe, A.Roberts, J.Welsh, D.Zaum, *The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, p.308; E.Touger, *Eyes Upon The Land*, http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/72429/jewish/Eyes-Up-On-The-Land.htm (23/01/14); Y.Tauber, *Land for peace?*, http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/82019/jewish/Land-for-Peace.htm (23/01/14); S.E.Crispe, *Peace or piece?*, http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/298030/jewish/Peace-or-Piece.htm (23/01/14);

and tourism. The Council formed a strong police force, while Israel continued to have responsibility for defense against external threats .²⁰⁵

Peace agreements almost always begin with taking into consideration issues that are easier to agree on and leaving more complex issues to the end. Starting with the more complex issues are likely to affect the entire negotiation. As the agreements are consolidated, you can get in more difficult questions.²⁰⁶

In this case, one of the most difficult issues was and is the question of Jerusalem. Apart from the crucial question of Jerusalem, the other remaining issues were: Palestinian refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighboring countries.

In the first period of the State of Israel, Israeli sovereignty was only on the Western part of Jerusalem. East Jerusalem was in Arab hands. With the '67 war Israel occupied the whole of Jerusalem. I repeat: the war of '67 represents the irreversible point of the conflict.

At a time when, as established in Oslo, the return of territories by Israel was to take place, the settlement of settlers increased by making the return more difficult. In 1991 settler population was 90,300 in west Bank. 3,800 in Gaza Strip, 137,300 in East Jerusalem, 11,600 in Golan Heights (total: 243,000). In 1998 settler population was 163,300 in west Bank, 6,100 in Gaza Strip, 165,967 in East Jerusalem, 14,900 in Golan Heights (total: 350,267).²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ Full text of The Principles of the Accords: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/isrplo.asp (22/01/14); O.Eran, Arab-Israel Peacemaking, The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of The Middle East, Continuum, New York 2002;

²⁰⁶ J.P.Lederach, Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Washington 1997; U.Savir, Colloqui di pace. Imparare a salvare il mondo ogni giorno, Luca Sossella Ed., 2008; B.Wood, Development dimensions of conflict prevention and Peace-building, UNDP, New York, June 2001.

²⁰⁷ Israeli Settler Population 1972-2006, Foundation for Middle East Peace, http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/israeli-settler-population-1972-2006 (22/01/14).

Thus began the gradual weakening of the PLO. The agreements were not fulfilled. Israel was building settlements in the Occupied Territories. The PLO was accused of corruption and mismanagement of funds arriving to facilitate autonomy ²⁰⁸. The European Union was an important supporter of the Palestinian Authority in terms of economic aid for the purposes of public education, infrastructure networks, administration of the state. According to some, these funds contributed to the enrichment of Arafat and/or served to support the Palestinian terrorism. ²⁰⁹

The PLO did not offer the Palestinians any concrete results. On the one hand the non-fulfillment of the agreements prevented the PLO from showing results, on the other colonies complicated the issue.

The problem of slow colonisation and the methodology of the Israeli occupation of the Old Town part of the Territories is the key feature, along with the issue of security, on which analysis was carried out in the first two chapters.

Given that the PLO could not present the results, disillusionment with the PLO gave strength to Hamas, an Islamist movement that has its origins in the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt ²¹⁰. Hamas has a strong social support network that compensates for the lack of a state benefactor. Hamas manages large social programs, and has gained popularity in Palestinian society by establishing hospitals, education systems, libraries

²⁰⁸ R.Ehrenfeld, And a Thief, Too: Yasser Arafat takes what he likes, National Review, July 29, 2002, <http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=12801> (23/01/14);

²⁰⁹ T.Kleine-Brockhoff and B.Schirra, Arafat bombs, Europa pays, Die Zeit, June 7, 2002, <http://likud.nl/2002/06/arafat-bombs-europa-pays-arafat-bombt-europa-zahlt-likoed-nederland/> (24/01/14).

²¹⁰ Founded by Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, ‘ Abd al-‘ Aziz al-Rantisi and Mahmoud al-Zahar in 1987. The Hamas Charter proposes the deletion of the State of Israel. The Statute states that there is no solution to the Palestinian question except in the jihad. Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by Canada, EU, Israel, Japan, US, and is banned in Jordan. In January 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections. The main electoral bases of Hamas were in the Gaza Strip. Hamas official website: [http://www.hamashinfo.net/ar/#&slider1=1](http://www.hamashinfo.net/ar/#&slider1=1;); Hamas Charter: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp; S.Mishal, A.Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, Columbia University Press, New York 2006.

and other services ²¹¹. The activities of Hamas with regard to social welfare and education are deeply rooted in the Gaza Strip. Hamas does not recognise the State of Israel and denied any peace agreement ²¹².

The credibility of peace declined significantly ²¹³. Both peoples lost the possibility of peace provided by the Oslo Accords. The strong political opposition to the peace process, fomented by Israeli right-wing groups and Islamic extremist groups, generated a climate of violence (Rabin's death due to an extremist religious Jew in 1995, the Hebron massacre in 1994, the Peres policy in Lebanon in 1996). The buildup of tensions between 1993 and 2000 culminated in the second intifada. With the security needs of the population born since the violence of the second intifada, the 'land for peace' scheme was modified to 'peace for security'.

'Peace for security' was much more complex because it involved an extreme control of the territory (see 2.1 and 2.2). The change of direction was within the peace negotiations but was hindered at the same time.

The events of September 11, 2001 further transform this conflict because the global war on terrorism puts it back into a bipolar character (the United States loses the role of guarantor and mediator typical of the Clinton era and when the guarantor takes a stand you lose the mediation process that provides oxygen). With the Second Intifada and the events of September 11 ends the possibility of the Oslo Accords. The question of the rights of the Palestinians and the return of the territory fades into background while the question of security takes over. We have already

²¹¹ E.Giorgi, Palestinian election raises varying opinions within U, Minnesota Daily, January 31, 2006, <http://www.mndaily.com/2006/01/31/palestinian-election-raises-varying-opinions-within-u> (24/01/14);

²¹² Nevertheless, in 2009, Mesh'al Khaled, head of the political office in Damascus, said that Hamas was willing to cooperate with a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict which included a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, provided that the right to return in Israel was granted to Palestinian refugees and that East Jerusalem was recognized as the capital of the new state (Jay Solomon, online.wsj.com, 21/07/2009, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124899975954495435?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB124899975954495435.html> -24/01/14-).

²¹³ G.Lalieu and M.Collon interviewing Mohamed Hassan, How can we explain the success of Hamas?, Michel Collon, Feb 23, 2009, http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_58458.shtml (24/01/14).

analysed in the course of the research, the unfolding of the Israeli security device.

The *road map for peace*, which we will see in detail in 3.2, still insists more on the issue of security with respect to the issue of territory.

The problem is that the topic of security proves to be de-sac. The Palestinian Authority is not able to guarantee the security and Israel, which, as shown in previous chapters, has much more strategic and technological resources.

It is appropriate to preface the examination of the different possible scenarios for the Old City (4.1), with an analysis of the various plans that were actually presented without producing results during the last twenty years (3.2).

Unlike the first two chapters dedicated to field research and analysis of bio-political-territorial conflict, the third chapter is intended as a chronicle as much as possible compilatory of the peace process.

Taking into account the failure of attempts, and analysing the reasons for it, it should constitute a weighting element in the formulation of realistic assumptions.

Peace processes are not in vain because they create in the collective unconscious memory roads of hope to use when situations transform.

3.2 Chronicle of a negotiation

In October 1991 the United States and the former Soviet Union made Israelis and Palestinians sit at the same table, firstly as part of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, on the occasion of the Peace Conference in Madrid ²¹⁴. A delicate negotiation had produced the formula according to which Israel agreed to a joint delegation of Palestinians and Jordanians provided that the members came from the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza and had no ties with the PLO. The Americans also allowed that they were acting as a Steering Committee in representing Palestinians living in East Jerusalem and outside the occupied territories²¹⁵.

Immediately after the end of the peace conference, direct bilateral negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians started. Simultaneously, Israel undertook secret negotiations with the PLO in Oslo. ²¹⁶ .

As the results of these negotiations, the Israeli government and the PLO signed up to Oslo 1993 and then officially signed a Declaration of Principles on interim self-government in Washington, the Oslo Agreement (DOP: *Declaration of Principles*) ²¹⁷. The DOP was signed by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, the Israeli government and the head of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority Chairman, Mahmoud Abbas, known as Abu Mazen. According to the scheme agreed between the two delegations, Israelis and Palestinians have conducted their negotiations for gradual stages, starting with efforts to reach agreements on a provisional self-government, which would remain in force for a period of five years. After the third year of the establishment of the Palestinian self-government, negotiations on the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza started.

²¹⁴ R.Lapidot and M.Hirsch, *The Arab-Israel Conflict and its Resolution: Selected Documents*, Dordrecht, 1992, pp. 383-287.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ G.Codovini, *Storia del conflitto arabo israeliano palestinese : tra dialoghi di pace e monologhi di guerra*, Mondadori, Milano 2007

²¹⁷ M. Klein, *Jerusalem. The Contested City*, New York, 2001

In this DOP, Israel recognised the principle of self-government of Palestine and the PLO recognised the right of Israel to live in peace and security, renouncing terrorism and promising to delete paragraphs from the National Charter in which they denied the right of Israel's existence. Israel recognised the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

There however, still remained serious problems to resolve, such as that of Jerusalem. The real test of the agreement was the future of Israeli settlements and the ability of Rabin and Arafat to maintain their positions in front of the disputes that would inevitably have arisen. The concessions of Arafat have been challenged by Hamas, who did not want any compromise with Israel and had the support of many Palestinians. On the Israeli side, however, the Rabin government had to face the opposition of the Likud party that had worked hard to strengthen the Jewish presence in the West Bank. The following table shows location and size of the areas expropriated from 1968 to 1991.

Table 6. Expropriations in East Jerusalem

Date of Expropriation	Area	Area in km ²
January 8, 1968	French Hill	3.345
	Mount Scopus Ramot Eshkol	
	Ma'alot Dafna	0.485
		Total : 3.830
April 14, 1968	Neve Ya'aqov	0.765
	Old City (Jewish quarter)	0.116
		Total : 0.881

August 30, 1970	Neve Ya'aqov	0.470
	Ramot Allon	4.840
	Shu'afat Ridge	
	East Talpiyyot	2.240
	Gilo	2.700
	Atarot	1.200
	Gai Ben Hinom	0.130
	Jaffa Gate	0.100
	Ramat Rachel Area	0.600
		Total : 12.280
March 20, 1980	Pisgat Ze'ev	4.400
July 1, 1982	Atarot	0.137
May 16, 1991	Har Homah	1.850
Total		23.378

Source: Margalit M., *Discrimination in the Heart of the Holy City*, Al Manar Modern Press, Jerusalem 2006

It was clear that the future of the peace process depended on the ability of Arafat and Rabin to convince the majority of Palestinians and Israelis that it would offer real benefits to the political and economic development.

In 1995, during the Oslo II, new, more challenging agreement was signed. The Israelis agreed to withdraw their troops and settlements from most of the towns and villages of the West Bank by 1996, leaving civil administration to Palestinian Council elected by the people ²¹⁸. In

²¹⁸ G.Codovini, *Storia del conflitto arabo israeliano palestinese : tra dialoghi di pace e monologhi di guerra*; M.Pinfari, *Quale pace? : Storia ed interpretazioni del processo di Oslo*, CLUEB, Bologna 2005.

exchange, the role of Israel was established in the control of security in some areas of the West Bank and Palestinians committed to amend paragraphs from their National Charter calling for the destruction of Israel. While the majority of Israelis seemed satisfied with that, in Hebron settlers demonstrated against concessions in the West Bank²¹⁹. Then Rabin was mortally wounded in 1995. Rabin's place was taken by Shimon Peres, who decided to proceed with the implementation of the agreements. At the end of the year, the key cities of the West Bank were now under the control of the Palestinian Authority after nearly three decades of Israeli occupation.

With Peres the peace process slowed down. The parliament was split in two, and Likud's Netanyahu won the 1996 elections²²⁰.

While not abandoning the dialogue for peace, he began to give priority to the security needs of Israel, demanding reciprocity of commitments by the Palestinian side.

