



Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia

Master's Degree
in
Comparative International Relations

Final Thesis

**The Racial Factor in US Foreign Policy toward North Africa during the First
Presidential Term of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1957**

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Matriculation number

882535

Academic Year

2020/2021

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Abstract

The figure of Dwight D. Eisenhower, as well as the foreign and domestic policy of his administration, is explored in a significant part of academic works. In particular, they include *Eisenhower: Soldier and President* by Stephen A. Embrose, *The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s* by William I. Hitchcock, *A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution* edited by David A. Nichols, *The Soul Of an American President: The Untold Story of Dwight. D. Eisenhower Faith* by Alan Sears and Craig Osten, *Eisenhower in War and Peace* by Jean Edward Smith and many others. In these works, the authors focused on the figure of Eisenhower and his attitude to current events both abroad and at home. However, within the framework of these works, the main focus is on the whole of US foreign policy in the period under study, without paying significant attention to individual aspects of foreign policy in relation to certain regions. Moreover, many of the works, while touching on the issue of domestic politics and desegregation, do not address the issue of the Eisenhower administration's attitude towards the process of decolonization and the establishment of US relations with new countries and how racial relations shaped them.

The main topic of this dissertation is the issue of the influence of the racial factor on the formation of US foreign policy during the first presidential term of Dwight D. Eisenhower toward the countries in North Africa. The Foreign Policy of the United States was analyzed in relation to the countries of the so-called French North Africa, which during the first term of Eisenhower's presidency gained their independence, or began an armed uprising against the colonial administration, as well as the independent countries of the region, namely Egypt and Libya. The main question which was posed is: whether the racial factor played a significant role in the relations between the USA with Northern African countries, and how it shaped them. The goal of the work is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the influence of racial factors on the formation of US foreign policy in North African countries during the period of the first term of Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953-1957. To do this I decided to set up several tasks, in particular, to understand what racial factor is, whether the internal racial dynamics in

the United States influenced the formation of foreign policy in this particular region, as well as to understand what forms of racial factor can we notice in the relations between the USA and the countries of North Africa. The work consists of an introduction, three chapters and a conclusion.

The first part is devoted to a general review of the internal political processes of desegregation in the United States, Eisenhower's attitude to the ongoing changes, as well as a description of the general trends in US foreign policy towards the countries of the region under study. In addition, this part also provides an understanding of what the racial factor is and how it affects US foreign policy, including in the historical period under study. For writing this part, materials from the above sources were used, as well as materials from the archives and diaries of Eisenhower.

The second part of the work focuses on US relations with countries that were under French colonial rule in the early and mid-1950s. Some of these countries (Morocco and Tunisia) gained their independence during Eisenhower's first term, while Algeria entered a phase of armed struggle with the colonial administration. The main questions covered in this chapter are the question of how the United States treated the independence movements in these countries, what language they used to describe these events in their correspondence and whether the Eisenhower Administration perceived the peoples of these countries as independent units capable of taking the rule into their own hands. Also, much of the chapter is devoted to how the Eisenhower administration's perception of nationalism and decolonization complicated US relations with the Western Allies in Europe, and the US balancing between trying to uphold the rights of peoples to self-determination and trying to maintain friendly relations with colonial administrations (in the case of North Africa, mainly France).

The third part of the thesis is devoted to the US relationship with the independent countries of North Africa: Libya and Egypt. By Eisenhower's accession to the presidency, both countries had gained their independence, and had established relations with the United States. This chapter is built on a comparison of how the United States perceived Libya, which was highly dependent on US economic assistance, and Egypt, which after 1952 began to attempt to build an independent

foreign policy. This chapter touches on a number of important issues for understanding US foreign policy during this period. In particular, one of these issues is the problem of how the United States perceived nationalism in these countries and how nationalism has become one of the threats. Also much attention in this chapter is given to how negotiations were conducted between the US and Libya, as well as the US and Egypt, as well as the issue of economic assistance and its use as an instrument of pressure on the governments of these two countries, as well as the question of what non-colonial instruments were used by the US administration to keep these countries in the sphere of their interests. Much of the chapter also focuses on the issue of the Suez Crisis and examines it through the lens of US attitudes towards nationalism, as well as the perception of Arabs and Egyptians in particular.

A number of sources were used to write this work, which included both primary and secondary sources. The main works that were used to write the first part include both works studying the personality of Eisenhower and works devoted to the study of US policy in the Middle East and North Africa. The first group of works includes the following monographs: *Eisenhower: Soldier and President* by Stephen A. Ambrose, *The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s* by William I. Hitchcock, *A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution* edited by David A. Nichols, *The Soul Of an American President: The Untold Story of Dwight D. Eisenhower Faith* by Alan Sears and Craig Osten. These works, which have already been mentioned above, provided an insight into Eisenhower's personality, and also helped paint a picture of Eisenhower's beliefs on issues of racial desegregation, foreign policy, communism, nationalism, and, to a lesser extent, the decolonization process. To write the part that dealt with the issue of US relations with the countries of North Africa, the secondary sources were also used. In particular, these include *America and the Arab States: an Easy Encounter* by Robert W. Stookey, *Handbook of US Middle-East Relations* by Robert Looney, *International Relations in the Middle East* by Louise Fawcett, as well as *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations since 1945* by George C. Herring, which was used as a work, which provided the main aspects of the US Foreign Policy during the period.

However, the largest part of the sources used in writing this work were primary sources, which included reports, diaries, diplomatic documents and diplomatic correspondence. The main documents that have been used in this work are the reports of the National Security Council, letters and telegrams, as well as memorandums. These documents included archival material on file at the Historians' Office Online Archive and covered the years of the first term of the Eisenhower administration, namely January 1953 to January 1957, as well as diaries and documents from the Digital Library of Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Astratto

La figura di Dwight D. Eisenhower, così come la politica estera e interna della sua amministrazione, è esplorata in una parte significativa dei lavori accademici. In particolare, includono *Eisenhower: Soldier and President* di Stephen A. Embrose, *The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s* di William I. Hitchcock, *A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Begin of the Civil Rights Revolution* di David A. Nichols, *The Soul Of an American President: The Untold Story of Dwight. D. Eisenhower Faith* by Alan Sears and Craig Osten, *Eisenhower in War and Peace* by Jean Edward Smith e molti altri. In questi lavori gli autori si sono soffermati sulla figura di Eisenhower e sul suo atteggiamento nei confronti dell'attualità sia all'estero che in patria. Tuttavia, nell'ambito di questi lavori, il focus principale è sull'insieme della politica estera statunitense nel periodo in esame, senza prestare particolare attenzione ai singoli aspetti della politica estera in relazione ad alcune regioni. Inoltre, molti dei lavori, pur toccando la questione della politica interna e della desegregazione, non affrontano la questione dell'atteggiamento dell'amministrazione Eisenhower nei confronti del processo di decolonizzazione e dell'instaurazione delle relazioni degli Stati Uniti con i nuovi paesi e di come le relazioni razziali li abbiano plasmati.

L'argomento principale di questa tesi è la questione dell'influenza del fattore razziale sulla formazione della politica estera statunitense durante il primo mandato presidenziale di Dwight D. Eisenhower verso i paesi del Nord Africa. La politica estera degli Stati Uniti è stata analizzata in relazione ai paesi del cosiddetto Nord Africa francese, che durante il primo mandato della presidenza di Eisenhower hanno ottenuto la loro indipendenza, o hanno avviato una rivolta armata contro l'amministrazione coloniale, nonché l'indipendenza paesi della regione, vale a dire Egitto e Libia. La domanda principale che è stata posta è: se il fattore razziale ha giocato un ruolo significativo nelle relazioni tra gli USA con i paesi del Nord Africa, e come li ha plasmati. L'obiettivo del lavoro è condurre un'analisi completa dell'influenza dei fattori razziali sulla formazione della politica estera statunitense nei paesi nordafricani durante il periodo del primo mandato di Dwight D. Eisenhower nel 1953-1957. Per fare ciò ho deciso di impostare diversi compiti, in particolare, per capire cosa sia il fattore razziale,

se le dinamiche razziali interne negli Stati Uniti abbiano influenzato la formazione della politica estera in questa particolare regione, nonché per capire quali forme di fattore che possiamo notare nelle relazioni tra gli USA e i paesi del Nord Africa. Il lavoro si compone di un'introduzione, tre capitoli e una conclusione.

La prima parte è dedicata a una rassegna generale dei processi politici interni di desegregazione negli Stati Uniti, all'atteggiamento di Eisenhower nei confronti dei cambiamenti in atto, nonché a una descrizione delle tendenze generali della politica estera statunitense nei confronti dei paesi della regione oggetto di studio. Inoltre, questa parte fornisce anche una comprensione di quale sia il fattore razziale e di come influisca sulla politica estera degli Stati Uniti, anche nel periodo storico in esame. Per scrivere questa parte sono stati utilizzati i materiali delle fonti di cui sopra, nonché i materiali degli archivi e dei diari di Eisenhower.

La seconda parte del lavoro si concentra sulle relazioni degli Stati Uniti con i paesi che erano sotto il dominio coloniale francese all'inizio e alla metà degli anni '50. Alcuni di questi paesi (Marocco e Tunisia) hanno ottenuto l'indipendenza durante il primo mandato di Eisenhower, mentre l'Algeria è entrata in una fase di lotta armata con l'amministrazione coloniale. Le principali questioni trattate in questo capitolo riguardano il modo in cui gli Stati Uniti hanno trattato i movimenti indipendentisti in questi paesi, quale linguaggio hanno usato per descrivere questi eventi nella loro corrispondenza e se l'amministrazione Eisenhower ha percepito i popoli di questi paesi come unità indipendenti capaci di prendendo in mano la regola. Inoltre, gran parte del capitolo è dedicato a come la percezione del nazionalismo e della decolonizzazione da parte dell'amministrazione Eisenhower abbia complicato le relazioni degli Stati Uniti con gli alleati occidentali in Europa, e gli Stati Uniti a bilanciare tra il tentativo di difendere i diritti dei popoli all'autodeterminazione e il tentativo di mantenere relazioni amichevoli con amministrazioni coloniali (nel caso del Nord Africa, principalmente Francia).

La terza parte della tesi è dedicata alle relazioni degli Stati Uniti con i paesi indipendenti del Nord Africa: Libia ed Egitto. Con l'adesione di Eisenhower alla presidenza, entrambi i paesi avevano ottenuto la loro indipendenza e avevano stabilito

relazioni con gli Stati Uniti. Questo capitolo è costruito su un confronto di come gli Stati Uniti percepivano la Libia, che era fortemente dipendente dall'assistenza economica degli Stati Uniti, e l'Egitto, che dopo il 1952 iniziò a tentare di costruire una politica estera indipendente. Questo capitolo tocca una serie di questioni importanti per comprendere la politica estera degli Stati Uniti durante questo periodo. In particolare, uno di questi problemi è il problema di come gli Stati Uniti hanno percepito il nazionalismo in questi paesi e di come il nazionalismo sia diventato una delle minacce. Molta attenzione in questo capitolo viene data anche al modo in cui sono stati condotti i negoziati tra Stati Uniti e Libia, nonché Stati Uniti ed Egitto, nonché alla questione dell'assistenza economica e al suo utilizzo come strumento di pressione sui governi di questi due paesi, così come la questione di quali strumenti non coloniali siano stati utilizzati dall'amministrazione statunitense per mantenere questi paesi nella sfera dei loro interessi. Gran parte del capitolo si concentra anche sulla questione della crisi di Suez e la esamina attraverso la lente dell'atteggiamento degli Stati Uniti nei confronti del nazionalismo, così come la percezione di arabi ed egiziani in particolare.

Per scrivere questo lavoro sono state utilizzate numerose fonti, che includono fonti primarie e secondarie. Le opere principali utilizzate per scrivere la prima parte includono sia opere che studiano la personalità di Eisenhower sia opere dedicate allo studio della politica statunitense in Medio Oriente e Nord Africa. Il primo gruppo di opere comprende le seguenti monografie: *Eisenhower: Soldier and President* di Stephen A. Ambrose, *The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s* di William I. Hitchcock, *A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the start of the Civil Rights Revolution* di David A. Nichols, *The Soul Of an American President: The Untold Story of Dwight D. Eisenhower Faith* di Alan Sears e Craig Osten. Questi lavori, che sono già stati menzionati sopra, hanno fornito uno spaccato della personalità di Eisenhower e hanno anche contribuito a dipingere un quadro delle convinzioni di Eisenhower su questioni di desegregazione razziale, politica estera, comunismo, nazionalismo e, in misura minore, il processo di decolonizzazione. Per scrivere la parte che ha affrontato il tema delle relazioni degli Stati Uniti con i paesi del Nord Africa sono state utilizzate anche le fonti secondarie. In particolare, questi includono *America and the Arab States: an Easy Encounter* di Robert W. Stookey, *Handbook of US Middle-East Relations* di Robert

Looney, *International Relations in the Middle East* di Louise Fawcett, così come *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Policy since 1945* di George C. Herring, che è stato utilizzato come opera, che ha fornito i principali aspetti della politica estera degli Stati Uniti durante il periodo.

Tuttavia, la maggior parte delle fonti utilizzate per scrivere questo lavoro erano fonti primarie, che includono rapporti, diari, documenti diplomatici e corrispondenza diplomatica. I principali documenti che sono stati utilizzati in questo lavoro sono i rapporti del Consiglio di sicurezza nazionale, lettere e telegrammi, nonché memorandum. Questi documenti includono materiale d'archivio in archivio presso Office of the Historian e coprivano gli anni del primo mandato dell'amministrazione Eisenhower, vale a dire dal gennaio 1953 al gennaio 1957, nonché diari e documenti della Biblioteca digitale di Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Introduction

In this thesis I research the interconnections between domestic and foreign policy of the US. The main focus of my work is on the so-called racial factor, i.e. the influence of internal race relations on the formation of US foreign policy in the countries of North Africa. Did this influence take place? How did domestic policy toward the civil rights movement affect foreign policy, and vice versa? Is there a connection between how black people were perceived in the United States and how people in territories under colonial rule were perceived, or in countries that gained their independence on the eve of the Eisenhower administration or during it? How was the concept of nationalism constructed and was it used to achieve foreign policy goals?

The goal of my work is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the influence of racial factors on the formation of US foreign policy in North African countries during the period of 1953-1957. To do this I decided to set up several tasks, in particular, to understand what racial factor is, whether the internal racial dynamics in the United States influenced the formation of foreign policy in this particular region, as well as to understand what forms of racial factor can we notice in the relations between the USA and the countries of North Africa.

The relevance of my work lies in the fact that race still plays an important role in the internal and external political life of the United States. We can see how political commentators are forcing the xenophobic idea of the "Great Replacement"¹ and Donald Trump, for four years of his administration, tried to build a wall, fencing off migrants from Mexico and introducing a ban on immigration from Islamic countries (while not including his ally in the Middle East in the person of Saudi Arabia). Hatred fueled by conspiracy theories like the "Great Replacement" or "White Genocide" continues to fuel

¹ Based on "That's just insane': Tucker Carlson resents ADL's response to 'Replacement' theory remarks, *USA Today*, 28.9.2021, Available at: <https://eu.usatoday.com/story/entertainment/tv/2021/09/28/fox-news-tucker-carlson-adl-great-replacement-theory-reactions/5897547001/> (Accessed: 10.02.2022)

hate crimes like the shootings in Texas² or Atlanta.³ At the same time, race is often ignored by researchers and is not taken into account when studying international relations. Even the mainstream theories of international relations (both classical and modern) neglect this factor.⁴

In turn, the region of the Middle East and North Africa has always played a fairly important role in the foreign policy of the United States in modern times. US relations with the countries of this region are an important topic for research and a significant amount of scientific work is devoted to them. Understanding how these relationships have developed over different historical periods provides a better perspective on the development of US foreign policy throughout the entire historical period. I chose the countries of North Africa, because they are often considered in conjunction with the countries of the Middle East and the development of their relations with the United States is not covered in a sufficient amount of research, especially at an early stage of their formation as independent states. The Eisenhower period is important for understanding both the first years of the development of US relations with these countries and then still colonial territories, and understanding how the perception of such concepts as race, nation and nationalism developed in the perception of the American establishment and their influence on the attitude toward the attempts to gain independence in these countries.

