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**United in Divergence: Analysing Foreign and Security  
Policy Alignment in France, Germany, and Denmark during  
the 2003 Iraq War and the 2011 Libya Crisis**

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## Riassunto:

Nel contesto dell'integrazione europea degli ultimi decenni, alla luce di significativi cambiamenti nell'ordine mondiale e dell'emergere di nuove minacce alla sicurezza europea, lo studio della Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Comune (PESC) dell'Unione Europea è diventato cruciale per comprendere l'evoluzione della coesione europea in ambiti strettamente legati alla sovranità statale. Tale dinamica ha generato notevoli divergenze tra gli Stati Membri dell'UE e le sue istituzioni; da una parte, vi è una marcata preoccupazione degli Stati riguardo alla perdita della propria sovranità nei settori della sicurezza e della politica estera, che rappresentano le manifestazioni concrete del monopolio statale sull'uso della forza e della sua legittimità internazionale nel sistema degli stati sovrani. D'altro canto, le istituzioni sovranazionali europee, sostenute da una storia di continui sforzi verso l'integrazione nel settore della sicurezza, perseguono lo sviluppo di un'identità europea unita e cooperativa. L'obiettivo è quello di posizionare l'Unione, e non solo i singoli Stati, come un attore di rilievo nel contesto internazionale, attraverso l'adozione di politiche estere e di sicurezza coerenti ed efficaci.

Questa dicotomia ha generato significative tensioni, ostacolando l'evoluzione di una politica estera e di sicurezza unitaria in Europa. Di fronte a gravi crisi di sicurezza, l'Unione Europea ha evidenziato risultati contrastanti e spesso divisivi. Ciononostante, l'evoluzione e l'espansione delle istituzioni dell'UE si sono sviluppate a un ritmo sorprendentemente veloce, trasformando radicalmente il contesto europeo. Analizzare il ruolo dell'UE e dei suoi stati membri in risposta a gravi crisi offre un metodo cruciale per valutare l'efficacia dell'integrazione europea recente, fornendo una prospettiva unica su come l'UE ha affrontato le sfide della globalizzazione, della sicurezza transnazionale e delle minacce ibride. Nonostante le sfide, l'adattabilità e la resilienza dell'UE hanno aperto la via a nuove modalità di cooperazione e integrazione, prospettando un futuro in cui la tensione tra sovranità nazionale e integrazione sovranazionale continua a influenzare la politica estera e di sicurezza, mirando a un equilibrio tra unità e rispetto delle specificità nazionali.

Per esaminare la dinamica tra l'europeizzazione e la sovranità statale, questa tesi si focalizza sull'analisi delle politiche estere e di sicurezza di Francia, Germania e Danimarca in risposta a eventi critici come la guerra in Iraq e la crisi in Libia, inserendoli nel contesto della

Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Comune dell'UE. Attraverso questo studio comparativo, il documento svela l'interazione tra interessi nazionali e obiettivi comuni europei, evidenziando come le crisi internazionali mettano alla prova l'unificazione delle politiche di sicurezza e estere a livello europeo. La rilevanza della ricerca risiede nell'analisi della dinamica tra sovranità nazionale e integrazione europea, offrendo spunti significativi sulla coesione europea in tempi di profondi cambiamenti politici.

Il primo capitolo della tesi si divide in due parti; la prima parte offre una panoramica teorica della Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Comune e della Politica di Sicurezza e Difesa Comune dell'Unione Europea, analizzando la loro evoluzione e l'impatto sul ruolo globale dell'UE. Il capitolo inizia tracciando la progressione storica di queste entità, evidenziando i traguardi chiave e le sfide nell'integrare gli sforzi europei in materia di difesa e sicurezza. Successivamente, approfondisce la dinamica complessa delle varie istituzioni dell'UE nel plasmare la politica estera, concentrandosi sui ruoli del Consiglio Europeo e dell'Alto Rappresentante per gli Affari Esteri e la Politica di Sicurezza. La recensione critica l'efficacia e la coerenza delle politiche estere e di sicurezza dell'UE, affrontando le sfide poste dagli interessi nazionali divergenti e dalla complessità del processo decisionale dell'UE.

La seconda parte, invece, definisce il concetto di europeizzazione e la sua influenza sulle politiche nazionali, concentrandosi su definizioni, ambito e impatto sulla governance. Il capitolo conclude valutando i limiti dell'europeizzazione nella politica estera e di sicurezza dell'UE, discutendo l'influenza della NATO, gli interessi nazionali, i gruppi regionali e l'inesattezza geopolitica.

Il secondo capitolo dell'elaborato si concentra su un'analisi della guerra in Iraq e le sue implicazioni per l'Unione Europea, esaminando le reazioni e gli approcci politici, economici e culturali di Francia, Germania e Danimarca. Questi elementi, che hanno plasmato la posizione di ciascun Paese nei confronti dell'invasione guidata dagli Stati Uniti in Iraq nel 2003, servono a delineare i numerosi fattori contrastanti che determinano le diverse prese di posizione nazionali. In particolare, il capitolo evidenzia l'opposizione di Francia e Germania alla guerra, sottolineando i loro forti interessi economici e politici in Iraq e nel Medio Oriente, la paura di uno "scontro di civiltà" e il loro sostegno per una politica di sicurezza centrata sull'Europa. Entrambi i paesi hanno dato priorità alla stabilità regionale e sono stati critici verso le azioni



militari unilaterali, promuovendo un approccio multilaterale alle relazioni internazionali e alla sicurezza.

Al contrario, la Danimarca ha sostenuto l'invasione, spinta dalla cooperazione politica e militare con gli Stati Uniti e da un impegno nelle relazioni transatlantiche. Nonostante l'opposizione pubblica e gli interessi economici limitati in Iraq, il governo danese ha visto nell'intervento un'opportunità per rafforzare la sua appartenenza alla NATO e mantenere la stabilità regionale.

Il capitolo approfondisce inoltre il contesto più ampio della politica di sicurezza europea, discutendo l'evoluzione della Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Comune dell'UE e delle Politiche Comuni di Difesa Europea e dei tentativi, talvolta

Riassumendo i fattori interni ed esterni che influenzano le risposte di Francia, Germania e Danimarca alla guerra in Iraq, il capitolo fornisce una panoramica completa delle complessità e delle sfide nel formulare una posizione unificata dell'UE sui conflitti internazionali. Sottolinea l'importanza della guerra nel plasmare il panorama della politica estera e di sicurezza dell'UE, dimostrando l'interazione tra politica nazionale, interessi economici e alleanze internazionali.

Il terzo capitolo della tesi segue una linea analoga a quella del capitolo precedente, contestualizzata però al decennio successivo durante la crisi libica del 2011. Il capitolo mira quindi ad offrire un'analisi necessaria per paragonare i periodi presi in considerazione nella tesi per analizzare le influenze domestiche e internazionali che hanno plasmato le politiche di questi Paesi. Osserva, quindi, le diverse reazioni di Francia, Germania e Danimarca 2011, nel contesto più ampio del quadro della politica estera e di sicurezza dell'Unione Europea.

Il capitolo offre una panoramica storica della Libia, dalla sua indipendenza post-coloniale fino alla Primavera Araba del 2011 che ha condotto al conflitto. Discute inoltre le implicazioni del Trattato di Lisbona sul ruolo dell'UE e sul coinvolgimento delle sue istituzioni durante la crisi, dettagliando gli approcci del Consiglio, della Commissione e del Parlamento Europeo. In linea generale, le istituzioni europee mostrano un supporto piuttosto coeso nei confronti della crisi in Libia, basato sulla tutela dei cittadini libici e della transizione democratica in un Paese Nordafricano durante la Primavera Araba. Il capitolo sposta poi l'attenzione sui singoli Paesi dell'analisi.

L'approccio della Francia alla crisi libica è stato caratterizzato da un forte sostegno all'intervento militare, motivato da considerazioni politiche interne; la Francia è stato il primo paese europeo a chiamare alla fine del regime di Gaddafi e ha giocato un ruolo di primo piano nell'intervento militare, giustificato dalla necessità di prevenire una catastrofe umanitaria e di sostenere i movimenti democratici. L'intervento ha ricevuto un ampio sostegno dal pubblico francese ed è in linea con la tradizione francese di promozione dei diritti umani e della democrazia.

Al contrario, la risposta della Germania è stata notevolmente diversa, optando per un approccio cauto che è culminato nell'astensione dal voto sulla Risoluzione 1973 del Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite, che autorizzava l'azione militare in Libia. Questa decisione rifletteva la riluttanza della Germania a impegnarsi in operazioni militari, influenzata dalle sue radici storiche e dall'esperienza recente in Afghanistan. Nonostante la dottrina della Responsabilità di Proteggere (R2P), che la Germania aveva precedentemente abbracciato, la decisione di astenersi è stata controversa e ha evidenziato un approccio cauto all'intervento militare. L'opinione pubblica in Germania era divisa, con una parte significativa a sostegno dell'intervento ma una percentuale minore a favore del coinvolgimento militare.

La posizione della Danimarca, sebbene più limitata, suggerisce come l'approccio della Danimarca in situazioni internazionali simili si allinei tipicamente ai suoi impegni nella NATO e a un forte enfasi sul diritto internazionale e sulla cooperazione, non necessariamente allineato con gli altri Paesi in analisi o con l'UE. Tuttavia, i Governi danesi dell'epoca avevano iniziato a mostrare un interesse verso la rimozione dello status di non-partecipazione della Danimarca nella politica estera e di sicurezza europea, suggerendo un progressivo avvicinamento all'europeizzazione.

Questo capitolo sottolinea le complessità e le sfide nella formulazione di una posizione unificata dell'UE su crisi internazionali, evidenziando gli interessi nazionali divergenti, le eredità storiche e le considerazioni strategiche che influenzano le politiche estere e di sicurezza degli stati membri. Riflette sul ruolo e sull'efficacia dell'UE nella gestione dei conflitti internazionali, in particolare alla luce delle riforme istituzionali ottenute fino al Trattato di Lisbona, che miravano a migliorare la coerenza e la capacità d'azione della politica estera dell'UE. Evidenza, inoltre, come il caso libico abbia potuto presentare più elementi di affinità

di interessi nazionali nei Paesi presi in considerazione, elemento di fondamentale importanza nel considerare l'effettivo impatto delle politiche europee sui singoli Stati dell'analisi.

In conclusione, l'analisi condotta rivela un significativo grado di europeizzazione della politica estera e di sicurezza dell'Unione Europea. Questa osservazione evidenzia come l'evoluzione istituzionale nel quadro della Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Comune abbia contribuito ad un certo allineamento delle politiche nazionali degli Stati membri. In altre parole, i Paesi dell'Unione Europea sembrano essere riusciti, in una certa misura e per i casi analizzati, a migliorare la loro coesione fra le politiche estere e di sicurezza nazionali. Questo processo riflette l'impatto dell'integrazione europea nel suo tentativo di promuovere, sebbene con riluttanze, una maggiore coesione nelle risposte alle crisi internazionali.

Nonostante questi progressi, permangono incoerenze dovute a specifici interessi nazionali, al predominio di istituzioni con maggiore capacità militare come la NATO e ai diversi sfondi storico-culturali degli Stati membri. Questi fattori creano un panorama complesso e sfumato di integrazione europea nella politica estera e di sicurezza. L'analisi sottolinea la traiettoria articolata dall'integrazione europea nel campo della politica estera e di sicurezza. Questi risultati suggeriscono strade per ricerche future, in particolare nell'esaminare come le istituzioni europee possono affrontare le nuove sfide globali con maggiore coesione ed efficacia dell'UE sulla scena globale. Inoltre, la ricerca contribuisce all'analisi futura fornendo un quadro per valutare l'equilibrio tra sovranità nazionale e azione collettiva europea, offrendo approfondimenti sul processo di europeizzazione in aree politiche di critica importanza.



## Introduction

Since the post-war era, the global world order has undergone a significant evolution, marked by a shift from a bipolar structure - dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union - to a more complex multipolar landscape. This transformation has been characterised by the emergence of new power centres and the redistribution of global influence, leading to a more diversified and interconnected international arena. In this multipolar order, the European Union (EU) has emerged as a pivotal actor, growing from an economic power, and expanding into other policy areas. The EU's role has now evolved past its initial economic focus, as it has increasingly engaged in diplomatic and security issues, leveraging its economic strength and political influence to assert itself on the world stage.

Although the EU has become a global power, it also represents a hybrid actor whose impact in this realm can be complex and challenging to understand. In the intricate realm of international relations, this thesis delves into the critical role of foreign and security policy analysis in understanding national interactions in the EU and their impact on the Union as a whole and in the global order.

As a result, even though Europe's diversity in national identities, cultures, and political systems is enriching, it has also posed stability challenges. Nevertheless, the European Union has become a groundbreaking experiment in regional integration, which makes its analysis particularly interesting in understanding the structural changes posed by globalisation and interconnectedness.

This thesis sets out to explore the foreign and security policies of France, Germany, and Denmark during the 2003 Iraq war and the 2011 Libya crisis in relation to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. These two critical events can help explore the complex interplay between these nations' sovereign interests and their adherence to the common European principles - as well as obligations - they have agreed embrace. The comparative approach adopted in this study aims to highlight the political, cultural, and historical factors that have shaped each country's decisions in the hopes of improving the rather complex understanding of European dynamics in foreign and security affairs.

A comprehensive analysis of foreign and security policies is essential to grasp the EU's role in the international order. The EU presents a unique case study as European integration

has required member states to relinquish part of their sovereignty to achieve it. Although the field of foreign and security policy has maintained an intergovernmental scope, its evolution has raised the question of whether sovereign states can maintain their legitimacy if they lose their monopoly of violence to a supranational institution. Therefore, analysing the foreign and security policies of EU nations, particularly during pivotal global crises such as the 2003 Iraq war and the 2011 Libya crisis, provides valuable insights into how these nations, characterised by differing approaches to integration, have balanced their sovereignty with the common EU policies.

At the heart of these dynamics stands the concept of Europeanisation which offers a lens through which to examine the development of national policies in the context of the European Union and its evolution.

Therefore, the first chapter of this thesis will provide an overview of the history of the most relevant EU treaties and the evolution of what is now more commonly referred to as the second EU pillar, namely the one about foreign and security policy. It will elaborate on the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy throughout the decades, with a special focus on the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty and the 2008 Lisbon Treaty. These treaties are not only crucial for their developments to the EU in the field of foreign policy; they can also offer some interesting historical insights to the case studies as they are the treaties that were ratified shortly after the escalation of the crises in question.

It will then move on to explore where the literature stands in the field of European integration, Europeanisation, and the CFSP; in particular, it will delve into the overall impact of EU Treaties on Member States versus the influence of national policy-making; it will investigate the role of national interests in EU foreign policy, and question what academia finds to be the balance between national and supranational interests. In other words, it will attempt to provide a literature framework through which to create a solid basis for the gathering of empirical evidence for the thesis.

The second chapter will then move on to the first case study about the 2003 Iraq war. It firstly embeds the topic in the historical and legislative context; then, it will analyse and provide the domestic and external reasons that have affected the decision-making of each nation studied during the crises. In particular, the domestic-level analysis will examine the Government's position, opinion polls, media, and perception of the conflict.

The external reasons will rely on multiple factors, such as bilateral interests, approaches to security policy, and the evolving support for the CFSP and EU integration. The third chapter will work on the same type of analysis for the 2011 Libya crisis in the hopes of finding whether the tense decade post 9-11 to the Arab Revolution had led to any developments in the field of European integration and policy alignment.

This thesis aims to critically provide deeper insights into the role of the EU as an external power in the international order, particularly in the balance of national and supranational interests. The numerous attempts to improve its status have often failed due to disagreements and inconsistencies among Member States, lack of transparency, and fear of losing national autonomy in defence matters.

By dissecting the individual foreign and security policy interests of France, Germany, and Denmark during two significant international crises, the thesis will provide the nuances of European integration and the challenges faced in harmonising national interests with the overarching goals of the EU. This type of analysis is fundamental in understanding the EU's role as an international actor and its potential to evolve beyond its status as a so-called "military worm" and into a more cohesive and influential entity in the global arena.

Ultimately, this thesis aims to contribute to the broader discourse on European integration, state sovereignty, and the evolving landscape of international relations in the 21st century.

## Methodology

The study's research methodology is designed to conduct a qualitative comparative analysis of two significant global crises - the 2003 Iraq war and the 2011 Libyan conflict - from a European perspective. The primary objective of this analysis is to examine the approaches to foreign policy and security of three European and EU nations, namely France, Germany, and Denmark, during these events. To contribute to the existing body of literature on the impact of the CFSP on Member States, this thesis undertakes a comparative analysis of EU foreign and security policy and the policies of three target countries – Germany, France, and Denmark – during two significant periods: the 2003 Iraq War and the 2011 Libya crisis. It aims to identify pivotal moments within each event to evaluate the alignment between national and supranational foreign policies and to examine their evolution over time. The primary objective is to evaluate whether the development of EU institutions from the 2003 Iraq war to the 2011

Libya crisis has led to a Europeanisation of the target countries, manifesting in a convergence of their foreign policies towards the EU's stance. To achieve this, the research will first dissect the domestic and global factors influencing each country's policies during these critical moments. It will then expand its scope to conduct a comparative analysis of policy shifts, aiming to illuminate the broader trends of Europeanisation and policy alignment among the EU Member States across these two pivotal events in recent years.

The dissertation will utilise diverse primary sources to gather data, which will include resolutions and legal treaties, official documents from international organisations, and important speeches by political leaders. Specifically, it will provide foundational legal frameworks established through the examination of international treaties and resolutions such as the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO, 1949), the Charter of the United Nations (1945) and UN Resolutions (e.g. Resolution 1443, 2002).

It will also delve into official documents from organisations strictly related to the scope of the research that have shaped and reflected the collective European response to crises. Among them, the thesis will include documents by the European Council, European Commission, and European Parliament that can offer a comprehensive view of the EU's resolutions and reactions to the events analysed.

Additionally, the primary sources will include speeches by Government officials of the countries considered that can offer a direct perspective on policy intentions during pivotal moments, such as speeches by former US President George W. Bush in 2001. It will also rely on statistical data gathered by national statistical services that often provide polls on citizens' opinions during international conflicts.

These primary sources will serve as the foundation for the research, which will leverage on the existing body of literature on the topic to complete the analysis.

### ***Research Design***

The chosen research design is qualitative. This approach can provide an in-depth analysis of the reasoning behind specific decision-making processes, each underlying the nation's security approaches and supranational institutions' role. By focusing on qualitative data, the study does not provide the analysis of an overall trend in policy-making or legislative processes; instead, it aims to capture the intricacies and complexities behind the integration of foreign and security policy, a field that struggles to break away from its national domain.



The research will employ a comparative approach to examine similarities and differences between each country's approaches during each event and, ultimately, between the two international crises. By proceeding in this matter, the thesis hopes to identify any evolutions or hints at Europeanisation in the foreign policy approaches of France, Germany, and Denmark. Consequently, it aims to assess the extent to which these countries' policies may have been subjected to - or at least aligned with - EU interests.

Furthermore, in this research, the methodology will employ two relevant forms of triangulation - Data Source Triangulation and Time Triangulation - to ensure a comprehensive analysis of the sources (Bans-Akutey and Tiimub 2021, p. 1)

Data Source triangulation refers to the analysis of different types of sources that are often very different in delivery and scope. These range from documents to speeches and reports that can strengthen the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the results by comparing them (Bans-Akutey and Tiimub 2021, p. 2). The primary objective of this method is to investigate whether there is a consensus or any significant differences among the sources regarding the foreign policy stances of each country during the crises. This method can provide a complete understanding of how national foreign policies are perceived at different levels, including national and supranational Government, public, and media.

The second type of triangulation present in this thesis is time triangulation. This research approach is helpful in examining how the foreign policy stances of different countries have evolved over time (Bans-Akutey, Tiimub 2021, p. 3). In this research case, this method will focus on two specific periods: the Iraq War and the Libya crisis. By comparing these equally significant international events that have shaped the foreign policy decisions of many nations, this research aims to uncover any potential patterns or shifts in national foreign policies in response to changing international circumstances and the evolving framework of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The temporal analysis will also be crucial in understanding the trajectory of European integration and the interplay between national sovereignty and collective EU action in foreign affairs. It will shed light on the evolving perception of countries of the role of the EU.

This approach may lead to interesting results. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 is regarded as a turning point in EU policy. It occurred shortly after the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, which aimed to enhance the CFSP established by the Maastricht Treaty. The focus on foreign policy

in the Amsterdam treaty stemmed from the desire for continued European integration and the EU's previous ineffectiveness as a regional and global power during the Balkans conflict. The war's violence and the EU's struggles to demonstrate cohesion and efficacy underscored the challenges of aligning foreign policies across countries.

By examining the cohesiveness (or lack thereof) of the European Union and its Members during the Iraq war, we can gain valuable insights into the state of the common foreign policy in the early 2000s. Building on this analysis, the thesis will apply a similar level of scrutiny to the 2011 crisis in Libya. This conflict is significant not only due to its geographical proximity to the EU but also because it emerged following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Once again, the Lisbon Treaty aimed to address the weaknesses identified after the Amsterdam Treaty and establish new institutions and figures to tackle CFSP challenges. Therefore, one may expect significant improvements.

The expected outcome of this research is to shed light on the extent to which the EU was able to influence the foreign and security policies of France, Germany, and Denmark during the war in Iraq and the conflict in Libya. The findings will contribute to the existing literature on European foreign policy and provide insights into the dynamics between EU integration and national interests in the context of international events. Ultimately, this research aims to deepen our understanding of the role of supranational institutions like the EU in shaping the foreign policies of its member states.

### ***Limits and Challenges of the Research***

There are two main difficulties that need to be addressed when studying the limitations and challenges encountered in this research. The first is that evaluating the impact of Europeanisation is inherently difficult because of the vast number of variables and actors involved. This includes major entities such as NATO. The complex interplay between the transatlantic alliance, regional alliances, and various national interests makes it difficult to isolate the specific impact of each actor within the broader framework of EU integration and policy alignment.

The second obstacle is the accessibility of resources. Many documents and insights into government and EU-level decision-making processes may be confidential, which can cast doubt on the completeness of the information available for analysis. This issue is particularly pronounced in Denmark, where there is less English-language literature available compared to other EU countries like Germany and France. Despite Denmark's unique position as an opt-out country offering valuable insights into the CFSP during the crises analyzed, this scarcity of resources may result in a comparative lack of depth in the analysis for Denmark relative to the other countries studied. These limitations highlight the complexities of comprehensive research in EU foreign policy and the inherent challenges in accessing and deciphering the full scope of factors influencing Europeanisation.



