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Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies: the Cyprus Case

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Sintesi introduttiva

Questo scritto nasce dalla necessità, più che mai attuale, di comprendere i meccanismi che influenzano la coesistenza di etnie differenti in ambienti critici. Cipro è il caso di studio ideale: la questione cipriota viene definita conflitto etnico a partire dal 1947 con la richiesta ufficiale di annessione alla Grecia (*enosis*) da parte dei Ciprioti greci, provocando la costituzione di un partito politico pro-turco guidato dal Dr. Fazil Kucuk. Da allora questioni etnico-politiche si sono intrecciate a problematiche religiose ed economiche, oltre a provocare polemiche e interventi internazionali, sia militari che diplomatici. Nonostante l'ultimo episodio bellico risalga al 1974, tutti gli sforzi messi in atto al fine di sanare la divisione geografica e politica che lacera questa piccola isola si sono rivelati inefficaci e sono stati infine frustrati anche dalla recente crisi che l'ha colpita.

Per ottenere una comprensione adeguata della materia mi sono servita di strutture concettuali fornitemi dalla sociologia politica e degli studi sulla sicurezza, operando inoltre una riflessione preliminare su temi quali "etnia", "nazione" e "societal security", appropriandomi così di strumenti di studio perlopiù condivisi:

In particolar modo, ho fatto uso del concetto di "societal security", il quale prendendo in esame le minacce all'identità collettiva, si rivela uno strumento analitico molto efficace per comprendere le questioni inerenti la sicurezza nelle società multi-etniche ed individuare quelle importanti dinamiche non-militari che i conflitti etnici racchiudono. Se una società viene privata della propria identità, la sua stessa

sopravvivenza viene messa in pericolo. L'idea di società riguarda la concezione che comunità ed individui che si identificano con quella comunità hanno di sé stessi. Le società sono cioè unità costituite da un senso di identità collettiva e sono generalmente composte da una moltitudine di identità diverse.

Il passo successivo non poteva che essere un'analisi delle fonti storiche per stabilire le coordinate temporali dei movimenti sociali e delle rivendicazioni politiche e le loro connessioni, addentrandomi in particolare nella riflessione sui livelli di integrazione delle componenti etnico-religiose nel corso delle dominazioni coloniali (ottomana ed inglese), esaminando di volta in volta la fazione politicamente più rilevante e i suoi rapporti con le sottomesse.

La maggiore difficoltà in questa parte è rappresentata dal fatto che anche in merito alle fonti si è ovviamente formato un dibattito nazionalistico, perciò ho dovuto operare una cernita e individuare ogni elemento marcatamente fazioso negli scritti, e laddove non mi è stato possibile operare in questo modo e giungere con ragionevole certezza a una verità storicamente affidabile, ho preferito riportare più voci possibili. Tuttavia anche il materiale non neutrale mi è stato utile per definire la manipolazione delle forze dominanti e le loro costellazioni concettuali.

In questa sezione ho fornito l'apporto più originale all'indagine dottrinale in merito alla questione cipriota, avanzando l'ipotesi che l'opinione prevalentemente accettata e condivisa tra gli studiosi come tra i Ciprioti stessi che il senso di appartenenza alla nazione greca fosse connaturato all'identità greco - cipriota sia in realtà una artificiosa fabbricazione andata costruendosi a partire dalla colonizzazione britannica.

Dallo studio delle fonti isolo nove cause alla questione Ciprota:

Innanzitutto il **nazionalismo** di ambo le parti, che consiste in una esagerazione dello spirito di appartenenza a quella che viene definita madrepatria, esagerazione che si perpetua dalle scuole fino alla vita adulta e che si accompagna alla manifesta avversione per la fazione opposta. Tale causa è identificata come immutabile, almeno in tempi brevi.

Vi è poi l'**inconciliabilità degli obiettivi politici**, che consiste nella convinzione che la tanto granitica quanto mal tollerata divisione *de facto* dell'isola sia preferibile a qualsiasi concepibile soluzione pacifica di condivisione del potere.

Un ulteriore elemento di disturbo è la **divisione psicologica** tra le due comunità, la quale comporta una diversa visione della storia e dell'attualità dell'isola, considerata come "occupata" dai turchi agli occhi dei greco - ciprioti, e come vittima di un tentativo di "ellenizzazione" per i turco - ciprioti.

A questo elemento si accorda la quarta causa di **negazione e rifiuto** delle rispettive comunità e delle loro rispettive istituzioni, che comporta una escalation militare e di propaganda.

La componente del **sostegno interno** è la quinta causa, in quanto non è possibile ottenere alcuna risoluzione senza l'appoggio convinto dell'elettorato, il quale può

ovviamente essere più sensibile a certe rivendicazioni aggressive piuttosto che a una politica di complicata convivenza.

Vi sono poi differenze a livello di **concezioni normative** tra l'applicazione di un principio di maggioranza democratica o di uno che preveda una quota di autonomia per ogni gruppo "consistente".

La settima concausa è **l'ideale della "giusta soluzione"**, la quale per esempio nel caso greco prevede l'allontanamento di tutte le truppe turche e dei coloni dall'isola, garantendo loro solo una minima autonomia politica. L'irrealizzabilità di simili soluzioni è evidente a entrambe le comunità, le quali tuttavia non sono disposte a cedere, nella convinzione che la non-soluzione può essere una soluzione e protraendo così lo *status quo* nel tempo.

L'idea del **federalismo** non è ben visto dai greco - ciprioti in quanto aprirebbe la via a una annessione della parte turca alla madrepatria, oltre a significare la condivisione di una proposta inizialmente avanzata dai turchi.

Infine **la paura del cambiamento** fa sì che la spiacevole situazione presente sia comunque preferibile a un incerto e quindi rischioso futuro.

Da ciò sorge inevitabile la domanda se Cipro sia effettivamente un'isola unificabile, tali e tanti sono i motivi fittizi (ma con effetti ben materiali) di separazione che oscurano i vantaggi reali di una unione.

La risposta non può essere puramente speculativa, e proprio per questo origina altre questioni come per esempio l'effettiva capacità della sociologia politica di influenzare o indirizzare le scelte nel mondo politico attuale. La domanda è cardinale per definire tale scienza del pensiero come "attiva" o "passiva", come attività capace di operare solo post eventum o in grado di ottenere risultati nel breve o medio periodo.

Il caso di Cipro è emblematico poichè evidenzia come delle soluzioni valide siano state avanzate a livello teorico, ma si scontrano con irriducibili difficoltà pratiche, difficoltà illogiche di per sé, ma che pure continuano a essere presenti. La traduzione di un impianto teorico speculativo infatti, aggirando o risolvendo quelle difficoltà, spetterebbe alla politica, se ciò non avviene (e a Cipro non è avvenuto se non per brevi periodi) le cause possono essere essenzialmente due: inadeguatezza del pensiero socio-politico o inadeguatezza politica. La questione Cipro complica nello specifico ancor di più la riflessione, e questo è vero anche per la questione palestinese ad esempio, ovvero sembra esserci una volontà dell'elettorato di non giungere a una unione, elettorato che dunque preferisce politici che si accordano alla sua volontà, esacerbando il conflitto e dando luogo a un circolo vizioso. Se anche ottenesse il governo un politico che sposasse una visione di distensione, egli dovrebbe in ogni caso avere a che fare con una larga parte della popolazione avversa alle sue proposte, con tutti i rischi che ne conseguono.

Cipro ha finora dimostrato come non è di fatto possibile agire su una situazione politica di crisi in cui vi sono forze esterne dominanti che spingono l'orientamento del potere in una direzione diversa dal conseguimento del bene comune, a partire da una riflessione socio-politica, per quanto accurata e approfondita; ha inoltre dimostrato

l'inadeguatezza generale della classe politica di liberarsi da giochi extra-politici, religiosi o economici che siano, al fine di giungere a una soluzione che massimizzi il bene per il maggior numero di cittadini; infine evidenzia come la volontà popolare possa essere modellata artificialmente, creando una storia comune da contrapporre ad altre narrazioni etniche con il fine di provocare un contrasto che con il tempo diviene insanabile. La questione di Cipro non è dunque una questione di soluzioni più o meno giuste da proporre, non sta nella ricerca del compromesso perfetto che possa essere accettato da ambo le parti, bensì è una problematica di sensibilità popolare e modellamento di volontà. Gli sforzi diplomatici messi in atto finora non sono inutili solo se vengono considerati come tentativi di modificare l'opinione pubblica delle fazioni, per ammorbidire le prese di posizione e creare col tempo un terreno comune di accordo e condivisione.

1. Introduction

Cyprus, a small Mediterranean island which has recently hit the headlines for the narrow escape of its financial collapse, has been trapped for almost forty years in the mesh of a regional and ethnic conflict among the most refractory to a solution. Since 1974, in fact, the island continues to be divided between the Republic of Cyprus, European Union member state, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a sovereign state recognized only by Turkey. Although lack of further armed clashes since 1974, beyond a few skirmishes along the border between the two states, the possibility of reunification seems more and more remote, so much that some scholars do not hesitate to compare the Cyprus conflict to the Israeli-Palestinian one and to the Indo-Pakistani dispute in Kashmir. My dissertation has the expressed purpose of ,firstly, analyzing the Cyprus conflict by tracing out the political social and cultural agents who gave life to the nationalism of ethnic matrix, secondly, providing an historical account, and thirdly, taking into consideration all those windows of opportunity for the problem resolution, such as Cyprus accession to the European Union, the Annan Plan and the negotiations between the Presidents Christofias and Talat, which regrettably ended in a stalemate. This will be followed by the exposure of the reasons hypothesized to be responsible for an impasse that has frustrated the efforts of almost all the Secretary-Generals of the United Nations. This thesis also poses the ambitious goal to fit into a broader framework of studies on ethnicity and politics, hoping to make a small contribution to historical sociological and political research, in the field of studies on deeply divided and conflicting societies.

2. The Emerging Issue of Societal Security

The term 'societal security' was coined for the first time in Barry Buzan *People, States and Fear* in 1991. It was defined as 'the sustainable development of traditional patterns of language, culture, religious, and national identities, and customs of states'.¹ The society was seen as one of the many fronts through which the state could be threatened and therefore the societal security represented an extension of the security studies that remained essentially national. Not surprisingly according to Buzan societal security was configured only as one of the areas of his five-dimension approach to national security (military security, political security, economic security, environmental security, societal security). With the deepening of security studies, the need to introduce new referents and to depart from a too state-centric neo-realist view, the concept of societal security, aiming to deal with the social communities, has been placed in an intermediate position between the notion of human security and that of global security. The emancipation of the formal societal security occurred in 1993 with the publication of the volume *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, in which Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre redefined the concept of security, opposing state security to societal security. The latter, then, while maintaining its role within the state security, it also acquires status as a referent for security on its own. This new approach was born in the light of the integration processes that were taking place in Europe and with an eye on those involving the disintegration of Eastern Europe. In fact, both these processes affected

¹ Alan Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 203

the relation between state and society: in Europe the political loyalties were moving upward on a supranational level and downward on a regional level; in Eastern Europe adherence to the federal state conflicted with the adherence to its constituent groups .

While state security concerns threats to its sovereignty, as a founding principle of the state (from the sovereignty depends the survival of a state), the societal security concerns threats to the collective identity. If a society is deprived of its own identity, its own survival is being questioned.

The concept of society is the cognition that communities and individuals who identify with that community have of themselves. Societies are units that consist of a sense of collective identity, collective identity that Waever defined as 'what enables the word *we* to be used'.² Societies are made up of a multitude of different identities. According to Anthony Giddens there are two ways of looking at society:

1. As a fixed entity whose well-delineated boundaries distinguish it from other similar entities
2. As the result of social interaction, a fluid concept more similar to a process than to a real object

The Copenhagen School, represented by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever among the others, look at society in this second sense, as a unit in the international system whose threatened identity produces politically significant effects. In 1996, this view was challenged by McSweeney who accused the Copenhagen School of reifying the concept of societal security. According to McSweeney, treating society and identity, fluid entities result of negotiations, as objective realities was wrong. Waever and Buzan replied that, like Constructivist theorists, they did not deny that the identities of

² Alan Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, p. 205

the various communities were socially constructed but highlighted as once constructed these identities could temporarily appear as fixed units. In support of this thesis in 2003 Theiler wrote that 'beliefs and institutions [...] deeply sedimented [...] change only very slowly'.³

With the term societal security the Copenhagen School meant the security of societies that are more than the mere sum of its individual constituents or social groups, and above all, they can claim the right to survive.

The nation is seen as a special case of society characterized by the attachment to a territory, continuity over time and self-perception to be one of the units that make up the social world. Very often nations are created to meet a need for identification, not surprisingly the concept of nation is often supported by cultural ties: belonging to a particular culture creates identity and cohesion, essential to the birth of the nation idea.