This work was written taking into account the principles of historicism, objectivity and value approach.

² Based on “White supremacy, racism: Remembering the El Paso massacre that targeted Latinos”, *NBC News*, 04.8.2021, Available at: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/white-supremacy-racism-remembering-el-paso-massacre-targeted-latinos-rcna1580> (Accessed: 10.2.2022)

³ Based on “Atlanta shooting: Biden condemns anti-Asian racism”, *BBC News*, 19.1.2021, Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-56464411> (Accessed: 10.2.2022)

⁴ The theories of International Relations and the race are covered in Kelebogile Zvobgo, “Why Race Matters in International Relations”, *Foreign Policy*, 19.7.2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/19/why-race-matters-international-relations-ir/> (Accessed: 10.02.2022)

The principle of historicism in scientific knowledge lies in the understanding of historical processes from the point of view of genesis and development, namely, the presence of the historical prerequisites, roots and continuity of each event.⁵ The principle of historicism is observed in the study of the overall process of the development of the US relation with the countries of North Africa, as well as in the study of the processes taking place in the US and in the region during the period under study.

The principle of objectivity is the most important principle of scientific research. Absolute objectivity consists in describing the object of research as it is.⁶ In this work, objectivity was achieved by researching various types of sources, as well as analyzing the works of a wide range of authors.

The value principle, in turn, based on the moral values and moral guidelines of the researcher, somewhat contradicts objectivity, but undoubtedly plays an important role. Its main role is to reproduce the social function of historical knowledge.⁷

In this work, two groups of scientific methods are used. They include general scientific methods and special historical research methods.

General scientific research methods are methods that are used in almost all areas of scientific knowledge. They can be divided into the following groups: 1) general logical methods of cognition, namely synthesis, deduction, analogy; 2) methods of empirical research, which include observation, description, comparison; 3) methods of theoretical research, in particular, concretization, formalization; 4) the methods used to systematize the knowledge gained.⁸

⁵ A.V. Bocharov, *Basic scientific methods in historical research. Tutorial.*, Tomsk, Tomsk State University, 2006, p. 14

⁶ A.V. Bocharov, *Basic scientific methods*, p. 13

⁷ A.V. Bocharov, *Basic scientific methods*, p. 15

⁸ E.V. Pustynnikova, *Methodology of scientific research: textbook for institutions of higher education*, Ulyanovsk, UIGU, 2017, p. 18.

In my work, relying on the above classification of methods of scientific knowledge, I focused on general logical research methods, as well as systematization of knowledge. In particular, synthesis and analysis played an important role in the study of US foreign policy (isolation of certain aspects of the subject of research, namely the racial component). Classification, as a part of systematization of the knowledge, was applied during dividing the objects (countries) under study into subgroups. Also, during the work, one of the main methods was deduction (from the general to the particular) and induction (from the particular to the general).

In contrast to general scientific methods of scientific research, special historical methods are used in the historical sciences. They also help to adhere to the principles of historical research, because they resonate with them.

The first and main special-historical method used in this work is the narrative or descriptive-narrative method. As the name implies, the narrative method is a method of simply describing certain events, the story of which, nevertheless, should not be devoid of logic and consistency.⁹ In this work, this method was applied everywhere: from the history of the development of the US relations with the countries of the region to the description of events taking place both in the US and in North Africa.

The second, but not least, is the historical-genetic method. It clearly resonates with the principle of historicism, and provides for the study of the problem in a historical context, taking into account the prerequisites for its emergence, the main stages of its development. For example, the development of US foreign policy in the region under study, the goals of the parties and interests are considered taking into account the historical context, without interruption from the events taking place on the world stage and historical background.

The other special-historical method, which was also widely used in the work, is the comparative method. It was actively applied in the second and third chapters, in particular, to compare the dynamics of the development of US relations with countries

⁹ V. V. Alekseev, N. N. Kradin, A. V. Korotaev, L. E. Grini, *Theory and methodology of history: a textbook for universities*, Volgograd, Teacher, 2014, p. 387

under colonial rule during the period under study, and countries that gained independence. To highlight the general and specific features of this dynamic, a variational comparison was used.

In general, the work was written using basic general scientific and special historical methods, as well as adhering to the main principles of historical research.

To achieve objectivity in writing the practical part of the work, numerous sources were used: archives of the digital library of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the archives of the Office of the Historians, as well as articles, books and statements. In general, sources can be divided into two large groups: primary and secondary.

The group of primary sources includes, as a rule, archival documents, statements, documents, manuscripts, autobiographies, etc. In this work, the main primary sources were the archives of the digital library of Dwight D. Eisenhower and the archives of the Office of the Historians. These archival documents covered the period from 1953 to 1957. The backbone of these documents was made up of notes, telegrams and statements of US diplomatic missions in North Africa. Also, for the preparation and writing of the practical part of this work (in particular the second and third chapters of this thesis), archival documents from the CIA electronic reading room were used.

Secondary sources, as a rule, are monographs, studies and articles that analyze and evaluate certain historical events. In this work, secondary sources are a broader group of sources and were also used to write not only the practical, but also the theoretical part of the work (the first chapter, in particular). Secondary sources used in this work cover topics of US foreign policy during the study period, Eisenhower administration policies, and racial issues.

Chapter 1

Eisenhower Administration, Civil Rights Movement and North Africa

1. Eisenhower and race: state of the art

By the early 1950s, race was becoming more and more prominent in domestic and foreign political life. Race became a problem not only for the black population, who were discriminated against and could no longer wait for them to get their rights, but also for the white population, who faced the growing civil rights movement and could no longer ignore the racial issue.

By Eisenhower's accession to the presidency, the process of desegregation was gaining momentum. In his second year in office, the Supreme Court is set to rule in the landmark case *Brown v. Board of Education*, which will set the stage for school desegregation. For the black population, this meant that the black population of the United States had hope that the issue of segregation would be resolved. What's more, *Brown vs. Board of Education* shook the system that had held Jim Crow for decades.¹⁰ However, it was not easy for the white population to leave the system of segregation that had long defined the domestic life of the United States. In 1955, the murder of Emmett Till takes place, which clearly showed the black population that whites are not ready to say goodbye to their privileges so quickly. Killings of blacks by whites have happened before in the United States. However, this time, it received wide publicity and exposed the cruelty of the existing system.¹¹

Against the background of the first steps towards decolonization around the world and the civil rights movement at home, racial issues in the United States have acquired the character of not only a problem of domestic policy, but also foreign policy one. In the post-war era and in the new world order in which the United States took the dominant role, "human rights" in principle should have extended to all of humanity as a

¹⁰ A. Morris, A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: Political and Intellectual Landmarks, *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 25, 1999, p. 521

¹¹ A. Morris, "A Retrospective", p. 521

whole. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, stated that “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”.¹² Against the backdrop of nationalist movements and the decolonization process that had begun, racial hierarchy was being questioned not only in the United States, but throughout the world.

During Eisenhower's first term in office, race relations in the United States underwent a number of significant changes. In this period, a number of legislative acts and initiatives were passed that laid the foundation for the flourishing of the Civil Rights Movement, as well as the elimination of discrimination based on race (at least in the legal field). In 1954, *Brown v. Board of Education* held that racial segregation in schools was illegal. In 1957, the Civil Rights Act was also passed, which established the Civil Rights Section of the Justice Department and allowed those who tried to interfere with the vote to be prosecuted federally.¹³

At the same time, the most important thing in the context of my analysis is not the events taking place in the period under study, but the position of the Eisenhower administration and, in particular, the President himself in relation to the ongoing changes.

Eisenhower took office in 1953. By this time, the process of desegregation of the army had already been launched (Truman's 1948 Executive Order 9981). However, the main changes were yet to come and the racial issue was raised by Eisenhower himself, including during the Eisenhower presidential campaign. At this time, his position on the issue of civil rights was rather ambivalent. At his first press-conference, in which he first appeared as a contender for the presidency of the United States, he

¹² Based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2, 10.12.1948, United Nations, Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights> (Accessed 12.05.2022)

¹³ Based on Civil Right Act 1957, 10.09.1957, The archives of the United States Senate, Link of Access: https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Civil_Rights_Act_1957.pdf (Accessed 12.05.2022)

declared that he supported the rights and freedoms of all Americans.¹⁴ However, he also stated that the law alone could not solve the problem of racial segregation.¹⁵ While conducting his presidential campaign in the Southern States, he declared that the existing way of life in these states would not be disturbed by federal intervention.¹⁶ At the same time, in his numerous campaign statements, he also said that he was ready to fight racial segregation, including stating the need for leadership to end racial segregation.¹⁷

Assessments of Eisenhower's performance as president on the issue of civil rights vary widely from criticizing the issue to praising the actions of his administration. I decided to focus on the major writings on Eisenhower and civil rights during his first term.

One of the most critical positions regarding Eisenhower and his civil rights policies and measures was expressed by Thomas Borstelmann. In his book *The Cold War and the Color line* the author writes about the ambivalence and little interest of the Eisenhower administration in racial issues. In particular, he mentions the reluctance to contact black political leaders, citing Eisenhower's only meeting with black political leaders during his second term.¹⁸ He also writes about Eisenhower's lack of interest in violence against blacks and lack of interest in their living conditions, which led to little overall interest in civil rights issues.¹⁹

¹⁴ The Presidential campaign and the civil rights are mentioned in W. L. Hitchcock, *The Age of Eisenhower America and the World in the 1950s*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2018, p. 336

¹⁵ Based on the statements in S. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier and President*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2014, p. 384

¹⁶ The words of Eisenhower are quoted in J. R. Young, Eisenhower's Federal Judges and Civil Rights Policy: A Republican "Southern Strategy" for the 1950s, *The Georgia Historical Quarterly*, n.3, 1994, p. 547

¹⁷ W. L. Hitchcock, "The Age of Eisenhower America", p. 337

¹⁸ T. Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena*, Harvard, Massachusetts and London, Harvard University Press, 2001, p. 88

¹⁹ T. Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, p. 89

Also interesting is the article *Eisenhower Federal Judges and Civil Rights Policy: A Republican "Southern Strategy" for the 1950* by Jeffrey R. Young, in which he talks about the attempts of the Eisenhower administration to keep votes and prevent discontent in the southern states by making unpopular decisions in the South regarding desegregation. In it, the author also notes Eisenhower's sympathy for the interests of the white southern states and his distancing from the landmark decision of the Supreme Court regarding the disintegration of schools. In particular, the author cites as an example Eisenhower's statements that desegregation should not affect the feelings and fears of white southerners and should not be forced.²⁰ Jeffrey R. Young also writes about Eisenhower's dissatisfaction with bus desegregation, as he believed that the court's decision on this issue in favor of desegregation "get [the country] into trouble."²¹

A fairly positive assessment of at least the first eight months of Eisenhower's presidency regarding discrimination against the black population is given by William L. Hitchcock in his book *The Age of Eisenhower America and the World in the 1950s*. As evidence, he cites the desegregation of restaurants in the metropolitan area and the fight against segregation in the army.²² However, he admits that Eisenhower tried to distance himself from passing the verdict in the public school desegregation case and believed that this decision should be left to lawyers and historians.²³

Stephen E. Ambrose writes about the same in his book "Eisenhower: Soldier and President", which is one of the most comprehensive works on the Eisenhower era. In particular, the author notes that Eisenhower's abstraction from these issues occurred after the adoption of *Brown v. Board of Education* and he repeatedly stated that the integration of schools is primarily a matter for judges.²⁴

²⁰ Based on the statements which are quoted in J. R. Young, "Eisenhower's Federal Judges and Civil Rights Policy", p. 558

²¹ The words of Eisenhower are quoted in J. R. Young, "Eisenhower's Federal Judges and Civil Rights Policy", p. 558

²² W. L. Hitchcock, *The Age of Eisenhower America*, p. 336

²³ W. L. Hitchcock, *The Age of Eisenhower America*, p. 352

²⁴ S. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier and President*, p. 592

A completely different view of Eisenhower and his attitude to the issue of racial rights was displayed in the book "A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution" by David A. Nichols. In his work, he believes that Eisenhower, contrary to popular stereotypes, was not indifferent to the issue of achieving equality between blacks and whites, and, moreover, made significant progress in this field.

In particular, the book gives a different interpretation of some of the actions and positions of Eisenhower on a particular issue. As an example, the author cites Eisenhower's blunt position regarding the desegregation of the army, namely, he quotes the words of Eisenhower, which he said in a 1947 interview: "Both as a Chief of Staff and as an American Citizen I oppose any discrimination in the rights and privileges awarded American soldiers based on color or race".²⁵ Explaining Eisenhower's position regarding Order 9981, adopted by H. Truman in 1948, the author believes that Eisenhower's strategy regarding the desegregation of the army did not concern each individual soldier, but "blending small black units into white divisions".²⁶

According to David A. Nichols, Eisenhower assumed leadership after taking the presidency by appointing an Attorney General who later filled The Justice Department with civil rights advocates.²⁷ Explaining the controversy regarding Eisenhower's reaction to *Brown vs Board of Education*, the author describes the reasons behind this position, in particular Eisenhower's concern about the reaction of the Southern States.²⁸

Eisenhower produces a similar positive impression after reading "The Soul Of an American President: The Untold Story of Dwight. D. Eisenhower Faith" by Alan Sears, Craig Osten and Ryan Cole. In this book, the authors pay considerable attention to Eisenhower's religious views. Concerning the topic of the rights of the black

²⁵ D. A. Nichols, *A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution*, New Your, Simon & Schuster, 2007, p. 17

²⁶ Quoted from D. A. Nichols, *A Matter of Justice*, p. 19

²⁷ D. A. Nichols, *A Matter of Justice*, p. 35

²⁸ D. A. Nichols, *A Matter of Justice*, p. 92

population, the authors note that “no president between Abraham Lincoln and Lyndon B. Johnson did more to advance the human dignity and civil rights of African Americans like Ike”.²⁹

According to the authors, Eisenhower's views on the civil rights movement were significantly influenced by his faith and, in particular, his relationship with Reverend Billy Graham.³⁰ In particular, the most interesting aspect of the analysis is the issue of church desegregation and claims that it was Eisenhower who asked the Reverend to use his influence to help desegregate churches in the South.³¹ However, the common element of this work and the above-mentioned works is the recognition that Eisenhower supported gradual and slow steps towards desegregation.³²

Official documents and diaries of Dwight D. Eisenhower, in which he touches on this topic, can help to shed light and give a more accurate characterization of Eisenhower and his attitude to the problem of segregation. First of all, it is worth recognizing the fact that Eisenhower was aware of the existing problem and understood that his office would have to solve it in one way or another. In particular, in one of his letters he writes: "I feel that my oath of office, as clearly as my own convictions, requires me to destroy [eliminate] discrimination within the definite areas of Federal responsibility".³³

