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## Titolo

Methods of U.S. political influence in the Ex-Soviet Union and their impact  
on the Russian-American relations

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## **Introduction**

The greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the late 20th century - the collapse of the Soviet Union - transformed the centuries-old world power in a blurred and amorphous post-Soviet space. Even now, after two decades, this space is described by turbulent processes, which have an ambiguous effect on the prospects for the formation and development of the ex-URRS states.

In fact, the ex-USSR is an area of major importance for U.S.: as an additional reliable energy supplier, as an important transit zone, but most importantly as a mean of limiting the influence and weakening Russia – one of the most serious obstacles on the way of the US long-term global plans. The achievement of these objectives fit into the complex of Washington's preventive measures, aimed to exclude the emergence of a new geopolitical rival. Russia by gaining influence over the post-Soviet states and reintegrating them could emerge as a new geopolitical rival in global supremacy game. In the 1990s, Russia was weak and unsuccessful, but the situation is changing. Russia managed to achieve progress on the path of economic and social modernization, also the democratization of the political system. Following this course of events Russia will inevitably become a powerful magnet for its neighbors, resulting in an economic and political union on a new basis.

The study of all these processes, the mechanisms of their relationship is highly relevant at the present time, since it will reveal the internal motives of their implementation, will enable to predict variations of the further situation development in the short and long term. The relevance of the research is also conditioned by the significant intensification of efforts from the side of the U.S. and its closest allies in the direction of trying to reconstruct the post-Soviet space to their advantage. Continued strengthening of the US military and political positions in different regions of the former Soviet space is in direct contradiction with the goals and interests of Russia.

All this leaves no doubt as to the need for continued comprehensive study of motivations, forms and methods of the evolution of U.S. policy in the post-USSR area and the prospects of the CIS.

**The aim of the thesis** is to reveal the mechanisms of political influence of the United States on the processes in the states of the former Soviet Union in the context of relations between the U.S. and Russia.

This goal could be divided in a number of tasks, which should be settled within the framework of this dissertation paper:

1. To display the evolution of U.S. interests in the former Soviet space and the transformation of the nature of relations with Russia;
2. To reveal the methodology of the US political strategy formation towards the post-Soviet space;
3. To analyze the role of the factor of the elites in the political process of the newly independent states and to identify the methods of establishing U.S. control over them;
4. To reveal the reasons of geopolitical competition between Russia and the U.S. in the CIS area;
5. To identify the level of US interference, influence and foreign policy effectiveness in the political processes of CIS countries.

The base of the research is represented by official documents, statistics, periodicals, researches of various think tanks from USA, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, France, UK, etc.

Many deductions made in the thesis are based on the bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements between the U.S., Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, etc., as well as on official documents of the Government of USA, US Department of Defense, CIA, Federal Assembly of Russia, the Russian Foreign Ministry, and other state structures from USA, Russia and other CIS countries. Valuable material on the topic of the research is contained in the speeches of Dmitry Medvedev, Vladimir Putin, Barack Obama, George W. Bush, Viktor Yushchenko, Viktor Yanukovych, and other U.S., Russian, and CIS political leaders.

## **Chapter 1.1**

While analyzing the US policy towards ex-Soviet Union, the fact of continuity in the foreign policy thinking of the United States cannot be ignored. It must be borne in mind that the current stage of the implementation of the US global mission is based on the historical roots of the American politics; that the U.S. policy in the post-Soviet states is just one of the tools in the implementation of the global supremacy goals that were formulated at the dawn of the American republic. Thus, in order to better understand the US intentions towards ex-URRS area, first of all the trends of the US foreign policy thinking in general and towards Tsarist Russia/USSR should be examined. Through many geopolitical theories and doctrines that lay at the basis of proving and justifying the expansion and the civilizing mission of the United States, the most significant are the works of *Captain A. Mahan*, *Halford John Mackinder*, *Nicholas John Spykman*; and the official documents, such as: *The Monroe Doctrine*, *The Truman Doctrine*, *The National Council Report 68 (NSC-68)*. The course of the US foreign policy thinking was studied mainly based on the works of *Zbigniew Brzezinski*, *Henry Kissinger*, *Kenneth N Waltz*, *Peter Kastor* and *Владимир Андреев*. The foundation and development of the policymaking in the early American republic is a theme of *Kastor's*

particular interest. *Waltz, Brzezinski, Kissinger, and Andropov* largely concentrate on the further evolution of the US foreign policy thinking in general and towards Soviet Union.

## **Chapter 1.2**

The scope of the second part of the chapter is to indicate the true intentions of the US foreign policy in the CIS area. As it was mentioned previously these intentions are closely linked to the main global goal of the US: to keep and fortify its status of a world leading power, which also implies the obstruction of any emergence of a super-power capable of challenging America. The access to the energy resources, the creation of a buffer zone for the “War on terror” or the establishment of new partners are substantial, but the foremost US foreign policy objective in the ex-USSR region is the gradual erosion of Russia’s geopolitical influence inherited from USSR; the isolation and obstruction of Russia from gaining its former power. Acting under the banner of democracy promotion, the U.S. policy towards the post-Soviet states is clearly aimed at their separation and isolation from Russia.

For the analysis of the evolution of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Soviet space, the author turned to the study of numerous official documents. Trough the most important ones are:

- *A Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship, The White House, 1992;*
- *Partnership for Peace, NATO, Brussels, 1994*
- *A National Security Strategy through involvement and expansion, The White House, 1994*
- *The National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, 2002*
- *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1990*
- *H.R. 854 (108th): Belarus Democracy Act of 2004, 108th Congress, 2003–2004*
- *H.R. 1133 (109th): ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2005, 109th Congress, 2005–2006*

- *Senate report 109-096 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and related programs Appropriations Bill FY 2006, 2005*
- *The National Security Strategy, The White House, March 2006*

Also, the works of *Anatol Lieven, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Thomas O. Melia, Patrick J. Glen, G. John Ikenberry, Anthony Lake, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Marshall I. Goldman, R. Craig Nation, Dmitri Trenin, Taras Kuzio, Батюк В. И., Сергей Михайлович Самуилов, Волков Я. В., Алексей Д. Богатуров, Владимир Игоревич Батюк, Леонид Иваишов* had a significant contribution while addressing to the U.S. foreign policy towards the post-Soviet space.

The arena of US-Russian geopolitical confrontation covers almost all the post-Soviet space. The multi-vector integration process in the ex-URRS area has had a character of a hard integrational confrontation. On the one hand, there are the former Soviet republics, which continue to rely on Russia. First of all, it is Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and the states with limited recognition such as: Abkhazia, Transnistria, and South Ossetia. On the other hand, Baltic States, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan have been attracted into the orbit of Western, and anti-Russian policies. The most prominent Western impact on the post-URRS space was observed during the Bush presidency. This is the period when civil unrests and mass protests would spark in almost every country of the CIS area, some of them (Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan) culminating in “Color Revolutions”. In a number of countries the elites acting under the banner of democracy and with a desire not only to enter the Euro-Atlantic structures, but also with an anti-Russian spirit, came to power. Many scholars, academics and experts, such as: *Volodymyr Dubovyk, Mark R. Bessinger, Mark Mackinnon, Andrew Wilson, Vitali Silitski, Nikolay Petrov, Michael A. McFaul, Владимир Фролов, etc.*, have done intensive and profound researches about the Western, and in particular the U.S., interference in the internal affairs of the CIS countries during these turbulent processes.

## Chapter 2

This chapter is dedicated to a more profound analysis of the US involvement in the political, social and economic processes of the CIS countries. Two countries, Ukraine and Georgia, in which the Western presence and influence have been particularly prominent, were chosen as models for study. The main objectives are:

- To reveal the main tools and areas of US interference in each of the two countries;
- To indicate the divergences, but most importantly the similarities, of the US influence on the political processes of Ukraine and Georgia;
- To point out the consequences of the Western interference in the post-Soviet space on Russia as an emerging power and on its foreign relations with the US, Georgia and Ukraine.
- To establish, if possible, the extent of US interference in the political processes of the CIS countries. On the examples of the Color Revolutions from Georgia and Ukraine, was the US the organizer or just an insignificant contributor of these events?

As previously mentioned, the official documents are of enormous value to the present thesis. The most significant treaties, agreements, resolutions, charters, etc. that contributed to the second chapter are:

- *H. Con. Res. 120, Supporting the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine and the progress of its political and economic reforms, Sept. 18, 1996*
- *H. Con. Res. 415, Urging the Government of Ukraine to ensure a democratic, transparent, and fair election process for the presidential election on October 31, 2004, Oct 4, 2004*
- *OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Ukraine presidential election 31 October, 21 November and 26 December 2004*



- *H.RES.997, Expressing the strong support of the House of Representatives for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to enter into a Membership Action Plan with Georgia and Ukraine, February 25, 2008.*
- *S. RES. 439, Expressing the strong support of the Senate for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to enter into a Membership Action Plan with Georgia and Ukraine, February 13, 2008*
- *United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, December 19, 2008*
- *Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine, 9 Jul. 1997*
- *National Security Concept of Georgia, December 23, 2011*
- *Capacity Building Fund/ Governance Reform Programme, Phase 2, UNDP and the Government of Georgia, 29 March, 2007*
- *A National Security Strategy for A New Century, May 1997*

The second chapter is constructed mostly on Western **scientific** publications, analytical and research papers, or on local (Ukrainian and Georgian) works. Russian sources are carefully selected, and used in rare cases. This is done in order to build an objective research paper, since the Russian interpretation and views of the US intentions on the post-Soviet space are usually extremely critical.

A number of scholars and experts, through which: *Paul Robert Magocsi, Patrick J. Buchanan, Steven Woehrel, Taras Kuzio, John Tefft, Dominique Arel, Steven Pifer, Natalia Shapovalova, Сергей Гриневецкий, Дмитрій Табачник*, made a thorough analysis of the US foreign relations and interests towards Ukraine, and the US interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine. As for Georgia and the US political influence in the Caucasus region the author addressed to the works of *Zbigniew Brzezinski, Bruno Coppieters, Svante E. Cornell, Gia Nodia, Dmitri Trenin , Сергей Кара-Мурза, etc.*

*Daniel Yergin* one of the most experienced analysts of energy policy with his work “The quest” gives the possibility to look at the world politics from a different perspective, the one based on valuable natural resources. Yergin gives two ideas that are important for the current thesis: the Caspian region - the epicenter of today’s energy

business and political confrontation and an Ex-Soviet area; the complexity and delicacy of the pipeline systems that often cause tensions among countries (ex: Ukraine-Russia).

Even after a thorough study of the US involvement in the post-URRS area, the extent of its influence on the local political processes still remains unclear. Thus, the second chapter concludes with a comparative analysis of this topic. Based on the views of different scholars, experts in the area, and journalists; such as: *Michael A. McFaul*, *Mark MacKinnon*, *Graeme P. Herd*, *Joshua A Tucker*, *Donnacha Ó Beacháin*, *Abel Polese*, *William Engdahl*, *Юрій Петрович Панасик*; the main factors of a color revolution will be pointed out. Following which, each factor will be separately examined, in an attempt to determine the level of the Western assistance and influence.

Finally, the last but not the least important source for the current research is represented by numerous articles from well-known and reputable newspapers, such as: *The Guardian*, *Washington Post*, *BBC News*, *Le Monde*, *Независимая газета*, *Kazakhstan Today*, *RFE/RL*, *American Forces Press Service*, etc.

## **1. The evolution of the U.S. policy toward Soviet Union and former Soviet Union:**

### **1.2 Geopolitical interests of the United States in regards to the Soviet Union: formation and development**

The creation of the United States of America came together with some core concepts: “Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness”, “Anti-Imperialism”, “Empire of Liberty”, etc. These powerful ideas have never been abandoned, but on contrary became stronger throughout the years, contributed to the expansion of the US geopolitical influence, and developed a strong spirit of US exceptionalism. The American exceptionalism, the ideology of the nation’s selectness, is a fundamental feature of the American public consciousness, which applies to both the ruling/intellectual elites and to the masses.<sup>1</sup> The founding fathers of the U.S. (e.g. Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson) and later many U.S. presidents (e.g. James Monroe; Abraham Lincoln; Theodore Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan) in their writings and speeches acknowledged about the exclusiveness of their nation and about the special mission of the U.S. to spread liberty and democracy in this world. As Thomas Jefferson stated “The last hope of human liberty in this world rests on us”.<sup>2</sup>

The US-Russian relations are considered to have begun in 1776. It all started on a very optimistic note. The Russian empress Catherine II supported the American struggle for

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<sup>1</sup> Peter Kastor, *America's Struggle with Empire: A Documentary History*, CQ Press, Washington, 2009, pp.1-18

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Jefferson, *Letter to Colonel William Duane*, Monticello, April 30, 1811

independence: deciding to continue trade with the colonies, refusing Britain's requests for military assistance, and insisting on peace talks.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the efforts to avoid the pitfalls of empire, the US quickly began to expand and acquire its own colonies, but "differently". First was the continental expansion, exterminating the Native Americans and incorporating new territories into the Union. Then, in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine was adopted, according to which the U.S. proclaimed the two parts of the Americas an area closed to European colonization and any attempt by European Powers to interfere would be viewed as an act of aggression, thereby transforming the Western Hemisphere into their fiefdom. The Monroe Doctrine had been further developed by the "Manifest Destiny" (1845), the policy that empathized the US mission and responsibility to extend both freedom and liberty across the continent, and later across the world. This policy has proved to be very popular and effective, the US in its "civilizing mission" has spread its control over more and more territories, and the process hasn't stopped yet.<sup>4</sup>

In the 80-90s of the XIX century the American leadership was already intensively developing global geopolitical plans. A number of new geopolitical theories and doctrines that were to prove and justify the expansion and the civilizing mission of the United States appeared. Among the authors of these concepts special position occupied Captain A. Mahan, who laid the doctrinal foundation of godly geopolitical predestination of the American power. He believed in an American global expansion, which could be realized using the marine fleet. According to his views, the U.S. ought

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<sup>3</sup> Norman Saul, *Distant Friends: The United States and Russia, 1763-1867*, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1991, pp. 10-11

<sup>4</sup> Peter Kastor, *America's Struggle with Empire: A Documentary History*. CQ Press, Washington, 2009, pp.1-18

to gain in the first place an unlimited control over the Caribbean basin, and after that to turn its attention to the Pacific Ocean.<sup>5</sup>

Mahan turned his view also towards Eurasia. It was he who began to develop the geopolitical setting of the American expansionism in this region. For Mahan the strip between 30-th and 40-th parallel, stretching from China to Mediterranean Sea was of great geopolitical importance. The Captain believed that it was a “Debatable and debated ground”, where there will be a clash of interests between USA, Great Britain and Russia. This land belongs to no one, considered Mahan, and the upcoming conquest of Eurasia should begin with the establishment of the American control over this space.<sup>6</sup>

Another important theory, that has had a great impact on the American foreign policy, was formulated by Halford John Mackinder in 1904. According to Mackinder, the world can be divided in 3 parts: The World Island (Europe, most of Asia, and Africa) with the Heartland (stretching from the Volga to the Yangtze and from the Himalayas to the Arctic, ruled by the Russian Empire, and then by USSR) as a pivotal and crucial area; The Offshore Islands (the British Isles and the islands of Japan); The Outlying Islands (North America, South America, and Australia).<sup>7</sup> The theory was summarized as:

"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;

Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;

Who rules the World-Island controls the world."<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1893, pp. 51-72

<sup>6</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Problem of Asia: Its Effect upon International Politics*, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1900, pp. 5

<sup>7</sup> Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1996, pp. 175-176

<sup>8</sup> *Ivi*, pp. 106

The central position and the size of the Heartland turned it into the key to controlling the World-Island. The power that controls the World-Island controls well over 50% of the world's resources. The dilemma was how to gain control of the Heartland, if the Russian Empire had ruled most of this area for centuries. The main idea was to prevent the Russian expansion, then to weaken its power, and finally to divide the country into smaller regions, making it easier to infiltrate its influence in the area.<sup>9</sup>

By the beginning of XX century the international alliance of major financial/industrial capital and political/military elites of the U.S. and Western Europe was entirely formed. The U.S. took the leading role in this alliance. It is in the "bowels" of the alliance that the idea of the "New World Order" was born. The so-called "Marburg Plan", the development of which was financed by Andrew Carnegie<sup>10</sup>, as well as a number of European bankers, was not part of the official American policy, but still it had in noticeable influence on the US foreign policy thinking. The "Marburg Plan" stated that the ultimate power should be concentrated in the hands of the international financiers "to control its councils and enforce peace [and so] provide a specific for all the political ills of mankind".<sup>11</sup>

In the first decade of the nineteen century a number of main industrial and financial Western corporations funded the Anti-Russian lobby, and displayed their non-amicable attitude towards Russia. For instance, during the Russian-Japanese War of 1905 the American financier Jacob X. Schiff, representative of the Rothschild Empire, blocked Russian attempts to get loans on the international markets, and provided financial assistance to Japan, which contributed to the humiliating defeat for Russia.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, the US administration supported the position expressed by the Western corporations. Here is what Henry Kissinger states: "Though Roosevelt proclaimed American

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<sup>9</sup> Ivi, pp. 180-194

<sup>10</sup> Andrew Carnegie - a powerful businessman and a leading force in the American steel industry. Today, he is remembered as an industrialist, millionaire, and philanthropist. Mode of access: [http://www.americaslibrary.gov/aa/carnegie/aa\\_carnegie\\_subj.html](http://www.americaslibrary.gov/aa/carnegie/aa_carnegie_subj.html)

<sup>11</sup> Jennings C. Wise, *Woodrow Wilson: Disciple of Revolution*, Paisley Press, New York, 1938, pp. 45-46

<sup>12</sup> Israel Shamir, *Cabbala of Power*, Four O'clock Press, UK, 2007, pp.64-65

neutrality, he leaned toward Japan. A Russian victory, he argued, would be “a blow to civilization”. And when Japan destroyed the Russian fleet, he rejoiced: “I was thoroughly pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.”<sup>13</sup>

“World War I provided the first occasion for the massive projection of American military force into Europe. A heretofore relatively isolated power promptly transported several hundred thousand of its troops across the Atlantic—a transoceanic military expedition unprecedented in its size and scope, which signaled the emergence of a new major player in the international arena.”<sup>14</sup> Besides, WW I, the US together with the Western Alliance was actively involved in the Russian Civil War (25 October 1917 – October 1922) . They supported the Imperial Russian Army (also known as The Whites), including the provision of troops and supplies.<sup>15</sup>

In numerous Russian history textbooks “the unprovoked intervention of alien forces was given a prominent role in the account of the Civil War..., it was viewed as marking the beginning of this conflict”.<sup>16</sup> Russian authors describe the 1918 events as follows:

“The mind behind the idea for open foreign intervention in Russia was Winston Churchill. He worked out the plan for reconstructing the German Army for the struggle with Bolsheviks and then undertook the efforts to unite the counterrevolutionary forces with the goal of overthrowing the Soviet government and breaking up Russia into a multitude of weak political units... The US delegation to the Paris peace conference brought with it a map of the “proposed Borders of Russia”. On this map Karelia, and the

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<sup>13</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994, pp.41-42

<sup>14</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, New York, 1997, pp. 4

<sup>15</sup> Joel R. Moore, Harry H. Mead and Lewis E. Jahns, *The History of the American Expedition Fighting the Bolsheviki*, The Battery Press, Nashville, TN, 2003, pp. 47–50

<sup>16</sup> James Wertsch, *Voices of Collective Remembering*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002, pp.100

Kola Peninsula, the Batiks, Ukraine, a significant part of Belorussia, Transcaucasia, Siberia, Central Asia, and other areas were outside the borders of Russia.”<sup>17</sup>

Without denying the positive features of the American society, it should be mentioned that from the beginning the idea of sharing the American model as a model of the most free, the most enlightened and the most powerful state on earth, have had an offensive, and often expansionary character. As noted by some Soviet and Western researchers, critics of the uniqueness of the American model, together with the US expansionism strengthens also the Concept of the American exceptionalism.<sup>18</sup>

USA took an offensive path towards Soviet Union right from its creation. It was viewed as a major obstacle in the implementation of the "American Dream". The prominent American scientist John Spargo, which actively endorsed and collaborated with the Wilson administration, emphasized that the destruction of Soviet Russia is the main task of the United States, since it was a challenge to the U.S. foreign affairs: “We shall defeat and destroy Bolshevism by keeping the light upon it, revealing its ugliness, its brutality, its despotism.”<sup>19</sup>

“The military intervention came to an end but, with the sole and partial exception of the Second World War period, the propaganda offensive has never let up. In 1943 Life magazine devoted an entire issue in honor of the Soviet Union’s accomplishments, going far beyond what was demanded by the need for wartime solidarity, going so far as to call Lenin “perhaps the greatest man of modern times”. Two years later, however, with Harry Truman sitting in the White House, such fraternity had no chance of surviving. Truman, after all, was the man who, the day after the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union, said: “If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia, and if

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<sup>17</sup> Л.Н. Жарова, И.А. Мишина, *История Отечества*, Просвещение, М., 1992, pp.213-214

<sup>18</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*, Norton & Co., Inc, New York, 1996, pp. 18

<sup>19</sup> John Spargo, *The Greatest Failure in All History*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1920, pp. 17



Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible.”<sup>20</sup>

The progress of the United States on the "international arena", led to the growing extent of their claims to be the world leader and the "savior" of mankind from all kinds of global challenges. During the Second World War, Nicholas John Spykman, also known as the "godfather of containment", came up with a new geopolitical doctrine. The American scientist combined the ideas of Mahan and Mackinder in the framework of "Heartland, Rimland." Spykman underlined the need to prevent the unification of Europe, the Sino-Soviet Union and the elimination of Germany and Japan as military powers. The formula of power was: "Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world." <sup>21</sup> Thus, the US administration had as a goal not only to fight against fascism, but also to remove Germany, USSR, and then Japan from the list of great powers and assert an American hegemony.

The Second World War dealt a crushing blow to multipolarity. Right from the start the WW II served as a conversion mechanism of a multi-polar world into a bipolar structure. By the end of the war a huge gap delineated the two powers - the Soviet Union and the United States - from all other countries, in relation to the military, political, economic opportunities and ideological influence.<sup>22</sup>

After the end of World War II, the United States became economically, technologically and militarily the most developed country of the world. The military, political and economic center of the capitalist system was transferred to North America. <sup>23</sup> The exclusivity of the U.S. began to be understood as an everyday American consciousness of superiority over all other peoples, and in all areas. And as the most powerful state in

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<sup>20</sup> William Blum, *Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since World War II*, Zed Books Ltd, London, 2003, pp.9-10

<sup>21</sup> Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1942, pp. 25-27

<sup>22</sup> Kenneth N Waltz, *Intimations of Multipolarity, The New World Order: Contrasting Theories*, Birthe Hansen and Bertil Heurlin, New York, 2000, pp.1

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*

the world, the United States took on the function of global guarantor of freedom and democracy- the extended version of the Manifest Destiny, which was introduced by the U.S. president Harry S. Truman: “The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world- and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.”<sup>24</sup>

The Soviet Union, shaped by the war and gaining vast and important areas of geopolitical influence in Europe and Asia, also became a great power. These circumstances allowed USSR to become the undisputed leader of the new geopolitical configuration - the world socialist system. Huge, from the Baltic to the South China Sea, the Eurasian space, the new country severely limited the depth of American influence on the course of events, and control over the rich natural resources of the supercontinent. USSR became a total challenge to the might of the United States, claiming to be the only great power.<sup>25</sup>

For the first time in the history of mankind the post-war structure of the world acquired a classic character: two global poles with approximately equal geopolitical potentials, with various community-social systems, economic models of the state, different meanings of life and development goals. On one side there was Soviet Union, with the following features: a messianic-idealistic development approach, an attempt to build a fair social structure, priority of the conceptual over material values, collectivism over individualism, and the desire to ensure its security on the principles of international balance of power. The center of the second pole was the United States, with the rational pragmatism as the dominant principle of life, extreme individualism, the desire for comfort and material wealth as the ultimate meaning of life, safety, based on the power superiority, aggression and expansion. “The geopolitical dimension could not have been

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<sup>24</sup> *The Truman Doctrine: Special Message to the US Congress on Greece and Turkey*, March 12, 1947.  
Mode of access:  
[http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/doctrine/large/documents/pdfs/5-9.pdf](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/pdfs/5-9.pdf)

<sup>25</sup> Владимир Андреев, *Политический феномен, бескровно изменивший мир*, Обозреватель-Observer, М., № 4, 2005, С.133

clearer: North America Versus Eurasia, with the world at stake. The winner would truly dominate the globe.”<sup>26</sup>

The democratic administration headed by G. Truman did not hide the desire to weaken the Soviet Union and bring it out of the big international game. The American president, who did not want to wait, when the Soviet system would explode from the inside pressure of internal contradictions and the severity of the competition with the leading capitalist countries, began a policy of direct pressure and confrontation, accompanied by the arms race. The Soviet Union was constrained to follow the US example, in order to survive. Even while the United States and the Soviet Union were still formal allies in the war to defeat Germany, the United States started to prepare for war with the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1945, at the time of the Conference in Potsdam concluding World War II, and within days of the atom bomb in the New Mexico desert, the US Pentagon was secretly developing a new American policy of ‘striking the first blow’ in a nuclear war. The first plan for all out conventional war against Soviet Union, called “Totality”, was drafted by General Dwight Eisenhower on the order of President Truman in 1945. The plan consisted in a nuclear attack on the twenty main Soviet cities.<sup>27</sup>

In 1949, the U.S. developed a secret military plan of a nuclear war against the Soviet Union, code-named "Dropshot". It represents a contingency plan for a possible conventional and nuclear war against USSR in order to cease the anticipated Soviet takeover of Western Europe, Near East and parts of Eastern Asia. The plan was very well staged and meticulously calculated.<sup>28</sup> The “initial Allied strategy against the USSR should emphasize the application of heavy atomic and conventional bombing attacks against selected critical targets and a continuation of the air offensive until the capitulation of the Soviets. Moreover, “it is imprudent to assume that complete victory

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<sup>26</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, New York, 1997, pp. 5-6

<sup>27</sup> Michio Kaku, Daniel Axelrod, *To win a nuclear war: The Pentagon's Secret War Plans*, South End Press, Boston, 1987, pp.30-31

<sup>28</sup> Anthony Cave Brown, *Operation World War III : The Secret American Plan 'Dropshot' for War with the Soviet Union, 1957*, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1979, pp. 5

can be won by the air offensive alone. Achievement of our war objectives will undoubtedly require occupation of certain strategic areas by major Allied land forces and may require a major land campaign.”<sup>29</sup>

In the same period Soviet Union illegally occupied and expanded its influence into Eastern Europe, but these actions were taken in order to create a “buffer zone”, to surround itself with friendly neighbors. Soviet equivalents to NATO (1949) and Marshal Plan (1947) - the Warsaw Pact (1955) and Comecon (1949) were founded much later, as a response to Western allies’ actions. The USSR plans, at least initially, did not include offensive actions against USA, or worldwide domination. The analysis of historical facts leads to the conclusion that the Cold War as a form of acute geopolitical rivalry, which lasted for half a century, was unleashed by Washington. The Soviet Union represented a potential challenge to the global imperial ambitions of the United States.<sup>30</sup>