The nation can be defined in relation to citizenship but also in terms of ethnicity. Although nation and ethnicity are often mixed and confused, the concept of nation differs from that one of ethnic group, since the former strives to get their own state while the latter acts within the existing statehood.

Anthony Smith suggested in 1993 that only when an ethnic group became politicized it might represent a nation, but he also warned that the politicization of an ethnic group did not always result in the quest for statehood.⁴

Waever makes use of the concept of ethno-national group in reference to society when he asserts that the main units of analysis of societal security are politically significant ethno-national and religious entities.

³ Alan Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, p. 205, pp. 214-15

⁴ Alan Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, p. 206

The societal security is defined as the ability of a society to persist in spite of changes and possible threats to its collective identity. Systems through which a social identity may be compromised range from repression of any expression of itself to interference with its ability to reproduce over time. This may include the prohibition to use its own language, its own names and distinctive clothes; closing of places of education and devotion, until the deportation and killing of the members of its community .

Against threats to societal security societies can react in two ways:

- Placing the threat to the attention of the state
- Using non-state means (obligatory path when the state is unable or unwilling to ensure their survival)

The defence of community identity can then carried out through military means and in this case the dynamics of societal security resemble those of an armed aggression between states, or, if the groups in question do not have armies, militias or they are unable to train them, the collective identity is defended without the use of force but through other strategies. Among these it is included what John Hutchinson identifies as cultural nationalism, which emphasizing common features, such as language, religion, history, and celebrating the specificity and exclusivity of the collective, it strengthens the feeling of unity and cohesion within the community. Strategies of cultural nationalism manifest concretely in the form of demands for cultural autonomy such as the acquisition of rights in relation to means of cultural production (control of its own journals, schools, religious institutions, etc.).

Other non-military means of defense of societal security is the use of political or ethnic nationalism, in which case we are faced with projects that make explicit

reference to territorial elements. The political nationalism research the political autonomy and self-government of a given region but in its most extreme instances can come to secessionism trying to establish itself outside of the existing state structures.

As shown in the societal security dilemma, which like the state security dilemma occurs when the action of a community to strengthen its security identity causes a reaction in a second community going to affect the safety of the first, the ambiguity in the relations between communities - potential source of conflict - arises from the above listed two facets that nationalism can take. When it is cultural assumes a positive value because it tends to maintain the *status quo* and to operate within the existing government structures, when it takes an ethno-political shape on the contrary it is perceived as dangerous for it is assumed that its ultimate goal is the annexation of territories and the disintegration of states.

Despite this as Lindholm writes 'ethnicity can be positive and negative. Of course, the divisive nature of contemporary ethno-nationalism, its violent boundary makings, its exclusiveness, etc., must also be viewed as considerable challenges to the modern international system, as well as potentials for violence and wars. One must not forget, however, that ethnicity has also a potential for internal group solidarity and loyalty'.⁵

In conclusion, although the concept of societal security has been issued by the Copenhagen School as a response to the European political agenda of the nineties, it proves, as we shall see in the course of this dissertation, an important analytical tool to effectively understand the issues concerning security in multi-ethnic societies,

⁵ Alan Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, p. 213

which appear very often divided, and identify those decisive non-military dynamics that ethnic conflicts contain.

3. Cyprus Ethnic Conflict

3.1. Creation Of Ethno-National Identity In Cyprus: A Challenging View

This section aims to question the commonly shared view among academics involved in the Cyprus issue according to which the majority of Greek Cypriots have always cultivated a strong sense of belonging to the Greek nation and, since the early years of the nineteenth century, under the leadership of the various Cypriot Orthodox Archbishops, called ethnarchs, have striven to achieve *enosis* (union with Greece).⁶ Challenging the widespread view according to which there are only Greeks and Turks in Cyprus and their relationships are entered either within the wider Greek-Turkish conflict or in a state of peaceful coexistence, as during the Ottoman and British domination,⁷ this paragraph wishes also to highlight how an ethno-national identity was institutionalized at the elite level during the period of British occupation. That said, I distance myself from the proposition advanced by some historians with little knowledge of imperial history, according to which the rise of Hellenic nationalism

⁶ One supporter of this thesis is Caesar V. Mavratsas, 'National Identity and Consciousness in Everyday Life: Towards a Sociology of Knowledge of Greek-Cypriot Nationalism', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1999, pp. 91-104

⁷ Costas Kyrris, *Peaceful Co-existence in Cyprus under British Rule (1878-1959) and after Independence*, Nicosia, 1977; Paschalis Kitromilides, 'From Coexistence to Confrontation: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus', *Cyprus Reviewed*, (ed.) Michael Attalides, Nicosia, 1977, pp. 35-70; A.C. Gazioglu, *The Turks of Cyprus*, London, 1990, pp. 250-269

would be due to the general British colonial mentality of ignoring the initial hostility to their rule.⁸

In contrast to what has been alleged by the above-mentioned historians and political scientists, Cypriot Archbishops were not all fervent Greek nationalists and the same concept of ethnarch had a completely different meaning in the pre-modern Cyprus. When, for example, Sir Steven Runciman wrote in his monumental work of 1968 on the Orthodox Church under the Ottoman Empire, 'the great Fathers of the Church [...] nor would they have approved of the politically minded Cypriot ethnarchs of our own day',⁹ he was certainly not referring to the Archbishop Sophronios, who would be horrified at the thought of a campaign for enosis full of anti-colonial violence, but rather to the one who authorized it in the 1950s and who would later become the first President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios III.¹⁰

As Adamantia Pollis wrote in 1976:

Throughout its history, the population of Cyprus has been a mixture of ethnic, tribal, and religious groups, but until the twentieth century whatever division and conflict existed was along lines other than nationality. During the Ottoman era the primary reference group for the mass of the population was the village and the attendant kinship system. Extending beyond the village, relatedness and identity reflected religion.¹¹

And to those who considered the religious identity a form of proto-nationalism

Adamantia Pollis replied thus:

⁸ Hubert Faustmann, 'Clientelism in the Greek Cypriot Community of Cyprus Under British Rule', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Fall 1998, pp. 41-77; R. Coughlan & W. Mallinson, 'Enosis, Socio-Cultural Imperialism and Strategy', *Middle East Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2005, p. 575, 580

⁹ Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity*, Cambridge, 1968, p. 411

¹⁰ Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, London, 1978; Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*, Oxford, 1998 (repr. 2002)

¹¹ Adamantia Pollis, 'International Factors and the Failure of Political Integration in Cyprus', Stephanie Neuman (ed.), *Small States and Segmented Societies*, New York, 1976, pp. 44-83, p. 50

[...] it is not possible to argue, as some writers have, that religious identity represented proto-nationalism. Quite the opposite, Ecumenical Orthodoxy, with its Patriarchate in Constantinople, the dominant non-Islamic religion in the Ottoman Empire, gradually splintered and became “nationalized”.¹²

The same opinion, in refuting the alleged primordial feeling of “Greekness” among the Eastern Orthodox Cypriots, was expressed by the anthropologist Rebecca Bryant and the historian Rolandos Katsiaounis, who argued that only with the development of a middle class in Cyprus, as a result of the political and economic opportunities arisen during the British colonial occupation, and its coming into contact with modernity the emergence of an ethnic nationalism had been observed.¹³

Andrekos Varnava has recently argued that until 1910 a uniform Greek nationalist agenda even at the elite level cannot be traced.¹⁴

Another view that this paragraph seeks to discredit and which follows the argument that the Cypriot Orthodox elite has somehow always been all Greek nationalist (‘Hellenist’) or it suddenly awoke one day Hellenist, presumably on the occurrence of Greek revolution or shortly after,¹⁵ is the idea supported by Diana Markides for whom there had been a ‘fluid evolution from millet to national consciousness on the island’ that entailed ‘a struggle between gradualism and radicalism itself so characteristic of *fin de siècle* engagements in the eastern

¹² Adamantia Pollis, ‘The Role of Foreign Powers in Structuring Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus’, Vangelis Calotychos (ed.), *Cyprus and its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community, 1955-1997*, Colorado, 1998, p. 85

¹³ Rolandos Katsiaounis, *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Nineteenth Century*, Nicosia, 1996; Rebecca Bryant, *Imaging the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus*, London, 2004

¹⁴ Andrekos Varnava, *British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878-1915: The Inconsequential Possession*, Manchester, 2009, pp. 152-201

¹⁵ Caesar V. Mavratsas, ‘National Identity and Consciousness in Everyday Life’

Mediterranean'.¹⁶ Assertion effectively contradicted by a recent article of Neophytos Loizides who claims that

Nationalism did not come to the Balkans because of industrialisation; rather, it was linked to the uneven modernization and underdevelopment which resulted from the socio-economic backwardness of the Ottoman Empire and the proximity of the Balkans to the West.¹⁷

By analyzing the Greek Cypriot memorialisation of ethnarchs I am going to show which political social and cultural agents produced the material culture responsible for the development of a Greek ethno-nationalist identity.

3.1.1. Under the aegis of the Ottoman Empire


During the Ottoman period Cyprus live peacefully with its two main communities, the Eastern Orthodox Christians and the Muslims, well integrated at all levels of society. However the term integration must not be confused with that of parity . For most of the Ottoman domination Cypriot society remains divided between a Muslim-Christian ruling elite representing the privileged class and a Muslim-Christian peasantry. Nevertheless these differences do not prevent the integration within the respective classes , where folklore, language and economic difficulties/benefits are equally shared, and mixed marriages are celebrated.¹⁸ The growth of mixed villages is

¹⁶ Diana Markides, book review of Andrekos Varnava, *British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878-1915: The Inconsequential Possession*, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2010, pp. 171-3

¹⁷ Neophytos Loizides, 'Religious Nationalism and Adaptation in Southeast Europe', *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2009, pp. 203-27

¹⁸ Kitromilides, 'From Coexistence to Confrontation', pp. 37-8; Paul Sant Cassia, 'Religion, Politics and Ethnicity in Cyprus During the Turkokratia (1571-1878)', *European Studies of Sociology*, 1986, pp. 3-

the proof: in 1832 the Ottoman census recorded 172 mixed villages, in 1858 they were estimated 239 by the British consul, and finally in 1891, during a second census, the number rose to 346, on a total of 702 villages.¹⁹



Easily perceived that the divisions of class and religion are thus the determinant factors in the construction of identity under the Ottoman millet system. This system granted religious and community autonomy on condition that millet leaders guaranteed absolute loyalty and cooperation on the part of their people (*dhimmi*) to the government and to the crown. Since the Cypriot Orthodox Church - which was defined *Romiee* (Roman) because after the spread of Christianity in the Roman Empire the term 'greek' had become synonymous with paganism²⁰ - was autonomous from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and the three Patriarchs of the

28; Kemal Cicek, 'Living Together: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eighteenth-Century Cyprus as Reflected by the Sharia Court Records', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1993, pp. 36-64

¹⁹ Richard A. Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971*, Department of Geography Publication Series, No. 4, University of Waterloo, 1976, p. 12

²⁰ John Kakridis, 'The Ancient Greeks and the Greeks of the War of Independence', *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1963, pp. 251-64; Victor Roudometof, 'From Rum Millet to Greek Nation: Enlightenment, Secularisation, and National Identity in Ottoman Balkan Society, 1453-1821', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1998, pp. 11-48

Apostolic Jerusalem , Antioch and Alexandria, its archbishop was recognized as the ethnarch (spiritual and secular head) of the Cypriot Orthodox community and co-opted into the ruling class (also composed of Muslims) . In essence, becoming the sole Christian authority recognized on the island , the Eastern Orthodox elite gained a lot of power after the Ottoman conquest.²¹

And it is this power that in 1821 caused the death of the Archbishop of Cyprus Kyprianos and of 400 Orthodox Cypriot notables. In that year, the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud III, at the urging of Governor Kuçuk Mehmet, ordered their execution fearing the excessive power gained by the Cypriot Orthodox Church, witnessed by the writings of many travellers of the time.²² This brutal incident is of fundamental importance for the construction of the myth of the Greek nation of Cyprus. Kyprianos is in fact immortalized in the national consciousness as the first Greek Cypriot ethno-martyr. In the Greek Cypriot nationalist discourse Kyprianos became the first Hellenic freedom fighter , a member of a secret society, the Friendly Society, which operated in order to fight the Ottomans and establish an Hellenic state.²³ Nothing could be further from the truth , since Kyprianos was a staunch opponent of the French revolutionary ideas and had always adhered strictly to the instructions of the sultan in order to push his own flock to cooperate against rioters calling for Greek liberty.²⁴ In 1815 he