One of the themes that appeared in Eisenhower's letters and diaries was the desegregation of public schools. In his diary entry dated July 24, 1953, he writes of his meeting with the governor of North Carolina, during which the question of school

²⁹ Quoted from A.Sears, C. Osten, R. Cole, *The Soul Of an American President: The Untold Story of Dwight. D. Eisenhower Faith*, Baker Publishing Group, 2019, p, 192

³⁰ A.Sears, C. Osten, R. Cole, *The Soul Of an American President*, p. 193

³¹A.Sears, C. Osten, R. Cole, *The Soul Of an American President*, p. 197

³² Based on A.Sears, C. Osten, R. Cole, *The Soul Of an American President*, p. 195

³³ The words of Eisenhower are quoted from Letter of Dwight D. Eisenhower to James F. Byrnes, 15.08.1953, Digital Library of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Available at: <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/civil-rights-brown-v-boe/1953-08-14-dde-to-byrnes.pdf> (Accessed 04.03.2022)

desegregation and the consequences that this would cause was raised. In this note, he notes that he always believed that “improvement in race relations is one of those things that will be healthy and sound only if it starts locally” and that the imposition of the Federal law, which would bring disagreement with the local powers and reverse the progress.³⁴

A similar thought also appeared in a letter dated December 1, 1953, to the same North Carolina Governor James F. Byrnes, in which Eisenhower notes that he would like to see progress in school desegregation, but at the same time he fears that discontent from a large part of the population can reverse it.³⁵ This supports the view that Eisenhower took a gradual approach and had misgivings about the reaction of the Southern States. At the same time, it cannot be said that Eisenhower was not interested in any solution to the problem of desegregation in principle. Interestingly, Eisenhower had a fairly active correspondence with James F. Byrnes, who was an ardent opponent of desegregation. In particular, this is evident from his inaugural address, in which he expresses hope that the Supreme Court will not make a decision that could ban segregation in schools.³⁶

Already after the adoption of Brown vs. Board of Education, Eisenhower, in his letter to Reverend Billy Graham, writes about progress in solving the problem of racial segregation, while noting that “all reasonable men appreciate that eventual and

³⁴ The words are quotes from the Diaries of Dwight D. Eisenhower, in particular from the note from 24.07.1953, Digital Library of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Available at: https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/file/DDE%20Diary%20Aug52_Aug53.pdf (Accessed 04.03.2022)

³⁵ Based on the statement made by Eisenhower in the letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to James F. Byrnes, 01.12.1953, Digital Library of Dwight D. Eisenhower Available at: <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/civil-rights-brown-v-boe/1953-12-1-dde-to-byrnes.pdf> (Accessed 04.03.2022)

³⁶ Based on the statements made by James F. Byrnes in Inaugural Address, 16.01.1955, South Carolina State Library: Digital Collection, Available at: https://dc.statelibrary.sc.gov/bitstream/handle/10827/704/Inaugural_Address_1951-1-16.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (Accessed 10.05.2022)

complete success will not be attained for some years”³⁷. Thus, he recognized that the solution to the problem of desegregation is a long and gradual process, the results of which may not be immediately visible. This again confirms Eisenhower's desire to solve problems gradually and slowly. The same letter, dated March 22, 1956, to Reverend Billy Graham confirms that Eisenhower called on the Reverend to follow the example of Joseph Francis Rummel, who had desegregated his parochial schools.³⁸

Despite Eisenhower's controversial position on the issue of civil rights and assessment of this position, his first term cannot be called a time of absence of any progress in achieving racial equality. In addition to the decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* and the very slow desegregation of public schools, Eisenhower's first term was characterized by a number of changes in other areas. On January 26, 1955, the report of the Attorney General on Racial Segregation and Discrimination was issued, which listed the main directions and achievements of the Cabinet in this area. This report reflected in places the position of Eisenhower himself regarding the achievement of the result in gradual steps, but at the same time noting that “there should be no unnessaccary delay in ending segregation”³⁹. The main areas of work were primarily education, transport, hospitals, employment, housing and the army.

A separate item was the District of Columbia. The successes of the Eisenhower administration in some of these areas are also noted by the authors who criticized Eisenhower and his policies towards the civil rights problem. In particular, William L.

³⁷ The words of Eisenhower are quoted in the letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Reverend Billy Graham, 22.03.1956, Digital Library of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Available at: <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/civil-rights-eisenhower-administration/1956-03-22-dde-to-graham.pdf> (Accessed 04.03. 2022)

³⁸ Based on the statements made in the letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Reverend Billy Graham, 22.03.1956, Digital Library of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Available at: <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/civil-rights-eisenhower-administration/1956-03-22-dde-to-graham.pdf> (Accessed 04.03. 2022)

³⁹ Quotes from Report by the Attorney General on the Administration's Efforts in the Field of Racial Segregation and Discrimination, 26.01.1955, Digital Library of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Available at: <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/civil-rights-eisenhower-administration/1955-01-26-attorney-general-report.pdf> (Accessed 04.03.2022)

Hitchcock who wrote that “Equally impressive was the speed with which Eisenhower embraced the tricky issue of segregation in the military”⁴⁰ and T. Borstelmann, who believed that the desegregation of the DC and the army were the two main successes of the Eisenhower administration in the direction of combating racial segregation.⁴¹

Interestingly, back in 1948, Eisenhower himself opposed the adoption of Executive Order 9981, which laid the legal foundation for combating segregation in the armed forces. In particular, his position was based on the fact that the desegregation of the army could lead to unrest that would interfere with the work of the army.⁴² Already at this time, his position on racial issues was emerging, which will partly characterize his personal attitude towards solving the problems of segregation. Justifying his thoughts, he noted, among other things, that “I believe that the human race may finally grow up to the point where it [race relations] will not be a problem. [It] will disappear through education, through mutual respect, and so on. But I do believe that if we attempt merely by passing a lot of laws to force someone to like someone else, we are just going to get into trouble.”⁴³

Summing up the above, it is possible to conclude that Eisenhower tried to balance between solving the long overdue issue of racial segregation and trying to prevent widespread grievances, from part of the white electorate from the Southern States. It cannot be said that he was in principle not interested in desegregation issues, since this topic appeared throughout his first term. However, he preferred a gradual solution to this problem, as slow and gradual as possible leaving the issue of racial segregation to the jurisdiction of the courts. Interestingly, as will be seen below,

⁴⁰ W. L. Hitchcock, *The Age of Eisenhower America*, p. 339

⁴¹ T. Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, p. 90

⁴² Based on Truman ends racial segregation in armed forces, July 26, 1948, Politico, 26.07.2018, Available at: <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/26/this-day-in-politics-july-26-1948-735081> (Accessed 04.03.2022)

⁴³ Th words are quoted in Truman ends racial segregation in armed forces, July 26, 1948, Politico, 26.07.2018, Available at: <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/26/this-day-in-politics-july-26-1948-735081> (Accessed 04.03.2022)

Eisenhower adhered to such an attitude in relation to decolonization. As for the main changes that took place during this time, they can no doubt include the beginning of a slow process of desegregation of public schools, the desegregation of the army and the District of Columbia.

2. Eisenhower Era and the US foreign policy towards North Africa

After the Second World War, the world was swept by a wave of struggle of the peoples under the colonial rule of Western countries for their independence. The creation of the United Nations and the recognition of the principle of peoples for self-determination gave hope to these peoples to build their own national states.

This wave did not bypass North Africa either. By the time of Eisenhower's accession to the US presidency in 1953, some of the countries of North Africa had already gained formal independence (in particular, Libya and Egypt), though they remained under clear British influence, and some remained under French colonial rule, namely Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Some of these countries would gain their independence during Eisenhower's first term, namely Tunisia and Morocco, who would become independent in March 1956. The US foreign policy in these countries and the French metropolises was determined by a number of factors, which will be discussed below.

One of the main challenges faced by the Eisenhower administration in the North African region was nationalism. By the early 1950s, a process of decolonization was launched here, which led to the independence of countries under colonial rule (in North Africa, mainly French colonial rule). In the context of decolonization (and decolonization in North Africa in particular), it is worth saying a few words about Eisenhower's attitude towards nationalism and Arab nationalism in particular. Arab nationalism has its roots in the early 20th century, but it reached its heyday and peak after the Second World War, becoming a motivator for Arab countries to achieve independence and becoming an important element in the integration processes that took place in the region at that time. Nationalist movements arose in this region as early as the beginning of the twentieth century. For example, in Tunisia, this movement was Néo-Dustūr, which was formed in the 1930s and became the driving force behind the

independence movement.⁴⁴ In Algeria this power will be represented by FLN - Front de libération nationale.

By 1953, when Eisenhower took his seat in the Oval Office, Arab nationalism was sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa. Eisenhower and Dulles were well aware that the nationalism that had swept through the Arab countries could not be ignored. In particular, this became evident after the Non-Aligned Movement Conference in Bandung in 1955, which showed that nationalism would have to be taken into account.⁴⁵ At the same time, Arab nationalism, viewed through the prism of the Cold War, caused concern among the Eisenhower administration. The American establishment feared that Arab nationalism was leftist⁴⁶ and often failed to draw a clear line between nationalism and communism, confusing the two.⁴⁷

Moreover, nationalism was a threat not only in the context of the Cold War. It was a threat in itself, specifically jeopardizing the ability of the US and Western Allies to gain access to Third World resources. In particular, this is confirmed by the US reaction to the Suez crisis of 1956, when the Eisenhower administration declared that Nasser could become an example for other countries and this would entail the nationalization of oil resources.⁴⁸ In addition, in general, the resources of these countries were seen as resources that should be available to the "free world". In particular, this is evident from the numerous reports that have been published regarding the main provisions of US foreign policy. In one such report, one of the main goals of

⁴⁴ The nationalistic movements are overviewed in the article L. El Houssi, "The History and Evolution of Independence Movements in Tunisia", *Oriente Moderno*, n. 5, 2017, p. 68

⁴⁵ Egya N. Sangmuah, Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa, 1956-1960, *Middle East Journal*, 1990, p. 77

⁴⁶ George C. Gerring, *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations since 1776*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 652

⁴⁷ R. J. McMahon, Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: a Critique of the Revisionists, *Political Science Quarterly*, n.3, 1986, p. 457

⁴⁸ Based on Special National Intelligence Estimate, 31.07.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d40> (Accessed 04.05.2022)

the Eisenhower administration was: “To insure that the area and its resources are available to the United States and its allies for use in strengthening the free world”.⁴⁹

In the context of decolonization and the spread of the independence movement in North Africa, what is important is what analogies can be drawn between the way the Eisenhower administration treated the acquisition of civil rights and independence by the countries of North Africa.

If we draw analogies between the approach of the Eisenhower administration and Eisenhower personally to the solution of the racial issue and to the issue of decolonization, one can notice a number of similarities: in both cases, Eisenhower adhered to a gradual approach. But if in the first case, in the case of desegregation, as already seen from the first part, Eisenhower resorted to arguments about the fears of the white population of the South or arguments that desegregation was a matter of the legal system, then in the case of decolonization, the Eisenhower administration used the old argument about premature independence. First of all, it is worth noting that in the American establishment of that time there was an idea that premature independence could do more harm than good.⁵⁰ Moreover, both Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed that decolonization would take several decades: the former believed that it would take 25 years to prepare for independence, Dulles - 50 or more.⁵¹ Also, being in the realities of the cold war, both Dulles and Eisenhower also believed that the inability of unprepared countries to maintain domestic political stability could cause the growth of the influence of the Soviet Union.⁵²

⁴⁹ Based on Draft Policy Statement Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for the National Security Council Planning Board, 18.08.1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d57> (Accessed 09.04.2022)

⁵⁰ S. Metz, American Attitudes Toward Decolonization in Africa, *Political Science Quarterly*, n.3, 1984, p. 522

⁵¹ Egya N. Sangmuah, “Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa”, p. 78

⁵² Egya N. Sangmuah, “Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa”, p. 79

In addition to decolonization and ensuring access of the "free world" to the resources of the Third World countries, one of the important goals of the United States in the region was also to ensure its strategic interests and reduce the potential threat of increasing influence of the Soviet Union. For this, a number of tools were used, in particular, tools of economic assistance and the provision of a military presence in these territories.

A prime example is Tunisia and Morocco. Both countries were important in securing US strategic influence in the region and became an important outpost for maintaining this influence. Morocco had become a place to ensure US interests by placing an American military base on the country's territory near the country's capital Casablanca. This base was of strategic value and was one of the reasons for providing economic assistance to the country. In particular, this is evidenced in Memorandum of Discussion at the 298th Meeting of the National Security Council on 27 September, 1956, where, in particular, it is noted that "the Budget Bureau believed that the grant of economic aid should be tied very directly to the maintenance of U.S. bases in Morocco rather than to more general objectives such as political stability."⁵³ However, for Eisenhower himself, the issue of political stability also played a role, since he believed that without political stability, military bases would be of no use.⁵⁴

Tunisia was also of great strategic importance to the US. However, the interests of the United States in this country were ensured, among other things, due to the pro-Western position of the leadership of Tunisia. Immediately after independence, the country under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba took a pro-Western stance, which impressed the Eisenhower administration. US assistance to the country included both

⁵³ Quoted from Memorandum of Discussion at the 298th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 27, 1956, 27.09.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d35> (Accessed 09.03.2022)

⁵⁴ Based on Memorandum of Discussion at the 298th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 27, 1956, 27.09.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d35> (Accessed 09.03.2022)

economic and military assistance. In particular, already in 1957, just a year after Tunisia gained independence, the United States began supplying weapons to the country.⁵⁵

Economic assistance to these countries also played an important role in maintaining US influence in the region. The volume of planned assistance for both countries was small and only a fraction of the assistance provided by France before independence. For 1957, the US planned \$8 million for Tunisia and \$20 million for Morocco (compared to \$25 million and \$57 million planned, respectively, for the French side).⁵⁶ This presented a number of economic and strategic problems for the United States. In particular, as noted in the Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State dated August 28, 1957, this presented the United States with a dilemma: either pay the costs to which the country did not was ready, or put its interests in the region at risk.⁵⁷

Relations with Libya, which gained its independence in 1951, are reminiscent of the patterns of US relations with Morocco. Regarding the US military presence in the country, American military bases were also located here. In 1954, three years after independence, an agreement was signed, according to which the United States could place a military base in the country to protect it from communism. In turn, Libya received \$2 million annually. Speaking of economic aid, it is worth noting that Libya has become the largest recipient of US economic aid in North Africa. In particular, the

⁵⁵ Egya N. Sangmuah, “Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa”, p. 79

⁵⁶ Based on Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State, 28.08.1957, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d90> (Accessed 10.03.2022)

⁵⁷ Based on Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State, 28.08.1957, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d90> (Accessed 10.03.2022)

volume of US economic assistance to Libya amounted to \$30.5 million annually from 1953 to 1957.⁵⁸

North Africa and the process of obtaining independence by the countries of the region have pitted the US against one of its European NATO allies, France. Before the era of decolonization, France owned quite extensive colonies in North Africa, which included the studied countries: Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. Nevertheless, there was a fairly large difference between these countries: if Algeria was a full-fledged colony, then Morocco and Tunisia had their own monarchies and were under the protectorate of France.