# Chapter I – The Evolution of the CFSP and Europeanisation

## *Introduction*

This first chapter of the dissertation begins by providing the historical development of the CFSP and the CSDP, highlighting some of their key milestones that have shaped the state of the EU to today. This section briefly describes the early efforts and challenges in unifying European countries in defence and security.

The chapter also delves deeply into the complex interplay of various EU institutions in shaping foreign policy and how they work together to achieve common goals. In particular, it highlights the roles of two key institutions, namely the European Council and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. By examining these institutions' functions and responsibilities, this chapter provides a comprehensive understanding of the decision-making processes underpinning the EU's foreign policy.

The review then moves on to elaborate on the effectiveness and coherence of the EU's foreign and security policies. It addresses the challenges posed by divergent national interests among member states and the complexities of the EU's decision-making process, which sometimes results in slow responses to global crises. The intricate relationship between the EU and other international entities like NATO is also explored, assessing how these interactions influence the EU's capacity to act as a unified global actor.

Additionally, the concept of Europeanisation and its implications for national foreign policies within the EU is a focal point of this chapter. The review scrutinises the definition and scope of Europeanisation, differentiating it from European integration and analysing its impact on domestic politics and governance of EU states. The complexity of policy-making in the EU is further dissected, considering the interplay of national interests, regional alliances, and institutional representation in shaping the EU's foreign policy.

Lastly, the chapter critically evaluates the limits of Europeanisation, particularly in the realm of foreign and security policy. It discusses the varying degrees of member states' commitment to EU treaties, the influence of NATO, and the challenges in achieving a cohesive EU defence policy. The role of national interests and representation in shaping Europeanisation

within the EU's foreign policy is also scrutinised, highlighting the diversity of perspectives and priorities among different regional groups within the Union. The aim of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive historical and scholarly foundation for understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the concept of Europeanisation. These two elements will be the main themes throughout the thesis, providing critical context and analytical frameworks for the subsequent discussions. This approach intends to clarify not only the evolution and implications of the CFSP in the broader context of European integration but also to examine the complex processes of Europeanisation as they intersect with the EU's foreign policy objectives.

### *The Evolution of the Security and Foreign Policy Area in the EU*

The origins of a Common EU foreign, Security, and Defence Policy can be traced back to the aftermath of World War II, when Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK signed the Brussels Treaty for mutual defence in 1948 (European Parliament, 2023).

Shortly after, the path was furthered by the creation of NATO, comprised of the US, Canada, and ten Western European countries. In the European continent, efforts to create a unified European Army had emerged since the first steps into European Integration with the de Gasperi initiative of 1952 and the discussion of the European Defence Community Treaty; however, while economic and political integration kept progressing, the overall scepticism led by France - that did not feel ready to lose such a critical national tool - caused the rejection of the proposal by 1954 (Brannegan 2001, p. 2). Despite this, the Western European Union (WEU) was still established in the same year while also incorporating Italy and West Germany (European Foreign Policy Unit, 2019).

While the first steps into defence integration were not particularly successful, European countries still attempted to achieve a certain degree of foreign policy coordination. At The Hague Convention in 1969, the six founding members agreed to discuss and coordinate foreign policy outside of EC institutions and under the European Political Cooperation (EPC). This method allowed the countries to maintain their full sovereignty while also ensuring an increased level of cooperation (Brannigan 2001).

By October 1970, the European Political Cooperation was created. The EPC relied on a Political Committee that began developing crisis consultation mechanisms.

For instance, the first example of coordinated policy is the EC's joint declaration on the Middle East. While the initial steps of the EPC were deemed successful by intergovernmentalists, it was not appreciated by the integrationists. In other words, those who supported increasingly ambitious plans for European integration aimed for treaties, such as the Single European Act in the 1980s, that could reinforce foreign policy.

The following decades, the 1980s and 1990s, were the most significant catalysts for change. Following the political integration in the 1970s and the early 1980s, by 1984, the WEU was reactivated, allowing defence ministers to meet frequently. From then on, the Single European Act in 1987, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 offered further integration and cooperation, such as creating the Common Foreign and Security Policy with the High Representative as the head and the Petersberg Tasks (EFPU, 2019).

Significant progress has been achieved since the ratification of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), with the creation of the II Pillar with the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In his paper "The Evolution of Foreign Policy", however, Brannigan (2001) argues that the EPC and the CFSP still share some similarities. The main two differences are the introduction of majority voting under specific circumstances - albeit entirely defined and limited - and the focus on "joint actions" (Council of the European Communities, Commission of the European Communities, Treaty on European Union, J.3.4.) This allowed to intensify cooperation and put pressure on the participating states. In fact, although the countries are not required to participate in these joint actions and will not face repercussions for non-compliance, they often face significant expectations.

One could argue that foreign policy in the EU, just like many other policy areas that are integrated, has made progress during crises that required a more cooperative Union. For instance, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the violent Balkan wars proved how ineffective EU foreign policy was. As a result, the treaties that followed the 1992 Maastricht Treaty aimed at improving the CFSP.

Firstly, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the possibility of “constructive abstention”. In other words, it introduced more flexibility and the traditional unanimous vote system and allowed states who did not want to partake in certain foreign policy decisions to abstain. However, it also asks those countries to accept the EU decision without interference. Secondly, it extended the possibility of voting by a qualified majority to more foreign policy areas as long as they were not related to defence. Finally, it developed the “common strategies”, namely plans created by the European Council in areas where the states shared common interests.

Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon - the EU’s most recent Treaty - amended both the TFEU and the TEU, reinforcing the foreign policy and security area. Some scholars argue that new failed attempts at effective foreign policies, like the war in Iraq, prompted progress. Indeed, the Treaty of Lisbon created a new institutional framework that notably shaped the EU. Firstly, the EU has obtained a legal personality. This implies that the Union can now be part of international agreements and organisations. Secondly, it introduced the three-hat function of the Vice-President of the European Commission. Not only does the VP work within the Commission, but they are also the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the President of the Foreign Affairs Council. The Treaty also operated the European External Action Service, the EU’s diplomatic service that is in charge of maintaining diplomatic ties and partnerships across the world.

All in all, heaps of progress have been made since the first failed attempt at European integration in the field of security in the 1950s. However, foreign policy and security are complex policy areas whose competence mostly belongs to sovereign countries; on the one hand, EU countries do not want to cede more sovereignty, as that threatens the very existence of the state; on the other hand, theories such as path dependency may support the idea of an eventual integration of all policy fields.

On the one hand, some argue that the Member States have been the most important actors; by exercising their traditional powers through their institutions, they have consciously ceded part of their sovereignty in response to a changing environment or emergencies (Pollack 2015a, p. 17). This process is often referred to as intergovernmentalism. According to authors such as Moravcsik (1998), intergovernmentalism is what drove the integration process among the most powerful States. In contrast, scholars who take a neo-functionalist approach believe that the EU supranational institutions were the actual drivers for change (Pollack 2015a, p. 15).



Due to its structure, many refer to the European Union as a sui-generis agreement (Moravcsik 1998). In other words, the EU has a unique and complex institutional framework that is unprecedented and ever developing in nature; it lacks the depth of integration that would make it a federal state (Moravcsik 1998). At the same time, however, the EU has enough decisional power on its MS to question whether their cooperation is purely intergovernmental. Furthermore, the state of the EU remains an open debate in academia because it has challenged many of the most traditional concepts in political science, such as the traditional idea of the Weberian state (Hix 1999, p. 4). For instance, the EU does not have a monopoly of violence over its people, in contrast to what all of the EUMS have (Hix 1999, p. 4). Secondly, and strictly correlated to the first point, is its uneven institutional development. While some policy areas have deeply integrated, others lag behind and struggle to make progress.

### *The Perception of the CFSP*

The tools employed by the CFSP can vary but mostly rely on the EU's soft power and diplomacy. Political dialogue, economic cooperation - or, in contrast, economic sanctions - humanitarian aid, and overall development assistance are just a few of the most important examples of EU power in foreign policy. As a result, the CFSP often appears as not effective. However, it is important to highlight how complex the creation of a common foreign and security policy can be in an agreement comprised of twenty-seven sovereign states.

The decision-making process within the CFSP framework is quite complex. It involves multiple EU institutions, such as the European Council and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The European Council, which is composed of the heads of state or government of the EU Member States, is in charge of establishing the overall trajectory of the EU foreign policy. In other words, it sets the political and strategic objectives of the CFSP. The High Representative, which the European Council appoints every five years, embodies the EU in the foreign and security policy field and is in charge of coordinating the CFSP.

Parallel to the CFSP, the CSDP provides a framework for addressing security and defence issues within the EU. It aims to strengthen the EU's capacity to manage crises, prevent conflicts, and contribute to international peacekeeping efforts. The CSDP encompasses both civilian and military aspects, enabling the EU to engage in various security-related activities, including civilian missions, military operations, and capacity-building initiatives.

Since creating such frameworks, the EU has carried out numerous operations and missions to prove its commitment on a regional and international level. Examples include the EU's presence during the Balkan War in the 1990s and the EU's presence in the Middle East and North Africa region in managing crises and supporting development and post-conflict reconstruction.

Despite its noble scope and mission, the EU has often faced severe criticism in its foreign and security policy. EU Member States' interests in the field often diverge, leading to discontent and a lack of cohesiveness. Divergent national interests among member states can hinder the formation of a unified European approach to foreign and security policies. The EU's decision-making process can also be complex and time-consuming, leading to delays in responding to crises. Critics argue that the EU's foreign and security policies lack effectiveness and coherence, questioning the ability of the EU to act as a unified global actor.

Further criticism argues that it is often difficult to distinguish between what the EU can do independently and what it achieves thanks to its international allies. For instance, the EU and NATO have a unique relationship in the context of security and defence. Although they have distinct roles and objectives, their shared security interests have continually been an incentive for continuous cooperation (Howorth 2020, p.530). As a result, they have increasingly worked together in areas of mutual interest, such as crisis management, capacity-building, and cooperation in addressing shared security challenges (Howorth 2020, p.534). The EU also collaborates with other international partners, including the United Nations and regional organisations, to enhance global security and stability.

Furthermore, scholars (Hill, 1993, and Toje, 2008) often question the effectiveness of these changes regardless of the continuous reforms. This issue is called the capability-expectations gap (Hill 1993, p.315). It refers to the gap between what the EU (or the EC at the time) had the ability to achieve and what would actually deliver. The gap analyses the tools and resources available, as well as the capability of finding agreements among states. While the 1999 Treaty tried to bridge the gap that had proved to exist during the Balkan war regardless of the 1992 Treaty, the 2003 Iraq War rechallenged the CFSP as a similar issue arose the Lisbon Treaty and the escalation of the Arab Spring and the war in Libya.

The EU intervened in the field of security, politics, and financial aid, albeit rarely cohesively as a Union and more thanks to the individual decisions of states. The most significant example, as this chapter will analyse in the following section, is the strong discouragement to go to war by the French and German governments; their decision is in stark contrast with the role played by the United Kingdom, which confirmed its role as an Atlanticist regardless of its key role within the European Union (Stahl 2004, p.420).

As the geopolitical landscape evolves and new security threats emerge, it is crucial for the EU to adapt its foreign and security policies continuously. The Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy will likely undergo further developments and reforms to address these challenges. This may involve enhancing the EU's strategic autonomy, improving crisis response capabilities, and deepening cooperation with international partners. The CFSP and CSDP are essential for maintaining regional and international security and will continue to shape the EU's role on the global stage.

All in all, Toje (2008) explains that the main issue behind the CFSP performance and the capability-expectation gap is, in fact, the unanimous consensus.

Unanimity within the EU implied that in order for decisions in foreign policy to be taken, the twenty-seven states need to reach a common agreement. This is because of intergovernmentalism and the value that is attached to state sovereignty and each state's right to assert its own strategy in the field of security (Toje 2008, p.130).

As a result, the literature seems to appear particularly pessimistic in the field of foreign and security policy; similarly, many European countries that have become pioneers of integration in the field throughout the decades, such as France, have frequently argued that qualified majority voting needs to be extended to an increasing number of policy areas (Toje 2008, p.132).

The unanimity rule, which has characterised most of the EU foreign policy, threatens to cause stagnation due to each country's preferences. As a result, unless the Union prefers scaling down its ambitions, it needs to acknowledge its profound gaps and the overall scepticism that is found in the literature and among political leaders.

## *The European Framework and its Interaction with National Policies - Analysis of the Literature*

Although frequently criticised, the European Union's attempts to integrate the realms of foreign and security cooperation beyond their national scope is a significant sign of common objectives. Bickerton and Irondelle (2011) explain that the EU framework in this sector is innovative, especially because it goes beyond the traditional definition of state sovereignty. The CFSP and the CSDP have created a multidisciplinary framework that does not only focus on the monopoly of violence and state existence but also other various security-related activities. Among them, and related to the case studies in this thesis, one can point out the EU's attempts at conflict prevention and management, as well as humanitarian aid and post-conflict stabilisation.

In other words, what makes the EU framework quite different from traditional approaches to security is its multilateralism that recognises the interconnectedness of its Member States. This framework has created a system with the potential to pool its resources and expertise.

Nevertheless, Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) argue that the impact of Europeanisation on domestic policies is still understudied, as scholars have shifted their focus towards the construction of the European framework over its integration domestically (p.3). In their analysis, the authors highlight three main mechanisms of incorporating a European framework in domestic structure.

Taylor (1986) and Scharpf (1999) argue that the first mechanism - and potentially the best known - is Europeanisation by Institutional compliance. This refers to the direct impact of policies on domestic institutions by using a defined European model that is imposed on states and Members of the EU. In other words, it is about the EU setting a specific institutional model that Member States must comply with; it has the legitimacy to replace domestic arrangements and has a strong impact on European integration (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002, p.7). It uses what Taylor (1986) calls "positive integration", namely the new rules provided by a higher authority.

In contrast, the second mechanism is Europeanisation by Changing Domestic Opportunity Structures (Scharpf, 1994); it involves the EU influencing the Member States' internal structure by altering power dynamics and resource distribution among all actors involved, such as the EU, Government, and stakeholders. This is the case for economic

integration and what is commonly referred to as “negative integration”, namely the removal of barriers that allow for a change in dynamics thanks to fewer constraints (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002, p. 9).

Finally, and most correlated with the field of foreign policy, is the mechanism of Europeanisation by Framing Domestic Beliefs and Expectations. The complexity of common foreign and security policy in the EU requires a more subtle approach to interest alignments. It frequently aims at changing the beliefs, expectations, and strategies of the domestic actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002, p. 11). Although under the CFSP, the EU has attempted to use all three mechanisms, the intergovernmental nature of it makes it harder for supranational impositions to integrate. In contrast, the attempts to align Member States’ expectations may eventually lead to common goals. Nevertheless, this mechanism is considered quite weak, as it does not rely on imposition.

### ***The Complexity of the Common Foreign Policy in the EU: National Interests, Regional Alliances, and Institutional Representation***

Creating a common and cohesive foreign policy in the European Union is a complex and multifaceted process that involves various actors and institutions working together to shape and implement policies at the supranational level in what is known as intensive transgovernmentalism (Wallace et al. 2020, p. According to Wallace et al. (2020), the EU policy-making process is characterised by a combination of intergovernmental and supranational decision-making, which reflects the unique nature of the EU as a hybrid political system. In this system, member states play a crucial role in policy formulation through the Council of the European Union, where national ministers representing their governments negotiate and adopt policies.

At the same time, the European Commission, as the EU's executive body, is responsible for initiating and proposing legislation, acting as the "motor" of integration (Wallace et al., 2020). Furthermore, the European Parliament, as the directly elected body of the EU, has gained significant powers in the policy-making process, mainly through the co-decision procedure, which requires its approval for most areas of legislation.

This tripartite system of governance, involving the Council, Commission, and Parliament, ensures a balance of power and representation in EU policy-making (Wallace et

al., 2020). However, it is essential to note that the policy-making process in the EU is not without challenges.

The complex decision-making procedures, the need for consensus among member states, and the influence of various interest groups and stakeholders can often lead to lengthy and cumbersome negotiations, resulting in slow and sometimes ineffective policy outcomes (Wallace et al., 2020). Nonetheless, the EU has made significant progress in policy-making, particularly in areas such as economic integration, environmental protection, and social policy, where the supranational approach has facilitated the harmonisation of rules and standards across member states (Wallace et al., 2020). Overall, the policy-making process in the European Union is dynamic and evolving, requiring the cooperation and coordination of multiple actors and institutions to address the challenges and opportunities of a united Europe.

The complexity is caused by the multiple actors that characterise the Union, which interact both vertically and horizontally. Member States interact with each other, yet they also refer to supranational institutions and third parties, such as NGOs and local institutions.

For instance, Member States have unique historical backgrounds and geopolitical concerns. Yet, each of these member states plays a significant role in shaping the Union's foreign policy, making their goals often inconsistent and not cohesive, advocating for different objectives.

Although it is difficult to align international affairs with other countries, it may be easier with states that share certain elements in common. In this regard, Cooper (2022) explains that many alliances among EU members operate under the BURG definition. The term refers to the Bottom-Up Regional Group and is a form of cooperation based on different criteria: firstly, it creates a formal cooperation that is active; secondly, it must be institutionally separate from the EU, yet comprised of Member States only; finally, the countries need to belong to the same regional area (Cooper et al. 2022, p. 953)

One example is the Visegrád Group. It is composed of Poland, Hungary, Czechia, and Slovakia and reflects the priorities of countries in central and eastern Europe (Cooper et al. 2022, p. 957). Due to their geographical position and being in close proximity to Russia, the countries have always placed a high value on energy security and defence policies. This became especially apparent after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, which increased the region's

focus on these issues. As a result, they prioritise their security policies to ensure their safety and sovereignty.

In contrast, they are more likely to oppose EU policies on mandatory refugee quotas; this approach stands in stark contrast with the regional cohesion of the Southern European countries, such as Italy, Greece and Spain (Cooper et al. 2022, p. 957). These are at the forefront of the Mediterranean migration crisis and have been seeking EU-wide strategies to manage migration flows and distribute asylum-seeker responsibilities more equitably.

The principle of unanimity that is present in key policy areas of foreign policy gives all states the power to veto decisions, granting them a substantial role in the EU's decision-making. This ensures that each member state has an equal voice in the decision-making process, regardless of its population or economic size (Panke 2011, p.134). However, these differing regional interests within the EU highlight the challenge of developing a unified foreign policy that takes into account the varied concerns of its member states. Although at times inefficient, it is important to underscore that the reason behind its complexity lies in the willingness to ensure that the interests of all member states are considered and that decisions are made in a fair and democratic manner.

Nevertheless, these dynamics can make the decision-making process more time-consuming and difficult, hindering the actualisation and effectiveness of a common foreign policy.

As the EU continues to evolve, it faces the challenge of managing the intricate interplay between the varied interests of its member states and the mechanisms designed to accommodate them. This aspect of governance is crucial to the Union's efforts in forging a cohesive and effective collective identity on the global stage. The EU's commitment to balancing the interests of all its members ensures that no country is left behind in the pursuit of a better future. The EU's approach to policy-making is a testament to its commitment to inclusivity, fairness, and cooperation, which are necessary for the success of any union.

## ***Europeanisation and National Foreign Policies***

### *Definition and Scope of Europeanisation*

In the context of foreign and security policy, the literature is quite divided on the impact of Europeanisation and its influence on EU member states. Throughout the decades, to the EU's changing nature and evolution, the literature has taken a different approach to the concept of Europeanisation; each definition is based on how narrow or wide the scope of the term is, making it difficult to outline a one-size-fits-all approach.

First, and probably most intuitively, some scholars have focused on the linguistic meaning of the word. Some argue that Europeanisation heavily relies on whether the member states have agreed to integrate in the field of foreign and security policy. The word Europeanisation seems to turn the attention to becoming like Europe. It may imply, therefore, that one actor external to the European or EU context may be subject - or subject itself - to a set of rules that makes it "Europeanised" (Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001). However, this definition may blur the line between the concept of Europeanisation and European integration, which are similar yet distinct, as will be described in the next section.

This definition may reduce, therefore, the concept of Europeanisation to a debate on integration and its impact horizontally - with the integration of new member states in the EU - or vertically by considering the impact of supranational institutions on Member States (Buller 2002,p.11)

Nevertheless, when taking this approach, Europeanisation has increasingly gained importance in the study of European integration, trying to explain how the European Union has exerted its influence on specific policy areas. One standard definition of Europeanisation in the literature is the following:

*"Processes of (1) construction (2) diffusion and (3) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated into the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies" (Radaelli 2004, p .3).*

In other words, this take on Europeanisation is about the institutional development that shapes the EU and its states via legal and authoritative measures. This can be seen as a top-down approach to define Europeanisation. This approach, however, is often perceived as European integration by some scholars, and not Europeanisation.



Although similar, the two concepts can have some vastly different implications when distinguished.

Mtchedlishvili (2018) defines European integration as the institutional convergence of Member States. It is most defined as the political, economic, and social alignment process among European countries and, more specifically, EU Member States (p.80). It is primarily achieved through the development of EU institutions. The goal is to create a framework that makes a cohesive supranational system to favour its member states' interests and the institutions' smooth functioning. To promote this process, states must relinquish part of their sovereignty and cede it to the supranational organs. It is unique to the EU and its institutions and cannot be applied to other cases (Mtchedlishvili 2018, p. 80).

Jaremba and Mayoral (2019) explain that, in contrast, Europeanisation refers to a country's domestic adaptation of institutional, political, legal, and social factors that result from joining the European Union (p. 387). In other words, it comprises of all those multilevel dynamics born out of the interaction of all the actors and networks within the EU – and their interaction with the external actors – that lead to cohesion among EU members. Therefore, although different from European integration, Europeanisation is a lens through which to interpret the impact of European integration on domestic politics and governance of EU states. While the former involves the creation of a framework through treaties and laws, the latter analyses in what way these are adopted by member states.

While European integration is interpreted as a top-down approach – or a “downloading process” (Jaremba and Mayoral 2019, p.388) – that evaluates the impact of EU institutions on states, Europeanisation is often seen as a bottom-up approach or a “downloading process”. In this case, the alignment starts at a local and national level of member states and eventually leads to EU-wide results (p.389).

Finally, (Mchedlishvili 2018) proposes a third approach to Europeanisation, which includes both the top-down and bottom-up definitions. This definition refers to the development and reinforcement of both formal and informal institutions and practices at the EU and national level. It includes in its analysis all networks of governance, becoming the process that establishes beliefs and norms developed within the EU and then internalised by Member States based on the institutional structure and context. This approach extends beyond European integration and breaks away from any strict definition that may make it difficult to analyse Europeanisation outside of strict boundaries (Mchedlishvili 2018, p.81)

All in all, Europeanisation should be seen as an ongoing and interactive process of change, linking the national and European levels. The responses of Member States to the integration process influence EU institutions and policy processes, and vice versa. Europeanisation is viewed as a reciprocal process between the EU and Member States, involving the reception and projection of EU policies. However, this circular movement blurs the cause-and-effect relationship, making it difficult to define the results of Europeanisation.