²¹ Costas Kyrris, 'The Role of Greeks in the Ottoman Administration of Cyprus', Proceedings of the First International Conference on Cypriot Studies, III, A, 1973, pp. 149-179; Nicholas Coureas, 'The Cypriot Reaction to the Establishment of the Latin Church: Resistance and Collaboration', *Sources Travaux Historiques*, XXXIII-IV, 1995, pp. 75-84

²² El Absassi Ali Bey, (Don Domingo Badia-y-Leublich), *Travels in Morocco, Tripoli, Cyprus, Egypt, Arabia, Syria and Turkey*, Vol. I-II, London 1816 (reprint 1970); William Turner, *Journal of a Tour in the Levant*, Vol. I-III, London, 1828

²³ Sir George Francis Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, IV, (ed.) Sir Harry Luke, London, 1952, pp. 41-2; J.T.A. Koumoulides, *Cyprus and the War of Greek Independence 1821-1829*, London, 1974

²⁴ R. Clogg, 'The Dhidaskalia Patriki (1798): An Orthodox Reaction to French Revolutionary Propaganda', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1969, p. 90; Koumoulides, *Cyprus and the War of Greek Independence*, pp. 40-5

excommunicated the Freemasons who had arrived in Larnaca because judged to be guilty of preaching the masonry and taking action against the Sultan. In 1821 under Sultan instruction he appealed to his devotees through an encyclical for giving in the weapons they had.²⁵ Despite this Kyprianos was memorialised as an ethno-martyr , not less than Makarios. Several major roads and local schools were named after him (the high school in Strovolos , where he was born , was called 'Ethno-martyr Kyprianos Lyceum'), and many statues were erected in his honour. Its memorialisation began in the early years of the twentieth century through the circulation by the Greek Cypriot photographer Theodoulos Toufexis of a portrait of the ethno-martyr and a photograph of his memorial erected at the Archbishopric in 1901 with funds raised in Greece by Greek Cypriot.²⁶ This memorialisation occurred after the death of Archbishop Sophronios III and during the Archbishop's dispute that saw opposing the Hellenised nationalists on the one hand and on the other hand those Ottoman era élites with regional and religious identity and willing to cooperate with the British. Worthy representative of the latter category was the aforementioned Archbishop of Cyprus since 1865 , Sophronios III, who a decade before the end of Ottoman rule wrote in his autobiographical note to the Jerusalem Theological School: 'my homeland is Cyprus and my parents are Orthodox Christians of the Eastern dogma'.²⁷ Cyprus is my homeland and my parents are Orthodox Christians of the Eastern dogma ' . It is therefore incorrect to state that the Cypriots had no identity or as Katsiaounis claimed a 'very low level of cultural development' before the arrival of the British, unless for

²⁵ Katsiaounis, *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus*, pp. 12-3, 18-9

²⁶ Stavros G. Lazarides, *Theodoulos N. Toufexis: The Award Winning Photographer of Cyprus*, Nicosia, 2004

²⁷ Sophronios autobiographical note, quoted in Theodore Papadopoulos, «The Ethnarch Role of the Orthodox Hierarchy», *Kypriakai Spoudai*, XXXV, 1971, pp. 95-141, 115

'cultural development ' we do not meant the Hellenic culture.²⁸ Sophronios, reflecting the spirit of the Cypriot Orthodox society of the time, characterizes its national identity according to the geographical context (referring to Cyprus as his homeland) and his religious beliefs (being Orthodox) . No mention is made neither to Greece nor to being Greek . As evidence of the absence of a widespread feeling of Greekness in the Cypriot Orthodox community is the regret that in 1876 Greece's last vice-consul before the British arrival expressed to his superiors observing how 'the spirit of Hellenism in some places is asleep and in others totally non-existent'.²⁹ Moreover, a further confirmation of the absence of nationalist movements among the Cypriot Orthodox clergy is provided by the strong denunciation and condemnation of 'tribalism' as 'ethno-nationalism' made in August 1872 by the Heads of the Eastern Orthodox Church, including the Archbishop Sophronios, in response to the Bulgarian schism of 1870.

Tribalism, that is, discrimination on the basis of diverse racial origins and language and the claiming or exercising of exclusive rights by individuals or groups of persons, exclusively of one country or collection, which may be enforced in secular states, is alien to our desire and lies beyond the scope of the present inquiry; but in the Christian Church, which is a spiritual communion, predestined by its leader and Founder to contain all nations in one brotherhood in Christ, tribalism is strange and entirely unthinkable [...] We abnegate, denouncing and condemning, tribalism, that is racial discrimination, ethnic controversies, envies and dissensions within the Church of Christ, as contrary to the teaching of the gospel and the holy canons of our blessed

²⁸ Katsiaounis, *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus*, p. 55

²⁹ Katsiaounis, *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus*, p. 52

fathers which define and direct the holy Church and the entire Christian communion, glorify it and lead it to divine piety.³⁰

It is therefore not surprising to find out how in the Greek Cypriot national consciousness the one who was Archbishop of Cyprus for 35 years and during an important period of transition, Sophronios precisely, was such a neglected and barely memorialised figure, compared to Kyprianos and Makarios III. No road, school or hospital took his name, and only three statues preserve his memory: one in the native village of Phoini; another in the gardens of the Metoci of Kykko, in Nicosia; and another in the Archbishopric. In addition, to be significant is the fact that the construction of the statue of Sophronios was not funded by any Cypriot nationalist committee in Greece, as had happened to Kyprianos, but by his family.

3.1.2. British Occupation, 1878-1910

During the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1878, the Ottoman government ceded to the British the right to occupy and administer the territory of Cyprus but not to hold sovereignty. If the official reason was to defend the Ottoman Empire against future Russian attacks, the preeminent intent that animated the Conservative government of Benjamin Disraeli in signing the Convention of Cyprus was the will to safeguard the British economic and strategic interests in the Near East. Imperative, therefore, was that the place offered guarantees of stability and security. Crete was rejected because the Hellenic nationalism was causing clashes between the Hellenised Orthodox

³⁰ Declaration signed by the ecumenical patriarch, the patriarchs of Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria, and the Archbishop of Cyprus, quoted in Pophaides, *Genesis of Greek National Identity in Cyprus*, p. 119

Christian community and the Muslim community. Cyprus was chosen because the British were convinced that in this island such a threat could not exist.³¹

Contrary to what many commentators³² and Cypriot government officers³³ argued, declaring that a Greek prelate, either Archbishop Sophronios or the Bishop of Kitium, had welcomed the first High Commissioner, Sir Garnet Wolseley, with declarations of loyalty dependent on a subsequent transfer of Cyprus to Greece, Archbishop Sophronios unconditionally welcomed the British showing full willingness to cooperate with them and hoping that the “changing of the guard” would bring equality before the law for both Christians and Muslims.³⁴

In reality Sophronios had much more care about retaining the privileged status of the Church in leadership roles, and the request to be co-opted in the British government structures as it had been during the Ottoman period was not long in coming. In February 1879, the Archbishop Sophronios and the bishops of Paphos, Kyrenia and Kitium presented a memorial to Wolseley asking that their privileges would be recognized.³⁵ Lord Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary, arguing that ‘the clergy have used the weakness of Turkish rule [...] to consolidate a power over their people

³¹ Viscount Sandon, *The Cabinet Journal of Dudley Ryder, Viscount Sandon*, (eds) C. Howard & P. Gordon, London, 1974, 11 May 1878, pp. 4-5

³² Theodore Papadopoulos, «The Ethnarch Role of the Orthodox Hierarchy», pp. 95-141, Zenon Stavrinides, *The Cyprus Conflict*, England 1976, 17-29; H.I. Salih, *The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State*, Tuscaloosa, 1978, p. 5; George Georghallides, *A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918-26*, Nicosia, 1979, p. 39, pp. 81-82; P. Oberling, *The Road to Bellapais*, New York, 1982, pp. 9-21; Stefanos Papageorgiou, ‘The Genesis of the Greek and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus, 1878-1914: A Common March at a Different Pace’, *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1997, pp. 56-65; Stavros Panteli, *A History of Cyprus*, London, 2000, pp. 57-59; Katia Hadjidemetriou, *A History of Cyprus*, Nicosia, 2002, p. 336, pp. 362-369; William Mallinson, *Cyprus: A Modern History*, London, 2005, p. 10

³³ Orr, *Cyprus Under British Rule*, p. 160; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. IV, p. 297. Sir Harry Luke, who edited Volume IV of Hill’s monumental study, was an officer in the Cyprus government from 1911 to 1920.

³⁴ Glenbow Library and Archives, Calgary, Canada, M1332, ‘Nicosia Address, 1878’

³⁵ FO Correspondence, 4319, June-December 1879, Memorial (French) to Wolseley, 16 February 1879

which is inconsistent with all modern views of civil government³⁶ rejected the request. Differently from what had happened in India, Malaya and the Ionian Islands co-option was not practiced.³⁷ Behind this choice like behind other British policies in the Island that we will investigate later, there was the perception that Cyprus, as primarily 'Christian', should be considered, in part at least, 'European' and therefore placed on a modern footing. Moreover, it was assumed that like the Ionians the Cypriots were Hellenized and they carried the huge weight of a grand Greek past. The above is easily traceable in much of the talk and in many of the images on Cyprus centered on its perceived ancient Greek past that circulated in the British newspapers and journals of the time just a few weeks after the occupation.³⁸ As Michael Herzfeld contended, since Europe claimed ancient Greece as its spiritual ancestor and fashioned a unitary ideal of it, it equally moulded a unitary ideal of a 'modern Greece', emerging from the decay of the Ottoman Empire.³⁹ The renewal, in Cyprus' case, was thus cast in terms of its past. In London, both the Liberal Party and the Conservative one agreed to consider the Eastern Orthodox Christian Cypriots Greeks. Lord Salisbury in his correspondence referred to the Cypriots as 'Greeks' and 'Turks', while the Liberal William Gladstone, a great Philhellene, sharply criticized the colonial policy for occupying 'virtually a European Island...inhabited by people who had been civilised for

³⁶ FO421/32, Salisbury to Biddulph, 4 July 1879

³⁷ David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire*, London, 2001, pp. 58-64; J.M. Gullick, *Malaya*, 2nd edition, London, 1964, pp. 38-40; Thomas Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion: Culture, Identity, and Power in the British Mediterranean*, Indiana, 2002, pp. 77-8, pp. 92-3

³⁸ Andrekos Varnava, 'Punch and the British Occupation of Cyprus in 1878', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, 2005, pp. 167-186

³⁹ Michael Herzfeld, *Anthropology Through the Looking-Glass*, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 28-30

centuries when we were barbarians...and who never lost the essentials of civilisation' and in 1880 he proposed giving Cyprus to Greece.⁴⁰

The fact that Cyprus was seen through these preconceived Hellenised cultural lenses had a significant impact on the choices that the colonial administration made, especially in education and governance. In this regard it is worth noting the refusal of Lord Kimberly, the Liberal Colonial Secretary, dating back to 1881, to the suggestion of introducing English alongside the local languages proposed by the second High Commissioner of the Island, Robert Biddulph, Claude Cobham, the District Commissioner of Larnaca and Reverend Josiah Spencer, who was Director of Education at the time, inasmuch as

the rich and varied literature of ancient Greece, and the great progress...modern Greece has made in the work of education, affords ample means not only for an ordinary education but for the attainment of a high degree of mental culture.⁴¹

The British application of modernity to Cyprus gave further stimulus to the Hellenist project of imposing *Katharevousa*, a language obtained by purifying the spoken tongue from 'foreign' influences. This artificial language was 'syntactically calqued on foreign prototypes but simultaneously claimed as the restored original of the local tongue'.⁴² It was taught in schools and used by newspapers, thus preventing the Cypriot language spoken by the majority of Christians and Muslims to access the

⁴⁰ W.E. Gladstone, 'England's Mission', *The Nineteenth Century*, IV, September 1878, pp. 560-584, 568-569

⁴¹ C.2930, Kimberley to Biddulph, 10 June 1881

⁴² M. Herzfeld, 'Hellenism and Occidentalism', (ed.) J.G. Carrier, *Occidentalism*, Oxford, 1995, p. 220

printed paper.⁴³ The British sealed its flowering by forcing Orthodox Cypriots to employ scribes in order to carry out legal and government activities.⁴⁴

