Università
Ca'Foscari
Venezia

Master's Degree programme
in Comparative International Relations
Global Studies

Final Thesis

The European Debate on George W. Bush's Campaign to "Export Democracy", 2002-2003

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Academic Year
2020/2021

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Abstract

Quando il Presidente statunitense George W. Bush rese pubblica la decisione degli Stati Uniti di attaccare l'Iraq preventivamente e senza l'appoggio unanime da parte delle Nazioni Unite, nessuno avrebbe potuto prevedere la portata delle conseguenze che si sarebbero verificate nel mondo occidentale a livello sociale, morale, politico ed economico.

È possibile effettuare un'analisi delle ragioni dietro la decisione dell'amministrazione americana da diversi punti di vista, partendo da elementi storici, economici, e politici. La letteratura accademica ci ha infatti dimostrato che la complessità della questione si basa su diversi fattori, come ad esempio il fallimento dell'approccio multilaterale delle Nazioni Unite e l'ideologia sottesa all'insieme di politiche estere che l'amministrazione Bush intendeva attuare con un attacco preventivo contro l'Iraq.

L'insistenza nel giustificare un intervento militare preventivo attraverso una retorica basata sui concetti opposti di male/bene e libertà/dittatura, ha permesso agli Stati Uniti di ottenere l'appoggio formale di vari governi, inclusi alcuni governi europei. Eventualmente, gli Stati Uniti riuscirono comunque ad agire anche grazie all'appoggio pubblico e materiale di una coalizione creata "ad hoc" e ad attaccare l'Iraq nel marzo del 2003.

Il presente elaborato approfondisce la questione, analizzandola da un punto di vista sociale e filosofico.

In particolare, questa tesi si propone di enfatizzare le ripercussioni materiali e concettuali delle manifestazioni del 15 febbraio 2003 contro la guerra in Iraq e le conseguenze sulle relazioni transatlantiche.

Partendo dalla guerra in Iraq, si analizzerà la narrazione statunitense sulla "guerra giusta" e sulla promozione della democrazia e l'impatto che ha avuto in Europa, soprattutto a livello sociale e filosofico. L'elaborato tratterà della risonanza del movimento che ha dato vita alle manifestazioni, e di come le proteste abbiano avuto un impatto in Europa sia a livello istituzionale, sia a livello sociale. Inoltre, il dibattito scaturito dalla partecipazione massiccia alle proteste servirà a descrivere il distacco ideologico tra Europa e Stati Uniti negli anni 2000.

Infine, dall'osservazione della situazione a distanza di 20 anni, si cercherà di inquadrare l'eredità del dibattito europeo sull'intervento e la narrazione statunitense riguardo ad Afghanistan e Iraq.

Se la decisione dell'amministrazione Bush di concentrare le risorse americane destinate alla politica estera per "combattere il terrorismo" fu parzialmente giustificata come risposta al crescente problema del terrorismo transnazionale, la controversa campagna di "promozione della democrazia" nell'ottica di "lotta contro il terrorismo" in Medio Oriente ha suscitato numerosi dibattiti sia a livello politico che sociale.

A livello politico, da un lato la portata della decisione dell'amministrazione americana ha provocato una spaccatura politica e ideologica nei rapporti tra Stati Uniti e Europa, una spaccatura sottolineata dalla celebre affermazione di Robert Kagan "gli americani vengono da Marte, gli europei da Venere".[1] Dall'altro, l'Unione Europea non fu capace di presentare un fronte unito in risposta al problema del terrorismo transnazionale. A livello sociale, le manifestazioni del 15 febbraio sottolineano come i cittadini europei hanno messo in dubbio la capacità e l'autorità morale degli Stati Uniti di portare a termine il loro progetto internazionale.

Il primo capitolo di questa tesi si occupa di presentare una descrizione degli avvenimenti che hanno portato all'inizio della guerra in Iraq, con un focus sul fallimento del concetto di multilateralismo e sulla spaccatura interna alla comunità internazionale. Per meglio comprendere la percezione sociale della guerra e della propaganda americana, verranno analizzate i dati racconti dall'Eurobarometro, il sistema di sondaggi sull'opinione pubblica commissionati dall'Unione Europea. Le domande si focalizzarono su diversi elementi: le criticità della promozione della democrazia attraverso le armi, le differenze tra gli Stati Uniti e l'Europa in campo ideologico e politico, e il ruolo dell'Europa sia in rapporto con l'America, sia come attore internazionale.

Una causa della percezione negativa risiede nella narrazione costruita dall'amministrazione Bush, una narrazione che questa tesi proverà ad inquadrare nel corso del secondo capitolo attraverso una descrizione di ciò che oggi viene chiamato la "dottrina Bush", cioè un insieme di elementi morali, ideologici, economici e politici che sono il risultato di decenni di storia americana. Se prima della guerra la posizione egemonica e il ruolo internazionale degli stati uniti come "paladini della democrazia"

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[1] "Le rivincite di Venere", *Limes*, online version, 16.02.2007, available at https://www.limesonline.com/cartaceo/le-rivincite-di-venere

venivano generalmente accettati – specialmente a livello europeo – la propaganda di promozione democratica attraverso le armi ha causato non poche reazioni contrarie all'approccio americano alla politica estera.