In 1950 The National Council Report 68 (NSC-68) was adopted. It is one of the most significant documents of American policy during the Cold War, shaping the U.S. foreign policy for the next 20 years, and leading to the intensification of Containment<sup>31</sup> against Communist expansion. Following the strategy outlined in NSC-68, the U.S. foreign policy should: significantly increase the military spending, establish a decisive advantage for U.S. forces on the Eurasian continent – a pivotal region of the world; initiate offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the Soviet system, etc. The

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<sup>29</sup> "Dropshot" - American Plan for War with the Soviet Union, 1957. Mode of access: <http://www.allworldwars.com/Dropshot%20-%20American%20Plan%20for%20War%20with%20the%20Soviet%20Union%201957.html>

<sup>30</sup> Владимир Андреев, *Политический феномен, бескровно изменивший мир*, Обозреватель-Observer, М., № 4, 2005, С. 131

<sup>31</sup> Containment – an US policy to prevent the spread of communism throughout the world, by using numerous strategies. Deborah W. Larson,, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985, p. 69

ultimate goal of NSC-68 was the collapse of the Soviet Union, the major threat of the emergence of a "New World Order" centered on American liberal-capitalist values.<sup>32</sup>

American historians Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln notice that the post-war U.S. military alliances, such as: NATO, SEATO, CENTO; were formed under the idea of encirclement of the Soviet Union. The control of neighborly lands in order to establish the superiority of American power in Eurasia was the US core strategic goal.<sup>33</sup>

After Yalta and Potsdam the West has spent enormous resources to establish a new balance of forces: the Marshall Plan, the integration mechanisms from Rome to Maastricht, the NATO military bloc, etc. This process created not only strong classic alliances, but a new type and level of world politics. They are no longer just limited to the circumstances; they irreversibly diminish the national, political and economic sovereignty. The West under the aegis of the U.S., generally speaking, emerged as a geopolitical, economic, military and cultural consolidated entity. The American political consciousness gradually became identified with the West in general, and respectively the integrated Western consciousness became, in their view, not just the strongest motive and identity of the world, but also that the rest is a province that does not have the right to historic initiative.<sup>34</sup>

Starting from 1970's with the loss of the appeal of communism in the world, the classical liberalism began to lose its original noble features, pushing to change the ideals of the Enlightenment, the sovereignty of the people, the equality and universality of progress, to a new global ideological project. The name of the new ideology is the Globalism. The USSR economic and political dependence on the West resumed, mostly as a result of increasing dependence on the export of raw materials and extensive

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<sup>32</sup> Paul H. Nitze, S. Nelson Drew, Ed., *NCS-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment*, National Defense University, Washington DC, 1994, pp.6-15

<sup>33</sup> Norman J. Padelford, George A. Lincoln, *The Dynamics of International Politics*, Macmillan Company, New York, 1967, pp. 108

<sup>34</sup> Владимир Андреев, *Политический феномен, бескровно изменивший мир*, Обозреватель-Observer, М., № 4, 2005, С. 129-131

economic growth. In the 1980s, during Reagan administration the idea to exhaust the Soviet Union was once again brought to the forefront. Among numerous ways to weaken the Soviet System, one of the most effective was by helping bring about a drastic fall in the price of oil, thereby denying the Soviet Union large inflows of hard currency. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Republicans openly declared that the policy of Reagan administration, focused on the economic attrition of the Soviet Union, ended successfully. Thus, the US actions represented an external factor that played a fateful role in the collapse of a superpower, the weak points of which, by their definition, were the ideology and the economics.<sup>35</sup>

The geopolitical interest in the area of the Russian Empire and then of its successor the Soviet Union, did not appear after the collapse of the USSR, but much earlier, at the end of XIX century. Historically, one of the constant tendencies of the U.S. foreign policy, regardless the party affiliation of the administration, has become an increasing trend for expansion and overwhelming desire to make the world in their own image. For this purpose a vast variety of methods have been used: economic means, diplomacy, covert operations, and often military force. The United States geopolitical interests had dramatically changed during the XIX - XX centuries: from the policy of isolationism, through the increasing role and significance of the U.S. in Europe and in the world, to a direct confrontation between the two superpowers - the U.S. and the Soviet Union, having as its ultimate goal the economic and political leadership on the world stage. The United States was the country that, in the struggle for world domination, for the establishment of a unipolar world, has made the most significant contribution to the collapse of the Soviet Union. "The defeat and collapse of the Soviet Union was the final step in the rapid ascendance of a Western Hemisphere power, the United States, as the sole and, indeed, the first truly global power."<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Peter Schweizer, *Reagan's War: The Epic Story of His Forty Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism*, Doubleday, New York, 2002, pp.362-370

<sup>36</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, New York, 1997, pp. 1-2

## 1.2. The U.S. position on the post-Soviet space after the collapse of the USSR.

*“It is imperative that  
no Eurasian challenger emerges,  
capable of dominating Eurasia  
and thus also of challenging America.”*

*Zbigniew Brzezinski, 1997*

On December 29, 1991 the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The United States became the dominant power in the world. This event had been awaited for many years, but nobody expected such a rapid denouement. The main political result of this huge geopolitical battle was the cardinal transformation of the geopolitical configuration. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his annual address to the Federal Assembly on 25 April 2005, called the collapse of the Soviet Union "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the XX century".<sup>37</sup>

Everybody criticized Gorbachev. Some would say that he betrayed the ideals of communism; others would blame him for being insufficiently democratic. But the main charge to the first and last president of the USSR is that he failed to keep the country he headed. He failed to preserve its geopolitical achievements, which came at the cost of unprecedented efforts and sacrifices of the Soviet people.<sup>38</sup> With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the geopolitical structure of the world has changed dramatically and has

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<sup>37</sup> В. В. Путин, *Послание Федеральному Собранию Российской Федерации*, Москва, Кремль, 25 апреля, 2005. Mode of access:  
[http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2005/04/25/1223\\_type633372type633374type82634\\_87049.shtml](http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2005/04/25/1223_type633372type633374type82634_87049.shtml)

<sup>38</sup> Уткин А. И., *Измена генсека. Бегство из Европы*, Эксмо: Алгоритм, М., 2009, С. 256

found signs of uncertainty in the trend towards unipolarity and, at the same time, multipolarity. Boris Yeltsin announced as a geopolitical idea the aspiration of Russia to be embedded into the Western community. It was a crazy idea for the country representing a state-matrix of the world ethnic cultures, since the integration in a completely alien civilization would inevitably lead to a change of national and civilizational identity, of the civilizational code, of moral values, traditions, standards, the meaning of life and so on. This would entail the abandonment of traditional allies, the change of the foreign policy model, and the recognition of the dominant U.S. role in the world.<sup>39</sup>

“The collapse of the Soviet Union had removed the only global challenger to US power. The US was established in a position of global dominance with no parallel in history, exceeding even that of the British Empire in the nineteenth century. US military spending soon equaled that of the next six states put together – and four of those were US allies.”<sup>40</sup>

The results of the collapse of the Soviet Union had a direct impact on the doctrine of the U.S. national interests. Now the essence was no longer the struggle against communism, but the affirmation of the US supremacy and the imposition of American values around the world. The former "Iron Curtain" was the expression not only of the ideological confrontation between liberalism and communism, but also, and maybe even more significantly, the power struggle between the West led by the United States and the Soviet Union. This second antagonism could not disappear with the collapse of communism in Russia, but only got a different, a softer form, as a new conglomerate of cooperation and conflict between the U.S. and the Russian Federation. In the essence,

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<sup>39</sup> Леонид Ивашов, *Тектонический сдвиг в структуре мира*, МР, № 30, 2009, С. 3-11

<sup>40</sup> Anatol Lieven, *The Secret Policemen's Ball: The United States, Russia and the International Order after 11 September*, International Affairs (London), Vol. 78, no. 2, 2002, pp. 246



the American doctrine of national interests has become a doctrine of American hegemony.<sup>41</sup>

“American supremacy has thus produced a new international order that not only replicates but institutionalizes abroad many of the features of the American system itself... Most of that system emerged during the Cold War, as part of America's effort to contain its global rival, the Soviet Union. It was thus ready-made for global application, once that rival faltered and America emerged as the first and only global power.”<sup>42</sup>

“The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) can be said to represent "global" interests, and their constituency may be construed as the world. In reality, however, they are heavily American dominated and their origins are traceable to American initiative.”<sup>43</sup>

In the 1990s it became clear that the United States inherited from its traditions, and still more from the cold war, a set of structures and attitudes which made it very difficult for it to act as a “satisfied” power and therefore as a hegemon of consensus.<sup>44</sup> The combination of the expansion of US geopolitical influence, support for military interventions and highly selective promotion of democratic revolutions made the United States appear extremely menacing to any state it viewed as a rival.”<sup>45</sup>

“For America, the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia. For half a millennium, world affairs were dominated by Eurasian powers and peoples who fought with one another

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<sup>41</sup> Антон Беблер, *Как далеко пойдет расширение НАТО? Последний этап и перспективы дальнейшего расширения*, Европейская безопасность: события, оценки, прогнозы, №16 (32), 2009, С. 12

<sup>42</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, New York, 1997, pp. 28-29

<sup>43</sup> *Ivi.*, pp. 27

<sup>44</sup> G. John Ikenberry, *Getting Hegemony Right*, The National Interest, n.63, Spring 2001, pp. 19-24

<sup>45</sup> Anatol Lieven, *The Secret Policemen's Ball: The United States, Russia and the International Order after 11 September*, International Affairs (London), Vol. 78, no. 2, 2002, pp. 247

for regional domination and reached out for global power. Now a non-Eurasian power is preeminent in Eurasia—and **America's global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained**... Eurasia is thus the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played.”<sup>46</sup> After the Soviet Union ceased its existence, the America's global hegemony could be achieved by gaining control over yet untouched Eurasian territories. “To put it in a terminology that hearkens back to the more brutal age of ancient empires, the three grand imperatives of (the US) imperial geostrategy are to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together.”<sup>47</sup>

With the collapse of the Soviet system, on its place a sort of giant zone of systematic demolition and tectonic mobility was formed. Almost anything and everything felt under change or reassessment - the territorial and political status, regimes, ideologies, elite, values, interests and goals, cultural and geopolitical orientation, international alliances, and history itself; an intensive redistribution of resources and power initiated. And the fact that the changes in various post-Soviet countries have been uneven, sometimes even of polar direction, not to mention the differences in their scale, rates and forms, further complicated the restructurization process that included one-sixth of the Earth's land area. The new states, which emerged on the Russian borders, immediately became the object of expansion not only of global players (the U.S., NATO, and the EU), but also some regional powers, such as: China, Iran and Turkey. Still, the most active policy in the former Soviet Union have been taken by the United States, projecting itself as the main rival to Russia for the establishment of dominant influence over the new international actors.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, New York, 1997, pp. 30-31

<sup>47</sup> *Ivi.*, pp. 40

<sup>48</sup> Волков Я. В., *Геополитика и безопасность в современном мире*, Военный университет, М, 2000, С. 19-25

The new leadership of Russia hoping so much on the Western assistance, after the initiation of the reforms fell short of their expectations. The support provided often had an opposite effect, contributing to Russia's faulty and improper strategies. External marks of respect and attention were given to Russia, for example, accepting Russia in the G8 and gradually improving its status in the organization. But in most cases the West acted without consulting Russia, even on issues related to the Ex-Soviet space. A good example is the expansion of NATO, which in a few years time after USSR ceased to exist reached the Russian borders, even though during the 1989 negotiations the western partners assured the NATO area will not be extended.<sup>49</sup> The American economist Jeffrey Sachs, who was an advisor to the Yeltsin government in Russia from December 1991 to January 1994, stated that the US and its Western Allies did not want significant economic reforms in Russia. According to him, the U.S. wanted to keep Russia weak.<sup>50</sup>

In 1992, under the guidance of the Western advisers The Presidential Administration of Russia adopted almost twenty priority laws and decrees to reform the Russian legislation, through which the most significant ones were the Privatization Laws. The final result of the above-mentioned structures was an acute crisis of all aspects of life in Russia.<sup>51</sup> "These changes led to beggary for most citizens, ushering in the most cataclysmic peacetime economic collapse of an industrial country in history. Under the banner of reform and the guidance of American-prescribed shock therapy, perestroika became catastroika."<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Dmitri Trenin, *Post-imperium: a Eurasian story*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow, 2012, pp. 150

<sup>50</sup> Jeffrey D. Sachs, *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time*, Penguin Press, New York, pp. 416

<sup>51</sup> Marshall I. Goldman, *The Privatization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry*, Rutledge, London, 2003, pp.79

<sup>52</sup> Milne Seumas, *Catastroika has not only been a disaster for Russia*, The Guardian, 16 August 2001. Mode of access: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/aug/16/russia.comment>

After the liquidation of the Soviet regime and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new Russian leadership hoped to build the US-Russian relations on the basis of parity, without taking into account the new alignment of forces in the world, and the new economic and political status of Russia. Moscow believed in the possibility of equal and mutually beneficial cooperation between the U.S. and Russia. However, the United States, becoming the sole superpower, was not eager to share the power with the defeated opponent.<sup>53</sup>

The first visit of the Russian President Boris Yeltsin to Washington (Camp David, February 1992), to some extent satisfied his ambitions. In the Joint Declaration of the new relationships between Russia and the U.S., both countries have declared that they “do not regard each other as potential adversaries”. The document contained a number of important innovations. First, it stated that the Russia - U.S “relationship will be characterized by friendship and partnership founded on mutual trust and respect and a common commitment to democracy and economic freedom”. Second, the paper stated the desire of the United States and Russia, to create a “new alliance of partners”, which in principle could mean the intention to emphasize trust and long-term nature of Russian-American rapprochement.<sup>54</sup> However, the “Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship”, signed during the second visit of Boris Yeltsin in the United States (Washington, June 1992), does not say anything about the “new alliance of partners”. The word “partnership” is often used, but without any explanation what exactly it would imply. The charter does not provide any evidences of an equal partnership.<sup>55</sup>

Obviously, it was the reluctance of Washington to recognize that Russia as an equal partner with the United States. But the facts that could not be said by the diplomats were

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<sup>53</sup> Волков Я. В., *Геополитика и безопасность в современном мире*, Военный университет, М, 2000, С. 19-25

<sup>54</sup> *Joint Declaration, First US-Russia summit between President Bush and President Yeltsin*, Camp David, February 1, 1992

<sup>55</sup> *A Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship*, The White House, June 17, 1992. Mode of access: <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/b920617b.htm>

revealed by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Despite the fact that he ceased to be a member of the US administration, still his opinion and ideas, based on his immense experience as a geostrategist, a political scientist, and a statesman, are not to be ignored. In his book "The Grand Chessboard", he shattered the illusions of the Russian political elite in this regard: "The deliberately friendly posture adopted by the West, especially by the United States, toward the new Russian leadership was a source of encouragement to the post-Soviet "westernizers" in the Russian foreign policy establishment. It both reinforced its pro-American inclinations and seduced its membership personally. The new leaders were flattered to be on a first-name basis with the top policy makers of the world's only superpower, and they found it easy to deceive themselves into thinking that they, too, were the leaders of a superpower. When the Americans launched the slogan of "the mature strategic partnership" between Washington and Moscow, to the Russians it seemed as if a new democratic American-Russian condominium—replacing the former contest—had thus been sanctified... Russia thereby would not only be the legal successor to the former Soviet Union but the de facto partner in a global accommodation, based on genuine equality. As the new Russian leaders never tired of asserting, that meant not only that the rest of the world should recognize Russia as America's equal but that no global problem could be tackled or resolved without Russia's participation and/or permission... The problem with this approach was that it was devoid of either international or domestic realism. While the concept of "mature strategic partnership" was flattering, it was also deceptive. America was neither inclined to share global power with Russia nor could it, even if it had wanted to do so. The new Russia was simply too weak, too devastated by three-quarters of a century of Communist rule, and too socially backward to be a real global partner."<sup>56</sup>

A practical proof of the fact that one of the US priority policies is to prevent the restoration of the Russian empire, the restoration of a strong Russia, is the US policy towards the Ex-Soviet countries (currently members of CIS). Although, based on the assurances of Washington that the U.S. does not view Russia as an enemy; Russia

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<sup>56</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, New York, 1997, pp.99-101

continues to be a major obstacle on the way to America's geopolitical ambitions, particularly in such a sensitive area for Russia as the post-Soviet space.<sup>57</sup>

In the Post-Soviet space Russia and the United States pursued opposing goals. Russia has been trying to keep its influence over the former Soviet Union, to create opportunities for their political, economic and military integration. The U.S., for its part, pursued the strategic goal of ousting Russia from the former Soviet "suburbs" and preventing them from rapprochement with Moscow.<sup>58</sup>

According to Alexei Bogaturov, Doctor of Science and Deputy Director of the Institute of International Security Studies (the Russian Academy of Sciences), three basic circumstances determine the situation of competition between Russia and the United States on the territory of the former Soviet Union:

First, there is a reassimilation of space resources of the southern and south-eastern regions of Russia's "underbelly", from the Caucasus to the Altai region. In fact, for the first time since the end of the XIX century this process has become highly competitive; in the struggle for influence, besides Russia, are present the U.S., China, the European Union, as well as (on a smaller scale) Islamic countries not belonging to the Caucasus or the Central Asian regions.

Second, the global context of the situation is determined by a major conceptual shift in strategic thinking of the United States. Basically, Washington has always paid attention to the strength of the American position in Eurasia. However, the US occupied almost exclusively reference points in its coastal and island areas. Only in the last decade the "epicenter" of the American political-strategic activities shifted to the deeper parts of the continental Eurasia. The two centuries of orientation towards Eurasia "from the sea" ended.

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<sup>57</sup> Батюк В. И., *Политика США в меняющемся мире*, Наука, М., 2004, С. 86-92

<sup>58</sup> *Ibidem*.

Third, the competition for resources of Eurasian mainland has a peaceful character. Currently, there are no noticeable signs of severe collision between the most powerful parties. But the point of tensions is that every one of the strongest powers not only is not confident in the stability of this peaceful competition, but consciously does not allow to anyone to gain that confidence. Finally, the area along the southern and south-eastern Russian borders is increasingly becoming a zone of potential international tensions.<sup>59</sup>

Bogaturov comes to the conclusion that the West is regularly testing the strength of Russian positions in the near perimeter of the Russian borders. The Western policy can be defined as "a strategy of biting off" the fragments of the former territory of the Soviet Union, which in Russia and even in the West are still considered a sort of natural sphere of Russian influence.<sup>60</sup>

For almost two decades, the U.S. policy in the post-Soviet space has undergone a certain evolution. During the first period, 1992 – 1994, the U.S. policy towards the CIS countries is closely related to the overall evolution of Russian-American relations. Often, - writes Sergey Samuilov, the political scientist and leading researcher at the Russian Institute for US and Canadian Studies- the U.S. initiatives in regards to the Commonwealth of Independent States (the European part, the Caucasus, Central Asia) and the individual states were reconciled with Moscow. The reason that Washington at first acted with caution was that, in the early years of the CIS, it has “made a bet” on Russia. It was assumed that Russia within the framework of the officially declared "strategic partnership" with the U.S. and NATO can serve as an “engine of democratization and market economy” for the entire former Soviet space.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Алексей Богатуров, *Между Западом и нефтью: Энергоресурсы могут сделать азиатизацию НАТО рентабельной*, независимая газета, 2005-03-22. Mode of access: [http://www.ng.ru/world/2005-03-22/6\\_between.html](http://www.ng.ru/world/2005-03-22/6_between.html)

<sup>60</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>61</sup> Сергей Михайлович Самуилов, *Этапы политики США в отношении СНГ*, США: Экономика. Политика. Идеология, М., № 3, 2005, С. 61

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the NATO advisory body founded in December 1991, whose main task was to improve relations between NATO and the ex-USSR countries and to implement the obligations of the USSR in the field of arms control, did not become the "common European home" that Gorbachev dreamed about. As for Bush's call for a "Europe whole and free"<sup>62</sup>, Yeltsin and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev had doubts: Is Russia included in the plan? In the spring of 1992 in Washington, Bush flatly rejected Yeltsin's suggestion of the Russian-American alliance, recalling the irrelevance of such an alliance in the circumstances of the new era. The hopes of Moscow that the West will accept Russia as an equal partner quickly dashed.<sup>63</sup>

One of the tools in neutralizing the ambitions of Russia was the elaboration of the NATO program "Partnership for Peace" (PfP), an American initiative, aimed at building up cooperation and gradual reorganization of the member states armed forces following the norms and standards of NATO and the alliance.<sup>64</sup> Twenty five countries were invited to participate in the program, including all the CIS countries, also Russia. But in fact the PfP program put forward for the CIS countries has been focusing on estranging the new independent states from Russia, this way weakening the Moscow influence in the former Soviet space. Paying attention to the anti-Russian directivity of the PfP program in the CIS, Sergey Samuilov points out the following features:

First of all, PfP program represents an aspiration of the West to form a single-pole structure of the European security through NATO. In the elaboration of the PfP

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<sup>62</sup>President George Bush, *A Europe Whole and Free: Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz*, Rheingoldhalle, Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, May 31, 1989. Mode of access: <http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6-890531.htm>

<sup>62</sup> Dmitri Trenin, *Post-imperium: a Eurasian story*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow, 2012, pp. 149

<sup>62</sup>*Partnership for Peace: Framework Document*, NATO, Brussels, 1994. Mode of access: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_24469.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24469.htm?selectedLocale=en)



program, Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)<sup>65</sup> were simply ignored as independent centers of military power in Europe, which could serve as a second pillar of the All-European structure. Initially Russia was invited to join the program on the same basis as other countries, not taking in account that Russia, despite its economic and political difficulties, from the military point of view was still a superpower.<sup>66</sup> Second of all, The PfP program created the possibility, for the countries that are not in trustful relationships with Moscow, to gradually approach NATO, with the distant and vague prospect of gaining membership in the alliance, i.e. security guarantees primarily from Russia. Actually, the PfP program alone was giving no security guarantees to its participants.<sup>67</sup>

And finally, the PfP program has been concentrated on a certain weakening of the Collective Security Treaty; as Moscow could not prevent its members to participate in the PfP. Thus, the Member States have had space for geopolitical maneuvering between NATO and Russia, in order to achieve some additional benefits. Several members of the CIS did not fail to take advantage of the hidden opportunities in the negotiations with Moscow or with NATO. In 1994, as soon as the PfP program was officially adopted, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine hastened to join it. The expectations for an eventual membership in NATO, seems to have done the trick.<sup>68</sup>

The end of 1994, when, under the US pressure, it was decided to expand the NATO to the East, can be considered the finalization of the first period. The American political

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<sup>65</sup> *The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)* - an intergovernmental military alliance based on The Collective Security Treaty, signed on 15 May 1992. CSTO members are Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Georgia, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan withdrew from the organisation. Mode of access: [http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index\\_aengl.htm](http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index_aengl.htm)

<sup>66</sup> Сергей Михайлович Самуилов, *Этапы политики США в отношении СНГ*, США: Экономика. Политика. Идеология, М., № 3, 2005, С. 65

<sup>67</sup> Dmitri Trenin, *Post-imperium: a Eurasian story*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow, 2012, pp. 151

<sup>68</sup> Сергей Михайлович Самуилов, *Этапы политики США в отношении СНГ*, США: Экономика. Политика. Идеология, М., № 3, 2005, С. 66-67

elite, having achieved some success, began a serious reassessment of the U.S. policy toward the ex-Soviet countries.

The second period of the U.S. administration's policy on the post Soviet space covers the years between 1995 and 2000. The main goal was the regionalization and the strengthening of the independence of Commonwealth countries from Russia. In the European CIS region, the Clinton administration made a bet on Ukraine, in the Caucasus - on Azerbaijan, in Central Asia – on Uzbekistan.<sup>69</sup>

As a way of weakening Russia's positions the US was taking into account the formation of alternative integration associations on the post-Soviet space. Such an organisation, called GUAM, having as members Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, was established in Strasbourg in May 1997. Following the intentions of Washington, Ukraine was to become the center of this association. A characteristic feature of GUAM, in contrast to the other sub-regional CIS groupings, such as: the Central Asian Union, the Eurasian Economic Community), was the orientation towards European and other international structures.<sup>70</sup> Clinton administration embodied the vision expressed by Brzezinski as early as 1994. He argued that the US policy towards the former Soviet Union should be based on the consolidation of the "geopolitical pluralism", with Ukraine as the key state that would prevent the revival of the Russian power.<sup>71</sup> In April 1999 Uzbekistan joined GUAM, and the union's name became GUUAM. In general GUUAM had a subordinate character in regards to the United States, and the American side does not hide the fact that the organization is funded by Washington.<sup>72</sup>

The third period of the U.S. policy towards the CIS came after the terrorist attacks from September 11, 2001. The main features of this period are as follows:

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<sup>69</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>70</sup> Taras Kuzio, *Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The Emergence of GUUAM*, European Security, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2000, pp. 81–83

<sup>71</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Premature Partnership*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2, Mar. - Apr., 1994, pp. 80

<sup>72</sup> Taras Kuzio, *Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The Emergence of GUUAM*, European Security, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2000, pp. 81–83

First, the US starts to show a strong interest towards Russia as a reliable partner in the coalition against terrorism, during the declared global war on terrorism. The interest amplified as a result of the continuous failure of the American occupation of Iraq.

Second, for Washington, after the terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001, the value of the Central Asian CIS countries has significantly increased, especially of Uzbekistan. The US priority policy for the Central Asian CIS countries, to strengthen their independence from Russia and to ensure broad access to their oil resources, has faded into the background. At the forefront came the interest in them as "frontline states". They became convenient springboards for the armed struggle against the "Taliban" and "Al Qaeda." Accordingly, in 2001, the US, with the approval of Moscow, conducted a military penetration into the Central Asian region.<sup>73</sup>

The ideological basis of the U.S. policy in the post-Soviet space is the concept of "the democracy expansion". Clinton administration was reflecting on how to steer the course of changes in the states that emerged after the collapse of the USSR in a favorable direction for the United States, and to establish conditions under which the developed countries of the West could gain access to the intellectual, human, energy, raw material, and other resources of the former "closed" countries. It was required to overcome their isolation by integrating into the world economic and political processes. It was assumed that the United States in accordance with its historical mission and purpose, will bring the "light of freedom" in the new states, will help them in their transition to democracy and will be able from the young democracies to create new partners in the global politics. In essence it was a question of the distribution of American influence in the vast spaces previously inaccessible to the U.S.<sup>74</sup>

On September 21, 1993, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Anthony Lake came up with a new concept of the democracy expansion. The main idea

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<sup>73</sup> Сергей Михайлович Самуилов, *Этапы политики США в отношении СНГ*, США: Экономика. Политика. Идеология, М., № 3, 2005, С. 68-80

<sup>74</sup> *History of the Department of State during the Clinton Presidency (1993-2001): Europe and the New Independent States*, US Department of State Archive, 1993-2001. Mode of access: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/8527.htm>

was that the priority of the American foreign policy should be the promotion of democratization in the former-socialist regimes from Eurasia (including the post-Soviet states).<sup>75</sup> The concept of Anthony Lake became the basis of the 1994 U.S. National Security Strategy: "A National Security Strategy through involvement and expansion."<sup>76</sup> The document underlines the expansion and consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, converting the post-communist countries into strategic allies.