The process of decolonization of these countries began in the early 1950s, and the United States faced a dilemma: to support its ally France for not undermining the unity of NATO or to support national movements in order not to lose influence in the new countries in the future and push them towards the communists. However, the decolonization of Tunisia and Morocco was quite peaceful. Thanks to this, the independence of these countries did not cause much tension between the US and France, which arose during the decolonization of Algeria during the war of 1954-1962.⁵⁹ Moreover, as mentioned above, both countries, Tunisia and Morocco, took a pro-Western position and became active recipients of US economic assistance.

The Algerian War of Independence began in 1954 and lasted almost 10 years. In the context of my analysis, what is interesting are the first two years of this war and the first reaction of the Eisenhower administration to the events and changes taking place. As mentioned above, Algeria was not a protectorate, but a colony of France, which considered Algeria as part of its territory, just being situated on the other continent, and

⁵⁸ The data was taken from US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, 1.07.1945 - 30.06.1963, USAID, p. 90, Available at: https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACZ071.pdf (Accessed 10.03.2022)

⁵⁹ Y. H. Zoubir, The United States, the Soviet Union and Decolonization of the Maghreb, 1945-62, *Middle Eastern Studies*, n.1, 1995, p. 58

did not want to give it away like Tunisia or Morocco. Moreover, the possession of Algeria also brought economic benefits: Algeria has very large oil and gas reserves.⁶⁰

The Algerian war became a destabilizing factor for the entire region of North Africa and US-French relations in particular. Even before 1954, the Eisenhower administration was trying to strike a balance between its interests in containing communism and trying not to significantly damage its relationship with France. During the beginning of the 1950s, the United States tried to use diplomatic channels to persuade France to grant political freedom in the colonies in North Africa.⁶¹

With the outbreak of the war, the United States took a wait-and-see approach with cautious reaction at the same time supplying weapons to France at the beginning of the war. Nevertheless, supporting its ally, the Eisenhower administration feared that the war in Algeria could exhaust France, which would affect NATO and, in addition, negatively affect the attitude towards the United States in Asian, African and Arab countries.⁶² Moreover, the US also recognized that war could pose a threat to US national security and interests, as well as destabilize the region. The Eisenhower administration understood that supporting the Algerian War in Tunisia and Morocco, which were essential to US strategic interests, could increase anti-Western sentiment in those countries, undermine Western economic interests, threaten military bases, and moreover, turn the entire region into a conflict zone.⁶³

The attempt to find a balance between opposing interests led to widespread criticism of the United States from both sides. In particular, France claimed that the US

⁶⁰ C. F. Gallagher, *The United States and North Africa: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964, p. 152

⁶¹ M. Barkaoui, Managing the colonial 'status quo': Eisenhower's Cold War and the Algerian war of independence, *The Journal of North African Studies*. N.1, 2021, Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629387.2011.586402?journalCode=fnas20&urlCode=fnas20> (Accessed 10.04.2022)

⁶² Y. H. Zoubir, "The United States, the Soviet Union and Decolonization of the Maghreb", p. 67

⁶³ Egya N. Sangmuah, "Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa" p. 80

was not providing enough support, while the FLN claimed US commitment to colonialism for sending helicopters to France.⁶⁴

These anti-American sentiments worried the American establishment, which was reflected in the 7 March , 1956 Telegram from the US Ambassador to France. In it, he noted that: "In France, however, a situation has arisen in which the United States is getting much more than the usual amount of adverse criticism. Many Frenchmen who are usually pro-American are beginning to believe that the United States is not sorry to see France in its present difficulty over Algeria and that American business is getting poised to take over Algeria".⁶⁵ In an attempt to ease the tension, the American ambassador made a public statement in March of that year. In this statement, he specifically assured France that the US supports the country in finding solutions "that will make possible long-term close cooperation between France and the Moslem communities of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria ".⁶⁶ A few months later, the US decided to take an even more moderate position than before. In particular, the NSC decided to get involved as little as possible in the Algerian War and find measures to minimize the risk to relations with Tunisia and Morocco.⁶⁷

In general, summing up, the following features of US foreign policy in North Africa during Eisenhower's first term can be distinguished.

The main challenge in North Africa, contrary to the realities of the Cold War, was as much the spread of communism as the emergence of nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments in these territories, which posed a threat to US strategic influence in the region. To ensure this strategic influence, both economic methods and methods of

⁶⁴ C. F. Gallagher, *The United States and North Africa*, p. 108

⁶⁵ Quoted from Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State, 07.03.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d67> (Accessed 11.03.2022)

⁶⁶ Quoted in Y. H. Zoubir, *The United States, the Soviet Union and Decolonization of the Maghreb*, p. 68

⁶⁷ Egya N. Sangmuah, "Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa" p. 81

establishing a military presence in the region were used. The Eisenhower administration saw nationalism as the main threat and also used a number of arguments to contain the decolonization process, including those of premature independence. The changes taking place in the region created a number of difficulties that the United States faced. In particular, economic difficulties associated with economic assistance to Tunisia, Morocco and Libya, geostrategic difficulties (deployment and retention of military bases in Libya and Morocco), as well as challenges that have arisen in relation to the United States with its closest NATO ally - France. Moreover, the US position in North Africa was also complicated by the administration's attitude towards decolonization, Arab nationalism, and attempts to find a balance between opposing interests.

Chapter 2

The US and French North Africa: The US foreign policy towards decolonization in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria

1. US and decolonization: an overview

In the post-war period, American racism became a problem in both domestic and foreign policy. At home, American society was faced with the increasingly vocal issue of racial segregation and the civil rights movement. In the foreign arena, American racism acted as an instrument of pressure from the Soviet Union, the United States was seen as an ally of the colonial powers, and the American establishment found itself in a situation where internal racial issues were intertwined with foreign policy issues. Until 1956, the US State Department invited only white diplomats to Independence Day celebrations. American diplomats who served overseas only took part in all-white events, and those who refused to do so faced misunderstandings from their American counterparts. At the same time, diplomats from newly independent African countries faced racial segregation, spreading both to the local black population and to visitors, and often could not find housing upon arrival or faced discrimination.⁶⁸

The racial politics of the United States has been challenged both at home and abroad. At home, the black population, already under Eisenhower's first term, entered the active phase of their civil rights fight. At the same time, decolonization was taking place in the international arena, which also called into question the existing racial order. The struggle of the black population of the United States and the struggle of peoples under colonial rule had common features.

In the US, “non-white” people declared that they claimed the fullness of all civil rights, while on the world stage, here and there, the anti-colonial struggle of dependent peoples for their independence from predominantly Western colonial powers flared up. Representatives of the civil rights movement regularly faced violence from the white population of the United States, while fighters for independence from colonial rule

⁶⁸ T. Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena*, p. 105

regularly faced state violence from the colonial powers. Both in the United States, as has already been seen, and abroad, as will be seen in the example of the North African countries, the United States took a position that would allow for a compromise between those who are discriminated against or repressed and those who are responsible for it. In the United States, the Eisenhower administration tried to find solutions that would suit both the white side (mainly from the Southern States) and satisfy the interests of black rights activists. The same position the United States adhered to in the case of the countries of North Africa, trying to contribute to the solution of the problem through compromises.

This chapter will analyze US relations with a group of countries that either did not gain independence during Eisenhower's first term (as in the case of Algeria) or became independent during his tenure as president.

2. Origins of the independence movement in French North Africa and the beginning of decolonization

At the time of President Eisenhower's accession to the presidency, the anti-colonial struggle was going on throughout French North Africa. In Algeria, in 1954, an uprising against French colonialism broke out; in Tunisia and Morocco, this struggle began much earlier. However, in all of the countries this struggle has historical preconditions.

Both Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria fell under the protectorate of France in the second half of the 19th - the first half of the 20th centuries. Algeria was incorporated into the French colonial empire in 1848, Tunisia came under the French protectorate in the 1880s. Morocco, unlike Tunisia or Algeria, during the period of colonial conquests at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries fell into the sphere of interests of Spain, France, Britain and partly Germany. In 1904, an agreement was concluded according to which Morocco was recognized as a zone of influence of France in exchange for Egypt, which fell into the British zone of interests. However, until 1912, Morocco was still the subject of disputes between France and Spain, who occupied the territory of the country. After 1912, most of the territory came under the protectorate of France. Both the 1904

treaty and the 1912 treaty obligated France to carry out reforms in Morocco in order to ensure the development of Morocco and the formation of a democratic state.⁶⁹

Despite the fact that the three countries were under French colonial rule for a long time, the emergence of the first nationalist movements can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century in French North Africa. One of the first such nationalist movements was the Jeunes Tunisiens (Young Tunisians) movement. It was formed in 1907, but did not have specific goals and objectives.⁷⁰

After the First World War, nationalist groups began to appear in Algeria and Morocco. In Algeria, in 1926, the first movement for independence was formed with demands for the protection of the interests of the Muslims of North Africa.⁷¹ In Tunisia, the Parti Liberal Constitutionnel, or Dustūr, became such a movement, one of the demands of which was the creation of a parliamentary assembly in which both French and Tunisians would be represented.⁷² In the 1930-s, people from this organization founded the new Néo-Dustūr movement.⁷³ This organization would later play an important role in the Tunisian independence movement after the Second World War. Many of its members would go on to high positions in independent Tunisia, such as Habib Bougriba, who would become the first Tunisian president to rule the country for thirty years.

The wave of nationalism did not bypass Morocco either. Here nationalism was born in the 1930s in the form of several organizations. The reference moment can be considered May 16, 1930. On this day, a law was passed according to which the Berbers

⁶⁹ C.R. Pennel, *Morocco: From Empire to Independence*, OneWorld Publications, 2013, p. 213 - 223

⁷⁰ The nationalistic movements are overviewed in the article L. El Houssi, “The History and Evolution of Independence Movements in Tunisia”, *Oriente Moderno*, n. 5, 2017, p. 68

⁷¹ Based on C. Paul, Colin P. Clarke, B. Grill, M. Dunigan, “Algerian Independence, 1954–1962 Case Outcome: COIN Loss” in C. Paul, Colin P. Clarke, B. Grill, M. Dunigan, *Paths to Victory*, RAND, RAND Corporation, 2013, p. 76

⁷² L. El Houssi, “The History and Evolution”, p.67

⁷³ L. El Houssi, “The History and Evolution”, p.69

fell under the criminal law of the United States and their tribal laws lost all force. This was seen as an attempt to assimilate the Berber population and turn them into French, and coupled with French failures to integrate young Moroccans into their culture, fueled nationalist sentiment.

The first organization to appear here, the Comité d'Action Marocaine, was organized in 1934. Among the main requirements of the organization were the observance of the rules of the protector, the use of Arabic as the national language, equal rights for Moroccans and French in taking administrative posts.⁷⁴ By that time, Moroccan nationalists had not yet demanded the country's complete independence, but they wanted the respect of the rights of the Moroccan population and to comply with treaties. The movement was not particularly popular with the local population, and only about 300 people from 1934 to 1944 identified themselves with it.⁷⁵ However, the 1930s are also notable for the emergence of another movement, Istiqlal, which has its roots in the 1920s. This movement, which became a party in 1943, would take over the organization of the protests and become the leading force in the struggle for independence in the following years.

After the Second World War and the proclamation of the right of peoples to self-determination, all over the world, countries under colonial rule gradually began to gain more and more autonomy, and eventually independence. In Tunisia and Morocco, by the beginning of the 1950s, the main nationalist forces had already been formed, while in Algeria this force would appear just before the start of an armed uprising. This force will be the FLN - Front de libération nationale. The main goal of this organization would be the achievement of independence by Algeria through an armed uprising and the "internationalization of the Algerian problem", which was of the same importance as armed resistance.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ H. Mitchell, "The Development of Nationalism in French Morocco", *Phylon*, n.4, 1955, p. 429.

⁷⁵ Walter B. Cline, "Nationalism in Morocco", *Middle East Journal*, n. 1, 1947, p. 23.

⁷⁶ M. Connelly, "Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the Algerian War for Independence", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, n.2, 2001, p. 223

However, by that time, the problem of Algeria had already been internationalized as part of the struggle of dependent peoples against colonial rule. It was the Arab and Asian countries that drew attention to the problems of French North Africa and raised the issue of bringing the problem of Tunisia and Morocco to the UN Security Council, which was resisted by colonial France, whose position was supported by the United States.⁷⁷ At the UN, the countries of these regions acted as a single bloc against the colonial powers. Algerian nationalists received support from Tunisia and Morocco after the independence of these countries. The peoples demanding independence in the countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East used similar methods of armed struggle, constantly encountering resistance from the colonial powers. Moreover, less than a year after the start of the Algerian uprising, in 1955, the countries of Africa and Asia united at a conference in Bandung, which marked the beginning of the “Non-Alignment Movement”. The Bandung Conference was a very important step towards the unity of the African and Asian countries, which were able to find their own voice and overcome regional and racial boundaries, as well as the realities of the Cold War. Moreover, this conference was an important challenge for both the communist camp and the US and its allies.⁷⁸

Returning to Morocco and Tunisia, it is also worth noting that the process of decolonization of these countries in the 1950-s was already gaining momentum. In 1950, the French side announced that they were ready to gradually guarantee Tunisia's independence. And in 1952, protests erupted in Rabbat following the arrests of several members of the Istiqlal movement. The next year is also marked by a wave of protest that swept the country after the expulsion of Sultan Mohammed V.

⁷⁷ Based on Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter), 14.04.1953, Confidential, Office of the Historical, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d491> (Accessed 10.04.2022)

⁷⁸ Jason Parker, “Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era”, *Diplomatic History*, n. 5, 2006, p. 870

2. French North Africa through the racial prism

By the beginning of President Eisenhower's first term, the process of decolonization of French North Africa was launched, and the Tunisian, Moroccan and Algerian nationalists were the main leading forces in this process.

Nationalism, as the leading force, was perceived as a threat to the colonial interests of not only France, but also US security in the region. Despite the fact that, as noted in the previous chapter, the Eisenhower administration tried to balance two conflicting interests, one of which was to support anti-colonial sentiment to keep new countries in its sphere of influence, the United States was extremely cautious about nationalism. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration did not confuse it with communism, but feared nationalism as it is, and in particular its so-called extremist elements (as will be seen below, this included any nationalists ready for violent resistance).

Reiterating its pattern in relation to the civil rights movement (the rejection of what Eisenhower called "radicalism" in his letters), the Eisenhower administration drew a line between "moderate" nationalists and "terrorists" and "extremists".

One of the first and basic documents that defines the position of French North Africa in the foreign policy of the United States of the first term of Eisenhower is the Draft Policy Statement Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for the National Security Council Planning Board of August 18, 1953. In this document, which describes the situation in North Africa, the struggle of the French against nationalism in this region, as well as the instability that results from this situation, are named the main threat to US foreign policy in this region.⁷⁹ Moreover, to suppress nationalist threats, the

⁷⁹ Based on the statements made in Draft Policy Statement Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for the National Security Council Planning Board, 18.08.1953, Secret, Office of the Historical, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d57> (Accessed 04.04.2022)

United States is ready to use such means as economic methods in order to ensure the interests of Western countries.⁸⁰

At the same time, nationalism in the eyes of the Eisenhower administration could be beneficial. But only when it did not carry any military resistance to the existing order and its representatives were ready to cooperate with the colonial administration. At the same time, when necessary, this nationalism must be used exclusively in the interests of the “free world”, which refers to the United States and its allies. In particular, it is clearly seen how the attitude towards nationalism in this region is changing, depending on such interests. If in 1953, in the above document, nationalism is a threat, then already in 1954 nationalism in Morocco and Tunisia is subdivided into “good nationalism” and pan-Arabism, which are “extremist elements”. In particular, this is evident from the Statement of Policy by the National Security Council of October 18, 1954, in which this graduation is clearly seen. The authors of the report claim that

“In the North African nationalist movements there is a fundamental cleavage—potential in Morocco, overt in Tunisia and Algeria—between pan-Arab extremist elements who look toward Cairo and the pro-Western moderates who favor negotiated solutions, with continued French and Western influence as their objective”.⁸¹

Extremists and terrorists in the eyes of the Eisenhower administration are any nationalists who are capable of resisting the current administration by force.