Europeanisation becomes, therefore, a lens to better observe EU dynamics and their impact on member states. It should not be seen as a one-size-fits-all process or a simple top-down imposition of EU standards and norms. This thesis aims to interpret Europeanisation as a rather multilevel and malleable concept that can incorporate different levels of analysis; however, this flexibility also implies some important limitations.

#### *The Limits of Europeanisation and the Impact on EU Member States*

While the vast use of the concept of Europeanisation is useful in qualitative research, as it allows for a detail-oriented analysis, it also presents some important challenges when evaluating its effectiveness.

For instance, a difficult element to take into account is the impact of NATO and transnational relations on European nations. NATO is an international military alliance comprising thirty member countries, mainly from North America and Europe; since its creation in the aftermath of World War II, the organisation has maintained a long-standing history of military cooperation. As a result, its military capabilities and experience in coordinating defence operations have made it an impactful actor in world events (Howorth 2018, p.524).

On the other hand, the European Union has a much more recent Common Foreign and Security Policy compared to NATO, and it initially began operating with more modest intentions. Its main aim was to strengthen the EU's capacity in crisis and security management operations and, eventually, to strengthen military capabilities (Howorth 2018, p.525). Nevertheless, the lack of coordination and coherence has made it difficult for the EU to emerge as much as NATO. Experience is not the only element contributing to differences between NATO and the EU. NATO seems to benefit from more coherent decision-making in security matters, primarily due to its focus on collective defence. For example, Article V of NATO's

charter, also known as the collective defence clause, states that an attack against a state is considered an attack against all member states.

In contrast, the EU has a much broader range of policy areas; as a result, the decision-making process is complex as it only does not include a focused approach. It requires all twenty-seven member states to coordinate their action and agree on the right approach, leading to slow response times and challenging the possibility of achieving consensus on security issues (Howorth 2018, p.527).

The reason why these elements may affect Europeanisation and the study of this process is quite simple. Many EU states, especially those with a tradition of supporting transatlantic ties, may not see the EU as an actual security guarantee. Consequently, they rely on NATO, slowing the development and integration of a comprehensive EU defence policy. In other words, many EU nations may simply not see the need for further integration when other, more effective, and secure institutions already exist and cover their need for a robust military alliance.

A relevant example, as we will see in the following chapters, is the difference between Germany and France, as supporters of EU integration in CFSP, and Denmark, a country that kept its opt-outs in EU security for thirty years. The presence of NATO acted as a deterrent for Denmark, emphasising the country's reliance on the Transatlantic alliance. Whether Denmark is "Europeanised" in that sense is, therefore, difficult to evaluate.

### *Conclusions*

This dissertation chapter examines the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, dissecting their evolution and impact on the EU's global role. It begins by tracing the historical progression of the two entities, highlighting the key milestones and challenges in integrating European defence and security efforts.

The chapter then moves on to explore the dynamics of EU institutions in shaping foreign policy, focusing on the roles of the post-Lisbon High Representative, which has increasingly gained a significant role in representing the EU as an external power.

The chapter also assesses the effectiveness of EU foreign and security policies, highlighting the difficulties that arise with divergent national interests and incoherent decision-making processes that lead to delayed responses in global crises.

Furthermore, this section defines the concept of Europeanisation in the literature and its influence on national policies, focusing on its multiple definitions, scope, and impact on governance. The chapter ends by evaluating the limits of the multilayered concept of Europeanisation in the EU's foreign policy, discussing the influence of NATO, national interests, regional groups and geopolitical unalignment.

Overall, the chapter sheds light on the intricate processes behind the concepts of European integration and Europeanisation in foreign affairs, a field that is, to this day, struggling to find the right balance between a shared approach and sovereign independence.



## Chapter II - European Foreign and Security Policy in Iraq - the French, German, and Danish Approaches

### *Introduction*

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the domestic and external interests that affected the foreign and security policy of France, Germany, and Denmark in the context of the 2003 Iraq war and whether these had a European rather than national scope. It will do so by analysing the historical context and events that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies. It will focus on the political and geopolitical factors that contributed to the decision to go to war, the military strategy employed during the invasion and the subsequent deployment of American troops.

The chapter will begin with a brief historical overview of the conflict. It will examine the political and legal background explaining the war's rationale, its legitimacy issues, and the various steps that characterised the dispute, including the casus belli, military escalation, and the Coalition of Provisional Authority.

Next, the chapter will examine the EU's approach to the conflict and why it was so significant for the Union, which had recently undergone reforms and had the opportunity to demonstrate its value to the world. After establishing this background, the chapter will delve into the French, German, and Danish perspectives on the war, analysing domestic and external interests that may have influenced their decision-making processes.

Ultimately, this chapter aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the interplay between the EU and its member states, shedding light on their different objectives, behaviours, and policies during the escalation and start of the war and how it impacted EU foreign policy towards the conflict.

### *The Invasion of Iraq, The Historical Background*

The war in Iraq (2003-2011) was a violent conflict initiated by the United States and some of its allies, such as the UK, to overthrow the Iraqi Government and secure a democratic, pro-western ally in the Middle East (Carney 2011, p. 5). The invasion caused the death of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians, and although it overthrew Saddam Hussein's

authoritarian regime, it failed to achieve the hoped-for democratisation.

The origins of the conflict can be found in historical and geopolitical factors. Like many other Middle Eastern countries, Iraq was under British colonial rule for decades until the nation became independent in the 1930s (Carney 2011, p. 5). Nevertheless, the highly multicultural territory constricted within Iraqi borders showed weaknesses. Conflict arose among religious and ethnic groups for most of the twentieth century, undermining Iraq's development chances. In this context, Saddam Hussein emerged as an active leader of the Ba'ath Party, a pan-Arabian socialist party that became popular both in Iraq and Syria (Jervis 2012, p. 13). After the party rose to power in the 1960s and was overthrown shortly after, Hussein spent some years in prison before rejoining the party as a leader in 1968 (Carney 2011).

Saddam Hussein's regime took an authoritarian turn by 1979. Following a purge within the Ba'ath party that killed sixty-six members accused of treason, Hussein established its authoritarian role for twenty-five years (Jervis 2012, p. 12). However, it must be noted that Iraq struggled with stability under Saddam Hussein. Although the leader would swiftly end the opposition movements with violent repression, the continuous fight against ethnic minorities in the country destabilised the area (Carney 2011).

Following the 9/11 terrorist attack in New York by Al-Qaeda, the United States questioned the possibility of invading Iraq for several reasons. Firstly, within the context of the Bush Doctrine's approach to foreign policy, Iraq was one of the target countries for the war on terror (Carney 2011). The presence of terrorist groups that were not limited to a single area - but, rather, spread across multiple countries - favoured the possibility of Iraq being involved with Al-Qaeda (Carney 2011). Furthermore, the public strongly believed that the Iraqi Government was cooperating and supporting Osama Bin Laden, who was the leader of the terrorist organisation. A 2003 Washington Post poll post 9/11 illustrated that 69% of interviewees believed Saddam Hussein was involved with the terrorist attack in the US, while 82% believed he was supporting Osama Bin Laden (Washington Post, 2003) - both claims were proved to be false (Riedel, 2021).

Secondly, political instability made the country prone to resistance movements. The frequent use of WMD against ethnic minorities in the area destabilised Iraq and split its people (Carney 2011). Not only did this instability make Iraq a more accessible target country - as it

was ultimately easier to turn the Iraqis against their authority - but it also seemed to justify the US presence in the area.

Finally, Iraq played a crucial geopolitical role. As an oil-rich country with a central position in the Middle East, the Bush administration hoped to turn Iraq into an ally rather than an enemy (Carney 2011). Having pro-US and pro-West nations in the area could have significantly benefited the American interests in the region.

### ***The Rationale for the Invasion***

#### *The US Legitimacy Issue*

The invasion of Iraq has been a highly debated topic. The scale and scope of the intervention lacked a legitimate justification and undermined US credibility. Moreover, scholars criticise the naivety of the US administration, who believed that they could quickly transform Iraq into a pro-West nation (Carney 2011). Iraq is historically rich and diverse, with a solid pan-Arab influence and influential religious groups (Jervis 2012, p. 3). The US should have acknowledged the well-established presence of Iraqis in the country who would not accept, and ultimately would strongly oppose, the American and European presence in the area. They believed they could establish a democratic country culturally aligned with Western powers, which was not feasible given the abovementioned factors.

To understand why the US administration was able to carry out this operation, one must look at the country's foreign policy during the time of US President George W. Bush. His approach, more commonly known as the Bush Doctrine, is relevant to the US's strategy in the Middle East following the 9/11 attack (Jervis 2012, p. 4). It is essential to understand this policy to gain a complete picture of the conflict.

In January 2001, former George W. Bush was appointed as President of the United States of America. However, during his first year at the White House, he had to face a devastating terrorist attack - the most violent in the history of the USA - now better known as the 9/11 attack. The event, which caused almost three thousand victims, destabilised America and its allies: for the first time, the United States appeared just as vulnerable as all other countries (Lafeber, 2002, p. 550). As a result, President Bush had to rethink its foreign policy strategy in the security domain (Lafeber, 2002, p. 550).

By June 2002, the United States had drafted The National Security Strategy of the



United States of America (White House, 2002). The document outlined new foreign policy guidelines to promote freedom and democracy while securing all regions (White House, 2002). In other words, the Bush administration created a strategy that targeted America's enemies - more precisely, a plan that would tackle the threat created by "radicalism and technology" (Bush, 2002). Therefore, President Bush agreed to a plan that would eradicate Islamist radicalism, which was hidden within Governments whose technological development - especially in arms production - could have become a threat to the safety of American citizens.

### *The Bush Doctrine in International Law*

The critical elements of the Bush Doctrine demarcated a rupture from the US's previous approach to foreign policy, based on deterrence and containment (Gupta 2008, p. 182). The Doctrine covered four main domains: unilateralism, pre-emptive strikes, the war on terror, and the promotion of democracy.

Rather than focussing on the specificities of these domains - which are self-explanatory - this chapter contextualises them in international law. Specifically, it is essential to understand whether the international body of laws that is available to States - and to which the US adheres - is congruent with the Bush Doctrine.

Firstly, the US's decision to pursue a unilateral approach to military intervention implied that the US Government was willing to intervene without relying on external international organisations such as the United Nations (Gupta 2008, p.183). This approach to military foreign policy is questionable, although relatively common in history (Gupta 2008, p.183). International institutions, such as the UN, have the duty and competence to intervene in international disputes to preserve peace around the world.

According to Article 2(3, 4) of the United Nations Charter, the UN Members have the duty to "[...] settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." (UN Charter, Article 2(3)). As a result, Members cannot use threats or force against any state unless it is consistent with international law (UN Charter, Article 2(4)). By that claim, the United Nations refer to Article 51 of the Charter, which claims the following:

*“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”*

In other words, Members are entitled to their right to self-defence and can, therefore, militarily defend themselves in case of necessity. However, considering how the United Nations aims to stabilise the world order, self-defence is allowed until the Security Council intervenes to reestablish peace.

The second element worth mentioning is the concept of pre-emptive strike under international law. First of all, it is important to identify the difference between a pre-emptive and a preventive strike. According to Barnes and Stoll (2007), a pre-emptive strike is an action taken against a target when one has the absolute certainty that said target is about to strike first. In other words, it is a type of intervention based on the assumption that attacking an enemy first is a better decision - security-wise - than waiting for an inevitable attack. In contrast, a strike is defined as prevention when one knows that the target will eventually strike first and, although not imminent, it is safer to take appropriate measures in time (Barnes and Stoll 2007, p. 7).

According to international law, these strikes are not allowed unless the Member has been attacked first or, in other words, unless it is defending itself. However, the Bush Administration was reluctant to accept this approach. President Bush explained that it was not clear to him why a nation would have to accept being harmed before being allowed to intervene.

Gupta (2008, p 185) argues that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had previously accepted some limited pre-emptive action, albeit only with an approved advisory opinion from its Court.<sup>1</sup> In the Nicaragua v. United States case (ICJ, 1986), the International Court of Justice gave an advisory opinion that allowed some limited self-defence based on pre-emptive strikes (Gupta 2008, p. 185). However, Gupta argues that the United States did not approach the ICJ about this matter. This attitude may imply that the US Administration was aware that the Court may not have approved their strategy, failing to find evidence of an imminent threat.

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<sup>1</sup> An ICJ Advisory Opinion refers to the legal advice provided by the ICJ to the UN (or other relevant specialised agencies) on any legal matters. It is not legally binding but carries moral authority (UN Charter, Article 96),

The potential lack of clear evidence that the United States was under an imminent Iraqi attack begs the question of whether the pre-emptive strikes that were part of the Bush Doctrine were, ultimately, preventive, and unlawful (Gupta 2008, p. 185). However, it is essential to note that the state of the literature is split, and not all scholars agree with this view. For instance, Lango (2005) explains that Article 39 of the UN Charter states that the UN Security Council has the obligation to evaluate and act against “*threats to the peace*” on top of explicit acts of aggression to maintain a solid state of security (UN Charter Art. 39). Therefore, the author argues the use of the words “threat” and “maintain” implies that the Council would be willing to intervene preventively against a target - not solely relying on military measures but also economic and diplomatic sanctions (Lango 2005, p. 251).

Similarly, the concept of “imminent” is still debated. O’Brien (1981) argues that evidence of the imminence of the threat is essential (O’Brien 1981, p. 131). In other words, it needs to be proven that the country is in a state of advanced preparation and that its target must urgently react. Nevertheless, the author also argues that regardless of the threat, the target’s defence must be proportional to the attack to avoid escalating the war (O’Brien 1981, p. 131). In contrast, Walzer (1977) explains that imminence is not essential; instead, evaluating the presence of active preparation to attack is more critical. By establishing the clear intent to attack, one may find that waiting to counteract might magnify the risk (Walzer 1977, p.81).

One thing that emerges from the literature is that no matter whether pre-emptive and preventive strikes are morally right - to which there seems to be a certain degree of flexibility based on the case and the morals - it is fundamental to intervene with the approval of the UN Security Council. In other words, the United States could not unilaterally intervene in Iraq; the US intentional decision to not consult the ICJ may prove a fear of the Court discouraging pre-emptive wars with Iraq; finally, the lack of evidence and the unlawfulness of the case clash with the principle of necessity and proportionality. The pre-emptive/preventive approach elaborated by the Bush Doctrine remains controversial in international law. As the next paragraph will elaborate on, the question of the Doctrine’s lawfulness has influenced the way country allies, such as EU countries, reacted to the intervention in Iraq.

The last few elements of the Bush Doctrine, namely the war on terror and democratisation, are just as prominent in the literature as the ones mentioned above. Firstly, the war on terror was an American-led military campaign aimed at destroying Al-Qaeda’s terrorist networks (Lewis and Reese 2009, p. 85). The phrase emerged years prior to 2001 during the Reagan administration and referred to the fight against state-sponsored terrorism

around the world (Lewis and Reese 2009, p. 85). However, it acquired a different meaning following 9/11. While President Bush initially talked about the attack as an “act of war”, he quickly adjusted his rhetoric on September 20th, 2001, during his speech to Congress that argued that “[The US’] war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (Bush, 2001).

The war rhetoric in Iraq was an important element that helped legitimise the American military presence in the country under international law. The Bush Administration argues that the war on terror referred to a conflict that was neither international nor a non-international armed conflict. Article 3 of the Geneva Convention (1949) refers to international conflicts as those armed conflicts among states that are parties to the Geneva Conventions; it defines non-international armed conflicts as those that involve one or more non-state organisations within a country’s borders (Geneva Convention, 1949). Therefore, the US leveraged the idea of the war on terror encompassing traditional definitions defined in International Humanitarian Law because Al-Qaeda was not part of the Geneva Conventions, and the terrorist network spanned across countries. Furthermore, the US defined terrorists as unlawful combatants, justifying the possibility of international detainment when captured (Red Cross).

This approach often led to asymmetric wars, lacking proportionality and targeting large territories even though the terrorist networks were fluid and not restrained to one area.

Finally, the hopes to democratise the country of Iraq, as well as other Middle Eastern nations such as Afghanistan, were embedded in the American belief of ensuring American hegemony worldwide. In his speech, President Bush explained that *“a truly strong nation will permit [...] dissent. A thriving nation will respect the rights of women, because no society can prosper while denying opportunity to half its citizens. Mothers and fathers and children across the Islamic world, and all the world, share the same fears and aspirations. [...] America has a greater objective than controlling threats and containing resentment. We will work for a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror.”* (Bush, 2002)

### *The Casus Belli and the Escalation*

The US administration believed that removing Saddam Hussein from power would quickly turn Iraq into an ally. According to the UN Charter, to which the US abides, military

intervention in a country requires the approval of the United Nations Security Council unless it is a matter of self-defence (UN Charter), Therefore, the US administration needed a *casus belli*, a reason to justify the military intervention even with the absence of an Iraqi attack on American soil.

As a result, on February 5th, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the United Nations Security Council and argued that there was evidence for the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. With the support of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, Powell argued that Iraq was developing biological WMD that would ultimately be used against Americans. The evidence for this claim was weak: the only informant consulted for proof was Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, a naturalised German citizen who had fled Iraq in 1999. His claims were confirmed as fabricated a year after the military invasion (Gupta, 2008).

The false claim led to a US-led, large-scale military intervention supported by the UK. The strategy used for the attack is frequently referred to as the Shock and Awe doctrine. The latter is a military strategy that aims to paralyse and overwhelm an enemy's will to fight by combining firepower, rapid manoeuvring, and psychological operations. Its goal is to achieve a swift and decisive victory in the shortest possible time, which, became a violent and complex war.

### ***Multi-national Force in Iraq***

Following the analysis of the rationale of the invasion of Iraq, embedded in historical, political, and judiciary context, the second relevant policy area of analysis is the Multi-National Force (MNF) deployed in Iraq during the military operation.

The creation of a military coalition began in November 2002, following George Bush's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit. In this occasion, the US President announced the formation of a coalition that would intervene in case Iraq refused to disarm (Carney 2011, p. 5). In fact, the United Nations Security Council released resolution 1441 (2002). Although it did not allow the United States to intervene militarily in Iraq, it strongly encouraged the Iraqi Government to adhere to international law and prove its disarmament plans. Specifically, the United Nations Security Council argued that:

*“Deploing the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass*

*destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council's repeated demands [...] and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people [...] Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions [...] Decides [...] to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council;”*

UNSC, 2002

In other words, the United Nations Security Council recognised Saddam Hussein's unwillingness to adhere to international law requirements when it came to disarmament. However, the resolution neither mentioned nor justified the possibility of a unilateral intervention on behalf of another sovereign state (Carney 2011, p. 5).

As a result, as mentioned in the previous sections. The United States did not have the UN approval to intervene militarily. However, they proceeded to create an army that would include American and foreign troops. NATO is a frequently-mentioned institution that provided noticeable support to the United States in this phase is NATO. Following the 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers, NATO invoked Article V of its statute for the first time since its creation (Carney 2011). The latter indicates that in the event of an armed attack on a NATO country, the other members of the alliance are required to intervene with the means at their disposal (NATO 1948, Article V). However, this article does not indicate how member countries should intervene. This is because, at the time of the article's drafting, European states wanted a guarantee that the United States would intervene in case of need; on the contrary, the United States did not want to risk the obligation of military intervention in the case of attacks on European states (Clapp and Verhelst 2022, p. 5).

The military troops that invaded Iraq were part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). OIF included not only American troops but also a multinational force that included thirty-seven countries led by the United States that included thirty-seven countries. Among them, however, only three of them provided active troops for the initial invasion, namely the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland (Carney 2011, p.6). The UK was the US' largest supporter of the conflict. Finally, as this chapter will elaborate on in the following sections, some argue that Denmark also participated in the initial invasion. However, the Danish Government never explicitly

acknowledged whether its troops were part of it or not (Carney 2011, p.6). Only four nations participated in the initial invasion because of the discouragement from the United Nations, whose Council had never approved of the military intervention.

The literature that focuses on multinational armed forces highlights a certain degree of difficulty in coordinating cross-national troops due to demographic, cultural, and linguistic differences (Elron et Al. 1999, p.75). Similarly, Carney (2011) argues that the MNF faced several challenges during its deployment in Iraq. These were caused by different approaches to the battlefield and organisational mismatches; furthermore, each country contributed differently to the mission; while some agreed to a full spectrum of military interventions, others gave precise outlines about what their troops were allowed to do. For instance, Japanese troops, which were mainly restricted to engineering specialists and could not conduct self-defence, were often paired with troops from other countries such as the Dutch, to protect them in case of need, as the Netherlands allowed for more military action (Carney 2011, p.6).

All in all, however, the MNF was able to move large amounts of resources and troops to Iraq for several years. Although the initial operation was deemed successful - albeit with multiple doubts about the legitimacy of the OIF and the frequent disregard for civilian victims, what was more debated was the post-intervention presence of the US and its allies in Iraq with the UN-appointed government: the creation of the Coalition of Provisional Authority.

### ***Coalition of Provisional Authority***

The Coalition of Provisional Authority (CPA) was established in April 2003 as a provisional governing body in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. Although mainly led by the United States, it also involved a fair share of British presence in the area. Its primary goal was to rebuild Iraqi institutions to create a democratic country that would support Western actors and goals (Dobbins, 2009).

Following the invasion of Iraq, American authorities decided to form a provisional government that could assist Iraq's transition to democracy immediately after the end of the war. While the leaders of the CPA consisted of both American and international personnel, American Ambassador Paul Bremer was the head of the Authority and played a critical role in the development of the CPA (Dobbins, 2009).

Under international law, the CPA was met with scepticism. First of all, the establishment of a form of executive and legislative power in Iraq by foreign powers implied

officially recognising the US (and the UK) as occupying powers. On May 22nd, 2003, the United Nations Security Council recognised the two nations as occupying powers; however, it did not endorse the occupation and emphasised the need for the power to return to the Iraqis in the following statements from the 2003 UN Security Council Resolution 1483.

*“The specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of [the United States and United Kingdom] as occupying powers under unified command (the “Authority”).”*

*“Calls upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future;”*

Although the international community gave partial approval for the presence of a provisional government in the hopes of democracy, the CPA faced multiple and unexpected challenges that threatened its existence.

First, there was a legitimacy issue among Iraqi citizens. The CPA was often seen as an external power that was not operating for the benefit of Iraqis and was perceived as more of an occupier rather than a liberator. As a result, it was difficult for CPA leaders to create reliable and stable agreements with Iraqi stakeholders (Dobbins, 2009).