Furthermore the British consented that the curricula active in Greece would be adopted in Cypriot schools. After 1878 schools, which hitherto were managed by the Church, passed under the control of the Egyptian Brotherhood, because people refused to continue paying canonical dues.⁴⁵ The Greek Brotherhood of the Cypriots of Egypt was composed of Greek immigrants and Hellenized residents of Larnaca and Limassol. A group equipped with a clear agenda of Hellenization, inasmuch as they had sharply criticized the absence of Hellenistic discourse from the speeches welcoming Wolseley (further proof that neither Sophronios nor Kyprianos had mentioned the *enosis*)⁴⁶ and in 1886 Spencer reported that nationalist books from Athens such as *On National Instruction* and *The Heroes of Modern Greece* had replaced the religious texts among these teachers who 'spread sedition and discontent amongst the people' to weaken trust in the British government'.⁴⁷

Regarding the governance front, in March 1882, the Liberal government announced that in Cyprus an elective legislative assembly with a local majority would be established, granting the island the most liberal constitutions of any of the non-settler possessions. Elected members of the Legislative Council were divided along religious lines according to the census made in 1881 that had attested a presence of Eastern Orthodox Christians amounting to the 73.9 per cent of the population and a

⁴³ Varnava, *British Imperialism in Cyprus*, p. 157; Pophaides, *Genesis of Greek National Identity in Cyprus*, p. 43

⁴⁴ Bryant, *Imagining the Modern*, pp.33-7, p. 45

⁴⁵ Peristianis, *Church and State in Cyprus Education*, p. 158

⁴⁶ Katsiaounis, *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus*, pp. 27-8

⁴⁷ Katsiaounis, *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus*, pp. 94-5; Spencer quoted in Bryant, *Imagining the Modern*, p. 125

Muslim presence of 24.5 per cent. The Council was therefore composed of nine Eastern Orthodox members, three representatives of the Muslim community and six official unelected British members. Although the first impression might be that the representative Muslim share together with the English one would serve to offset the Eastern Orthodox members, it seems more plausible that the British had thought they could rely on the vote of at least three members of Orthodox Christians or Muslims for any legislation who intend to launch, especially given the pro-British agenda of Sophronios and his followers.⁴⁸ In addition, an alliance of British and Muslims against Christians was not a viable option for the first thirty years of British rule in view of the opposition to the introduction of representative institutions on the part of Muslim leaders. However the tide turned after 1910, precisely the crisis of 1931 - that sparked unrest in rural areas and nationalist demonstrations in the towns - was due to the alignment of a Muslim member with Orthodox Christians in regards to various legislative proposals, particularly the tariff bill, forcing the Governor Sir Ronald Storrs, to approve the bill with an Order in Council.⁴⁹

The refusal to co-opt the Orthodox Church and the introduction of modernity had repercussions on the development of the politics and the identity of the elite in the Cypriot-Orthodox community. The latter split into two factions: one led by Sophronios who pursued cooperation with the British and good relations with the Muslims, the so-called 'religious, realist cosmopolitans', and one desirous of a new hierarchy and a new social order through the union of Cyprus with Greece, the so-called 'uncompromising, uncooperative Hellenists'. To the latter category belonged the

⁴⁸ Varnava, *British Imperialism in Cyprus*, pp. 166-7

⁴⁹ G. S. Georghallides, *Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 Crisis*, Nicosia, 1985

bishop of Kitium, Kyprianos, the small Hellenic community and a small number of Hellenized Cypriots in Larnaca and Limassol. They accused Sophronios and the other bishops to be paid by British agents and try to dominate the legislative council. Sophronios , who, as the bishops of Paphos and Kyrenia, risked bankruptcy because he was no longer able to collect canonical dues, was about to resign in 1886. The British for their part, in the spirit of the new modernizing times refused to make statutory the state's affairs with the Church before asking people.

Rejecting the co-option , the British allowed another power base, who had usurped the topological dream of Hellenism, to challenge the traditional leaders and the identity of Cypriot Eastern Orthodox Christians, as well as the British rule. Somewhat ironically, actually, Hellenised modernisers clashed with the British modernisers who had given them the space to grow and develop. This came to a head during the severe drought of 1887, which left destitute most of the Cypriot population. Sophronios , after insistent solicitation by nationalists and because of it (he was Concerned that they would hijack any missions if he was not present), agreed to send a delegation to London to seek aid. The British government did nothing except to reiterate that placing the relationship between church and state on a statutory basis and adjust the payment of taxes was the sole task of the local legislative council. This decision helped to create the conditions for Hellenists to unseat the traditional elites. The *enosis* , with disgust of Sophronios , became the main Greek Cypriot elite response to the problems of the island.

In 1894 the Office of the War brought about a reduction of the garrison troops stationed in Cyprus for the necessity to reinvigorate the ranks in other imperial

possessions , namely Malta , Egypt and India.⁵⁰ The Hellenists seized the opportunity and in newspapers and coffee-houses spread the rumor that the British had the intention of abandoning the entire island to the 'barbaric Turk'. The press in favor of Sophronios replied to this scaremongering minimizing cuts to the garrison as a simple matter of military and imperial contingency and reassuring that the British would not abandon Cyprus to the Ottomans.⁵¹ Accordingly, as the troops were withdrawn, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Ripon, explained that he had appreciated and understood the Cypriot disappointment for the withdrawal of the troops, which entailed a loss for those who had dealings with the army (mainly nationalists of Limassol), but he guaranteed that Cyprus 'would be in no worse position than the great majority of the British Colonial Possessions'.⁵²

Within a few months after the withdrawal of part of the garrison , the peasants began to complain to the elite of Nicosia that they could not hold the weight of taxes any longer and so a committee headed by Sophronios informed the High Commissioner Walter Sandal that broad assemblies would be organized across the island to settle the matter and he would soon receive memorials about it. The following meetings showed the different focus on issues of leaders in Nicosia and Kyrenia to those in Larnaca, Limassol and Paphos. The memorial of Nicosia and Kyrenia demanded tax relief, protection from taxes, and *enosis* if England was weighing the possibility of leaving the country. In the memorial of Larnaca instead the only solution contemplated was to implement as soon as possible the union with the

⁵⁰ Varnava, *British Imperialism in Cyprus*, p. 214

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 215-9

⁵² *The Times*, 23 January 1895, 10g

mother Greece. The same could be read in the memoirs of Limassol and Paphos.⁵³ Sophronios was forced to grudgingly accept the *enosis* in 1895 in the event that British left the island. The Cypriot Orthodox elite, knowing only governance under a foreign master, preferred that the next master would share their faith.

The death of Sophronios in May 1900 triggered an archiepiscopal dispute between those with a religious national identity who respected Cypriot multi-religious reality and those who wanted to impose an ethno-national identity and *enosis*. The Bishop of Paphos, who had been entrusted with the planning of the election, unfortunately died before Sophronios, leaving to the bishops of Kyrenia and Kitium the daunting task. The severe Bishop of Kyrenia, Kyrillos Vasilliou, and his group (*Kyreniaki*) were deployed in support of Sophronios line, pro-British and claiming Orthodoxy as the people's true identity. His rival was the instigator Kyrillos Papadopoulos, Bishop of Kitium since 1893. During the illness of Sophronios, Papadopoulos and his followers (*Kitiaki*), many of whom were Greek citizens, began to weave a political network to win the archbishopric. They remarked that the Cypriot Eastern Orthodox were Greek⁵⁴ and they did not scruple to destroy the Orthodox-Muslim integration⁵⁵ nor to use unorthodox means to achieve their purposes. How Pophaides reveals in fact, in the village of Athiennou, under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Kitium, one of three local priests refused to celebrate the Sunday mass, even blowing out the candles of the faithful in order to force the villagers to vote for Papadopoulos. In addition, as reported by a local police commander, it seems they had held meetings in which it

⁵³ CO67/91/8547, 110, Sendall to Ripon, 7 May 1895, with memorials and signatures

⁵⁴ Bryant, *Imagining the Modern*, pp. 82-7

⁵⁵ Bryant, *Imagining the Modern*, p. 83

was decided that the *mouktar* (village chief) and other leading elites who opposed Papadopoulos would be attacked and even killed.⁵⁶

The High Commissioner, William Haynes Smith, nourishing the legitimate belief that it would be dangerous if Papadopoulos had succeeded to become Archbishop, warned London that strong actions had to be taken but Cyprus was not as strategically important as Malta and so the Colonial Office bothered to suppress the anti-British faction that operated in Malta and did not intervene in Cyprus⁵⁷

The legacy of Archbishop Sophronios as the champion of co-option and co-operation with the British and the Muslim community, and as a person who identified himself as an Orthodox whose homeland was Cyprus, was shattered by the nationalist forces represented by the Bishop of Kitium and his entourage.

In 1903 Cyprus-Orthodox members of the Legislative Council who supported Papadopoulos, wrote a memorial to the Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain calling for *enosis* and pointing out that Sophronios had accepted the British rule in 1878 on condition that the British would have given the island in the future to Greece.⁵⁸ The reality was altered and, since Sophronios had lived longer than all the bishops around in 1878 and so no one could refute the claims of the nationalists, they were able to undermine the Kyreniaki positions at the root reinventing Sophronios as a nationalist. This stunning fabrication became a generally accepted truth by government officers,⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Local Commandant of Police to W. Collet, District Commissioner of Nicosia, 1 September 1901, in Pophaides, *Genesis of Greek National Identity in Cyprus*, p. 141

⁵⁷ Varnava, *British Imperialism in Cyprus*, p. 181

⁵⁸ Katsiaounis, *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus*, p. 25

⁵⁹ Orr, *Cyprus Under British Rule*, p. 160; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, IV, p. 297

Greek Cypriot authors,⁶⁰ largely society, and by many scholars even after Katsiounis revealed its groundlessness in 1996.⁶¹

The archiepiscopal dispute was resolved by the successor of Haynes Smith, Charles King-Harman, a great Philhellene, who obviously collected immediate success among the followers of Papadopoulos. On the 3rd of March 1908 the Ecumenical Patriarch Joakim declared Vasilliou archbishop but King-Harman and Papadopoulos refused to recognize it. The day after scuffles broke out between the two factions pushing King-Harman to call the Yorkshire Regiment from Polymedia. Since this measure did not prove sufficient to stop the violence King-Harman proclaimed martial law. On the 6th of May King-Harman pushed through the Legislative Council the 'Archiepiscopal Election Law' thanks to the votes of the British and eight supporters of Papadopoulos. In April 1909, Papadopoulos was elected archbishop, unchallenged because Vasilliou had judged the intervention of the secular authorities a violation of the ancient and holy laws of the Church of Cyprus, but in 1910 he had to surrender and accept the election.⁶²

3.1.3. Conclusion

Debates about the past, about who should interpret events of national significance and how they are to be remembered, have always occurred all over the world; they

⁶⁰ Papadopoulos, «The Ethnarch Role of the Orthodox Hierarchy», pp. 95-141; Stavrinides, *The Cyprus Conflict*, pp. 17-29; Georghallides, *A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918-26*, 39, pp. 81-2.

⁶¹ Papageorgiou, 'The Genesis of the Greek and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus, 1878-1914', pp. 56-65; Panteli, *A History of Cyprus*, pp. 57-9; Hadjidemetriou, *A History of Cyprus*, 336, pp. 362-69; Mallinson, *Cyprus*, p. 10

⁶² J. Hackett 'The Close of the Archiepiscopal Question in Cyprus' *Irish Church Quarterly*, 1910, pp. 230-42

are transnational and transcontinental, and they often generate heated discussions in public forums.

In Cyprus, many nationalist historians have been appalled at the new interpretations proposed by Katsiaounis and Bryant, for their power to undermine myths consolidated along the script of the Greek nation in Cyprus. This reaction reflects the broader 'History war' being fought on the island about textbooks, which has recently claimed among its victims the Minister of Education Andreas Demetriou, denounced for having declared 2010 the year of reconciliation and inclusive histories thus inaugurating a fleeting transition from the adoption of exclusive (nationalist) textbooks to that of inclusive ones.⁶³

Although debates about textbooks recur frequently, little attention is however paid to an anachronistic and misleading public history that would require a revision in order to facilitate the construction of a bi-communal, bizonal and federal Cyprus.⁶⁴

Another overlooked element, which only Loizides mentions⁶⁵, is the re-emergence of divisions within the Church on the issue of identity, which saw as protagonist the Bishop of Morphou Neophytos. Neophytos indeed stated that:

Nationalism is a sin and that the Greek Orthodox Church committed that sin... Nationalism arrived in Cyprus from various currents from Greece starting at around 1922. So I feel that the Cypriot Church being a living organism has entered this adventure of nationalism as a temptation.⁶⁶

⁶³ Yiannis Papadakis, *History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek-Cypriot*, Nicosia, 2008

⁶⁴ Stavroula Philippou and Andrekos Varnava, 'Constructions of Solution(s) to the Cyprus Problem: Exploring Formal Curricula in Greek-Cypriot State Schools', Andrekos Varnava & Hubert Faustmann (eds.), *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, London, 2009, pp. 194-212

⁶⁵ Loizides, 'Religious Nationalism and Adaptation', p. 213, p. 222

⁶⁶ Sevgül Uludağ, 'Bishop of Morphou Neophytos: Nationalism is a sin and the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church has committed this sin', *Yeraltı Notları*, 17 April 2003

Neophytos then, besides recognizing that the Cypriot ethno-nationalism is a modern phenomenon (which he traces back to the post-First World War), and that the Church opened the way for the spread of this ideology; he states, as Sophronios did long before, that the modern currents that led to the development of ethno-nationalism distanced the Church and the people of Cyprus from their historical roots and from religious and regional identification.