When an uprising breaks out in Algiers in November 1954, the actions of the rebels are assessed with an extremely negative attitude. From the very first day of the

⁸⁰ Based on the statements made in Draft Policy Statement Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for the National Security Council Planning Board, 18.08.1953, Secret, Office of the Historical, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d57> (Accessed 04.04.2022)

⁸¹ Cited from Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, 18.10.1954, Secret, Office of the Historical, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d59> (Accessed: 05.04.2022)

war in Algeria, the US Consul in Algeria, Clark, in official correspondence gave an extremely negative assessment of the uprising and the rebels. Moreover, they did not consider it as part of the national liberation struggle. In particular, on November 2, 1954, he writes about them as "terrorists"⁸², and calls the uprising nothing more than "riots".⁸³ On November 5, similar vocabulary appears in a letter from The Consul General at Tunis (Hughes) dated November 5, 1954, in which he calls the uprising "terrorist outbreaks" from the beginning of his letter.⁸⁴

The same characteristics, in principle, all other nationalists who are not ready to sit down at the negotiating table. This is clearly seen in the National Intelligence Estimate of August 31, 1954, where again the above-mentioned gradation of nationalist movements is applied:

"The nationalist movement is still largely factionalized: an extremist faction favors violent action to achieve independence, while a moderate group appears to favor gradual evolution within the French Union."⁸⁵

Interestingly, in the United States itself, the same vocabulary was applied to those who forced rapid changes in the sphere of black rights. Only in this case, they

⁸² The word is used in describing the event in Algeria in The Consul General at Algiers (Clark) to the Department of State, 02.11.1954, Official Use Only Priority, Office of the Historical, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d165> (Accessed 05.04.2022)

⁸³ Quoted from The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State, 04.11.1954, Confidential, Office of the Historical, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d166> (Accessed 05.04.2022)

⁸⁴ Quoted from The Consul General at Tunis (Hughes) to the Department of State, 05.11.1954, Confidential, Office of the Historical, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d167> (Accessed 05.04.2022)

⁸⁵ Quoted from National Intelligence Estimate, 31.08.1954, Secret, Office of the Historical, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d58> (Accessed 05.04.2022)

were not “extremists” and “terrorists”, but “radicals”. At the same time, state violence, both in the United States itself and on the part of France, is not subjected to such negative assessments.

Returning to the question of nationalism and its perception as a threat or something positive, one can trace how, after gaining independence, Moroccan and Tunisian nationalism no longer looks like a threat, but is presented as a tool that can serve as a counterbalance to Egyptian pan-Arabism (which is a “bad” one nationalism). The Eisenhower administration explicitly states this in the National Security Council Report of October 3, 1956, which came out after the independence of Morocco and Tunisia.⁸⁶ Thus, one can trace how nationalism was perceived exclusively through the prism of Western interests and goals. Nationalism, in the eyes of the Eisenhower administration, is not the driving force behind the decolonization of North Africa. It acts as a threat to the existing order, and has the right to exist only if its representatives are ready for a gradual solution of problems.

Of course, considering any militant nationalism as a threat, and also pursuing the interests of the Western countries and its allies, the Eisenhower administration also did not understand the essence of the processes that took place in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. It was not a national liberation struggle or a process of decolonization. It was just a "problem". This is well shown in numerous letters and reports. In particular, the national liberation war in Algeria, two years after the start of the struggle, is still a "French problem."⁸⁷ The US still recognizes that Algeria is part of France and views the conflict as an internal issue. The decolonization of Tunisia is also presented in numerous correspondences as a “problem”, and not as a decolonization or a national

⁸⁶ Based on National Security Council, National Security Council Report, 03.10.1956, Secret, Office of the Historical, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d36> (Accessed 05.04.2022)

⁸⁷ Quoted from Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France, 08.03.1956, Secret, Office of the Historical, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d68> (Accessed 07.04.2022)

liberation struggle. Any armed resistance by Tunisians, as in the case of Algeria, is classified by the US as “terrorist activity”.⁸⁸

The peoples themselves living on the territory of these colonial possessions of France are also looked at through the Western Prism and, moreover, deprived of subjectivity. In particular, this is clearly seen in the example of Algeria.

Like black people in the United States, the population of the territories of colonial Algeria, in the view of the US administration, is devoid of subjectivity, and their desires and needs are not taken into account. Such sentiments are evident even during the Truman administration. Algerians are not considered as a people separate from the French, with its own mentality, which may have a desire to develop along its own path. On the contrary, the most desirable development for the population of Algeria is, according to the US Consul General in Algeria, the Western path of development and the French mentality, without taking into account the specific characteristics of the Algerian Arabs. At the same time, Westernization of the Algerian population is not considered, for example, as a tool for the development of the people themselves. It is presented as a tool to solve the problem of Algerian nationalism and leave Algerian territories under French control.

“The only real solution to the problem thus posed”, - writes Lockett, speaking about a potential nationaglist uprising in Algeria. - “is to Westernize and modernize Algeria and its people, bringing the latter to a standard of living and to a psychology closer to those of the French.”⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Quoted from Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter), 14.04.1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d491> (Accessed 07.04.2022)

⁸⁹ Quoted from The Consul General at Algiers (Lockett) to the Department of State, 27.02.1952, Confidential, Office of the Historical, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d161> (Accessed 07.04.2022)

At the same time, the Algerians themselves were categorically against assimilation, which the United States is talking about. In the Memorandum dated November 29, 1956, Ferhat Abbas said that “Algerians would continue to fight until the French accepted the principle of equality rather than assimilation”⁹⁰, thus declaring the rejection of assimilation as a way of interacting with France.

The same rhetoric is present in the rhetoric of the Eisenhower administration. Some US findings also echoed the aforementioned statements about the assimilation of Algerians. In particular, the peoples living in the territories of French North Africa must associate themselves exclusively with the free world. This rhetoric is repeated throughout 1954, in particular, one of the US goals is "To insure the association of the peoples of the area with the free world".⁹¹ And even after the independence of Tunisia and Morocco, the same rhetoric continued to be found in 1956.⁹² At the same time, the assistance that should be provided in these countries after their independence should be directed to the presence of France in these territories, and cooperation programs should “strengthen the Western position in the area.”⁹³ Even after independence, these countries must continue to develop in a way that is beneficial to the United States, France and the

⁹⁰ The words of Ferhat Abbas are quoted in Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 29, 1956, 29.11.1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d80> (Accessed 07.04.2022)

⁹¹ Based on Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, Secret, 18.10.1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d59> (Accessed 07.04.2022); The National Security Council Staff, Draft Policy Statement Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for the National Security Council Planning Board, Secret, 18.08.1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d57> (Accessed 07.04.2022)

⁹² Based on the statements made in National Security Council Report, 03.10.1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d36> (Accessed 08.04.2022)

⁹³ Based on National Security Council, National Security Council Report, 03.10.1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d36> (Accessed 08.04.2022)

"free world", and the peoples living in these territories must assimilate with the free world.

Misunderstanding (or rejection) of the desires of the local population is also expressed in unwillingness, for example, to interact with the nationalist leaders of the countries under study. In particular, in 1953, when the issue of Morocco and Tunisia was included in the agenda of the UN General Assembly, the United States declared its rejection of the inclusion of representatives of unofficial Tunisia in the discussions, justifying this by the fact that this could cause tension and unrest in the region.⁹⁴

The local population is also not seen by the United States as an important element in the discussion of the future that awaits the country after the declaration of independence. Among the correspondence of official US diplomatic representatives from 1953 to March 1956 (the moment Morocco and Tunisia gained independence) there is not a single letter or memorandum that the US held any negotiations with Tunisian or Moroccan nationalists on the future of independent Tunisia and Morocco.⁹⁵

The unwillingness to listen and hear those who are on the other side of discrimination, namely the discriminated and oppressed, is also reflected in Eisenhower's domestic policy regarding the issue of civil rights for the black population. Only once in his two terms did Eisenhower meet with leaders of the civil rights movement, in 1958, for a 45-minute meeting.⁹⁶ At the same time, Eisenhower actively corresponded with the governors of the Southern States, while his administration in North Africa maintained contacts with the French side. Neither in domestic nor in foreign policy did the United States take into account the voice of those who were under discrimination and oppression.

⁹⁴ Based on the statements made in Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State, 05.09.1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d498> (Accessed 08.04.2022)

⁹⁵ The statement is based on the analysis of the archive of the US diplomatic correspondence from 20.01.1953 till 01.03.1956

⁹⁶ T. Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, p. 88

Returning to the issue of subjectivity, analyzing the documents and the position of the United States, it can be found that Tunisians, Moroccans or Algerians were deprived of subjectivity on the issue of their further development. This applies to both further reforms and the development path for already independent Morocco and Tunisia.

Until independence, the future development of these countries is perceived exclusively through the prism of the West. In particular, in August 1953, the United States in the Policy Statement decided that the reforms being carried out in French North Africa should slow down nationalist sentiments, but at the same time not affect the interests of France.⁹⁷ Here, the resources and peoples of these territories act as the property of the “free world”, and should be available for “to the United States and its allies for use in strengthening the free world”.⁹⁸

Moreover, these territories should not only have a Western model of development, which would correspond to the interests of Western countries. The Eisenhower administration sincerely believes that this is the only model that can be applied here, and it was the Western countries that brought civilization to these territories and created these states. In addition, according to the position of the American establishment, it was the westernization of these lands that brought nationalism to these territories.

These statements appear in red lines in several documents of 1954. First of all, according to the position of the Eisenhower administration, it was Westernization and Western institutions that helped the population of French North Africa to acquire their

⁹⁷ Based on Draft Policy Statement Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for the National Security Council Planning Board, 18.08.1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d57> (Accessed 09.04.2022)

⁹⁸ Quoted from Draft Policy Statement Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for the National Security Council Planning Board, 18.08.1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d57> (Accessed 09.04.2022)

national identity. In particular, in the National Intelligence Estimate in August 1954, the Eisenhower administration notes that

Among the Arab and Berber population, especially the small educated classes, there has been a steady increase in political consciousness and sense of national identity, largely as a result of the continuing impact of Western political, social, and economic concepts and institutions, and the concomitant weakening of belief in the traditions and social institutions of Islam.⁹⁹

Similar arguments are found in another document from 1954.¹⁰⁰ The Eisenhower administration literally attributes the formation of the national identity of these peoples to the colonial administration, ignoring and actually not accepting the role that tradition and Islam played in the formation of nationalism in these territories, which is contrary to reality.

In particular, for example, the Algerian FLN, stated that they want to restore the Algerian state within the framework of the principle of Islam.¹⁰¹ Moreover, the first movement that opposed French rule in Algeria and wanted to achieve independence, formed in 1926, also aimed to protect the interests of Algerian Muslims.¹⁰² In Morocco, a noticeable increase in the first nationalist sentiments was also associated with Islam,

⁹⁹ Quoted from National Intelligence Estimate, 31.08.1954, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d58> (Accessed 10.04.2022)

¹⁰⁰ In particular the statement that “Naturally, the groups newly brought into existence by the Westernization of North Africa, having the least to lose in the death of the old society and chafing most in the half-way house of the present status quo, have provided the leadership for the nationalist movement.” in Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, Secret, 18.10.1954, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part One, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d59> (Accessed 10.05.2022)

¹⁰¹ P. Chalk, “Algeria (1954–1962)”, in A. Rabasa, L. A. Warner, P. Chalk, I. Khilko, Paraag Shukla, *RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Paper 4*, RAND, RAND Corporation, 2007, p. 18

¹⁰² C. Paul, Colin P. Clarke, B. Grill, M. Dunigan, “Algerian Independence, 1954–1962 Case Outcome: COIN Loss”, p. 76

namely with the abolition of Islamic laws and their replacement with customary law.¹⁰³ The only exception, perhaps, was Tunisia, where the Destour party in 1934 split into Old Destour and New Destour, the former of which advocated the restoration of Islamic traditions.¹⁰⁴ However, it was New Destour who took the lead in independent Tunisia, and perhaps this is the reason why Tunisia took an unequivocal pro-Western stance after independence. At the same time, representatives of national movements in these countries were constantly subjected to repressions and arrests. Based on the foregoing, it can be said with confidence that the nationalist movements arose and developed not due to Western influence, but in spite of it.

In addition, the same arrogant position of the Eisenhower administration slips in relation to those who support radical, in the opinion of the United States, nationalists. Despite the fact that, as already mentioned above, nationalism in the eyes of the Eisenhower administration posed a threat to US national interests, part of the fear about this can also be explained by a banal misunderstanding of why the local population supports local nationalists. Particularly interesting in this context is the remark made in the framework of the Statement of Policy by the National Security Council of 19 October 1954:

To the extent that the Western foreigner educates them, improves their health, develops their means of communication, draws them into a modern economy and political state, and thus generally raises their aspirations, this group is increasingly drawn, not to the foreigner who promises gradual and orderly progress, but to the leaders of their own community who promise a new world.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ E. G. H. Joffé, “The Moroccan Nationalist Movement: Istiqlal, the Sultan, and the Country”, *The Journal of African History*, n. 4, 1985, p. 290

¹⁰⁴ “Tunisia: The Destour Democratic Party; its founding members and founding date; its political persuasion and ideology; its relationship with other established parties; its relationship with the authorities”, *Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada*, 04.6.2004, Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/41501c650.html> (Accessed 11.04.2022)

¹⁰⁵ Quoted from Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, 18.10.1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d59> (Accessed 11.04.2022)

This saying doesn't just extol the achievements of Western civilization. In principle, it puts the local population in a subordinate and dependent position in relation to the Western colonialists, without calling into question the existing hierarchical order, but, thus, supporting it and supporting the stereotype about the civility or uncivilization of certain peoples. The American establishment literally perceives the local peoples as children who are under the care of Western, colonial powers.

In favor of the advantages of Western civilization and the underdevelopment of local traditions and way of life, in the eyes of the American establishment, also speaks to the fact that it was the colonial powers that won and conquered these countries. In particular, the Eisenhower administration claims that:

Their impotence to resist European political and economic control and the ensuing supremacy (sometimes even the acknowledged superiority) of Western theories and practices, made this realization an inescapable necessity.”¹⁰⁶

Here, the National Security Council also builds a false argument, saying that the superiority of Western theories and the inadequacy of local traditions, including, were recognized by Muslim leaders even before the conquest of these lands, while not giving examples and facts of such statements. Arguments that Western civilization created some countries or brought civilization are nothing new to the American establishment and have often been used to justify colonialism.

¹⁰⁶ Quoted from Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, 18.10.1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d59> (Accessed 11.04.2022)

In particular, a similar argument was used by the Truman administration in relation to Algeria. Describing the situation in Algeria, The US Consul General in Algeria uses pseudo-historical facts and says that "no such entity as Algeria, by name and dimensions, existed before it was established by the French".¹⁰⁷ At the same time, both the Eisenhower administration and the Truman administration ignore historical reality. And if the Eisenhower administration ignores the influence of local traditions and Islam, then the Truman administration ingores the history of Algeria itself.