It was only in October 1998 that the first real step forward occurred, when Arafat and Netanyahu came together at the Wye Conference Center in Maryland. The agreement established further Israeli evacuation of the West Bank, which would leave 40% of the territory under Palestinian control, and Arafat committed to a program of action to combat the attacks²²¹. This time it was the Likud clutching an agreement

²¹⁹ A. Levi, *E' battaglia a Hebron tra i coloni e i militari*, Corriere della Sera, 16/01/1995, http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/1995/febbraio/16/battaglia_Hebron_tra_coloni_militari_co_0_9502166513.shtml (28/12/2013)

²²⁰ C. Enderlin, *Storia del fallimento della pace tra Israele e Palestina. Il sogno infranto. La ricostruzione dei negoziati di pace, ufficiali e segreti, a partire dall'assassinio di Yitzhak Rabin nel 1995 fino alla seconda Intifada*, Newton & Compton, Roma 2003; A. Levi, *L'uomo che non vince*, Corriere della Sera, 31/05/1996, http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/1996/maggio/31/UOMO_CHE_NON_VINCE_co_0_96053111974.shtml (28/12/2013); L. Cremonesi, *Israele, sullo schermo vince Bibi*, Corriere della Sera, 27/05/1996, http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/1996/maggio/27/Israele_sullo_schermo_vince_Bibi_co_0_96052711246.shtml (28/12/2013).

²²¹ H. Sicherman, *The Camp Wye Accords, February 1999, Foreign Service Despatches and Periodic Reports on U.S. Foreign Policy*, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_10/sicherman_wye.html (29/12/2013); text of memorandum: http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/wye_eng.htm (29/12/2013); D. Ross, *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004

with the Palestinians. The role of Arafat in accepting the new safety program was targeted by Hamas, meanwhile, Netanyahu had to face an internal crisis since the agreement undermined the core of the positions of the Likud in the West Bank. Netanyahu had no choice but to agree to hold early elections in 1999, in which the Labourite Ehud Barak won. Within a few days Barak met Arafat in Gaza and promised to commit to work to remove the obstacles that hindered implementation of the peace.

In 2000, President Clinton decided to get a final agreement between Israel and the Palestinians before the end of his term and convened a summit between Barak and Arafat at Camp David. From the point of view of Barak, Israeli proposals were entirely new. He offered the Palestinians a contiguous area that included more than 90% of the West Bank, a Palestinian capital located in an area of Jerusalem, a kind of joint sovereignty over the Temple Mount and the return of refugees to a Palestinian state, even if not in Israel. The Israeli offer left no hope to refugees who had resided within the borders of the state of Israel pre-1967²²². Arafat was also asked to settle for less than 22% of the portion of Palestinian territory resulted from the 1948 war, which the Palestinian leader considered impractical due to the fact that he had accepted Resolution 242 in 1967.

Everything was amplified by the internal situation, where the failure of the summit led to a significant increase in tension. The episode that brought out these tensions was provided by Likud leader Ariel Sharon, who publicly announced that he wanted to visit the Temple Mount. In 2000, Sharon went into the holy place. Thus began the 'Al-Aqsa Intifada', the second intifada. Unlike before the end of the '80s, the

²²² Principles of Camp David's American Plan, Settlement Report, vol 10 n 5, September-October 2000, Foundation for Middle East Peace, <http://www.fmep.org/reports/archive/vol.-10/no.-5/principles-of-camp-davids-american-plan> (5/01/2014); D.Ross, *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*; S.Ben-Ami, *Camp David Diaries*, *Ma'ariv* 6/04/2001, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/benamidiary.html> (5/01/2014); M.Abbas, *Reports of the Camp David Summit*, 9/09/2000, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol XXX no 2, winter 2001

Palestinian security forces were now armed. Clinton tried to save the situation and, still in 2000, there was a summit meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, representatives of the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority, along with the Americans, the Egyptians and the Jordanians, the United Nations and all of the European Union. Clinton announced the establishment of an international committee to establish the facts ²²³. Barak announced elections for 2001. Meanwhile, in the last days of his term, Clinton made a last attempt to bring the two parties together. Representatives of Israel and the Palestinian Authority met in Taba, Egypt, in 2001. The proposal was a Palestinian state on 97% of the territories and East Jerusalem, and \$ 30 billion for the rehabilitation of refugees ²²⁴. The proposal was accepted by Barak but rejected by Arafat. The talks broke down just days before the Israeli elections. Ariel Sharon won a landslide victory.

Despite the perpetuation of violent outbursts as a result of the Second Intifada, negotiations continued to move forward. On 16 and 17 October 2000, in Sharm el-Sheikh, a meeting was summoned in which in addition to the Israeli and Palestinian delegations, U.S. president Clinton, Jordan's King Abdullah, Egyptian President Mubarak and Secretary of the United Nations Kofi Annan all took part. Barak and Arafat, despite not signing any agreement, pledged to stop the fighting and accept the sending of an American mission that would investigate the events of the intifada ²²⁵. The Knesset, in the meantime, on 27 November 2000, passed

²²³ UNISPAL, Report of The Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, April 30, 2000, See more at: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6E61D52EAACB860285256D2800734E9A#sthash.cRW5BsOC.dpu f; The Sharm el-Sheikh agreement, BBC, 17/10/2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/976760.stm (7/01/2014).

²²⁴ D.Matz, *Trying to understand the taba talks*, *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture*, vol 10 n 3, 2003, <http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=32> (7/01/2014).

²²⁵ Full report: http://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/docs/mitchell_report_2001_en.pdf (7/01/2014).

by an overwhelming majority a constitutional law that prohibits any transfer of sovereignty over the eastern part of Jerusalem ²²⁶.

The law, however, was not an obstacle to the revival of the peace initiatives. On 23 December, Clinton, whose term would expire January 20, 2001, summoned the parties to the White House to announce his new proposals. The plan provided for the transfer of 94-96% of the West Bank to Palestinian sovereignty and the evacuation of most Israeli settlements. The territory annexed by Israel would have to be offset by an exchange of lands at a rate of 1 to 3%. An international force, with an Israeli military presence for a period of between three and six years old, would have been deployed along the Jordan Valley. As for Jerusalem, the general principle was a division based on ethnic criteria: the Arab areas under the sovereignty of the Palestinians, the Jewish ones under Israeli sovereignty. This principle would also be applied to the Old Town, with the following division: Palestinian sovereignty over al-Haram ash-Sharif and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall and the area between the two mosques ²²⁷.

Barak decided to accept the "Clinton Plan" as a basis for negotiations but wanted Arafat to do the same. From Gaza the Palestinian President responded to Clinton with a letter in which he asked for more assurances and explanations of his proposals.

To solve the problem of Jerusalem, the two delegations were inspired by the Clinton parameters based on the division of sovereignty according to ethnic criteria. The Palestinians declared they were ready to

²²⁶ Amendment no 1 of The Basic Law: Jerusalem, capital of Israel (1980) was passed by the Knesset and published in Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 5762, p. 28, http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic10_eng.htm (7/01/2014).

²²⁷ Full text of Clinton Parameters: http://www.peacelobby.org/clinton_parameters.htm (9/01/2014); Interview with D.Ross, Fox News Sunday, 21/04/2002, <http://digilander.libero.it/asdfghj2/dossier/Quando%20Arafat%20disse%20di%20no%20alla%20pace.%20E%20perche.htm> (7/01/2014); Official Palestinian Response to The Clinton Parameters, January 1, 2001, Negotiations Affairs Department, Palestine Liberation Organization, <http://www.nad-plo.org/etemplate.php?id=98> (7/01/2014).

discuss the Israeli demands relating to Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem built after 1967 but categorically ruled out the possibility of including settlements Maale Adumim and Givat Zeev under Israeli sovereignty, located outside of the municipality ²²⁸.

The parties declared themselves available to the idea of an "open city", the capital of two states. The negotiations this time not stalled on the fate of Jerusalem, like at Camp David, but on the problem of the Palestinian refugees.

Behind the refugee problem lies the issue of population in the conflict (1.5). Clinton suggested the establishment of an international commission in order to track down a solution to the problem, which combines the three following assumptions: compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation. The guiding principle was that any solution should take into account the needs of both parties and, in view of the two states, that the Palestinian state would become the focal point for the Palestinians and the Israeli of the Israelis. Clinton proposed 5 possible accommodations for refugees: the future Palestinian state; areas of Israel transferred to Palestine in the land swap, rehabilitation in a host country; rehabilitation in a third country, and finally resettling in the state of Israel. ²²⁹

The Clinton proposals were, together with Resolution 242, the basis of the negotiations at Taba in 2001. The talks ended with a joint statement in which the two parts admitted to not being able to agree ²³⁰. The peace process was suspended indefinitely. With the landslide victory

²²⁸ Deconstructing the Taba Talks, Settlement Report, vol 11 no 2, March-April 2001, Foundation for Middle East Studies, <http://www.fmep.org/reports/archive/vol-11/no-2/deconstructing-the-tabatalks> (8/01/2014); Taba Peace Talks, January 2001, The Forward, February 22, 2002, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/Taba.html>.

²²⁹ Clinton Proposal in Israeli-Palestinian Peace, Meeting with President Clinton, White House, December 23, 2000, full text on http://www.peacelobby.org/clinton_parameters.htm (24/1/14).

²³⁰ J.Pressman, *International Security*, vol 28 no 2, Fall 2003, "Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?", <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/pressman.pdf> (8/01/2014); UNISPAL, The Moratinos non-paper, <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/CEA3EFD8C0AB482F85256E3700670AF8> (8/01/2014)

of Sharon, and the gradual loss of authority of Arafat, the chance of the deal faded. In 2002, an Arab summit approved what can be considered a turning point in the Arab-vis Israel: the Beirut Declaration ²³¹.

Inspiration behind the Declaration was Saudi Prince Abdallah. He asked first of all Israelis to return to the borders of the State of Israel within the limits imposed by resolution 242 of the UN Security Council, possibly exploiting the principle of exchange "land for peace", Israel would then have to accept the idea of a independent Palestinian state, with the assurance from the Arab side of a permanent peace.

He asked Israel to reconsider the peace policy as a real strategic option.

There were three Arab²³² demands: full withdrawal from the territories occupied since June '67, the achievement of a solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees, and the establishment of a sovereign and independent Palestinian state, which would find its own ground in the occupied territories' 67, in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, which became its capital.

As a result, the Arab states declared themselves willing to look over the Arab-Israeli conflict, to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, to ensure security for all the states in the region ²³³.

The demand for a full Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders clashed with repeated Israeli utterances, and with them concrete taking possession of the land, concerning the conquest of defensible borders, in addition, it was unthinkable that Israel would renounce the Jewish Quarter and the *Old City* ²³⁴.

²³¹ J.Teitelbaum, The Arab Peace Initiative: a primer and future prospects, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2009, <http://www.jcpa.org/text/Arab-Peace-Initiative.pdf>

²³² The proposals were made by the members of the Arab League and not only by the Palestinians.

²³³ Full text of the Arab Peace Initiative: <http://reliefweb.int/report/israel/text-arab-peace-initiative-adopted-beirut-summit> (8/01/2014); J. Cingoli, Beirut Ginevra Gerusalemme, percorsi di pace in Medioriente, CIPMO, Milano 2006, 141-142.

²³⁴ J.Cingoli, Beirut Ginevra Gerusalemme, percorsi di pace in Medioriente; G.Rifkind, The Arab Peace Initiative: Why Now?, Oxford Research Group, November 2008,

An element of innovation in this project was the establishment of a full normalisation of relations with Israel and peace, not only military but also commercial and diplomatic.

In any case, the Beirut Declaration became the text of comparison of successive attempts at dialogue and official documents.²³⁵

At that time, relations between Israelis and Palestinians were particularly tense, especially for the sudden escalation of the intifada.

The Israeli dissent to the proposals focused on the Saudi side on the return of the pre-1967 borders was seen in the Beirut Declaration as a precondition to the recognition of the State of Israel and not a result of the peace agreement between Israel and various Arab states.

The Arab League approved the Saudi plan, which was blocked by Israel ²³⁶. A further cause for exacerbation of relations was the Palestinian terrorist attack that struck the same evening as the approval of the project by Arab, a hotel in Netanya, which killed 29 people celebrating the Passover Seder.