L'unica opposizione chiara e distinta all'intervento statunitense in Iraq si è manifestata a livello sociale il 15 febbraio 2003, quando leader dei movimenti sociali riuscirono a coordinare le proteste in 789 città per mandare un messaggio chiaro alla comunità internazionale: "No alla guerra".

La partecipazione massiccia dei cittadini dei Paesi Europei fu così degna di nota da spingere due filosofi europei, Habermas e Derrida, a scrivere un manifesto basato sulla teorizzazione di una "sfera pubblica europea" che chiedeva a gran voce una politica estera collettiva che rappresentasse dei valori identificati come propriamente "europei", frutto di una storia comune. Il terzo capitolo approfondirà questa questione.

Il pilastro contemporaneo della politica estera statunitense - "promuovere la democrazia" - fu percepito più come un progetto imperiale di "esportazione della democrazia" per "ristrutturare il mondo". Le proteste hanno dimostrato che le giustificazioni morali degli Stati Uniti non erano più accettate in Europa.

In particolare, il dibattito intellettuale promosso dal filosofo tedesco Habermas sfociò in una proposta di "ristrutturazione" morale e ideologica dell'Unione Europea basata sulla concezione di valori e pratiche democratiche specifiche della storia europea. Il contributo di Habermas e di tanti altri intellettuali europei spinse i membri del Parlamento Europeo a considerare il dibattito in un'ottica più ampia di "ristrutturazione" in ambito di politica interna, nel caso del problema del cosiddetto "deficit democratico", e di politica estera.

Quest'ultima era particolarmente importante in quanto cercava di trovare un compromesso tra i leader politici con lo scopo di arrivare ad un approccio europeo alla politica estera e, come risultato della retorica Bushiana, ai progetti di promozione democratica.

L'obiettivo di questa tesi è quello di esaminare in che termini la partecipazione senza precedenti dei cittadini europei abbia avuto un impatto sul dibattito sia a livello intellettuale che politico durante le discussioni su un possibile contributo collettivo europeo alla gestione della guerra contro l'Iraq. Verrà analizzata la declinazione che il concetto di democrazia ha avuto nella narrazione utilizzata sia dall'amministrazione statunitense sia dalla leadership dell'UE e come il rifiuto sociale della guerra a tutti i costi

abbia messo in discussione l'etica della "guerra giusta" in un'epoca in cui i processi di "democratizzazione" hanno aumentato il numero di Paesi democratici in tutto il mondo.

Inoltre, la questione dell'impatto transatlantico del dibattito sulla campagna di Bush per "esportare la democrazia" verrà investigata per sostenere l'argomento della tesi.

Per trattare la questione, la tesi farà largo uso sia di fonti primarie come i discorsi dei presidenti Americani e i sondaggi dell'opinione pubblica commissionati dall'Unione Europea.

L'analisi della dottrina Bush da un punto di vista sia ideologico che politico sarà fatta considerando il lavoro di James Mann "*Rise of the Vulcans, The History of Bush's War Cabinet*", e gli studi condotti sulle dottrine economiche e la loro particolare influenza sulla sfera politica americana.

Per capire meglio come si sono svolte le manifestazioni del 15 febbraio 2003, analizzerò sia gli scritti di Sidney Tarrow sull'evoluzione dei movimenti sociali a livello globale, sia articoli di giornale, video d'archivio, sondaggi sull'opinione pubblica europea e filmati che raccolgono la percezione e il sentimento degli individui nei confronti della guerra.

Concentrandomi sul dibattito filosofico scaturito dalle proteste, citerò le considerazioni di intellettuali di tutta Europa. Partendo dal lavoro di Daniel Levy "*Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe*", analizzerò il contributo intellettuale alle discussioni su una politica estera comune europea come risposta al fallimento della presentazione di un fronte politico unitario riguardo alla guerra degli Stati Uniti contro l'Iraq.

Insieme al problema di "esportare la democrazia" attraverso l'uso della forza, la questione dell'"etica" della guerra ha evidenziato le possibili differenze tra la politica estera americana e quella europea. Le considerazioni filosofiche sulla storia della democrazia, il suo sviluppo e le sue sfide saranno integrate per fornire un background adeguato all'idea di promozione della democrazia come strategia di politica estera.

Per riconoscere appieno le implicazioni sul presente e sul futuro delle relazioni transatlantiche, prenderò in considerazione il lavoro di studiosi americani ed europei, dall'analisi più concreta approfondita da Robert Keagan, alle considerazioni più filosofiche di Habermas e Derrida.

Inoltre, l'analisi sarà condotta utilizzando le trascrizioni dei dibattiti al Parlamento europeo dopo le manifestazioni del 15 febbraio, con particolare attenzione alle citazioni politiche di Habermas e delle sue idee.