The efforts to "democratize" the post-Soviet states particularly intensified when George Bush Jr. became president. The new "Bush Doctrine" was introduced with "The National Security Strategy of the United States" from 2002.<sup>77</sup> As stated in the document, the U.S. foreign policy should be based on three pillars:

- The policy of unrivaled U.S. military superiority - U.S. should strive to strengthen its military power to maintain the status of the world's sole superpower;
- The policy of the "preventive war" (the United States should overthrow foreign regimes that represented a potential or a perceived threat to the United States, even if the threat was not immediate) combined with the policy to pursue U.S. military interests unilaterally;
- The policy of spreading democracy, liberty and security around the world.

Many analysts tend to view this doctrine as fundamentally new for the U.S., a doctrine of an aggressive conduct of a superpower. "Bush's vaunted democracy initiative was never anything but a farce, as he cozied up to one dictator after another as long as they

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<sup>75</sup> Anthony Lake, *From containment to enlargement*, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol.4, Issue 39, 9/27/93, pp.658

<sup>76</sup> *A National Security Strategy through involvement and expansion*, The White House, 1994. Mode of access: <http://edocs.nps.edu/govpubs/wh/1994/nss1994.pdf>

<sup>77</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, The White House, 2002. Mode of access: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>

helped us with other strategic goals, including fighting terrorism and providing us with energy.”<sup>78</sup> All in all, “The Bush administration had a different idea of how to install democracy, often resorting to means of “democratic imperialism” and, in certain countries, “bombing in” democracy.”<sup>79</sup>

Since 2000, growing conflict between the U.S. and a number of post-communist governments (particularly Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and Uzbekistan) over their foreign policy orientations, the lack of significant results in the "democracy promotion" and the Bush administration's unilateral efforts to shape the world in the American interest have led to more aggressive approaches toward fostering “democratization” in the post-Soviet region.<sup>80</sup> Washington has prompted to act in other ways. It was assumed that removing the former Communist party officials or pro-Russian leaders from power and replacing them with young, energetic, pro-American leaders, would open the way to the U.S. geopolitical influence in the desired region. The success of such an approach could not be initially guaranteed, not so much depending on the encouragement of the United States, but on favorable coincidence of many other random factors. However, after September 11, 2001, the Bush administration, unlike its predecessors, Democrats began the attempts in implementing this approach. Indeed, in the case of a successful outcome, Washington could achieve its goals with minimum efforts and costs.<sup>81</sup>

The first success of this strategy was the Georgian "Rose Revolution", November 2003. As the Rose Revolution was getting under way, G. W. Bush spoke before the National

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<sup>78</sup>Dan Froomkin, *What Is the Bush Doctrine, Anyway?*, Washington Post, September 12, 2008.

Mode of access: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2008/09/12/BL2008091201471.html?hpid=opinionsbox1>

<sup>79</sup> Volodymyr Dubovyk, *Kyiv and Tbilisi: No Longer Washington's Favorites?*, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, No. 93, March, 2010, pp.1-4. Mode of access: [http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/PONARS\\_Eurasia\\_After\\_the\\_Color\\_Revolutions.pdf](http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/PONARS_Eurasia_After_the_Color_Revolutions.pdf)

<sup>80</sup> Mark R. Bessinger, *Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions*, Perspectives on Politics, Vol.5. No.2, June 2007, pp.261 Mode of access: <http://www.princeton.edu/~mbeissin/beissinger.modrev.article.pdf>

<sup>81</sup> Mark Mackinnon, *The New Cold War: Revolutions, Rigged Elections and Pipeline Politics in the Former Soviet Union*, Basic Books, 2007, pp. 116-119

Endowment for Democracy, where he called the American invasion of Iraq the beginning of a “global democratic revolution”. The new Georgian government, getting full support from Washington, immediately declared that one of their main foreign policy goals will be joining NATO. In May 2005 Bush traveled to Tbilisi, where he praised the Rose Revolution as an example to be emulated throughout the world. Since then, the U.S. made active efforts to support democratic revolutionaries within the post-Soviet region and elsewhere.<sup>82</sup>

Next was Ukraine. The United States government spent \$65 million on “democracy promotion” in supporting the Orange Revolution. Much of the financial support was channeled through third-party NGOs to Ukrainian NGOs, many of which played a direct role in the Revolution. Andrew Wilson, senior lecturer in Russian and Ukrainian studies at the University of London, the winner of the 2005 Alec Nove Prize, describes the sophisticated scheme of the US financial assistance to democratic opposition movements in the CIS countries on the example of Ukraine. He states that USAID (the United States federal government agency) granted millions of dollars to the Poland America-Ukraine Cooperation Initiative (PAUCI), which is administered by Freedom House (a U.S.-based non-governmental organization). PAUCI then sent these funds to numerous Ukrainian NGOs and social movements.<sup>83</sup>

In the period between 2003 and 2006, some attempts to organize mass protests against “fraudulent elections” failed (Armenia, Belarus and Uzbekistan). The main reason is that the pro-Western opposition in these countries did not have a mass support. In addition, some political leaders of CIS actively opposed the US infiltration in the area. In particular, the President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov acted vigorously. In 2004, he forced the western representatives of international organizations to re-register. This decision caused a negative reaction in the West. However, the protests and criticism from the West did not stop Karimov. He closed the office of Open Society Institute of

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<sup>82</sup> Mark R. Bessinger, *Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions*, Perspectives on Politics, Vol.5. No.2, June 2007, pp.261  
Mode of access: <http://www.princeton.edu/~mbeissin/beissinger.modrev.article.pdf>

<sup>83</sup> Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2005, pp. 183-189

George Soros and tightened the control over the activities of other Western organizations located on the territory of Uzbekistan. In May 2005, Karimov decided to withdraw from GUUAM, as a result the organization took the original acronym - GUAM.<sup>84</sup>

As for the US policy toward Belarus, the most significant event is represented by the Belarus Democracy Act<sup>85</sup> signed by President Bush in 2004. The Belarus Democracy Act is a bill that authorizes assistance to pro-democracy activism in Belarus, the “sanctions offensive” and other actions undertaken by the Bush administration with the intention of overthrowing the Lukashenko regime. The document allows the US government, directly and on legal basis, to provide assistance for Belarusian political parties, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and independent media, and in the same time prohibiting the U.S. government agencies from providing loans and investment to the Belarus government.<sup>86</sup> These actions were rebuffed by Lukashenko. He used the restrictions on Belarus’ major energy exporter, Belnaftekhim, as a pretext to minimize the presence and activity of the U.S. embassy and other Western structures on the territory of Belarus.<sup>87</sup>

The most violent among all was the Kyrgyzstan’s 2005 Tulip Revolution. Still it had a classic scenario of a Color Revolution: as a result of the protests organized after the parliamentary elections of February 27 and of March 13, which were declared

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<sup>84</sup> Сергей Михайлович Самуилов, *Этапы политики США в отношении СНГ*, США: Экономика. Политика. Идеология, М., № 3, 2005, С. 81

<sup>85</sup> H.R. 854 (108th): *Belarus Democracy Act of 2004*, 108th Congress, 2003–2004. (Passed Congress/Enrolled Bill). Mode of access: <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/hr854>

<sup>86</sup> *Belarus Democracy Act Will Help Cause of Freedom, Bush Says, New law applies sanctions, provides funding for parties, NGOs, media*, the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, 21 October 2004. Mode of access: <http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2004/October/20041022100536btrueveceR0.8822595.html>

<sup>87</sup> Vitali Silitski, *Explaining Belarus’ Post-Orange Transformation*, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, No. 70, September, 2009, pp.1-5. Mode of access: [http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/PONARS\\_Eurasia\\_After\\_the\\_Color\\_Revolutions.pdf](http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/PONARS_Eurasia_After_the_Color_Revolutions.pdf)

fraudulent by international election observation missions, president Akayev signed his resignation statement.<sup>88</sup>

In 2005, the next candidate to the change of power through the "management of legitimate elections" became Azerbaijan, a country with significant reserves of oil. This country was of particular interest due to the economic and geopolitical considerations. "Despite its limited size and small population, - wrote Brzezinski - , Azerbaijan, with its vast energy resources, is also geopolitically critical. It is the cork in the bottle containing the riches of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. The independence of the Central Asian states can be rendered nearly meaningless if Azerbaijan becomes fully subordinated to Moscow's control. Azerbaijan's own and very significant oil resources can also be subjected to Russian control, once Azerbaijan's independence has been nullified. An independent Azerbaijan, linked to Western markets by pipelines that do not pass through Russian-controlled territory, also becomes a major avenue of access from the advanced and energy-consuming economies to the energy rich Central Asian republics. Almost as much as in the case of Ukraine, the future of Azerbaijan and Central Asia is also crucial in defining what Russia might or might not become."<sup>89</sup> The opposition hoped for another color revolution, but the drastic measures of president Aliyev impeded the development of such events. Three leaders of the opposition movement were jailed, accused of planning an armed revolt, and at least twelve government officials have been sacked and arrested on charges of planning a coup.<sup>90</sup>

The events from Georgia and Ukraine, that led to a series of "color" revolutions and the rise to power of pro-American politicians in these countries, Washington's attempts to replicate these events in other CIS countries, particularly in Belarus and Azerbaijan,

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<sup>88</sup> *Akayev quits as Kyrgyz president*, BBC News, 4 April, 2005. Mode of access: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4403591.stm>

<sup>89</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, New York, 1997, pp. 46-47

<sup>90</sup> *Azeri opposition leaders arrested*, BBC News, 5 November, 2005. Mode of access: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4409812.stm>



inevitably attracted the attention of Russian policy makers and researchers. Thus, according to the deputy general director of the Effective Politics Foundation, Vladimir Frolov, currently on the post-Soviet space, Russia is faced with a qualitatively new phenomenon that is fundamentally changing the role of the election procedure in the formation of a legitimate government. With the tool of national will, the elections in the CIS countries increasingly become a convenient excuse for multilateral foreign interference. The goal is the formation of an international legal environment for regime change by challenging the election results, the delegitimation of existing constitutional procedures and the establishment of political crisis in the country. The crisis, as a rule, either ends in a "color" revolution, i.e. the change of government through unconstitutional coup with automatic recognition at the international level, or leads to a long-term, a controlled from outside, political destabilization, paralyzing the legally elected government ".<sup>91</sup>

In order to legitimize such scenarios of regime change, Washington has an extensive support of the international community represented by the integrated network of Western non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the media, the international monitoring bodies, opinion leaders and the political leadership of Western countries; which play a crucial role in controlling the outcome of the elections by operating with the legitimacy of the electoral process. Moreover, the same players, "the traveling evaluators" recognize the election results in some countries of the former Soviet Union as illegitimate and in others as legitimate, despite almost a mirror match of the claims set."<sup>92</sup>

According to Sergey Markov, a political scientist and a Duma deputy from the United Russia ruling party, "the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine opened a new page in the theory and practice of revolutions. Revolutions no longer take the shape of military turnovers, like they did during the 19th century, nor are they made by professional

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<sup>91</sup> Владимир Фролов, *Демократия: Дистанционное управление*, Россия в глобальной политике, М., № 4, 2005, С. 173

<sup>92</sup> *Ivi*, С. 174-175

parties, as in the 20th century. Rather, they are prepared openly—not from a single center but by a network of nongovernmental organizations united by an ideology. Such networks are present in many countries undergoing development with foreign financial and technical assistance.” According to this line of thinking, the Color Revolutions were instigated by the U.S. government through local branches of international NGOs and its numerous puppet organizations among the local civil society, media, political parties, and the state apparatus.<sup>93</sup>

On November 6, 2003, in Washington, George W. Bush, speaking on the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), “adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East” resulting in “the global democratic revolution”. Bush announced: “This strategy requires the same persistence and energy and idealism we have shown before. And it will yield the same results. As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace.”<sup>94</sup> The beginning of this policy has been put in the Middle East with the “liberation of Iraq” and the construction of “a modern and peaceful government”, becoming a role model for other peoples. The “liberation”, according to Bush, needs at least 40-50 countries of our planet, and the National Endowment for Democracy choice as the “platform” for his new policy of democratization was not accidental.<sup>95</sup> This organization was created in 1983 by Ronald Reagan and the U.S. Congress to strengthen democratic institutions around the world through its impact on non-governmental institutions.<sup>96</sup>

Twenty years later, George W. Bush, a neoconservative, who considered himself the successor of the “case of Reagan,” declared the crusade again, but this time not against the communist “evil empire,” but against those regimes and “dictators” whose foreign

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<sup>93</sup> Nikolay Petrov, *Russia's Orange Revolution Syndrome*, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, No. 102, June, 2010, pp. 1-7. Mode of access: [http://www.qwu.edu/~ieresqwu/assets/docs/PONARS\\_Eurasia\\_After\\_the\\_Color\\_Revolutions.pdf](http://www.qwu.edu/~ieresqwu/assets/docs/PONARS_Eurasia_After_the_Color_Revolutions.pdf)

<sup>94</sup> *Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy*, United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., Nov 6, 2003. Mode of access: <http://www.ned.org/george-w-bush/remarks-by-president-george-w-bush-at-the-20th-anniversary>

<sup>95</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>96</sup> David Lowe, *Idea to Reality: NED at 25*. Mode of access: <http://www.ned.org/node/30>

and domestic policies do not satisfy the American "guarantor of freedom and democracy." In the liberation mission were involved not only "charitable" organizations, but also the political, economic, intellectual, advocacy, diplomatic and, finally, military resources of the most powerful nation of the world. Bush finished his speech calling for a full engagement "in the great cause of liberty".<sup>97</sup> And soon the U.S. lawmakers responded to this call.

On March 3, 2005, four U.S. Congressmen: two Senators (John McCain and Joseph Lieberman) and two members of the House of Representatives (Tom Lantos and Fred Wolf) completed a draft bill called the "Advance Democracy Act"<sup>98</sup>. This act contains a number of specific arrangements. The leading post of the preparation and implementation of "peaceful" democratic revolutions in the "non-democratic" countries lies on the U.S. Department of State, establishing a new Office of Democracy Movements and Transitions at the State Department and separate Regional Democracy Hubs at several embassies abroad. A Democracy Promotion Advisory Board was created to provide outside expertise to the U.S. Government. \$250 million in increased funding was authorized for democracy promotion over two years. The bill also covered the involvement in the preparation and financing of the "revolutionary process" of public funds and organizations: National Endowment for Democracy, United States Agency for International Development, Freedom House. An annual report on democracy to include action plans to promote democracy in non-democratic countries and various training and incentives for State Department personnel in the promotion of democracy have been established.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> *Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy*, United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., Nov 6, 2003. Mode of access: <http://www.ned.org/george-w-bush/remarks-by-president-george-w-bush-at-the-20th-anniversary>

<sup>98</sup> *H.R. 1133 (109th): ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2005*, 109th Congress, 2005–2006., March 03, 2005. Mode of access: <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr1133/text>

<sup>99</sup> Thomas O. Melia, *The Democracy Bureaucracy, The Infrastructure of American Democracy Promotion*, The Princeton Project on National Security, September, 2005. Mode of access: [http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/democracy\\_bureaucracy.pdf](http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/democracy_bureaucracy.pdf)

The public funding available for democracy promotion activities has increased substantially since 2000, when it was roughly \$500 million per year. When as, in FY2005, it reached the amount of about \$2 billion. “It is impossible to arrive at a precise number, due to the highly decentralized nature of the welter of agencies, organizations, programs and activities, overlapping budgets (as funding is moved between agencies and organizations quite often)... There are also programs that are framed principally as something else that have a component or an aspect that is clearly related to democracy promotion – exchanges and scholarship programs, military exchanges and training, foreign assistance for traditional development programs that is conditioned, in part, on democratic performance by other governments (as in the Millennium Challenge Corporation and some programs administered by USAID).”<sup>100</sup>

The authors of the bill came to believe that in the current geopolitical situation the United States, spending relatively small amounts, can create (organize, finance, prepare) from the local "protest resources" a well-prepared opposition group capable in a "peaceful, non-violent" way to change the unwanted government of any country of the world. “The comprehensive democracy strategy... include[d] technical assistance, reporting and advocacy, public and private diplomacy, educational and cultural exchanges, and punitive measures. It is bilateral and multilateral.”<sup>101</sup> If previously many “democratization” actions taken by the US government were mostly covert, with this bill they became legally acceptable.

Actually the bill was largely inspired by the book written in 2003 by the retired U.S. Ambassador Mark Palmer, called: *Breaking the Real Axis of Evil; How to Oust the World's Dictators by 2025*.<sup>102</sup> The author describes in details the 25 conditions which

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<sup>100</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>101</sup> Patrick J. Glen, *The ADVANCE Democracy Act and the Future of United States Democracy Promotion Efforts*, Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 10-31, Santa Clara Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, 2011, pp. 273-277

<sup>102</sup> Thomas O. Melia, *The Infrastructure of American Democracy Promotion*, A discussion paper prepared for the Princeton Project on National Security, Working Group on Global Institutions and

can ensure the successful and "low-cost" overthrow of the unwanted U.S. political regimes ("dictators" as Palmer called them). In short, these conditions as follows:

- The establishment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) locally, forming the team from local individuals that hold liberal values and pro-Western views;
- The creation of liberal and pro-Western media (press, radio, TV, websites);
- Conducting intensive and systematic propaganda to delegitimize and demonize the "undemocratic regime" in the minds of the citizens of this country and the Western public opinion through the Western media;
- Conducting mass propaganda to legitimize the regime opposition groups and organizations and to give them the image of the true representatives of the people through Western and local "democratic" media;
- Passing resolutions in the UN, the European Union, the OSCE, PACE and other international organizations, condemning "human rights violations", "attack on the freedom of the press", etc. in the country where a "democratic revolution" is planned;
- Training the opposition groups and organizations of for the street "non-violent" actions: demonstrations, rallies, pickets, blockade of official buildings and institutions, etc.;
- Creating a psychological atmosphere in the country, that paralyzing the ability of the existing power supporters to resistance;

- Using diplomatic and financial methods of pressure on the "dictators", members of the leadership of the country in order to force them to give up power "peacefully".<sup>103</sup>

Thus, Palmer, not rejecting the concept of neo-conservative global democratic revolution, proposes to do it not by force, not using the Marines, or organizing a "Pinochet stile" coup; but via "peaceful and non-violent" methods, and most importantly in a cheap and most painless way for the United States.<sup>104</sup> Interestingly enough, already after the occurrence of the Color Revolutions, many western scholars, while analyzing this phenomenon, attribute characteristics that are very similar to Palmer's conditions. For instance:

1. Mark R. Bessinger - Professor of Politics, Princeton University. Director, Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies –
  - "The revolutions that have materialized among the post communist states since 2000 are examples of a modular phenomenon in this sense, with prior successful examples affecting the materialization of subsequent cases. Each successful democratic revolution has produced an experience that has been consciously borrowed by others, spread by NGOs, and emulated by local social movements, forming the contours of a model. With each iteration the model has altered somewhat as it confronts the reality of local circumstances. But its basic elements have revolved around six features:
    - 1) the use of stolen elections as the occasion for massive mobilizations against pseudo-democratic regimes;
    - 2) foreign support for the development of local democratic movements;
    - 3) the organization of radical youth movements using unconventional protest tactics prior to the election in order to undermine the regime's popularity and will to repress and to prepare for a final showdown;
    - 4) a united opposition established in part through foreign prodding;

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<sup>103</sup> Mark Palmer, *Breaking the Real Axis of Evil; How to Oust the World's Dictators by 2025*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, MD, 2003

<sup>104</sup> *Ibidem*.

- 5) external diplomatic pressure and unusually large electoral monitoring;
- 6) massive mobilization upon the announcement of fraudulent electoral results and the use of nonviolent resistance tactics.”<sup>105</sup>

2. Michael A. McFaul – academic of political science at Stanford University and diplomat-

“The factors for success (of a Color Revolution) include:

- 1) a semi-autocratic rather than fully autocratic regime;
- 2) an unpopular incumbent;
- 3) a united and organized opposition;
- 4) an ability quickly to drive home the point that voting results were falsified,
- 5) enough independent media to inform citizens about the falsified vote,
- 6) a political opposition capable of mobilizing tens of thousands or more demonstrators to protest electoral fraud, and
- 7) divisions among the regime’s coercive forces.”<sup>106</sup>

Beginning with the presidential elections in Armenia from spring 2003, none of the post-Soviet states election campaigns has been recognized entirely legitimate and meeting democratic standards by the international organizations monitoring the elections and the U.S.

| Electoral opportunities for modular democratic revolution among post-Communist regimes with flawed elections, 2000–2006* |                  |                  |             |             |                 |  |
|--|------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|--|
| Country  | Date of election | Type of election | Presence of | Other forms | Size of largest |  |

<sup>105</sup> Mark R. Bessinger, *Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions*, Perspectives on Politics, Vol.5. No.2, June 2007, pp.261  
Mode of access: <http://www.princeton.edu/~mbeissin/beissinger.modrev.article.pdf>

<sup>106</sup> Michael A. McFaul, *Transitions from Postcommunism*, Stanford University, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, no. 3, July 2005, pp. 5-19

|            |           |              | <b>electoral<br/>fraud<br/>(OSCE)</b> | <b>of electoral<br/>violations<br/>(OSCE)</b> | <b>protest</b> |                      |
|------------|-----------|--------------|---------------------------------------|---|----------------|----------------------|
| Kyrgyzstan | 20-Feb-00 | legislative  | Yes                                   | Yes   | 2.000          |                      |
| Tajikistan | 27-Feb-00 | legislative  | Yes                                   | Yes   | -              |                      |
| Russia     | 26-Mar-00 | presidential | No                                    | Yes   | -              |                      |
| Georgia    | 9-Apr-00  | presidential | Yes                                   | Yes   | -              |                      |
| Belarus    | 15-Oct-00 | legislative  | Yes                                   | Yes   | 300            |                      |
| Kyrgyzstan | 29-Oct-00 | presidential | Yes                                   | Yes   | 3.000          |                      |
| Azerbaijan | 5-Nov-00  | legislative  | Yes                                   | Yes   | 15.000         |                      |
| Belarus    | 9-Sep-01  | presidential | Yes                                   | Yes   | 2.000          |                      |
| Ukraine    | 30-Mar-02 | legislative  | Yes                                   | Yes   | -              |                      |
| Armenia    | 19-Feb-03 | presidential | Yes                                   | Yes   | 25.000         |                      |
| Armenia    | 25-May-03 | legislative  | Yes                                   | Yes   | -              |                      |
| Azerbaijan | 15-Oct-03 | presidential | Yes                                   | Yes   | 300            |                      |
| Georgia    | 3-Nov-03  | legislative  | Yes                                   | Yes   | 100.000        | Rose Revolution      |
| Russia     | 7-Dec-03  | legislative  | No                                    | Yes   | -              |                      |
| Russia     | 14-Mar-04 | presidential | No                                    | Yes   | -              |                      |
| Kazakhstan | 19-Sep-04 | legislative  | Yes                                   | Yes   | -              |                      |
| Belarus    | 13-Oct-04 | legislative  | Yes                                   | Yes   | 3.000          |                      |
| Ukraine    | 31-Oct-04 | presidential | Yes                                   | Yes   | 1.000.000      | Orange<br>Revolution |
| Uzbekistan | 26-Dec-04 | legislative  | Yes                                   | Yes   | -              |                      |
| Kyrgyzstan | 27-Feb-05 | legislative  | Yes                                   | Yes   | 15.000         | Tulip<br>Revolution  |
| Tajikistan | 27-Feb-05 | legislative  | Yes                                   | Yes   | -              |                      |
| Moldova    | 6-Mar-05  | legislative  | No                                    | Yes   | -              |                      |
| Azerbaijan | 6-Nov-05  | legislative  | Yes                                   | Yes   | 20.000         |                      |
| Kazakhstan | 4-Dec-05  | presidential | Yes                                   | Yes   | -              |                      |
| Belarus    | 19-Mar-06 | presidential | Yes                                   | Yes   | 20.000         |                      |
| Tajikistan | 6-Nov-06  | presidential | Yes                                   | Yes   | -              |                      |

Between 2003 and 2005, six election campaigns ended in mass protests; in three cases they led to the unconstitutional change of government (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan) and in other countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus) - to political destabilization. The parliamentary elections in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, etc., also the referendum to extend the presidential term of Alexander Lukashenko (2004-2005), were declared



"completely undemocratic and illegitimate." This conclusion is used by Washington and Brussels as a legal basis for the promotion of public claims about the need to overthrow the regime in these countries. It can also be noted that in all cases the decisions about the illegitimacy of the elections and their results were made in case of those political regimes that did not suit the U.S. and the EU policy and were supported by Russia. Thus, the assessment of the elections legitimacy and their results turned into a new instrument of the U.S. policy in the former Soviet Union. In 2005-2006, the American mechanism to "manage the legitimacy of elections" had been tried, but without any visible success, on the presidential elections in Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Azerbaijan. The governments of these countries monitored more closely or even closed down the democracy promoting NGOs, established closer relations with Russia as a way of providing international support against the threat of transnational revolution, and founded their own pro-regime youth movements to counteract the influence of transnational youth movements.<sup>107</sup> Putin's tough talk that Russia, like any self-respected government, will not allow foreign funding of the political activity suggest that the Russian Federation will seek effective means against the "democratic expansion" of the U.S. and the West in the former Soviet space.<sup>108</sup>

The White House foreign policy towards the post-Soviet space has been continuous with the evolution of the U.S. approaches for global role and world order projects. Already in the spring of 1992, in the depths of United States Department of Defense a plan was developed, in which the main strategic objective of the United States after the end of the Cold War was formulated as such: "to insure that no rival superpower is allowed to emerge in Western Europe, Asia or the territory of the former Soviet Union." With regard to the post-Soviet space, this meant at least the prevention of any reintegration trends, leading to the consolidation of a strong and independent political and economic formation around Russia. The United States "must continue to hold at

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<sup>107</sup> Mark R. Bessinger, *Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions*, Perspectives on Politics, Vol.5. No.2, June 2007, pp. 270  
Mode of access: <http://www.princeton.edu/~mbeissin/beissinger.modrev.article.pdf>

<sup>108</sup> Владимир Фролов, *Демократия: Дистанционное управление*, Россия в глобальной политике. М., № 4, 2005, С. 175-178

risk those assets and capabilities that current -- and future -- Russian leaders or other nuclear adversaries value most" because Russia will remain "the only power in the world with the capability of destroying the United States."<sup>109</sup>

“A successful transformation of Russia, Ukraine and other states of the former Soviet Union to stable democracies should clearly be one of our major goals. But we are not there yet. Our pursuit of this goal must recognize the as yet robust strategic nuclear force facing us, the fragility of democracy in the new states of the former Soviet Union, and the possibility that these new states might revert to closed, authoritarian, and hostile regimes. Our movement toward this goal must, therefore, leave us with timely and realistic responses to unanticipated reversals in our relations and a survivable deterrent capability.”<sup>110</sup>

In 2005 during his second inaugural address George W. Bush said: “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” The president declared the promotion of democracy around the world a great new mission of the U.S.<sup>111</sup> And of course one of the major areas of interest is the post-Soviet space. Here are some excerpts from the Senate Committee Report 109-096 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and related programs Appropriations Bill FY 2006 from June 30, 2005<sup>112</sup>:

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<sup>109</sup> Patrick E. Tyler, *U.S. Strategy plan calls for insuring no rivals develop*, New-York Times., March 8, 1992. Mode of access: <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/us-strategy-plan-calls-for-insuring-no-rivals-develop.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

<sup>110</sup> Dick Cheney, *Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy*, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 1993, pp. 11-17

<sup>111</sup> *President Bush's Inaugural Address: 'There Is No Justice Without Freedom'*, Washington Post, Federal News Service, January 21, 2005, pp. A24. Mode of access: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23747-2005Jan20.html>

<sup>112</sup> *Senate report 109-096 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and related programs Appropriations Bill FY 2006*, U.S. Department of State, June 30, 2005. Mode of access: [http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&sid=cp10942khg&rn=sr096.109&dbname=cp109&&sel=TOC\\_1&](http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&sid=cp10942khg&rn=sr096.109&dbname=cp109&&sel=TOC_1&)

“- The Committee believes that democracy and rule of law programs are of critical importance to countries undergoing democratic transitions, particularly Ukraine, Georgia, and the Kyrgyz Republic. The Committee notes that the success of democracy in these countries will be critical to encouraging and furthering the gains of democratic reformers elsewhere, including in Belarus. The Committee encourages the State Department to convene an international conference on the promotion of democracy in this region.