The act that most clearly expressed the Israeli reaction was that, on the part of Prime Minister Sharon to start in the Occupied Territories the *Defensive Wall* operation, approved in principle by the *Ministerial committee for Security Matters* 14 April 2002.

On the proposal of the "Quartet of peace" (European Union, Russia, the United States and the United Nations) and in particular the U.S. Department of State, 30 April 2003 *Road Map* ²³⁷ was published.

Both parties accepted it. It was conceived as a process consisting of three phases and it aims to put an end to the conflict between Israelis and

http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers/arab_peace_initiative_why_now;
A.El Amraoui, Can Israel agree to peace?, Al Jazeera, 18/02/2009,
<http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2009/02/200927225945114103.html>

²³⁵ For example the UN Security Council Resolution 1397 adopts on 12 March 2002.

²³⁶ Arab leaders relaunch peace plan, BBC News. March 28, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6501573.stm; A.Issacharoff, PA:Arabs should cal on Israel to accept Saudi plan unchanged, March 27, 2007, Haaretz.

²³⁷ Full text of the Road Map: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2989783.stm.

Palestinians over two years. In the first phase, to be implemented by May 2003, the Palestinian Authority must unequivocally recognise the right of Israel to exist in peace and security, pledging to fight terrorism, disarming all groups who set out the goal of destroying the Jewish state, while consolidating its security forces. At the same time, the Palestinians had to reform the structure of their institutions through the adoption of a constitution that would have to structure the state as a parliamentary democracy and a strong cabinet formed by a Prime Minister, with wide powers and distinct from the President. In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip they would then hold free and democratic elections. At the same time, Israel undertook not to take any action that could undermine the confidence of the Palestinian commitment to peace to be achieved, taking all the necessary steps for the normalization of Palestinian life, blocking the practice of targeted killings, withdrawing from the occupied areas after 28 September, 2000, the beginning of the second intifada, dismantling the settlements built after March 2001 and to freeze any further expansion of all settlements. The second phase, which was to go from June to December 2003 provided for the holding of Palestinian elections and the formation of a new government based on the new constitution. The verification of this process of reform of the Palestinian Authority would be the responsibility of the Quartet that, if he deemed appropriate, would later promote the establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders. The purpose of this state would be to allow a negotiation between equals with Israel, to be implemented through an international conference, which would ensure international recognition of the new Palestinian state. The third phase would then take place over two years, between 2004 and 2005, with the consolidation of Palestinian institutions and the definitive end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For this purpose, a second International Conference was provided in which

they had to face the most controversial issues: borders and therefore the issue of the settlements, the status of Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian refugees ²³⁸.

The next phase was scheduled only after the Quartet had verified the completion of the previous stage, although some exemptions were partial. This rigidity in setting unfortunately allowed the initial hurdles to hinder throughout the whole process. The Palestinians were not able to impede terrorism ²³⁹ and failed to reform their institutions, both for the resistance to the Israeli attitude. Israelis, for their part, further developed the practice of targeted killings ²⁴⁰ and continued to establish new settlements ²⁴¹.

²³⁸ The Road Map, Institute for Palestine Studies, Journal of Palestine Studies XXXII, no. 4, Summer 2003, pp. 83–99

²³⁹ According to B'Tselem more than 400 members of the Israeli security forces, and 821 Israeli civilians were killed by Palestinians between 1993 and 2000 (B'Tselem, Statistics, Fatalities, Btselem.org, <http://www.btselem.org/statistics> -22/01/14-). According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1,137 Israelis were killed by Palestinians during the Second Intifada (Victims of Palestinian Terror since September 2000, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/victims%20of%20palestinian%20violence%20and%20terrorism%20sinc.aspx> -24/01/14-). See: M.Harrison, Bombers and Bystanders in Suicide Attacks in Israel, 2000 to 2003, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 29 (2), <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/harrison/public/sct06postprint.pdf> -24/01/14-.

²⁴⁰ Some of the targeted killings by the Israeli military were Hamas leaders Mahmoud Adani (2001), Jamil Jadallah (2001), Salah Shahade (2002), Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (2004), Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi (2004) and Adnan al-Ghoul (2004). On December 14, 2006, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled admissible the practice of targeted killings (in Hebrew *sikul memukad*, ie targeted prevention). See: A.Stahl, *Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings Against Hamas Religio-Military Command as a Counter-terrorism Tool*, Monitor Journal of International Studies. Vol 12 n 1, Winter 2006, <http://web.wm.edu/so/monitor/issues/12-1/6-stahl.pdf> (22/01/14); Scott Wilson, *Israeli High Court Backs Military On Its Policy of Targeted Killings*, Washington Post, Dec 15, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/14/AR2006121400430.html> (22/01/14).

²⁴¹ C.Urquhart, Israel flouts road map with new settlement, 6 August 2004, The Guardian London, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/aug/06/israel> (24/01/14). Despite the Israelis and Palestinians agreed on the plan of the road map in 2003, the number of Israeli settlers increased from 427.617 in 2003 to 460.838 in 2005 (Israeli Settler Population 1972-2006, Foundation for Middle East, http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/israeli-settler-population-1972-2006 -24/01/14-). The Sasson Report in 2005 stated that the Israeli state bodies had diverted millions of shekels to build settlements and outposts in the West Bank (<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/state/law/pages/summary%20of%20opinion%20concerning%20unauthorized%20outposts%20-%20talya%20sason%20adv.aspx> -24/01/14-). In the same year the Israeli government confirmed the plan to increase the size of the settlement Maale Adumim in the West Bank (Israeli confirms settlement growth, 21 March 2005, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4367787.stm -24/01/14-). At the same time, with Israel's unilateral disengagement plan, 21 settlements in Gaza and four in the northern West Bank were evacuated (What Next For Gaza and West Bank?, 30 August 2005, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4714611.stm -24/01/14-). In 2007, Israel approved the construction of 300 new homes in Har Homa, in East Jerusalem (EU criticises Israel settler plan, 10

While remaining a point of reference, the *Road Map* was now locked.

In 2003, a document was presented by a joint team of Israeli and Palestinian social partners known as the *Geneva Initiative* ²⁴². It was intended to address and resolve the most complicated issues left unresolved by the Oslo Accords and its core was the principle that displaced Palestinians would waive their right to return in exchange for major concessions on Jerusalem and the Haram al-Sharif in the Old City. A very peculiar element of the Agreement is its positive character, devoid of any reference to the old ideological disputes, in particular with regard to the two crucial issues of refugees and Jerusalem. Especially for the issue of the Old City agreement it was particularly analytical, starting from the recognition of the rights of Israelis and Palestinians to have their own statehood, also guaranteed by the establishment of a multinational force as a guarantee of their sovereignty. It considered the undoubted religious and cultural importance of the city, the parties recognised the universal value, historical, religious, spiritual and cultural centre of Jerusalem and its character as a sacred place for Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In recognition of this status, the Israelis and Palestinians reaffirmed their commitment to the preservation of the sacred character, for freedom of worship in the city and for complying with the existing division of administrative functions and religious practices among the different faiths. He foresaw the birth of an interfaith group, consisting of representatives of the three monotheistic religions, which functions not

December 2007, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7136984.stm -24/01/14-). In March 2008, the Municipality of Jerusalem communicated the plan to build 600 new homes in East Jerusalem, and the U.S. Secretary of State C.Rice stated that this expansion hindered completely the obligations of the road map (Rice calls for Israel to halt settlement expansion, 31 March 2008, Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/03/31/us-palestinians-israel-construction-idUSL3140883420080331> -23/01/14-).

²⁴² Swiss Confederation. The Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, *The Geneva Initiative* , www.eda.admin.ch/eda/it/home/topics/peasec/peac/confre/genini.html. The full text of the document is available on <http://www.geneva-accord.org/mainmenu/english>; Official website: <http://www.geneva-accord.org>

only as an Advisory Group for Israeli and Palestinian officials on matters related to the religious value of the city, but also to promote interfaith understanding and dialogue. Jerusalem was mutually recognised as the capital of two states, under their respective sovereignty. Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the Muslim, Christian and Armenian neighbourhoods of the Old City was recognised, while West Jerusalem and the Jewish Quarter of the Old City would have fallen under Israeli sovereignty. As for the area of the Temple Mount, the Agreement provided for the establishment of an international group composed by the Group for the implementation and verification and others. Given its unquestioned religious value, it was expected that excavations or buildings constructions could not be carried out without the agreement of the parties. The State of Palestine, assuming the sovereignty of the area, was invested with the responsibility for the maintenance of its security, which was not to be used for hostile acts against Israelis. The Wailing Wall would instead remain under Israeli sovereignty. The agreement also included detailed instructions about the Old City, the Western Wall Tunnel and places of religious importance. Despite the overall positive acceptance of the proposal of Geneva, a subsequent reflection also led the Arab states to reduce the scope of the Agreement. It stated that it was only an initiative that was supposed to be informal and reiterated the importance of the Road Map view as opposed to the Agreement itself. The fundamental points of the model proposed by the Geneva initiative are: *internationally recognised borders based on the 1967 lines, with 1:1 exchanges of territory; mutual acceptance of Israel and Palestine's right to the creation of two separate states; mutual cooperation in the field of security; international recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of both states; global regulation of the refugee problem; ending of the conflict and of the*

claims ²⁴³.

The world had enormous resonance over the Geneva Agreement of 2003, and the impacts on the Israeli public were certainly not a secondary factor in convincing Prime Minister Sharon to make a proposal. In 2003, he announced a new project, which was approved by the Israeli government on 15 April, 2004 ²⁴⁴.

Specifically, the Sharon plan included the option of a unilateral withdrawal, not planned with the Palestinians, which aims to break the deadlock in front of which he had come to see the Jewish state with the outbreak of the Intifada.

Israel chose to adopt a *disengagement plan*, unilateral in coordination with the United States. Sharon explained that his approach was not inconsistent with the *Road Map*.

The plan was divided into three parts: the redeployment of the Israeli army along a new line of security and the construction of a security barrier along this line, and the redeployment of Israeli settlements to reduce to a minimum the number of Israelis living among the population Palestinian.

The new line of security did not constitute the border of Israel, because only once the *Road Map* had been restarted, the army would be deployed gradually over a final border. The construction of the new line of defense would have required a difficult passage, or the redistribution of

²⁴³ Swiss Confederation. The Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, *The Geneva Initiative*, www.eda.admin.ch/eda/it/home/topics/peasec/peac/confre/genini.html.

²⁴⁴ Address by PM Ariel Sharon at the Fourth Herzliya Conference, Dec 18 2003, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2003/Pages/Address%20by%20PM%20Ariel%20Sharon%20at%20the%20Fourth%20Herzliya.aspx>; B.Hollinder, *The Israeli Disengagement Plan: Unilateralism in the Face of Multilateral Agreements*, Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Washington College of Law, vol 13 Issue 1, Fall 2005, <http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/13/israeli.pdf>

settlements, which still would not have been included in the territory of Israel as part of any possible peace agreement ²⁴⁵.

At the same time, it would have strengthened control over those areas in the 'Land of Israel' that would constitute an inseparable part of the State of Israel in any future agreement, even if they avoided specifying to which settlements they were referring to.

Finally, Sharon stated that the disengagement plan was not politics, but only a measure of security, that would not change the political reality between Israel and the Palestinians nor would prevent them from returning to the realization of *Road Map*.

The Likud came out confirmed as winner in the elections of 2003. Meanwhile, Israel saw the birth of a new political entity, the *Shinui* ²⁴⁶ of Benny Lapid. The secular party was more interested in domestic issues than non-international. The Shinui was a symptom of a portion of the Israeli electorate that, before the failure of attempts to deal with the Palestinians and to the deterioration of the international situation, opted for some sort of closure. The new Sharon government was based on the agreement of 4 parties: Likud, the Shinui, the National Religious Party and the National Unions.