To support the existing hierarchy and justify colonialism, in addition to the old arguments that the Western countries actually created the national identity of the peoples of North Africa or brought civilization to these territories, arguments were also used about the "maturity" or "immaturity" of a particular country for independence. Neither Tunisia, nor Morocco, nor Algeria escaped such assessments.

Back in 1953, neither Tunisia or Morocco, in the eyes of the American establishment, was ready for full independence. This is evidenced in particular by a letter from The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France dated May 27, 1953, in which the American side confirms that "Tunisia and Morocco were not ready for independence".¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Quoted from The Consul General at Algiers (Lockett) to the Department of State, 27.02.1952, Confidential, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d161> (Accessed 11.04.2022)

¹⁰⁸ Quoted from The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, Secret, 27.05.1953, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d56> (Accessed 12.04.2022)

However, a year later, the position of the Eisenhower administration is changing, and Tunisia now looks like a country that is ready to receive autonomy and independence. In particular, in 1954, France recognized this, stating that the Tunisians “had evolved to the point that in general they were now able to administer their own internal affairs”.¹⁰⁹ They are also echoed by US officials, declaring that Tunisia has a greater political maturity than neighboring Morocco.¹¹⁰ Algeria, even after the start of the national liberation uprising, is still not ready for independence.¹¹¹

At the same time, the American establishment does not define what this “readiness” for independence means. However, it is not difficult to assume that this readiness is interpreted through the prism of Western perception, without taking into account what the Tunisians, Moroccans or Algerians themselves think about it. Also, none of the documents or reports indicate the deadlines and criteria that must be met in order to obtain this independence or autonomy. As a result, it is the Western countries that determine when and which countries will become independent.

It is also interesting that, contrary to the UN Charter and the people's right to self-determination, independence for countries under colonial rule is not a guaranteed right. This is a privilege they must earn by some evolution or political maturity. At the same time, the independence and maturity of Western countries is not called into question. Here, parallels become clear between how the rights of the black population and the white population were perceived, when the rights of the latter were not questioned.

¹⁰⁹ Quoted from The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State, 27.07.1954, Confidential, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d509> (Accessed 12.04.2022)

¹¹⁰ Based on the statements made in The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State, Confidential, 06.12.1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d522> (Accessed 12.04.2022)

¹¹¹ Based on the statements made in Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France, Confidential, 08.03.1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d68> (Accessed 12.04.2022)

Parallels between how the Eisenhower administration dealt with colonized peoples and how they dealt with the issue of desegregation at home can also be seen in how the US establishment dealt with those who were colonizers or maintained the current racial order at home. As noted in the first chapter, the Eisenhower administration favored a gradual solution to the problem of black segregation. The USA followed a similar rhetoric on the issue of colonialism. In particular, this is reflected in the above statements about the "readiness" or "unreadiness" of certain countries for independence and self-government, or attempts to seat everyone at the negotiating table.

An important similarity is also the tactics that the United States chose to solve the problems that arose between France and its colonial possessions. In particular, in both domestic policy and foreign policy, the Eisenhower administration tried to find a compromise between those who discriminate and those who are discriminated against.

Algeria is a prime example. In 1956, in a telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France, the State Department wrote that it supported France's attempts to "achieve a solution providing for a relationship of interdependence on the basis of mutual cooperation and confidence between France and peoples in North Africa".¹¹² At the same time, the problem was not to find any compromise between the French colonial forces and the Algerian nationalists. The problem is that these colonial forces, in principle, should not be in Algeria. This is clearly seen from the goals of the Algerian nationalists, which were set out in the Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington of 29 November 1956. Part of this memorandum is devoted to setting out the goals of the Algerians, who in this case were represented by Farhat Abbas, one of the leaders of the nationalist movement.

¹¹² Quoted from the statement made in Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France, Confidential, 08.03.1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d68> (Accessed 12.04.2022)

Among the conditions for a ceasefire, Abbas calls, among other things, “recognition of her [Algeria] right to independence”¹¹³ by France. This perfectly demonstrates that the Algerians did not want a return to the status quo or a solution that would suit both sides. They wanted independence.

At the same time, it is worth paying tribute to the Eisenhower administration, the United States understood that part of the problem lies not only in the nationalists, but also in the very policy of France. They recognized that France's policy lacked realism, and her unwillingness to move further in her positions could complicate the overall French presence in North Africa.¹¹⁴

The Eisenhower administration also understood this in the issue of Tunisia and Morocco. In particular, the American establishment in 1954 believed that “However, in the short term, the French will not make concessions which will endanger their strategic control of the area or destroy the privileged economic position of the settlers of French descent”.¹¹⁵ That is, the US recognized that colonial rule was part of the problem and its only solution was independence (at least for these countries). Moreover, the Eisenhower administration urged France to find some kind of compromise or solution to the problem in North Africa that would reduce the discontent of the local population.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ The word of Ferhat Abbas are quoted in Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 29, 1956, 29.11.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d80> (Accessed 12.04.2022)

¹¹⁴ Base on the statements made in Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State, 21.11.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d77> (Accessed 12.04.2022)

¹¹⁵ Quoted from National Intelligence Estimate, Secret, 31.08.1954, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d58> (Accessed 14.04.2022)

¹¹⁶ Based on the statement made in Operations Coordinating Board Report, 01.06.1955, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Documents 25-37, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d25> (Accessed 14.04.2022); Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Tyler) to the Director of the Office (Jones), 16.06.1955, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the

However, despite the recognition of France as part of the problem and the desire for the French establishment to make some concessions or compromises, it is somewhat different from how the policy was carried out in relation to another discriminated group - the black population in the United States. In domestic politics, the Eisenhower administration was in no hurry to put pressure on the Southern States in order to implement desegregation. In matters at home, the American establishment did not rush things and consistently maintained a gradual resolution of the issue throughout Eisenhower's first term. This was probably due to the fact that the Eisenhower administration understood that the nationalist feelings of the local peoples in North Africa could not wait any longer.

United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d27> (Accessed 14.04.2022)

Chapter 3

The US, Libya and Egypt

1. The US and The Newly Independent Countries

The racial factor in US foreign policy during the Eisenhower period is revealed not only in US policy towards the dependent territories of North Africa, but also in relations with the independent countries of North Africa.

By the time Eisenhower took the presidency, the colonial movement was not just gaining momentum: many countries had already gained independence and began their path to political and economic development. These new countries, in the context of the global conditions of the early and mid-1950s, took their place in US foreign policy and were seen by the US as a springboard for satisfying their foreign policy ambitions. Many newly formed countries that gained their independence by the beginning of Eisenhower's presidency had not yet decided on their position in the context of the Cold War and were of great strategic importance. Political and economic stability in these countries was seen as a tool to contain communism. One of the National Security Council reports specifically stated that one of the US goals in these regions is: "Undertake a new initiative designed to improve the political and economic stability of those nations, to enhance their will and ability to maintain their independence against Communist pressures and possible aggression, and to counter the influences exercised by the Communist powers".¹¹⁷ For their association with the "free world" a number of tools were used, in particular economic and political ones. The main elements for this were programs of technical assistance, economic development and education.¹¹⁸ In addition, the underdeveloped nations were to become part of the trading system of the

¹¹⁷ National Security Council, Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, 07.08.1954, Statement of Policy, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d124> (Accessed April 30, 2022)

¹¹⁸ Based on Paper Prepared by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen), 09.11.1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, P. 10, Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d130> (Accessed April 30, 2022)

free world, since trade was considered the main condition for the economic development of these countries.¹¹⁹

At the same time, despite the fact that these countries have already gained independence, they were still considered as underdeveloped countries that were subject to communist propaganda and couldn't fully use the independence that they have. Moreover, nationalistic or anti-colonial sentiments in these countries act as a threat and an obstacle to the containment of communism and the development of the "free world". Linked to these arguments is the old racist argument about precocious development. Specifically, a report dated September 30, 1953 states that: "The underdeveloped areas of the free world will be especially vulnerable to Communist penetration and subversion by reason of nationalism and anti-colonialism, deep-seated distrust of the West, retarded economic growth, military weakness, political ferment. Strong pressures will result from impatience to achieve political and economic aspirations."¹²⁰ In addition, the traditional way of life of these peoples is also presented as an obstacle, and economic and political changes for the association of these countries with the free world "calls for some changes in traditional habits".¹²¹

Relations with Third World countries were also complicated not only by their difficulty of integrating into the framework of the "free world", but also by racial issues that spoiled the US image abroad. This was expressed not only in the fact that, as a country with segregation, the United States faced problems maintaining its image as the leader of the free world, but also in the fact that, as already seen in the second chapter,

¹¹⁹ Based on National Security Council Report, 07.01.1955, Basic National Security Policy, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX - Office of the Historians, P. 40-41, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d6> (Accessed April 30, 2022)

¹²⁰ Memorandum to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), 11.10.1954, Memorandum, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d127> (Accessed April 30, 2022)

¹²¹ National Security Council Report, 07.01.1955, Basic National Security Policy, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX - Office of the Historians, P. 40-41, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d6> (Accessed April 30, 2022)

many of the patterns of its policy towards the black population transferred to US relations with new countries.

This chapter describes US relations, primarily with Libya, but also with Egypt (in particular the events of the Suez crisis) through the prism of race relations and colonialism. Relations with these countries, the perception of nationalism and pan-Arabism, and the US response to the 1956 crisis clearly show the racial factor, as well as all the above patterns that also applied to these two countries.

2. A Brief History of the Colonial History of Libya and Egypt

By 1953, Libya and Egypt were two independent countries that gained their independence in 1951 and 1922 respectively (Egypt remained under British influence until 1952).

Libya came under colonial rule in 1911, and until 1943 was a colony of Italy, after being divided into two zones of occupation: the British and French zones. Egypt, in turn, was part of the Ottoman Empire until the middle of the 19th century, and then came under the influence of the British Empire. This happened in 1882, when Great Britain brought its troops into Egypt and established a protectorate. However, one of the most important events in my analysis took place a few years earlier: the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.

The Suez Canal is an important water artery that connects two seas: the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. This canal is of great economic importance, as it allowed faster delivery of goods, and also proved to be more important in the further colonization of Africa by Western countries. The channel was actually under the control of the British Empire, and Egypt was removed from the management of this waterway. However, within the scope of my work, it is a significant event, because the 1956 Suez crisis around this canal coupled with the Arab nationalism feelings of the Egyptian government, as will be shown below, proved to be a serious challenge to the colonial system of the mid-1950s.

Returning to Libya, it is a territory that is geographically and culturally divided into two territories: Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. The history of Libya is the history of these two territories, which from time to time followed a similar path, but had a historically different orientation: Tripolitania had more ties with Tunisia, while Cyrenaica was closer to Eastern North Africa, namely Egypt.¹²² Moreover, these territories were inhabited by various local peoples, each of which had its own interests, which was little taken into account by the colonial forces. It is also impossible to write off Fezzan, a desert territory inhabited by only a small part of the population of modern Libya. The misunderstanding of the Libyan context can be traced to the attempts of Italy after the First World War to create a parliament in Tripolitania, which turned out to be a failure, since the parliamentary concept did not fit the internal context of the country. Moreover, the Italians and the Arabs viewed this situation from different angles: the Italians - as the inability of the Arabs to assume autonomy, the Arabs - as an opportunity for further autonomy.¹²³

In the 1920s and early 1930-s on the territory of Libya, a movement was formed that resisted the Italian presence in Libya. This period gave impetus to the formation of nationalist sentiments. Despite the fact that Italy, through military suppression and political manipulation, was able to win over part of the urban population to its side, the Libyan population sympathized with the rebels. This is particularly evidenced by the fact that in order to suppress anti-Italian sentiments in Cyrenaica, the entire Arab population was either under police control or was sent to contra-camps.¹²⁴

In 1943, Libya was liberated from Italian colonial rule, but immediately fell under the occupation of Great Britain and France. The liberation from Italian colonialism caused the outbreak of nationalist sentiments in Tripolitania and the first political parties began to organize here, which, despite the tribal structure, had common

¹²² B. Rivlin, "Unity and Nationalism in Libya", *Middle East Journal*, n. 2, 1949, pp. 31-44

¹²³ Digital Curation Center, "The Nationalist Movement in Libya", *The World Today*, n. 7, pp. 330-339

¹²⁴ DCC, "The Nationalist Movement in Libya", p. 334

goals: the unification of all three parts of Libya, participation in the League of Arab States and, most importantly, independence.¹²⁵

After gaining independence in 1951, Libya took an important place in the policy of the United States in the region. In the Mediterranean, the United States had several important strategic goals, one of which was to secure the right to military bases, in particular in Libya. The achievement of a treaty that would ensure these rights for the United States, as well as suit the Libyan side, was one of the main topics for negotiations with Libya in 1953-1954. and the red line is in the correspondence of US diplomatic representatives. What matters in my analysis, however, is not the negotiations per se, or the agreement signed in 1954. The most important part is how the Eisenhower administration saw Libya and whether it repeated the neo-colonialist patterns discussed above.

3. US and Libya through the prism of the racial factor

At the time of Eisenhower's accession to the presidency, negotiations with Libya over the rights to a military base were in full swing. These negotiations, which lasted from 1952 to 1954, perfectly show how the United States, formally perceiving the country as independent, was by no means going to take into account the interests and principles of an independent state.

Libya, located on the Mediterranean coast, had, like all of North Africa, an important strategic position. Even before Libya gained independence, the United States understood that the establishment of a military base on the territory of the country would involve economic costs not only for the maintenance of this base, but also for economic assistance to Libya. However, at the time, the Truman administration was reluctant to tie economic aid to military bases, fearing that it could lead to similar requests from other nations and also pose a threat to military bases if aid was reduced.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Ronald Bruce St John, *Libya: From Colony to Revolution*, Oneworld Publications, Third edition, 2017, pp. 170-171

¹²⁶ Ronald Bruce St John, *Libya: From Colony to Revolution*, p. 184

In December 1951, Libya and the United States came to an agreement under which the United States got the opportunity to use the territory for a military base, as well as to use the country's infrastructure in exchange for 1 million dollars annually for 20 years.¹²⁷ Most importantly, however, this treaty was an imperialist instrument that allowed Libya to gain independence in exchange for US interests in the region. Moreover, this interim treaty of 1951 contained provisions that directly threatened the sovereignty of Libya (about which the Libyans had already expressed their concern during the Eisenhower administration, which will be discussed below). In particular, some articles of the treaty allowed American personnel in the country not to fall under the jurisdiction of Libyan law, exempted them from criminal prosecution by Libya, and materials, equipment and other goods imported by the United States into the country were not to be subject to inspections or customs control.¹²⁸ Obviously, such conditions aroused suspicion on the part of the Libyans and the 1951 treaty was never ratified by the Libyan parliament. This paved the way for the very negotiations that the Truman administration, and later the Eisenhower administration, had with Libya.

After gaining independence, Libya found itself in an extremely disastrous economic situation. More than 80% of the country's population was employed in the agricultural sector. The industrial sector, in turn, was underdeveloped and suffered from a shortage of raw materials, capital, and skilled labor.¹²⁹ All this made Libya dependent on external assistance, and the country was forced to look for it from its neighbors in the region or from larger players. The United States was one of such players. Using Libya's dependence on economic aid, the US effectively turned it (economic aid) into a neo-colonial instrument that helped keep Libya under control.