La guerra contro l'Iraq è stato un avvenimento senza precedenti che ha provocato grandissime ripercussioni a livello sociale e geopolitico e incentivato diverse revisioni di concetti in ambito morale e filosofico.

L'analisi di un tema relativamente inesplorato come il dibattito europeo sulla campagna di Bush per "esportare la democrazia" è utile principalmente per tre ragioni.

In primo luogo, fornisce uno studio su come il dibattito segnali per la prima volta un cambiamento nella percezione americana della questione della democrazia e quindi un cambiamento nella strategia di politica estera di promozione della democrazia. L'osservazione di questo cambiamento ci permette di sottolineare la distanza tra l'approccio europeo e quello americano alle questioni internazionali nell'ambito delle pratiche democratiche.

In secondo luogo, il punto di partenza di quest'indagine, costituito dal riconoscimento dell'importanza dei movimenti "dal basso" nella formulazione di soluzioni a lungo termine e dalla riflessione sui principi ideologici causata dalla risposta collettiva della società europea alla guerra, fornisce un nuovo strumento di analisi.

A mio avviso, la mancanza di ricerche sui contributi filosofici ha compromesso un'analisi completa ed efficace della più recente ristrutturazione materiale e ideologica del progetto europeo.

La terza e ultima ragione consiste nel fatto che l'analisi di questo specifico momento della storia delle relazioni transatlantiche costringe noi europei a comprendere che il dibattito nato dalla "sfera pubblica" europea offre opportunità senza precedenti per le future discussioni sul valore della democrazia.

Introduction

This thesis aims to analyse the material and conceptual repercussions of the demonstrations of 15 February 2003 against the war in Iraq, and the international relations consequences on the Transatlantic relations.

Starting with the war in Iraq, a study will be made on the US rhetoric of justified war and democracy and the impact it has had in Europe, particularly on a social and philosophical level. The paper will deal with the resonance that the movement has had in European institutions, to give a clearer description of the context of the ideological detachment between Europe and the United States in the 2000s.

Finally, from the observation of the situation after 20 years, an attempt will be made to frame the legacy of the European debate on US intervention and rhetoric in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The decision of the George W. Bush administration to attack Iraq in 2003 without the United Nations' mandate has been a very discussed topic. No one could have foreseen the magnitude of the social, moral, political, and economic consequences it provoked in the Western world. The academic literature showed that the complexity of the issue relied on different elements, such as the failure of the multilateral approach of the United Nations, and the ideological nuance of the set of foreign policies the Bush administration planned to implement with a pre-emptive attack against Iraq.

After 9/11, George W. Bush's controversial campaign to "promote democracy" to "fight terrorism" in the Middle East caused numerous debates both on the political and the social level, and European citizens questioned the capability and the morality of the United States to complete its international project. Scholars have extensively analysed the statements and speeches Bush issued in a perspective of providing proof of a political attempt at framing the conflict as morally justified:

> "Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as
> we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the
> peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by

> building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.".[2]

As the US foreign policy in the Middle East shifted toward fighting against terrorism, the National Security Strategy of 2002 mirrored the change.[3]

As will be recounted in the thesis, the American rhetoric and propaganda promoted as a democratic plan supporting freedom and liberty, was negatively perceived in Europe.

At the political level, leaders of the member states showed heterogeneity and division, highlighting a situation of frailty within the European Union. On the other hand, the clear opposition to the US intervention in Iraq came at the societal level on 15 February 2003, when leaders of social movements all over the world succeeded in coordinating protests in 789 cities. The demonstrations turned out to be the largest participatory protest in post-war history. The newly born "European public sphere" strongly condemned US actions abroad, highlighting a negative turn of the American cultural influence in Europe. The contemporary pillar of US foreign policy - "promote democracy" – was perceived more as an imperial project of "exporting democracy" to eventually "restructure the world". The protests showed that US moral justifications were no longer accepted in Europe. Although the demonstration was against US and British military intervention, European philosophers including Habermas and Derrida theorised a moral stance on the part of world public opinion. Starting from the theorization of the existence of a European "public sphere", the two philosophers fostered an intellectual debate on a moral and ideological "restructuring" of the EU, which in the bigger picture would also entail practical changes such as the reaching of a common foreign policy that followed values that were inherently Europeans in nature.

The aim of this thesis is to examine in what terms the unprecedented participation of citizens in Europe impacted the debate both on the intellectual and the practical level during discussions on a possible collective European contribution to the managing of the war against Iraq.

I will conduct an analysis on the role that democracy had in the rhetoric used both by the US administration and the EU leadership and how the societal refusal of war on all terms

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[2] The White House Archives, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point", available at https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html (accessed 20.06.2022)

[3] See the opening remarks at https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nssall.html

questioned the ethics of "just war" in an era where the "democratization processes" increased the number of democratic countries all over the world.

Furthermore, I will focus on how the debate on the George W. Bush's campaign to "export democracy" impacted the foundations of the Transatlantic partnership.[4]

To answer this research question, this thesis will reference both primary and secondary literature. The analysis of the Bush doctrine from both an ideological and a political perspective will be made considering the work of James Mann's "*Rise of the Vulcans, The History of Bush's War Cabinet*", archival documents reporting speeches US Presidents issued to prove a past and present reference to the subject, and official documents embodying specific political and moral tendencies.