The year before the death of Sharon's policy in 2006, his party suffered an internal split between the right 'realist' on the one hand and the national-religious on the other. Sharon favored a split in his own party, the Likud, mostly contrary to the plan of unilateral withdrawal from some settlements in the occupied territories. When Sharon took the decision to dismantle the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip, he had the need to find a new centrist parliamentary majority

²⁴⁵ D.Pioppi, N.Tocci, Il conflitto israelo-palestinese: daré priorità ai diritti umani e al diritto internazionale, Istituto Affari Internazionali, http://www.iai.it/pdf/mediterraneo/Pioppi_tocci_181206.pdf; J.Hilal, "Palestina quale futuro ? La fine della soluzione dei due stati", Jaca Book, Milan 2007, p.77-78; S.Casertano, "Gaza 2012: la battaglia d'Israele", gozare, Firenze 2012.

²⁴⁶ A.Arian and M.Shamir, The election in Israel 2003, Israel Democracy Institute, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey 2005, p 147

²⁴⁷. From Likud a part of the leadership team came out, led by Sharon, to build *Kadima* in agreement with the escapees of the Labour led by Shimon Peres. The coalition government between Kadima and Labour was chaired by Ehud Olmert.

In early 2007, the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said it was still necessary to U.S. involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process, even as a counterpart to the commitment that moderate Arab states had taken to curb Iranian influence in the Middle East ²⁴⁸. The Israeli and Palestinian sides reaffirmed each other that neither of them had completed the obligations of the *Road Map*.

Moreover, within the Palestinian government, there was now the presence of Hamas, considered a terrorist organization by the U.S. government, and this only increased the difficulty. In fact, Olmert refused to negotiate with Abbas until Hamas, which won Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, recognised the existence of the State of Israel.

In June 2007, however, Hamas took full control of the Gaza Strip; a gesture that put it in the position of President Abbas dissolved the Palestinian government ²⁴⁹. In this gesture both the Americans and the Israelis wanted to see a way to oust Hamas from the actual government of the Palestinian Authority and, therefore, a further opportunity to resume the dialogue.

Olmert and Abbas met several times in the following months in order to prepare a statement of principles on the final status on the main

²⁴⁷ N.Ratzlav-Katz, PM Sharon: we are committed to the Road Map, Arutz Sheva, 22 Nov 2005, <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/93456#.UuFlUvZd4nU> (24/01/14); K.Adler, Analysis: Israel's new coalition, 3 May 2006, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4966602.stm (24/01/14)

²⁴⁸ R.McCarthy, Rice calls meeting of Quartet in new pus foro Middle East peace, The Guardian, 19 Jan 2007, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/19/usa.israel>; G.Kessler, The Confidante: Condoleezza Rice and the creation of Bush Legacy, St Martin's Press, New York 2007, p 238-24

²⁴⁹ Abbas to Dissolve Palestinian Authority Government in Wake of Hamas-Fatah War, Published June 14, 2007, FoxNews.com, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/06/14/abbas-to-dissolve-palestinian-authority-government-in-wake-hamas-fatah-war/>

themes: Jerusalem, the borders of the two states, Israeli settlements, refugees, security. Olmert wanted the statement to be drafted in vague terms, however, to avoid concessions that would have provided to his political opponents opportunities to undermine the government, while Abbas said that the most important issues were addressed in a substantial manner to prove to his people that the negotiations could actually lead to the end of the occupation and the Palestinian state-building. No document was concluded.

In November 2007, for additional time to overcome this impasse the U.S. invited 49 nations and international organisations to send their representatives to a conference at the American Naval Academy in Annapolis. The size of the meeting pointed to the international will to support the peace process. The Conference turned into a *Joint Understanding*, which was to form the backbone of the negotiations to be concluded by 2008 ²⁵⁰.

In *Joint Understanding*, the parties undertook to comply as soon as possible to the obligations of *Road Map* Under the supervision of the United States, until they reach a peace treaty.

During July 2013, the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks resumed after a break of five years ²⁵¹. The announcement made in November 2013, regarding 20 thousand new homes in Israeli settlements has threatened to block negotiations once again ²⁵². After the intervention of the U.S.

²⁵⁰ <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/586E84217636CF87852573A00065F149>, Joint Understanding Read by President Bush at Annapolis Conference, November 27, 2007, Memorial Hall United States Naval Academy Annapolis, Maryland Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary; see more at: <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/586E84217636CF87852573A00065F149#sthash.CHI9Z12h.dpuf>

²⁵¹ B.Ravis, Obama welcomes renewal of Israeli-Palestinian talks, but says 'hard choices' lie ahead, 29 Jul 2013, [haaretz.com](http://www.haaretz.com), <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.538586> (25/01/14)

²⁵² Palestinian negotiators quit in protest, [aljazeera.com](http://www.aljazeera.com), 14 Nov 2013, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/palestinian-negotiators-quit-protest-201311148159235852.html> (25/01/14)

Secretary of State, Kerry, the dialogue started again with the intention to be concluded within nine months ²⁵³.

²⁵³ L.Wroughton, Kerry warns Israel of troubles ahead if peace talks fail, Reuters, 7 Nov 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/07/us-palestinians-israel-kerry-idUSBRE9A60P220131107> (25/01/14)

Chapter 4

THE HYPOTHESES AND THE FIELD RESEARCH

After examining the evolution of the peace negotiations, the fourth and last chapter is dedicated to the specific question of the Old City through two main axes.

The first axis (4.1) concerns the hypotheses about the the Old City to come and examines the different possibilities regarding the division of sovereignty between the involved parties and the role of an international organization. I will consider the five scenarios proposed by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies ²⁵⁴ and the five proposed by the International Peace and Cooperation Center ²⁵⁵. For each hypothesis I will list overall impact in the daily management of the territory with regard to sovereignty, authority, security in the shell, policing, management, symbols, freedom of access, freedom of worship, rules of behavior, excavation. Then I will consider the possible situations in the event that the city administration was in the hands of an international community.

The second axis of analysis (4.2) is mainly focused on my field research. This last part of the work, rather than provide a real scenario to come, wants to present the methodology used to explore the conflict area. The aim is to provide the tools for mapping the Old City through a biopolitical lens, and, especially, to offer the chance to know the device-area through media instruments (maps and audio) completing the written research.

The maps and interviews are an integral part of research and are regarded as valid textual analysis.

²⁵⁴ "The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies is a think tank for research and ideas on Jerusalem, environmental and innovational policy in Israel, and management of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Institute focuses on the unique challenges of modern Jerusalem, and its analyses are widely acclaimed by policy makers, scholars and the general public." www.jiis.org

²⁵⁵ "Established in 1998 in Jerusalem, IPCC is a Palestinian non-profit policy and applied research center specializing in urban planning and community development. IPCC's programs are based on five main pillars: policy research; urban planning, zoning and development; civil society and community engagement; media; training and capacity building." home.ipcc-jerusalem.org

4.1 Hypotheses, projects and possible scenarios

Many scientists and research groups from different countries have attempted to outline a future for Jerusalem that will liberate the Old City of Jerusalem from its intricate questions (sovereignty, jurisdictional authority, security, public policy, space management, freedom of access, freedom of worship, and planning of excavation, construction and demolition).

Before analysing two of these conceptual maps on the possible future of the city in detail, I shall schematically present some of the proposals that have come and gone over the years.

1992	Adnan Abu Odeh (Jordanian ambassador to the United Nations and adviser to King Hussein)
Old City. Make it a spiritual place, outside of any sovereignty, administered by a council of the highest authorities of the three religions. New Town. Eastern part: Palestinian sovereignty. Western part: Israeli sovereignty.	
Cfr. «Two Capitals in an Undivided Jerusalem», Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, n. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 183-88.	

1992	Sari Nusseibeh (Palestinian, a member of the steering committee of the Palestinian National Authority), Mark Heller (Israeli, a researcher at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University)
United Jerusalem, administered by a municipal council elected by all its residents. At a lower level, administrative authority sub-divided into districts.	

Arab neighbourhoods: run by a Palestinian municipality.
Jewish neighbourhoods: run by an Israeli Municipality.
Cfr. Heller M.A., Sari Nusseibeh S., <i>No Trumpet no Drums: A Two State Settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict</i> , New York 1991, Hill and Wang.

1993	IPCRI, Israel-Palestine Center for Research and information (non-profit organization).
City limits and subdivision of powers determined by Palestinians and Israelis through the drafting of a common "Jerusalem Charter."	
Palestinian or Israeli jurisdiction in different areas according to the demographic composition.	
Justice administered by a special mixed tribunal. Police made up of Israelis and Palestinians.	
Cfr. <i>The Future of Jerusalem. Proceedings of the First Israeli-Palestinian International Academic Seminar on the Future of Jerusalem</i> , Jerusalem 1993, Ipcri.	

1996	John Whitbeck (American, pro-Palestinian, international law expert)
Joint sovereignty over united Jerusalem according to the <i>condominium</i> model, organised into district councils, with contacts between the different zones encouraged. Final prospect of demilitarisation.	
Cfr. «The Road to Peace Starts in Jerusalem», Middle East International, 14/4/1989; «Jerusalem: The Condominium Solution», Jerusalem Times, 15/3/1996.	

The *Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies* (JIIS), a major cultural institution that deals with issues concerning Israel, has suggested five possible solutions for the future the Holy Basin area, including the Old City.

- A) Full sovereignty and Israeli control.
- B) Full sovereignty and Palestinian control.
- C) Division of the territory between the two sides, with international supervision.
- D) Single administration, with sharing of leadership roles and international support.
- E) International administration delegating the powers to representatives of both parties.

The focussing of the problem on finding an agreement regarding the division of the Holy Basin is derived from the absolute importance of this problem, which is recognised as the heart of the conflict.

The JIIS itself points out that the first two alternatives were formulated for academic purposes, since neither Israel nor the Palestinians would accept sovereignty and total control of the opposing party.

I shall therefore examine the other three, which are united by the importance given to international involvement, in line with a trend that is increasingly gaining attention:

*“The possibility of international involvement in the resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in general, or in the dispute over the future of Jerusalem in particular, has been the subject of extensive attention in recent years (...) The inclusion of international bodies as a key component in resolving international conflicts is a growing phenomenon”*²⁵⁶

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In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian issue, according to the JIIS, the use of international support is necessary for several reasons:

²⁵⁶ Ramon A. (ed.), *The Historic Basin of Jerusalem. Problems and Possible Solutions*, JIIS, Jerusalem, 2010, p. 55.

“From the profound lack of trust between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, from the conflicting interests of the sides in this field, and from the historical and religious importance of the Basin and the holy places”.

International involvement in each of the identified scenarios would have the threefold purpose of *“enhance the credibility of the arrangement reached by the two sides, to assist in the implementation of the agreed arrangement, and to improve the chances that it will indeed be implemented”*²⁵⁷.

Let us therefore examine the scenarios C, D, E, resulting from alternatives A (Full sovereignty and Israeli control) and B (Full sovereignty and Palestinian control).

Alternative C

The basic principle of this hypothesis is the division of territory between Israel and Palestine, with international supervision.

After reaching an agreement on the border, the two parties would each have sovereignty and authority over their own territories. The greatest, probably unsolvable, difficulty would be to agree on the territorial division, especially with regard to the Old City and the Temple Mount, which is home to the greatest religious symbolism.

If, hypothetically, one could overcome this problem, alternative C would be simpler than the other alternatives in terms of practicality:

“It is clear that if the sides can reach agreement on this matter, this alternative will be easier to implement than joint arrangement requiring

²⁵⁷ Ramon A. (ed.), *The Historic Basin of Jerusalem. Problems and Possible Solutions*, cit., p. 56.

cooperation between the sides, or arrangements including a large degree of international involvement " ²⁵⁸ .

This alternative would also have the secondary territorial division issues of no little relevance, which could generate five different scenarios.

A) The Jewish Quarter and the Armenian Quarter will be included in the sovereign territory of the State of Israel. The Muslim Quarter and the Christian Quarter will be under Palestinian sovereignty. The Temple Mount will be included in the sovereign Israeli territory.

B) The Jewish Quarter and the Armenian Quarter will be included in the territory of the State of Israel. The Muslim Quarter and the Christian Quarter will be under Palestinian sovereignty. The Temple Mount will be included in the sovereign Palestinian territory.

C) The Jewish Quarter will be included in the territory of Israel. The Muslim, Christian and Armenian Quarters will be under Palestinian sovereignty. The Temple Mount will be included in the sovereign Palestinian territory.