Secondly, it was difficult to maintain total control over the country as an external power. While it is true that many opposed Hussein’s regime, this does not imply that insurgency movements did not arise following its fall. The CPA’s frequently criticised inability to establish security in the area severely threatened its scope.

Finally, the CPA entered Iraq with the intention of reconstructing a country that had been destroyed by centuries of authoritarianism, poverty, and war. By failing to provide an efficient plan for the reconstruction of Iraq, the CPA lost reliability and trust.

Some scholars explain that the CPA did have a positive effect on certain aspects in Iraq; nevertheless, the positives are often overshadowed by the shortcomings (Dobbins, 2009). One main criticism is about the US naivety in predicting how complex Iraq was, severely underestimating the country’s challenges.



## ***The Significance of the War in Iraq for the European Union***

### *The 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty and the Foreign Policy Efforts*

The early 2000s were a time of change for the European Union, especially in the field of common foreign policy. The EU had already achieved significant progress since the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) was ratified in 1992, with the creation of the II Pillar with the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The CFSP distanced itself from the previous approaches to a common strategy. The main two differences are the introduction of majority voting under specific circumstances - albeit defined and limited - and the focus on “joint actions” (Council of the European Communities, Commission of the European Communities, Treaty on European Union, J.3.4.) This allowed to intensify cooperation and put pressure on the participating states. Although the countries are not required to participate in these joint actions and will not face repercussions for non-compliance, they often face significant expectations.

One could argue that foreign policy in the EU has frequently made progress during crises that required a more cooperative Union. Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the violent Balkan wars, the EU had to face the fact that the effectiveness of its common security policy could not prove how ineffective EU foreign policy was. As a result, the treaties that followed the 1992 Maastricht Treaty aimed at improving the CFSP.

The Amsterdam Treaty that EU Member States signed and ratified in 1999 emerged with the goal of improving the CFSP. The Balkan war, whose violence culminated with the genocide in Bosnia, had proved yet again that European countries were deeply divided when it came to security. This inefficiency came at civilians' expense and hindered the EU's power as an external actor (European Parliament, *europarl.eu*).

There are several improvements in the field of foreign and security policy. Firstly, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the possibility of “constructive abstention”. In other words, it introduced more flexibility and the traditional unanimous vote system, allowing states who did not want to partake foreign policy decisions to abstain. However, it also asks those countries to accept the EU decision without interference. Secondly, it extended the possibility of voting by a qualified majority to more foreign policy areas as long as they were not related to defence; it developed the “common strategies”, namely plans created by the European Council in areas

where the states shared common interests. Finally, in 1999, the European Union institutionalised the position of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy; by creating a leading position for the CFSP, the Amsterdam Treaty hoped to guarantee more authority and effectiveness in the field of foreign policy (EP, *europarl.eu*).

*The role of European Institutions: The European Council, the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament*

Within the context of the war in Iraq, European institutions attempted to exert their power at a time of profound division among Member States. During the period from 2002 to 2003, the EU had to rethink its strategies in the Middle East and the Mediterranean due to the complexity of the post-war situation in Iraq.

The European Council held five Council meetings related to the war in Iraq between 2002 and 2003 (Solana 2003, p.1). The first Council, held in Copenhagen on the 12th and 13th of December 2002, declared complete and unequivocal support for Resolution 1441 of the Security Council, therefore aligning the EU's interests with the United Nations' (European Council 2002). A few months later, as the tensions escalated, the Council held an extraordinary European Council on February 17th, 2003.

It mainly focuses on the crisis in Iraq and discusses the importance of the United Nation's central role in promoting stability in the international community. Furthermore, the Council emphasised the importance of the role plate of the UN Security Council as the actor with the primary responsibility of handling the Iraqi disarmament. Similarly to the previous meeting, this summit discussed the EU's closeness with UNSC Resolution 1441, with a special emphasis on peaceful means. Furthermore, the European Council urged Iraqi cooperation in Baghdad and to allow UN inspectors in the country to ensure a smooth downscaling of the events.

The third European Council meeting began in late March 2003. Upon the continuous Iraqi reluctance to deescalate the conflict, the EU reiterated the need for cooperation in the international sphere to prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction and outlined the EU's goals as a security actor in the following statements found in the summit's conclusions (2003)

*“We are determined to strengthen the capacity of the European Union in the context of the CFSP and the ESDP [...],*

*We remain convinced that we need to strengthen the transatlantic partnership, which remains a fundamental strategic priority for the European Union; to this effect, a sustained dialogue on the new regional and global challenges is necessary [...].*

*The above objectives are interrelated and complementary. They should be pursued in parallel, through coordinated action of all the main international players. In this spirit, the restoration of the unity of the international community is an absolute imperative.”* (European Council, 2003, p.34)

With this statement, the EU underscored its willingness to improve its CFSP to face the challenges ahead. Nevertheless, it also clarified that any progression in EU integration would not damage the transatlantic relationship nor distance the American and European blocs.

The fourth Summit, held on April 16th, 2003, was the first European Council meeting after the initial invasion of Iraq. As a result, with the presence of the Secretary-General of the UN, the EU argued for the start of a new era for Iraqis and for the hopeful stabilisation of Iraq's neighbouring countries (Solana 2003, p.3). Finally, with the last summit of the period on June 19th, 2003, the EU welcomed Resolution 1483 to end sanctions and proposed the EU's willingness to support the reconstruction of Iraq with collective efforts and humanitarian aid.

The European Parliament expressed its opinion in a set of resolutions whose impact strongly argued against unilateral attacks and, ultimately, condemned the United States and the United Kingdom for the invasion of Iraq. On January 31st, 2003, the EP explained it was important to respect human rights and international law. As a result, it argued it would not approve of unilateral military action, as it would be both illegitimate and not in accordance with international law (European Parliament, January 2003). Furthermore, it emphasised the EU's role in protecting the territorial integrity of Iraq and the neighbouring countries. When the war escalated, the EP condemned the attack on Iraq in a resolution on March 25th, 2003. In this case, the Parliament argued that the attack perpetrated by the US and the UK was unjust, illegitimate, illegal and against international law. Therefore, it expressed closeness to the Iraqi people and asked for the end of the conflict (Solana 2003, p.3).

Finally, on September 19th, 2003, the EP approved of a recommendation addressed to the Council, where it argued that the EU now bore the responsibility for the reconstruction of Iraq.

In contrast, the European Commission did not explicitly condemn the US-led invasion of Iraq. The different heads of the countries were deeply divided on the topic, leading to a fairly inconsistent European approach on all levels. As a result, the Commission mainly focused on sanction - initially - and then on aid. The European Commission, following the guidelines of the European Council based on peaceful means of resolution of the tensions, drafted three different proposals for Council Regulation based on economic and financial sanctions in Iraq covering between 2002 and 2003. While the three regulations - each drafted every few months - varied in scope and severity of the sanctions, the final proposal on June 10th, 2003, concerned economic and financial sanctions that targeted specific aspects of European and Iraqi relations (Solana 2003, p.3). With the continuation of the war, the Commission began supporting aid packages via the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office.

### *The War in Iraq: the French, German, and Danish Perspective*

Following the 9/11 attack in the United States, European countries strongly supported the war on terror. US allies perceived the attack as a severe threat to the integrity and safety of the US and were willing to support American policies.

Although, as previously mentioned, France preferred distancing itself from complete dependence on US foreign and security policy, the initial support for the 9/11 attack was solid. First of all, France supported the invocation of Article IV by NATO and the UN Security Council Resolution 1368. While the former argues that NATO Members are required to consult together when the territorial integrity of a state is threatened (NATO), the latter condemns the terrorist attack fully (UN Security Council, 2001). Secondly, France took part in the retaliation against Al-Qaeda immediately after the attack by providing up to 5000 troops (Shapiro). This approach received the support of the French people as well; a 2001 poll by the Pew Research Center found that following 9/11, more than six in ten French people believed that US-led campaigns in Afghanistan were justifiable to fight terrorism.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Germany, along with other European and NATO states, invoked Article V of NATO to ensure collective security. The German public opinion largely favoured the initial military campaign in Afghanistan, with approximately 60% of the population approving of it. Furthermore, about 69% of Germans believed that their government was providing appropriate support for the war on terror (Pew Research Center, 2001). To contribute to the war on terror, Germany sent up to 3700 troops to the Middle East (Harsch, 2011).

Similarly, according to a survey conducted by Gallup International in 2001, Denmark was a staunch supporter of the United States' reaction to the 9/11 attacks. A significant majority, up to 80% of the population, believed that it was Denmark's responsibility to intervene and assist the US in the war on terror. (Gallup International, 2001) All in all, most Europeans and their Governments believed that the US was not overreacting and that its reaction was a direct consequence of a threat to the country's safety. As a result, one could mistakenly assume that when the war on terror moved to Iraq, public opinion and politics in Europe maintained a fairly supportive approach.

However, Germany and France's stance shifted when the US government began planning the invasion of Iraq. Germany, along with France, showed resistance to the invasion and changed their approach towards the US's efforts. This shift did not affect Denmark to the same extent, proving a discrepancy among the EU member states. Therefore, the next section will investigate what internal and external reasons have affected these countries' foreign policy and see if, and to what extent, the EU institutions contributed to their decision-making.

### ***The War in Iraq: the France Perspective***

#### *France's Support for the US in the Invasion - domestic politics*

Although France had been a constant US ally for the past one hundred years - and had supported the war on terror in the post 9/11 reality - the war in Iraq severely loosened the ties among the Big Three alliance of the twentieth century (US, UK, France). The end of the Cold War had already weakened their ties, yet France had continued to show support for the Anglo-Saxon alliance. For example, the French government had proved unwavering support for the 1990-1991 Gulf War following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In this regard, former French President François Mitterrand had told the cabinet "*If we have to choose, I believe we must join*

*the struggle against Saddam Hussein, no matter what the consequences. If we don't do it, we will be the false friends of the West.” (Mitterrand, 1990)*

However, just one decade later, things had changed dramatically. Following the 2002 Presidential election in France, which saw the re-election of President Jacques Chirac, the French government took a clear stance against American foreign policy (Lee, 2007). President Chirac, together with Foreign Affairs Minister Dominique de Villepin, strongly opposed the war in Iraq.

It is important to highlight that the historical context, as well as the reasons why the US had intervened in 1990s Kuwait and in early 2000s Iraq, are vastly different. Therefore, it would be impossible - and even inaccurate - to predict what Mitterrand's administration would have done had it been in Chirac's position. Nevertheless, Academic Charles Cogan (2004) offers an interesting analysis of why this change is remarkable. According to his study, socialist tradition in France was Atlanticist in nature, more than the Gaullists were. Therefore, Chirac was not anti-American, or at least one can expect that he was more of a supporter than Mitterrand. In contrast, the author explains that Chirac and Bush did not appear as particularly fond of each other following both official visits and France's attempted rapprochement with NATO (Cogan, 2004). As a result, some scepticism on France's behalf could have been expected, yet the French Government became one of the prominent opposers to the war in Iraq. Therefore, following the 2002 elections, the Chirac administration began expressing clear dissent against US foreign policy in Iraq.

As mentioned by President Chirac, the dissent within the Government was a representation of the growing opposition in public opinion. 78% of the public in 2003 disapproved of the war in Iraq and believed France needed to oppose the invasion (*The Guardian*, 2003).

Finally, France had a bargaining power that no other country in Europe could claim - other than the UK, which was, however, a US ally: its permanent seat at the UNSC with veto power. Thanks to France's ability to veto potential US proposals at the Security Council level, the French administration could “threaten” the US that it could block its actions at any moment. This threat implied that any actions taken without the consent of the Security Council could severely damage the diplomatic relations between the US and France - and potentially with other EU nations too (Lee, 2007 p. 4).

## *France's Bilateral Relations with Iraq*

The literature highlights a few other domestic reasons that may justify why France's opposition to the war differed from the United States' approach. These elements are mainly economic and sociocultural and highlight the importance of bilateral relations when analysing the different foreign policy approaches to security.

First of all, Lee (2007) investigates the impact oil might have had on the French approach to the Iraq question (p.11). Iraq is an oil-rich country, and certain territories contain large reserves of crude oil, such as the *Maknoon* and the *Bin Umar* fields. As of 2003, France had contributed to the development of industrial areas in Iraq that could promote the extraction of natural resources. This is because the most prominent energy corporation in France called Total SA, had been active in Iraq since the 1920s and had financed the Iraqi community (Total SA) and had been part of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme in the 1990s, which allowed Iraq to sell oil in exchange of food, medicines, and other necessities (United Nations, 2023). During this time, the bilateral relationship between the two countries were steady and strongly relied on economic ties. Furthermore, Lee notices that these connections could often become opportunities for more strategic alliances in the entire region, especially among Arab countries.

Strong ties with other Arab countries close to Iraq did not have economic implications only; it was also an opportunity to maintain a pro-Arab foreign policy. Not only were French policy-makers concerned about stability in the area, but they were also mindful of the Arab attitude towards France. Due to its colonial past, France had maintained strong connections to other Arab and Islamic nations. The threat to any of them could have been perceived as an attempt to destabilise the region (Lee 2007, p. 7). Furthermore, the French Government felt apprehensive about the impact of a war in Iraq to its ever-increasing Muslim population within its borders. In 1990, the Muslim population in France was shy of four million people; by the 2000s, it had increased to almost 4.8 million people (Kettani, 2010).<sup>2</sup> As a result, fears of exacerbating the peaceful coexistence of different cultures often affected policy decisions.

All in all, on a bilateral level, the French had both economic, geopolitical, and cultural interests at stake that a potential invasion of Iraq could have damaged. This cluster of issues contributed to France's scepticism towards any exacerbations of its close ties to Iraq.

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<sup>2</sup> It is important to highlight that these numbers can sometimes represent an exaggerated estimate of the population. This data does not seem to take into account non-practising Muslims, second generation French citizens or mixed couples that may not have strong ties with a religion or a country of origin.

## *France's Position in Security Policy*

As one of the main regional powers in Europe, France has been one of the main actors when it comes to regional security policies. From the 1950s to the 2000s, even though French security policy underwent significant changes, it can be argued that France has prioritised its national and European security measures over a more global - or rather Atlanticist - approach (Lakomy 2011 p.150).

One example of this strategy is what is now known as the “*force de frappe*”, namely the deterrent strategy of owning a national nuclear arsenal to assert a crucial role on the world stage (Lakomy 2011, p.135). It was developed after World War II following the threat of the Cold War, which questioned the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear powers.

Although each European country responded to the threat of the Cold War differently, it could be argued that Western Europe was mainly influenced by an Atlanticist approach. In other words, these nations aligned themselves with the US. In contrast, post-war France is often referred to as a “reluctant Atlanticist” due to its inclinations towards maintaining an autonomous foreign policy (Lakomy 2011 p.136). The most relevant example of this approach is the 1966 withdrawal from NATO’s Military Command Structure. As a founding member of NATO, France played a critical role in the establishment of the Atlantic Organization (Hoffmann 1991, p.19). However, by 1966, former French President Charles De Gaulle decided to descale France’s involvement in NATO for greater independence and autonomy in foreign policy. This move was motivated by the idea that the US dominance within NATO was ultimately hindering France’s sovereignty.

According to historian Stanley Hoffman (1991), De Gaulle perceived NATO as an American tool to influence and ultimately maintain a certain degree of control over European countries. This approach strongly opposed France's national interests, which, as explained by Bruno Tertrais (2019), emphasised the country’s will to operate alongside NATO. In other words, acting as an independent actor when needed and having the right tools to achieve such a goal (e.g. nuclear power).

Although France rejoined its full status as a NATO member in 2009, its core approach to security policy stayed the same, proving France’s willingness to maintain its role as a regional and global power regardless of external Organisations in which it partakes.

## *France's Support for Common European Defence Policies*



The more regionally oriented approach to foreign and security policy has made the CFSP a significant priority in France's foreign policy.

One of the factors that contributed to this strategy was the end of the Cold War and of the bipolar world order. The new environment created a vacuum that presented new opportunities for European establishment and development. As explained in the previous chapter, France eventually played a critical role in supporting the reintegration of the Western European Union (WEU) in the 1980s and has attempted to fortify the role of the EU as an external power. Furthermore, by leading the integration process, France was motivated to develop a European identity to prevent the loss of importance in global politics.

Political Scientist Lakomy (2011) explains that there were several reasons that incentivised the support for the CFSP by French diplomacy. First of all, the deepened state of cooperation was deemed like the natural progression of the European project. Following economic integration, many believed that other policy areas would be affected by a spillover effect and eventually integrate. Secondly - and largely correlated to France's entire approach to foreign and security policy - creating a common European policy could protect EU countries from the presence and influence of other superpowers. Finally, the EU has the potential to become an important actor at a global level, going beyond its traditional and controversial soft power approach.

Although the European Union indeed made significant progress since the early 1990s, France has pushed for an increasingly united CFSP when confronted with challenges that would prove the EU's inability to respond. Among them, the war in the Balkans and the Kosovo war are just a few of the examples of a fairly-ineffective Europe. Furthermore, France has often hinted at an excessive reliance on NATO and rooted for a CFSP that could complement the Transatlantic Organisation rather than rivalling it. As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the lack of a tangible guarantee that the US would intervene in Europe if any of the members invoked article V pushed Paris for further integration up until the break of the Iraq war, as this thesis will elaborate on in the next paragraphs.

### ***The War in Iraq: The German Perspective***

#### *Germany's Support for the US in the invasion - domestic politics*

On a domestic level, the political sphere played a crucial role in determining Germany's approach to the war in Iraq. Since winning the 1998 elections, Schröder's Social Democratic

Party (SPD) had been in charge of the German Government up until the end of its mandate in 2002. During the second elections, the SPD seemed to struggle to achieve a re-election; it appeared that Germans were not enthusiastic about four more years under the SPD majority. Germany had shown unconditional support towards the US following 9/11, but Germans were strongly against the invasion of the country (Lee 2007, p. 7). Therefore, Schröder realised he may have to leverage its position against the Iraq war to ensure successful elections. By 2002, following a campaign that was strongly against military action in Iraq, the SPD won re-elections. On this occasion, Schröder argued that Germany would refuse to intervene militarily in Iraq without a UN mandate and that the US pieces of evidence were undermining any other diplomatic efforts. In particular, he explained that:

*"We will not allow ourselves to be drawn into adventures whose consequences for human civilization are unforeseeable... Let me say very clearly: There will be no participation by Germany in an unprovoked attack on Iraq."* (Schröder, 2002)

Furthermore, Chancellor Schröder also argued that a potential US-led war in Iraq would severely threaten the stability between Western and Middle Eastern countries, as well as hinder the fight against terrorism in the area. As a result, the Chancellor began using the phrase "Deutsches Weg", the German way, to highlight the willingness of the Government to act based on German interests and priorities only (Lee 2007, p. 12). Consequently, the political environment on a domestic level in the time leading to the invasion of Iraq was profoundly unaligned with US interests. It prioritised German objectives in spite of the initial unconditional support to the Western alliances.

#### *Germany's Support for the US in the invasion - bilateral relations*

Similar to France, Germany and Iraq shared some economic ties in the 1970s. More specifically, German industries often played a significant role in Iraq. They often supplied dual-use technology and military equipment to Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s, up until the First Gulf War in 1991. Lee (2007) argues that within the Iraqi Government, Germany was known as the "hub of Iraq's military purchases in the 1980s." This element denotes a strong economic interest in the area and a willingness to maintain close ties with Iraq. Following the 1991 war, Germany did not reduce its cooperation with Iraq and signed a memorandum of mutual

understanding (MOU) related to the Oil for Food Program in 1996, much like France did (Lee 2007, p.13).

The Oil for Food programme appeared to be especially successful for the French-Iraqi trade as it expanded the exchange of goods between the two countries (Lee, 2007). Furthermore, the negative stance towards the US-planned invasion of Iraq in the early 2000s continued to strengthen the relations between the two countries.

Germany also faced some controversies regarding its economic ties to Iraq involving the German arms industries and the possibility of it aiding Iraq's covert weapons of mass destruction, as pointed out by some UN reports. This point begs the question of the right balance between national interests and international alliances.

Furthermore, similarly to France, Germany cared about preventing a potential clash of civilisations, especially within its borders; in fact, Germany has had a significant Muslim majority for the past decades, especially from Turkey. Although the German willingness to maintain good ties with Muslim countries and the Middle East does not appear to be as prominent as it was in France, the tensions still questioned Germany's involvement in the war (Lee 2007, p. 14).

### *Germany's Position in Security Policy*

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, Germany's approach to security policy has felt the influence of the role the German state played during the First and Second World Wars. Especially following the post-WWII agreements, Germany had to adhere to a series of commitments both on a European and international level that would prevent the German Government from committing the crimes of the past. As a result, the second half of the twentieth century and The Cold War in West Germany were defined by a repulsion of militarism and unilateralism, contrasted by an inclination for multilateral approaches and a focus on socio-economic development (Longhurst 2004, p.50).

The end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany begged the question of whether the country had to rethink its security policies (Gross 2007, p. 501). While it is true that the German state had been limited in its militarisation for historical and security reasons, Germany had continuously proved to be one of the main actors on the continent. For this reason, as the Soviet threat dissolved, Germany was asked to face the European and global security

threats that were arising. This shift led to the creation of a so-called *Armee ohne Feindbild*, an army without an enemy (Longhurst 2004, p.55). In other words, it was an attempt to modernise German security policy while being mindful of the past and the potential risks that could arise.

Germans were asked to prove their security policy evolution during the conflicts of the 1990s and the early 2000s. While the first Gulf War in the 1990s seemed to prove that not only the German state but also German citizens were not ready to support an intense military presence in the Arab peninsula, Germany was put in the spotlight during the intervention in Macedonia and the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (Longhurst 2004, p.76). While the German elites were quite sceptical of supporting the deployment of German soldiers to Afghanistan, the United Nations praised the German intervention (Longhurst 2004, p.78).

Following the rift between Germany and the US during the war in Iraq, however, some assumed Germany was bound to return to a unilateral, more traditional approach to foreign policy. In contrast, post-2003 showed a return to both Atlantic relations and a willingness to lead the improvement of the ECDP in Europe (Longhurst 2004, p.95).

#### *Germany's Support for Common European Defence Policies*

Although post-war Germany was often constrained in its approach to security policy and military interventions, its importance within the European Union - especially when it comes to the Franco-German relationship - is worth noticing. As a Member State that was fairly limited in its military influence, it was important for German Governments to push further integration in the field of foreign and security policy to ensure the country could exert more influence than on its own (Gross, 2007). Furthermore, as explained by Karen E. Smith (2007), Germany also saw integration as an opportunity to overcome nationalist rivalry among states. In other words, it was seen as an opportunity to support multilateralism and cooperation in the hopes of promoting peace within the Community's border; at the same time, increased integration would evolve into chances of increased influence abroad.