- The Committee believes that an authoritarian Russia presents a growing danger to countries undergoing democratic transition in the region and that offsetting this threat should be a priority to the United States. The Committee notes that significant resources are required to support democracy assistance programs inside Russia, and urges the administration to increase the budget request for these purposes in subsequent fiscal years.

- The Committee directs the State Department and USAID to more emphatically and publicly support political process programming in Russia and Azerbaijan. Freedom is ill served by excessive hand wringing over concerns with projecting political balance in programming or of offending authoritarian host governments.

- The Committee recommends \$85,000,000 for assistance for Russia, of which \$5,000,000 shall be made available to the NED for political party development programs.

- The Committee commends the people of Ukraine for the success of the Orange Revolution and reiterates its strong support for political and economic reforms in that country. The Committee recommends \$95,000,000 for assistance for Ukraine, \$7,000,000 above the budget request.

- The Committee is aware of the work of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, and commends the Foundation for its support of democracy and the rule of law in Ukraine. The Committee directs USAID to continue to support the Foundation's activities beyond November 2005, when funding is scheduled to end. The Committee believes the Foundation has an important role to play in strengthening the *Rada* and in increasing

transparency and accountability at all levels of government. The Committee expects funding levels to exceed those of prior years.

- The Committee reiterates the importance of political party development programs, as elections serve as catalysts for freedom, evidenced most recently in Georgia and Ukraine. The Committee expects the State Department and USAID, in particular, to understand this basic tenant of democracy building and to provide adequate funding for these programs.”

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, adopted in March 2006, asked for even more forceful and aggressive character of U.S. military power. With the rise of Russian power on the world stage, it came to be considered as a partner on strategic issues and on defeating Global Terrorism, still the United States expressed its skepticism about the democracy development in Russia, and its intentions towards the post-Soviet space, restricting Russia’s area of influence via “democratic” means. The document states: “By reason of geography and power, Russia has great influence not only in Europe and its own immediate neighborhood, but also in many other regions of vital interest to us: the broader Middle East, South and Central Asia, and East Asia. We must encourage Russia to respect the values of freedom and democracy at home and not to impede the cause of freedom and democracy in these regions. Strengthening our relationship will depend on the policies, foreign and domestic, that Russia adopts. Recent trends regrettably point toward a diminishing commitment to democratic freedoms and institutions. We will work to try to persuade the Russian Government to move forward, not backward, along freedom’s path. Stability and prosperity in Russia’s neighborhood will help deepen our relations with Russia; but that stability will remain elusive as long as this region is not governed by effective democracies.”<sup>113</sup>

The more ambitious understanding of American objectives implied not just the neutralization of what is called "the Russian neo-imperialism", but the probability of emergence of a counterweight to the United States. This could be achieved through the

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<sup>113</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, The White House, March 2006. Mode of access: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/>

integration of the post-Soviet countries in the sphere of the American ideological and geopolitical influence, through their internal change in accordance with Western standards of democracy and market economy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States left the ideological idea of geopolitical rivalry with historical Russia and has moved, according to the Russian researcher Alexander Domrin, to “pure geopolitics”. With regard to Russia, says Domrin, it means that whatever the regime in power - the king, the communists or the “democrats” - Russia to the West was, is and will be a natural enemy, “the evil empire”.<sup>114</sup>

In 1997 Brzezinski gave clear instructions in how to limit the Russian aspirations to gain its former position on the world stage: to decentralize and territorially divide Russia and to minimize as much as possible the economic and political ties between Russia and the post-Soviet states. “A loosely confederated Russia -- composed of a European Russia, a Siberian Republic, and a Far Eastern Republic -- would also find it easier to cultivate closer economic relations with its neighbors. Each of the confederated entities would be able to tap its local creative potential, stifled for centuries by Moscow's heavy bureaucratic hand. In turn, a decentralized Russia would be less susceptible to imperial mobilization.

Russia is more likely to make a break with its imperial past if the newly independent post-Soviet states are vital and stable. Their vitality will temper any residual Russian imperial temptations. Political and economic support for the new states must be an integral part of a broader strategy for integrating Russia into a cooperative transcontinental system. A sovereign Ukraine is a critically important component of such a policy, as is support for such strategically pivotal states as Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan.

Large-scale international investment in an increasingly accessible Central Asia would not only consolidate the independence of the new countries, but also benefit a postimperial and democratic Russia. Tapping the region's resources would increase

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<sup>114</sup> Александр Домрин, *Русский лист Джонсона: Способен ли, частный проект вашигтонского исследователя повлиять на представления Запада о России?*, НГ- Сценарии. М., № 6, 1998, С. 7

prosperity and prompt a greater sense of stability, reducing the risk of Balkan-type conflicts. Regional development would also radiate to the adjoining Russian provinces, which tend to be economically underdeveloped. The region's new leaders would gradually become less fearful of the political consequences of close economic relations with Russia. A non-imperial Russia could then be accepted as the region's major economic partner, although no longer its imperial ruler.”<sup>115</sup>

The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union has not led to a reduction of the Western military expenditure. The U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (2002)<sup>116</sup>, which was considered the foundation of the nuclear safety. The installment of permanent military bases with missile defense systems in Romania and Bulgaria (2006), constituted a breach of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe<sup>117</sup>. This event is also aimed at weakening Russia's foreign policy positions, and its unilateral disarmament.

The Russian Federation is paying such closer attention to the post-Soviet states, because the ability of Russia to continue its historic development, its strategic location and importance in the world, its internal security and consolidation, as well as national identity and historical self-awareness of its people, depend on the relationship with the neighboring countries. Moreover, the formed belt of the new states could separate Russia from other civilizations and geopolitical centers in the west and south. And while the era of globalization deprives the proximity factor of its former absoluteness, its value will never be fully offset. Thus, the political landscape of this “belt of

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<sup>115</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *A Geostrategy for Eurasia*, Foreign Affairs, LXXVI, n. 5, September-October 1997, pp. 50-64

<sup>116</sup> *ABM Treaty Fact Sheet: Announcement of Withdrawal from the Abm Treaty*, Statement by the Press Secretary, The White House, December 13, 2001. Mode of access: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.html>

<sup>117</sup> *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe* - legally binding agreement known as the CFE Treaty, signed in Paris on 19 November 1990, within the framework of the CSCE among 23 participating States - those belonging to NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, outlining provisions aimed at establishing a military balance between the two alliances, at a lower level of armaments. Mode of access: <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/cca/cfe/index.htm>

countries” has the most direct impact on the extent and nature of Russia’s interaction with Europe and NATO, the Arab world, the Greater Central Asia, the Far East, as well as the U.S., which is present in all of these areas.<sup>118</sup>

The analysis of the U.S. policy toward the post-Soviet states shows that this policy is clearly aimed at their separation and isolation from Russia. Instead of promoting the free development of new states, the need for which is so often said in the White House, the U.S. administration actively encourages the former Soviet republics to confrontation with Russia. The ideas raised by the US of the Russia’s imperial ambitions not only create the threat of conflict among the post-Soviet states, but the aggravation of Russian-American relations. In this sense, the U.S. actions have clearly expressed an anti-Russian orientation. As for the outlook for the immediate future, it is likely that the U.S. foreign policy in the post-Soviet space will continue to be guided by the well-known postulate of American geopolitics: “Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world”.<sup>119</sup>

In his report R. Craig Nation, Professor of Strategy and Director of Russian and Eurasian Studies at the U.S. Army War College, concludes: “U.S. regional (Caucasus region) goals seem to be **to contain Russia**; isolate Iran; ensure some degree of control over the hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian and develop alternative pipeline access routes; reward and sustain the allegiance of regional allies including Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan; open up the possibility of greater military access including possible basing rights; and reinforce regional stability and resolve the issues of Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh by encouraging their reintegration into the metropolitan states with some kind of guaranteed autonomy. More generally the United

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<sup>118</sup> Сергей Михайлович Самуилов, *Этапы политики США в отношении СНГ*, США: Экономика. Политика. Идеология, М., № 3, 2005, С. 95-96

<sup>119</sup> Владимир Игоревич Батюк, *Политика США на постсоветском пространстве после окончания «холодной войны*, *Международная жизнь*, № 8, 2011, С. 72—75

States seeks to project influence into a regional power vacuum with the larger goals of **checking Russian reassertion**, preempting an expansion of Iranian and Chinese influence, and reducing Islamist penetration.”<sup>120</sup>

The US interference in the post Soviet space initiated right after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Up until the end of the last decade, the substantial financial and political support seemed to be very fructuous. The United States had been gradually increasing its influence, becoming an important player in the area. In a number of countries the elites acting under the banner of democracy and with a desire not only to enter the Euro-Atlantic structures, but also with an anti-Russian spirit, came to power. In the Russia's relations with the Central Asian members of the CIS the integration impulses counterbalanced the disintegration ones. However, in the key geostrategic area, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Caucasus (excluding Belarus), the predominant tendencies were described by a historical reorientation towards the West and a discontinuity in the relationships with Russia. This decade instead, started on a very optimistic note for Russia. The Ukrainian presidential elections of 2010(Yanukovich became president) and the Georgian parliamentary elections of 2012(oppositional Georgian Dream coalition won) are bright examples that the CIS countries, which first were looking to the West as to their savior, are reconsidering the old foreign policy models and their traditional allies. The present tendencies are described by trying to find a balance between the Western (with the US as the main player), ex-Soviet (with Russia as the main player) allies, and China, which intentions in becoming an important player in the post Soviet Union has already been observed in Central Asia.

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<sup>120</sup> R. Craig Nation, *RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE CAUCASUS*, the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101, February 2007, pp.29  
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub764.pdf>



Thus, in the past twenty years the landscape of the former Soviet Union has cardinally changed, and despite the existence of contradictory trends and Russia's partial recovery of its role (in Central Asia, Caucasus, and Ukraine) in the past few years, the general vector of these changes are favorable for the U.S. They managed to noticeably limit Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space. The geopolitical fragmentation of the not so long ago socio-culturally integrated area drastically deepened. Alternative integration structures (GUAM) and major international projects (Baku –Tbilisi - Ceyhan oil pipeline) were founded on the territory of the post-Soviet space without Russian participation, but under U.S. patronage. The post-Soviet states, including Russia, are involved on one or another institutional basis in constant contact with NATO; the issue of joining the Euro-Atlantic structures of Georgia, Ukraine and potentially other countries was postponed, but not removed from the agenda.<sup>121</sup>

It is in the countries of the post-Soviet space more than anywhere else that the fundamental contradictions between Russia and the United States manifest. This area is the key to the constructive development of the full range of Russian-American relations.

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<sup>121</sup> Владимир Игоревич Батюк, *Политика США на постсоветском пространстве после окончания «холодной войны*, *Международная жизнь*, № 8, 2011, С. 72—75

## **2. The mechanisms of the implementation of U.S. policy in the post-Soviet states: based on the cases of Ukraine and Georgia**

### **2.1. Mechanisms of the implementation of U.S. policy in Ukraine**

The roots of the current Ukrainian-American relations should be sought in the late 80's of the last century. Already at that time, Ukraine was in the focus of the American diplomacy. Particularly insightful oracles from Washington would discuss about the possibility and even inevitability of Ukraine's independence, arguing that such a development fully meets the interests of the United States. Shortly before the events of August 1991, The Heritage Foundation<sup>122</sup> published a study under the eloquent title "Ukraine's Difficult Road to Independence", which analyzed the possible development of the situation in Europe in case Ukraine becomes an independent state. The conclusion is that this event would weaken the military power and potential of the Soviet Union and would strengthen the stability in the region.<sup>123</sup>

At the end of the 20th century a new stage in the history of Ukraine started. The independence was sudden and swift, for which, apart from a small number of political dissidents, no one fought. This stage is characterized by large-scale division of Soviet property, degeneration of political, business and academic elite unprecedented

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<sup>122</sup> Founded in 1973, The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institution—a think tank—whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense. Mode of access: <http://www.heritage.org/about>

<sup>123</sup> *Ukraine's Difficult Road to Independence*, The Heritage Foundation, June 14, 1991. Mode of access: <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1991/06/ukraines-difficult-road-to-independence?query=Ukraine's+Difficult+Road+to+Independence>

embezzlement of public funds and corporate factions struggle for the division of public property, building on the multi-vector policy of the outstretched hand.<sup>124</sup>



*Fig. 1: The map of Ukraine*

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, on the ruins of the post-socialist and post-soviet area, a new world order started to be built, which was influenced and supported by the Euro-Atlantic alliance. Western infiltration and spread was mainly done through financial support, assistance to pro-democracy activism, and political support to the opposition leaders and diplomatic pressure of the ruling regime. All these actions

<sup>124</sup> Зленко А.М., *Дипломатия и политика. Украина в процессе динамичных геополитических перемен*, Фолио, Харьков, 2004, С.7

largely contributed to the development of a revolutionary ambience, culminating in a Color Revolution.<sup>125</sup> These revolutions are more likely to resemble a carefully prepared coup, which resulted in a change of the ruling elites. The new elites in social terms are the same as the old ones; both after the fall of USSR seized enormous wealth that formerly belonged to the whole nation. They differ only in the visions of the future of their country. The old ruling elite believed that the acquisition of new friends in the West should not be accompanied by the rejection of the old in the East, whereas the new elites firmly declared a break with the past for the sake of the European future. The new rulers ignoring the geo-political, socio-cultural and religious boundaries, rushed to become a part of the European home and a strategic partner with the United States.<sup>126</sup>

The U.S. policy in the 1990s, have evolved from isolated steps to support the independence of Ukraine from Russia to clear policies aimed to solve the political and economic challenges of Ukraine. Bill Clinton established a favorable western orientated platform: providing security assurances and starting financial assistance to the country; from which his successor Bush Jr. started a real offensive against russian presence and influence in the area.<sup>127</sup>

One of the first public documents that outlined the main positions of the U.S. in regards to Ukraine during Clinton's presidency was the joint resolution<sup>128</sup> № 120 "Supporting the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine and the progress of its political and economic reforms". The document passed by the House of Representatives

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<sup>125</sup> Mark R. Bessinger, *Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions*, Perspectives on Politics, Vol.5. No.2, June 2007, pp.261-262

<sup>126</sup> F William Engdahl, *Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order*, Progressive Press, California, 2011, pp. 51-52

<sup>127</sup> Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples*, University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Toronto, 2010, pp. 731-732

<sup>128</sup> **A joint resolution is a** legislative measure approved by both chambers (the House of Representatives and the Senate) and is submitted to the president for possible signature into law. -  
Mode of access: [http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary\\_term/joint\\_resolution.htm](http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/joint_resolution.htm)

and the U.S. Senate in September 1996, outlined in details the priorities of the American administration and made clear statements of what is to be done by the president, the parliament and the government of Ukraine and of USA, for instance:

- “the Government of Ukraine should make its first priority the dismantling of the remaining socialist sectors of its economy, particularly by speedily privatizing medium and large state-owned enterprises, ...protect the right to private property, and make other changes that build a positive climate for foreign investment; the dismantlement of the remaining socialist sectors of the economy, acceleration of privatization, protection of private property rights and creation of a positive climate for foreign investments should become a priority”;
- “the Government of Ukraine should continue to act in defense of its sovereignty and that of the other independent states of the former Soviet Union by opposing the emergence of any political or military organization which would have the potential to promote the reintegration of the states of the former Soviet Union”;
- “the President of the United States should support continued United States security assistance for Ukraine, including assistance for training of military officers, military exercises as part of the North Atlantic Alliance’s Partnership for Peace program, and appropriate military equipment to assist Ukraine in maintaining its defensive capabilities as it reduces its military force levels;”  
etc.<sup>129</sup>

Thus, the document explicitly shows that Washington is against any type of

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<sup>129</sup> *H. Con. Res. 120(104th): Supporting the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine and the progress of its political and economic reforms*, 104th Congress Sept. 18, 1996. Mode of access: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-104hconres120enr/pdf/BILLS-104hconres120enr.pdf>

reintegration among ex-member-states of USSR, intends to retain Kiev in its orbit of influence and have military presence in the area.

In early 2001, George W. Bush was elected president of The United States. During his rule U.S. foreign policy was marked by a sharp acceleration in the Ukrainian direction, which peaked in 2004. U.S. openly interfered in the internal affairs of Ukraine and provided direct pressure on the Ukrainian leadership. Thus, in October 2004, the Congress passed the Resolution N. 415, defining “this presidential campaign as a central factor in determining the future relationship between the two countries”. The main message of the document was: in case there will be violations of the presidential elections and free access for international observers to all election procedures will not be provided, Washington will revise further assistance to Ukraine.<sup>130</sup>

According to Ukraine's electoral law, a candidate has to win 50% or more of all ballots cast in order to become a president. The first round of voting was held on October 31, 2004. As no candidate had 50% or more of the votes cast on November 21 a run-off ballot between the two-highest polling candidates, Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovich, was held. According to official Central Election Commission the run-off election was won by Viktor Yanukovich. The election results were challenged by Viktor Yushchenko, his supporters, and many international observers, claiming that the election was rigged.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> *H. Con. Res. 415(108th): Urging the Government of Ukraine to ensure a democratic, transparent, and fair election process for the presidential election on October 31, 2004*, 108th Congress, Oct 4, 2004.  
Mode of access: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-108hconres415eh/pdf/BILLS-108hconres415eh.pdf>

<sup>131</sup> *Ukraine presidential election 31 October, 21 November and 26 December 2004*, OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 11 May, 2005.  
Mode of access: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/14674>



*Fig. 2: George W. Bush supporting Viktor Yanukovich during the Orange Revolution*

The subsequent events led to a political crisis in Ukraine, with widespread protesters, the so-called "Orange Revolution," demanding a re-run of the elections. John Laughland writes in the Guardian: "Enormous rallies have been held in Kiev (also) in support of the Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovich, but they are not shown on our TV screens: if their existence is admitted, Yanukovich supporters are denigrated as having been "bussed in". The demonstrations in favor of Viktor Yushchenko have laser lights, plasma screens, sophisticated sound systems, rock concerts, tents to camp in and huge quantities of orange clothing; yet we happily dupe ourselves that they are spontaneous."<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> John Laughland, *The revolution televised*, The Guardian, November 2004. Mode of access: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2004/nov/27/pressandpublishing.comment>





*Fig. 1: The demonstrations in favor of Viktor Yushchenko*

Under the pressure of the crowds President Kuchma and the Ukrainian Supreme Court declared the election invalid. The final re-run ballot was held on December 26. Viktor Yushchenko was declared the winner with 52 percent of the vote to Yanukovich's 44 percent.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> Patrick J. Buchanan, *What Are We Up to – in Ukraine?*, December 6, 2004. Mode of access: <http://www.antiwar.com/pat/?articleid=4114>



Immediately after Viktor Yushchenko came to power the NATO-Ukrainian collaboration has increased substantially. All the actions were intended to bring Ukraine closer to membership in the alliance.<sup>134</sup>

In early 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted the resolution N997<sup>135</sup> and respectively the Senate - the resolution N439<sup>136</sup>, expressing their strong support for Ukraine's accession to NATO.

Another important document is the "United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership" signed on 19 December, 2008. It enforces close bilateral Economic, Trade and especially Energy Cooperation, such as: "rehabilitating and modernizing the capacity of Ukraine's gas transit infrastructure and diversify and secure Ukraine's sources of nuclear fuel making Ukraine less dependent on foreign sources of nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel storage." The Charter also reflects the intention of the U.S. administration to actively develop cooperation with Ukraine's regions, specifically with Crimea.<sup>137</sup> Crimea is a sub-national unit, an autonomous republic of Ukraine and a very strategic point, since the soviet Black Sea Fleet was located there. After the collapse of

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<sup>134</sup> *NATO-Ukraine Relations 1997-2012*, NATO. Mode of access: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-16762101-55CCFA70/natolive/official\\_texts.htm?search=true&chunk=1&order=desc&sortbyfield=v\\_title&query=\\*%28NATO+relations%29&date\\_from=&date\\_to=](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-16762101-55CCFA70/natolive/official_texts.htm?search=true&chunk=1&order=desc&sortbyfield=v_title&query=*%28NATO+relations%29&date_from=&date_to=)

<sup>135</sup> *H. RES. 997 (110<sup>th</sup>): Expressing the strong support of the House of Representatives for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to enter into a Membership Action Plan with Georgia and Ukraine*, 110th Congress, February 25, 2008. Mode of access: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c110:1:./temp/~c110dVSEoP::>

<sup>136</sup> *S. RES. 439 (110<sup>th</sup>): Expressing the strong support of the Senate for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to enter into a Membership Action Plan with Georgia and Ukraine*, 110th Congress, February 13, 2008. Mode of access: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c110:3:./temp/~c110W3QJXS::>

<sup>137</sup> *United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership*, Washington DC, December 19, 2008. Mode of access: <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/142231.htm>

the Soviet Union, the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet, the military wharf and shore installations were divided between Russia and the newly formed Ukrainian Navy.<sup>138</sup>

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, unlike Russia, which inherited the capital and the personnel of a broken common state, in the new independent states the formation of the power structure, of the state elite, of the national domestic and foreign policy started virtually from scratch. Russia busy with its internal problems, practically did not participate, neither had an influence on the process. On the other hand, all kinds of non-governmental U.S. and European organizations took the most active part, such as "Freedom House" , "Carnegie Foundation" , National Democratic Institute, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, etc. These organizations have offices in almost all CIS countries. They run different programs, such as: offer grants, organize political technologies training trips, etc.; having as a goal the formation of pro-American and pro-European political elite. Thus, the standard Western political model has been imposed in Post-Soviet countries, without taking into account if the society of these countries was ready for such changes. As a result, under the outer democratic shell (presidential elections by direct universal suffrage, political parties, the parliament elected on a competitive basis) appeared whether weak and corrupt regimes, or explicit "oriental despotism". CIS countries have not solved the problem of the legitimate transfer of power between the elite teams. This is the main reason that the natural renewal of power took place more and more often in the form of colored revolutions. The post-Soviet political elites that had a pro-Russian orientation, one by one have left the political scene, to which Russia was unprepared, and impulsive attempts to support them, without a lengthy preparatory work, turned out to be unsuccessful.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Steven Woehrel, *Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service, Report RL33460 for US Congress, September 10, 2012, pp. 8.  
Mode of access: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33460.pdf>

<sup>139</sup> F William Engdahl, *Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order*, Progressive Press, California, 2011, pp. 38-57

For the past twenty years, the U.S. has been active in approximating the countries that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The main purpose of these efforts are to ensure such an ambience in the post-Soviet space, in which Russia, under no circumstances, would be able to regain the power and the territorial control of the former USSR, which for half a century was the biggest obstacle in the way of U.S. global domination. The process of NATO enlargement intensifies, but this is not enough to achieve the goal. The indispensable condition is the abstraction of Ukraine from Russia. "The loss of Ukraine was geopolitically pivotal, for it drastically limited Russia's geostrategic options. Even without the Baltic States and Poland, a Russia that retained control over Ukraine could still seek to be the leader of an assertive Eurasian empire, in which Moscow could dominate the non-Slavs in the South and Southeast of the former Soviet Union. But without Ukraine and its 52 million fellow Slavs, any attempt by Moscow to rebuild the Eurasian empire was likely to leave Russia entangled alone in protracted conflicts with the nationally and religiously aroused non-Slavs."<sup>140</sup>

Thus, Ukraine is important for the United States not only in itself, but above all in the context of U.S. policy toward Russia, because Russia is a powerful state with great potential, that managed to preserve the important attributes of a superpower, inherited from the Soviet Union: an impressive nuclear arsenal and a permanent membership in the UN Security Council with the right of veto. If the two largest countries on the European continent, with the largest population (Ukraine/about 50 million and Russia/about 145 million) and the highest industrial potential among CIS countries will unite again, a new geographical, economical and geopolitical superpower will basically emerge. Therefore, the prevention of any form of association between Ukraine and Russia has been considered by U.S. politicians the best guarantee against the revival of a new superpower, which, in their view, would change the geo-strategic balance not

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<sup>140</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The grand chessboard - American Primacy And It's Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, 1997, pp. 92

only in Europe, but in the whole world. It was therefore decided to oppose the possible convergence and encourage Ukraine's integration into Western institutions.<sup>141</sup>

Although, officially such plans were, of course, never publicly expounded, still in the works of American political scientists it is seen quite clearly. Here is what Zbigniew Brzezinski writes: "Cooperation with Russia must be matched by simultaneous efforts to consolidate geopolitical pluralism in the former Russian imperial space, thereby creating enduring obstacles to any attempts at imperial restoration. NATO and the EU must therefore make certain to include the newly independent post-Soviet states, especially Ukraine, in the Euroatlantic community's expanding orbit."<sup>142</sup>

Under President Kuchma the concept of "Kuchmism phenomenon" appeared. It consisted in the maintenance of the balance between the Eastern and Western identity of Ukraine. The policy did not have much impact on the development of the country, but at least it kept the fragile Ukrainian integrity. During the first presidency of Leonid Kuchma Ukraine rather successfully used the NATO plan in order to get the U.S. support. This way, in the second half of the 90's Ukraine reached the third place among the countries receiving American aid. Ukraine initiated close bilateral relations with the U.S. military. In the period between 1994 and 2000, the two pro-Western foreign ministers - G. Udovenko and B. Tarasiuk - did not stop the talk about Ukraine's integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. The degree of confidence in the US-Ukrainian relations in this period can be shown using the following fact: even if Ukraine's parliament has condemned the NATO aggression in South Yugoslavia, President Kuchma was present at the anniversary summit in Washington, April 1999. In March 2000, in Kiev, within the frames of the North Atlantic Council took place the first meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC), the decision-making body set