¹²⁷ Ronald Bruce St John, *Libya: From Colony to Revolution*, p. 185

¹²⁸ H. Karayam, *Libyan-American Relations, 1951 - 1959: The Decade of Weakness*, 2018, Middle Tennessee State University, PhD Dissertation, pp. 93-94. Available at: <https://jewlscholar.mtsu.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/da3e14d0-9d6f-441e-b28b-64dcb31a622c/content> (Accessed 30.04.2022)

¹²⁹ Ronald Bruce St John, *Libya: From Colony to Revolution*, p. 190

In particular, this is particularly evident from the above-mentioned negotiations. One of the first letters to come from the Eisenhower administration dates as early as January 21, 1953, just a day after Eisenhower took office. In this letter, The Minister in Libya Villadr writes about how the negotiations are going and in particular about the concerns of the Libyans about their sovereignty, which they see as a threat not just in establishing a military base, but in the fact that US military personnel will not be subject to Libyan jurisdiction, which echoes the same fears that existed back in 1951.¹³⁰ However, what is interesting about this letter is how Libya is trying to squeeze more preferences out of the US than the US can offer, in particular by appealing to its friendship with the UK and the greater amount of economic assistance that the country can offer to Libya.¹³¹ This pattern of behavior on the part of the Libyan government would be repeated throughout the first term of the Eisenhower administration, and presented a challenge for US attempts to establish a neo-colonial policy, since Libya was quite skillful in maneuvering between its economic needs and US foreign policy goals on its territory.

Different visions of the situation and attempts by the Eisenhower administration to impose their conditions on Libya are evident from further correspondence. In particular, Libya believed that the United States already in 1953 should have paid its part of the economic assistance to Libya for 1952, while the United States believed that until the agreement was signed, there could be no talk of any money.¹³² This clearly shows how the United States used the much-needed economic assistance to Libya as an

¹³⁰ The statement can be made based on The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State, 21.01.1953, Secret, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d278> (Accessed 01.05.2022)

¹³¹ The statement can be made based on The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State, 21.01.1953, Secret, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d278> (Accessed 01.05.2022)

¹³² Based on the Conversation between British Prime Minister and the Minister in Libya Villard, which can be found here: The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State, 01.04.1953, Secret, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d279> (Accessed 01.05.2022)

instrument of pressure on the country. At the same time, it is difficult to blame Libya for its claims, since the Wheelus Field Base was used by the American side, but no money was received for it.

From a position of strength, the Eisenhower administration continued to negotiate until the conclusion and ratification of the agreement. In particular, The Minister in Libya Villard, in his letter to the State Department, writes about a strategy that should unbalance the Libyans or put them in a “psychologically disadvantageous position” when negotiations for compensation begin.¹³³ At the same time, the United States, essentially encroaching on the sovereignty of Libya by deploying its military bases in the country, refuses to provide Libya with any guarantees or compensation for hypothetical attacks on the country by Egypt or the League of Arab States. These concerns on the part of the Libyan side are not taken into account by the United States. Specifically, Villard states that:

I doubted further United States would be moved by demands for compensation against hypothetical future attacks in view of probability that in such event other parts of free world including US would undoubtedly suffer even more.¹³⁴

This once again shows how Libya was viewed solely as a resource for ensuring US strategic security in the region, without taking into account Libyan needs. At the same time, the United States considers the independence of Libya partially as its achievement, since in the same note there are words that the United States “had sponsored Libyan independence”.¹³⁵ This, in particular, echoes the same US arguments

¹³³ Quoted from the Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State, 16.02.1954, Secret, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d286> (Accessed 01.05.2022)

¹³⁴ Villard is quoted in The Consul at Benghazi (Summers) to the Department of State, 16.04.1954, Secret, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d293> (Accessed 01.05.2022)

¹³⁵ The letter can be found here: The Consul at Benghazi (Summers) to the Department of State, 16.04.1954, Secret, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at:

that were cited in the direction of Morocco and Tunisia, where not independence, but nationalist movements in the eyes of the United States developed due to Western influence, and Algeria, for example, was created exclusively by the efforts of the French side. At the same time, it is worth recognizing that, as has already been shown above, Libyan independence was indeed partly a subject of bargaining and was ensured, among other things, thanks to the US interest in military bases in these territories. However, it is difficult to say whether the US was just as zealous for Libyan independence otherwise.

Returning to the issue of negotiations on the aforementioned base, the American side perceived the arguments of the Libyan side not just as an obstacle to achieving its goal. Any attempts by the Libyan side to use the same bargaining arguments that are used by the American side are perceived negatively by the United States. In particular, the issue of jurisdiction, which not without reason worries the Libyan side, results in the following assessments: “They will use question of jurisdiction as top bargaining card, which attitude of course tantamount to blackmail and showing little change from barbary pirate tradition.”¹³⁶

It is worth paying attention to the language used by US diplomatic representatives. In particular, as mentioned above, such expressions as “psychologically disadvantageous position”, or “barbary pirate tradition”.

The agreement on the rights to a military base and economic assistance was signed on September 9, 1954¹³⁷ and US-Libyan relations entered a new phase.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d293> (Accessed 01.05.2022)

¹³⁶ The Statement can be found here: The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State, 12.06.1954, Secret Priority, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d295> (Accessed 01.05.2022).

¹³⁷ The date of the agreement signature can be found here: The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), 13.12.1954, Secret, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d302> (Accessed 01.05.2022)

During 1955 - early 1957 US foreign policy towards Libya concerned mainly issues of economic assistance, as well as attempts to keep Libya in the sphere of its interests and under its control. The main threat to these interests from the US point of view, contrary to the realities of the Cold War, was not communism, but anti-colonialist and nationalist sentiments in the country. In particular, this is evidenced by a number of letters, the first of which refers to March 11, 1955. In this letter, Ambassador to Libya Tappin writes that:

There is in Libya no anti-colonial, nationalist movement directed at an occupying or mandatory power, which might threaten the security of U.S. installations, as is the case in Morocco, for example. Moreover, there is no ascertainable internal opposition which views the Base Agreement as a reason for attacking the “ruling class” or for accusing it of supporting “imperialists.”¹³⁸

This echoes the patterns of US policy towards Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, where nationalism was also seen as a threat. Moreover, acting as the leader of the "free world", the US seems to be in no hurry to insist that the standards of human rights and political freedoms be applied in Libya if this would threaten American interests. In particular, the American establishment is not particularly concerned about the lack of freedom of the press in the country:

There is no “free” press in the normal Middle Eastern sense of the word and consequently, provided we retain the friendship of the Government in power, we are not subject to irresponsible attack through that medium.¹³⁹

¹³⁸ Quoted from Letter From the Ambassador in Libya (Tappin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen), Paragraph 2, 11.03.1955, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d147> (Accessed 02.05.2022)

¹³⁹ Quoted from Letter from the Ambassador in Libya (Tappin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen), Paragraph 6, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d147> (Accessed 02.05.2022)

Considering Libya as an independent country, the United States, however, during the first term of the Eisenhower administration, does not consider it necessary to respect its sovereignty when it comes to the foreign policy actions of the Libyan government, which may pose a threat to US strategic security in the region. This is clearly manifested in the case of the establishment of relations between the USSR and Libya.

Relations between the USSR and Libya were established on September 5, 1955. In the context of my analysis, two US statements are interesting as a reaction to this step by Libya. Firstly, the United States did not see this move by Libya as an attempt to lean towards communism, but rather as an attempt by Libya to prove that it is not subservient to Western countries. What is interesting here is that Libya's standard right, provided by its sovereignty, to establish relations with any country appears as an "anti-Western" action. At the same time, nationalism and anti-colonial sentiments continue to pose a greater threat to US interests in Libya. In particular, anti-imperialist and nationalist slogans in the eyes of the United States can cause unrest in the region and the penetration of communism in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the United States is ready to "turn a blind eye" to such "anti-Western" statements by Libya, as long as the country remains a partner of the United States on major issues, and the establishment of Libya's relations with the USSR is a simple attempt by Libya to prove to the Arab countries that the country does not is a vassal of the West. In particular, the following words testify to this:

Until the Arab World as a whole no longer believes that any anti-Western statement or act is of necessity pro-Arab, Libyan attempts to prove independence and "Arabism" can be expected to take this form. In the meantime, we should not

¹⁴⁰ Based on the Despatch From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State, 30.11.1955, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d149> (Accessed 02.05.2022)

be unduly alarmed by such activities so long as Libya remains a friend on the major issues.¹⁴¹

The establishment of relations with Libya led to a number of accusations from the US administration, in particular, in attempts to encroach on the independence and sovereignty of Libya. Interesting in this context is the telegram from the State Department to the Libyan embassy. In this, the Eisenhower administration declares that:

The United States has been watching pattern efforts Soviet Union undermine independent countries throughout world. Not unexpected, therefore, that once they succeed establishing diplomatic relations Libya they should arrive in large numbers, propose economic assistance, and if rumors correct raise questions of airstrips and other related matters.¹⁴²

However, while recognizing that such actions by the USSR as described above are a threat to Libyan independence, the US must also recognize that its actions, namely the provision of economic assistance to Libya in exchange for an agreement on the rights to a military base, are the same - a threat to Libyan sovereignty. However, the Eisenhower administration, contrary to its previous actions, claims that: “We cannot, nor would it be our intention, to emulate Soviet Union, either in its irresponsible offers of aid or its deceptive motives. What we have done we would have done irrespective of Soviet presence”.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Quoted from Despatch From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State, 30.11.1955, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d149> (Accessed 02.05.2022)

¹⁴² Quoted from Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya, 19.01.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d150> (Accessed 01.05.2022)

¹⁴³ Quoted from Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya, 19.01.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d150> (Accessed 01.05.2022)

This statement fundamentally contradicts the way the United States, as has already been seen from the above, built its foreign policy in relation to Libya during the period of negotiations with the country on the rights to a military base. It also contradicts the US actions regarding the use of economic assistance as an instrument of pressure on the country. In addition, such a US reaction shows how the Eisenhower administration constructed the concept of independence and sovereignty, when the alleged actions of the USSR pose a threat to Libyan sovereignty, while US actions and attempts to establish control over the country, in the eyes of the US establishment, are not encroachments on independence and country's sovereignty.

Moreover, US foreign policy towards Libya can be viewed within the framework of neo-colonialism. The term was first used by Kwame Nkrumah in his book *Neo-colonialism: the Last Stage of Imperialism*. "The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent, and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economics system and thus its political policy is directed from outside", - he wrote in the introduction to his book.¹⁴⁴ Non-colonialism has several important aspects. The economic policies of countries under neo-colonialism are subject to constant evaluation by First World countries, and their economic policies are determined from outside. Puppet regimes act as an instrument of political control. The instrument of cultural control is the dominance of Western culture in the cultural space, language, lifestyle and manner of dressing.¹⁴⁵

If we look at the relationship between the United States and Libya from a neo-colonial angle, we can see clear patterns of such codependent relationships. As a method of establishing control over Libya, the United States uses economic assistance, taking advantage of the disastrous economic situation in Libya. In exchange for economic assistance, the United States gets the opportunity to establish a military base in the country, while using economic assistance as a way to blackmail Libya. The

¹⁴⁴ K. Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, International Publishers, New York, 1966, p. 9

¹⁴⁵ Pramod K. Nayar, *The Postcolonial Studies Dictionary*, Wiley Blackwell, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2015, p. 115

Eisenhower administration is wary of nationalist or anti-colonial sentiment that is an obstacle to establishing control over the country and could sway Libya towards Arab nationalists, who in the eyes of the American establishment, as has been repeatedly noted, represent a danger to US goals in the region. Moreover, they openly admit that it is control over Idris (King of Libya) that allows you to keep Libya under control:

Libyan leaders fear Egyptian domination and suspect Egyptian intentions, yet they will cooperate with Egypt in various policies, some of which are hostile to Western interests. However, at least as long as Idriss is in control, Libya is unlikely to join the ESS Arab bloc.¹⁴⁶

At the same time, such statements, as well as statements about the advantages of the absence of nationalist or anti-colonial sentiments, freedom of the press, the “authoritarian nature of the regime” and “low political awareness”, which allows the United States to ensure the security of military bases in the short term,¹⁴⁷ refer us to the “puppet regime” argument in favor of neo-colonialism again. Of course, one cannot say that the government of the early to mid-1950s in Libya was completely a puppet. However, it was, to varying degrees, under significant US control and, despite the claims of the Eisenhower administration, was not perceived as a country in full possession and control of its sovereignty.

4. US and Egypt through the prism of racial factor

In 1952, a military coup took place in Egypt, as a result of which King Farouk, who had ruled the country since 1936, came to power under the leadership of the charismatic Gamal Abdel Nasser, who would later become the president of Egypt.

¹⁴⁶ Quoted from National Intelligence Estimate, Paragraph 4, 19.06.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d160> (Accessed 02.05.2022)

¹⁴⁷ Based on National Intelligence Estimate, Paragraph 4, 19.06.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d160> (Accessed 02.05.2022)

Initially, the changes that took place in Egypt did not particularly alarm the Eisenhower administration. In particular, this was due to the fact that the American side believed that moderate changes led by a government led by nationalists and the military would not pose a threat to US interests in the region. Throughout 1953, Egypt appeared in US documents as a recipient of economic and military aid.¹⁴⁸ However, the situation began to change rapidly when it became clear that the Egyptian regime was radicalizing under the influence of Nasser.¹⁴⁹

The figure of Nasser and Egypt under his rule presented a big challenge for the Eisenhower administration to try to establish neo-colonial rule in North Africa and the Arab world as a whole. In particular, this was due to the difference in how the world was seen by the Eisenhower administration and the new government of Egypt. If for the Eisenhower administration the main threat stemmed from the spread of communism, and any method is good to contain its spread, then for Egypt the main danger lay primarily in imperialism and colonialism. In particular, Nasser himself stated this: “The Soviet Union is more than a thousand miles away and we've never had any trouble with them. They have never attacked us. They have never occupied our territory”.¹⁵⁰

Moreover, the main goal of the new government was to get rid of the complete presence of the British in Egypt. In particular, Nasser himself stated this at a meeting with Dulles in May 1952: “Nobody” would now accept the statement that the UK can

¹⁴⁸ Based on Draft Memorandum Prepared for the National Security Council, Undated, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d54> (Accessed 02.05.2022); Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, 14.07.1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p1/d145> (Accessed 02.05.2022)

¹⁴⁹ R. Looney, *Handbook of US-Middle East Relations*, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2009, p. 285

¹⁵⁰ Nasser's words are quoted in the article R. Thomas Bobel, 'A Puppet, Even Though He Probably Doesn't Know So': Racial Identity and the Eisenhower Administration's Encounter with Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Arab Nationalist Movement, *The International History Review*, n. 5, 2013, pp. 949-950

be genuine allies of the Arabs. The population of Egypt would think crazy anybody saying this.¹⁵¹

Over time, relations between Egypt and the United States deteriorated further. The nationalistic and pan-Arabist approach of the new Egyptian government greatly complicated and spoiled the relations of the American side with the country. Moreover, Egypt, unlike Libya and independent Morocco and Tunisia, pursued a fairly independent foreign policy. Nasser, along with other Third World representatives, was one of the most important figures at the Bandung Conference. In September 1955, Egypt signed an arms supply agreement with Czechoslovakia, and in May 1956, it recognized communist China.¹⁵²

However, what is important in my analysis is not the events that took place during this period, but the racial prism through which the United States perceived what was happening in Egypt.