In Cyprus, no less than in other places⁶⁷, the past has been shaped by various political and social agents, particularly local elites, but also the colonial and imperial authorities, as well as agents of cultural representation, such as sculptors. As Gellner, Anderson, Hobsbawm, Conner, Bhabha, and others argued, ethnic national identities are modern construct, formed and bound by imaginative narrative and symbolic discourses.⁶⁸ The elite, either in power or not, local or colonial/imperial, use and abuse of the past as a strategic resource to impose certain notions of identity, through the printed media, education and government policies, and erecting monuments, buildings, exhibitions and other cultural indicators in order to sustain the nationalist narrative. 'Questions of how the nation is imagined, and who lays claim to defining it, are intimately intertwined with questions of history and historical representation'⁶⁹ and with matters of policy and strategy, inclusion and exclusion. In the case of Cyprus the British imperial and colonial policy created a perfect fertile ground for the seed of

⁶⁷ (eds.) Daniel J. Walkowitz and Lisa Maya Knauer, *Memory and the Impact of Political Transformation in Public Space*, Durham, N.C. 2004

⁶⁸ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, 1983; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, London, 1983; E. Hobsbawm, 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', (ed.) E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, 1989; W. Conner, 'When is a Nation', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, III, 1990, pp. 92-103; Homi K. Bhabha, *Nation and Narration*, London & New York, 1990; Stathis Gourgouris, *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonisation, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, California, 1996; W. Conner, 'The Timelessness of Nations', *Nations and Nationalism*, X, 1/2, 2004, pp. 34-47

⁶⁹ Knauer and Walkowitz, 'Introduction', *Memory and the Impact of Political Transformation*, p. 4

Hellenism to grow and develop producing the Hellenization of the Cypriot Orthodox Christian elite and the adoption of *enosis* as the predominant national discourse. In order to promote and spread the nationalist discourse the historical leaders should be worshipped as ethnic national heroes, whether they advocated an ethnic national identity and *enosis* or not. Monuments, streets, public buildings erected in honor of the nationalists heroes had as much function to recall the past as to address the future. The Hellenized Cypriot elite, in the wake of Sophronios' passing, erected monuments in honour of the 'ethno-martyr' Kyprianos, and soon after other monuments with the intent of giving credit to the myth that Sophronios had accepted the British in 1878 on condition that Cyprus was in future united to 'mother Greece' – so making him into a hero of Cypriot Hellenism. These elites were well aware that, in addition to the increasing demands for *enosis*, the 'cosmopolitans' would have been challenged and called into question by a future generation of Cypriots educated according to the Greek curricula and bombarded by a press that did not fail to highlight the efforts of Crete to join Greece, and the widespread discontent among the peasant classes for the British liberal system that, while on the one hand it had granted Cypriots a great system of representation, on the other hand it had imposed more taxes, a more efficient collection and the disappearance of that paternalistic attitude in case of famine and drought which had characterized the Ottoman regime instead. This intense activity of propaganda and indoctrination and the myriad of monuments erected to celebrate the most nationalistic of ethnarchs, in particular the 'ethno-martyr' Kyprianos and Archbishop Makarios III, were means of pressure strong enough to lead to the Hellenization of the Cypriot Orthodox Christians.

Summing up briefly what has been exposed in these paragraphs, the majority of the Cypriot Orthodox Christian elite did not have an Hellenic consciousness and did not receive the British like the saviors from a tyrannical and oppressive Turkish regime but rather as Europeans who would carry on the tradition of peaceful multireligious reality of Cyprus. The British, on their part, fancying that Cypriot Orthodox Christians shared with them the same heritage of Hellenic myths, politically treated Cyprus according to modernity standards. This created the conditions for the development of a Hellenist elite who later on manufactured a glorified image of Kyprianos as the first martyr of the nationalist cause and one of Sophronios as an anti-British crusader for freedom.

Thus the conclusions which can be drawn on the different received wisdoms about Cyprus are the following: firstly, the nationalist discourses reflected in the memorials are inaccurate and should be replaced by a new awareness of the true mechanisms of identity formation in Cyprus; secondly, the idea that the British implemented a policy of divide and rule should be discarded, because, as it has been shown above, the British applied the modernity in their approach to governing; and, finally, the nationalized Greek Cypriots manufactured nationalist *ethnarchs* in order to legitimize their claims of belonging to Greece and to *enosis* even when these leaders were not nationalist at all, as in the case of Kyprianos and Sophronios.

3.2. Historical Overview

The Cyprus question began to be seen as an ethnic conflict in 1947 when the Greek Cypriots officially presented to the British request to be united with Greece (*enosis*)⁷⁰ and Turkish Cypriots as a reaction formed a political party led by Dr. Fazil Kucuk in order to hinder the *enosis* and get the support of the Turkish government in the proposal of separation (*taksim*) and union with Turkey.⁷¹

The British ruling class therefore were compelled to hold a consultative conference to draw up a provisional constitution for self-government. On this occasion there was the first split in the coalition between the Greek Cypriot nationalists led by the Church and the Communist Party AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People), that for fear of being accused of betraying its principles and sell off the *enosis* in 1948 it abandoned the conference⁷² This act marked that the diehard nationalists led by the Archbishop of Cyprus had gained the upper hand and the possibility to come to terms with the Turkish Cypriots would thus be precluded⁷³

In 1950, with the election as Archbishop of the firebrand nationalist Makarios III, Greek governments were subject to increasing pressures to recourse to the United Nations to achieve *enosis*, both by the Greek Cypriots and the Greek public opinion

⁷⁰ Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*, London: Hurst & Co, 1999, p. 4.

⁷¹ Mensur Akgun et al., "Quo Vadis Cyprus?," *TESEV working paper* (April 2004), p. 14.

⁷² George C. Fidas, "The Evolution of Cyprus Communism," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 6, 1973, pp. 443–444

⁷³ Stanley Kyriakides, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968, pp. 27–35; George Horton Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939–1955*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1990, pp 72–8; Harry Anastasiou, *The Broken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and the Quest for Peace in Cyprus*, vol. I, *The Impasse of Ethnonationalism*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008, p. 3, p. 83

itself. Large demonstrations were organized in Greece for this purpose. Eventually in 1954, Greece presented the issue to the General Assembly of the United Nations sparking a four-years diplomatic war which saw opposing Britain and Turkey on the one hand and Greece on the other. In 1955 a guerrilla group, known as EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) and headed by a Greek army colonel of Cypriot origins, Grivas, began with the Greek military and technical support a violent offensive against the British first and then, in 1956-57, the Turkish Cypriots and leftist Greek Cypriots⁷⁴ In order to tackle this paramilitary organization the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey established the Volkan, a guerrilla force that would be then replaced by TNT (Turkish Resistance Movement).⁷⁵

The spectre of an inadmissible three-condominium solution that seemed to manifest itself in the minds of the British Harold MacMillan, pushed Greece and Turkey to undertake bilateral agreements. Between November 1958 and January 1959 fruitful negotiations between the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Averoff-Tossizza and the Turkish one Zorlu⁷⁶ followed one another and led to the conclusion of the Zurich Agreement between the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and the Turkish one Menderes. In February 1959 Karamanlis, Menderes, the English Foreign Minister Selwyn-Lloyd, Makarios and Kucuk signed up to the London Agreement with which it

⁷⁴ Kyriakos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, pp. 15–16, pp. 19–20; Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question 1950–1963*, New Rochelle: Aristide Caratzas, 1986, pp. 149–64, pp. 307–8; George Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, ed. Charles Foley, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964

⁷⁵ Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978, pp. 71–113; Suha Bolukbasi, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, Lanham: University Press of America, 1988, pp. 25–30; Tozun Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 32–41; Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1993; Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord*, pp. 10–59

⁷⁶ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, pp. 294–329

was set up a bi-communal and independent Republic, whose sovereignty and territorial integrity would be guaranteed by Great Britain, Greece and Turkey.

Terms such as *enosis* and *taksim* were replaced by those of ‘power-sharing’ and ‘consociationalism’, concepts that were not very familiar at the time and whose logic did not achieve great success especially among the Greek Cypriots. The Zurich-London Agreement was shaped, actually, more like an imposed settlement⁷⁷, and to this feature much of the literature on conflict resolution attribute the reason for its failure only three years after having signed it.⁷⁸

Archbishop Makarios reluctantly agreed with the proposal, postponing the realization of *enosis* to better times. Colonel Grivas was much more difficult to persuade. Initially he refused entirely the proposal because it constitutionally excluded the *enosis* option, but behind the granting of political amnesty for all political prisoners associated with the EOKA that had filled the prisons and detention camps of British colonial administration he was forced to accept. The Turkish Cypriots, for their part, once the reinforced constitutional rights guaranteed and special veto powers as a form of protection against the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots, did not oppose.

Thus in 1960 the independent Republic of Cyprus was born, provided with a constitution that sanctioned full representation of both communities on the island in the main political organs, the armed forces and public administration. Reflecting the constitutional arrangements for which the President of the new republic would have

⁷⁷ Polyvios Polyviou, *Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiations, 1960–1980*, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980, pp. 13–15; Alan James, “The Making of the Cyprus Settlement, 1958–1960,” *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 11–32, 1998

⁷⁸ For example, John M. Richardson and Jianxin Wang, “Peace Accords: Seeking Conflict Resolution in Deeply Divided Societies,” in K. M. de Silva and S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, eds., *Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict*, London & New York: Pinter Publishers, 1993, p. 185

been a representative of the Greek Cypriots and the vice president would be a Turkish Cypriot, Archbishop Makarios III was named president and Dr. Fazil Kucuk was appointed vice president. The British gave up all claim on Cyprus but retained two sovereign military bases (in Akrotiri and Dhekelia). The agreement also required the expulsion of Grivas from Cyprus.⁷⁹

As Anastasiou writes, the fledgling and artificial republic 'proved too weak to curb or contain the range of antithetical forces incubated within its realm by the combined historical forces of autocratic colonialism and revolutionary nationalism'⁸⁰ and so nationalism prevailed on the creation of a free, open and well integrated civil society. The strong ethnic and political polarization produced administrative complications, difficulties and inefficiencies, until a paralysis of the government. The compromise that the Zurich-London Agreement had sanctioned could not last. The friction between the two communities intensified so much as to lead to the "13 point amendments" proposed by Makarios in November 1963. Although apparently intended to improve the efficiency of the administration, they actually aimed to reduce the political power of the Turkish Cypriots and to repeal the agreements of 1959-60.⁸¹ The outbreak of intercommunal violence in December was inevitable and it protracted intermittently until 1967. In May and August 1964 there was the direct intervention of the Greek army which sent to Cyprus an entire division commanded by Colonel Grivas. In May 1964, Turkey responded with an aerial bombardment of Cyprus and the threat of military intervention on a large scale if the Greek offensive had gone

⁷⁹ Anastasiou, *The Broken Olive Branch*, Vol. I, pp. 94-95

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 95

⁸¹ Xydis, *Cyprus*, 461-520; Michael A. Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics* Edinburgh: St. Martin's Press, 1979, pp. 81-86; Paschalis Kitromilides, "Political Community in Plural Societies," in Charles Fried, ed., *Minorities: Community and Identity*, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1983, pp. 321-329; Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations*, pp. 51-55; Markides, *Rise and Fall*, p. 26, pp. 90-91

on. Only the strong worded letter of the American President Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu avoided an escalation. The first in fact warned that NATO would not intervene if the Turkish military operations were continued and the Soviet Union had taken the field.⁸²

In those years it was established a UN peacekeeping force still present in the area and early attempts at mediation were started by the UN Secretary-General of the time U. Thant and by the U.S. administration. Dean Acheson, under Johnson administration, introduced several possible solutions to the problem, including the annexation of Cyprus to Greece guaranteeing minority rights to the Turkish part of the population and granting a 10 percent of the territory to Turkey. This solution was not gladly accepted by Makarios and his followers because it smelled of partition. In 1965, the Secretary-General U. Thant assigned Galo Plaza the task of mediator. In his report Plaza accepted many of the demands submitted in the 13-point Amendments of Makarios - making it indigestible to the Turkish Cypriots - but still met the detriment of Greek Cypriots and Greece as it denied *enosis*⁸³