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<sup>141</sup> Сергей Михайлович Самуилов, *Этапы политики США в отношении СНГ//США: Экономика. Политика. Идеология*, М., №3, 2005, С. 66

<sup>142</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, Basic Books, New York, 2004, pp.103

up in accordance with the "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine"<sup>143</sup> in 1997.<sup>144</sup>

From 1998 to 2001, NATO has launched the most extensive program of cooperation with Ukraine than with any other former socialist country. Only in May 2001, Ukraine officially announced its intentions to become a NATO member. NATO continued its dialogue with Ukraine and gave her advice on the content of the Action Plan for 2002, the reform in the field of defense, economy and politics. The former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer notes that "In terms of defense reform, Ukraine has been receptive to our suggestions and has done well in beginning the process of reforming its military to make it interoperable with NATO forces."<sup>145</sup>

Even though, Kuchma initiated and developed collaborative relations with NATO and with the western world in general, he did not ignore, tried hard to maintain and even ameliorate neighborly relationships with Russia. In 2004, as a result of the "Orange revolution" Victor Yushchenko came to power. The obvious element of the new ideology was the rejection of the "multi-vector policy", so characteristic of the Kuchma era. The new president focuses on Euro-Atlantic relations and European integration, whereas Russia is left behind. Many major foreign policy decisions are taken in accordance with U.S. recommendations, for instance: forcing entry into NATO, a tough and confrontational line in relations with Russia, support in the "export of the Orange Revolution".<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>143</sup> *Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine*, 9 July, 1997. Mode of access: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_25457.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25457.htm)

<sup>144</sup> Taras Kuzio, *EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?*, Occasional papers: EU institute for security studies, Paris, N 47, Nov. 2003, pp.14

<sup>145</sup> Steven Pifer, *Ukraine's future and US interests*, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Washington, DC, US Department of State Archive, 2004. Mode of access: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/32416.htm>

<sup>146</sup> Гриневецкий С.Р., Крючков Г.К., Симоненко П.И., Табачник Д.В., Толочко П.П., *Заявка на самоубийство: зачем Украине НАТО?*, Довіра, Киев, 2009, С.76-77

Almost simultaneously, in January 2005, Senators Hillary Clinton and John McCain nominated Viktor Yushchenko and Mikhail Saakashvili for the Nobel Peace Prize. The letter to the Nobel Committee said: "In leading freedom movements in their respective countries, [these two presidents] have won popular support for the universal values of democracy, individual liberty, and civil rights...We believe that the actions of Presidents Saakashvili and Yushchenko testify to the power of peace and human rights in their battle against oppression. Recognizing these men with the Peace Prize would honor not only their historic roles in Georgia and Ukraine, but would also offer hope and inspiration to those seeking freedom in lands still denied it."<sup>147</sup>

For a long time between the policy makers and researchers there was controversy about the extent to which Washington contributed to the change of power in Ukraine. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, John Tefft, speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in Chicago, did not deny the great interest of the U.S. in the outcome of Ukrainian elections. "Indeed, - said Tefft, - from at least the fall of 2003, the presidential election was the primary focus of U.S.-Ukraine relations. Over a period of many months, the U.S. and our European allies repeatedly advised Ukrainian authorities, publicly and privately, that we were watching the election closely and considered it a test of Ukraine's commitment to democracy."<sup>148</sup>

Shortly before the election-day, several senior U.S. officials and politicians visited Ukraine: Secretary of Defense - Donald Rumsfeld, Former President - George H. W. Bush, Former Secretaries of State - Henry Kissinger and Madeleine Albright, several

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<sup>147</sup> McCain, Clinton nominate presidents of Georgia and Ukraine for Nobel Peace Prize, MCCAIN, January 25, 2005. Mode of access:  
[http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecord\\_id=877DA268-EE6A-4E47-97CA-28B65DF158F9](http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=877DA268-EE6A-4E47-97CA-28B65DF158F9)

<sup>148</sup> John Tefft, *Ukraine and the United States: The challenges ahead*, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Remarks to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, US Department of State Archive, 2005. Mode of access:  
<http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/42044.htm>

delegations of Congress and many others. They again insistently repeated the idea of the importance of democratic elections for the country's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and for US-Ukraine relationships in general. When Washington's expectations did not come true and Yanukovych won the elections, Secretary of State Colin Powell on behalf of the United States refused to recognize the election results as legitimate and warned that "if the Ukrainian government does not act immediately and responsibly, there will be consequences for our relationship, for Ukraine's hopes for a Euro-Atlantic integration, and for individuals responsible for perpetrating fraud." In fact, the U.S. was the first country that declared the elections of November 21, 2004 fraudulent and did not recognize the results.<sup>149</sup>

In the U.S. media the election struggle between Yanukovych and Yushchenko was presented as a conflict between the forces of dictatorship and democracy, between the authoritarian regime and the democratic opposition. However, for professionals it was clear that the fight between the two candidates, both representing the new Ukrainian elite, was fought mainly because of the following issue: how best to preserve their privileged status - in alliance with Russia, or by intensifying integration with the West. In the meantime, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the National Endowment for Democracy and other foundations sponsored the activities of a number of U.S. organizations in Ukraine, including: the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the Solidarity Center, Freedom House, the Eurasia Foundation, and others. Individual European countries, European Union and the Soros Foundation proceeded in the same way. It is through these organizations that the financial and technical support to the "independent" opposition was provided. P. Buchanan describes the US implication in Ukraine as a "perfected technique of the "post-modern coup".<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Peter Finn, *Tension Rises over Ukraine Vote*, Washington Post Foreign, 2004, pp. A01. Mode of access: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A9396-2004Nov24.html>

<sup>150</sup> Patrick J. Buchanan, *What Are We Up to – in Ukraine?*, December 6, 2004. Mode of access: <http://www.antiwar.com/pat/?articleid=4114>

According to the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, on January 1, 2004, there were 399 international organizations and associations, 421 Charity Foundations with international status, 179 structural cells of international NGOs registered in Ukraine. The budgets of 90% of organizations ranged from 50 thousand to 300 thousand dollars, and one in ten had a budget of not less than 500 thousand dollars. Annual remittance to Ukraine represented about 200 million dollars.<sup>151</sup>

In their turn, the International Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) were probing the public opinion, contributing to the contacts of the local political parties, their leaders and officials with the U.S. political establishment. At the same time, the NGOs collected necessary information about the structure, quality, potential and prospects of development of the political situation in the country; allocated funds for the creation of a large number of local nongovernmental organizations; sponsored training activities with experts in the media and the law, etc. International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute organized a training program for the Ukrainian opposition parties, which later joined into the coalition led by Viktor Yushchenko. In 2004-2005 US official assistance for the "democratization of Ukraine" reached a record figure of about 58 million per year, three times as much as what was allocated in previous years. However, in 2006 the amount of the assistance dropped significantly and since then it has never turned to the same level. Another interesting fact is that, between 2004 and 2007, US support to non-state actors decreased by 70%, while the assistance given to the government sector increased by 59%.<sup>152</sup>

Thus, the U.S. pumped millions of dollars into the "orange" revolution, and this fact wasn't overlooked by the US press. For example, the American researcher Heather Cottin has a few interesting articles in regards to this theme, such as: "George Soros, Imperial Wizard", "Ukraine voters say no to NATO", which disclose the true intentions of the US, that are hidden under the powerful slogans of freedom and democracy. The

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<sup>151</sup> А. Беякова, О. Матвейчева, *Большая актуальная политическая энциклопедия: НГО / НКО*.  
Mode of access: <http://politike.ru/dictionary/839/word/ngo-nko>

<sup>152</sup> Natalia Shapovalova, *Assessing Democracy Assistance: Ukraine*, Fride Project Report, June 2010, pp. 2-3. Mode of access: [http://www.fride.org/descarga/IP\\_WMD\\_Ucrania\\_ENG\\_jul10.pdf](http://www.fride.org/descarga/IP_WMD_Ucrania_ENG_jul10.pdf)



author emphasizes the connection between the US government and the NGOs, the last ones being used as undercover mechanisms of political influence in the region. For instance Soros, the NGO that showed an incredible activity during the "Orange revolution" in Ukraine, is rented for mutual benefit by U.S. intelligence agencies.<sup>153</sup> Allen Weinstein one of the NED's founders stated in a 1991 interview for the Washington Post that "A lot of what we (NED) do today was done covertly years ago by the CIA."<sup>154</sup> In Ukraine the apparatus of secret political monitoring, infiltration and influence in the interests of Washington was established a long time ago. The students are the first on whom the undercover scheme is implemented, following which the new elite is brought up in a spirit of loyalty to the principles of the Atlantic globalism, but also hatred towards Russia and the Slavic-Orthodox civilization in general.<sup>155</sup>

It should be noted that the situation in Ukraine at that time was favorable for the NGO activities, conditioned by the dissatisfaction of the masses in regards to economic and social policies failure, corruption at the highest level of government and law enforcement authorities. This discontent was fueled and skillfully directed against the ruling regime. The method for mass consciousness manipulation, accompanied by a strong informational support, was widely used. As a good example we could mention the myths about supposedly spontaneous mass protests against the "unfair" and "unfree" elections, in which many believed. Other effective tools in the NGOs arsenal are: the parallel vote count, the exit polls from the polling stations, and the publication of experts' opinions, all these interestingly enough coincide with the U.S. expectations. Furthermore, the activity of local observers was well established, being trained and financed by the U.S. NGOs. Freedom House and the National Democratic Institute organized an impressive civil regional election monitoring effort in Ukraine, involving

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<sup>153</sup> Heather Cottin, "George Soros, Imperial Wizard" 2002, "Ukraine voters say no to NATO" 2010: Mode of access: <http://dimension.ucsd.edu/ceimsa-in-exile/ateliers2/a15/art15-29.html>  
[http://www.workers.org/2010/world/ukraine\\_0225/](http://www.workers.org/2010/world/ukraine_0225/)

<sup>154</sup> Devon DB, *NGOs: The Missionaries of Empire*, The Centre for Research on Globalization, March 03, 2012. Mode of access: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/ngos-the-missionaries-of-empire/29595>

<sup>155</sup> Кара-Мурза С. Г., *Экспорт революции. Саакашвили, Ющенко ...*, Алгоритм, М., 2005, С.40

more than 1,000 trained observers. They also organized exit polls, which a few days before the elections gave Mr. Yushchenko an 11-point lead. The exit polls represent a critical element; they take away the initiative in the propaganda battle, and along with wide media coverage, manipulate the mass consciousness.<sup>156</sup>

An important element in the technology of "elections" organization, very well streamlined by the Americans, was the creation of an atmosphere of fear among the Ukrainian ruling elite. They were informed that in case of use of force against the defiance campaign organizers and the participants, retaliation could follow in the form of criminal prosecution; frozen accounts in Western banks, and seized property. Here is what "The Guardian", a British national daily newspaper, states: "the campaign is an American creation, a sophisticated and brilliantly conceived exercise in western branding and mass marketing that, in four countries in four years, has been used to try to salvage rigged elections and topple unsavory regimes".<sup>157</sup>

Another important reason of the US efforts to bring real democracy in Ukraine is based on the fact that it will provide an important impulse for democratic reforms in the former Soviet space, including Russia. This process would inevitably have a strong influence on the revitalization of democracy in Russia, "more and more Russians would view the Putin regime as an anachronism".<sup>158</sup>

In general, it can be specified that Washington has a sufficiently wide range of tools and methods to accomplish the foreign policy goals and challenges. The combination of methods skillfully varies depending on where, when and what kind of problems have to be solved. The U.S. power structure, also the American civil society, without hesitation would even use military force to remove the ruling political forces that represent, in

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<sup>156</sup> Ian Traynor, *US campaign behind the turmoil in Kiev*, The Guardian, 2004. Mode of access: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/nov/26/ukraine.usa?INTCMP=SR>

<sup>157</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>158</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Imperial Russia, Vassal Ukraine*, Wall Street Journal, December 1, 2004, pp. A10. Mode of access: <http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110186090398787481,00.html>

their view, a threat to their national security. In such cases, Washington is ready to use as allies even authoritarian regimes, forgetting for a moment the constantly declared commitment to "democracy" and "freedom." In the countries under transition from the "authoritarian" to the "democratic" system, Washington operates differently. In such cases, American politicians and experts believe that, a more reliable and effective method of achieving their goals is the application of "Controlled and Regulated democratization" technologies. Moreover, if necessary the so called "democratic dictatorship" can be imposed, that is used to restrict the activities of the political forces that Washington considers unacceptable, i.e. "Anti-democratic".<sup>159</sup>

The most powerful instrument to ensure the influence and to create a favorable environment for Washington in the desired area still remains the "carrot", in the form of financial and other type of support. Regarding Ukraine, the U.S. administration knew very well that the new political regime will not be able to stay in power without concrete financial support. In addition, the U.S. Congress agreed to provide at least 200 million dollars for the maintenance of democracy in Ukraine.<sup>160</sup>

As years passed by, it started to be clear that the political elite of Ukraine, even with foreign financial and social support, could not cope with the difficult task of state-building. They failed to unite the society, to structure government institutions, to determine the national priorities, etc. Even the elite have not become a firm, solitary national political force. In reality, Ukraine has been successively run by two competing political (i.e. political and economic) corporations, and each party has tried to build its own state.<sup>161</sup>

As far as it is known, the elites are determined by two criteria: formal - the official position occupied by certain persons, valuable – the public authority conquered by

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<sup>159</sup> Кара-Мурза С. Г., *Экспорт революции. Саакашвили, Ющенко ...*, Алгоритм, М., 2005, С.125-127

<sup>160</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>161</sup> Гриневецкий СР., Крючков Г.К., Симоненко П.Ы., Табачник Д.В., Толочко П.П., *Заявка на самоубийство: зачем Украине НАТО?*, Довіра, Киев, 2009, С. 244

certain persons irrespective of their formal (official) status. When talking about the political elite, these criteria can be rephrased as: formal political elite - those who rule, valuable political elite - those who deserve to rule. Ideally, these criteria should coincide. Indeed, the essence and the purpose of democracy is to bring the society as close as possible to this ideal. Democratic procedures and institutions are established to ensure that, on the one hand, the rulers are those who deserve to rule, and on the other hand, those who deserve to rule would have such an opportunity.<sup>162</sup>

The elite of itself - is nothing, if it is not based on the national spiritual, cultural and moral foundations. It cannot be called a class, but only an intercontinental mercenary. The problem is that nothing qualitatively new in science, culture and the economy can be created outside of the national soil, the national school. Moreover, the cultural and spiritual foundation is a basic condition for the preservation of the nation's identity. Once this foundation is subject to erosion and especially if destroyed, the nation and the state start to rashly collapse. First, crises brake out in different sectors, including the economic sector, and then there is a crisis of the entire system. On the other hand, the elite should follow the national interests. Moreover, the national interests should be the purpose and meaning of existence of the political elite. Otherwise, the elite is (what happened in Ukraine) a kind of comprador intellectuals, whose interests are not only outside their homeland, but often are in contradiction with the national interests.<sup>163</sup>

American NGOs that are operating in Ukraine are closely linked to the ruling elite and the local expert sector. For example, in 2005, soon after the Orange revolution, the "U.S.-Ukraine Policy Dialogue" was launched, in order to encourage democratic reforms and the formation of a strategic partnership. Among the participants are Ukrainian research structures, such as: Razumkov Centre for Economic & Political Studies, International Centre for Policy Studies., "Europe XXI" Foundation, etc. The program was initiated by the "Ukraine-USA" Foundation, one of the co-founders and

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<sup>162</sup> Кара-Мурза С. Г., *Экспорт революции. Саакашвили, Ющенко ...*, Алгоритм, М., 2005, С.202-204

<sup>163</sup> *Ibidem.*

the vice-president in 1991-1993 is Kateryna Yushchenko, the wife of Victor Yushchenko.<sup>164</sup>

Another good example is the National Democratic Institute (NDI) that operates in Ukraine<sup>165</sup>, the chairman of the board of directors is the former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The Institute is financed by the United States Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State and the Democratic Party. NDI began working with the parties of Ukraine from 1992, and participated in the financing of the Orange Revolution, promoted Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and supported the youth organization Pora.<sup>166</sup>

The director of the International Republican Institute, which since 1994 has been organizing various activities and programs in Ukraine in the sphere of the party system development, monitoring the election, supporting the youth, developing NGOs, etc., is Senator John McCain. The former director of the office of the International Republican Institute in Moscow, Philip Griffin was hired as a personal adviser and the image-maker of Yanukovych. During Yanukovych's trips Griffin supervised the entire team of assistants during the election campaign.<sup>167</sup>

Global Fairness Initiative, with Bill Clinton as chairman, hired the PR-company Rock Creek Creative to develop a Web site and strategy for a February 2004 conference in Kiev called 'Ukraine in Europe and the World'. This company had been involved in the development of the communication strategy, brand and policies for the Orange Revolution website, calling the website a "virtual freedom plaza for the democracy

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<sup>164</sup> *U.S.-Ukraine Policy Dialogue*, US-Ukraine Foundation, Washington DC, June 5 - 10, 2005.  
Mode of access: <http://www.usukraine.org/dialogue.shtml>

<sup>165</sup> The National Democratic Institute in Ukraine, Mode of access: <http://www.ndi.org/Ukraine>

<sup>166</sup> Ian Traynor, *US campaign behind the turmoil in Kiev*, The Guardian, 26 November, 2004.  
Mode of access: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/nov/26/ukraine.usa?INTCMP=SRCH>

<sup>167</sup> Dominique Arel, *The Ukraine list*, Ukrainian Studies of Ottawa, 22 May, 2007, pp. 24-26.  
Mode of access: <http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/UKL415.pdf>

movement". Furthermore, in its news release the company stated that in taking on the contract, the challenge was not only to create a site that was secured from hackers "but that would also not be seen as a vehicle for any U.S.-driven political message."<sup>168</sup>

Ukraine is a part of the East Slavic civilization space and the withdrawal from this area could be catastrophic for the country. Moreover, Russia and Ukraine have a very complex and strong historical connection. The Russian state had been founded in Kiev, which now is the capital of Ukraine. Ukraine had been part of the Russian Empire from 1648. The daily and official language in Soviet Ukraine was Russian, not Ukrainian. Starting from 1991, after Ukraine became independent, the country seemed to have a slow, but steady split: eastern Ukraine still felt bound to Russia; western Ukraine would start to increasingly gravitate toward Europe. With the advent of Yushchenko team supported by U.S. and Western Europe, the fight between the political forces, that support two fundamentally different concepts of development of Ukraine in the western and eastern civilization space, dramatically escalated. The foreign involvement only aggravates the already difficult development path of the country, leads to conflict between various political elite and between population groups that support them.<sup>169</sup>

The reason for the ineffectiveness of public Ukrainian political elite is not the lack of knowledge and skills, but the lack of necessity to consider the interests of the society. This need can be dictated by the moral principles of the elite, or by effective political responsibility mechanisms, or by civil society pressure. The last two factors are still absent in Ukraine. Amazingly enough, even after eighteen years of sovereign development, the Ukrainian political elite is still not structured ideologically. With the exception of the Communist Party, all the rest represent an amorphous ideological mixture, where in an unimaginable unity intertwined ethnocentrism and Westernization, social democracy and liberalism, presidential monarchism and republicanism,

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<sup>168</sup> Annys Shin, *Local PR Firm Caught in Worldwide Web of Bad Press*, Washington Post, March 7, 2005, pp. E01-02. Mode of access: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12464-2005Mar6.html>

<sup>169</sup> Daniel Yergin, *The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World*, Penguin Press, New York, 2011, Page 337

Unitarianism and Federalism, capitalism and socialism, Orthodoxy and Catholicism, etc. The ideological priorities of most parties are so mobile that it is practically impossible to keep track of them. Even those whose names would seem to define their ideological content, at different stages declare diametrically opposite values. Yesterday they were socialist and today they are liberal. The past supporters of the Common Economic Space and a strategic alliance with Russia today declare that they have always supported Ukraine's course towards joining the EU and NATO.<sup>170</sup>

And finally, the political counter-elites still has not come up with clear and specific offers of actions, strategies and tactics to overcome the crisis, and to settle the first-priority problems of the society. This fact puts into question the ability of the new government to provide a breakthrough for democracy, and the sincerity of its democratic intentions. Also, this fact suggests that the rotation of the ruling political elite in Ukraine will not automatically lead to a change in the nature of the political regime. Probably just as before, the ruling class will not be interested in the provision of law, order, elimination of poverty and the formation of the middle class (improvement of the living standard of the majority of the population, creation of conditions for development of small and medium enterprises), as these processes would inevitably lead to society resistance against authoritarian exercise of power.<sup>171</sup>

Today, Ukraine is still facing two unrealizable and competing projects, the two utopias that have no chance to materialize. The first - the "orange" Utopia: to take the whole of Ukraine including the two-thirds of the pro-Russian population and enter NATO. The second, not less utopian project: to take the whole of Ukraine, together with pro-Western regions and join Russia. The solution of the Ukrainian crisis would probably be

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<sup>170</sup> Зленко А.М., *Дипломатия и политика. Украина в процессе динамических геополитических перемен*, Фолио, Харьков, 2004, pp. 9-10

<sup>171</sup> Табачник Д.В., *«Утиный суп» по-украински*, Фолио, Харьков, 2008, С. 83

to find a middle way, a method to keep the balance between the two opposite projects.<sup>172</sup>

In Eastern Europe there is a clash of interests of the big geopolitical players (the U.S., EU and Russia). Ukraine's geopolitical destiny depends on if the ruling elite will be able to find the right balance between the external centers of military, political and economic power. The attempt of the “orange” governance to act as an American pawn in this game has already caused irreparable damage to the Ukrainian state, led to the partial collapse of its geopolitical code.<sup>173</sup>

The inner code of the country is constructed on three general vectors: West (European Community), East (Russia) and South (maritime boundaries), reflecting the peculiarities of Western, Eastern and Southern Ukraine. The loss of one of the external areas leads to the destruction of the multidimensional communication area of the state. Therefore, then the elites deliberately tried to eliminate the eastern (Russian) aspects, in the hope for an accelerated promotion to the capitalist West, the result was different from the one expected. A chain reaction followed, the southern (maritime) and the eastern vectors, which the last two centuries have been shaped by the Russian geopolitical space, were suddenly deteriorated. As a result the population of Southern and Eastern Ukraine, who's wellbeing depended on those vectors rose against the new western vector, this way distancing the entire country from the West. The authorities not only failed to provide the optimum combination and balance between the major geopolitical vectors, but consistently worsened all of them.<sup>174</sup>

Today it is obvious that the population of Ukraine split up not because of their political sympathies, but based on their geopolitical orientation. Most of the west wants to enter NATO, Europe and Atlanticism; whereas the major part of the East wanted to be closer

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<sup>172</sup> Ivi, pp. 102-103

<sup>173</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>174</sup> Гриневецкий СР., Крючков Г.К., Симоненко П.Ы., Табачник Д.В., Толочко П.П., *Заявка на самоубийство: зачем Украине НАТО?*, Довіра, Киев, 2009, С. 104



to Russia, to their homeland. Thus, two main geopolitical identities are present in Ukraine.<sup>175</sup>

The US has been particularly active into including Ukraine into NATO, since such development of events would serve three important purposes:

- First, to strengthen its position in the alliance, to increase the number of countries that would obediently support the U.S. policy.
- Second, to consolidate Ukraine, the largest country in Europe, as a pro-American and an anti-Russian country;
- Third, the U.S. considers the territory of Ukraine as the "southwestern underbelly of Russia", providing direct access to Russian borders.