D) The Jewish, Armenian and Christian Quarters will be included in the sovereign territory of Israel. The Muslim Quarter will be under Palestinian sovereignty. The Temple Mount will be included in the sovereign Israeli territory.

*E) Any of the four above-mentioned alternatives, together with the territorial division of the Temple Mount between Israel and the Palestinians.*²⁵⁹

Each of the two parties would be required to govern in accordance with the previously signed treaties, including the bilateral and

²⁵⁸ Ramon A. (ed.), *The Historic Basin of Jerusalem. Problems and Possible Solutions*, cit., p. 59.

²⁵⁹ Ramon A. (ed.), *The Historic Basin of Jerusalem. Problems and Possible Solutions*, cit., pp. 57-58.

multilateral agreements with other States. In the case of issues included in multilateral conventions signed by one of the two parties, *"the bilateral agreement between Israel and the Palestinians could include reference to a list of international conventions both sides are bound to apply in their relations in the Historic Basin"* ²⁶⁰.

The weakness of this alternative, as mentioned, is the low probability of Israelis and Palestinians coming to an agreement on the division of the Historical Basin territories. It is clear, but impractical.

Alternative D.

In this case, the Historical Basin would be administered as a unit, and the two sides would have to cooperate to exercise both administrative and police functions, with specific agreements on the (educational and cultural) functions to be administered separately, always following the provisions of the preliminary agreements. Potential restrictions may derive from international law, and customary and contractual issues.

International bodies would enter into action only if, for whatever reason, the two sides did not apply the agreements. In this case it may have purely monitoring functions, or alternatively it may have a greater executive authority in sensitive areas, for example the administration of the Holy Places.

The key question in relation to this last point is: *" In which circumstances will the international body take the authorities of the sides, and who will be empowered to determine that circumstances justifying this step have indeed emerged? (...) Thus, for example, the agreement should establish which official in the international body is empowered to make the decision regarding the taking of authorities, what procedures must be*

²⁶⁰ Ramon A. (ed.), *The Historic Basin of Jerusalem. Problems and Possible Solutions*, cit., p. 61.

observe before doing so (consultation with the sides and/or with outside experts), and so on " ²⁶¹.

The idea of a joint administration by Israelis and Palestinians could be met with some favour by both parties, but would present difficulties in implementation due to the large number of people involved in the administration of the Basin and the consequent ease of disagreements and conflict.

Alternative E.

The Historic Basin would be administered by an international body through the delegation of authority by both parties: *"Under the agreement, and with the consent of both sides, the international body will exercise extensive authorities and manage by itself large areas of the Basin* " ²⁶².

An exception would be made for the small areas over which there is no conflict, which would then be divided between the two parties on a territorial basis, without the intervention of international bodies.

In this scenario, the international forces would not only have a monitoring role, but would also be responsible for administration, control and protection, and indirectly for other exercises such as the police, taxation, planning, construction, and the ability to use force against violations Individual agreements, and to represent a legal person in trials ²⁶³.

They must, however, act in accordance with the bilateral agreements and international law.

²⁶¹ Ramon A. (ed.), *The Historic Basin of Jerusalem. Problems and Possible Solutions*, cit., p. 65.

²⁶² Ramon A. (ed.), *The Historic Basin of Jerusalem. Problems and Possible Solutions*, cit., p. 66.

²⁶³ "Most of the international forces established in the past have not been empowered to manage a specific territory. However, a number of international forces (particularly over the past decade) have received such extensive administrative authorities, usually for a limited period time. The most prominent examples of this over the past decade are the United Nations operations in East Timor (2002), Cambodia (1991-1993) and Kosovo (from 1999)" (Ramon A. (ed.), *The Historic Basin of Jerusalem. Problems and Possible Solutions*, cit., p. 67).

There would also be several alternatives with regard to the international body called upon to supervise the government of the territories concerned.

"The three main alternatives regarding the body that will and supervise the work of the international body are: (1) An international organization (such as the United Nations, NATO or the European Union); (2) A special multinational organization established by the sides for the purpose of this mission (an ad hoc force); (3) States (such as the United States, Canada or Switzerland) " ²⁶⁴.

As with the previous alternative, in this case it is possible to assert there would be fair possibility that the parties would accept the hypothesis, but it would be difficult to implement because of the high number of persons involved in the administration.

A general issue that concerns each possible hypothesis is the distribution of the Temple Mount and the Western Wall, which appears to be the most difficult problem of all, because of the religious and historical implications related to the area.

"For both sides, then, the Temple Mount is a charged and explosive site which must be treated with the utmost caution. In addition to developing agreement on the key questions relating to the authorities for the management and control of the site, attention must also be given to the way the agreement can be "marketed" in order to secure acceptance by the majority of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Muslim communities " ²⁶⁵ .

The boxes below summarise the features of the five alternatives set out above (A, B, C, D, E), grouped by areas of action, with specific regard to the agreements on *the Temple Mount*.

²⁶⁴ Ramon A. (ed.), *The Historic Basin of Jerusalem. Problems and Possible Solutions*, cit., p. 68.

²⁶⁵ Ramon A. (ed.), *The Historic Basin of Jerusalem. Problems and Possible Solutions*, cit., p. 80.

<i>Sovereignty (control)</i>	
A	Israeli (not all the manifestations of sovereignty will be realized in practice)
B	Palestinian
C	Palestinian on the Temple Mount and Israel at the Western Wall and Western Wall Tunnel
D	Suspended
E	The international body is the source of authority, but does not intervene in routine management and ritual arrangements

<i>Jurisdictional authority</i>	
A	Israeli
B	Palestinian
C	Palestinian on the Temple Mount and Israel at the Western Wall and Western Wall Tunnel
D	Individuals – according to citizenship or according to the point of entry into the Historic Basin; in the case of violation of arrangements by either side – the joint committee under international auspices.
E	An international body in accordance with a special agreement

<i>Security in the “shell”</i>	
A	Israeli
B	Palestinian
C	Geographical division between Palestinian and Israeli security

	services.
D	Geographical division under international supervision.
E	International body.

<i>Policing and public order</i>	
A	Israeli in the shell, with the authority to enter the site in the case of violent incidents; guarding by the Wafq inside the site.
B	Palestinian; guarding of the Western Wall with Israeli involvement.
C	Palestinian on the Temple Mount and Israeli in the Western Wall plaza.
D	Palestinian on the Temple Mount and Israeli in the Western Wall plaza and in the access to the Western Wall from the Jewish Quarter, under international supervision.
E	International body.

<i>Management</i>	
A	By a committee of the Waqf, including Israeli (Muslim) representatives.
B	Palestinian
C	Muslim Palestinian on the Temple Mount; Israeli Jewish in the Western Wall plaza.
D	Muslim on the Temple Mount and Israeli Jewish in the Western Wall plaza.
E	The international body will empower the Muslim Palestinian

	side to manage the Temple Mount and the Israeli Jewish side to manage the Western Wall plaza.
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<i>Symbols and flags</i>	
A	No flags, except on the Makhkama building, which serves a security function.
B	As determined by the Palestinians.
C	According to sovereignty.
D	No flags or national symbols.
E	No flags or national symbols.

<i>Freedom of access (entry by visitors, but not for prayer or ritual)</i>	
A	The only restrictions on entry will be for reasons of security and public order.
B	Access by non-Muslims will be ensured at agreed times.
C	Ensured under international supervision; the access road to the Western Wall and Jewish Quarter will also be ensured.
D	Ensured under international supervision.
E	Ensured under international supervision.

<i>Freedom of worship</i>	
A	The situation in which Jews refrain from exercising their right of worship will continue.

B	Muslims only.
C	Muslims on the Temple Mount and Jews in the Western Wall plaza.
D	Muslims on the Temple Mount and Jews in the Western Wall plaza.
E	Muslims on the Temple Mount and Jews in the Western Wall plaza.

<i>Rules of behavior</i>	
A	As coordinated by the sides.
B	As determined by the Muslims.
C	By sovereignty and custom.
D	With restricted supervision and according to custom.
E	As agreed, under the supervision of the international body.

<i>Excavation, building, demolition</i>	
A	According to Israeli law.
B	According to Palestinian law.
C	Unilateral actions will be prevented.
D	Unilateral actions will be prevented.
E	Restrictions, under the supervision of the international body.

<i>Authority of the international body</i>	
A	None.

B	None.
C	Monitoring and restricted supervision to ensure compliance with the restrictions and rights as detailed above; participation in the multilateral managing group.
D	Close monitoring and supervision to ensure compliance with the sides' undertakings; authority to remove management from the side violating its undertakings in a substantive and ongoing manner.
E	Full powers as the source of authority; delagation of managing authorities to the religious bodies, but these can be removed in the case of substantive and ongoing violations.

Source: JIIS, 2010, pp. 92-95

It is clear that to discuss these alternatives, which relate to the future for Jerusalem, is to reflect on what might be the best choice for Israel and for the Palestinians. The matter is so delicate and complex that it is not possible to provide an easy, simple answer. Each of the alternatives has advantages and disadvantages.

JIIS scholars have identified some variables that affect or should affect the assessment of the proposals.

"The selection of the optimum alternative depends on the basic assumptions of Israeli policy, political and international circumstances, and priorities of Israeli decision makers at any given point in time. Selection of the most desirable alternative for Israel also depends on the following factors: (A) The scope and strength of Israeli control in the Historic Basin; (B) The likelihood that the sides will reach an agreed arrangement; (C) The

*likelihood that the agreed arrangement will be implemented successfully"*²⁶⁶.

To evaluate the alternatives, in short, it is essential to keep in mind the likelihood of being able to reach an agreement and to implement its provisions.

The approach taken by the JIIS has been criticised by the International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC), which in turn has proposed another group of hypotheses. The criticism of the JIIS by the IPCC concerns the fact that the divisions proposed in the document in question would have a negative affect on the ability to perform daily activities regularly.

" The JIIS researchers did not argue for any one specific scenario but they established the criteria by which success would be defined, the factors producing success, and the success factors related to several functional issues: inter alia, inhabitants, education, symbols, local administrations, security, holy sites (including the Temple Mount or Haram al-Sharif), economy, restoration and development, settlement of conflicts, international intervention, citizenship and the right of residence, cc and sovereignty " ²⁶⁷ .

To identify the possible alternatives, according to the scholars of the IPCC, it is also necessary at the outset to face a fundamental problem, summed up in one question: is the current situation, imposed by Israel, revocable or not? Can it be considered a starting condition from which to begin negotiations?

This is a question it is essential to take into account, according to the IPCC, especially with regard to the Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem and its surroundings.

²⁶⁶ Ramon A. (ed.), *The Historic Basin of Jerusalem. Problems and Possible Solutions*, cit., p. 70

²⁶⁷ Khamaisi, R. e Nasrallah, R. (eds.), *Jerusalem. The Urban Fabric and Geopolitical Implications*, IPCC, Jerusalem, 2003, p. 63.

So far the attempts at geopolitical planning for Jerusalem have been conducted on the principle of the irreversibility of the situation. The IPCC predicts that the current situation in Israel and the administrative conditions and life in Jerusalem stemming therefrom may evolve into the realisation of what would be the worst-case scenario, i.e. the Hebron model.

It is a scenario in which the Jews would intensify their presence in residential areas of the Islamic and Christian quarters of the Old City, adopting a provocative attitude towards the Palestinians.

Hebron is a city in the West Bank that is highly important in the Palestinian context because it plays a very significant role from an economic and religious perspective, and was a major centre of the textile industry.

Today, Hebron is one of the greatest examples of Israeli occupation, and is *"the only community in the West Bank where Israeli settlers live in the centre. It is a city literally divided in half between Palestinians and Israeli settlers"*²⁶⁸.

In 1994 a document was drafted, known as the Hebron Protocol, as a result of a bloody act of violence committed by a fanatical Israeli, Baruch Goldstein, who killed twenty-nine Palestinians attending Morning Prayer at the Ibrahimi Mosque.

The Hebron Protocol divided the city in two: H1 under Palestinian civil and military control; H2 under Israeli control.