To better understand how February 15, 2003, demonstrations happened, I will analyse both the writings of Sidney Tarrow on the evolution of social movements at the global level, journal articles, archival videos, European public opinion surveys, and movies gathering individuals' perception and sentiment over the war.

As I focus on the philosophical debate that originated from the protests, I will cite the considerations of intellectuals from all over Europe. Starting from "*Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe*", I will analyse the intellectual contribution to the discussions on a European common foreign policy as a response to the failure of presenting a united political front for the US war against Iraq. Together with the problem of "exporting democracy" through the use of force, the issue of the "ethics" of waging war highlighted possible differences between the American and European foreign policy. Philosophical considerations on the history of democracy, its development, and its challenges will be supplemented to provide a proper background on the idea of democracy promotion as a strategy of foreign policy.

To fully acknowledge the implications on the present and future of the Transatlantic relation, I will consider the work of both American and European scholars from Robert Keagan to a more philosophical interpretation as the one Habermas wrote.

Moreover, the analysis will be conducted by using the transcriptions of the debates at the European Parliament after the demonstrations of February 15, with a particular focus on political citations of Habermas and his ideas.

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[4] R. Kagan, *Of paradise and power: America and Europe in the new world order*. New York, Vintage books, 2007

Using the aforementioned sources, the first chapter of this thesis will deal with the reasons behind the American decision to wage war against Iraq, and the short-term consequences that these decisions had on the United Nations, the Transatlantic partnership, and the European Union. The Eurobarometer will contribute to describing the social perception of the American decision that led to the organization of the February 15th rally.

The second chapter will examine the Bush doctrine and the controversial "democracy promotion" element, assessing what the Bush administration meant by "democracy", and how the definition entailed different conceptions at the European level.

Once established the fundamental context in which the debate emerged, the third chapter will examine the manifesto Habermas and Derrida co-signed as the starting point of the discussion. I will then analyse both the intellectual considerations on the American decision and the debate inside the European Parliament, trying to assess the correlation between Habermas' words and political talks before and after the effective beginning of the war in Iraq.

The analysis of a relatively unexplored topic such as the European debate on the Bush's campaign to "export democracy" is useful for three main reasons.

Firstly, it provides a study on how the debate signals for the first time a shift in America's perception of the issue of democracy and therefore a change in the foreign policy strategy of democracy promotion. Remarking on this shift allows us to underline a distance between the European and the American approach to international issues under democratic practices.

Secondly, the acknowledgment of the significance of bottom-up movements in the formulation of long-term solutions and the revisitation of ideological principles by using the collective European society's response to the war will form the starting point of this inquiry. In my opinion, the lack of research on the philosophical contributions undermined a complete and efficient analysis of the most recent material and ideological restructuring of the European project.

Lastly, it also forces us Europeans to understand that the debate offers unprecedented opportunities for future discussions on the value of democracy in this era.

This work might contribute to a broader reflection on the role of conflict, and the part it will play in the future.

Chapter 1

The 2003 Iraq War and the First Largest Coordinated Protest in History

1. The second war in Iraq: why and how the Bush administration intervened in Iraq

After the 9/11 attacks and the military intervention in Afghanistan, throughout 2002 the then US President George W. Bush and his administration undertook a political project to formally justify both nationally and internationally the reasons behind a military intervention in Iraq and to gather enough consent for a successful invasion.[5]

At first, most government members of the United Nations showed a real interest in supporting the Bush administration in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. Nevertheless, the more the possibility of an actual war became real, the more the international community – and civil societies - pondered the difficulties linked to the US rationale behind a joint intervention in Iraq. Eventually, the United States failed in convincing all members of the UN Security Council to quickly approve a joint international attack against Iraq: by February 2003 the Bush administration decided to "go it alone".

The USA did strengthen political and economic ties with certain governments and obtained enough international support to proceed with the war, eventually forming an ad-hoc alliance with Australia, Poland, and the United Kingdom. On the 20 March 2003, without the mandate from the United Nations and after having issued an ultimatum for Saddam and his family to exit Iraq within 48 hours, British and US troops attacked Baghdad.[6]

The reasons behind the contemporary involvement of the United States of America in Iraq and the beginning of the war in March 2003 are varied and complex. On this topic, the international relations literature supports academic theories on different levels, trying to draw an accurate picture of the US ideological, economic, and political environment of the second half of the 20th century and the early 2000s.

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[5] M. Del Pero, *Libertà e impero: Gli Stati Uniti e il mondo 1776-2016*. Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa, 2017, pp. 427 - 432

[6] "Bush gives Saddam and his sons 48 hours to leave Iraq.", *The Guardian*, online edition, 18.03.2003, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/iraq.usa1

The debate on a joint international intervention with the mandate of the United Nations in Iraq marked the failure of international multilateralism and questioned the role of a powerful country such as the United States of America within the international community.[7]

Furthermore, the 2003 war in Iraq underlined changes in the Transatlantic relations that dangerously compromised the Euro-America network to the point in which, nowadays, Transatlantic relations are fundamentally different both from a political and a societal perspective.