United States invests a lot of pressure, effort and money, in order to achieve a full NATO membership for Ukraine and to tear the country away from Russia, since these actions represent an integral part of the concept of the American dominance on the European continent.<sup>176</sup>

The NATO Membership, for which Yushchenko and his team has strived so much, will be accompanied by profound geopolitical transformation, the consequences of which cannot be calculated for the future of the Ukrainian state, but also for the continent in general. Just one error in the implementation of this complex geopolitical process could lead to the disintegration of the country, since, in contrast to its neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, it is crossed by a civilization boundary. U.S. has had a very active presence on the Ukrainian political space, but still the hopes for a strategic alliance with Ukraine have no ground. The US, also Russia, in principle, is not suitable to be a strategic partner for Ukraine, because the huge potential of the two powers contribute to the split of the Ukrainian political class. In political terms, Ukraine strategically

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<sup>175</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>176</sup> *Ivi, pp. 106-108*

depends on the U.S., in the economic terms on the strategic scale it still relies on Russia.<sup>177</sup>

Despite the objective and subjective obstacles, Ukraine gradually enters into Europe:

- 2006 Readmission Agreement - The Agreement sets out the procedural requirements related to identification, return and re-admission of persons who are citizens of Ukraine, EU member states, citizens of third states and stateless persons who illegally enter in or stay on the territory of Ukraine or EU member states, to their home countries;<sup>178</sup>
- 2007 Visa Facilitation Agreement – the agreement facilitates the issuance of visas between Ukraine and the European Union;<sup>179</sup>
- 2010 Visa Liberalization Action Plan - the European Council and Ukraine announced "an action plan for Ukraine toward the establishment of a visa-free regime for short-stay travel";<sup>180</sup>
- 2010 The Association agreement – The agreement aims at political association and economic integration; it includes a "deep and comprehensive free trade area", and runs parallel to the negotiations for a visa-free regime.<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>177</sup> Ivi, pp. 110

<sup>178</sup> *Agreement between the European Community and Ukraine on readmission of persons*, the Official Journal of the European Union (L 332/48), December 18, 2007 Mode of access: <http://www.ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/eu/en/31063.htm>

<sup>179</sup> *Agreement between the European Community and Ukraine on the facilitation of the issuance of Visas*, the Official Journal of the European Union (L 332/68), December 18, 2007. Mode of access: <http://www.ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/eu/en/publication/content/11576.htm>

<sup>180</sup> *Visa liberalization dialogue between Ukraine and the EU*, Brussels, 29 October, 2008. Mode of access: <http://www.ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/eu/en/32257.htm>

<sup>181</sup> *Association Agreement the European Community and Ukraine*, in the process of ratification. Mode of access: <http://www.ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/eu/en/publication/content/47343.htm>

Thus, the European vector of Ukraine has strengthened. The evidence of this fact is that after the results of the presidential elections from in Ukraine from 2010 the European Parliament adopted a resolution that grants the right of Ukraine to apply for membership in the EU. Not surprisingly, after the inauguration, Viktor Yanukovych first went to Brussels, not Moscow. When it comes to the prospects for political and economic development of Ukraine, then, of course, the relationship with the EU and the U.S. will always have priority over "Moscow's direction." Russia is not competitive and has nothing to offer to attract Ukraine under its political interest. Even the energy blackmail is not effective any longer.<sup>182</sup>

Certainly the Agreement to extend the deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea for 25 more years, signed by Viktor Yanukovych, is a decisive break with the policies of his predecessor, Viktor Yushchenko. Not surprisingly, the American Washington Post immediately called the Russian-Ukrainian agreement as a threat to U.S. goals in the region, as the Pentagon hoped to place part of its missile defense shield on warships in the Black Sea.<sup>183</sup> However, despite the efforts done towards Russia and the public opinion before his presidency, Yanukovych did not turn to be a firm pro-Russian leader. Already on April 27, 2010 Yanukovych turned his back on the intentions of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to establish the Unified Economic Space, the process that started back in 2003 and was suspended when Viktor Yushchenko took office in 2005. He stated that "Ukraine has entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) and is integrating into the WTO. We are developing policies according to the organization's principles. Joining the Russian-Belarusian-Kazakh

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<sup>182</sup> Шушарин Д., *Украина вышла замуж*, 24.02.2010. Mode of access: <http://www.slon.ru/blogs/shusharin/post/291736/>

<sup>183</sup> Pan P., *Ukraine's extension of Russian base's lease may challenge U.S. goals in region*. Washington post, April 28, 2010. Mode of access: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/27/AR2010042703887.html>

customs union is impossible now because of the WTO's economic principles which do not allow us to join this union."<sup>184</sup>

It could be said that the foreign policy of Viktor Yanukovich, as of his predecessor Leonid Kuchma, is reduced to balancing between the West and Russia. Yanukovich had his main political school in the reign of President Leonid Kuchma, when Ukraine had grown an expert in extracting from any non-binding promises of friendship quite real profits. President Leonid Kravchuk, alike his successor Leonid Kuchma, used the same tactics. Ukraine first enters into an integrated union, or at least promises to seriously consider it, in exchange for some benefits. Receiving the benefits, Kiev suddenly informs that the new obligations imposed by the union are in contradiction with the legislation of Ukraine and violate its sovereignty, and therefore Ukraine cannot implement them.<sup>185</sup>

The victory of Viktor Yanukovich in the presidential election does not mean revenge for 2005. Ukraine will come back into the orbit of the Russian influence - as well as other neighboring countries – only if the quality of life and politics in Russia will improve. The quality of life is not just income growth and the development of the nanotechnology, but also improvement of human rights protection in the broadest sense. If Russia becomes rich and free, the problem with the pro-Russian candidates will disappear.<sup>186</sup>

Thus, today it can be said that the U.S. implemented a part of the objectives. Washington increased its presence in Ukraine and simultaneously weakened Russia's position in a strategically important country of the former Soviet Union. In the long term U.S. policy towards Ukraine will not change. Of course, there may be some changes in prioritizing the objectives and the mechanisms of their achievement, since

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<sup>184</sup> Sergey Guneev, *Ukraine's Yanukovich says 'no' to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan customs union*, 27/04/2010. Mode of access: <http://en.rian.ru/world/20100427/158770510.html>

<sup>185</sup> Табачник Д.В., «Утиный суп» по-украински, Фолио, Харьков, 2008, С. 30

<sup>186</sup> Щербак А., *Новое начало. Президентство Януковича будет нелегким как для России, так и для Украины*, 25.02.2010. Mode of access: [http://slon.ru/world/novoe\\_nachalo-293829.xhtml](http://slon.ru/world/novoe_nachalo-293829.xhtml)

every American administration has its own vision, and Obama is no exception. Overall, however, U.S. policy thinking towards Ukraine will continue.<sup>187</sup>

William Green Miller, the former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, stated that it is up to Ukraine's leaders to use their mandate to give their people what they asked for, but the Obama administration will continue to provide crucial support where needed. "The future is in the hands of the people of Ukraine but we should be ready to stand shoulder to shoulder with a democratic Ukraine as we have in the past."<sup>188</sup>

Taking into account the complex nature of Russian-Ukrainian relations, the Obama program for Ukraine will be aimed at removing the obstacles that prevent the Ukrainian authorities to take another step toward the West. The American administration will focus on the following areas:

- First, it will seek to change the balance of power among the political elite, seeking dominance of pro-American sentiments. Something similar was performed on the politicians from the western and central Ukraine. Now came the turn of the east and south-east.
- Second, it will focus on non-governmental organizations. The grants to support "democratic change" will be the main instrument for the ideological development of the east. Such work is already active in the eastern part of Ukraine. Despite the crisis, non-governmental organizations funded by the

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<sup>187</sup> Steven Woehrel, *Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2012, pp. 12-13. Mode of access: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33460.pdf>

<sup>188</sup> Sarah Dixon Klump, *Priorities for U.S. Policy toward Ukraine in the Obama Administration*, The Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2013. Mode of access: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/priorities-for-us-policy-toward-ukraine-the-obama-administration>

United States, increased the amount of funds allocated to the formation of the young elite.

- Third, the United States can offer to Ukraine other mechanisms of rapprochement to NATO. The Membership Action Plan (MAP), for which Yushchenko was fighting all these years and against which stood Russia, will give way to other programs that should camouflage the process of entering into the alliance.
- Fourth, the United States can establish tighter collaboration with the leading Ukrainian parties seeking changes in their positions in the US favor.
- Fifth, greater attention will be paid to Crimea, which does not only have a strategic importance in the Black Sea region, but also represents a knot of problems: the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Crimean Tatar factor, as well as the prospects of oil and gas deposits of the Black Sea. At the moment the process of opening a U.S. representative office in Crimea has slowed down, but there is no doubt that such an interest is still present.<sup>189</sup>

Of course, this list of problems and mechanisms, with which the U.S. intends to sell its interests in Ukraine, is incomplete and only defines the framework of American politics. Obviously, the U.S. is going to save the results achieved over the past decade, and, despite the election of Viktor Yanukovich, will try its best to prevent improvements in the Russian-Ukrainian relations and the emergence of new pro-Russian structures in the post-Soviet zone. An unfriendly Ukraine towards Russia is more responsive to the U.S. interests. Such an approach is consistent with the strategic plan of the United States, which is to limit as much as possible the Russian sphere of influence. Thus, the outcome of the U.S. administration's policy towards Ukraine suggest that Washington's actions are intended to achieve a complete separation of Ukraine from Russia. In the political

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<sup>189</sup> Гриневецкий СР., Крючков Г.К., Симоненко П.И., Табачник Д.В., Толочко П.П., *Заявка на самоубийство: зачем Украине НАТО?*, Довіра, Киев, 2009, С. 382-387

sphere, this can be seen in the tacit support of unproductive involvement of Ukraine in the CIS, in the stimulation of Kiev's efforts in the development and revitalization of the alternative to Commonwealth associations, such as, for example, GUAM<sup>190</sup>. For the same reasons Washington puts effort to encourage Kiev to more intensive cooperation with the West within NATO. In the economy, Washington's attempts to minimize the economic cooperation between Ukraine and Russia can be noticed. In an effort to increase the "independence" of Ukraine, Washington plans to take actions in order to reduce Ukraine's dependence on Russian energy supplies. In the case of the successful implementation of these plans Ukraine threatens the dubious benefit of replacing the dependence on Russia, to the dependence on the West.<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>190</sup> GUAM is a military-political organisation established between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova 1997. Mode of access: <http://guam-organization.org/node/242>

<sup>191</sup> Гриневецкий СР., Крючков Г.К., Симоненко П.Ы., Табачник Д.В., Толочко П.П., *Заявка на самоубийство: зачем Украине НАТО?*, Довіра, Киев, 2009, С. 382-387

## 2.2. Mechanisms of the implementation of U.S. policy in Georgia

Georgia is the second state (after Lithuania) that, on April 9, 1991, as a result of a referendum, officially announced its complete separation from the Soviet Union. Over 99% of the participants at the referendum (with a 90.6% turnout of voters) voted for the independence of Georgia and the Soviet dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the leader of the pro-independence bloc Round Table-Free Georgia, became the first president of Georgia. At the same time, Georgia was one of the first post-Soviet states to prove that getting rid of the communist domination and electing the path of independence not only failed to give the recipe for their major problems, but also created new risks. Georgia was the first republic where the struggle for independence and later the approval of the state borders were burdened by bloody ethnic conflicts and struggles.<sup>192</sup>

Georgia has never been a mono-ethnic country. It has represented a real mosaic of different and very diverse ethnic groups:

- Georgians (70.1%) - part of Caucasian peoples, the majority is Orthodox Christian;
- Armenians (8.1%) – also Caucasian people mostly Oriental Orthodox;
- Azerbaijanis (5.7%) – Turkic people mostly Muslim;
- Ossetians (3%) - an Iranic ethnic group of the Caucasus Mountains;
- Abkhazians (1.8%) - belong to the north-western group of Caucasian peoples and are mostly Muslim;
- Adjars (1.5%) - Muslim Georgians, who converted to Islam during the several centuries of Ottoman rule;
- And others (3.5%).<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> Bruno Coppieters, *Contested Borders in Caucasus*, VUB University Press, Brussels, 1996: pp. 17

<sup>193</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, New York, 1997, pp.127-128





Fig. 4: The map of Georgia

The Adjars, South Ossetians, and Abkhazians have held autonomous areas since the 1920s, whereas the Armenians and Azerbaijanis have never had any autonomy. The question of Georgia's territorial integrity has always been on the agenda since its inception, but became particularly fragile after Stalin's dictatorial actions on artificial increment of its territory.<sup>194</sup> Occasional friction and discord have been present during the Soviet period between the Georgians, the titular ethnic group, and the representatives of other ethnicities, but real mass tensions began from 1987, when the first movements toward dissociation with the Soviet Union emerged in Georgia. The minority groups fearing that an independent Georgia would lead to the elimination of their autonomy started to show their discontent, which gradually turned into serious

<sup>194</sup> Svante E. Cornell, *Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, Curzon Press, UK, 2001, pp.4-6

separatist actions.<sup>195</sup> The issues at stake for most Georgian minorities were similar, with language issues, in particular, at the top of the agenda. They generally spoke their mother tongue and Russian, the language of interethnic communication in the Soviet Union; but few of them spoke Georgian. Thus, the nationalistic policies of Gamsakhurdia: the law strengthening the position of the Georgian language, scarce presence of minorities in the parliament(only 9 out of 245 deputies),etc; were perceived as a threat to the minority regions.<sup>196</sup>

In 1990, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the population of South Ossetia organized a referendum voting for independence and secession from Georgia. South Ossetians declared their independence, calling themselves the Republic of South Ossetia. The Georgian government responded by abolishing South Ossetia's autonomy and trying to retake the region by force. This led to the 1991–1992 South Ossetia War.<sup>197</sup>

Then in 1992 war broke in Abkhazia. The separatist leadership, as in the case of South Ossetia, managed to secure control over the entire territory. Months of fighting brought no success to Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia de facto ever since, did not obey the Georgian authorities.<sup>198</sup>

Eduard Shevardnadze, the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, of course was aware of all the multinational processes and events in Georgia and tried to have an influence on them ever since he left Georgia in 1985, and became the minister of

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<sup>195</sup> Svante E. Cornell, *Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective*, World Politics, Volume 54, Number 2, January 2002, pp. 245-276

<sup>196</sup> Svante E. Cornell, *Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, Curzon Press, UK, 2001, pp.4-6

<sup>197</sup> *Ivi*, pp. 153-155

<sup>198</sup> Svante E. Cornell, *Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective*, World Politics, Volume 54, Number 2, January 2002, pp. 245-276

foreign affairs of the USSR, also the chief adviser of Gorbachev in his policy towards Georgia. In December, 1990 after his resignation from the post of the Minister of foreign affairs, observing the apparent trend of disintegration of the Soviet Union, he understood that his political future in Russia is questionable and that the only possible arena where he could continue his career was Georgia.

In January 1992, as a result a violent coup d'état launched by opposition supporters Gamsakhurdia and members of his government were overthrown. A Military Council took over the government on an interim basis, with Eduard Shevardnadze, an old rival of Gamsakhurdia, as chairman. In November 1995 when the Presidency was restored he was elected as president of Georgia, and in April 2000 reelected for the second term.<sup>199</sup>

In 1997, the Parliament of Georgia adopted the "National Security Concept of Georgia", a document aimed to strengthen the stability of the social life, of the state sovereignty and security, restore the territorial integrity of Georgia. It was based on the theory of the European orientation of Georgia. In the historical context the role of Russia was critically evaluated, the paper pointed out the crucial importance of NATO in providing security to European countries and welcomed the policy of the alliance enlargement. The purpose of the concept is to show the presence of an alternative to cooperation with Russia.<sup>200</sup> Already in 1999, Shevardnadze publicly announcement of his intentions to join NATO, and in 2005 will apply for the membership. All these actions gave the reason for the U.S. to consider Georgia as one of the key regional

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<sup>199</sup> Svante E. Cornell, *Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, Curzon Press, UK, 2001, pp. 146

<sup>200</sup> Gia Nodia, *Developing a National Security Concept for Georgia*, Proceedings of the International Conference (Tbilisi, 1-2 April 1996), THE CAUCASIAN INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT, Tbilisi, April, 1996, pp. 7

partners, to promote and stimulate the part of the political elite that stands for the estrangement from Russia.<sup>201</sup>

The objections by Russia against Georgia's membership in NATO had geopolitical nature. Moscow feared the "domino effect": Georgia could follow for Azerbaijan and Armenia will be forced move away from Russia and to rely on the United States in order to deter Baku. As a result, Moscow would lose its ties with Azerbaijan and Armenia. Furthermore, the entire strategic important energy corridor from the Caspian region to Europe would be entirely in the hands of the West, under the protection of U.S. troops, and U.S. would become a hegemon of the Black and Caspian Seas.<sup>202</sup>

In the American view, an exclusive Russian sphere of influence would be dangerous and destabilizing for the consolidation of Georgia and other newly independent nations, and the world order in general will be more peaceful.<sup>203</sup>

The situation in Georgia is related to the geographical location of The South Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia). For centuries this region has served as a bridge between Europe and Asia. It is a critical crossroads of the world that "could become a breeding ground of terrorism, a hotbed of religious and political extremism, and a battleground of outright war... fueled and lubricated by oil."<sup>204</sup> Thus, from one side this region is highly unstable, and from another it is very valuable, and both cases are more or less thanks to the natural resources from the Caspian Sea, which lies above one of the world's largest groups of oil and gas fields. Due to its location the South Caucasus came

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<sup>201</sup> Shevardnadze Says Georgia to Join NATO, April 29th, 1999. Mode of access: <http://asbarez.com/39770/shevardnadze-says-georgia-to-join-nato/>

<sup>202</sup> Dmitri Trenin, *Post-imperium: a Eurasian story*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow, 2012, pp. 142

<sup>203</sup> Daniel Yergin, *The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World*, Penguin Press, New York, 2011, pp. 47

<sup>204</sup> *A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia*, Speech of Strobe Talbott (U.S. Deputy Secretary of State), Baltimore, Maryland, July 21, 1997. Mode of access: <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/970721talbott.html>

to be regarded by the United States as the only acceptable corridor for the transportation of energy resources from the Caspian Sea.<sup>205</sup>

Georgia can play the role of a "plug" or, conversely, the "open door" for the traffic flows, while no other ways are satisfactory for the U.S. administration, based on various, mostly political, reasons. The U.S. interest in Georgia is also because of its proximity to Chechnya and the North Caucasus in general, which has always been regarded by Washington as one of the most visible problem areas of Russia, an epicenter of separatist tendencies. According to the U.S. Administration, Georgia could become over time a base for the U.S. Navy, thereby further limiting the Russian influence in the region. Way back in 1919, Winston Churchill called the Caspian region "Russia's soft underbelly", and this idea remained unchanged up until nowadays in the western politics.<sup>206</sup>

In the current conditions of a "unipolar world" the US seeks once and for all to solve the problem which was not solved in 1919 by Churchill. In 1997 the Caucasus and Caspian basin started to be considered an area of national interests of the US.<sup>207</sup>

During the rule of Eduard Shevardnadze (1992-2003), Georgia turned into a country that suffers bankruptcy: huge scale corruption, growing crime and ethnic separatism, etc. The inefficient government of Georgia had no control over the situation in the country. For years the U.S. created a mythical image of Shevardnadze as a respectable, thoughtful diplomat; at the same time, both in Washington and in Georgia there was a huge list of accusations against him, such as: fostering corruption, clan-leadership, the destruction of the economic space, the political crisis, etc. Soon United States realized that Shevardnadze exhausted his potential and his place is in the backyard of the history.

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<sup>205</sup> Daniel Yergin, *The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World*, Penguin Press, New York, 2011, pp. 44

<sup>206</sup> Svante E. Cornell, *Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, Curzon Press, UK, 2001, pp. 376

<sup>207</sup> *A National Security Strategy for A New Century*, May 1997. Mode of access: <http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/#III-europe>

Implementing the tried and tested strategies of Brzezinski, the U.S. with the support of the Georgian opposition had prepared the overthrow of the pro-American Shevardnadze regime.<sup>208</sup>

In July, 2003 the Secretary of State James Baker, on President Bush's behalf, organized a few meetings at the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi, where the leaders of all opposition parties gathered: Zurab Zhvania - "United Democrats", Levan Gachechiladze - "New Right Party", Mikheil Saakashvili - United National Movement, Shalva Natelashvili – "Labor Party", Akaki Asatiani – "Union of Georgian Traditionalists". During the meeting, the further actions scenario of the opposition was sketched.<sup>209</sup> In the same period, Baker met with Shevardnadze, urging him to cede power peacefully and without any fuss, if he wants to keep further good relations with the US political elite.<sup>210</sup>

The events of November 2003 in Tbilisi have diverse assessments -from the "Rose Revolution" to the coup. Of course, there was no Revolution. The socio-economic system remained unchanged, and the ruling class has maintained its position. A more accurate name for the event would be a "coup d'état", although even in this case there is need for some reservations to be mentioned. First, Shevardnadze himself announced about his resignation and retirement from politics, he did not only save his life and liberty, but also certain privileges (dachas, security). Second, the presidency was

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<sup>208</sup> Кара-Мурза С. Г., *Экспорт революции. Саакашвили, Ющенко ...*, Алгоритм, М., 2005, С.101-103

<sup>209</sup> Giorgi Kandelaki, *US Pressure Helps Achieve Breakthrough in Georgian Domestic Political Dispute*, July 17, 2003. Mode of access: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav071803.shtml>

<sup>210</sup> Natalie Nougayrède, *L'attitude de la Russie sera déterminante pour la stabilisation du pays – Analyse*, Le Monde, France, 25 Novembre, 2003. Mode of access: [http://www.lemonde.fr/cgi-bin/ACHATS/acheter.cgi?offre=ARCHIVES&type\\_item=ART\\_ARCH\\_30J&objet\\_id=828679&xtmc=natalie\\_nougayrede&xtr=24](http://www.lemonde.fr/cgi-bin/ACHATS/acheter.cgi?offre=ARCHIVES&type_item=ART_ARCH_30J&objet_id=828679&xtmc=natalie_nougayrede&xtr=24)

Russian version: Натали Нугайред, *Ключ к решению грузинского кризиса власти находится в руках Москвы* // «Le Monde», Франция. - 25 ноября 2003 г. Mode of access: <http://eup.ru/Documents/2003-12-01/2771A.asp>

abandoned under the pressure of the crowds from the streets and squares that were led by his ex-associates and ex-disciples.<sup>211</sup>

Here are the stages of preparation for the overthrow of Shevardnadze:

1. The preparatory stage. It started about three months before the event, when the opposition announced its existence, and its leaders through a variety of organizations, especially foreign ones, began a focused work with the masses, relying primarily on the young population. In April 2003, a new group called "Kmara" ("Enough") was created, sponsored by Soros Foundation. About two thousand young people received special training on how to create a strong movement.
2. The second stage – expansion, publicity and PR - took place up to the elections day, by organizing concerts, various protests and demonstrations, also largely using the media as a powerful instrument to manipulate and condition the masses.
3. The third phase involved the destabilization of the situation in the capital during the elections.
4. The final stage, in case the results of the elections are unsatisfactory, is the coup itself.<sup>212</sup>

"Kmara – 03, Campaign for Free and Fair Elections" is just one example of the documents prepared by U.S. experts specifically for the youth movement. It states that OSGF (Open Society - Georgia Foundation), namely the Georgian Soros, in the run-up to the November parliamentary elections plans to support the "International Society for

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<sup>211</sup> Кара-Мурза С. Г., *Экспорт революции. Саакашвили, Ющенко ...*, Алгоритм, М., 2005, С.124-125

<sup>212</sup> Natalia Antelava, *How to stage a revolution*, BBC News, 4 December, 2003. Mode of access: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3288547.stm>

Fair Elections and Democracy» (ISFED) and to increase funds for "Kmara". The objective of the "Kmara" is to mobilize the voters, whereas the purpose of ISFED is to monitor the elections. The project also involved the creation of computerized voting lists, for the realization of which 300,000 dollars were allocated.<sup>213</sup>

The document also contains information about the street protests, aimed to organize noisy actions, to mobilize the activists and the population. The cost of the protests shown in the document is 31.310 dollars. Moreover, the methods of civil disobedience are listed in detail. It is explicitly stated that all the measures taken should be nonviolent, but in such cases it is hard to set the boundaries and the limits. For example, through the methods listed are: "erection of barricades", "destruction of private property", "rude gestures", "mocking the officials," "ostentatious, political funerals", "nonviolent harassment ", etc. Only the painting of urban parks costs 3.300 dollars. Printing and distribution of brochures and posters with the slogan "Kmara", symbols, flags, T-shirts, caps "Kmara", television and radio advertisements calling for the public to get involved in the actions, that's another 173,000 dollars.<sup>214</sup>

In general, according to the list of methods, we are talking about the organization of a defiance campaign against the government. The government was put under pressure at all levels, dealing with all kinds of strikes, including hunger strikes, occupation via non-violent methods, presentation of forged documents, blockade of the data lines, resignation from government jobs, etc.<sup>215</sup>

The parliamentary elections were held in the Republic of Georgia on November 2, 2003. "The United States provided over \$2 million in assistance for election monitoring, voter education, voter lists, and poll-worker training for these elections. Georgia's numerous and active non-governmental organizations, many of which have benefited

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<sup>213</sup> Глазунов О. Н., *Государственный переворот. Стратегия и технологии*, Олма-Пресс, М., 2006, pp. 169-180

<sup>214</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>215</sup> *Ibidem.*



from U.S. assistance, played a critical role in providing an independent assessment of the November parliamentary... The independent media, also supported by U.S. programs, are among the strongest in Eurasia.”<sup>216</sup>

According to statistics released by the Georgian Election Commission, the elections were won by a combination of parties supporting President Eduard Shevardnadze. As expected, U.S. did not recognize the election results. The representatives of the opposition and the masses supporting them, led by Saakashvili, invaded the streets of Tbilisi, accusing the authorities of rigging the elections. Following the orders of their leaders, the supporters of the opposition for three weeks gathered daily at the walls of



*Fig. 2: The chorus in a shape of the US flag during the Rose Revolution*

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<sup>216</sup> *U.S. Priorities in Europe, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, March 3, 2004, pp. 19. Mode of access: <http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/108/92344.pdf>*

the Parliament. The culmination of the event was on November 21-23, when the opposition seized the parliament building and the presidential administration in Georgia.

The Supreme Court of Georgia annulled the results of the parliamentary elections, and on January 4, 2004 new presidential elections were held. Mikheil Saakashvili won an overwhelming victory and on January 25 was inaugurated as the new President of Georgia.<sup>217</sup>



*Fig. 3: US and Georgian flags together as a symbol of the Rose Revolution*

New Georgian authorities immediately confirmed that one of their main foreign policy goals is to join NATO. As a result, they received full support from Washington.