" About 500 settlers now live in the historical centre, the social and economic heart of Hebron (where Abraham's Tomb is located), in five different settlements that split the city in two and prevent direct connection between the Palestinian neighbourhoods in the North and the South The Old Town has thus become a real 'ghost town': in fact, more than a

²⁶⁸ Mancini E., Ricostruire Hebron per contrastare l'occupazione, www.forumpalestina.org/news/2012/Marzo12/22-03-12RicostruireHebron.htm

thousand Palestinian homes, 41.9% of the total, are now empty in H2. The goal of the Israeli settlers and authorities has been partially achieved: to make life impossible for the Palestinians and force them to abandon their homes in the centre " ²⁶⁹ .

This model is currently supported by the Israeli government.

"The Israeli government supports, in a practical way, expanded settling activities, and the Israeli ministries offer diverse services and facilities for this purpose. The Israeli police intensify their security procedures to protect the settlers, and the implementation of these procedures restricts the movement and the daily lives of Palestinians" ²⁷⁰ .

To avoid the risk of the occurrence of such a situation, the IPCC presented its own five hypotheses, which vary in relation to the participation in international and national sovereignties considered. The five scenarios are summarised in the following tables.

Scenario 1. Internationalization / special international system.

Inhabitants (per 1000)	Political reality	Spatial relation with the Palestinian state	Area in dunams	Citizenship
33,000 Palestinians 4,000 Israelis	Foreign international authority administrates the old city in a separate way from the sovereignty of the Palestinian and Israeli state outside the old city.	Isolated region is subject to control and sovereignty of international bodies	900	International citizenship or citizenship related to each sovereign state

²⁶⁹ Mancini E., *Ricostruire Hebron per contrastare l'occupazione*, cit.

²⁷⁰ Khamaisi, R. e Nasrallah, R. (eds.), *Jerusalem. The Urban Fabric and Geopolitical Implications*, cit., p. 63

Scenario 2. Joint sovereignty.

Political reality	Spatial relation with the Palestinian state	Area in dunams	Citizenship
Joint sovereign authority of both parties with the division of authorities and responsibilities.	Contact with the space surrounding the old city is subject to the considerations of the status of the joint sovereignty.	900	Citizenship or residence statues and/or affiliation of each national group to the mother sovereign state

Scenario 3. Division of sovereignty (Jewish Quarter under Israeli sovereignty and the rest of the Old City under Palestinian sovereignty).

Political reality	Spatial relation with the Palestinian state	Area in dunams	Citizenship
Each party is responsible for the zone that is subject to its sovereignty.	Each sovereign zone is in contact with the rest of sovereign zones of each state	778 under Palestinian sovereignty including the Armenian Quarter (126 dunams);	Palestinian citizenship for Palestinians and Israeli citizenship for Israelis

Scenario 4. Non-sovereign zone for any party.

Political reality	Spatial relation with the Palestinian state	Area in dunams	Citizenship
Special system without sovereign meanings inside the old city for any of the conflict parties.	Isolated region subject to control and sovereignty of international bodies.	900 with the possibility of annexing.	Citizenship of each state according to the national affiliation or special status.

Scenario 5. Absolute Israeli sovereignty over the Old City and its surroundings within the Israeli definition of the “holy basin” (City of David in Silwan and the Jewish cemetery on Mount of Olives).

Inhabitants (per 1000)	Political reality	Spatial relation with the Palestinian state	Area in dunams	Citizenship
Decrease in the number of Palestinians in the Old City	Reinforcement of Israeli domination over the Old City and its surroundings	Isolation of the Old City from its Palestinian surroundings, including Palestinian city neighborhoods or suburbs and the rest of the West Bank regions	900	Imposition of the Israeli citizenship on Palestinians or preservation of the residence status without granting the rights of citizenship

Source: Khamaisi R., Nasrallah R. (2009), Jerusalem. The Urban Fabric and Geopolitical Implications, cit., p. 65.

Scenario 1. The administrative authority over the Old City would be in the hands of an international government that would allow both parties to participate in decisions. It could be seen as an interim solution, but not a definitive one. It would still be necessary for both parties to participate in final decisions and in the administration of the Old City.

Scenario 2. There would be a joint Palestinian-Israeli administration throughout the Old Town, with no division of sovereignty. This option requires a strong capacity for and commitment to collaboration, especially when defining how to administer the Old City in the most functional manner to ensure the services for the residents and tourists.

Scenario 3. In this case, the entire Old City would be under Palestinian sovereignty, with the exception of the Jewish Quarter. One difficulty would be represented by the issue of sovereignty over the Armenian quarter, which Israel has been keen to preserve in order to ensure a protected passage between West Jerusalem and the Jewish Quarter ²⁷¹ .

It should also be added that there is also no agreement between Jews and Arabs on the definition of the Old City, which would cause further difficulties, as "*the Israeli definition of the Old Jerusalem is not restricted to inside the ancient walls. Israel wishes in any future solution to preserve its sovereignty over several regions surrounding the Old City, especially the City of David in Silwan and the Jewish cemetery on Mount of Olives* " ²⁷² .

Scenario 4. The Old City would be administered by both parties, with or without the participation of foreign forces. In practice, it would not be subject to the sovereignty of anyone.

Scenario 5. The Old City and its surroundings would be under Israeli sovereignty, and an effort would be made to reduce the size of the Palestinian population.

After having outlined the above scenarios, the IPCC has focused on the prediction of the possible situations in the event that the city administration was in the hands of an international community. Three possible developments were identified, starting from the shared idea of the division of the territory into two states, with an international body with the task of supervising the *Old City*.

²⁷¹ The Armenians in Jerusalem are mostly pro-Israel.

²⁷² Khamaisi, R. e Nasrallah, R. (eds.), *Jerusalem. The Urban Fabric and Geopolitical Implications*, cit., p. 65.

1) Spiralling Tension. Neglect, Confrontation, Violence

There is no improvement in the conditions of the Old City from either an economic or social point of view, much less in the services, especially in the Arab quarter. There are no interactions between the international authorities and the Palestinian population. The action of the authorities is exclusively focused on legal and political issues.

Such a situation would lead the Palestinians to perceive the action of the international forces as a anti-Arab and anti-Islamic breakthrough to the benefit of Israel.

It would exacerbate tensions between Jews and Arabs on both sides: Extremist Jewish groups intensify their effort to colonize the Old City by controlling more Arab houses and property especially in the Muslim quarter; the provocation of settler groups visiting the Haram Al-Sharif and the Muslim Quarter becomes a major source of unrest and violent confrontation.

All the Palestinians resident in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, would carry out protest actions against Israel and its occupation policy, accusing the international forces of not intervening and to favouring Israel.

There would be violence by Palestinians against the Jewish settlers, and there would be the possibility of vengeful acts of retaliation and terrorism.

In essence, there would be an escalation of tension and violence.

2) Social Withdrawal.

The international administration fails to win the confidence of the Palestinians, it ignores their material needs and devotes more attention to issues concerning security and religion. In this scenario, the

administration would focus on the security and maintenance of the religious *status quo* .

The relationship between the Palestinians and the international forces would be marked by Palestinian passivity. The Palestinian population openly refuses contact with the administration, merely fulfilling the registration and tax obligations set.

The immediate consequences of this situation are the languishing of civil society, the persistence of an individualistic mentality that does not take the common good into account. The Palestinian population of the West Bank would benefit from the peace achieved, but it would be at the expense of their fellow countrymen in Jerusalem.

There would be no perceptible change in the daily life of the Palestinians in Jerusalem, who would be forced to emigrate to the West Bank due to poverty and lack of prospects. There would be grounds for strengthening elements of Islamic fanaticism, which would consider the new regime as a new kind of foreign occupation simply replacing the occupation by Israel.

The Jews would accept the situation better, as the already wealthy population of the Jewish neighbourhoods would enjoy economic improvement, starting from a very different situation from that of the Palestinians.

In Palestinian neighbourhoods, social problems such as drugs, crime and violence would grow and only traditional, informal laws relating to customs and family ties would be applied.

The tension on public and religious occasions would be reduced, however, in part because of the attention paid to the issue of security and the preservation of the religious status quo by the administration.

3) Successful Engagement Scenario: Cooperation and Integration.

In this scenario, the Old City is subjected to a plan that manages to revitalise it, thanks to an energetic stimulus by international forces. In fact, these forces consider it crucial to make the Old City workshop of social growth, and therefore act in harmony with civil organisations and the unofficial leaders of the various communities. The administration is sensitive to the social structure and needs of the population and does not consider the urban fabric as a mere service provider, but as a way to enhance quality of life and support identity and the image of a peaceful Jerusalem.

The latter, in turn, would create the conditions for the economic and social improvement of the city.

If this scenario were to take place, the weight of religious fanaticism would diminish greatly. There would be more social mobility among the Palestinians, which would facilitate modernisation, ferrying traditional Arab society from a conservative and informal structure to an organised civil community.

The urban developments would take place under the full authority of international organisations, with the representation of national and local governments, in accordance with UNESCO protocols.

The Old City would be perfectly integrated with other areas of Jerusalem.

4.2 The field research

The fieldwork was conducted between the months of January and June 2012. The open helpfulness of CRFJ, *Centre de Recherche Français à Jérusalem*, and its staff has proved crucial. I owe much to all of them.

Within the Research Centre it was possible to make a constructive and comparative comparison of methodological possibilities, in terms of their validity and usage. I rented a home in the Old City throughout the entire period, in an area between the Muslim and the Christian quarter. I lived in the field of participatory research as part of my everyday participatory, observational and emotional experience.

I constructed a network of trustworthy individuals in the field to carry out the interviews. I prepared a letter, presenting the topic and the main lines of research, which I provided for the interview respondents in the old city before each meeting. Thus far I have given each respondent the possibility of using the guidelines as merely indicative. All of them had the chance to submit suggestions and personal impressions, which proved essential for the development of 'participatory' research.

The key interviews were conducted with religious and secular subjects, official representatives of religion and culture, traditional informal Palestinian mediators, representatives of certain civic associations in the old city, and my neighbours. The interviews conducted were carried out in the form of audio-portraits. Everyone can listen to interviews in the audio-portraits section of the online project on http://www.emiliomaroscia.com/visions/jerusalem_portraits.html.

Respondents were captured in 24 mm in their surroundings. I subsequently edited a portion of the audio of the interview over each portrait. Each audio-portrait has a precise location on the map (there is a map with a red circle beside each portrait). The result is that you can

listen to the voices of civil society and place them in the analysed territory integrating the written text.

I used psycho-cognitive geography and I tried to reproduce it electronically so as to provide the reader with the elements required to participate in field in the most synesthetic manner possible. Comparing the maps of the Old City, especially the tourist information point of Jaffa Gate with the one provided by International Peace and Cooperation Centre, I built/designed my own personal map. On this map I have marked interviews, audio-strings, paths, friction areas and commercial zones. It is thus possible to unite map markers ad infinitum to hypothesize the lines to come, to map out possible relationships between the elements, saturate the device, and ravel and unravel the coil.

Psychogeography is an investigative methodology of urban space created in the early 1950s by the Lettrists movement ²⁷³. It assumes subversive characteristics since it deconstructs urban spaces with respect to how they are described by the classical geography, which does not include correlations between the psyche and the environment.

Through a *creative redefinition* of urban areas, psychogeography is a game and a method used to investigate the reality and connections between man and the environment. The psychogeographical exploration technique is the *drift*, which indicates a sudden passage through different environments between them.

"To make a drift, to walk around without a destination or schedule. Choose the path not based on what you know, but based on what you see. You need to be estranged and look at everything like it was the first time. One way to facilitate this is to walk with measured steps and look slightly tilted upward, so as to bring the architecture to the centre of the visual field

²⁷³ www.lelettrisme.com

*and leave the road surface at the bottom edge of the view. You have to perceive the space as a whole and be attracted by details."*²⁷⁴

Crossing the territory on foot and using the psychogeographical method is to understand and interpret the urban landscape by restoring dignity and identity through the survey and the project, especially in cases in which the territory is characterized by a density of elements that are different from each other.

Therefore, psychogeography, the union of psychology and geography, is a way of understanding the urban survey like a drift, wandering, often linked to sites with many stories to tell and endless possibilities for changes in speed and direction.

There are many ways of getting around in a city but a few ways to get lost in a conscious way. Getting lost in a city is the best way to hear and perceive, with greater sensitivity, the moods of different neighbourhoods and its inhabitants. They cross them, see them and control them. Getting lost in the urban survey often means *being lost*, mentally wandering into a dimensions that is suitable for the reception of each stimulus and signal.