2. The failure of the UN's multilateralism and the "drift" in the Transatlantic partnership: "Vulcans" against Europeans

After the League of Nations, the United Nations (UN) is the second attempt conducted by the international community which ultimately aimed at maintaining a stable global environment. Being a party to the UN Charter heavily tightens the power and possibilities that countries normally exercise. If the actions of a country member of the United Nations violate any article of the UN Charter, then its national government will have to answer for its violation to the global community. In this respect, countries signatories to the Charter tend not to breach any article because of the legal – but most importantly reputational – consequences that violations would imply.[8]

It is not a rarity for the representatives in the UN Security Council to unanimously agree on the existence of an actual threat to international peace and security, but it has been difficult for the Permanent Five members - the representative of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America - to compromise over certain issues and approve the use of force, especially when the solution would entail overcoming the sovereignty of certain countries.

For this reason, when the government of the United States of America called for pre-emptive international action against Iraq, not all UN members supported the US fervent desire for military intervention. Not all countries party to the United Nations blindly agreed on the moral legitimacy of an attack against Iraq with the UN mandate, but they certainly acknowledged the necessity of establishing the existence of a real material

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[7] Thompson, Alexander. *Channels of power*. Cornell University Press, 2010, pp. 133 - 168
[8] Thompson, Alexander. *Channels of power*, pp. 210 - 215

breach of UN resolutions. On 8th November 2002, the UN Security Council (UNSC) approved unanimously the resolution 1441 (2002) which – following the demand of US representatives - asked the Iraq Presidency for unconditional and active cooperation with the UN inspections aimed at testing the alleged presence of illegal weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).[9]

If found and not voluntarily renounced, WMDs would have ultimately bettered the chances of a UNSC approval of military intervention with the UN mandate in Iraq. The political debate around resolution 1441 (2002) arose because the resolution was subject to interpretation: on one hand, the mere writing of the resolution was perceived as a sign that there was enough proof for the UNSC to approve military intervention with a UN mandate; on the other hand, countries such as Germany, France, and Russia asked for more time for UN inspectors to find actual proof of the existence of WMDs in order to approve the use of force. Given that two out of three of these countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council, their veto power obstructed an official material and immediate response. In particular, French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac famously stated that France and Germany stood firmly against the war in Iraq for two fundamental reasons: the first one was that allowing a powerful UN member state to unilaterally and pre-emptively declare war on another country and morally transform a national problem into a global one could create a precedent; while the second reason was that for the very nature of the United Nations, the use of force had always to be discouraged, let alone the use of force in a pre-emptive way.[10]

The debate on military intervention in Iraq harshly contributed to the "drift" of the fragile equilibrium within the United Nations, underlining the failure of international networking and multilateralist approaches, but also provoking a widening in the already-existing ideological gap between Europe and the United States, or as often referred to, the "Transatlantic partnership".[11] Contrary to what it seemed, causes of tensions between Europe and America did not begin with the George W. Bush administration and the 2003 Iraq war.

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[9] United Nations Digital Library System, available at: https://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf (accessed 29.12.2021)

[10] "France, Germany stand firm on Iraq", *CNN*, 22.01.2003. available at https://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/01/22/sproject.irq.schroeder.chirac/index.html (accessed 29.12.2021)

[11] R- Kagan, "Power and Weakness", Hoover Institution, *Policy Review*, 1.06.2002, available at https://www.hoover.org/research/power-and-weakness

One of the relevant elements contributing to the ideological "drift" between the US and the EU dates to the 1970s, when historical, economic, and political differences heavily influenced the American language politics, determining the way policies and institutions were shaped. On the other side of the Atlantic, as the American cultural influence started to erode, Western Europe pushed for more political autonomy. The cultural "distance" allowed Europeans to notice the differences in both language politics and approaches to foreign policy, highlighting the existence of contrasting elements impacting decision-making processes.[12]

In the US, especially after the affirmation of the neo-conservative movement in the high spheres of US political elites, the American political language mirrored new ideological and economic elements.[13] Neo-conservative principles of political individualism and the qualified endorsement of free markets strongly impacted the US foreign policy agenda: from Reagan to George W. Bush, via the administrations of George H. W. Bush and William J. Clinton, the neo-conservative ideology reached its full private and public expression. Over the years, it significantly changed the US approach to international and national politics. Most of the Bush administration trained during the years of the Reagan administration and strongly contributed to the approach behind the presidency of George W. Bush and the consolidation of representatives of the neo-conservatism – or "Vulcans" - in US politics.[14] In the Bush II administration, "Vulcans" held the highest position in the military and foreign affairs.[15]

The role of Paul D. Wolfowitz as a neo-conservative within the Bush administration was fundamental: during the presidency of George W. Bush, and especially after 9/11, Wolfowitz' academic connections in the neo-conservative movement were instrumental in the interpretation of the US foreign policy as an attempt at "re-shaping" the Middle East.[16] The neo-conservative influence within the Bush administration led to the implementation of what they called "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan, and

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[12] M. Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890–2010*. Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 339 - 342

[13] Justin Vaisse, *Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement*, Harvard University Press, 2010

[14] J. Mann, "RISE OF THE VULCANS: The History of Bush's War Cabinet.", Penguin Books, 2004.