However, it is important to note that the German approach differed from the French one due to historical legacies. Therefore, many authors argue that although more limited compared to France, Germany supported the development of the CFSP. For instance, 2004 Eurobarometer statistics proved that around 80% of the public interviewed believed in a CFSP among EU Member States, while 87% were in favour of European defence and security policies (Eurobarometer).

## *The War in Iraq: the Danish Perspective*

### *Denmark's Support for the US in the Invasion - domestic politics*

On a domestic level, Denmark's decision to support the invasion of Iraq in 2003 can be attributed to a combination of political and economic interests.

On a political level, Denmark had been trying to build tighter relations with the United States and to maintain its status as a faithful NATO member. According to Larsen (2000), Denmark's support for the invasion was mainly driven by its commitment to its transatlantic relations. Another element may have had to do with regional stability. The destabilisation of Iraq under Saddam Hussein had been perceived as a threat to the region.

Following the 2001 elections that established the Anders Fogh Rasmussen government for the following two mandates, Prime Minister Rasmussen fortified its support for the US. His party, the *Venstre* party (*Danmarks Liberale Parti*), had advocated in favour of the invasion and even provided the troops needed to intervene in the initial phases. Denmark was one of the only five countries that intervened in 2003 and actively participated in the military action. Despite strong opposition on a public level, PM Rasmussen argued that there was proof of the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in an infamous statement delivered on March 21st, 2003, on the day the country declared war on Iraq:

*"Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. This is not something we think. We know it. Iraq has itself admitted that it had mustard gas, nerve gas, anthrax, but Saddam will not settle. He will not tell us where and how the weapons have been destroyed. We know from the UN inspectors, so there is no doubt in my mind."* (Rasmussen, 2003, retrieved from *Information*, 2003)

Regardless of the Government's approach, it is important to note that there were severe protests against the war. Although Denmark appeared to be more supportive of the war in Iraq, public opinion was severely split, and there were discrepancies between the Government's decisions and the public's perception of the conflict.

### *Denmark's Support for the US in the invasion - bilateral relations*

Before the 2003 Iraq War, Denmark had fewer economic ties with Iraq compared to other countries such as France and Germany. Furthermore, due to Iraq's history of conflict, sanctions, and overall international isolation, very few countries could argue to have strong ties with Iraq, especially in the West (DeLong 2009, p.369). Therefore, Denmark had significantly less interest in the country, as reflected in its approach to the Iraqi conflicts throughout the decades.

First, Iraq faced some international sanctions in the 1990s. These were imposed by the United Nations and the international community as a reaction to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. Denmark agreed to impose those sanctions and continued to maintain a reasonably detached approach to any ties with Iraq, including deciding not to partake in the oil-for-food program. Therefore, Denmark's involvement in the Iraq War in 2003 was probably incentivised by the lack of economic and geopolitical interests in the area and was driven by political and military cooperation with the United States and other partners (DeLong 2009, p.373). Furthermore, Denmark was one of the few countries to send actual troops for the invasion. It proved its attempt at aligning its foreign and security policy to US interests over the interests of other major powers in Europe (DeLong 2009, p.373).

#### *Denmark's Position in Security Policy*

Denmark's approach to foreign and security policy from the end of World War II to the 2000s is often defined as a balance of three main cornerstones: NATO, Nordic Cooperation and the EC (Larsen 2000, p.43).

On a military level, Denmark's approach to security policy is multilateral and NATO-oriented: as a small-sized country, the Danish Government needs to maintain an active and involved approach to cooperation, especially in the field of security. As a result, Denmark became one of NATO's founding member states in 1949. Its participation in the Atlantic Organization was considered fundamental to prevent potential threats from the Soviet Union during the Cold War to which Scandinavian countries were often subjected. As stated by political scientist Henrik Larsen (2000), "NATO is still seen as the crucial actor concerning the safeguarding of Denmark's territorial integrity and major military activities in Europe" (p.44). In other words, and hinting at the mutual defence clause of NATO, frequently threatened countries felt the need to have the assurance of a military alliance in case of an attack from a much larger and stronger regional power such as the Soviet Union.

The second cornerstone is politics. Specifically, on a political level, Denmark has had the tendency to cooperate with the Nordic Cooperation. As Larsen explains, although the Danish tendency was to maintain a multilateral approach to security on a political level, Denmark mainly was aligned with other Nordic countries who have had, by tradition, a fairly neutral approach (Larsen 2000, p.41). Consequently, Denmark's security policy was influenced by its politically neutral tendency, combined with the willingness to maintain its regional reach among other Nordic countries.

Finally, the European Community was the economic cornerstone. It allowed for market integration for a more stable economy but did not serve a relevant purpose in security policy (Larsen 2000). As a result, Denmark's role in EU Security Policy has taken the opt-out path, therefore maintaining a rather detached approach to common security.

### *Denmark's Support for Common European Defence Policies*

Denmark's support for the Common Foreign Security Policy is characterised by a rather delicate balance between EU integration and a willingness to maintain solid sovereignty in the field of security. Denmark's position on CFSP has been influenced by domestic politics and the country's membership in NATO (Schradd, Schimmelfennig 2020).

As an EU Member since 1973, Denmark has integrated in many policy areas ever since. However, one significant event in Denmark's relationship with the CFSP - and the EU as a whole - was the 1992 referendum, where Danish citizens rejected the Maastricht Treaty. Denmark negotiated four opt-outs in different fields of EU policy; among them, the decision not to participate in certain fields of the CFSP affected the state of Danish presence in European security policy (Schradd, Schimmelfennig 2020).

The process of deciding what elements of EU policies to integrate is referred to as differentiated integration. This type of integration, which relied on the possibility of allowing a certain extent of heterogeneity among countries that joined the EU, had become increasingly important with the deepening of the Union.

Although the Danish opt-outs implied that the decisions taken by the CFSP did not involve Denmark, it is important to emphasise that NATO is still a key element of the common security policy. Consequently, as a NATO member, Denmark has had military and security obligations towards other EU countries. Furthermore, Denmark has often proved to be a vital Atlanticist member, therefore contributing to creating and managing the transatlantic framework (Schradd, Schimmelfennig 2020).

Denmark’s approach to security within the EU framework can be seen as not as enthusiastic as the German and French approaches. It has often maintained NATO as the priority core in the security field and has carefully committed to EU integration to preserve national sovereignty. However, Danish governments have often reminded their citizens of the importance of both institutions; as former Danish Foreign Minister Lene Espersen noted in 2011, "We need both NATO and the EU... They complement each other."

**Findings**

The analysis provided in the previous paragraphs can be summarised in the following table:

	France	Germany	Denmark
Domestic politics	Government and public opinion did not approve of the US approach to Iraq. France’s veto power at the UNSC was used as a threat against the US.	Debate against the war in Iraq was a key element in the 2002 elections.	Perceived Iraq as a threat to security strongly supported NATO and the US.
National interests (economic, political, cultural)	Strong economic and political interests in Iraq and the Middle East. Fear of “clash of civilisations”, willingness to maintain close ties with the Arab world.	Vital economic and political interests in Iraq and the Middle East. Fear of “clash of civilisations”.	No relevant economic interests in the area. Political interest emphasised stability in the Middle East and continuous support for Atlanticism.
Position on Security Policy	Euro-centric, a supporter of a European approach	Traditionally Atlanticist, but willing to support	Atlanticist.



	that centred France and protected French interests.	further European integration	
Support for Common European Defence Policies	Supporter	Supporter	Opt-out country, neutral approach. Denmark believed the EU was its economic arm, while NATO its military arm.
Support for Iraq War	Opponent	Opponent	Supporter

Following the historical analysis of the war in Iraq and its relevance within international law and within the European Union, this chapter explored both domestic and external factors that may have contributed to each nation's reaction to the war in Iraq.

When analysing domestic politics, France and Germany clearly emerge as strong opposers to the Iraq War. This decision, played by two of the most influential European actors in the region and NATO Members, highlighted the controversial inconsistencies in the US' plan of invasion and the unquestioned British support.

Specifically, although both France and Germany had been long-time allies of the US in the post-war reality - with France even supporting the Gulf War against Iraq in 1991 and Germany providing financial support and equipment - their support radically shifted by the 2000s. In France, President Chirac and Foreign Affairs Minister de Villepin stood against the invasion of Iraq shortly after elections and were met with similar opposition in public opinion, with up to 78% of the French public disapproving of the war.

Similarly, German politics played a crucial role in shaping the approach to the war in Iraq. Following the challenging 2002 elections, the Social Democratic Party led by Chancellor Schröder used opposition to the War in Iraq as a campaign issue to secure re-election. Just like France, most Germans did not support the war in Iraq even though they felt sympathetic towards the US for the 9/11 terrorist attack.

Overall, however, France's strong opposition to the war was seen as particularly strong, thanks to the significantly more important diplomatic leverage that France had as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The French Government's threat to block the US at the UN level strengthened its position and escalated the political tensions between the two countries.

In contrast, Denmark stood out as one of the trusted US allies in the military intervention. It was one of the few active participants in the invasion, even though public opinion did not approve of the violence that was expected with the start of the war in Iraq. Despite public disapproval, the Government had been largely in favour of a US-led military campaign in the country. Not only was the Danish Government concerned about the development of WMDs, but it also believed that it needed to prove its faithful status as a NATO member.

When it comes to bilateral relations and potential geopolitical interests, the analysis seems to show that France was the country with the most at stake with its involvement in the conflict. In fact, France had both economic and geopolitical interests in the area that were related to the oil trade and to strategic alliances in the Middle East. Furthermore, France had to acknowledge its historical and cultural connections with Arab and Islamic nations, whose citizens had continuously migrated to France in the previous decades. Concerns about the impact on its Muslim population within its borders were key influencers of the country's policy decisions.

In contrast, Germany and Denmark had much fewer cultural and domestic interests due to their limited - if absent - presence in the area compared to other colonial powers. As a result, their bilateral interests mainly concerned economic and stability factors. Germany had built fairly consistent economic ties with Iraq that had become more significant in the 1970s.

More specifically, German arms industries had sold military equipment and supported the development of new technologies in the country. Although this approach was also investigated by the United Nations following some speculations that Germany may have contributed to the production of WMDs in Iraq, the trade relations did not cease. Finally, Denmark was mainly concerned about maintaining stability in the area to avoid potential repercussions within European borders. As a result, its policy decisions were dictated by national security interests and its commitment to NATO.

When it comes to external catalysts and the three countries' approaches to security policy and EU integration, the cases analysed lead to different outcomes. Due to historical reasons, France and Germany came from vastly different backgrounds. France had championed integration in Europe with a sceptical eye towards Atlanticism and was willing to integrate at a European level. Furthermore, it had emerged as a winner of WWII, therefore keeping a robust military arsenal and leading the European security sector. In contrast, Germany had been forced to give up on its military power for stability reasons. As a result, it had emerged as a much weaker - and even fearful - state in the field of security.

Examples of these differences can be seen in France's development of a nuclear arsenal to maintain its role as a superpower in the global sphere; furthermore, the French government - following some historical disagreements that had previously made France an opponent of the potential European Defence Union (Empty Chair Crisis) had become a strong supporter of integration in more policy areas. It was perceived as a way to overcome potential nationalist rivalries among EU Member States and as an opportunity to enhance the position of the European Union as an external power. Germany, on the other hand, was only allowed to reintegrate its military presence in missions abroad after decades of abiding by historical commitments. The country had to initially avoid militarism and unilateralism, and its presence became increasingly more prominent only by the 1990s when it began engaging in the Balkans and Afghanistan - although not always successfully.

The end of the Cold War was also a significant event that allowed Germany to reassess its position as a global power, permitting it to focus more on European interests. Nevertheless, Germany did not contrast Atlanticism as much as France did, being unable to provide such a strong stance; therefore, it supported the development of the CFSP and continuous integration in security policy, emphasising the need for a European project that would complement NATO rather than rival it.

Finally, on an international level, Denmark does not emerge with the same influence and political weight as France and Germany; nevertheless, it can provide some interesting insights as an opt-out country in the field of security.

Denmark's approach to international relations is strongly Atlanticist. Due to its size and limited power, Denmark has had to rely on external power to maintain its stability. For the political sphere, it relied on the Nordic Union. For the economic sphere, it relied on the European Community. Finally, for security, one aligned best with NATO and the UN. As a result, it did not see the EU as a reliable and decisive power in the security field.

All in all, France and Germany, both with substantial domestic and economic interests in Iraq, were primarily against the invasion, concerned about the legitimacy of military action without a UN mandate. Their positions also reflected broader national strategies: France's pursuit of strategic autonomy and a stronger EU role in global affairs and Germany's evolution from post-WWII constraints to a more assertive foreign policy within the EU framework. In contrast, Denmark, with fewer interests in Iraq, prioritised its NATO commitments, aligning closely with the US.

The divergent positions of these countries illustrate the complexity and challenges of achieving a unified EU foreign policy. France and Germany, as key EU actors, opposed the war, believing it would have adverse regional and global consequences, while Denmark's support for the US-led invasion highlighted the differing priorities and strategic orientations within the EU. This disparity underscored the EU's profound divisions and the difficulty in developing a joint stance on major international issues.

These findings seem to highlight that the European Union had a limited impact on these countries' approaches to the war in Iraq. France and Germany, which both had strong domestic interests (on a political and economic level), were more likely to be against any potential disruptors in Iraq. Furthermore, they seemed concerned about the legitimacy behind this invasion without the UN mandate. In contrast, Denmark had significantly fewer interests in Iraq and shifted its priorities to the security sector only; therefore, following the 9/11 attack, its priority was ensuring Saddam Hussein would not pose a threat to its nation.

The Franco-German opposition axis by 2003 stood out against the opinion of countries in both Eastern and Western European countries (Longhurst, 2013). On the one hand, France and Germany played a crucial role in shaping the primary opponents to the US in the West. On the other hand, other EU and European countries gave their support to the invasion. On January 30th, 2003, the leaders of Spain (José María Aznar), Portugal (José Manuel Barroso), Italy (Silvio Berlusconi), United Kingdom (Tony Blair), the Czech Republic (Václav Havel), Hungary (Peter Medgyessy), Poland (Leszek Miller), and Denmark (Anders Fogh Rasmussen) signed a letter called "Europe and America Must Stand United" (Global Policy Forum, 2005). It was a letter of solidarity towards the US and emphasised the need to strengthen the transatlantic alliance (Longhurst, 2013).

While the first letter was signed by Western European countries in January, by February, another letter was signed by the "Vilnius Ten," a group of ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe, endorsing the US war on Iraq. The Foreign Ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia argued that they belonged to the trans-Atlantic community and would "stand together to face the threat posed by terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction" (EUObserver, 2003).

However, this endorsement was not without controversy. Germany and France, two of the most critical actors in Europe and the EU, believed that they could dictate a common European ground on the war. They opposed the war and believed it would have negative consequences for the region and the world.

In contrast, Professor Longhurst (2013) explains that there was a rift between the bilateral Franco-German dynamic and the rest of Europe. The idea that France and Germany could represent the moral interests of the EU as a whole was disproved, proving that the EU was profoundly divided and could not develop a joint plan. This division highlighted the challenges of achieving a common foreign policy among EU member states (Longhurst, 2013).

Another issue that highlights the lack of cohesion within member states in the EU can already be seen in the analysis. Although France and Germany had an overall positive approach towards EU integration and the CFSP, their interests in Iraq were mostly national rather than European. In other words, their willingness to avoid an escalation of the conflict in the Middle East mainly involved their domestic issues and, at most, international security reasons.

When focusing on the war in Iraq, the European Union did not take a clear stance in either support or opposition to the United States. Although all nations and supranational institutions seemed concerned about escalating the tensions, finding a cohesive approach to the issues was difficult due to the natural intergovernmental nature of the security field in the EU. As a result, scholars argue that the event emphasised how unstable and unprepared the CFSP was in 2003 and delegitimised the EU rhetoric that was championing the creation of a common foreign and security policy (Wood, 2003).

Furthermore, Lee (2007) explains that critical decisions were often kept at a national level to avoid disrupting the already fragmented balance of power and consensus within the CFSP. As a result, the EU found itself unable to have any significant impact on the decision-making process.

For this reason, this chapter seems to confirm that the Iraq War, which happened after the Amsterdam Treaty and a time of reform within the EU, emphasised the EU's difficulty in having a tangible impact on its Member States. Furthermore, by reconnecting the case to Europeanisation, it highlights that the supranational structure and networks created fail to interact in an authoritative way with EU states. The opposite is also true: Member States, even the most influential like France and Germany, lack the set of abilities to influence other states. The EU failed to provide any form of cohesion and cooperation among countries, and individual nations acted mainly on their personal interest. The failure of the Iraq War, which was not only a political tragedy but also, most of all, a humanitarian one, pushed the EU to review its role as an international actor. For this reason, the following chapter will explore the conflict in Libya, a crisis that questioned the impact of EU integration on the foreign and security policy of the states.



# Chapter III - European Foreign and Security Policy in Libya - the French, German, and Danish Approaches

## *Introduction*

This dissertation's final chapter builds upon the foundations laid in the previous chapter with the objective of dissecting and understanding the interplay of domestic and international influences shaping the foreign and security policies of France, Germany, and Denmark during the 2011 Libya crisis.

The chapter adheres to the same method of analysis established in the Iraq case study to ensure a systematic and coherent approach to data collection and to facilitate the nuanced comparison between the two geopolitical scenarios.

It will begin with a succinct historical overview of Libya, tracing its journey from post-colonial independence to the 2011 complex geopolitical background. It will present the state of the country under Muammar Gaddafi's dictatorship spanning various decades and culminating in the pivotal Arab Spring of 2011, which started the Libyan conflict. In addition, the chapter will delve into the ramifications of the Lisbon Treaty, the involvement of EU institutions during this crisis, and the interests and stakes for France, Germany, and Denmark in this context.

The goal of this chapter is to foster a comprehensive analysis of the Libya so that it can be compared to the analysis in the previous chapter. This comparison aims to highlight any shifts and continuities in the Europeanisation process post-Lisbon Treaty, offering profound insights into the changing dynamics of EU foreign and security policy. Through this comparative lens, the aim is to explain the nuanced dynamics that illustrate how these events may have affected the trajectory of Europeanisation within the realm of foreign and security policy.

## *The Crisis in Libya, the Historical Background*

The 2011 Libya crisis marked a pivotal point in the history of Libya and had profound implications for international and predominantly European politics. The crisis did not emerge in a vacuum: it was characterised by violent uprisings against the Libyan regime that had



emerged as a culmination of decades of political, social, and economic developments deeply rooted in Libya's complex post-colonial history (Fabbrini 2014, p. 183).

This section aims to analyse the intricacy of Libya's past, covering the colonial influence, post-colonial governance and the rise and fall of Muammar Gaddafi that eventually led to the escalation of the crisis. By better understanding the 2011 Libya crisis, this section will help comprehend the intricacies of the event and the reasons behind the European response. By doing so, the chapter aims to develop a comprehensive understanding of the crisis within the broader international context and its geopolitical consequences in the European Union.

### *Colonial Legacy*

The roots of Libya's 2011 can be traced in part back to the impact of Italian colonisation during Italian rule, which began in 1911 and lasted until the end of World War II (Medici 2011, p.163). This period profoundly shaped Libyan society and politics, leaving indelible marks on the nation's structure. Although during this time, Libya experienced significant infrastructural development, these advancements were often obtained via brutal methods of coercion imposed by the colonial regime. Examples include forced Christianisation, resettlement, and harsh oppression of freedom and opposition movements (Medici 2011, p.162).

The main consequence of this period - other than the more obvious oppression and exploitation of a nation and its people - was the internal fragmentation in Libyan society (El Gamaty, 2016). Geographically, the division occurred between the regions of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan. Culturally, ethnic groups began standing against each other to gain from colonial governance. The legacy of these divisions influenced Libya's post-independence landscape and fostered an environment based on fragmented regionalism (Grigoriadis et al. 2021, p. 120). Therefore, this period of colonial rule serves as an essential starting point for unravelling the historical threads that led to the events of the Arab Spring in Libya.

### *Post-independence Era and Monarchy*

Following Libya's independence from Italy and the UK, the country embarked on a new period under the monarchy of King Idris. This was an essential time that laid the foundation for the modern Libyan statehood. The main challenge the country faced in this post-

colonial era was ensuring a smooth transition to independence while unifying diverse tribal and regional entities into one cohesive Libyan identity. King Idris' rule is often referred to as a moderate form of governance, trying to avoid radical tendencies such as imposed Westernisation or radical Pan-Arabism, both of which had characterised development in neighbouring countries (Grigoriadis et al. 2021, p. 122).

Economically, the discovery of oil in 1959 allowed Libya to profit from its newfound wealth and resources (El Gamaty, 2016). Nevertheless, scholars argue that if, on the one hand, the country had enormous potential for development, on the other hand, it often suffered from uneven development and disparity between urban and rural areas (Grigoriadis et al. 2021, p. 122).

Socially, the monarchy brought a time of modernisation yet maintained a fairly conservative approach to social reforms (Grigoriadis et al. 2021, p. 124). This type of governance was frequently criticised for being too cautious, not wanting to disrupt the rather fragile equilibrium that had been established.

As a result, the lack of dynamism led to quick political stagnation, planting the seeds for unrest during challenging times. As explained by Ardiç (2012), this period failed to address the aspirations of the younger generations fully and ignored the regional and tribal differences that were experiencing growing disparity (p.10). Due to this cautious approach, the monarchy failed to create a robust and inclusive national framework; the sole reliance on oil reserves - mainly from Cyrenaica - had neglected other parts of the country, creating great discontent. Therefore, these policies contributed to the dramatic shift in Libya's political trajectory by the end of the 1960s, when the monarchy was overthrown by Muammar Gaddafi (Grigoriadis et al. 2021, p. 124).

### *Rise of Muammar Gaddafi*

The 1969 coup d'état against King Idris led by Muammar Gaddafi marked a shift in Libya's political landscape. As an army officer belonging to a new generation of Libyans, Gaddafi gained popularity by leveraging the aspirations of those disappointed with the monarchy. His rise to power was primarily welcomed and based on the idea that Libya had much greater potential if its sources were to be used more efficiently (Totman and Hardy 2015, p.1). Gaddafi's ideology, which was a blend of Islamic socialism and Pan-Arabism, aimed to redistribute wealth and implement social reforms (Joffé and Paoletti 2011, p. 6). He argued that

Libya could become the leader of a unified Arab world and challenge Western influence in the region. Furthermore, he supported Pan-Africanism, advocating for a strong, united Africa that could be finally free from colonial legacy and exploitation. These ideologies were not just part of his propaganda but became part of his domestic and foreign policies (Joffé and Paoletti 2011, p. 7).