In November 1965 there was a resurgence of rivalries with new attacks by the Greek militia led by Grivas and Turkey threats of armed intervention. Again it was the American shuttle diplomacy embodied by Cyrus Vance to avoid the worst. With great satisfaction of Turkey, Grivas and his troops were forced to leave the island.⁸⁴

⁸² Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations*, pp. 56–57, pp. 60–71; Bolukbasi, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, pp. 55–78, pp. 81–85, p. 86–90

⁸³ Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacekeeping*, pp. 42–51; Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997, pp. 107–108; Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus*, pp. 101–103; Ker-Lindsay, "History of Cyprus Peace Proposals," p. 14

⁸⁴ Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations*, pp. 72–75; Rizas, *Enosi, Dihotomisi, Anexartisia*, pp. 224–231; Bolukbasi, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, pp. 133–144

The Greek Cypriots continued to keep a firm grip on the government ruling it in an almost autonomous way which politically marginalized the Turkish community without the role of Cyprus as a member -state of the United Nations being questioned . And UN Cyprus membership was not challenged even by the fact that until 1968 the Greeks had imposed a strict economic blockade on all those enclaves scattered throughout the territory in which Turkish Cypriots were crammed (2-3 percent of the national territory).⁸⁵

A phase of inter-community dialogue was opened between January 1968 and June 1974 with the start of negotiations without mediation - although under the auspices of the Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim - between the leader of the Turkish Cypriots Raouf Denktash and that of the Greek Cypriots Glafkos Clerides. The Turkish civilian government of Demirel and the military junta led by G. Papadopoulos who seized power in Greece in April 1967 encouraged their communities not to appear intransigent and make every efforts to come to terms with the other party.⁸⁶ The Turkish Cypriots agreed to be bound by many of the points of Makarios if a certain local autonomy had been given to them. In 1968 and 1974, Denktash and Clerides seemed to come to an agreement but negotiations went up in smoke due to Makarios insisting not to grant Turkish Cypriots the role of constituent community but that of minority and rejecting any form of autonomy.⁸⁷

To boycott efforts to reach a compromise and a cessation of hostilities intervened Grivas who had returned clandestinely to Cyprus in 1971, founded the paramilitary

⁸⁵ Necatir Munir Ertek˙un, *The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus*, Oxford: K. Rustem, 1984, p. 14

⁸⁶ Polyviou, *Cyprus*, pp. 126–130; Sotiris Rizas, "The Greek Military Regime's Policy Towards Cyprus, 1963–1974," *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook*, pp. 18–19, pp. 240–245

⁸⁷ Polyviou, *Cyprus*, pp. 62–153

organization EOKA B and unilaterally waged attacks on Turkish Cypriot villages. Like the original EOKA terrorist group of the fifties, EOKA B was intended to achieve by any means the total Hellenization of the island and accused the Left and Makarios of having betrayed and abandoned the sacred ideal of *enosis* accepting the republic.

On the 15th of July 1974 the EOKA B with the backing of the Greek military junta implemented a bloody coup against Makarios and his government orchestrated by the Greek dictator Ioannidis. The survivor Makarios fled to London and turned to the UN Security Council crying out 'invasion'. The Turkish government of Ecevit, faced with the danger that Greece could become one of its southward neighboring states⁸⁸ and wanting to protect the panicked Turkish Cypriot community, took up arms. From a civil war between Greeks in Cyprus, the conflict turned into a ethnonational interstate war.

On the 20th of July 1974 Turkey conducted a military operation in the northern part of Cyprus that led it to take control of a 7 per cent of Cyprus' territory. On the 23rd of July 1974 the military junta in Greece collapsed under the weight of the military defeat dragging the Greek - Cypriot counterpart with it. In Greece, a botched democracy was tried to be restored calling Karamanlis from Paris and appointed him as prime minister, while in Cyprus Makarios was reinstated in his post, now at the head of a divided and partially occupied Cyprus.

Between the 8th of August and the 14th of August 1974 in Geneva it was convened a conference attended by Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers, Denktash and Clerides, and the British Foreign Minister Callaghan as chairman. Any attempt to reconcile the

⁸⁸ Mehmet Ali Birand, *30 Hot Days*, London: K. Rustem, 1985, pp. 1–6; Jan Asmussen, *Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict During the 1974 Crisis*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2008, pp. 32–33, p. 50, p. 53, pp. 59–63, p. 75, p. 85

parties made a hole in the water. Turkey remained adamant in its position, or a federal solution or anything. The Greek Cypriots and Greeks on their part wanted to return to the *status quo* that had been imposed by the agreements of Zurich and London and they categorically refused any solution which would allow the constitution of a federation, let alone that one of cantons presented by Turkey and based on a Kissinger's idea.⁸⁹

The conference ended in a stalemate and Turkey did not hesitate to undertake a second military campaign through which it acquired the 37 percent of Cypriot territory, causing the deaths of hundreds of Greek Cypriots and turning a quarter of Greek-Cypriot population into refugees. Neither of the two warring parties spared violence and brutality. The international community that had shown appeasement with regards to the first Turkish intervention, harshly condemned this second military action. Entire populations were uprooted and replaced. Cyprus was now geographically divided between a Turkish Cypriot North which claimed its own autonomous administration supported by Turkish military and drew an increasing number of Turkish settlers in the occupied territories, and a Greek Cypriot South who demanded the restoration of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. As Anastasiou writes 'the abstractions of the nationalist visions of ethnically pure societies corresponding to monoethnic states had forcefully become a reality'.⁹⁰

The international community and in particular the United Nations did not give up. Waldheim strove to restore the inter-community dialogue and so in Vienna on the 12th February 1977 after nearly a year of negotiations was reached a historic

⁸⁹ Bolukbasi, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, pp. 200–212; Birand, *30 Hot Days*, pp. 79–115; Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations*, pp. 100–102; Polyviou, *Cyprus*, pp. 159–185; James Callaghan, *Time and Change*, London: Collins, 1987, 348–357; Asmussen, *Cyprus at War*, pp. 181–215

⁹⁰ Anastasiou, *The Broken Olive Branch*, Vol. I, p. 100

agreement between Denktash and Makarios which would lay the foundations for the future establishment of a bizonal bicomunal federation in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot public opinion was enthusiastic about it while the Greek Cypriots were more suspicious. Unfortunately in August 1977 Makarios died of a heart attack and was replaced by the hardly reassuring figure of Kyprianou, who, needless to say, rejected the plan in 12 points advanced in 1978 by the United States, Canada and Great Britain (the ABC Plan) to establish a bicomunal federation of two components. Waldheim tried to persuade him to be more conciliatory and in May 1979 Kyprianou and Denktash reached at last an agreement along the lines of the one between Makarios and Denktash .

Between 1980 and 1986 negotiations for a rapprochement between the two communities continued with the help of the new United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar who outlined a different plan of resolution. In 1985 and 1986, both sides seemed close to accept it but Kyprianou scuppered negotiations with amazement of Greek Cypriots themselves who had not expected so much stubborn intransigence on the part of their leader.⁹¹

On the 15th of November 1983 with a unilateral declaration of independence that defied the international community and international law, the leader of the Turkish Cypriots Denktash gave birth to the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC), giving formal application to the process of secession in place *de facto* since 1974. If basically nothing changed on the ground, politically it gave more power, prestige and

⁹¹ Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacekeeping*, pp. 93–94, pp. 133–138, pp. 176–180; Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus*, pp. 177–198, pp. 184–190; Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations*, pp. 115–125; A. J. R. Groom, “Cyprus, Greece and Turkey,” in John T. A. Koumoulides, ed., *Cyprus in Transition*, London: Trigraph, 1986, pp 126–128, pp. 131–145; Ker-Lindsay, “History of Cyprus Peace Proposals,” pp. 16–18

determination to the Turkish-Cypriot nationalism. So it is no wonder that from 1988 to 1992 it was the turn of Turkish Cypriot counterpart to frustrate all efforts to reach a solution. Good intentions and genuine commitment of the newly elected Greek Cypriot President George Vassiliou were of little use to reach a compromise, nor the new plan proposed by De Cuellar in 1989, much less the "Set of Ideas " presented in 1992 by the new Secretary-General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros -Ghali.⁹²

In 1993 in the presidential elections of the Republic of Cyprus, the nationalist right wing led by Clerides gained the victory over Vassiliou, albeit marginally. Among the accusations that Clerides had moved to the latter there had been the excessive flexibility and compliancy shown in accepting the resolution framework contained in the "Set of Ideas " of Boutros -Ghali .

Given these assumptions it is not difficult to imagine how any attempt to reach a settlement between the two sides carried out between 1993 and 1999 proved useless. With Clerides at the head of the nationalist Greek Cypriots and Denktash at the head of the Turkish Cypriots nationalists, tensions mistrust and distrust between the two communities could only grow.

Only between 1999 and 2004 a real chance of ultimate resolution of the Cyprus issue seemed to peep out.

⁹² Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus*, pp. 192–204; Anastasiou, *Broken Olive Branch*, vol. I, pp. 103–105; George Vassiliou, *From the President's Office: A Journey Towards Reconciliation in a Divided Cyprus*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2010

3.3. Glimpses of Peace

As pointed out by Heraclides there are seven factors⁹³ that made the years 1999-2004 fertile ground to grow the seed of harmony : 1) the prospect of Cyprus accession to European Union, which would have acted as a great stimulus to a resolution of the conflict; 2) the strong support of Turkey for the accession to the EU which would translate into an Ankara distancing from the nationalist rhetoric of Denktash⁹⁴; 3) a genuine appetite for reunification by a large share of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots that would have thinned the power base in support of Denktash; 4) an unexpected thaw in relations between Greeks and Turks in 1999, the so-called “seismic rapprochement”; 5) the Greek exhortation to reach an interethnic compromise; 6) the U-turn of the Turkey from mid-2003 onwards under the Erdogan government in support of the Annan Plan; 7) renewed efforts by the U.S., British and European Union to reach a solution.

The successful convergence of all these variables entailed a textbook case of conflict transformation⁹⁵ : major structural changes created a context and unprecedented conditions more favorable and decisive in order to reach a resolution of the Cyprus question. Despite this, as we shall see, they failed to unravel the tangle.

The EU catalyst was the first to fail. Greece had promised to remove the veto on Turkey's application if the process of accession of Cyprus would proceed, and at the

⁹³Alexis Heraclides, “The Cyprus Gordian Knot: An Intractable Ethnic Conflict”, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* (2011), 17:2, pp. 122-123

⁹⁴Tozun Bahcheli, “Saying Yes to EU Accession: Explaining the Turkish Cypriot Referendum Outcome,” *The Cyprus Review* (2004), 16:2, pp 55–65.

⁹⁵Raimo Vayrynen, ed., *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*, London: Sage, 1991, pp. 4–6.

EU summit in Helsinki in December 1999, a decision established that the resolution of the conflict would facilitate the access of Cyprus to the EU. However, the membership would occur in any case and only a neglected conditional clause, the " Helsinki tail ," declared that 'if settlement was not forthcoming the EU Council would take into consideration all the relevant circumstances'.⁹⁶ This clause was abandoned with ease at the EU summit in Copenhagen in 2002 and once Cyprus became a member of the European Union the Greek Cypriots lost all incentives to resolve the situation. The mistake here was made by the Greeks and the European Union leadership that did not take advantage of the occasion to pose as prerequisite to the entry of Cyprus into the EU the overcoming of the crisis. It seems that this error of assessment within Europe was due to the impression that it was the rejectionist attitude of Denktash the only obstacle that stood to a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. The Greek Cypriots would get only benefit from reunification, ending the Turkish occupation and a *de facto* division of the territory. Furthermore, the two major Greek Cypriot political parties, AKEL and DISY (Democratic Rally), which covered the 65 percent of the electorate, also seemed in favor of a resolution. Nobody would have imagined that just the Greek Cypriots, influenced by their new rejectionist President Papadopoulos, would reveal the most troublesome in coming to terms.

When in November 2002 the bilateral negotiations between Denktash and Clerides seemed to have reached rock bottom, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched his eponymous peace plan .