[15] S. Reyna, " We exist to fight": the killing elite and Bush II's Iraq war.", *Social Analysis*, 2005, pp. 190-197.

[16] B. High, "The recent historiography of American neoconservatism." *The Historical Journal*, 2009, pp. 475-491.

then the establishing efficient democratic rhetoric and propaganda to construct the legitimation of the war against Iraq.[17]

From a political perspective, the gap in the American and European conception of power and how to use it in terms of management of international challenges led to a European identification of the US as an "empire" with "imperial" drives.[18] This perception caused major controversies between the states of the European Union and the USA, which translated into suspicion and, from time to time, aversion.[19] The contrast was aggravated by the material power gap resulted from the aftermath of World War Two: at the end of the global conflict, the USA emerged as the most powerful country and exercised power with little opposition. During the Clinton administration, US politics grew impatient with the "timidity" that some European states showed in the handling of certain UN decisions strongly, contributing to exacerbating the Transatlantic disagreement.[20]

From a societal perspective, Transatlantic tensions - together with the debate over a possible Iraq military intervention - provoked even a wider contrast with Europeans viewing the general approach of the United States towards the resolution of conflicts as needlessly dangerous, militaristic, and hegemonic: a 2003 public opinion survey conducted by the BBC found that two-thirds of interviewees in France, Great Britain, and Russia thought of Americans as "negatively as arrogant but positively free".[21] Citizens in Europe did no longer consider the United States as a rightful model, marking the end of the American cultural hegemony in Europe.[22]

3. The "Anti-War" rally and its resonance

On 15 February 2003, 789 cities in 72 countries saw the largest protest in post-war history. People from hundreds of cities marched to unitedly express objection against possible material support of national governments to the intervention in Iraq.

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[17] D. Milne, "Intellectualism in US diplomacy: Paul Wolfowitz and his predecessors." *International Journal*, 2007, pp. 667-680.
[18] M. Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century,* pp. 370 - 371

[19] S. Kull, "Just another major crisis? The United States and Europe since 2000.", in G. Lundestad (ed.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 233 - 234
[20] R. Kagan. "Power and Weakness", *Policy Review,* n. 113, 2002, pp. 1 - 8
[21] "Poll suggests world hostile to US", *BBC News*, 16.06.2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2994924.stm (accessed 29.12.2021)
[22] M. Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century*, pp. 267 - 303

Originally, the date was set during the European Social Forum which took place in Florence in November 2002 as the International Day of Protests against the war, and then it became global when the idea was relaunched at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in January.[23] The global character of the protest was unprecedented, and the impact the demonstrations had in Europe was remarkable. With an unparalleled move, European societies asserted themselves by intervening in issues of war and peace – notably considered the exclusive domain of politics.[24] What rendered this protest unique?

As Victoria Carty puts it:

> "The power of social movements often lies not only in their ability to influence specific policies, but also in their capacity to change the context in which societies debate problems and to influence types of policy alternatives that are considered legitimate in a given socio-political context.".[25]

Contemporary social movement theory largely contributed to the study of this new kind of social collective participation. The "political opportunity structure" – or specific national political conditions – in European states helped to directly connect social movements to politics, contributing to the success of the protest. European citizens engaged in the so-called "contentious politics" creating new social opportunities for others to participate in.[26] Survey data showed that participants came from various socioeconomic environments and different places and that the protests succeeded in convincing to publicly show dissent even those that normally did not believe in the usefulness of social movements, the so-called "unusual suspects".[27] The then Mayor of London Ken Livingstone publicly claimed that the march in the British capital was a "[…] microcosm of Britain, all classes, all races, all religions, and all regions of Britain are represented here".[28]

International social networks and mobilizing structures had an incredibly important role, allowing associations and protest communities to develop social ties and solidarity

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[23] D. Della Porta, M. Diani, and L. Mastellotto, "No to the war with no ifs or buts": Protests against the War in Iraq.", *Italian Politics* 19, 2003, pp. 200-218.

[24] V. Carty, "The anti-war movement versus the war against Iraq.", *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 2009, pp. 17-38.