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<sup>217</sup> Богданович В.Ю., Маначинский А.Я., Бутенко С.Г., *Конфликты и войны после распада СССР*, Полесье, Житомир, 2006, С. 281-282

The president of the US George W. Bush declared that "the Rose Revolution... is a powerful example to people around the world who long for freedom and long for honest government. And so the Rose revolution is an inspiring moment of history."<sup>218</sup> In other words, the U.S. President himself publicly welcomed and supported the "Rose Revolution". Thus, for Bush a forced removal from power of the disliked leaders by pushing the opposition leaders to organize mass protests, is an example of freedom and democracy.<sup>219</sup>



*Fig. 2: George W. Bush supporting Mikheil Saakashvili during the Rose Revolution*

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<sup>218</sup> *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Administration of George W. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions with president Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia and an exchange with reporters*, U.S. Government Printing Office, February 25, 2004. Mode of access: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2004-book1/pdf/PPP-2004-book1-doc-pg266.pdf>

<sup>219</sup> Самуилов С. М., *Этапы политики США в отношении СНГ*, США: Экономика. Политика. Идеология. М., 2005, № 3, С. 81

From the beginning of his presidency, Saakashvili initiated a process of militarization of the country. In the last year of Eduard Shevardnadze (2003) Georgia's military budget was 30 million dollars. In 2004, it tripled to 90 million, in 2005 it was 200 million, in 2006 reached 0.5 billion dollars, in 2007 - 850 million, but it was twice revised and by the end of the year was spent about \$ 1 billion dollars. For 2008, the military expenditures were increased to \$ 1.5 billion dollars. In the same time there was a significant increase of the armed forces of Georgia. If in 2003, there were about 6,000 officers and enlisted men; by the middle of 2008 the Georgian military force has completely converted into a professional army, its staff reaching 32 thousand people. They were trained by a large number of foreign instructors, mainly from the U.S. and Israel.<sup>220</sup>

Immediately after Shevardnadze forced resignation, the United States has taken numerous actions in order to support the new Georgian leaders. On December 5, 2003, less than two weeks after the change of the government, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Henry Rumsfeld visited Tbilisi, where he met with the new key leaders Burjanadze, Zhvania and Saakashvili. Following the talks, it was announced about further development of the US-Georgian military cooperation "Georgia Train and Equip program». The program was designed for two years and costs 64 million dollars. Instructors from US Special Operations Forces and later from US Marine Corps trained the Georgian army. At the same time the United States took care of all the provision of weapons and ammunition.<sup>221</sup>

Of course, the U.S. has expressed support to the new Georgian leadership not only in the military sphere. Speaking at a congressional hearing, the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Elizabeth Jones said: "Once the revolution took

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<sup>220</sup> Гриневецкий СР., Крючков Г.К., Симоненко П.Б., Табачник Д.В., Толочко П.П. *Заявка на самоубийство: зачем Украине НАТО?*, Довіра, Киев, 2009, С. 249-250

<sup>221</sup> John D. Banusiewicz, *Rumsfeld Visits Georgia, Affirms U.S. Wish That Russia Honor Istanbul Accords*, American Forces Press Service, Dec. 5, 2003. Mode of access: <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=27675>

place and real, rapid reform became possible, we immediately sent a senior delegation to Tbilisi to work out a plan of action with the new authorities. We accelerated some spending and redirected other program funds to help stabilize the new government and to launch its ambitious reforms. We haven't slowed the pace. Our message is clear—if you reform, we'll be there to support your efforts. ". The visits of the American representatives had as a goal not only the support of Georgian leaders, but also to convince the population of the republic, as well as other countries, that the assistance is or can be real and beneficial for them, too.<sup>222</sup>

The U.S. government authorities had close contacts with the new Georgian elite a long time before the “Rose Revolution”. In particular this applies to President Saakashvili, who received a fellowship from the United States State Department, and studied in two of the best US universities. Fourteen other members of Saakashvili cabinet also visited the United States or studied there under U.S.-funded exchange programs. As noted the Assistant Secretary E. Jones: “In Georgia, our investment in exchange programs over the past ten years to promote democracy and the rule of law has paid off in a big way.”<sup>223</sup>

Intensive exchange of diplomatic visits between the U.S. and Georgia continued through the winter of 2003-2004. On January 13, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe visited Tbilisi. On January 25, Secretary of State Colin Powell was present at the inauguration of the new President of Georgia, and here is what he announced during the press briefing: “I was pleased that we were able to provide you both political and financial support during the transition period that led to your election in January...earlier in January. And we will continue to provide assistance, and during this fiscal year we expect to provide \$166 million worth of assistance from the United States government.” In addition, Mikheil Saakashvili

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<sup>222</sup> *U.S. Priorities in Europe, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, March 3, 2004, p. 18-19.*  
Mode of access: <http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/108/92344.pdf>

<sup>223</sup> *Ibidem.*

received an invitation from the US president George W Bush to visit the White House.<sup>224</sup>

The Georgian leader's visit began on 23 February, when he met with the heads of the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security, as well as the Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. According to official statements, the themes of these meetings were the fight against international terrorism, a program of U.S. military assistance to Georgia and the participation of Georgian troops in operations in Iraq.<sup>225</sup>

Already after the end of trip to the U.S., Saakashvili said that the main purpose of cooperation of Georgian and U.S. security agencies is to ensure security of the Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan pipeline: "We intend to get U.S. assistance in training and equipping our forces... to ensure security of the pipeline. I discussed this issue during a visit to Washington ".<sup>226</sup> The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is a 1,768 kilometers long oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. It connects Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan; Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia; and Ceyhan, a port on the south-eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey. It is the second longest oil pipeline in the former Soviet Union after the Druzhba pipeline. The project was initiated in 2000, and the first oil was pumped on 10 May 2005.<sup>227</sup>

On February 25, 2004 Saakashvili held talks with the U.S. President George W. Bush. Both sides stressed the need to withdraw the Russian military bases from Georgia. Many official contacts of U.S. and Georgian representatives were accompanied by such

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<sup>224</sup> *Press Briefing with Georgian President-Elect Mikheil Saakashvili*, Secretary Colin L. Powell, US Department of state Archive, January 25, 2004. Mode of access: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/28478.htm>

<sup>225</sup> Jean-Christophe Peuch, *Georgia: Groups Urge U.S. To Tie Aid To Human Rights Progress* , February 25, 2004, Mode of access: <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1051664.html>

<sup>226</sup> *Political provocations against BTC expected*, Kazakhstan Today, 05.03.2004. Mode of access: <http://engnews.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=304683>

<sup>227</sup> Daniel Yergin, *The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World*, Penguin Press, New York, 2011, pp. 62-74

statements.<sup>228</sup> During his visit in the US Saakashvili said that the program "Train and Equip" upon completion will be transformed into a new program: thousands more troops will be trained under a new five-year deal. The new program that had to begin a few months later would appear to contradict statements made a month earlier in Moscow by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who gave assurances that the United States had no plans to establish a long-term presence in Georgia.<sup>229</sup>

In early 2004, under the initiative of the president Mikheil Saakashvili, and the partnership of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Development and Reform Fund was established (DRF). The DRF was designed to pay a fairly large by Georgian standards dollar bonuses to the existing salaries of the leading officials.<sup>230</sup> Thus, according to the information available in the press, The Georgian president, prime minister, and speaker of the Parliament received monthly salary supplements of \$1,500 each; ministers received \$1,200 a month, deputy ministers \$700, etc. The program was funded by UNDP and Mr. Soros's Opened Society Institute, which in 2004 allocated about 1.5 million dollars.<sup>231</sup>

In total, the funding scheme covered about 5 thousand state officials. For comparison, the average salary in Georgia in 2004 was not more than 50 Lari which is less than 25 US dollars. The pensions were even lower, maximum 10 dollars a month. For the first

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<sup>228</sup> *President Bush Welcomes Georgian President Saakashvili to White House*, The White House Archive, February 25, 2004.

Mode of access: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040225-1.html>

<sup>229</sup> Jeffrey Donovan, *Georgia: Saakashvili Meets Bush In Washington*, February 25, 2004. Mode of access: <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1051665.html>

<sup>230</sup> *Capacity Building Fund/ Governance Reform Programme, Phase 2, The United Nations Development Programme and the Government of Georgia*, The United Nations, 29 March, 2007. Mode of access: [http://www.undp.org.ge/files/project\\_files/prodoc-CBF%20SIDA.pdf](http://www.undp.org.ge/files/project_files/prodoc-CBF%20SIDA.pdf)

<sup>231</sup> Benny Avni, *Russia Accuses U.N. Agency of Funding Georgian President*, September 30, 2008. Mode of access: <http://www.nysun.com/foreign/russia-accuses-un-agency-of-funding-georgian/86826/>



time in the international practice, the whole governing apparatus of one country was financially maintained by sources originating from another country.<sup>232</sup>

Already at the beginning of 2004, the financial aid from the U.S. reached 1.3 Billion dollars in foreign aid, Georgia becoming the second largest per capita recipient of U.S. assistance.<sup>233</sup>

On 26 August, 2004, following the strong recommendations of the United States, the leading officers of the General Staff of Georgia that were educated in Russian and Soviet military schools were replaced by their colleagues who have completed similar American institutions. The United States had an interest in these changes in order to make the military leadership of Georgia more controllable and manageable.

In autumn, 2004 US-Georgian negotiations for further development the U.S. program to form new units of armed forces in Georgia took place. The talks that ended with a new Sustainment and Stability Operations Program(GSSOP), an initiative intended as a follow-up to the two-year "Train and Equip" Program that ended in April 2004.<sup>234</sup>

For the GSSOP program administered by U.S. European Command(EUCOM), which started in March 2005 and lasted 15 months, were spent about 64 million dollars. Two battalions of Georgian soldiers received special training that included light infantry tactics; brigade-level engineer, logistics, reconnaissance and signal skills; and command and control training at the brigade level and above. Lt. Col. Chuck Hensley, chief of the EUCOM Operations Division's international cell, stated that: "In the short term, Georgia provides two battalions to Iraq that the U.S. doesn't have to provide. That allows us to

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<sup>232</sup> Симонян Ю., Гордиенко А., Байкова Е., *Вашингтон берет руководство Грузии на содержание*, Независимая газета, 26.03.2004. Mode of access: [http://www.ng.ru/cis/2004-03-26/5\\_tbilisi.html](http://www.ng.ru/cis/2004-03-26/5_tbilisi.html)

<sup>233</sup> David L. Phillips, *Stability, security, and sovereignty in the Republic of Georgia, Rapid response conflict prevention Assessment sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations*, January 15, 2004, pp. 3. Mode of access: <http://www.cfr.org/russian-fed/stability-security-sovereignty-republic-georgia/p6656>

<sup>234</sup> John Mackedon, *With US Help, Georgia gets its cake and eats it, too*. December 16, 2004. Mode of access: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav121704.shtml>



focus in other areas... In the long term, Georgia gets a better-trained total force, which numbers right now around 22,000."<sup>235</sup>

Thus, the benefits of US-Georgian cooperation are far from one-sided. For its Georgian assistance programs Washington received Tbilisi's increased support for US operations in Iraq. In November, the Georgian government announced a decision to increase the country's contribution of peacekeeping troops in Iraq to 850, a contribution that placed Georgia second only after the United States in terms of the ratio of troops to domestic population: 16 troops for every 100,000 Georgian citizens.<sup>236</sup>

The U.S. efforts were also intended to prevent the strengthening of economic relations between Georgia and Russia. For instance in this period the idea was to prevent the purchase of the Georgian transit pipeline, which delivers gas from Russia to Georgia, Armenia and Turkey, by the Russian corporation Gazprom. This pipeline needs extensive renovation, for which Gazprom proposes to allocate \$ 150 million. In spite of the fact that when it comes to such cases in Russia, the United States has always stood for their maximum openness and support to foreign investments. Whereas, in the case of Georgia Washington strongly opposed to the sale of the gas pipeline. Washington even tried to threaten Georgia that, in case the pipeline is sold, Georgia will lose the opportunity to buy Azerbaijani gas, which will be supplied by the main gas pipeline Baku - Tbilisi-Erzurum.<sup>237</sup>

At the end of the day, Washington understood that the threats won't help to the pipeline reparation. Thus, during his visit to Tbilisi on May 10, 2005, President George W. Bush announced that will allocate \$ 200 million for the pipeline repairs. These funds were to

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<sup>235</sup> Doug Kimsey, *Training for Iraq Boosts Security in Caucasus*, Special to American Forces Press Service, June 28, 2005. Mode of access: <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=16284>

<sup>236</sup> With US Help, *Georgia gets its cake and eats it, too*, December 16, 2004. Mode of access: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav121704.shtml>

<sup>237</sup> Юрий Симонян, Петр Орехин, *Газпрому в Грузии замены нет*, Независимая газета, 2005-03-21. Mode of access: [http://www.ng.ru/cis/2005-03-21/1\\_georgia.html](http://www.ng.ru/cis/2005-03-21/1_georgia.html)

be provided under the American program “Millennium Challenge”, which provides large-scale financial support to "promising" developing countries. Surely, the Georgian government immediately declared that the pipeline will not be sold to Gazprom.<sup>238</sup>

Three months later the Millennium Challenge Corporation, approved a five-year \$295.3 million Compact with Georgia. The program is exclusively designed to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth in the regions below the poverty line. And here is how Millennium Challenge Corporation is going to help the poor Georgian population: “over one quarter of the population of the country will receive indirect benefits from the program; for example, the reliable transmission of gas will reduce environmental, health, and safety risks.”<sup>239</sup>

The five-day war in August 2008 was the most serious threat to security in Europe since 1988, when Gorbachev began the strategic retreat. According to Moscow, it was a fight not as much with Georgia, as with the United States, and Tbilisi acted only as a puppet. The Russian leadership from the very beginning was very skeptical about the joint program about the U.S. military equipment and training of Georgian forces, as well as sending Georgian troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, claiming that their purpose is to obtain weapons, training and political support in the war preparation for the return of the two breakaway provinces.<sup>240</sup>

Generally western scholars reject the idea that US influenced Georgia in starting the South Ossetian conflict, but William Engdahl has a different view: “Washington obviously had backed and encouraged the hot-headed Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili to invade South Ossetia, clearly knowing that such actions, if successful,

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<sup>238</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>239</sup> *Millennium Challenge Corporation Board Approves \$295.3 Million Compact with Georgia*, U.S. Government: Millennium Challenge Corporation, Press Release, August 16, 2005. Mode of access: <http://www.mcc.gov/pages/press/release/release-081605-mccboardapproves>

<sup>240</sup> Dmitri Trenin, *Post-imperium: a Eurasian story*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow, 2012, pp. 144

could minimize the issues of the transit of the Central Asian gas and limit Russian influence in the Caucasus region... Russia was forced to intervene to draw in the sand against America's relentless encirclement. “<sup>241</sup>

In late 2008, it became clear that a new version of the Cold War emerged, this time for the strategic control of energy resources and the unilateral dominant position of the nuclear arsenal. From the actions taken by Washington after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it became clear that one of the main geopolitical goals of the US was and still is to encircle, and put maximum efforts in not letting Russia to regain its former geopolitical influence and become a Superpower. Russia is the only state in Eurasia, which is able, using its vast reserves of oil and gas, to create an effective union of states. Russia is “the one remaining power that could prevent a total global American Century – the realization of Full Spectrum Dominance, as the Pentagon called it.”<sup>242</sup>

But this time, the U.S. administration has miscalculated its actions. Recently, the world situation has changed. After the collapse of the USSR, while Russia was suffocating in the economic crisis, shaken by the widespread threats of separatism and the clashes between the left and right parties, no one took the "Russian factor" seriously. Although the return of Russia on the global political arena was expected, nobody thought it would happen so quickly. It is thanks to the oil factor, Russia is regaining the position of a world power. The growing influence of Russia on the world energy situation has occurred simultaneously with the consolidation of the Russian political layer around President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and Russia's transition to a more active foreign and defense policy. As Сергей Бабурин, a well known Russian political scientist, states: during the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, Russia made it

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<sup>241</sup> F William Engdahl, *Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order*, Progressive Press, California, 2011, pp. 6-7

<sup>242</sup> *Ivi.*, pp. 24

clear to the West, especially the United States that it would no longer tolerate the expansion of NATO to the east.<sup>243</sup>

The events of August 2008 and the subsequent recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia became a turning point in the US-Russian relations in the South Caucasus. Sharp hostility of the U.S. towards Russia's actions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the subsequent harsh statements from both Russian and American sides made it clear that the model of Russia's behavior in the South Caucasus represents a real threat to the implementation of the U.S. plans. The U.S. identified as a new main problem the prevention of additional States to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, and the need to implement a set of measures to prevent the recurrence of such a model of actions in the other regions of the CIS. Thus, at the moment the US officials report the situation around South Ossetia and Abkhazia as an accidental and unfortunate incident, as a Russian foreign policy mistake, which will sooner or later have to be admitted. Russia considers the situation around Abkhazia as a thoughtful step and a possibly to start a new policy in the former Soviet space.<sup>244</sup>

The next point of reference of the new Georgian-Russian confrontation may well be the December 2009 demolition of the memorial to Georgian soldiers who died in the Great Patriotic War in Kutaisi, the legislative capital of Georgia. "A towering 46 meter high concrete and bronze structure was built to commemorate the estimated 300,000 Georgians who were killed while fighting for the Red Army. Despite sustained protests by Russian officials, Red Army veterans and pro-Russian political groups in Georgia, the government decided to destroy the monument and build a new national parliament on the site. The demolition of the monument, already a politically sensitive issue, was then further marred by the violation of safety regulations during the controlled explosion, which led to flying chunks of concrete killing two people and wounding another four. Following the destruction of the monument Russian Prime Minister Putin

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<sup>243</sup> Бабурин С. Н., *Кризис: Россия спасет мир?*, АСТ, М., 2009, С.172

<sup>244</sup> *Ibidem*

condemned the move as ‘another attempt to erase the former Soviet peoples’ memory of their common and heroic past’ and announced that a replica of the monument would be built in Moscow.’<sup>245</sup>

Numerous Russian sources claim that, according to the new interpretation of the history given by Saakashvili, the Georgians fought the Nazis, along with the Americans, New Zealanders, Australians and Canadians, not as a part of the soviet army. The president believes that the symbol of Georgian contribution to the victory over Nazism is represented by Pore Mosulishvili, who heroically died in Italy, where he fought in the guerrilla group; while the importance of thousands of Georgians - Heroes of the Soviet Union - is denied in general. The destruction of the memorial from Kutaisi was not just a technical measure to clear the area for the construction of a new parliament building, but a political action with far-reaching political goals: to further consolidate the anti-Russian and in the same time pro-American policy of Georgia. Currently, Saakashvili and his identity are losing their weight for Washington. The North American political beau monde openly acknowledged that Saakashvili discredited himself during the events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and that a new leader would be positive for Georgia. However, this does not change the overall strategy of the U.S. in relation to Georgia and in particular to the post-Soviet space, where the main objective is still to have as many states with pro-American ruling elite as possible.<sup>246</sup>

Юрий Петрович Панасик, a Russian political expert, comes up with a well structured, but not a completely demonstrated scheme of the US actions in the CIS area. He argues that the US administration has built a multi-level presentation and promotion system of their interests in the former Soviet Union, including Georgia. At the top level are the state agencies. The main role has the Department of State, being the chief strategist and developer of the post-Soviet space programs, and at the same time a key distributor of

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<sup>245</sup> Kelly Hignett, *Conflicting Interpretations of Soviet-era War Monuments*, Word Press, July 4, 2011. Mode of access: <http://thevieweast.wordpress.com/tag/kutaisi/>

<sup>246</sup> Саакашвили: "Грузины не участвовали в Великой Отечественной войне", Новая газета, 32.12.2009. Mode of access: [http://www.u-f.ru/ru/Archive/2009/12/48/Article/ID\\_24231](http://www.u-f.ru/ru/Archive/2009/12/48/Article/ID_24231)

budget funds in this area. It is followed by the National Security Council. The non-governmental organizations represent the second level. The NGO's are practical tools of the State Department and other U.S. agencies, receiving in fact instructions and financial backing from them.<sup>247</sup>

There are many active American NGOs in Georgia. One of the most influential is the International Republican Institute, which is funded by the U.S. government through the National Endowment for Democracy. The members are conservative politicians, representatives of the military-industrial complex, the officials of law enforcement agencies and others. The American NGOs in Georgia do not only train the elite, but also create it, provide possibilities for its renewal. The Institute was one of the main architects of the "Rose Revolution." After Saakashvili came to power the institution began to play the role of the president's "intelligent headquarters".<sup>248</sup>

After the revolution, the leading members of the institute and the people associated with this NGO took a number of influential positions: Alexander Lomaia – Secretary of National Security Council, Giga Bokeria - Deputy Foreign Minister, Gigi Ugulava – mayor of Tbilisi, Vano Merabishvili - minister of Interior Affairs, etc. Thus, in order to promote its interests the U.S. actively use the mechanism of non-governmental organizations. In this case, NGOs function as an alternative to the political parties and as a source of their formation in the country. The NGOs serve as a gathering of loyal to the US Georgian elite, as a recruitment channel of the Pro-American elite.<sup>249</sup>

On the third level are the lobbying companies (legal, GR- and PR-companies). Lobbying services market is highly developed in the U.S. Leaders of post-Soviet states often use their services in order to protect their interests in Washington. But, despite the

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<sup>247</sup> Юрий Петрович Панасик, *Инструментальный подход: Механизмы реализации интересов США на евразийском пространстве*, Независимая газета, 2008-10-28. Mode of access: [http://www.ng.ru/scenario/2008-10-28/11\\_podhod.html](http://www.ng.ru/scenario/2008-10-28/11_podhod.html)

<sup>248</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>249</sup> *Ibidem.*

great interest in the sector, its impact should not be exaggerated. It strongly depends on the State Department, other government agencies and mainly performs mediation functions.<sup>250</sup>

Some of the most suitable tools for the "soft", non-force tactics for implementation of the foreign policy interests, according to U.S. experts, are the international exchange programs. Here is how, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) describe the academic exchange programs: "Educational and cultural engagement is premised on the knowledge that mutual understanding, the development of future leaders, and the benefits of education programs influence societies and affect official decision-making almost everywhere in the world today... Special Academic Exchange Programs target underserved populations from the developing world or strategically important areas. These programs provide selected participants with the opportunity to participate in exchanges and develop international competencies and skills, which allow them to serve as leaders in their professions and communities." There are a few programs organized specifically for Ex-Soviet area, such as: The Edmund S. Muskie Graduate Fellowship Program and The Junior Faculty Development Program.<sup>251</sup>

Another interesting project created exclusively for Ex-soviet countries is the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX), "the U.S. government's premier youth exchange program, funded by the U.S. Department of State through the FREEDOM ("Freedom for Russian and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets") Support Act. Numerous alumni that participated at these programs "have returned to serve in positions of leadership in their home countries."<sup>252</sup> Thus, these programs to a large degree develop

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<sup>250</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>251</sup> *Special Academic Exchange Programs*, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2003. Mode of access:  
<https://www.cfda.gov/?s=program&mode=form&tab=step1&id=daa47c6cd0a91c788960c0e3e24fd9f4>

<sup>252</sup> *Assessment of the future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) Program*, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, July, 2003. Mode of access:  
[http://exchanges.state.gov/media/pdfs/office-of-policy-and-evaluations/completed-program-evaluations/full-report/flex-final-report\\_july-2003.pdf](http://exchanges.state.gov/media/pdfs/office-of-policy-and-evaluations/completed-program-evaluations/full-report/flex-final-report_july-2003.pdf)

the Pro-American foreign elite. Currently the mechanism of the implementation of exchange programs in the United States as a political tool is entirely formed. The biography of Mikhail Saakashvili usually is given as an example of "cultivation" of pro-Western elite in the US universities, for further advancing the interests of America in the post-Soviet space. The president was granted an Edmund S. Muskie Graduate Fellowship, through which he earned an LL.M. from Columbia Law School and took classes at George Washington University Law School. Many other members of Saakashvili cabinet also studied there under the U.S. funded exchange programs. Specifically, the US exchange programs took a part of the promising young people from Ukraine, Georgia and other CIS countries out of Russia's cultural influence.<sup>253</sup>

Finally, for U.S., in the promotion of their interests in the post-Soviet area, politics is more important than economics. In Russia, it is traditionally considered that the business presence in the neighboring countries may be the key to political influence, but not in the United States. In the past years, Russian, Kazakh and Turkish, but not American companies invested in Georgia. However, as it can be noticed, a so-called pro-Russian political lobby hasn't been created in the Georgian political system. Such behavior is observed virtually in almost all post-Soviet states. The U.S. put in the first place, the political (with NGOs, civil society, political parties, the opposition, the media) and administrative (a large part of the State Department, Defense Department, intelligence) tools.<sup>254</sup>

Following the "National Security Concept of Georgia" adopted in December 23, 2011, the Georgian ruling elite will continue to build their national development strategy in the XXI century on the following principles:

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<sup>253</sup> Кара-Мурза С.Г., *Экспорт революции. Саакашвили, Ющенко ...*, Алгоритм, М., 2005, С.121

<sup>254</sup> Глазунов О. Н., *Государственный переворот. Стратегия и технологии*, Олма-Пресс, М., 2006, С. 214



- the historical and political cutback of Russian-Georgian relations;
- the reorientation of its external interests and priorities towards a rapprochement with Western states and their military-political and economic organizations;
- active participation of Georgia in the formation of the balance of power in the Caucasus based on the expansion of NATO and the bilateral military ties between Georgia and U.S., Western European countries and some CIS countries – members of GUAM.<sup>255</sup>

The Georgian elite have lost its interest in Russia as the state in which not so long ago Georgia and its representatives, because of known traditions, took quite a privileged position.

The National Security Concept of Georgia<sup>256</sup>, introduced in 2005 and finalized in 2008, is fully combined with the American plans in the Caucasus region, seeking:

- First, to ensure free, independent from Russia, deliveries of Caspian oil and gas to international markets;
- Second, to ensure the independence and economic vitality of the former Soviet republics in the region, to prevent the revival of a strong southern flank of the former Soviet Union;

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<sup>255</sup> *National Security Concept of Georgia*, The Government of Georgia, December 23, 2011. Mode of access: <http://nsc.gov.ge/files/files/National%20Security%20Concept.pdf>

<sup>256</sup> *The National Security Concept of Georgia*, The Government of Georgia, 2008. Mode of access: <http://www.nsc.gov.ge/files/files/National%20Security%20Concept.pdf>

- Third, to prevent and block political and military initiatives of Russia and Iran aimed at ensuring their dominance in the Black Sea-Caspian region in matters related to the development of Caspian hydrocarbon resources and the transfer of their choice of routes; to prevent strategic rapprochement and cooperation between Moscow and Tehran.<sup>257</sup>

One of the main tasks to implement the U.S. strategy in the Caucasus is to increase the military presence in the Caucasus through the involvement of Georgia in the Atlantic security system. Washington plans to locate a few military bases in Georgia became realistic. The U.S. military forces are already treated specially in Georgia. They were given diplomatic status, granted indefinite visa, allowed free movement in the country and permitted to carry personal weapons. However, the accession of Georgia, experiencing unresolved domestic problems, into NATO is uncertain in the foreseeable future.<sup>258</sup>

The special position of Georgia in the Caucasus and the nature of the policy carried out by its ruling elite determine the role and importance of Georgia in the system of the American foreign policy priorities in the Ex-Soviet space. The various exercises and training held in Georgia in the framework of "Partnership for Peace" (PfP) strengthen the US military positions in the Caucasian, as well as in the Caspian and the Black Sea regions.<sup>259</sup>

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<sup>257</sup> Daniel Yergin, *The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World*, Penguin Press, New York, 2011, pp. 55-57

<sup>258</sup> *US bases to be deployed in Georgia? How will Russia react?*, Georgia Times, 24.09.2009. Mode of access: <http://www.georgiatimes.info/en/interview/22133.html>

<sup>259</sup> *NATO-Georgia Relations, Chronology*. NATO, 1992-2010. Mode of access: [http://eu-nato.gov.ge/index.php?que=eng/NATO\\_W\\_I\\_N\\_E/G\\_A\\_N\\_P\\_E](http://eu-nato.gov.ge/index.php?que=eng/NATO_W_I_N_E/G_A_N_P_E)

### 2.3. A comparative analysis of the US influence in the post-Soviet area.

Even after a thorough study of the US involvement in the post-URRS area, still the extent of its influence on the local political processes remains unclear, and a highly debatable subject. This chapter is an attempt to clarify as much as possible the extent of the Western interference, influence and foreign policy effectiveness in the political processes of CIS countries, by analyzing the most significant works and research papers dedicated to this theme.

The Color Revolutions represent the apogee of the political processes in the post-Soviet space, and also of the Western presence in the area. Thus, by pointing out and examining the factors of the Color Revolutions, there could be a chance of detecting the extent of the US assistance and influence that led to these events.

Mark MacKinnon, a leading Canadian journalist, states that the Color Revolutions are a U.S. based conspiracy. The US, through a well manufactured and orchestrated plan involving the US governmental programs, the NGOs, private agencies, the financial aid, etc., managed not only to stimulate, but to actually cause, all the main factors of the Color Revolution.<sup>260</sup> His interpretation of the events is supported by a number of Western and especially Russian scholars, such as: F William Engdahl <sup>261</sup> and Юрий Петрович Панасик<sup>262</sup>. However, their arguments are often based on interviews with only a few people, or quotations from public websites, deducting links that are not really apparent and coming up with strong affirmations when there is little evidence. They also disregard the desire of the people for democracy or change, or the power of

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<sup>260</sup> Mark MacKinnon, *The New Cold War, Revolutions, Rigged Elections and Pipeline Politics in the Former Soviet Union*, Random House, Canada, 2007, pp. 3-25

<sup>261</sup> F William Engdahl, *Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order*, Progressive Press, California, 2011

<sup>262</sup> Юрий Петрович Панасик, *Инструментальный подход: Механизмы реализации интересов США на евразийском пространстве*, Независимая газета, 2008-10-28

these people to craft their own futures, which were also important elements of the Color Revolutions.