The issue of Arabism and Arab nationalism, as already shown in the second chapter and in the first part of this chapter, in the eyes of the Eisenhower administration was one of the threats to US interests in the region. To protect the national interests of Egypt and resist Western influence, Nasser actively used pan-Arabist slogans. He actively advocated the unification of the Arabs and believed that it was in solidarity and unity that the strength of the Arabs lay. Moreover, according to Nasser, the Arab states are not able to stand alone against the hegemony of the Western countries, while united they are able to do so.¹⁵³ Given that the United States believed that “The underdeveloped areas of the free world will be especially vulnerable to Communist

¹⁵¹ The meeting was held on 12.05.1953 and the words of Nasser are quoted in Memorandum of Conversation, 12.05.1953, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p1/d5> (Accessed 03.05.2022)

¹⁵² R. Looney, *Handbook of US-Middle East Relations*, p. 286

¹⁵³ R. Thomas Bobel, “A Puppet”, p. 950

penetration and subversion by reason of nationalism and anti-colonialism”¹⁵⁴, no wonder the Eisenhower administration was wary of such a statement.

The Eisenhower administration also tried to use the same instruments of neo-colonial management with Egypt that it had used with Libya to overturn the actions of the Egyptian government. In particular, such instruments included economic assistance. One of the projects that needed urgent funding was the Aswan Dam project. This project required significant financial investments. After Nasser accepted a Soviet economic aid offer on September 26, 1955, under which the USSR offered \$86 million in aid to Egypt in exchange for 100,000 Egyptian cotton, the Eisenhower administration decided to offer Egypt significant financial assistance to fund the project in the amount of \$200 million for the construction of the dam and \$1.2 billion for subsequent projects.¹⁵⁵ However, as soon as it became clear that Nasser was not making any concessions, was not going to give up his pan-Arab positions, and was also not ready to enter into any negotiations with Israel, economic assistance in the Aswan Dam project was very quickly withdrew.¹⁵⁶ This is reminiscent of the patterns of relations with Libya, when economic assistance was used as a tool to "push through" and accelerate a favorable treaty for the United States, and in this case, the position expected from Egypt.

Interestingly, extremely negative assessments were used to denigrate Nasser, who was inconvenient for the US foreign policy. In particular, Nasser is demonized and compared in official letters to Mussolini.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, already after the Suez crisis of

¹⁵⁴ Quoted from Memorandum to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), 11.10.1954, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d127> (Accessed 03.05.2022)

¹⁵⁵ D. Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, The University of North Carolina Press, 2008, p.309

¹⁵⁶ D. Little, *American Orientalism*, p.309

¹⁵⁷ Based on Note From the British Ambassador (Makins) to Secretary of State Dulles, 21.03.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v15/d208> (Accessed 03.05.2022)

1956, Nasser in the eyes of the American establishment became a leader of the Hitler type.¹⁵⁸

At the same time, the Egyptian government also didn't have a warm attitude to the American establishment. Particularly in the context of racial analysis, Egypt has been a vocal critic of what has been happening to race relations within the US. According to the United States Intelligence Agency, coverage of events such as the Lucy case, the Montgomery Bus Boycott and other racial incidents in the Middle East was broadly covered in Egypt.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, the USIA noted that the Egyptian press, which is controlled by the Egyptian government, deliberately covers these events and tries to "direct public opinion in this anti-American campaign."¹⁶⁰

Nasser's Egypt and its foreign policy, pan-Arabism and attempts to pursue an independent foreign policy, as already seen, were loud challenges to American attempts to establish control in the North African region. However, the most serious challenge to the colonial (or attempts to build a neo-colonial system) was the crisis of 1956. According to Thomas Borstelmann, one of the authors who studied the issue of the influence of race on US foreign policy during the Cold War, the Suez crisis was an attempt by Israel, France and Great Britain to draw a color line.¹⁶¹

The Suez Crisis was the quintessence of Egyptian nationalism under Nasser. On July 26, 1956, Nasser nationalized The Suez Canal Company, which was a challenge not only for those who owned this company (namely the French and British), but also for the United States. The nationalization of the channel, according to the French side,

¹⁵⁸ Based on Paper by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell), 04.08.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d62> (Accessed 03.05.2022)

¹⁵⁹ Kevin E. Grimm, *Color and Credibility: Eisenhower, the U.S. Information Agency, and Race, 1955-57*, Master's Degree Thesis, Ohio University, 2008, p. 90

¹⁶⁰ The USIA is quoted in the work of Kevin E. Grimm, *Color and Credibility*, p. 91

¹⁶¹ T. Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena*, p. 102

is an action that cannot be left unanswered, because otherwise: “ all of the Middle Eastern pipelines would be seized and nationalized within the next three months and Europe would find itself totally dependent on the goodwill of the Arab powers.”¹⁶² This statement vividly illustrates what was said in the second chapter: Western countries considered the resources of the Third World countries as resources that should be available to the “free world” without obstacles from the countries in whose territory these resources are located. The British side, in turn, not without reason, believed that if Nasser's actions remained unanswered, then the influence of both Britain and the United States in the Middle East would be undermined. In particular, according to British Prime Minister Eden: “If we take a firm stand over this now, we shall have the support of all the maritime powers. If we do not, our influence and yours throughout the Middle East will, we are convinced, be irretrievably undermined.”¹⁶³

Both the French and British sides were ready for a military solution to the problem. The United States, in turn, adhering to moderate passion, also considered this scenario. However, they understood that this could undermine the authority of the United States and, in particular, lead to negative consequences:“ Throughout the Arab-Asian world it would be attacked as the ally of “colonialism” and “imperialism” and charged with having been hypocritical in its initial espousal of moderation in the Suez crisis.”¹⁶⁴ What is interesting here is how the United States, in principle, did not consider the option that the Arab-Asian countries could develop in a paradigm outside

¹⁶² Quoted from Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State, 27.07.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d4> (Accessed 04.05.2022)

¹⁶³ The Words of British Prime-Minister are quoted in Message From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower, 27.07.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d5> (Accessed 03.05.2022)

¹⁶⁴ Based on Special National Intelligence Estimate, 05.09.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d175> (Accessed 04.05.2022)

the Soviet or Western model. In particular, the potential events that could occur include the risk that:

The Sino-Soviet Bloc would almost certainly take full advantage of these opportunities to extend its economic penetration of the area, to increase its diplomatic and cultural ties with the Arab-Asian nations, and to spread the concept that the interests of the underdeveloped nations lie more with the Communist powers than with the West.¹⁶⁵

In addition, the US saw Nasser's actions not only as a threat to its own interests, but also as an incentive to further spread nationalism, which was a threat to Western oil production. In particular, in one of the earliest National Intelligence Estimates, the American side speaks directly about this, stating that: "Nasser's action has strengthened anti-Western, anticolonial, and nationalist trends throughout the area, and if successful, will encourage future moves toward early nationalization or other action against foreign-owned oil pipelines and petroleum facilities."¹⁶⁶ In addition, according to the Secretary of Defense, the fall in Western prestige also poses a threat to American bases in Arab countries.¹⁶⁷ This, in particular, as has been noted more than once, coincides with the way the Eisenhower administration saw North Africa, where the main threat to American interests was not communism, but nationalism. This, in part, explains why, despite understanding that supporting Western countries in colonial conflicts is damaging to the image of the United States among Third World countries, the Eisenhower administration was never able to truly side with countries in their struggle

¹⁶⁵ Quoted from Special National Intelligence Estimate, 05.09.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d175> (Accessed 04.05.2022).

¹⁶⁶ Based on Special National Intelligence Estimate, 31.07.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d40> (Accessed 04.05.2022)

¹⁶⁷ Based on National Intelligence Estimate, 14.08.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII, Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d14> (Accessed 04.05.2022)

for independence, since the anti-colonial struggle and the struggle for independence is in principle impossible without nationalism, which was a great threat to US interests.

The reaction to Nasser's actions can also be explained by the fact that in the eyes of the American establishment, Nasser, having become a symbol of Arab nationalism, “would be able completely to unite and dominate the Arab world from Morocco to Iraq”.¹⁶⁸ This, no doubt, challenged the dominance of Western forces in this region.

The response to Nasser's actions from France, Great Britain and Israel, which joined these countries, was not long in coming. On October 29, 1956, the Israeli side, with the support of France and Great Britain, attacked Egypt. In the context of these hostilities, the US reaction was quite harsh. In particular, the American side came up with a resolution in the UN Security Council, which called on Israel to stop the aggression against Egypt. In the context of the racial factor, it is interesting that Eisenhower reacted to the crisis in the same manner in which he would react to the crisis in Little Rock in 1957. In both cases, in particular, he will take the side of the Third World and black southerners.¹⁶⁹ This can be explained by the fact that in the eyes of Eisenhower, military actions by Israel, Great Britain and France looked like radicalism, which he avoided both in domestic and foreign policy.

US foreign policy towards Egypt, and in particular the US response to the Suez Crisis, can be explained not only by the fear of losing its influence in the Middle East and North Africa or fears that Egyptian nationalism will spread to other countries, which will entail an increase in nationalization of oil industry infrastructure. Part of the US reaction can be explained by the stereotypes that the Eisenhower administration had about Arabs and Egyptians as well.

¹⁶⁸Quoted from Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay), 07.08.1956, Office of the Historians, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d68> (Accessed 04.05.2022)

¹⁶⁹ T. Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, p. 103

In his article 'A Puppet, Even Though He Probably Doesn't Know So': Racial Identity and the Eisenhower Administration's Encounter with Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Arab Nationalist Movement, R. Thomas Bobal writes about how racial stereotypes have shaped US foreign policy about Nasser's Egypt. In particular, according to the author, the fears of the United States, among other things, were due to the fact that the Eisenhower administration saw Nasser's actions through the prism of irrational emotionality, which was due to racial stereotypes.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, the Eisenhower administration assumed and feared that he was exploiting the emotionality of the Arabs in other countries, which could in particular lead to pooling the resources and forces of the Middle East against Western countries.¹⁷¹ The racial perspective also partly explains why the Eisenhower administration feared the spread of nationalist sentiment, which could follow the example of Egypt, and lead to the further nationalization of assets in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa.

In general, Egypt of the period 1953-1957. presented a huge challenge to the colonial policy of Western countries and the establishment of neo-colonial influence of the United States in the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt, in the eyes of the United States, embodied the fears of what Arab nationalism could lead to and, contrary to the realities of the Cold War, turned this nationalism into the main threat to US interests in the region.

¹⁷⁰ R. Thomas Bobal, "A Puppet", p. 960

¹⁷¹ R. Thomas Bobal, "A Puppet", p. 961

Conclusion

Dwight Eisenhower's first term marked a turning point in race relations in both foreign and domestic US policy. In domestic policy, the administration faced a rising civil rights movement, while in foreign policy the racial hierarchy was being called into question by the ongoing decolonization process. These processes posed a threat to US interests and were viewed not only through the prism of the realities of the early and mid-1950s, but also through the racial and colonial prism.

In North Africa, this prism was applied both to territories under colonial rule and to already independent countries.

In French North Africa (namely in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria) decolonization and destruction of the old hierarchical order, as well as nationalist sentiments in the territories of North Africa, in the view of the United States, were one of the threats to their strategic interests in the region. At the same time, local nationalism was viewed solely through the prism of its own benefit: when necessary, it turned into a useful tool to achieve US goals. Any forceful resistance of the local population is labeled as "terrorism" and the United States, in principle, were not ready to consider this type of nationalism as something more (the forceful and repressive mechanisms of France do not receive a similar assessment). Moreover, the Eisenhower administration was not prepared to consider this nationalism as something in its own right and distinctive, which requires attention not only within the framework of a threat to US interests. It is viewed through the prism of Western influence, perceived as a product of Western values and civilizations.

The independence, population and resources of French North Africa act as an instrument, and not as independent subjects. Considering that the US viewed these countries and their populations as a product of Western civilization that feeds, clothes, educates and cares for them, it is not surprising that even after the independence of Tunisia and Morocco, the US continues to perceive them as a springboard for American or French interests.

In this context, it is not surprising that the Eisenhower administration considers itself in the right to determine the "readiness" or "political immaturity" of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, since in the eyes of the United States, Western civilization, being more developed than the local one, seized these lands, Western civilization created these countries, Western civilization nurtured nationalism in this region and, therefore, it is Western civilization that should determine the vector of development in these countries. Neither the countries themselves, nor their populations, in principle, have any subjectivity, and reforms, within the framework of their needs and desires, should be carried out only when it is necessary for the interests of France or the United States.

At the same time, both in relation to the Eisenhower administration towards these oppressed peoples, and in relation to the discriminated black population, a number of similarities are observed. In both cases, the Eisenhower administration refused to listen to the second, discriminated or oppressed side. In both places, the Eisenhower administration tried to find some kind of compromise, not realizing that in the situation of the oppressor there can be no compromise between those who oppress and those who are oppressed, because the oppressed want complete freedom. In both cases, the Eisenhower administration preferred to talk to predominantly white and Western oppressors, without taking into account the wishes of either the Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians, or the blacks of the discriminated population.

However, nevertheless, the American establishment recognized the existence of a problem both at home and abroad, however, while in the case of France, the United States considered compromises and concessions as a possible solution to the problem, in domestic politics the Eisenhower administration still refused to recognize any methods that to force the Southern States to fulfill their obligations (this is also evidenced by the numbers, in particular only 6.4% of schools¹⁷² that were desegregated after the adoption of *Brown v. Board of Education*, despite all the statements).

¹⁷² T. Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, p. 93

With regard to already independent countries, the US used a number of tools aimed at keeping these countries in the US zone of influence. In particular, as was shown in the case of Libya, one of these tools was economic assistance, which was needed by poor Libya, which was in an extremely distressed economic situation. This assistance acted as an instrument of pressure on the country, forcing the government to make concessions.

At the same time, the Eisenhower administration considered the country from a position of superiority, in particular, believing that the independence of Libya is, among other things, the result of US sponsorship, which echoes, among other things, how the Eisenhower administration considered the creation of Algeria or the emergence of nationalist movements in Morocco and Tunisia, which in the eyes of the American side looked like a product of Western influence. Moreover, as in French North Africa, nationalism and anti-colonialism in Libya was viewed by the US as a threat to national interests.

As for Egypt, Egypt after 1952, having taken a course on an independent foreign policy and attempts to unite the Arab countries under the slogans of pan-Arabism, presented a great challenge to the colonial hierarchy of the 1950s. Egyptian nationalism was also a source of concern for the Eisenhower administration, which assumed, among other things, that nationalist sentiment was also breeding ground for communism. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration did not consider the desire of the Egyptian government to develop a foreign policy in isolation from the Cold War and opposing communism with the "free world".

Moreover, Egyptian nationalism led to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, which led to the crisis of late 1956. However, this crisis, which represented a challenge to the existing system, showed how the Eisenhower administration (as in the case of French North Africa) repeated the patterns it applied to address the issue of racial desegregation at home.

In general, it is possible to conclude that during the first term of Dwight D. Eisenhower as president, US foreign policy towards North Africa was determined not only by the containment of communism or the pursuit of its strategic and foreign policy goals. An important factor in this region, which shaped US foreign policy, was also the movement for independence, nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments, which the Eisenhower administration considered through the prism of "readiness" or "unpreparedness" of certain countries for independence, the prism of the superiority of Western civilization, and also the prism of racial stereotypes.

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