[25] V. Carty. "The anti-war movement", p. 24

[26] S.G. Tarrow, *Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 16 and 230 - 233

[27] D. Gordon, "The Cost, Consequences and Morality of War in Iraq." *Radical Statistics,* Issue 84, 2003, p. 62

[28] "Ken Livingstone Hyde Park Speech", *BBC News*, 15.02.2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2767427.stm (accessed 29.12.2021)

between different groups which fostered members' interest in collective action.[29] The "framing" of the issue at the centre of the protest - "No to the war" – and the "frame bridging" element played a major role in connecting internationally defined interests and expand the scope of the protest, giving participants a transnational sense of belonging. The rise of technology-enabled the beginning of a new kind of social participation called "cyberactivism", a form of online civil disobedience.[30]

The debate of European citizens around the 2003 war in Iraq and the demonstrations in March 2003 were perceived in the European philosophical realm as the "birth of the European public sphere".[31] German philosopher Jürgen Habermas famously stated that the day of the demonstrations marked "the birth of a common European public sphere", with European citizens unitedly showing a deep mistrust in national institutions. The challenge they posed to national governments was to protect and promote European values such as democracy and multiculturalism through a new common European foreign policy, in contraposition with the morally controversial US foreign policy.[32] Protesters asked themselves whether it was necessary to enter an unlawful war now that most Western citizens experienced decades of peace and stability.[33] This inquiry strongly took hold in Europe and, following years of Transatlantic tensions, was translated into a moral and ideological social criticism towards the United States and the Bush administration. The idea of "unjustified violence" that protesters shared implied that governments' decision to side with the United States military in the intervention in Iraq was, for all reasons, illegal.[34] European governments now had two possibilities: obey the United States or global civil society.

The next chapter will compare public opinion surveys on potential support of the US military intervention in Iraq to analyse when and how national politics and civil society opinions matched, and the consequences that the debate caused on the US image within the Transatlantic partnership.

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[29] M. Diani, "The structural bases of protest events: Multiple memberships and civil society networks in the 15 February 2003 anti-war demonstrations." *Acta Sociologica,* 2009, pp. 63-83.
[30] S.G. Tarrow, *Power in movement,* p. 254
[31] J. Habermas, and J. Derrida, "February 15, or what binds Europeans together: A plea for a common foreign policy, beginning in the core of Europe." *Constellations*, 2003, p. 291
[32] J. Habermas. *L'occidente diviso*. Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa, 2017, pp. 19 - 26
[33] R. Kagan, *Il Diritto di Fare la Guerra. Il potere americano e la crisi di legittimità*, Milano, Mondadori, 2004, pp. 5 - 6
[34] J. Hands. "Civil society, cosmopolitics and the net: The legacy of 15 February 2003.", *Information, Communication & Society*, 2006, pp. 225 - 226

4. When official politics does not reflect society: analysis of 2002-2003 public opinion surveys

Although the UNSC did not approve military pre-emptive intervention in Iraq, the EU member states showed a particular heterogeneity in the debate over the possibility of European support for the war against Iraq.

On one side, the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Denmark, plus candidate countries for the European enlargement process Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, publicly demonstrated their willingness to militarily assist the US in the war. In addition, ten states from the European Eastern bloc - Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Macedonia – did the same.[35] The political decision underlined a turn toward a collective "Atlanticism" orientation of national foreign policies.[36] On the other side, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg recalled the importance of European independence from the United States, opposing the US intentions of waging war against Iraq as a representative of the Transatlantic ideology.[37]

The 2002-2003 debate around a potential joint intervention against Saddam Hussein's Iraq divided European politics into two factions. Some of the US's allies **-** the United Kingdom, Spain, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Hungary, Poland, and Portugal - co-signed a letter showing plain political support for a potential US war against Iraq.[38] The letter recalled the historical foundations of the Transatlantic partnership, and the importance of showing unity before the threat Iraq – allegedly - represented:

> "The real bond between the United States and Europe is the values we share: democracy, individual freedom, human rights and the Rule of Law. These values crossed the Atlantic with those who sailed from Europe to help create the USA. Today they are under greater threat than ever. The attacks of 11 September showed just how far terrorists - the enemies of our common values - are prepared to go to destroy them. Those outrages were an attack on all of us. In standing firm in defence of these principles, the governments and people of the United States and Europe have amply

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[35] T.E. Fakiolas and E.T. Fakiolas, "Europe's 'Division' over the war in Iraq.", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 2006, pp. 299 - 306

[36] J. Lubeck, "Poland in Iraq. The politics of the decision.", *The Polish Review*, 2005, pp. 69 - 92

[37] T. Young, and P. Crawford, "Hands Across the Atlantic?", *International Business & Economics Research Journal (IBER)*, 2004, p. 90

[38] M. Champion, "Eight European Leaders Voice Their Support for US on Iraq.", *Wall Street Journal*, online version, 30.01.2003, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10438754701584445104 (accessed 23.01.2022)

demonstrated the strength of their convictions. Today more than ever, the transatlantic bond is a guarantee of our freedom. We in Europe have a relationship with the United States which has stood the test of time. […] Thanks, too, to the continued co-operation between Europe and the United States we have managed to guarantee peace and freedom on our continent. The transatlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the current Iraqi regime's persistent attempts to threaten world security. In today's world, more than ever before, it is vital that we preserve that unity and cohesion.".[39]

In addition to the first letter, nine out of ten countries of the so-called "Vilnius 10" group sent a similar statement to the White House, which was later publicly published on 5 February 2003.[40] Following the publication of the letters, the US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld labelled the faction supporting the US call for a collective intervention in Iraq "New Europe", and the other one "Old Europe".[41]

"You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the centre of gravity is shifting to the east and there are a lot of new members. The vast numbers of other countries in Europe, they're not with France and Germany, they're with the United States.".[42]

When compared to European divisions in the political realm, public opinion surveys the EU commissioned – the Eurobarometer – showed a tendency for the citizens in Europe to agree on specific topics.