The psychogeographic drift is a field research of the relationship between the land and its inhabitants, between the land and the person investigating, it is not a psychological or sociological analysis but, in fact, it is psychogeographic.

Anyone can practice psychogeography. It is an activity that can be learned with practice. Psychogeography is not so much a matter of study but rather a state of mind. On the one hand, it is an analytical tool that uses intuition and, on the other hand, it is an intuitive tool that uses the analysis. Through this double track, the psychogeographic survey bridges

²⁷⁴ G. Debord, *Théorie de la dérive*, International Situationniste, No. 2, Paris, December 1958

the gap between the tools designed by the scientific method and sensitive instruments of imagination, intuition and subjectivity.

Being subjects also means being creative, personal and craftsmen, this means prefixing a "person" to the map.

When I wandered the streets of the Old City of Jerusalem, I realized that there was a game in progress. Before starting to draw my own maps, my steps were almost forced. I felt as if I was in an enclosed space, in a space where the movement was already made once and for all.

The urban space seemed to me like a huge machine organized according to the requirements of the control. I looked at my movements and those of others on the map and noticed the urban everyday life was not so much the story of the territories but the story of the trajectories.

Within the territorial conflict, each man did not have more than his routes. The Old City was transformed into a bundle of trajectories and coloured dots to be marked, freehandedly, on the map.

So I started to draw my psychogeographical remarks on some of the self-produced maps. I did it to 'recover' the city, or to recover the human and personal dimension of the map by dispelling, at the same time, the control, mechanical route and forced strategy.

In these cases, psychogeography is a true weapon of survival, a medicine for humanity threatened by the strategic paradigm that governs the map.

"Since the psychogeographer is not a 'geographical critic' but, in fact, psychogeography, is inevitably interested in investigating all submerged branches that bring elements to the creation of a New Consciousness of the Territory" ²⁷⁵.

²⁷⁵ L. Blissett, Journal of Psychic War and Seditious Gatherings, No. 0

It is the man himself, through the poietic imagination and artistic ability, who is able to produce psycho-cognitive alterations of the territory and, therefore, of the urban environment.

Drawing maps, living them and making them public is a way to question the urban organization based on the strategies of power that continuously and deeply affects *the cognitive ecology* in which we are immersed. Drawing the map is a way to subtract, in some moments, our presence at the service of the device and pay homage to the structural creative, subversive and research ability inherent to our humanity.

4.3 Mapping devices

My point of departure was the idea that a body of work made up of graphic representations and oral material could be considered as a textual work. Cartography constitutes a clear example of how visual and oral research can become the object of a radical epistemological transformation and an appreciation of its narrative element.

The production of spatial and cartographic relations is always charged with narrative elements. The narrative element is not an ornament but an improvement of the representation.

Normally the production of a map undergoes a process of normalisation which should render the cartography the result of scientific and objective parameters as if the cartography was a faithful copy of reality. But it is not really so. Formerly the historian and cartographer J.B. Harley proposed, during the 1980's, a change of epistemological cartography through the negation of the objective relations between reality and representation ²⁷⁶.

Harley referred to Foucault and to the bio-political system to mention that in maps there are always issues of technical, scientific knowledge, social positions, ideology and relationships of power.

Cartography is a form of knowledge which embodies the relationships of power which produce the representation.

Maps thereby lose their neutrality and approach much more the interpretation of literary texts. Maps can be used as narrative texts.

The narrative potential must be taken into account even at the moment of the production of the maps (providing various levels of interpretation, multiplicity of points of view of those who inhabit the territory).

²⁷⁶ J.B. Harley, *The new nature of maps*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2011

The map is therefore a cultural text and not an objective representation of reality; the map is not only an instrument to obtain knowledge of a territory but a device for getting to know the social and cultural dynamics of who reads about and/or occupies a territory.

The map so conceived opens the possibility of new models which reproduce the different stratified levels on/in the territory.

The approach to cartography assumes in this way a strongly political importance.

The practice of cartography is an act of constructing in space and in writing the relationships of power. The systemic maps reveal the relationship of power.

It is really the concept of cartography as a device and the upgrading of its political and social that opens the way to the practise of liberating experimentation which aims at exorcising, through mapping, the relationships of power written in the territory.

It can produce a change in social relationships by the measure in which it can provide new and creative representations.

With the politicisation of cartography the user of the map claims the right to produce his own representation based on advancing his own research.

The production of a personal psychogeographical map is not an individual practice made only for oneself but socially and collectively (access and consultation on line guarantee this).

The production of the map now takes into account a multiplicity of points of view and of levels in operation on the same territory. (layers and interviews positioned on the map guarantee the proliferation of the significance of the map).


One thereby guarantees an explorative approach aimed at experimenting with the hypotheses of the reading.

Anybody can benefit from the map overlapping the layers combined with interviews according to the device one wants to represent – perhaps in a device and in an order that the maker of the map has not even thought of.

New cartography wants to record the complexity of the levels that cross a territory. The use of multiple voices (mapped interviews) and the overlapping of layers/transparencies (zones of friction, routes, quarters, commercial and tourist areas) allow the device to be dismantled and reconstructed *ad infinitum*.

Even those who use the map are therefore involved at more levels transforming completely their emotive, spatial and geographic experience.


This terrain, especially for use as a new methodology of research, is all yet to be explored.




My artisan map of the Old City produced with the psychogeographical method based on direct observation and based on the comparison between the tourist map provided from the Information Centre of the Jaffa Gate and the one provided by the International Peace and Cooperation Centre.



QUARTERS




COMMERCIAL AREAS




ROUTES




FRICTION AREAS



Friction Areas. Cameras, temporary and permanent checkpoints and settlers.



Breakdown based on districts. Red indicates the Muslim Quarter; the Jewish Quarter is in blue, Christian Quarter in purple and the Armenian Quarter in green. The dashed line indicates the Judaization of a part of the Armenian Quarter.




Commercial areas and tourist routes. Green indicates the mostly commercial areas and purple the pre-established tourist routes.




Routes. Red indicates the Palestinian routes, blue is the Jewish routes and purple the tourist routes.

Some of the possible overlaps of more than one transparencies:



Districts, Frictions, Routes




Commercial areas, Routes



Friction areas, Routes

After drawing the maps and tracking the possible reading levels that could be overlapped with transparencies, I set out to digitize the material produced and collected for the creation of a *web page*

(www.emiliomaroscia.com/visions/jerusalem.html) on which it was possible to consult the research, either through reading the actual text or by consulting maps, interviews and photographic material:






In the *Notes* section, it is possible to see the entire final report produced during my stay at the CRFJ, the French Research Centre of Jerusalem:



In the *Maps* section, it is possible to view the self-produced maps and choose the transparency used for the reading:





In the *audio-portraits* section, it is possible to listen to interviews after having the position of each respondent on the map. A player that lets you listen to its voice accompanies the photographic portrait of each respondent:




The project '*Bio politics and Territoriality in The Old City of Jerusalem*' is now online and open to public consultation/use at: www.emiliomaroscia.com.

4.4 An example of assembly

Now I can give a concrete example of how to build a biopolitical device through the materials that I have provided. The biopolitical devices to build are endless, and they depend on: the part of the text taken into account, the selected interviews, the chosen map, and the applied overlap. Multiple devices can be used simultaneously.

I start from the general map and choose a synapse in the map. I recognize a synapse in Al Wad Street because I observe that in a single location there are more markers of interest.



I see that the orange synapse corresponds to points of density in the overlaps.

- The synapse is a central point in the level of reading concerning control, friction zones and presence of settlers (top right).

- The synapse is also the intersection of all the lines together in the reading level concerning the paths (bottom right).
- In addition, the synapse is present in the reading level concerning commercial areas and tourist routes (bottom left).

Therefore, the synapse is connected to the control device, the touristic device, the high-frequency passage device, the settlers presence device.



Now I check where the synapse is positioned through the overlap of traditional division into quarters. It is in the heart of the Muslim quarter.

The online platform offers twenty-four audio-portraits. There are six audio-portraits exactly positioned in the synapse taken into account: Atheret Cohanimi Settlers; Huda Imam, director of the centre for Jerusalem Studies at Al Quds University; Yasser Qous, manager at African Community Society; H.A, inhabitant of the Muslim quarter; Jamil Kadamani, cameraman at TvFrance1; students of Atheret Cohanimi Yeshivat.



According to the text of the thesis²⁷⁷ and the text of the paper online ²⁷⁸, one who consults the project knows that:

- the Ateret Cohanim organization is part of the Jerusalem Forum Coalition, working for the Judaization of the Old City. They control 20 buildings in the Muslim and Christian quarters. Most of these buildings can be found along El Wad Street, where the best known is the home of A. Sharon in the heart of the Muslim quarter;
- The seizure of property by settler organizations takes place through demonstrating that the property belonged to a Jew in the past, through the Absentee Property Law or through the use of Palestinian collaborators.
- There are frequent temporary checkpoints in the Old City, particularly on high frequency passages (El Wad St.). Foucault insists on the term 'Surveillance' to indicate that the control is carried out by viewing. The subject is aware of being watched constantly, both in cases where the controller is a human eye or an electronic eye.

Now I can listen to the six associated audio-portraits. I can give a voice to the information adding new data.

Interview with Settler Association on the roof of Ateret Cohanim Yeshiva in **Al Wad Street**.



The building of Ateret Cohanim Yeshiva in the Muslim Quarter was acquired through legal aid, and from the beginning the intention was to expand; from El Wad Street you can reach the Western Wall in a short time; through Ateret Cohanim Association, a Jew who wants to live in Jerusalem has an incentive

²⁷⁷ See 2.2 of this thesis, chapter two, paragraph two, pp.70-76.

²⁷⁸ As I have explained previously (4.3), the paper is available online within the Jerusalem project on http://www.emiliomaroscia.com/visions/jerusalem_notes_1.html

to purchase a home in the heart of the Muslim Quarter; through the Western Wall Tunnel, the Wailing Wall is just three minutes from the Yeshivat; there are several small apartments managed by Ateret Cohanim in the Muslim Quarter, some of them are not whole buildings but only parts of them; all homes are equipped with a camera at the entrance and a monitoring system on the roof; J.S. says that until 1967 many of these buildings were in the hands of Arab guardians paid by the real owners who were Jewish; the Jewish homes in the Muslim quarter can be recognized thanks to white walls around the entrance door and thanks to the hidden camera in the handset.

**If one wants to deviate from the current line of the device in order to hypothesize the line referring to the control in the Old City and the purchase of homes by settlers, I suggest:*



Interview with Huda Imam, director of the centre for Jerusalem Studies in **Al Wad Street.**



A Palestinian of the old city can not leave his home for a long period of time because he risks losing his residence. You have to have a job to get the residence but the job market in Jerusalem is closed and is regulated by Israel; after a period of stay in France, H.I. went to the Interior Ministry to apply for a visa to reside in her hometown; every two years she receives a letter, only in Hebrew, by the Ministry of the Interior. The letter stated that she has thirty days to prove that she lives in Jerusalem (through the payment of taxes, bills paid to the Israeli telephone company, contract of employment); the Palestinians, to be permitted within the boundaries of Jerusalem, must obtain a permit of permanent residence. They need the identity card known as the Blue ID, which differentiates them from the inhabitants of the West Bank. The permanent residence does not have the characteristics of Israeli citizenship because, while recognizing the right to work in Israel, to use the services of the National Insurance Institute and to elect representatives to the town hall, it does not allow participation in elections for the *Knesset*, access to certain public offices and to the army. Control of the residence permits allows a choice of the inhabitants of Jerusalem, and the law assigning this document is, in fact, aimed at reducing the number of Palestinians in the city and at controlling them, as permanent residence is not hereditary. The Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, as well as native, are treated, in

all respects, as foreigners. You can read about this issue in the third paragraph of chapter one (1.3 Structure of the field: urban fabric) and in the first paragraph of chapter two (2.1 First hand: governmentality).

**If one wants to deviate from the current line of the device in order to hypothesize the line referring to the palestinian everyday life(Christians and Muslims) in The Old City, I suggest:*



Interview with Yasser Qous, manager at African Community Society in Al Wad Street.