On a national level, Gaddafi nationalised the oil industry and pursued redistributive social welfare policies, striving for economic equality. Nevertheless, his policies hinted at and quickly veered towards authoritarianism; the leader concentrated power in his hands, violently oppressed political dissent, and limited freedom of speech (Grigoriadis et al. 2021, p. 129).

Internationally, and before the 2011 crisis, Libya's international relations often fluctuated, alternating rising tensions and de-escalations. Scholars argue that Gaddafi's initial approach to foreign policy was confrontational. In other words, Libya often clashes with both Western and Arab states. On the one hand, it attempted to distance itself from colonial ties and dependence on the Western world; on the other hand, it created tensions with Arab states, such as Qatar, whose governments could become a threat to its stability. Libya was also a supporter of specific terrorist movements and was frequently accused of endorsing them; examples include the 1988 Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and the 1989 UTA Flight 772, which strained relations with the West and especially the United States and the United Kingdom (Totman and Hardy 2015, p.3).

Libya's involvement and support for controversial terrorist acts resulted in international sanctions that isolated the country both on an economic and diplomatic level. The United Nations imposed sanctions on Libya in 1992 and 1993, which included some relevant provisions such as reduced diplomatic representation in Libyan embassies abroad, restricted air travel, a ban on arms sales to Libya, and a freeze on Libyan assets worldwide (Totman and Hardy 2015, p.2).

The consequences of the sanctions had a significant impact on Libya, and by the 2000s, Gaddafi attempted to mend relations with the West as a way to lift the debilitating sanctions. Furthermore, the post-9/11 political landscape required swift actions. As a result, by the end of 2003, Libya had given up on weapons of mass destruction (Fabbrini 2014, p.183).

This rapprochement helped Libya reintegrate into the global community, and it swiftly became an attractive partner thanks to its large oil reserves, leading to increased investment

and trade ties (El Gamaty 2016). This engagement period with the West marked a significant departure from Libya's previous foreign policy, reflecting Gaddafi's attempts to secure economic stability and political legitimacy. However, internal reforms did not mirror these changes, leaving domestic divisions and issues unresolved. The stagnant domestic policy had begun threatening to boil over and escalate into a much greater conflict within the country's borders.

As a result, although Gaddafi's rule had obtained a fair amount of success for its revolutionary and ambitious socio-economic reforms, it quickly became associated with human rights abuses. These tensions exacerbated and further contributed to the 2011 crisis that characterises Libya today (El Gamaty 2016).

#### *The 2011 Crisis in the Arab Spring Context*

Political oppression and economic grievances inevitably caused severe internal unrest and dissatisfaction in the 2000s.

Economically, despite the wealth generated from Libya's vast oil reserves, the benefits were unevenly distributed, leading to significant economic disparities between populations. Young Libyans faced high unemployment rates, and the lack of appropriate investments and development in sectors beyond the oil industry signalled poor future prospects for the youth. Furthermore, the country presented vastly underdeveloped areas with poor infrastructure and a lack of services (Ardıç 2012, p. 10).

The combination of economic and political factors gave rise to a tumultuous environment in Libya. The population became increasingly disillusioned with the status quo. The stark contrast between the nation's oil wealth and the daily realities of economic hardship and political suppression left them frustrated. As this undercurrent of discontent grew, people became more willing to challenge the regime's authority, setting the stage for the eventual uprising. The Arab Spring's influence in neighbouring countries further fueled the desire for change in Libya, ultimately leading to the outbreak of protests and the ensuing crisis.

Finally, the Arab Spring, a series of anti-government protests and uprisings that swept across the Arab world in early 2011, had a profound influence on Libya, acting as a catalyst for the eventual crisis (Ardıç 2012, p. 8). The successful uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, Libya's neighbours, served as a powerful inspiration for the Libyan people. These events demonstrated

that longstanding authoritarian regimes could be challenged and overthrown by popular movements, a previously unthinkable notion to many (Ardiç 2012, p. 22). The images of Tunisian and Egyptian citizens taking to the streets, demanding political change, and achieving what at the times seemed victories ignited a sense of possibility among Libyans, who shared similar grievances against their own oppressive government (Ardiç 2012, p. 22).

The Libyan response to these regional uprisings was initially cautious but soon became proactive. As the wave of dissent reached Libya, small-scale protests quickly escalated into a nationwide movement. The Libyan uprising began in the region of Cyrenaica, where the frustration for both socio-economic and cultural divisions had grown stronger. What was initially started as modest demands for reform quickly turned into a full-fledged call for regime change.

The protests rapidly turned violent, facing brutal suppression from Gaddafi's security forces. Gaddafi's regime responded to the protests with extreme force, using live ammunition, mercenaries, and aerial bombings against demonstrators.

The influence of the Arab Spring on Libya was thus twofold: it provided the impetus for the Libyan people to revolt against Gaddafi's regime, and it shaped the nature of the uprising, as the Libyan people, aware of the potential for success, were emboldened to pursue more radical changes.

### ***The Significance of the 2011 Libya for the European Union***

The political dynamics between European nations and Gaddafi's Libya prior to the 2011 crisis were characterised by a mix of cautious engagement and wariness, largely due to the unpredictable nature of Gaddafi's regime. European diplomatic relations with Libya, especially after Gaddafi's renouncement of weapons of mass destruction in 2003, entered a phase of cautious normalisation. This period saw the lifting of international sanctions and the gradual reestablishment of diplomatic and commercial ties. European leaders, keen on securing energy deals and opening up investment opportunities in Libya, engaged in pragmatic diplomacy with Gaddafi, often overlooking his erratic governance and human rights violations (Koenig 2011, p. 13).

However, Gaddafi's unpredictable policies constantly challenged these diplomatic relations. His leadership style was marked by sudden policy shifts, often driven by personal

whims and a desire to maintain a balance of power. Gaddafi's penchant for using oil as a political tool, by threatening to cut off supplies or shift contracts to other countries, was a source of continuous concern for Europe, given its dependency on Libyan oil (Koenig 2011, p. 15).

These political dynamics were a tightrope walk for European nations. They had to navigate the complexities of maintaining a working relationship with Gaddafi, ensuring the flow of oil and safeguarding investments while also being prepared for sudden shifts in Libya's foreign policy. The impact of Gaddafi's unpredictable policies extended beyond the economic sphere, affecting Europe's broader geopolitical strategies and its approach to North African and Middle Eastern politics. This background of complex and often strained political dynamics was a significant factor in shaping the European response to the 2011 Libya crisis, influencing the decisions made by European leaders during the unfolding of the events.

### *The Lisbon Treaty and the Libya Crisis*

The Libya crisis was the first large-scale international crisis the EU faced following the ratification and entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1st, 2009. Similar to the 2003 Iraq war, it was an opportunity for the European Union to test - and ultimately prove - the institutional changes the EU had gone through.

The Treaty of Lisbon introduced significant changes to the decision-making process in the European Union, allowing for a more sophisticated institutional structure for EU governance. Although it distanced itself from Constitutional Treaties that had previously been an EU failure, the Treaty provided an institutional structure that very much resembled what a Constitution would do (Fabbrini 2014, p.178).

First of all, the Treaty formalised the governmental structure around two legislative chambers, namely the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, and two executive institutions, namely the European Council and the European Commission (European Parliament, 2023).

The co-decision procedure was identified with its current name as the “ordinary legislative procedure”. It aimed at highlighting the elevated role of the European Parliament, putting it on par with the Council and, therefore, increasing its influence - and the influence of European citizens. The EP and the Council would, consequently, have a joint role in adopting regulations, directives, and decisions based on the Commission’s proposals.

The European Council was also fortified to maintain a more strategic executive role to set the general guidelines and priorities of the EU coherently. At the same time, the Commission continued its role as a technical executive, focusing on policy implementation (European Parliament, 2023).

It is also essential to highlight the reinforced role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which supervises the EU institutions. The Lisbon Treaty introduced different ECJ approaches to the different policy areas. Very sensitive areas such as foreign and security policy favoured an intergovernmental approach, while more consolidated sectors - such as the single market one - had a supranational approach. While this may appear as a poor improvement for the field of foreign and security policy, the Treaty significantly strengthened the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, serving both as the vice-president of the Commission and the permanent chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Council, bridging supranational and intergovernmental roles. Finally, establishing the European External Action Service (EEAS) aimed at supporting the High Representative and implementing the Union's foreign policy more coherently (European Parliament, 2023).

### *The Initial European Responses*

The initial European response to the Arab Spring, particularly in Libya, was a complex mix of cautious diplomacy and strategic considerations. Initially, the European Union was praised for its fast response to the escalation of the crisis (Koenig 2011, p. 14). The reactions ranged from expressions of support for the democratic aspirations of the people in the region to concerns about stability and security, especially given Europe's close geographical and economic ties with North African countries. In Libya, where the situation quickly escalated from protests to armed conflict, European institutions began thinking of employing the tools that had been developed in the previous years. In fact, the post-2003 reality had seen an increase in EU projects for security, such as Frontex for migration and stricter sanction options (Koenig 2011, p. 14)

However, as the violence in Libya intensified and the humanitarian situation, European nations, along with the international community, began to shift their stance. This shift was marked by a growing consensus that Gaddafi's brutal response to the uprising was unacceptable and that some form of intervention might be necessary to prevent further atrocities.

The European response was also influenced by internal debates within the European Union and among its member states about the appropriate course of action. While there was a general agreement on the need to support democratic movements, there were differences in opinion on the extent and form of intervention that should be undertaken in Libya. These initial responses and diplomatic engagements set the stage for the subsequent European involvement in the crisis, reflecting the complex interplay of humanitarian concerns, strategic interests, and the challenges of achieving consensus in international policy-making. This period of initial response is key to understanding the evolution of European policy towards Libya during the 2011 crisis, as it highlights the factors that influenced the decision-making processes of European leaders.

*The role of European Institutions: The European Council, the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament*

European institutions during the Libya crisis played a crucial role in implementing an EU response.

Shortly after the first hints at the escalation of the conflict in Libya, President of the European Council Van Rompuy called for an extraordinary European Council on Libya on March 11th, 2011. Emergency meetings had been quite rare in the past decade, and had occurred post 9-11, the Iraq war, and the Georgia war (Van Rompuy 2011, p. 5).

In 2011, the European Council held an emergency meeting to discuss the situation in Libya. During the meeting, the Council expressed grave concerns about the state of affairs in the country. They strongly condemned the violent repression by the Libyan regime and disapproved of the lack of freedom, respect for human rights, and violence against civilians (European Council 2011a, p.28).

The European Council pledged to help protect the Libyan population within the bounds of international law. They recognised the need for cooperation with regional and international groups and requested the Council and Commission to formulate a plan for potential migrations quickly. The European Council committed to working with the Arab League, African Union, and UN to respond to the crisis (European Council 2011a, p.30).

In the European Council meetings held on March 24th and 25th, 2011, the focus remained squarely on the unfolding crisis in Libya. The Council endorsed the Foreign Affairs



Council's conclusions from March 21 and expressed approval of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, highlighting the responsibility to protect civilians (European Council 2011b, p.7). This satisfaction was extended to the results of the March 19 Paris Summit, which significantly contributed to the resolution's implementation.

The European Council also maintained a strong stance against the Libyan regime's continuous disregard for UN resolutions and its brutal repression of its own citizens. It was noted that actions aligned with the Security Council's mandate had been crucial in protecting civilians and saving lives, with a clear stipulation that military operations would cease once civilians were no longer under threat. The objectives of UNSCR 1973 were met.

It highlighted the essential involvement of Arab nations, particularly the Arab League, in both the execution of UNSCR 1973 and the pursuit of a political resolution to the crisis. A reiterated call was made for Colonel Gaddafi to relinquish power promptly (European Council 2011a, p.8).

In its June 2011 session, the European Council reaffirmed its support for the UN Council Resolutions concerning Libya. It emphasised the European Union's deep commitment to the democratic transformation of Libya, highlighting the significant role of the National Transitional Council (NTC) as an essential representative body of the Libyan population. This stance by the Council was in line with international efforts and resolutions that aimed at a peaceful and democratic transition in Libya (European Council 2011c, p.15).

Finally, the last 2011 European Council that tackled the Libya crisis was the planned meeting on October 23rd, 2011. On this occasion, the European Council recognised the death of Muammar Gaddafi as a pivotal moment, signifying the end of an era marked by oppression and tyranny. This turning point was seen as an opportunity for Libya to embark on a path towards democratic governance, and the Council expressed deep content for the Libyan people and highlighted its support for the upcoming reconstruction of the country (European Council 2011d, p.9).

Overall, in the span of four Councils in 2011 - one of which was held as an emergency one - the European Council showed support for the Libyan cause and its path towards democracy. It condemned Gaddafi's dictatorship and its unwillingness to cooperate with the UN. Furthermore, it supported the NTC's hope for a smooth transition to a free country and

encouraged the Commission and the Council of Ministers to elaborate strategies for potential migrants.

The Commission also swiftly reacted in response to the crisis. It implemented a comprehensive approach to support the country's transition and aid UN mediation efforts. The Commission's approach included backing the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) of 2015 by the UN, which led to the establishment of the Government of National Accord (GNA) (Robinson, 2020). Furthermore, the EU provided extensive support through the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (ICSP) (Robinson, 2020). The package of over €120 million was allocated for various sectors, including civil society, governance, health, and education (EU Commission, 2011). This is because the EU's support for Libya touched upon many fields, such as restoration of infrastructure and institution building.

The Commission also focused on migration and protection as requested by the Council, with over €50 million directed towards programs including training the Libyan Coast Guard and rights-based management of migration. The aim was to address the Libya crisis's political, humanitarian, and migration-related dimensions (EU Commission, 2011). Additionally, it allocated €10.8 million was assigned to help internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups in Libya (EU Commission, 2011).

Similarly, the European Parliament adopted some resolutions in 2011 that were related to the crisis in Libya and the Arab Spring. Among them, the Resolution approved on September 15th, 2011, was pivotal in shaping the EU's stance on the Libyan crisis. The resolution followed a similar path to that of the other EU institutions, condemning authoritarianism and supporting human rights. It supported the NTC and called for the legitimate recognition of authority in Libya (European Parliament 2011). Additionally, the resolution addressed the commitment of various states and international organisations to assist Libya's reconstruction, including unfreezing Libyan assets and lifting sanctions on specific Libyan entities (European Parliament 2011).

Despite these efforts aimed at stability, together with the changes brought along with the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU struggled to assert itself as it wished. Before the crisis, several European countries such as Italy and France had cultivated strong economic and commercial

ties with Libya, particularly after Gaddafi's 2004 renunciation of its weapons of mass destruction program. High Representative and VP of the Commission Catherine Ashton, alongside other EU leaders, urged the Libyan authorities to refrain from violence in the following statement on February 20th, 2011:

*“The European Union is extremely concerned by the events unfolding in Libya and the reported deaths of a very high number of demonstrators. We condemn the repression against peaceful demonstrators and deplore the violence and the death of civilians [...] The EU urges the authorities to exercise restraint and calm and to refrain from further use of violence against peaceful demonstrators immediately. Freedom of expression and the right to assemble, as provided for in particular by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are human rights and fundamental freedoms of every human being which must be respected and protected. [...] The legitimate aspirations and demands of the people for reform must be addressed through open and meaningful Libyan-led dialogue.”* (Ashton, 2011)

The statement by the HR was endorsed and followed by the statements of other leaders, such as the President of the European Commission, Barroso, and the President of the European Council, Van Rompuy, in the following days (Fabbrini 2014, p.183). This support signals overall cohesion among EU institutions.

The following weeks saw the crisis escalate and called for intervention by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which adopted Resolution 1970, imposing sanctions and an arms embargo on Libya. It was then followed by the discussion on Resolution 1973, which proposed a no-fly zone and civilian protection measures. These events began showing the first signs of division in Europe. While some leaders, such as the French President and the UK Prime Minister, favoured active intervention in Libya, the European Union - and especially HR/VP Catherine Ashton - continued to advocate for a more cautious approach based on continuous dialogue and sanctions as the primary coercive tool (Fabbrini 2014, p.184).

The EU's internal divisions became more pronounced as member states tackled the strategy for intervention. For instance, Italy was considered an avoidant country. Due to its economic ties with Libya, former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi preferred avoiding any type of direct confrontation with Gaddafi (Fabbrini 2014, p.184). In contrast, France recognised the

Transitional National Committee as Libya's legitimate representative by March 10<sup>th</sup>, 2011, position which was shared by the Council of the European Union shortly after (Domestic-Met 2011, p.867). (

The disunity among such crucial actors in the EU was also evident in the military intervention phase. Although EU foreign ministers eventually endorsed the military action against Libya, the operation was quickly transferred to NATO due to resource limitations and the need for a seemingly EU-led initiative, although the US provided remarkable support.

All in all, the crisis highlighted once again the limitations of the EU's capabilities despite the Lisbon Treaty. The lack of a unified political consensus and adequate military resources revealed the EU's internal divisions and struggled to handle a crisis collectively. Many argue that the Libya crisis served as a reminder of the complexities and limitations in EU foreign policy coordination and crisis response, underscoring the need for more robust and unified mechanisms within the Union's framework (Fabbrini 2014, p.192)

### ***The War in Libya: the French Perspective***

#### *France's support for the intervention in Libya - domestic politics*

In 2011, when the Libyan civil war broke out, France, along with the United States and the United Kingdom, intervened militarily to support the Libyan opposition forces in their fight against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. Domestic political considerations heavily influenced the decision to intervene in France. President Nicolas Sarkozy, who was facing declining popularity and impending elections, saw the intervention as an opportunity to assert France's leadership on the international stage and boost his chances at a further mandate. Following the bloody turn of the protests on February 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2011, France was the first European country to address the issue and call for the end of Gaddafi's regime (Rasmi 2021, p.6). In fact, on February 24<sup>th</sup>, 2011, President Sarkozy argued that "Mr. Gaddafi must leave" in the presence of the Turkish leader, explaining that the unacceptable actions called for sanctions and the International Criminal Court (*LePoint*, 2011). Shortly after, in an address to the nation, Sarkozy said that the French had the duty to protect the Libyan people so that they could have the freedom to choose their own destiny (*LePoint*, 2011).

Sarkozy's decision to support the intervention was also a strategic move to diverge from France's previous foreign policy decisions, such as its initial opposition to the Iraq War (Rowdybush and Chamorel 2011, p.164). By championing the cause in Libya, Sarkozy aimed to reassert France's role as a key player in global affairs. Additionally, the intervention was presented as a moral obligation to protect civilians and support democratic movements, which resonated with the French public's growing concern for human rights and global democratic values (Rowdybush and Chamorel 2011, p.163). By supporting the Libyan opposition forces, France aimed to promote these values and uphold its reputation as a human rights defender in the international community. The French Government argued that the intervention was necessary to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and to protect civilians from Gaddafi's regime. The French public widely accepted this narrative and helped justify the military intervention (Bucher et al. 2012).

Although public opinion initially appeared sceptical towards any intervention, their opinion was overturned in one month. According to a 2011 Ifop poll, at the beginning of the crisis, only 30% of the people believed a military intervention would be beneficial. However, by the end of March 2011, 66% of the French people were in favour of some intervention in Libya, with 22% of the interviewees being strong supporters; this data stands in stark contrast with what had previously happened in Iraq, where the French had proved to stand against the state presence in the country firmly (Reuters 2011).

The study by Bucher, Engel et al. (2012) analysed the media coverage of the Libyan crisis in the most important newspapers in France and Germany. The authors found that the two countries had different approaches to media coverage, which influenced the public perception of the crisis.

In France, newspapers supported the government's stance on intervention and covered the crisis from its very start (Bucher et al. 2012). The media put much more emphasis on the intervention leading up to Resolution 1973. This approach resulted in greater public support for the intervention, as the media presented it as a necessary and justified action. The French media's alignment with the government's position reflected the country's interventionist foreign policy and its desire to play a leading role in international affairs (Bucher et al. 2012).

Finally, the legacy of the war in Iraq might have played a key role in shaping the country's opinion. The Iraq war was a contentious issue in France, as a strong opponent of the invasion. One of its main criticisms was the need for legitimate international support and the idea of entering a conflict in a third country with a well-defined strategy. However, in this case, Libya had been sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which called for the protection of civilians (Bucher et al. 2012). As a result, France could put great emphasis on this legitimacy, seeing it as a missing factor in the Iraq war. In other words, the UN mandate framed the intervention in Libya as a humanitarian response rather than an unprovoked invasion, therefore gaining the support of public opinion.

Although the intervention was driven by France's commitment to promoting democracy and human rights, France's decision to support military intervention in Libya was heavily influenced by domestic political considerations, including Sarkozy's desire to boost his domestic standing and assert France's leadership on the international stage.

#### *France's Bilateral Relations with Libya*

France's bilateral relations with Libya were deeply affected by its colonial ties. Following the Italian colonisation period, France took over an area of Libya called Fezzan. Fezzan is a region in South Libya, close to the French colonies of Chad and Niger (El Gamaty 2016). What makes the area attractive to foreign powers is the probable presence of oil, gas, and mineral reserves. When the country became independent, formerly colonial powers attempted to maintain close ties with the country in the hopes of having favoured access to natural resources. Libya is believed to be the African country with the largest reserves and, therefore, an incredibly resource-rich area (El Gamaty 2016). Although some French companies had already proved to be interested in the area - among them, Total Energies is the most famous - Gaddafi had maintained close ties with Italy and with Berlusconi's executive. As a result, the Italian oil company ENI was the most present in the area.

During the Arab Spring, a period of social unrest in most Arab nations in North Africa and the Middle East, both Western and Arab powers eyed the opportunity to reaffirm their presence in the country. In the Libyan context, France, the United Kingdom, and Qatar rapidly aligned themselves with the Libyan rebels (Khatib 2013). President Sarkozy and personal advisor Bernard-Henri Lévy, saw the unrest as a threat for Europe as a whole because of the

risk of high migration, as well as an opportunity to re-establish an important geopolitical role following the failed attempt to contain other rising tensions in Tunisia and Egypt during the same period (Davidson 2013, p. 317).

In his address regarding the Libyan crisis in March 2011, former President Sarkozy highlighted the direct implications of North Africa's instability on Europe. He posited that while Europe must continue its cooperation with the United States, it was crucial for Europe to take the lead in decision-making processes (Sarkozy, 2011). Sarkozy drew parallels between the democratic transitions in North Africa and those witnessed in Europe a few decades earlier, acknowledging their potential imperfections and abrupt nature but underscoring the importance of supporting them. Furthermore, he advocated for an EU strategy to manage the potential large-scale migration crisis stemming from the conflict, emphasizing the necessity to establish bases for humanitarian assistance (Sarkozy, 2011).