A more measured and considered view at the idea that the revolutionary events from the CIS countries developed as a consequence of western planning and conspiracy is offered by Dr. Graeme P. Herd, Head of the International Security Programme and Co-Director of the International Training Course in Security Policy (ITC) at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. In his research Herd points out five necessary preconditions for a Color Revolution:

1. United opposition;
2. High popular frustration;
3. Weak and failing government;
4. Stronger than supported civil society and media;
5. Rigged elections.<sup>263</sup>

Dr. Herd points out that the central part in boosting all the revolutionary factors was played by:

- The NGOs funded by the United States, such as: Freedom House, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the George Soros-funded Open Society Foundation;
- The Western-funded international organizations that advocate democracy, such as: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe;

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<sup>263</sup> Graeme P. Herd, *Colorful Revolutions and the CIS: "Manufactured" Versus "Managed" Democracy?*, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 52, no. 2, March/April 2005, pp. 6-7

- The diplomatic missions: U.S. embassies and U.S. Agency for International Development projects and programs.<sup>264</sup>

The national, international, and non-governmental organizations are seen as vital to the deployment of the revolutionary climate. However, “the real threat to the regimes change does not come from NGOs and other Western-funded structures working in concert, but simply from working inside the country. “Under certain conditions, self-determination can occur and people can assert their rights. Teaching the principles of democracy to citizens in a semi-authoritarian system will inevitably empower the opposition to the incumbent and work to the disadvantage of pro-government parties.”<sup>265</sup>

As a result of a thorough analysis of the events and facts, Herd concludes that the “revolution-for-export thesis”, “though weak, is grounded in fact: Euro-Atlantic states and institutions do actively support the process of free and fair elections and political pluralism both in theory (for example, democratization underpins the U.S. National Security Strategy of September 2002) and in practice. However, the assertion that international organizations, foreign countries, and NGOs act in concert to achieve a grand strategy of transforming the CIS states into democracies by exporting catalytic revolutions rests on assumptions that are hard to credit.”<sup>266</sup>

According to Michael A. McFaul, an American academic and diplomat, a Stanford University professor, and currently the U.S. Ambassador to Russia, the main factors of a Color Revolution are:

1. “A semi-autocratic rather than fully autocratic regime;
2. An unpopular incumbent;

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<sup>264</sup> *Ivi.*, pp. 12-16

<sup>265</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>266</sup> *Ibidem.*

3. A united and organized opposition;
4. An ability quickly to drive home the point that voting results were falsified,
5. Enough independent media to inform citizens about the falsified vote,
6. A political opposition capable of mobilizing tens of thousands or more demonstrators to protest electoral fraud,
7. Divisions among the regime's coercive forces.”<sup>267</sup>

McFaul underlines that the US influence contributed to the value of each factor of the Color Revolutions delineated above. The relatively democratically orientated ruling regimes installed in the CIS countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union was inspired and supported by the Western society. The cause of ruling elite unpopularity had been backed by the independent media sources, and youth movements, emphasizing on the economic stagnation, growing corruption of the government and illegitimacy of the governing authorities. Western funded NGOs and survey firms carried out the local exit polls and parallel vote count, providing the result quickly after polls had closed. “Stalin famously said that election victories are claimed by the one that “counts the votes.” The logic now, however, suggests that victory is claimed by whichever vote counter the public believes. This is the essence of “parallel vote tabulation” and foreign-funded regime change. With a highly-politicized media arm and a well-organized, highly-disciplined student movement, each of them crying fraud before the world (sometimes even before the election is finished), does it even matter what the actual vote count is?”<sup>268</sup>

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<sup>267</sup> Michael A. McFaul, *Transitions from Postcommunism*, Stanford University, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, no. 3, July 2005, pp. 6

<sup>268</sup> Michael A. McFaul, *Transitions from Postcommunism*, Stanford University, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, no. 3, July 2005, pp. 7-19

The presence of autonomous media able to relay news about the falsified vote and to publicize increasing civil protests was crucial especially in Georgia. For instance: Rustavi-2, a privately owned free to air terrestrial broadcaster, and some smaller media outlets were endlessly showing the exit-poll and parallel-count results, right next to the official results released by the Georgian Central Electoral Commission. McFaul states: “What is perhaps most interesting about political opposition media outlets like Rustavi-2 is the label of “independence.” All throughout the world, opposition media outlets that are labeled by Western governments and their partners in media as “independent” or “pro-democratic” are almost always heavily financed by Western governments (either directly or through conduit NGOs like George Soros’ Open Society Institute or the National Endowment for Democracy).”

The sixth critical factor for democratic breakthrough in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine was the opposition’s capacity to mobilize significant numbers of protestors to challenge the falsified electoral results. In all three cases, the newly created youth movements — Kmara in Georgia, and Pora in Ukraine— had strong ties with both the main opposition parties and the local NGOs. They provided logistical support, mobilized the masses, also contributed to the minimization of any intention of a violent repletion of the protest.

Thus, the author concludes that the Western presence can be attributed to every important factor of the Color Revolutions. Still, he continues, the US assistance, generally speaking, did not play an independent role. Every factor would still emerge and develop even if there would have been no Western interference, with the exception of elections monitoring and the presence of “independent” media. The overall idea is that the US served only as a catalyst, an accelerator of the revolutionary events.<sup>269</sup>

Donnacha Ó Beacháin - a lecturer and Marie Curie Fellow at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Ireland - and Abel Polese - Marie Curie Fellow at

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<sup>269</sup> *Ibidem.*

the Institute of Geography, University of Edinburgh, UK - identified five key elements for a revolutionary outcome:

1. A relatively democratically orientated ruling regime that would allow the development of a civil society;
2. A compact and strong enough opposition;
3. “External influences”
4. “The people” –if the people do not want it and are not willing to risk, a color revolution cannot occur.<sup>270</sup>

Polese and Ó Beacháin identify the foreign presence, assistance and interference as a separate element of the Color Revolutions, which did not have a major effect on the evolution of the other factors, with exception of the last one.

They state that “it would be an erroneous assumption that the US, by pumping money into a country, can by themselves change the destiny of individual post-Soviet countries.” Yet, the US influenced the civil society. In most non-democratic countries, particularly during the period of the Color Revolutions, the US and EU concentrated their assistance on the civil society. Moreover, the development of the civil society depended not only on the Western support, but mainly on the “legal environment” and the “absorptive capacity” of each country individually.<sup>271</sup>

The fundamental elements of a Color Revolution in accordance with the study of Mark R. Bessinger, a professor in the Department of Politics at Princeton University and the Director of the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, are:

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<sup>270</sup> Donnacha Ó Beacháin, Abel Polese, *The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures*, Routledge, London, 2010, pp. 7-8

<sup>271</sup> *Ivi.*, pp.8



1. “the use of stolen elections as the occasion for massive mobilizations against pseudo-democratic regimes;
2. foreign support for the development of local democratic movements;
3. the organization of radical youth movements using unconventional protest tactics prior to the election in order to undermine the regime’s popularity and will to repress and to prepare for a final showdown;
4. a united opposition established in part through foreign prodding;
5. external diplomatic pressure and unusually large electoral monitoring;
6. massive mobilization upon the announcement of fraudulent electoral results and the use of nonviolent resistance tactics.”<sup>272</sup>

The Color Revolutions from Bessinger’s point of view are seen as “modular” events, since they were “based in significant part on the prior successful example of others”, but also on the US government and NGOs efforts to foster the spread of democratic revolution.

Since 2000, the Bush administration took unilateral efforts to shape the world in the American interest. Growing tensions and conflict between the U.S. and a number of post-communist governments (in particular: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) over their foreign policy orientations was the cause for a more aggressive approach of the American government toward promoting democratization in the post-Soviet region.<sup>273</sup>

The United States actively supported democratic revolutionaries in the post-Soviet area:

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<sup>272</sup> Mark R. Bessinger, *Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions*, *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol.5. No.2, June 2007, pp.261

<sup>273</sup> *Ivi.*, pp. 259

- Through financial support: spending hundreds of millions of dollars for democracy promotion, much of it transferred through third-party NGOs to local NGOs and social movements, which were directly involved in the Color Revolutions.
- Through legalization of assistance to pro-democracy activism, such as: The Belarus Democracy Act with the intention of overthrowing the Lukashenko regime.
- Through political support to the opposition leaders and diplomatic pressure of the ruling regime.<sup>274</sup>

Thus, according to Bessinger, the US had a major influence on most of the essential factors of the Color Revolutions, especially on the second, the fourth and the fifth factor. Still, the author interprets the revolutionary phenomenon as a domestic political effort, rather than an instrument of external statecraft.

Generally speaking, different experts and scholars unanimously came to a conclusion that the fundamental factors of the Color Revolutions are:

1. A relatively democratically orientated ruling regime
2. A united opposition
3. Electoral monitoring and rigged elections
4. Mass civil protests and movements
5. Western interference
  - Direct
  - Intertwined with over factors of the revolution

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<sup>274</sup> *Ivi.*, pp. 261-262

Thus, the US effort to replace unfriendly leaders to more western-orientated ones is a fact, but what about the extent of these efforts? Here we discover a full spectrum of opinions. On one end is the idea that the Color Revolution is a well manufactured and orchestrated US operation, and on the other is the opinion that the US, though present, did not influence much the course of the revolutionary events.

It is difficult to determine to what degree the U.S. interference is responsible for the Revolutionary developments in the post Soviet Area. Although the United States had sent impressive financial assistance to the CIS countries: \$807 million in FSA account aid to Georgia, \$2.1billion to Ukraine, \$408 million to Kyrgyzstan, etc; these countries remained economically stagnant and corrupt. “U.S. programs, however, may have planted seeds of change, especially in support for civil society and political party training, both of which emphasize ways in which advocacy groups can make their voices heard.”<sup>275</sup>

All in all, the majority of experts and scholars deduced, based on substantial evidences, that most fundamental factors of the Color Revolutions were either stimulated, or generated by the United States. It would not be an exaggeration to say, that the United States had a major impact on the events from the post-Soviet space and the US interference could be considered an essential and indispensable element of the Color Revolutions.

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<sup>275</sup> Curt Tarnoff, *U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet Union*, Congressional Research Service, Report RL32866 for US Congress, March 1, 2007, pp.8-9.  
Mode of access: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32866.pdf>

## **Conclusions:**

The current stage of the implementation of the US global mission in general and in the post-Soviet area in particular is based on: the historical roots of the American politics; the U.S. global goals that were formulated at the dawn of the American republic, and the fact of continuity in the foreign policy thinking of the United States. The main ideas are:

- The expansion of the US imperial ambitions in general ( first – continental: 1776 -1823, then – hemispheric: 1823- 1947, and finally – global: 1947-present). Officially the US took on the function of global guarantor of freedom and democracy in 1947, but already in the 80-90s of the XIX century the American leadership was intensively developing global geopolitical plans.
- The gradual escalation of confrontation towards the geopolitical ambitions of the Tsarist Russia/ USSR as one of the/ and then the main obstacle on the way to dominate the world geopolitical scene.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the idea of American exceptionalism and messianism, the special role of the U.S. in the world development gained a new momentum. At the basis of the US-Russian relationships lies the U.S. self-appreciation of its national superiority and, since 1993, this idea defines the U.S. international strategy towards Russia. In the past 20 years, many American leaders, as well as the U.S. foreign policy elite, were committed to the view that the United States can determine the world order without the consent of the other major powers, and in the same time without causing negative reactions against America and the American leadership.

Russia officially is no longer an opponent of the U.S., but not even a candidate for the Allies in the Global Affairs. Russia is a partner only in temporary, regional, strategic defense or other issues that are convenient for the US. New opportunities for compromise in the US-Russian relationships may temporarily appear, but the overall U.S. foreign policy towards Russia and the post-Soviet space in general can be characterized by a continuity of the course.

Over the past twenty years the United States has become one of the most active players in the former Soviet Union. The U.S. ultimate objective in this region is the creation of a conglomerate of U.S. satellites near the border with Russia, the gradual erosion of Russia's geopolitical influence inherited from USSR and the transformation of Russia into a second-rate player, isolated from major international processes.

The traditional tools of pressure on other states, such as: economic clout and military force continue to play an important role in the arsenal of the United States of America, but the importance of non-traditional, more sophisticated methods, which depend on the cultural, ideological and institutional impact, has increased. This applies primarily to the U.S. policy towards the former Soviet Union. The CIS countries are faced with a qualitatively new phenomenon that is fundamentally changing the role of the election procedure in the formation of a legitimate government. With the tool of national will, the elections in the CIS countries increasingly become a convenient excuse for multilateral foreign interference. The goal is the formation of an international legal environment for regime change by challenging the election results, the delegitimation of existing constitutional procedures and the establishment of political crisis in the country.

The U.S. have tried to actively influence the political processes in the CIS countries, and the key element is the pro-American elite, creating and bringing them to public administration, even by seizure of power. For the legitimization of the scenarios of power shift the US has widely used "The support of the international community" represented by an integrated network of Western non-governmental organizations, mass media, international supervisory structures, opinion leaders and political leaders of Western countries. The network have played a decisive role in managing the election

results in the post-Soviet countries, its controlling and operating with the legitimacy of the electoral process. The evaluation of the elections results and legitimacy turned into a new instrument of the U.S. policy on the Post-Soviet space.

Two countries, Ukraine and Georgia, in which the Western presence and influence have been particularly prominent, were chosen as models for a more profound analysis of the US involvement in the political, social and economic processes of the CIS countries. The Pro-American elites that came to power in these countries failed to substantially increase the level of freedom and democracy, or to bring major positive changes in their countries, the future development is uncertain, the corruption and clan structures flourish and the percentage of people living below the poverty line is still high, especially in Georgia.

Ukraine has an intermediate, "marginal" geopolitical position between the Western and Russian geo-political superstructures. After the change of power in Ukraine, there is no reason to believe that Ukraine will be in the foreseeable future a strategic Russian ally. Kiev is doomed to participate in two geopolitical projects simultaneously – the Russian and the anti-Russian. Tactically Ukraine will continue to balance between the East and the West. In relations with Ukraine, Russia will have to increasingly rely on the standard format of interstate relationships.

The Georgian ruling elites have been designing their national development strategy in the XXI century on the principles of diminution of Russian-Georgian historical relations and cutback of Russian-Georgian political relations; the reorientation of its external interests and priorities towards a rapprochement with the Western states and their military-political and economic organizations; active participation of Georgia in the formation of the balance of power in the Caucasus based on the expansion of NATO and the bilateral military ties between Georgia and US.

Without an attractive integration project Russian Federation will not be able to restrain the expansion of NATO in the former Soviet Union. It is realistically possible that in the foreseeable future Ukraine will be a NATO member, which will actually position the country out of the post-Soviet space, and will create a regional political

crisis. Notwithstanding the change of the US administration, the continuity in the foreign policy thinking of the United States towards the post-Soviet space is, and will remain a fact, at least in the foreseeable future.

The predominating Western tendencies of the CIS, no doubt, were caused not only by external factors. Behind them there is a whole set of reasons primarily of domestic nature. Also, the faults of the Russian policy are not excluded; but one of the most powerful external factors, without which they could not take such a form at such a massive scale, is represented by the policy of the United States of America.

Scholar and experts, while analyzing the revolutionary events from the CIS, came to the conclusion that most fundamental factors of the Color Revolutions, such as: a relatively democratically orientated ruling regime, a united opposition, electoral monitoring and rigged elections, mass civil protests and movements; were either stimulated, or generated by the United States. Thus, the United States interference had a substantial impact on the evolution of the events from the post-Soviet space and could be considered an indispensable and essential element of the Color Revolutions.

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## **Riassunto**

Il crollo dell'Unione Sovietica ha trasformato la secolare potenza mondiale in un vago e amorfo spazio post-sovietico. Anche adesso, dopo due decenni, questo spazio è sottoposto a dei processi turbolenti, che hanno un effetto ambiguo sulle prospettive per la formazione e lo sviluppo degli stati dell'ex URSS.

In realtà, l'ex Unione Sovietica è un territorio di grande importanza per gli Stati Uniti in quanto è considerato uno dei fornitori affidabili di risorse energetiche; un'importante zona di transito; ma soprattutto rappresenta un mezzo per poter limitare la potenza e l'influenza della Russia, considerata ancora come uno degli ostacoli più gravi per la realizzazione dei piani a lungo termine degli Stati Uniti a livello globale.

Il raggiungimento di questi obiettivi rientra nel complesso di misure di prevenzione di Washington, volte ad escludere la nascita di un nuovo rivale geopolitico attraverso l'influenza sugli stati post sovietici. Nel 1990, la Russia era debole e fallimentare, ma la situazione sta cambiando per il fatto che realizza progressi sulla via della modernizzazione economica e sociale, anche sulla democratizzazione del sistema politico. Di conseguenza la Russia diventerà inevitabilmente un potente magnete per i suoi vicini, con un conseguente unione economica e politica su nuove basi. E, guadagnando l'influenza sugli Stati post-sovietici, con una loro eventuale reintegrazione in seguito potrebbe emergere come un nuovo rivale geopolitico nel gioco della supremazia globale.

Lo studio di tutti questi processi è molto importante al momento attuale, per il fatto che potrebbe rivelare i motivi interni della loro attuazione e consentirà di prevedere le variazioni dello sviluppo ulteriore della situazione nel breve e lungo termine. L'importanza della ricerca è condizionata anche dallo significativo sforzo crescente da parte degli Stati Uniti e dei suoi più stretti alleati per ricostruire lo spazio post-sovietico a loro vantaggio. Questo continuo rafforzamento della posizione politico – militare

degli Stati Uniti nelle diverse regioni dello spazio ex sovietico è in contraddizione con gli obiettivi e gli interessi della Russia.

Tutto questo non lascia dubbi circa la necessità di continuare lo studio delle motivazioni, le forme e i metodi di evoluzione della politica degli Stati Uniti nella zona post-URSS e sulle prospettive della CSI.

Nel presente documento mi pongo l'obiettivo di studiare i meccanismi di influenza politica degli Stati Uniti nell'attuazione dei processi riguardanti gli stati dell'ex Unione Sovietica basati sul contesto delle relazioni tra Stati Uniti e Russia. Questo obiettivo potrebbe essere diviso in una serie di attività, che mi sono posta di analizzare nel quadro di questa tesi:

1. Visualizzare l'evoluzione degli interessi statunitensi nello spazio ex sovietico e la trasformazione della natura delle relazioni con la Russia;
2. Rivelare i metodi formativi della strategia politica degli Stati Uniti verso lo spazio post -sovietico;
3. Analizzare il ruolo delle élite dei nuovi Stati indipendenti al processo politico locale e di identificare i metodi per stabilire il controllo degli Stati Uniti su di loro;
4. Rivelare le ragioni della competizione geopolitica tra la Russia e gli Stati Uniti nella zona della CSI;
5. Identificare il livello di interferenza, influenza e efficacia della politica estera statunitense nei processi politici dei paesi della CSI.

La continuità nel pensiero di politica estera degli Stati Uniti non può essere ignorato nell'analisi della politica statunitense nei confronti dell'ex Unione Sovietica. Si deve ricordare che l'attuale fase di attuazione della missione globale degli Stati Uniti in generale e nello spazio post sovietico in particolare, si basa su: le radici storiche della politica americana; gli obiettivi globali degli Stati Uniti che sono stati formulati agli albori della Repubblica Americana; e la continuità nel pensiero di politica estera degli Stati Uniti. Le idee principali sono:

- L'espansione delle ambizioni imperiali degli Stati Uniti in generale (primo passo – espansione continentale: 1776 -1823; secondo passo – espansione emisferica: 1823 – 1947; e infine - espansione globale: 1947 - presente). Ufficialmente, a partire dal 1947, gli Stati Uniti hanno assunto la funzione di garante globale della libertà e della democrazia, ma già negli anni '80 - '90 del secolo XIX la leadership americana sviluppava piani geopolitici globali.

- L'escalation graduale dello scontro delle ambizioni geopolitiche tra gli USA e la Russia Zarista / URSS, vista dagli Stati Uniti come uno e in seguito il principale ostacolo sulla strada per dominare la scena geopolitica mondiale.

Dopo il crollo dell'Unione Sovietica, l'idea di “eccezionalismo” americano ed il ruolo speciale degli Stati Uniti nello sviluppo del mondo ha ripreso un nuovo slancio. Alla base delle relazioni USA-Russia sta la percezione statunitense della propria superiorità nazionale. Dal 1993, quest'idea definisce la strategia internazionale degli Stati Uniti nei confronti della Russia. Per gli ultimi venti anni, molti leader ed altri appartenenti all'élite della politica estera statunitense hanno condiviso l'idea che gli Stati Uniti siano in grado di determinare l'ordine del mondo, senza il consenso delle altre grandi potenze, e nello stesso tempo senza causare reazioni avverse contro l'America e la leadership americana.

Negli ultimi venti anni gli USA sono diventati uno dei giocatori più attivi nello spazio dell'ex Unione Sovietica. La politica estera degli Stati Uniti nell'area della CSI, come è stato detto in precedenza, è strettamente legata al principale obiettivo globale degli Stati Uniti, che è quello di mantenere e fortificare il suo status di leader a livello mondiale, che implica anche l'ostruzione di emergere di un'altra super-potenza capace di sfidare l'America. L'accesso alle risorse energetiche, la creazione di una zona cuscinetto per la "guerra al terrore" e la creazione di nuovi partner sono importanti, ma il principale obiettivo della politica estera degli Stati Uniti nella regione dell'ex-URSS è la graduale erosione dell'influenza geopolitica della Russia, ereditata dall'Unione Sovietica, il suo allontanamento dalla prospettiva di riacquistare il potere precedente. Tale obiettivo potrebbe essere raggiunto con la creazione di un conglomerato di satelliti degli Stati Uniti vicino al confine con la Russia, per limitare la sua potenza e isolarla da grandi

processi internazionali. Agendo sotto la bandiera della promozione della democrazia, la politica degli Stati Uniti verso gli stati della CSI persegue chiaramente il loro allontanamento e la separazione dalla Russia.

Gli strumenti tradizionali di pressione sugli altri stati, come ad esempio il peso economico e la forza militare continuano a svolgere un ruolo importante nell'arsenale degli Stati Uniti d'America, ma l'importanza di quelli non tradizionali, i metodi più sofisticati, che dipendono dalla cultura, dall'impatto ideologico e istituzionale, è aumentata. Ciò vale anzitutto per la politica degli Stati Uniti verso l'Unione Sovietica. I paesi della CSI si trovano di fronte ad un fenomeno qualitativamente nuovo che sta cambiando radicalmente il ruolo della procedura di elezione per la formazione di un governo legittimo. Attraverso il principio di volontà nazionale, per esempio, le elezioni nei paesi della CSI sono diventate sempre di più una scusa conveniente per le interferenze multilaterale straniere. L'obiettivo è la formazione di un contesto giuridico internazionale per un cambio di regime, sfidando i risultati delle elezioni, la delegittimazione delle attuali procedure costituzionali e l'istituzione di crisi politica nel paese.

Gli Stati Uniti hanno cercato di influenzare in modo attivo i processi politici nei paesi della CSI, e l'elemento chiave si trova nell'élite filoamericana, che va modellata e portata nella pubblica amministrazione, anche attraverso la presa di potere. Per legittimare gli scenari del cambio di potere, gli Stati Uniti hanno ampiamente utilizzato "il sostegno della comunità internazionale", rappresentata da una rete integrata occidentale di organizzazioni non governative, mass media, strutture di vigilanza internazionali, di leader di opinione e responsabili politici dei paesi occidentali. Questo network ha giocato un ruolo decisivo nella gestione dei risultati elettorali nei paesi post-sovietici, controllando il processo elettorale. La valutazione dei risultati e della legittimità delle elezioni sono diventate un nuovo strumento della politica degli Stati Uniti nello spazio post-sovietico.

Due paesi, l'Ucraina e la Georgia, in cui la presenza e l'influenza occidentale sono state di particolare rilievo, sono stati scelti come modelli per un'analisi più approfondita del coinvolgimento degli Stati Uniti nei processi politici, sociali ed economici dei paesi



della CSI. Le élite filoamericane, venute al potere in questi paesi non sono riuscite ad aumentare in modo notevole il livello di libertà e di democrazia, nemmeno a portare grandi cambiamenti positivi nei loro paesi, il cui sviluppo futuro è incerto; le reti di corruzione e le strutture di clan continuano a fiorire e la percentuale delle persone che vivono al di sotto della soglia di povertà è ancora alta, soprattutto in Georgia.

L'Ucraina ha una posizione geopolitica intermedia e "marginale" tra le sovrastrutture geopolitiche occidentali e russe. Dopo il cambio di potere in Ucraina, non vi è motivo di ritenere che l'Ucraina diventi nel prossimo futuro un alleato strategico della Russia. Kiev è destinata a partecipare a due progetti geopolitici contemporaneamente - quello pro e quello contro Russia. Tatticamente l'Ucraina continuerà a bilanciarsi tra l'Oriente e l'Occidente. Nei rapporti con l'Ucraina, la Russia dovrà fare sempre più affidamento sul formato standard dei rapporti interstatali.

Le classi dirigenti georgiane progettano la propria strategia nazionale di sviluppo del secolo XXI su: i principi della diminuzione delle relazioni storiche e politiche russo-georgiane; l'orientamento dei suoi interessi e priorità estere verso un riavvicinamento con gli Stati occidentali e le loro organizzazioni militari, politiche ed economiche; la partecipazione attiva della Georgia nella formazione dell'equilibrio di potere nel Caucaso, basandosi sull'espansione della NATO e sui legami bilaterali militari tra la Georgia e gli Stati Uniti.

Senza un progetto specifico e attrattivo di integrazione, la Federazione Russa non sarà in grado di frenare l'espansione della NATO nello spazio ex sovietico. È verosimilmente possibile che nel prossimo futuro l'Ucraina diventerà un membro della NATO, il che posizionerà il paese fuori dallo spazio post sovietico, e creerà una crisi politico regionale. Nonostante il cambio di governo degli Stati Uniti, la continuità nel pensiero della politica estera degli Stati Uniti nei confronti dello spazio post-sovietico è, e rimarrà un dato di fatto, almeno nel prossimo futuro. Le tendenze predominanti occidentali della CSI, senza dubbio, sono stati causati non solo da fattori esterni. Al seguito, vi è tutta una serie di motivi in primo luogo di natura interna. Inoltre, non sono da escludere le carenze della politica russa, ma uno dei più potenti fattori esterni, senza

il quale le tendenze non potrebbero assumere una forma a così larga scala, è rappresentato dalla politica degli Stati Uniti d'America.

È difficile stabilire in che misura l'interferenza degli Stati Uniti sia responsabile per gli sviluppi rivoluzionari nella zona post sovietica. Anche se gli Stati Uniti hanno finanziariamente assistito in modo impressionante i paesi della CSI: \$ 807 milioni dal conto FSA alla Georgia, \$ 2.1 miliardi in Ucraina, 408 milioni dollari in Kirghizistan, ecc; questi paesi sono rimasti economicamente stagnanti e corrotti. I piani degli SUA, tuttavia, potrebbero aver piantato i semi del cambiamento, in particolare nel sostegno della società civile e la formazione dei partiti politici, entrambi dei quali enfatizzano metodi dove i gruppi di pressione possono fare sentire la propria voce. La maggior parte degli esperti e studiosi hanno concluso, sulla base di evidenze sostanziali, che i fattori fondamentali delle rivoluzioni colorate sono stati o stimolati, o generati dagli Stati Uniti. Tutto sommato, non sarebbe una grossa esagerazione dire che gli Stati Uniti hanno avuto un forte impatto sugli eventi accaduti nello spazio post-sovietico e l'interferenza degli Stati Uniti potrebbe essere considerata un elemento essenziale e indispensabile delle Rivoluzioni Colorate.