If you want to get a certificate to be a tour guide in the old city, you must first have a certificate from the Israeli police. The Palestinians associations in the old city are not certified by the Israeli police. The associations continue to organize tours as a tactic of resistance. Palestinians have developed their *rootedness* (you can read this issue in 1.6), a connection with the place that is based on the repetition of everyday life. Jerusalem is also Palestinian due to the life that its inhabitants carry out every day. According to Y.Q., the Palestinian issue is not just Palestinian but it is an Arab global issue. The Palestinian issue must be interpreted as a case of apartheid committed by Israel as Jewish-ethnic state. Israel has separated the Old City from the important palestinian neighborhoods, and many Palestinians living in these neighborhoods do not have free access to the old city (see 1.3 Structure of the field: urban fabric). The Israeli zoning-planning led to a division of the old city from neighboring districts and a division of Palestinian neighborhoods between each other encouraging the construction of settlements. Planning in Jerusalem has clearly organized the territory for the purposes of power through zoning-dividing the territory into zones depending on their use. Urban planning in Jerusalem takes place through classical planning sectors – zoning - and strategic planning aimed at addressing urban policies towards desired long-term results (see 2.1 First Hand: governmentality).

**If one wants to deviate from the current line of the device in order to hypothesize the process of zoning, and urban planning I suggest:*



Interview with H.A., Muslim inhabitants of **Al Wad Street**.



After spending a period outside the old city, H.A. returned to his home in El Wad Street, and he found a hole in the wall of his house. Jewish settlers, in the adjacent building, believing that the house was abandoned had practiced the hole. The settlers have responded by offering the purchase of the house.

Interview with Jamil Kadamani, cameraman at TvFrance1, inhabitant of **Al Wad Street**




Al Wad Street is a key path for Muslims, Christians and Jews. For Muslims it is the center of their neighborhood, and one can reach the Al Aqsa mosque. For Christians, one can reach the Via Dolorosa. For Jews, one can reach the Wailing Wall. Israel controls the street. The idea of Israel is to have the highest possible number of houses in this street. The settlers bought the houses from Arabs, through Arab mediators, but move only when the Arab owner dies. Some Arabs working for Israel and they buy the houses for the Jews. In return, the Arab mediators take a big commission. The idea of Israel regarding Jerusalem is that the city belongs to the Jews. The security system is present in the Old City in order to protect the Jews and not the Palestinians.

Interview with the students of Atheret Cohanimi Yeshivat during the Jerusalem Day²⁷⁹ celebration in **Al Wad Street**



The Yeshiva students say: "this is our country. We celebrate the return of Israel in our spiritual capital, where we connect with God to bring peace and love".

**If one wants to deviate from the current line of the device in order to hypothesize the line referring to the religious idealization in the Old City, I suggest:*



²⁷⁹ The Jerusalem Day is an Israeli national holiday commemorating the reunification of Jerusalem and the establishment of Israeli control over the Old City in June 1967.

I remember that I have followed the Al Wad Street reading line but the lines inside the device are numerous and can be continuously changed. Through the pages of the thesis taken into account, the maps with overlaps, and the interviews, Al Wad Street reading line showed that:

- ❖ there is a process of colonization in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City;
- ❖ this colonization occurs through legalized methods (difficulty by Palestinians to obtain or retain the residence) and through the presence of yeshivas and settlers;
- ❖ the purchase of homes by settlers often occurs through the use of Palestinian mediators;
- ❖ the Ateret Cohanim yeshiva plays a key role in the management of Jews building in the Muslim Quarter;
- ❖ Al Wad Street can be considered a litmus test of an ongoing process;
- ❖ this process in the Old City is also supported by ideological-religious motivations;
- ❖ the Muslim quarter is subjected to a continuing affirmation of the control through cameras, temporary checkpoints, military presence.

Regarding the research methodology, the given example shows that:

- it is possible to represent a device through the individuation of power relations that pass on a territory;
- a device has more lines inside. Each direction generates new lines. The device can then be defined as a coil;
- the creation of maps, overlaps, and interviews is an integral part of the representation of a biopolitical device;

- the representation of the device and the line to follow depend on who lives, reads, and assembles the device and are not provided by the artisan-research-maker once for all;
- all the data provided in a device should be used as textual;
- no data can be considered separately because it is necessarily connected to multiple elements.

The Old City of Jerusalem can be interpreted, experienced, analyzed, represented as a biopolitical device. The biopolitical device is a form of strategic governance, which creates several power relations to direct, block, stabilize, and use social and territorial formations. A device is within a power relationship, and has both visible and hidden elements. The subjects are produced by the device which they pass through.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation was created with the intention to trace the elements needed to consider the Old City of Jerusalem a biopolitical device. In order to do this, it was imperative to take into consideration the device from a theoretical and purely political viewpoint. The initial intention was to create a theoretical framework through which to read the data collected in the field. The grid to theoretically acknowledge the device was given from a few concepts that I recognised to be essential: territoriality, governmentality and security. The study was conducted in accordance with two parallel axes: on the one hand the study of the device and biopolitics and on the other hand the specific case of power relations involved in the Old City of Jerusalem. In my opinion, the security device of the Old City seemed dominant on a daily basis that I asked myself with what means, practical and theoretical, could this be represented. We have seen that security refers to governmental rationality, just like governmentality refers to a logical governing of people. The biopolitical device is provided by territoriality, governmentality and security. The Jerusalem issue assumes a Foucauldian connotation due to the colonization practiced by Israel as a power strategy. Through the analysis of the concept of territoriality, I explained how the control of space is the necessary framework where you can install territorial strategies to shape the territory to the will of the conquering power. The territorialising desire is the need to give geographical dimension to ideologies. The territories are always recorded in other policy spheres in a continuous reassertion of power relations to determine who has the authority and, therefore, who organises the territory. The territoriality can be perceived. It contains elements that are communicated through the presence flags, checkpoints, memorials and monuments. In this way control over the

territory is strengthened and the bond of identity between the dominant subject and the land is celebrated. This reinforces the belonging of the subjects included in the territory and emphasizes the exclusion of people excluded from the territory. The power, through the explicit meanings, acquires a material referent in the world. The stronger the control, the more power is crystallized in the territory (just think of prison gates). The territory is also consistently ranked by area, and so the subjects are re-configured and managed on the basis of generic identity linked to the territory (the man in a state of detention is 'the prisoner'). The militarization of the territory is then justified by the need to preserve security. Militarization becomes a means of complete control over the freedom of the individual. The Jerusalem issue seems unsolvable due to: the territorial model in which it is registered; the conflict of identity that it determines; the structure of bio power that is organized through governmentality, control of the population. To obey with the territorial and ethno-demographic principle, Israel has used and uses territoriality as a governmental device. However, bio-power has generated and generates counter-governmental responses and resistance that are likely to take the same territorial logic, national identity and the power generated. The Palestinians, inscribed in a controlled device territory, resist and in turn perpetuate conflict. The refusal by the Palestinians of Jerusalem to accept what is "offered" to them by Israel has had political significance over time. Separate transport services, refusal of medical assistance, special education, parallel institutions and sumud are practices that, until the 1990s, were very common among Jerusalemite Palestinians who have developed their *rootedness*, a connection with the place that is based on the repetition of everyday life. Jerusalem is also Palestinian due to the life that its inhabitants carry out every day. The Old City represented the emblem and can be considered a litmus test of the

macro-conflict. Many possible hypotheses for the future of the Old City have been designed, they all relate to some major issues: sovereignty, borders, territorial division and administration. All scenarios show positive and negative aspects, all appear difficult to achieve. It seems that all the ideas have already been expressed and none can be said to be truly effective. Unfortunately, up to now, the debate has shifted to a competitive resolution for sovereignty, where one side wins over the other or both are dissatisfied, rather than cooperative, where the process is aimed at a mutual satisfaction. The actual Israeli domain of the Old City is in some way different to the way used in East Jerusalem. Israel has strengthened and divided districts for demographic reasons. While the general Clinton principle ("Where there are Israelis it belongs to Israel, where there are the Palestinians it belongs to the Palestinians") was in some way implemented in the territory outside the Old City, on the contrary, in the Old City an Israeli centralisation process is active. This centralisation was encouraged by governmental policies. We need to look for future scenarios that offer concessions on both sides. In my opinion, the most viable hypothesis encompasses Israeli and Palestinian cooperation and integration under an international regime. In fact, a third party is imperative. International involvement is important for the future of the Old City. This international involvement could mediate between the concerns of the parties. International Intervention does not guarantee the effective implementation of the agreement but is only one of the factors that influence the implementation. International force must also have additional functions, such as rehabilitation of public institutions and a fair system that controls the security of both parties. Both parties must accept that international intervention will necessarily limit the freedom of action that both of their policies have within the Old City. In view of satisfying results for both, the parties must accept that the logics of the current

biopolitical device may not contribute to agreements. This needs to be represented in order to overcome and acknowledge the current logics. Representing the device means, in the words of Foucault, “taking seriously” the power logics used in order to not exchange these with something given and random. The Old City of Jerusalem is a biopolitical device if it has strategic governance, which creates several power relations to direct, block, stabilize, and use social and territorial formations. The following actively contribute to this: the Israeli acquisition of Palestinian properties in Christian and Muslim quarters with the use of means legalised by governmentality; the progressive Judaization of the Armenian Quarter; Israeli zoning policies under which the territory is divided into areas whose characteristics and the use of which are determined by those in control/power; the immense watchful electronic eye and military presence that establishes that those in control decide on the territory; the difficulties experienced by the employed population to assume an equal legal role; the idealization of Jewish Jerusalem through the strategic use of historical and identitary narratives. Observing the powerful territorialisation device that is active within the Old City of Jerusalem has made me wonder what could be valid method to represent the biopolitical conformations of the territory. The creation of handmade maps came from this need and is an integral part of the research work. Psychogeography was helpful, not only as a work method, but also as a personal tool to dispel the daily dynamics of the field and to oppose the 'subjectual' applicaiton to the dynamics of biopower. Hence the desire to roughly produce the material by hand. There is the conviction that public access to data contributes to, in the words of Foucault, ‘taking seriously’ the device, then suggested the idea of creating the on-line platform. I felt that the traditional written text was not, in my case sufficient to represent the multi-linearity that I was faced with. Other

instruments to be treated explicitly and that were not necessarily written were required. Illustrating the device, through audio-evidence and territorial maps (remote monitoring, paths, ethnic division and areas of friction with the presence of settlers) meant, on the one hand, redeeming the individual creative dignity of the individual passing through an excessively territorialised territory and was there to analyse it, and, on the other hand, wonder if the knowledge of this device through data communication facilitated by more textual levels, could become direct information to a much wider audience than that properly represented by research. Currently, the majority of the audio-interviews and maps are already online in the multimedia project related to this thesis. The first map created in February 2012, that includes uncertainties regarding the method, will be donated to CRFJ-CNRS, the French Research Center in Jerusalem, which hosted me during the fieldwork. In order to find funding from entities interested in the possibility of methodological research in the field, it would be desirable to consider an interactive exhibition. In this interactive exhibition, it would be possible to traverse the different maps and listen to the voices of the protagonists through speaking photographic portraits placed in the maps themselves. During the hypothetical exhibition, it would also be possible to show the origin of the maps, or rather the transition from the initial sketches to more complex transparencies depicting the surveillance system (mapping of the control system was the last of the maps created in July 2012), and dedicate a specific route to the cognitive psychogeographical method, and the role, difficulties and doubts of the mapper. A relevant part could also adopt photographic data, which could also be positioned on the map (I believe that positioning the transparency including the routes based on ethnicity could be helpful). The photographic data was not included during this dissertation. The written text would also be a strong support on which to

organise the impressions received during a broader and debated discussion.

The final question of this paper, and the hypothetical future use of the same, are related to the field research method and the assumption that, in representing biopolitical devices, the use of synaesthetic material is functional to the public and the results easily accessible. The possibility that the device will be recognized is interesting. It is the knowledge of the device that helps create valid alternative to the same. At the same time, the assumption is that the psychogeographic and multisensory representation of the device, to be integrated to the written text, is able to get even closer to the real multi-linearity of its territoriality. In the specific case, the question relates to the possibility that the definition of 'biopolitical device' is one of the possible valid patterns through which to approach the social and territorial study of the conflict.

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