The willingness to maintain close ties with North Africa combined with the humanitarian aspect of the operations led to frequent visits by executives from major French companies were reportedly travelling to rebel-held areas of Libya; French intelligence sources indicated that Sarkozy intended to position French enterprises, potentially displacing established players like Italy's Eni, to capitalise on the post-Gaddafi scenario (El Gamaty 2016).

Furthermore, the 2011 confidential emails to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hinted at French geopolitical interests in the conflict beyond its resources; these were leaked in 2016 and confirmed what had been an ongoing trend in the region (Blumenthal 2011).

The first interest was geographical. Libya is strategically located on the Mediterranean and plays a key role as a bridging factor between Europe and Africa. For example, Libya was a critical partner for France in the fight against illegal immigration, as many migrants from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa used Libya as a transit point to reach Europe (Blumenthal 2011). By building closer ties with Libya, the country could improve domestic politics, especially during the elections that would be held the following year.

Secondly, Libya was a member of the African Union and had been gathering large gold reserves. This hinted at an attempt to create a pan-African currency based on the Libyan Dinar, which would end the CFA Franc hegemony in Francophone Africa (Blumenthal 2011). In other words, it would refocus the African financial system in the region, keeping a European power out of the area; this move could damage France. Moreover, Libya was also a member of the

Arab Union at a time of incredible unrest in the Arab community (Blumenthal 2011). Finally, it could have promoted France's position on a global scale by enhancing its international role. In a famous quote by Minister of Foreign Affairs Alain Juppé, he explained that he:

*"[...] was particularly attentive to the intervention of President Josselin de Rohan, who perfectly explained the logic of our intervention in Libya. I want to tell him at this moment how happy I was to work with him, as I consider his action as chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee to be very positive."* (Alain Juppé, 2011)

In this passage, he explained that it was not simply right but rather logical to intervene in Libya, considering the multiple - and highly critical - interests in the region.

### *France's Position in Security Policy*

France's approach to security policy, particularly after the 2003 Iraq War and during Nicolas Sarkozy's presidency, reflects France's attempts at asserting itself as a leader in global security via strategic autonomy (Lequesne and Rozenberg 2008, p. 24).

After strongly opposing the Iraq War led by the US, France was keen on ensuring that future interventions would heavily have a legitimate international law backup. In other words, the lack of an official UN mandate and the dubious decision-making that led to the invasion of Iraq - which had proved to be based on false premises - led the French administration to support lawful legitimacy in security matters strongly. As a result, France's security policy gradually became more aligned with the principles of multilateralism and adherence to international law (Lequesne and Rozenberg 2008, p. 24). As Lequesne and Rozenberg (2008) explained, France felt the need to act within the framework of international organisations such as the United Nations. Furthermore, there was also a conscious effort to balance the influence of the United States in international affairs, building on a tradition of independent foreign policy that would not be overly reliant on US-led initiatives.

The French Government's stance on foreign and security policy under Sarkozy's presidency was marked by a departure from his predecessor, Jacques Chirac, and other predecessors, especially when it came to Atlanticism (Lequesne and Rozenber 2008, p. 9). As mentioned in the previous chapter, France had a unique approach to NATO. It had not failed



to run against the Organisation whenever it felt like it was not safeguarding France's and European interests. Chirac, for instance, had a Gaullist tradition in foreign policy. This type of policy maintained a certain degree of wariness towards American influence and a reluctance to fully integrate into NATO (Lequesne and Rozenberg 2008, p. 15). As a result, France had often prioritised an independent foreign policy that could, sometimes, diverge from American interests. The most notable example was the strain on France and the US relations during the Iraq war.

In contrast, Sarkozy represented a more pro-Atlanticist approach compared to Chirac. The opposition had criticised the pro-US approach, yet it did not affect the President's program. For instance, the Government reversed France's 1966 decision to leave NATO's integrated military command structure and rejoined it by 2009, reversing Charles de Gaulle's 1966 decision to withdraw. This move was seen as a precise alignment with NATO and, by extension, a closer relationship with the United States (Lequesne and Rozenberg 2008, p. 9). Although this may appear as an attempt to improve the Franco-American alliance, Sarkozy was a supporter of European defence autonomy. France supported initiatives to strengthen the CSDP, envisioning a Europe that would be better suited to tackle global affairs.

### *France's Support for Common European Defence Policies*

As mentioned in the previous chapter, France was one of the leading EU members in the field of European integration, both because of its historical role as a founding member and its political power as one of the leading powers in Europe.

The post-Iraq War period, with the drafting and ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the election of Nicolas Sarkozy, brought new opportunities and challenges—the Lisbon Treaty aimed to strengthen Europe's weakest policy area, namely foreign and security policy. The creation of the EEAS had goals that reflected those of the Fifth Republic since De Gaulle; these included independent security capabilities, a focus on human rights and democracy, and the protection of European values. Furthermore, it aimed at supporting a multilateral world order with the EU as an increasingly present actor in the global sphere (Lakomy 2011, p. 137)

As a result, Nicolas Sarkozy presented himself as a supporter of the EU and its potential developments with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. In his winning speech on May 6th, 2007, Sarkozy spoke about the European Union in reassuring yet weighed terms:

*"I want to launch an appeal to our European partners to which our destiny is closely linked. To tell them that I have been a European all my life, that I deeply believe in the building of Europe and that tonight France is back in Europe. But I beg our European partners to hear the voice of the people who want to be protected. I beg our European partners not to turn a deaf ear to the anger of the people who see the European Union not as a protection but as the Trojan Horse for all the threats of a changing world."* (Sarkozy, 2007, translated by Reuters)

With these words, the French President wanted to underscore its support for the European Union, yet warned all actors involved that Euroscepticism could bring new challenges; it was, therefore, necessary to strengthen the Union to ensure it would be perceived as a threat to Europeans.

In this regard, the Lisbon Treaty was crucial for defining the EU's goals in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, the Treaty's ratification faced significant hindrances, notably Ireland's initial referendum rejection in 2008, which raised concerns about the future of the CFSP and the CSDP (Nies, 2008). While Sarkozy initially downplayed the Irish referendum result, he later stressed the Treaty's importance for the EU's expansion and preparedness, even pushing for a second Irish referendum and critiquing the reluctance of Poland and the Czech Republic to ratify the Treaty (Lakomy 2011, p. 141).

Sarkozy's vision for the EU was a Europe that was capable of independent action and defence. France and Germany reaffirmed their crucial role as drivers of the EU's political and security dimensions. Their approach was especially evident during France's presidency of the European Council in the second half of 2008, where Sarkozy prioritised the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and a common security doctrine, advocating for the EU to become a global actor in crisis management, counter-terrorism, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in collaboration with NATO, the UN, and the African Union (Lakomy 2011, p. 142).

Furthermore, Sarkozy aimed to enhance the EU's role in international relations through multidimensional partnerships across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas, focusing on political and security matters and economic, social, and environmental cooperation

(Davidson 2013, p. 317). He sought to promote French and EU interests and values, such as the rule of international law, democracy, and human rights. He believed that a broad network of partnerships would elevate the EU's global role, with France at its forefront (Lakomy 2011, p. 144).

### ***The war in Libya: The German Perspective***

#### *Germany's Support for the Intervention in Libya - Domestic Politics*

Germany strongly opposed its participation in the civil war in Libya, going as far as abstaining in the vote on the UNSC Resolution No. 1973 on March 18th, 2011, during a time when Germany held its seat at the Security Council.

The decision was controversial and heavily criticised. This approach to the crisis seemed in stark contrast to Germany's policies. One of the reasons for the country's reluctance may lie in historical roots. Not only was Germany not particularly keen on maintaining a leading role in military operations, but it had also recently suffered from its long and unsuccessful presence in Afghanistan (Bower, 2011). The fear of replicating a similar scenario may have hindered the Government's response.

Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle officially justified the decision by stating that Germany would not gain anything important from participating in Libya. Nevertheless, this approach raised some scepticism in Germany. A few years prior to this decision, the German Government had embraced the so-called Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Hallam, 2011). The R2P refers to the international norm endorsed by the UN that holds the states accountable for protecting their population from crimes against humanity and had emerged as a result of tragic events in the 1990s, such as the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides. In other words, it allows states to intervene - within the realm and guidelines of international law - whenever such crimes are committed.

In any case, military intervention is considered the last resort, preferring other diplomatic tools. Germany had embraced this approach, so its decision to oppose Resolution 1973 falls into a grey area of incoherence. Nevertheless, the decision was well received by opposition parties as well, such as the Leader of the Social Democratic Party, Sigmar Gabriel,

who argued that his party understood the complexity of the Government's decision and agreed to the abstention.

Nevertheless, the willingness to remain neutral did not sit well with the public. A 2011 Emnid survey proves how different the Government's approach was compared to public opinion. When the crisis started, roughly 65% of Germans supported active intervention in Libya (EMNID, 2011). However, only 30% believed Germany had to involve its military. In other words, most Germans believed it would be essential to intervene - some were even shocked that Germany stayed silent during an alleged humanitarian crisis (Hallum, 2011) - they maintained a distanced approach to militarism. This mentality is also reflected in the media. The analysis provided by Bucher, Engel et al. (2012) proves that German newspapers began extensively covering the crisis in Libya a few weeks after the breakout - and several weeks behind French coverage. This may result from the German tendency to avoid military interventions beyond its national borders, as the country continues to carry the heavy weight of its dramatic past (Bucher, Engels et al. 2012, p.11).

Finally, elections in some critical *Länder* shortly after the breakout of the crisis might have played a significant role, yet in contrast with the elections' role in France. Nevertheless, all aspects point to a rather cautious approach to the crisis, which was largely reflected in the media.

### *Germany's Bilateral Relations with Libya*

Germany's bilateral relations with Libya have been mostly focused on economic interests. In fact, Germany's approach to Libya and its autonomy, in stark contrast to Italy, France, and the UK, is not founded in colonial ties. The lack of a colonial past in Libya for Germany has led to a much more detached and uninvolved approach by the German Government (*Deutsche Welle, 2006*).

The economic ties between Germany and Libya have been a significant factor in shaping their bilateral relations. Germany's export-oriented economy and proximity to Libya have made the country Libya's second-largest trading partner (*Deutsche Welle, 2006*). As a result, Germany has had a vested interest in maintaining stable relations with Libya. This interest has been driven by the desire to protect its economic interests, which have facilitated German companies' operation in the field of infrastructure, technology, and overall development. Despite the strong economic ties, however, the two countries have experienced

significant tensions, primarily due to the 1986 La Belle terrorist attack in West Berlin, which was attributed to Libya (Sharpe, 1991).

The attack caused a severe diplomatic crisis between the two countries, distancing Germany from other European countries. However, the crisis was eventually resolved in 2004 after the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charity Associations and the legal representatives of the German La Belle victims settled on \$35 million in compensation. The decision eased diplomatic tensions between the two countries, paving the way for a German state visit to Libya by Chancellor Schröder and a visit by Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair (*Deutsche Welle, 2004*).

Overall, while Germany's approach to Libya has been more detached and uninvolved than other European countries, its economic interests have been a crucial aspect of the bilateral relations between them. Germany would prioritise maintaining these ties and avoid any actions that could potentially harm them.

### *Germany's Position in Security Policy*

The period leading up to and including the Libyan War of 2011 marked a crucial phase for Germany's foreign and security policy. It emerged at a time when European countries were still acutely aware of their mistakes during large-scale crises in the 1990s and early 2000s. Germany's 2006 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (2006), published by the Federal Ministry of Defence, highlights the emergence of new challenges. Among them, the Paper focuses on globalisation, instability, and fragile states and underscores the increasing importance played by the African and Asian continents.

It praises its role as a trusted partner for NATO while also emphasising the increasingly important role of the EU with the 2003 European Defence Strategy (EDA) (White Paper 2006, p.20): However, the document criticised the low spending and slow reform patterns, which weakened the Bundeswehr and its ability to tackle new challenges. It concluded by explaining that the military would have to integrate with other policy domains in Germany. In other words, it would have to regain its security policy to ensure an increasing presence of the German state as a security power.

The 2006 White Paper was published shortly after the election of Angela Merkel's government in 2005. Although the Government wanted to frame Germany as a stronger

security power, the Chancellor adopted a multifaceted approach to the crisis unfolding in North Africa, eventually leading to criticism.

In the beginning, Germany sought to maintain neutrality in Libya. As shown in previous sections, the German executive was wary of participating in military interventions. In fact, when the crisis in Libya escalated in March 2011, Germany held its seat as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Nevertheless, when asked to vote on Resolution 1973, Germany was the only EU country to abstain, together with Brazil, China, India, and the Russian Federation. In contrast, France, the United Kingdom and Portugal all voted in favour of the Resolution.

Although Germany abstained, its Government maintained a rather questionable position on the matter. Shortly after the vote, Chancellor Angela Merkel argued that the country's abstention did not imply neutrality; in contrast, Foreign Minister Westerwelle explained that although Germany maintained close ties with its European partners, it "will not take part in any military operation and will not send troops to Libya" (Westerwelle, 2011). He argued that it would be better to use diplomatic means in order to avoid a potentially long and cruel civil war in the country.

In other words, the two most prominent actors in the German government emphasised Germany's habit of not partaking in violent action yet struggled to find a unanimous approach that could justify distancing itself from other European countries.

Furthermore, as violence escalated within Libya, the situation demanded more decisive action. As part of the NATO forces, Germany actively enforced the no-fly zone established by the UNSC resolution. In addition, they provided logistical support for coalition operations involving air strikes aimed at suppressing pro-Gaddafi forces. Such actions were seen as necessary to prevent further bloodshed and promote stability in the region.

Despite these military engagements, German policymakers remained cautious about becoming directly involved in post-conflict reconstruction efforts or significantly influencing political outcomes inside Libya. Instead, their focus lay primarily on stabilising the country after Gaddafi fell and facilitating transition processes. They supported UNSMIL (United Nations Support Mission in Libya) initiatives aimed at organising democratic elections, disarmament, and reintegration of former combatants into society.

Moreover, German engagement extended beyond direct military or diplomatic activities. Economic assistance played a vital role, too. Berlin offered aid packages targeting infrastructure development and capacity-building programs. These included financial contributions to projects like improving healthcare systems, education facilities, and water supply networks, among others. The rationale behind such investments was twofold: fostering socioeconomic recovery and enhancing stability by reducing grievances rooted in poverty and lack of basic services.

In conclusion, the German foreign and security policies surrounding the Libyan War of 2011 showcased a nuanced blend of restraint, active engagement, and economic cooperation. Nevertheless, the German security policy around that time was still struggling to assert itself, both for historical and structural reasons. On the one hand, the culture prevented Germans from comfortably supporting conflicts; on the other hand, the post-war system established in Germany often neglected the security domain, leading to a slow and inefficient Bundeswehr.

#### *Germany's Support for Common European Defence Policies*

Germany has maintained a very supportive approach to Common European Defence Policies. Together with France, the integration goals in the 2000s remained consistent for both countries. As a result, similarly to the French case, Germany showed unwavering support for the Lisbon Treaty, exemplified by its deep commitment to the principles of European integration and the CFSP (Lemke 2010, p.511).

The Lisbon Treaty ratification on April 24, 2008, with a decisive vote in the Bundestag, led to an overwhelming majority of 515 to 58 voted in favour of the Treaty. This was followed in May by a near-unanimous endorsement from 15 Länder in the Federal Council (Bundesrat).

This profound political consensus highlighted the common understanding that most political parties in Germany believed the EU needed institutional reforms. Furthermore, it emphasised the German people's pro-EU sentiment.

According to Lemke (2005), Chancellor Angela Merkel's administration, particularly under the Grand Coalition government (CDU/CSU-SPD), was a driving force behind this process. Germany's EU Presidency in the first half of 2007 had allowed Merkel to navigate the otherwise complex political landscape of the EU (p.509). It also helped the Government

promote a balanced compromise that eventually culminated in the Treaty's adoption as a central element of Germany's foreign policy agenda. Her administration's unwavering support for the Treaty was pivotal even in the face of partial dissent over specific proposals, such as establishing a robust European foreign ministry and directly incorporating the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This demonstrated Germany's resolve to steer the EU towards more cohesive and unified governance structures, even when unanimity among all member states proved elusive.

The supportive approach to the EU was not, however, always reflected in Germany's support for the CFSP. Although Germany was generally aligned with the European Union's principles, its stance during the Libya crisis may have undermined the cohesion of the EU's foreign and security policy. Germany stood apart by maintaining a neutral position and abstaining from the UN Security Council vote on Resolution 1973 when major EU countries adopted a more unified and interventionist approach (Weitershausen et Al. 2020, p.48). This abstention and the subsequent shift of responsibility from the European Council to NATO highlighted Germany's divergence from a potential leadership role, thereby affecting the ability to foster a cohesive EU approach to the crisis. Nevertheless, many scholars highlight that Germany did eventually provide military support in Libya for NATO forces. Although it indicates the EU was sidelined in the process, it also highlights that Germany maintained its support for other European nations and interests, indicating a subtle but present realignment with the EU's collective actions (Stavridis 2015, p. 6).

### ***The war in Libya: The Danish Perspective***

#### *Denmark's support for the intervention in Libya - domestic politics*

Denmark's involvement in the Libyan conflict was marked by substantial domestic political and public support, deeply rooted in the country's history of backing military interventions.

This support was overwhelmingly evident when the Danish government decided to send F-16 fighter jets to Libya, a decision met with approval from all political parties, major news outlets, and about 78% of the Danish population, marking the highest level of public support among nations in the initial phase of the air campaign (*Politiken*, 2011). The Danish public's inclination towards military involvement had historical precedents, such as during NATO's air



war over Kosovo in 1999 and the mission in Afghanistan, where Denmark had the highest casualty rate per capita among participating nations (Jakobsen and Møller 2012, p. 106). Additionally, as seen in the previous chapter, Denmark had approved and heavily intervened in the 2003 Iraq war.

This specific intervention in Libya was notable as it was the first instance where every party in the Danish parliament voted in favour of going to war. Except for the Red-Green Alliance - who had initially supported the war under the humanitarian aid claim, but later withdrew its support due to concerns about the coalition's adherence to the UN mandate, parliamentary support remained exceptionally high throughout the campaign. The media and public opinion largely mirrored this support, as the records from the time show a predominantly positive coverage of the matter (Jakobsen and Møller 2012, p. 115).

The Danish government's strategy in Libya was characterised by a continuous and inclusive consultation process with all political parties. This consensus approach led to crafting government policies tailored to address various parties' concerns, such as the rejection of deploying ground troops and arming rebels. The government typically waited to propose significant policy changes until they were adopted by Denmark's allies in the EU and NATO, ensuring alignment with broader international strategies. This consensus approach was also reflected in the Danish Libya strategy published in April 2011 and its subsequent renewal in August, aiming to build and maintain domestic support while providing flexibility for practitioners in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. Although not providing operational guidance, this strategy served the dual purpose of sustaining domestic support in parliament and the public and allowing manoeuvrability for policy implementation.

Denmark's approach to the Libyan crisis was marked by a significant alignment of domestic political and public opinion with the government's strategic decisions, underlining a broader national consensus on military interventions and reflecting the country's longstanding support for such actions on the international stage.

#### *Denmark's Bilateral Relations with Libya*

Denmark's bilateral relations with Libya at the time of the intervention were primarily focused on enhancing stability in northern Africa. It did not share colonial ties, just like Germany, and did not have specific interests in the area. However, ensuring the country maintained a stable political position could prevent countless issues that would inevitably involve the European continent. Political unrest in Libya - or a civil war, as it had been happening in other Arab countries - would bring to the rise negative dynamics, such as economic breakdown, refugee flows, terrorism, and the spread of armed conflict to neighbouring countries (Jakobsen and Møller 2012, p. 117).

Although on a bilateral level, Denmark did not have extensive interests that went beyond preventing unrest, a stable Libya could also imply continuous trade between the EU and North Africa. As previously mentioned, the EU was a fundamental economic arm, and it was, therefore, necessary for all EU members to maintain close ties with economic partners.

As a result, the Danish approach in Libya was characterised by aligning its interests with its values. The Danish government believed that its interests in trade and stability were best served by promoting democracy and human rights (Jakobsen and Møller 2012, p. 117). This approach was also seen as a way to capitalise on the opportunity presented by the Arab Spring. Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen emphasised the importance of this approach, highlighting the need to prevent Muammar Gaddafi's brutal treatment of his own population, which was viewed as potentially stifling the Arab Spring (*Politiken*, 2011).

#### *Denmark's Position in Security Policy.*

Denmark has maintained an Atlanticist approach to security policy throughout its entire post-war period up until recent years. However, Denmark's Atlanticism is frequently defined as "repressed" during the Cold War years (Mouritzen 2007, p.155), as it still maintained a detached approach to US decisions; it then moved to "mainstream Atlanticism", which occurred in the 1990s. This approach had to ensure Denmark could establish itself as an independent European power without the fear of becoming a buffer zone that divided Europe and Russia, similarly to Baltic countries.

This position is what can be found leading up to the war in Iraq. Finally, Hand Mouritzen (2007) explains that post 9-11 Denmark became a "super Atlanticist" (Mouritzen 2007, p.158). In other words, it supported NATO completely, having recently given up on

participating in EU security integration. Nevertheless, Denmark was also affected by the unlawful invasion of Iraq, forcing the country to rethink its controversial role in 2003.

As a result, Denmark's security policy exhibited a further evolution during the Libyan conflict. The main objectives of Denmark's foreign and security policy in this era were twofold: to protect Denmark's territorial integrity and economic prosperity from external threats and to promote and protect values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. These objectives were integral to Denmark's decision-making on using force since 1990, with an added focus on building a trustworthy reputation in NATO, the EU, the UN, and with key allies like the United States.

The guiding principles of Denmark's security policy during this time included a strong commitment to supporting and demonstrating relevance to its great power allies, especially the United States, to ensure security guarantees. Adherence to UN norms and principles was fundamental, with a preference for UN mandates, although united NATO or EU mandates were considered acceptable alternatives (Jakobsen and Møller 2012, p. 111). Broad parliamentary support was crucial for Denmark's military engagements, emphasising the importance of domestic consensus. The comprehensive approach, a key principle, entailed using military force in a manner that fostered conditions for liberal peace, characterised by democracy and human rights and involved coordinated civilian and military efforts.

Lastly, the 'clean hands' principle guided Denmark to maintain adherence to international law and avoid involvement in actions conflicting with its legal obligations (Jakobsen and Møller 2012, p. 111). This multifaceted approach reflected Denmark's evolution from a traditional peacekeeping nation to an active participant in international military operations, aligning national interests with global security and humanitarian values.