Based on the projects that had preceded him (especially on the plan of De Cuellar and on the Set of Ideas of Boutros-Ghali), on the negotiations that had occurred

⁹⁶ Alexis Heraclides, "The Cyprus Gordian Knot", p. 123

between 1975 and 1992 and the latest negotiations between Denktash and Clerides, it amounted to the most comprehensive ‘elaborate and sophisticated proposal ever presented to the rival ethnic communities of Cyprus’.⁹⁷

It addressed all the issues that the previous plans had treated schematically and sketchily.⁹⁸ Aimed at the reunification of the island it was envisaging a consociational federation modeled on the Swiss and Belgian ones, making sure that neither side clearly proves loser.⁹⁹

The fifth version of the Annan Plan (31 March 2004) was meeting all the major concerns of the warring parties, although there were still several points of collision regarding the issues listed below:

1. Sovereignty
2. Efficiency of the federal government
3. Return of territories to Greek Cypriots
4. Refugees’ return to their homes
5. Repossession of property
6. Political equality between the two constituent states
7. Turkish immigration
8. Deviations from European acquisition

⁹⁷ Anastasiou, *Broken Olive Branch*, vol. II, p. 52

⁹⁸ Alexis Heraclides, “The Cyprus Problem: An Open and Shut Case? Probing the Greek-Cypriot Rejection of the Annan Plan,” *The Cyprus Review* (2004), 16(2): pp. 38–39; Chrysostomos Pericleous, *The Cyprus Referendum: A Divided Island and the Challenge of the Annan Plan*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2009, pp. 185–186

⁹⁹ Christalla Yakinthou, “Consociational Democracy and Cyprus: The House that Annan Built?,” in Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann, eds., *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2009, pp. 25–39; Neothyos Loizides, “Pro: An Appraisal of the Functionality of Annan V,” in Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann, eds., *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2009, pp. 82–94; Erol Kaymak, “The Turkish Cypriot Views of Annan V,” in Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann, eds., *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2009, pp. 145–160

9. Guarantor powers and the number of their troops
10. Provisional stage
11. Implementation of the final agreements
12. Economic impacts

In Heraclides' opinion, among the seventeen changes made between the first version of the Annan plan and the last one, twelve were in favor of the Greek Cypriots, while only five were meeting Turkish Cypriots' demands.¹⁰⁰ Despite this, Papadopoulos did everything to discredit the Annan plan labelled as the prelude to a partition, totally impractical and the result of a Anglo -American ruse.¹⁰¹ In the forefront of negotiations there were two nationalist antagonists with maximalist approaches: the leader of Turkish Cypriots Denktash was still doggedly trying to negotiate a secessionist solution, while the leader of the Greek Cypriots was stubbornly pursuing a solution that approached the unitary state existing before the events of 1974. Both accusing each other of intransigence. However, the position taken by the party AKEL, partner of the Greek Cypriot government since 2003, in favor of the Annan Plan rekindled the hopes and Britain, the United States, UN, Greece and Europe began to rely on it. Shortly before the referendum, however, the rift between the cadres and the party's base surfaced. The latter in fact, like the majority of the Greek-Cypriot population, was contrary to the peace plan. In order to take time Christofias (at the head of the party) tried to postpone the referendum, but faced with the impossibility to delay it, and dreading the internal costs in terms of popularity and

¹⁰⁰ Alexis Heraclides, "The Cyprus Gordian Knot", p. 124; Anastasiou, *Broken Olive Branch*, vol. II, pp. 133–138; Pericleous, *Cyprus Referendum*, pp. 289–291

¹⁰¹ Pericleous, *Cyprus Referendum*, p. 281, pp. 293–294, pp. 315–330; Anastasiou, *Broken Olive Branch*, vol. II, pp. 145–146

votes, was forced to opt for a "soft no" which did not preclude a future yes if appropriate changes to the plan had been implemented.¹⁰²

On the 24th of April 2004, in the simultaneous separate referenda held in the Republic of Cyprus and in the TRNC, the 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan plan while the 65 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots accepted it. This event marked a historic turning point in the evolution of the conflict. As Kofi Annan wrote in his report 'what was rejected [by the Greek Cypriots] was the solution itself rather than a mere blueprint'.¹⁰³ What this referendum highlighted was the lack of willingness on the part of a substantial portion of the population to reunify the island on equal basis.

An important role was certainly played by the rejectionist propaganda of the proud nationalist Papadopoulos and his party, DIKO (Democratic Party). It aimed to convince that the Annan plan, inadequate with regard to economic and security aspects, human settlers, the right to restitution of property etc., was simply a reflection of a plan designed by the western powers to appease Turkey and then in favor of the Turkish Cypriots. Invectives were not spared even to Kofi Annan, represented as a bully who had overstepped its mandate and its role by imposing an unfair arbitration on a small island defenseless.¹⁰⁴

Papadopoulos' party alone, reflecting the ideas and feelings of a 12-15 per cent of the electorate, would not have been able to influence so decisively the outcome of the referendum if there had not been a widespread tendency to "no" among the

¹⁰² Anastasiou, *Broken Olive Branch*, vol. II, pp. 163–170; and Pericleous, *Cyprus Referendum*, pp. 296–302

¹⁰³ "Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good-Offices in Cyprus," United Nations/Security Council, S/2004/437 (28 May 2004), p. 20

¹⁰⁴ Claire Palley, *An International Relations Debacle: The Secretary-General's Mission of Good in Cyprus 1999–2004*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005.

Greek Cypriot population. Heraclides in his article identifies six reasons that since the launch of the Annan plan made this proposal disliked by the Greek Cypriot citizenship, briefly listed below:

1. Distrust of the Turkish Cypriots i
2. Unwillingness to share power with the Turkish Cypriots
3. Reluctance to accept political equality with the Turkish Cypriots since they accounted for only the 18 percent of the population
4. Insecurity for the presence of Turkish occupation troops on its territory
5. Economic costs
6. The convincing Papadopoulos' argument according to which the Republic of Cyprus would be in a better bargaining position once entered the European Union¹⁰⁵

What, however, the Greek Cypriots did not heed and take into account were the many sacrifices that this plan would really require for the Turkish Cypriots. In fact, they would have to give up a big chunk of the territories they conquered, they would force many of their countrymen to leave their homes and pass to the refugee status because of the return of the territory to the Republic of Cyprus, and moreover with the removal of Turkish troops from the island they would not have been able to benefit from the Turkish military protection any more.¹⁰⁶

A criticism made by members of literature on conflict resolution with respect to the Annan plan is that, being Cyprus question a deep-rooted ethnic conflict, the third parties intervened in the negotiations should have had a role of co-ordinators rather

¹⁰⁵ Alexis Heraclides, "The Cyprus Gordian Knot", p. 125

¹⁰⁶ Bahcheli, "Saying Yes to EU Accession," p. 56; de Soto, "Case of Cyprus," p. 4; Kaymak, "Turkish Cypriot Views," pp. 146–516

than 360 degrees mediators.¹⁰⁷ In addition 'the adversarial posture followed in all the Cyprus negotiations and UN good offices, with their emphasis on tangible gains and losses and their rigid legalistic approach' had only increased the distance between the two communities rather than directing them to focus on the common needs and interests.¹⁰⁸

With the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union in May 2004 there was a tightening and a hardening of positions on the part of Greek Cypriots led by Papadopoulos. Any attempt to create dialogue between the parties turned out useless. In February 2008, the presidential election unexpectedly appointed Christofias as the new President of the Republic of Cyprus. It was the first time that at the head of both communities' government leadership, there were two non-intransigent and leftist political personalities. If these two leaders had been in office long enough to resume negotiations and completing them, trying to bring their respective public opinions round and not to be subjugated by them (as it had happened in Clerides' case), this new window of opportunity would prove decisive.¹⁰⁹

On the 21st of March 2008, Christofias and Talat met and began to develop a plan of negotiations to finally reach a solution to the Cyprus conflict by establishing a bizonal bicomunal federation. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed as Special Advisor Alexander Downer to reiterate the United Nations commitment in the peace process and facilitate negotiations, but as Ban Ki-moon himself declared, the

¹⁰⁷ John W. Burton, "Resolution of Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* (1972), 16:1, pp. 5–29

¹⁰⁸ Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Lenos Trigeorgis, "Cyprus: An Evolutionary Approach to Conflict Resolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (1993), 37:2, pp. 345–349

¹⁰⁹ "Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus," United Nations/Security Council, S/2009/610 (30 Nov. 2009), p. 5

negotiations were ‘Cypriot-led’ and ‘Cypriot-owned’ and the two leaders took on the ‘responsibility for the course of the talks’.¹¹⁰

Six working groups and seven technical committees were established. The working groups were tasked to deal with:

1. Sovereignty, governance and power-sharing (executive, legislative, federal competences, external relations)
2. Aspects of EU membership (access, exemptions etc.)
3. Return of territory
4. Property
5. Security
6. Economic issues

The technical committees were intended to address the critical issues in the everyday life of the members of the two communities, and adopted ‘23 confidence-building measures’.¹¹¹

On issues related to governance, power-sharing, economy and Europe both parties acted in synergy, whereas the aspects relating to land, property and security remained complex and thorny.¹¹²

Meanwhile growing criticism began to mount among the population in relation to their leaders and to the peace process in progress¹¹³. An opinion poll noted that 90 percent of the Greek - Cypriot population did not trust Talat.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 2, p. 5.

¹¹¹ Alexis Heraclides, “The Cyprus Gordian Knot”, p. 126

¹¹² “Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus,” United Nations/Security Council, S/2010/603 (24 Nov. 2010), p. 4, pp. 5–6

¹¹³ “Report of the Secretary-General,” (30 Nov. 2009), p. 4

When in April 2010 there was the call for new elections in TRNC no agreement had yet been reached and the decline of the political influence of Talat led him to lose against the nationalist Dervis Eroglu, a great supporter of the independence of TRNC.¹¹⁴

Nevertheless, the negotiations between Christofias and Eroglu, thanks to pressure from the government in Ankara, went on. The question of property, however, remained an unresolved issue. The Greek Cypriots supported the position that their members should have the right to choose between exchange, compensation and reinstatement, while for the Turkish Cypriots that position was unacceptable. Actually it would have meant the return of most of the territory to the Greek Cypriots if they had all opted for a reinstatement of the property. In this way the bizonality would be undermined. According to the Greek Cypriots, property evaluation should have been made on the basis of how much territory would be returned to them. The Turkish Cypriots then replied that they would discuss the issue at a conference open to the three guarantor powers (Turkey, Greece and Great Britain). The guarantee scheme was another crash reason: on the one hand the Turkish Cypriots wanted its maintenance, on the other hand the Greek Cypriots wanted its cessation¹¹⁵

In November 2010, Ban Ki-moon wrote in his report to the Security Council that 'a worrying lack of progress', a widespread lack of confidence in the outcome of the talks and 'a steady stream of untruthful and highly negative remarks about the United Nations reflected in the media' led him to fear that even if the two parties had come

¹¹⁴ *The Economist* (24 April 2010), 15, 26–27

¹¹⁵ "Report of the Secretary-General," (24 Nov. 2010), p. 6

to an agreement, with all probability one of them or both would not have honored it and so 'a critical window of opportunity' would be 'rapidly closing'.¹¹⁶

In recent years, the loss of the support of public opinion, the excessive prudence of Christofias and the lack of a genuine commitment on the part of Eroglu to reunify the island have undermined the success of any negotiations.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 5-7

3.4. Inquiring into Cyprus Conflict Intractability

Although third-party mediations from 1964 to the present days which have seen the involvement of six Secretaries-General of the United Nations, negotiations between the parties that go on for forty years leading presumably to think that mutual recognition is not in doubt, and the absence of armed clashes since 1974, the Cyprus conflict remains one of the most enduring unresolved ethnical and regional conflicts in history.

In this section we will analyze the nine causes responsible for the Cypriot empassé.

1) Nationalism

It is indisputable the role played by the clash between Greek Cypriot nationalism and Turkish Cypriot nationalism in triggering the conflict and fomenting it.¹¹⁷ As long as the Greek Cypriots feel the Hellenes of Cyprus,¹¹⁸ the ‘truest Greeks’, and the Turkish Cypriots part of the Turkish nation, the affirmation of a pan-Cypriot identity will be hard.