### *Denmark's Support for Common European Defence Policies*

In the context of Denmark's role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union, the country's unique position was shaped once again by its defence opt-out. This opt-out, a part of Denmark's relationship with the EU, legally restricts its participation in EU-led military operations (Danish Parliament, 2022). This means that, under the current arrangements, Denmark is not obligated to participate in military aspects of the CFSP, distinguishing it from most other EU member states that do not have such exemptions.

However, the sentiment within Denmark, particularly in the political arena, began shifting in the post-9/11 era. The rise of new challenges begged the question of Danish security and whether it would be reasonable to adhere to the CFSP. The article by Jakobsen and Møller (2012) points out that an increasing number of Members of Parliament in Denmark were in favour of removing this defence opt-out. This indicates a growing political will to deepen Denmark's military involvement in EU operations and a desire to align more closely with EU defence policies. As a result, the country began questioning the possibility of holding the referendums that would ask the Danish people if they wanted to remove their four opt-outs, including the defence one.

Nevertheless, the path to removing the opt-out proved harder than expected and involved multiple governments.

In 2007, following the election of Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Government announced that it aimed to hold referendums to abolish the EU opt-outs, especially the common currency one. It was described as an attempt to make Denmark a complete member of the European Union (Schraff and Schimmelfenning 2020, p.5). Nevertheless, the referendum was postponed following Ireland's disheartening rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon. Several attempts were made in the following years under the leadership of Lars Løkke Rasmussen, but they were all unsuccessful (Danish Parliament, 2022).

With the 2011 elections and the new Government under Helle Thorning-Schmidt, Denmark tried to modify both the defence and Justice and Home Affairs opt-outs. However, once again, instability in Europe postponed the attempt. Finally, with the return of Lars Løkke Rasmussen in 2015, Danish people had the opportunity to vote on the referendum. The multiple attempts at modifying the opt-outs, which clearly highlighted the political sphere's intention to integrate further, proved to be in contrast with public opinion (Schraff and Schimmelfenning 2020, p.5). By December 2015, the Danish people voted and rejected the proposals (Danish Parliament, 2022). Even further attempts to repropose the referendum failed in the following years, often leading to the Prime Ministers that had proposed it to lose the subsequent general elections.

The Danish people’s unwillingness to integrate into the foreign and security policy field - and, to a certain extent, the same can be said for the common currency argument - signals that the security field is very sensitive. Countries requiring mandatory referendums for any constitutional changes have often shown some scepticism in European integration. In other words, even when the political sphere maintains a relatively open approach to integration, there is the possibility that the citizens may feel threatened by the idea of ceding their sovereignty to a supranational institution unless there is the presence of a serious threat that justifies the decision.

All in all, the failed attempts at removing the defence opt-outs in Denmark in the time period examined prove that Danish people did not see the war in Libya as a threat that could only be tackled with an increasingly integrated Union. The presence of NATO, the UN mandate, and Denmark’s own military were considered enough not to threaten the integrity and security of the Danish people. While the shift from a historically limited participation in EU-led military operations to a more integrated role in the EU's defence initiatives is significant, the change in the Danish approach to the CFSP was quite limited between the 2003 and 2011 period; this signals very little evolution in the Danish approach, proving This change foreshadowed a potential redefinition of Denmark's position within the EU - with the alignment of its defence policy more closely with the broader objectives of the CFSP - that eventually happened in 2022, with the Russian war on Ukraine (Danish Parliament, 2022).

*Findings*

The analysis provided in the previous paragraphs can be summarised in the following table:

	France	Germany	Denmark
Domestic politics	Government and public opinion approved of the French military presence in Libya. Legitimacy was written in the UN	Government and public opinion were wary of any military presence in Libya. Nevertheless, the uncertainty of both the Government and	Perceived Libya as a threat to security strongly supported NATO and the US.

	Resolution 1973, embedded the conflict in international law and legitimised the intervention.	the Chancellor led to criticism.	
National interests (economic, political, cultural)	Strong economic, political, and cultural interests at stake. France had colonial ties in Libya; it also had economic interests due to Libya's large resources; finally, Libya played a key geopolitical role in France's position in Francophone Africa and became a threat to French hegemony in the area (e.g., the French CFA).	Limited economic, political, and cultural interests in Libya. No colonial ties, but Libya was a strong economic partner due to the large trade by German companies in the area.	No relevant economic interests in the area. Political interest emphasised stability in the MENA Region and continuous support for Atlanticism.
Position on Security Policy	Multilateral approach and adherence to international law. Rapprochement with NATO and the US under Sarkozy's presidency.	Under Chancellor Merkel's administration, security policy was cautious yet determined to reintegrate Germany's military into the world order.	Little evolution since 2003. Maintained a "Super Atlanticist" approach, the war in Libya was a further opportunity to reinforce support for NATO. Nevertheless, the post-Iraq experience had taught Denmark to rely on legitimacy in international law strongly.
Support for Common European Defence	Supporter, France advocated for the strengthening of the	Supporter but initially did not align its foreign policy to	Opt-out country, yet Parliament and Government

Policies	CFSP to turn the EU into a global power in cooperation with other Organisations to compensate for inefficiencies (e.g. NATO, African Union).	that of other EU countries, contributing to a divided perception of European interests and a slow European response.	favoured removing the opt-out status considering new challenges and the CFSP's evolution. Nevertheless, very little change since 2003.
Support for the intervention in Libya	Supporter, position reflected in public opinion.	Partial opponent, reluctance led to a discrepancy between Government and public opinion.	Strong supporter, one of the few countries contributing to the initial military operation.

Following the analysis of the crisis in Libya and its relevance for the European Union, this chapter explored both domestic and external factors that may have had an impact on the way France, Germany, and Denmark behaved during the 2011 conflict in relation to their position as EU members; each member seems to have been influenced by a unique set of political, historical, and strategic considerations.

France's position was highly strategic and proactive. Under President Nicolas Sarkozy, France became a very outspoken supporter of military intervention. It played a leading role in the international coalition through the different UN Resolutions, such as the enforced no-fly zone in Libya.

Furthermore, domestic political considerations partly influenced Sarkozy's decision to intervene to affirm his popularity in France and strengthen France's global influence. The public and the media primarily approved of this tendency, as the operation was quickly framed as an attempt to end human rights abuses in Libya and to establish a peaceful and democratic Government in the country.

In contrast, Germany maintained a much more cautious approach to the crisis, which led to a restrained - and frequently criticised - action plan. Opposing military involvement, Germany stood out by abstaining from voting on UNSC Resolution 1973, in spite of the support of France, which had often cooperated with Germany in crises. This stance reflects, again, Germany's historical reluctance to engage in military operations, influenced by its experiences in Afghanistan and the Balkans.

Denmark, on the other hand, demonstrated to be one of NATO's most supportive members. Its supportive approach was proved by the Danish Government's decision to send F-16 jets to Libya, one of the few countries to participate in the active military operation. This decision received nearly unanimous parliamentary approval, uniting both governing and opposition parties. Public support for the intervention did not waver, reminiscing the supportive approach demonstrated during the Iraq war.

The historical reasons and bilateral relations among the three countries also differ and offer interesting insights on the matter. France had colonial ties with both Libya and neighbouring African countries; as a result, it had maintained some economic ties and geopolitical interests, such as the partition of natural resources and the Frank CFA and Gaddafi's interests in creating a Pan-African currency. The active participation of France in the conflict had prospects to give the French Government an economic and military foothold in post-Gaddafi Libya, making the operation much more attractive.

Germany and Denmark, on the other hand, did not have such close ties with Libya and North Africa as a whole. Nevertheless, they adopted largely different approaches to the intervention, suggesting that this was not a highly critical matter in the two countries' agendas. Germany relied on Libya's importing habits to trade its technology and infrastructure as an export-oriented economy. These ties did not falter during crises, including the Libya-attributed terrorist attack in Germany in 1986. The German Government maintained a rather detached approach to Libya, preferring to let private industries maintain close economic relations.

Denmark did not have economic interests in Libya, so its main concern was security. In this regard, not having high-stake political and economic interests in an area made Denmark more willing to intervene to reestablish peace in the region. As highlighted in the previous sections, Denmark perceived the EU as an economic arm, while NATO was its military one. Therefore, it seems reasonable to militarily support NATO while ensuring peace in North Africa could imply continuous and stable relations between the EU economic bloc and the North African bloc.

On a security policy level, all three nations seem to have an increasingly supportive approach to NATO. The French Government under Sarkozy reintegrated France's role in NATO, showing a pro-Atlanticist stance that had often been disregarded in previous presidencies. Similarly, post-Iraq war Germany with the election of Angela Merkel,



demonstrated that Germany valued multilateralism and believed both in NATO's and the EU's role as complimentary partners. Furthermore, it hinted at the need to strengthen the country's military domain, which had lacked attention and resources due to its complex history.

Unsurprisingly, Denmark maintained its unwavering support for Atlanticism, which morphed throughout the decades but did not falter. Nevertheless, all three countries have emphasised the importance of adherence to international law, a reasonable stance considering the tragic and extensive 2003 Iraq war that had proved to be based on weak grounds.

Denmark's "super-Atlanticism" led to a profound divide between politics and public opinion in the country regarding the Danish EU Opt-Outs. Despite political intentions for Denmark's military involvement in EU operations, any attempts to abolish the defence opt-out through referendums were consistently unsuccessful, reflecting the public's reluctance towards deeper integration in defence policy. This sentiment indicates the complexity of balancing political ambitions for EU integration with public scepticism. In contrast, France and Germany were leading powers in support of the Lisbon Treaty and believed that multilateralism included an increasingly integrated European Union.

An initial overview of the case may make the study seem similar to Iraq's; each nation in the analysis had largely different domestic and international interests and did not agree on the right way to intervene in Libya. Fabbrini (2011) explains that Libya was the EU's first attempt to test the CFSP in the post-Lisbon era, yet it failed due to divisions and weaknesses. Similarly, Koenig (2011) explains that while NATO intervened positively, the same cannot be said for the EU, which appeared as incohesive and undecided. The scholars who argue in favour of these statements have multiple factors to rely on to prove their thesis. As one of the most influential EU Members, Germany's abstention in adopting resolution no.1973 was a clear signal of incoherence.

Furthermore, European participation in the first operations varied extensively when the military intervention began. The EU was divided and did not have a military structure that allowed for a large-scale presence in Libya. The main EU supporters of the operation, such as France and the UK, did not have the capability to sustain their military goals. Very few other countries in the EU had agreed to participate in hitting the targets with their own resources. Shortly after the start of the crisis, the EU had to cede its presence to NATO, strongly relying on US resources and defeating the purpose of a strengthened CFSP.

Nevertheless, the analysis also shows some increased cohesiveness in the EU. The EU took significant steps to intervene in Libya. The EU immediately condemned the Libyan Government considering the Arab Revolution through multiple personalities and institutions. It also provided significant aid and support, activating Frontex in key areas knowing the crisis would lead to more migrants.

On a more pragmatic level, EU sanctioning and attempts to intervene militarily via EUFOR Libya signal a willingness to intervene despite the reluctance of some Member States. Furthermore, the presence of the EU at the London and Paris Conferences on Libya, representing the EU in its entirety, shows an increased presence of the EU as an external actor with full legitimacy in the global order. Finally, post-conflict, the EU continued its involvement in Libya with aid and financial support.

Overall, the EU seems coherent at a political level and shows improvement from the previous decade. At a state level, it is possible to see a certain degree of alignment among states.

Nevertheless, despite the vocal support for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by key EU member states such as France, Germany, and the first steps towards greater integration within the EU's foreign policy framework (Denmark), the intervention in Libya underscored a critical limitation: the EU did not emerge as the primary institution for intervention among these member states. Instead, these countries leaned more heavily on other organizations, notably NATO and the United Nations (UN), which played significantly more influential roles in the escalation of the conflict, both legally and militarily. This reliance on external institutions rather than the CFSP underscored a relatively low level of Europeanization, revealing the CFSP's limited impact on the member states' strategic approaches to the crisis.

The analysis sheds light on the predominantly political role of the CFSP in the context of EU member states' foreign policies. While it facilitated a platform for consensus-building among the states, particularly around humanitarian concerns and, to some extent, economic and geopolitical interests, the CFSP lacked the necessary resources and capacity to independently manage a crisis of Libya's magnitude. Consequently, France, Germany, and Denmark were compelled to prioritize their individual strategies and the operational support of NATO, supplemented by the legal backing of the UN. This scenario underscores the challenges

facing the CFSP in asserting itself as a dominant force in international crises, highlighting the gap between the EU's aspirational policy coherence and its practical capabilities on the global stage.



## *Conclusions*

The analyses provided in the previous chapters of the thesis seem to highlight that although there has been a certain degree of Europeanisation that led to an increasingly cohesive foreign and security policy among the Member States – with a stronger leadership role by the EU - the field maintained a strong attachment to national preferences and an undoubted reliance on other external institutions; while the focus on national sovereignty may be attributed to the sensitivity of the policy field and its potential implications in creating a common strategy at EU level, the reliance on other International Organisations may be due the lack of efficiency and trust in the European ones in front of crises.

### *France's Foreign Policy Evolution from Iraq to Libya*

France's foreign intervention policies have evolved significantly from Iraq to Libya, with changes in strategy, motivation, and international cooperation reflecting the complex interplay between domestic politics, international law, and France's role on the global stage. Under President Jacques Chirac, France opposed the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, citing the lack of a UN mandate and concerns over the legitimacy and consequences of the intervention. In contrast, under President Nicolas Sarkozy, France took a proactive role in leading the intervention in Libya in 2011, driven by domestic considerations, including bolstering France's international image, and framing the intervention as a moral obligation to protect civilians and support democratic movements.

These concerns also influenced France's stance on international law and multilateralism. In Iraq, France opposed the war due to the absence of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the intervention. In contrast, in Libya, the intervention was sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which called for protecting civilians under threat of attack.

Finally, France's stance on foreign interventions also affected its position within the European Union and NATO. France's opposition to the Iraq War highlighted its desire for a strong, independent European stance on global security issues, diverging from American influence. However, the intervention in Libya saw France taking a leading role within the EU and NATO, seeking to integrate European defence policies more closely with broader international efforts and balance the influence of the US with a more robust, unified European position.

## *Germany's Foreign Policy Evolution from Iraq to Libya*

When examining Germany's approach to interventions in Iraq and Libya, it is evident that the country's consistent and evolving foreign policy principles concerning military interventions, multilateralism, and its role within the European Union played a crucial role in shaping its stance. Four key factors influenced Germany's approach.

Firstly, the domestic political context and decision-making process significantly shaped Germany's stance towards these interventions. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's decision to oppose the Iraq war reflected the widespread public opposition to the invasion, and he promised no participation in an unprovoked attack on Iraq without a UN mandate. Such a stance highlighted Germany's cautious approach towards military interventions and its preference for charting an independent path that prioritized the country's interests. Similarly, Germany's decision to abstain from the UNSC Resolution 1973 vote on Libya was also influenced by its cautious stance towards military interventions. This decision reflected a consistent approach to avoiding involvement in military conflicts without explicit UN endorsement and a preference for diplomatic and non-military solutions.

Secondly, bilateral relations and economic interests also significantly shaped Germany's approach towards these interventions. Germany had financial ties with Iraq, mainly through industrial and technological exchanges during the 1970s and 1980s. Despite controversies over these ties, Germany's opposition to the Iraq war underscored its preference for maintaining stable relations and avoiding actions that could jeopardize economic interests or contribute to regional instability. Similarly, Germany's relations with Libya were primarily economic, focusing on trade and investment. Its cautious approach to the Libyan conflict, like with Iraq, indicates a preference for preserving economic interests and stability over involvement in military interventions that could risk these ties.

Thirdly, Germany's approach towards security policy orientation was another crucial factor that shaped its stance towards these interventions. Germany emphasized the importance of multilateralism, diplomatic solutions, and a reluctance to engage in military interventions, reflecting post-WWII commitments and a desire to avoid repeating historical mistakes.

Finally, Germany supported the development of the CFSP and a vital EU role in global security in both cases. Its approach underlines a commitment to enhancing the EU's security and defence capabilities, advocating for a unified European stance in international affairs, and balancing its military constraints with a decisive political role within the EU. Overall, Germany's approach to interventions in Iraq and Libya highlights the country's commitment to a cautious and principled foreign policy approach, shaped by factors ranging from domestic politics to economic ties and security policy orientation.

#### *Denmark's Foreign Policy Evolution from Iraq to Libya*

Denmark's involvement in international military operations in Iraq and Libya had different levels of domestic support. The decision to support the invasion of Iraq was controversial, with strong public opposition and debates about the legitimacy and evidence justifying the intervention. In contrast, the intervention in Libya enjoyed widespread political and public support, marked by a unanimous parliamentary vote in favour of military action (excluding the Red-Green Alliance's later withdrawal) and high approval among the Danish population. The reason for this shift can be attributed to the Libyan intervention being framed as a humanitarian mission under a UN mandate, which resonated more positively with the Danish public and political spectrum.

Denmark's participation in Iraq was influenced by its desire to strengthen ties with the United States and affirm its commitment to NATO. Economic and geopolitical interests in Iraq were minimal, allowing Denmark to prioritise political and military cooperation with the US. Conversely, in Libya, Denmark's involvement was less about bilateral relations with Libya itself and more about contributing to regional stability and supporting the values of democracy and human rights, aligning with the broader European response to the Arab Spring.

Denmark's security policy underwent a significant shift after the 9/11 attacks, with an increased commitment to NATO and reevaluating its role in international military interventions following the controversial involvement in Iraq. By the time of the Libyan conflict, Denmark had refined its approach to prioritise broad parliamentary support, adherence to international law, and a comprehensive strategy integrating military and civilian efforts to promote liberal

peace. This reflected a more cautious and values-driven approach, ensuring alignment with UN norms and principles.

Denmark's EU defence opt-out has influenced its stance on common European defence policies, limiting its participation in EU-led military operations. Despite growing political will to engage more deeply with EU defence policies during the post-9/11 era, public opinion remained sceptical about ceding sovereignty to supranational institutions. The Libyan intervention did not significantly alter this dynamic, as NATO and the UN mandate were deemed sufficient for Denmark's involvement.

*Comparing European Responses to the Crises in Libya and Iraq: Analysis of Foreign and Security Policies and the Europeanisation of the EU's CFSP*

The responses of European countries to the crises in Libya and Iraq provide a fascinating perspective to understand the development and challenges of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union and the orientation of the foreign policies of its member states. The different approaches adopted by France, Germany, and Denmark, demonstrate the difficulties of aligning national interests with the collective strategies of the EU. This highlights the potential and limitations of a unified European foreign policy stance.

The Iraq war had a significant impact on a European common strategy, as it exposed deep divisions within the EU. France and Germany emerged as vocal opponents of the US-led invasion, reflecting not only their domestic political landscapes and public opinion but also their broader foreign policy philosophies. France, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, leveraged its diplomatic clout to position itself as a leader in opposition to the war, drawing on its historical ties and interests in the Arab world, as well as concerns about the war's legitimacy and its potential impact on global security and relations with the Muslim community within its borders. Meanwhile, Germany, still navigating its post-WWII military reticence, aligned with France in opposition, driven by a mix of political, economic, and ethical considerations. In contrast, Denmark's support for the invasion underscored its alignment with NATO and the US, prioritising transatlantic relations and security concerns over EU consensus.



The European countries' response to the crisis in Libya marked a notable change in their foreign policy dynamics. France, led by President Sarkozy, adopted a proactive and interventionist approach driven by a combination of strategic interests, humanitarian concerns, and the desire to reinforce France's position on the global stage. Contrastingly, Germany exercised caution and refrained from voting on intervention at the UNSC, reflecting its persistent uncertainty towards military engagements. Denmark, on the other hand, played a supportive role in the NATO-led intervention in Libya and demonstrated its Atlanticist orientation, which is consistent with its position during the Iraq war. Despite these varied responses, some scholars argue that these countries – and many other European countries, such as those that had close ties with Libya like Italy – ended up aligning themselves and participating in Libya quite cohesive, particularly in considering the role played by EU Institutions and the High Representative, that intervened on a humanitarian and political level (Stavridis 2014, p.13).

Nevertheless, some limited optimism on the matter should not lead to the assumption that the analysis and the literature observe a satisfactory development of Europeanisation in the European foreign policies field. The comparison between the European responses to the crises in Libya and Iraq reveals the challenges in balancing national interests with the goals of EU foreign policy integration. The Iraq War exposed significant divisions within the EU and the Union hoped the crisis could provide useful insights for future events; however, the Libya crisis showcased that, even with a more coordinated approach among EU members, NATO's leadership underscored the limited role of the CFSP and the missed opportunity to increase the EU's role as a global actor.

### *Final Remarks*

This thesis provides an analysis of the impact of Europeanisation on the foreign policies of EU member states, with a focus on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The study evaluates the national and institutional changes brought about by European integration and their effect on strengthening or maintaining the EU's influence over the foreign policy orientations of its member states. The analysis highlights the ambiguous scope of the CFSP and its varying reception among member states.

Furthermore, positioning the EU as a credible external force, beyond its economic and political influence keeps raising scepticism among member states about delegating such a critical component of their sovereignty to an institution still navigating its strategic direction in foreign policy. The 2003 Iraq War exposed a deeply divided and incoherent Europe; Conversely, the Arab Spring and the subsequent crisis in Libya in appears as a missed opportunity to prove the advancements made in its foreign policy mechanisms, in light of the stark lessons from Iraq.

The relevance of this research at a time of changing global dynamics begs the question on what the role of the EU and its Member States will be as the world order shifts and tackles new challenges. On the international stage, major military powers such as the US, Russia, and China have continued to assert their geopolitical and military dominance on a regional and global level; the United Kingdom, another significant military player, chose to leave the EU by 2020, casting some doubts on the Union's future. Wars in Europe and the Mediterranean challenge the efficacy and global standing of the EU's regional and international role and may call for a decisive role in the region.

To conclude, the thesis illustrates the intricate interplay between national sovereignty, European identity, and the external influence of global powers and alliances. Despite the critical gap between aspirations and realities, there appears to be a desire for a unified European Foreign and Security Policy at an institutional level. However, this requires acknowledging geopolitical dynamics, limitations, and member states' reluctance to cede sovereignty. Nonetheless, there is potential to work towards effective solutions for a coherent and impactful foreign policy stance on the global stage. This involves exploring how EU foreign policy adapts to emerging global challenge, and the potential for reforming the CFSP to better equip the EU to act as a unified global actor. Additionally, it may be relevant to investigate the EU's ability to navigate its relationship with NATO and other international bodies as it moves towards increased autonomy. By doing so, the EU can create a compelling case for the trajectory of Europeanisation and its potential to shape a unified and effective foreign policy stance on the global stage that benefits all EU Member States.



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