In the schools of both communities, students are taught love and attachment to their respective motherlands and aversion for the other party regarded as the historic

¹¹⁷ Paschalis Kitromilides, “From Coexistence to Confrontation: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus,” in Michael A. Attalides, ed., *Cyprus Reviewed*, Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, 1977, pp. 35–70; Peter Loizos, “The Progress of Greek Nationalism in Cyprus, 1878–1970,” in John Davis, ed., *Choice and Change: Essays in Honour of Lucy Mair*, London: The Athlone Press, 1974, pp. 116–118; Markides, *Rise and Fall*, pp. 3–17; Rebecca Bryant, *Imagining the Modern*; Anastasiou, *Broken Olive Branch*, vol. I

¹¹⁸ Yiannis Papadakis, *Echoes from the Dead Zone: Across the Turkish Divide*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2005, p. 4

enemy to keep a wary eye on(except for the period of Talat government (April 2005 to April 2010) during which, as we saw earlier, the ethnocentric textbooks were replaced by inclusive textbooks). The strong nationalist indoctrination that younger generations receive increases the distance and sharpens more and more the tensions between these two communities that now perceive the other as an integral part of the historical conflict that pitted Greeks and Turks, as a 'diachronic, invariable, and existential fact'.¹¹⁹

2) *Irreconcilable political objectives*

The prevailing view, and now deeply rooted in both communities is that this conflict is zero-sum: there can only be winners or losers. This has given rise to a situation in which, as far as the present division of the island appears unpleasant, it is still more convenient than a conceivable power-sharing arrangement. This conception of non-solution as a solution to the problem is not, however, openly declared by none of the two communities, as the Greek Cypriots fear the costs on the domestic and international level while Turkish Cypriots of being absorbed by the Turkish motherland¹²⁰

The absence of what I. William Zartman called 'a hurting stalemate'¹²¹ represents, as stated by Brian Mandell, 'the greatest impediment to resolution [...] Neither Cypriot

¹¹⁹ Anastasiou, *Broken Olive Branch*, vol. I, p. 11

¹²⁰ Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992, p. 125; Groom, "Cyprus, Greece and Turkey," p. 145; Bahcheli and Rizopoulos, "Cyprus Impasse," pp. 32–33

¹²¹ I. William Zartman, "Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts," in I. William Zartman, ed., *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992, p. 18

community is sufficiently dissatisfied with the status quo to make the difficult compromise necessary for resolving the conflict. There is little urgency to reach a settlement as the alternatives to reaching a final solution are not so unattractive as to warrant a genuine desire for a settlement'.¹²² As a consequence 'Greek and Turkish Cypriots will always have better reasons for not rocking the boat than for trying to sail it with a mixed crew'.¹²³

3) *Socio-psychological sphere*

With the passing of time in the minds of members of both communities is rising a psychological barrier that delineates the conflict as the battle between good and evil, culture and barbarity, justice and iniquity.

For a large part of Greek-Cypriot population the Turkish Cypriots are the train of Turkish yoke and the means through which Turkey tries to achieve its ambitions of territorial domination. And therefore the Cyprus question becomes simply a case of occupation and invasion¹²⁴, an intercommunal conflict started in 1974.¹²⁵

The Turkish Cypriots instead have traced the conflict back to 1956 and 1964. They are convinced that they represent a nuisance and an obstacle to Greek Cypriots in their project of Hellenization of the island. They consider the way to the coexistence with the Greek Cypriots impassable and dangerous as the weaker party. Therefore

¹²² Mandell, "Cyprus Conflict," p. 220

¹²³ Stearns, *Entangled Allies*, p. 125

¹²⁴ Yiannis Papadakis, "Enosis and Turkish Expansionism: Real Myths or Mythic Realities?," in Vangelis Calotychos, ed., *Cyprus and its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1998, p. 70

¹²⁵ Papadakis, *Echoes from the Dead Zone*, p. 82

they rely on the Turkish military shield as the only guarantee against their cultural and physical extinction.

As shown from the above analysis of misperceptions of the Other, it is the prevalence of the belief that enosis and taksim are the persistent aspirations of the Other that creates paranoid attitudes in both communities.¹²⁶

To keep alive the memories of the bitter ethnic clashes of 1963-67 and 1974 through every possible means - textbooks, parades, memorials, museums of national struggle, statues in honor of the 'hero-martyrs' - contributes to cement the psychological barrier inimical to any reconciliation.

4) Denial and refusal

The denial and rejection of the Other are the major impediment to the resolution of the ethnic conflict in Cyprus.

This denial occurs in the Greek Cypriot community in the following terms :

- Cyprus is Greek and has been so from time immemorial.¹²⁷
- The Turkish Cypriots are simply Turks (sometimes disparagingly called 'Little Turks'¹²⁸) who happened to reside in the territory of Cyprus.
- The Turkish Cypriots do not exist politically, they are simply pawns of Ankara government.
- The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus does not exist, it is Greek Cypriot territory misappropriated by Turkish occupation forces.

¹²⁶ Papadakis, *Echoes from the Dead Zone*, p. 105, p. 129

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 4

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 94

As far as regards the Turkish Cypriot front and their lack of recognition of the Other:

- The Turkish Cypriots refer to the Republic of Cyprus as the 'Greek-Cypriot Administration' and the President of the Republic is simply the leader of the Greek Cypriot community.
- The Greek Cypriots are not identified as true Cypriots.
- The definition of Greek Cypriots as Greeks is branded as being an invention and their pretended descent from Ancient Greece a simple fabrication to rally support from Greece and Europe.
- In addition, as Greek Cypriots were subjected to Ottoman rule in the past, Turkish Cypriots have fun mockingly calling them 'Rum',¹²⁹

As a result of this mutual negation in both communities it has been gradually developing a sense of 'being victimized through a denial of their identity'.¹³⁰ In Turkish Cypriots' case this paranoia is accompanied by a cultural cum existential fear, while the Greek Cypriots add to this sense of being victimized a strong sense of insecurity due to the presence in its territory of 40,000 Turkish army troops. Certainly, only their own fears are felt to be well-founded and justified while the Other's anxieties are swept away as improbable, paranoid or mere propaganda. After all both communities perceive themselves as minorities in need of protection: Greek Cypriots with respect to the Turkish invader and Turkish-Cypriots in relation to a harsh Turkish motherland able to engulf the TRNC baby land.

¹²⁹ Papadakis, *Echoes from the Dead Zone*, p. 130; Niyazi Kizilyurek, "National Memory and Turkish-Cypriot Textbooks," *International Textbook Research* (1999), 21:4, pp. 387–395

¹³⁰ Fisher, "Conclusion," p. 249

5) *Internal Factors*

‘Without the consent of the large majority of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots’¹³¹ no resolution can come to fruition. The main problem in the ethnic conflicts is that the internal dynamics tend to favor defiant stances rather than reconciliation. The consequence is a political paralysis because without the support of the electorate it is unlikely that the political leaders have the courage to take far-reaching decisions to extricate themselves from a onerous antagonism. The failure of the negotiations between Christofias and Talat is a striking example. Although both non-nationalists and conciliatory leaders they gave up in the face of stubborn intransigence of their electorate who they failed to sway. Political advantage and lure of power led also non-rejectionist political parties to vote contrarily to their positions, as AKEL did in 2004, thus persevering the spiral of hostility

6) *Different normative conceptions*

As regards the normative dimension, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are divided on two principles that characterize the democratic regime: the concept of majority, on the Westminster model, and the consociational concept that provides for the assignment of a level of autonomy and effective political participation to all those groups that going beyond the considerable share of 10-15 per cent of the population do not fall under the category of minorities.

¹³¹Bahcheli and Rizopoulos, “Cyprus Impasse,” p. 28

Another controversial issue is the difference in the notion of self-determination. The Greek Cypriots claim the people's right to self-determination in which the majority decides. On the other hand Turkish-Cypriots, since November 1983, claim their right to self-determination legitimized secession by the oppression suffered at the hands of Greek Cypriots from December 1963 to 1974.¹³²

7) *The just solution*

The achievement of a just solution is another minefield and a deceptive illusion.

The just solution for the Greek Cypriots should meet the following conditions:

- The removal of all Turkish troops
- The departure of all Turkish settlers
- The return of all properties to the Greek Cypriots and the chance to resettle in their homes
- The power and territory assigned to the Turkish Cypriots in the new federal state should be in proportion to their demographic presence (not more than 20 percent)¹³³

It is clear that none of these absolutist conditions could be satisfied in a deal that should have the consent of both parties. The same Greek Cypriots cannot fail to be aware of the unfeasibility of certain instances.¹³⁴ And it is presumable that these

¹³² Heraclides, "55 Year Cyprus Debacle," pp. 75–76; Oliver Richmond, "Ethno-Nationalism, Sovereignty and Negotiating Positions in the Cyprus Conflict: Obstacles to a Settlement," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 35:3, pp. 42–63; Zaim M. Necatigil, *The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989

¹³³ Zenon Stavrinides, "Greek-Cypriot Perceptions," in Clement H. Dodd, ed., *Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives*, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1999, pp. 59–61

¹³⁴ Zenon Stavrinides, "Greek-Cypriot Perceptions," in Clement H. Dodd, ed., *Cyprus: The Need*

unattainable goals are presented precisely in order not to reach a reasonable compromise, and so justify the non-solution.

8) *Federalism*

The idea of a binational and bicomunal federation, as the underlying theme of all peace proposals advanced in the years since 1977, continues to be viewed with suspicion, especially by the Greek Cypriots.

The main reasons that made it unpopular among Greek Cypriots are:

- The fear that granting Turkish Cypriots a federal state would open the way to a partition and a subsequent annexation to Turkey
- The difficulty in sharing power on equal basis after having monopolized it for fifty years
- Accepting the idea of a federation would mean saying yes to a proposal that was originally put forward by the Turkish Cypriot counterpart and implicitly admitting the Turkish invasion as a *fait accompli*

As pointed out by Alvaro de Soto, the propaganda of the many Rejectionist hardline nationalists leaders that over the time ruled the Republic of Cyprus (first of all Denktash) exempted the “Greek Cypriots from pondering dispassionately over what a compromise settlement might actually entail”¹³⁵ and in doing so the majority of Greek Cypriots never bothered to discover the benefits of a federal solution for societies deeply divided on the basis of ethnic instances.

for New Perspectives, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1999, p. 58
¹³⁵ de Soto, “Case of Cyprus,” p. 5

With regard to the Turkish-Cypriot side, where in general the federal proposal mainly took root among the Turkish Cypriots willing to reunify the island, the idea of a federation generates the fear that it may turn into a masquerade domination of the Greek-Cypriots to the detriment of the numerically inferior Turkish Cypriots.¹³⁶

9) *Fear of change*

The present situation is indeed disappointing but still 'preferable to the uncertainties of any future regime'.¹³⁷

The Republic of Cyprus has been for decades a prosperous, functioning and well-governed state, with a GDP per capita among the highest in Europe.¹³⁸ What advantage would the Republic have to join the poor North with which it feels also culturally alien? The reunification 'is not sought at any price'¹³⁹, and although many express the desire to be reunited with the North, nevertheless they admit as well that the balance between risks, sacrifices, clutches, and inconveniences would be negative.¹⁴⁰

Another story would be for the Turkish Cypriots, who would find advantage to join a richer state. They fear, however, the other side of the coin, and namely that a country so economically and politically powerful would be destined to dominate a reunited Cyprus.¹⁴¹

¹³⁶ Anastasiou, *Broken Olive Branch*, vol. I, p. 187

¹³⁷ Michalis S. Michael, "The Cyprus Peace Talks," *Journal of Peace Research* (2007), 44:5, p. 593

¹³⁸ Robert I. Rotberg, "Reunifying Cyprus: Essential Challenges," in Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann, eds., *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2009, p. 251

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ "Report of the Secretary-General," (28 May 2004), p. 20

¹⁴¹ Michael, "Cyprus Peace Talks," p. 593

From the above we can agree then with Anastasiou when he states that the Cyprus issue is a case of 'risk aversion' on the part of Greek Cypriots and 'loss aversion' on the part of Turkish Cypriots: Greek Cypriots prefer 'what is minimal but certain over what is optimal but risky', while Turkish Cypriots 'avoid a decision that clearly entails a certain loss, even if that decision leads to a desirable end with benefits that by far supersede what is lost at the outset'.¹⁴²

¹⁴² Anastasiou, *Broken Olive Branch*, vol. I, p. 199

4. Conclusion

“I know of no problem more frustrating or more bedeviled by mean-spiritedness and lack neither of mutual confidence, nor of as problem where all concerned would so obviously gain from a reasonable settlement.”¹⁴³

Faced with the impossibility of reaching a solution in spite of the advantages that would derive, the two great wasted opportunities represented by the Annan plan and the negotiations between Christofias and Talat, one wonders if a unified Cyprus is, as Calotychos writes an ‘unimaginable community’.¹⁴⁴

The obvious advantages of reunification are obscured by separatist inclinations.

Imposing a solution from above or from outside is impractical because if an agreement was reached its implementation would be at risk anyway.

The dream of a bizonal bicomunal Cyprus is now fading.

Today, as Heraclides writes, ‘Cyprus Gordian knot’ can only be dissolved or through a ‘velvet divorce’ involving a transfer of territory from north to south, or through an ‘adversarial divorce’, a resolution for lack of action, according to which ‘no solution is a solution’.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ Brian Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War*, New York: Harper and Row, 1987, p. 198

¹⁴⁴ Vangelis Calotychos, ed., *Cyprus and its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1998

¹⁴⁵ Alexis Heraclides, “The Cyprus Gordian Knot”, p. 134

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