When expressing their opinion over issues such as the role of the United States within the Transatlantic partnership and as an international actor, war, and the EU defence, citizens in Europe gave interesting responses. The Flash Eurobarometer 114 on the "International Crisis", issued in November 2001 to collect individuals' perceptions of the 9/11 attacks against the United States, showed a European civil society that favoured indirect support to the US troops asking for a quick response against Afghanistan. As the propaganda behind the American intervention in Afghanistan was different from the one promoting a pre-emptive attack against Iraq, the societal responses were different. What is still relevant in the answers given through this survey is the subject of the preferences of the

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[39] "Leaders' statement on Iraq: Full text", *BBC News*, online version, 30.01.2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2708877.stm (accessed 23.04.2022)

[40] "Eastern Europe: Do Citizens of Vilnius 10 Support Action Against Iraq, Or Only Their Governments?", *RadioFreeEurope*, 07.02.2003, available at https://www.rferl.org/a/1102167.html (accessed 23.04.2022)

[41] J. Springford, "'Old' and 'New' Europeans United: Public Attitudes Towards the Iraq War and US Foreign Policy." *Brief of the Centre for European Reform,* London, 2003, pp. 1 - 7

[42] "Anger at Rumsfeld attack on "old Europe"", *The Guardian*, online version, 24.01.2003, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jan/24/germany.france (accessed 23.04.2022)

"EU action" as a direct response to the threat terrorism represented. With obvious differences depending on the nationality, agreement over options such as "preventing the extension of the current conflict", "humanitarian assistance", and "support restoration of democracy in Afghanistan" was almost overwhelming. The issues highlighted in the survey were, as Habermas will note in his manifesto published two years later, the problem of European collective defence and external action against the dangers of transnational terrorism.[43]

In 2002, as the political debate on European support for the war in Iraq caused massive repercussions on the unity of the EU, the Eurobarometer focused also on the role of the United States "when it comes to peace in the world, the fight against terrorism, the growth of the world economy, the fight against poverty in the world and the protection of the environment.". The resulting data showed that EU citizens were critical of the US and its role to address contemporary challenges.[44]

In a Worldviews survey commissioned between June and July 2002, information recollected shows that despite differences in national political stances, citizens in both France and the United Kingdom supported a potential US war in Iraq, while German citizens were quite consistent in voicing their opposition. Overall, many responses in all six previously mentioned countries were in favour of the US plan in Iraq.[45]

The more concrete the possibility of a conflict became, the more the percentages in favour of the US war in Iraq dropped: in December 2002, most citizens in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany answered "no" to the question poll "Are you in favour of a war in Iraq?". With an unmatched renewed interest in political issues, European global civil society started to strongly oppose national support for the invasion on both political and moral grounds.

In Europe, politics and civil society did not always go hand in hand during the debate on a possible US war in Iraq. If initially French public opinion and national politics clashed – with French President Jacques Chirac insisting on suspending official support to the United States in the war against Iraq until the final UNSC decision on the subject and

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[43] See Flash Eurobarometer 114: "Europeans and the International Crisis", November 2001 – November 2001, available at https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/31 (accessed 19.06.2022)
[44] See Standard Eurobarometer 58 – Autumn 2002, Fieldwork: Oct. – Nov. 2002, available at https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/331 (accessed 19.06.2022)
[45] H. Jun, "The European Public's Decision on the War in Iraq: Differences among the EU Member States.", *International Area Review*, 2009, pp. 45-63.

French citizens supporting the US war – in early February polls showed that a high majority of French citizens changed their minds and joined the February 15th demonstration in Paris. In the United Kingdom, British Prime Minister Tony Blair – who supported US President George W. Bush from the very beginning – initially had the support of his citizens, but the protest in London and Glasgow was one of the most participated demonstrations his country had ever seen.[46] In Italy, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi frequently showed and proved Italian political support to the US President and his administration while in Rome, 3 million protesters participated in the largest pacifist demonstration in the Italian country.[47]

While in Europe not always official politics reflected society, the social debate provoked unprecedented problems to the US image abroad, unleashing the worst wave of "Anti-Americanism" in a very long time. The Second War in Iraq fundamentally damaged the historically stable favourable attitude towards the United States and US foreign policy.[48] BBC European Affairs analyst William Horsley reported how an early-February 2003 poll found most of the German public opinion as seeing the United States of America – and not the regime of Saddam Hussein - as a much more dangerous peril to world peace. Polls even showed that 57% of Germans thought the USA was a "nation of warmongers".[49]

The decisions of the Bush administration concerning the war in Iraq determined the future of Transatlantic relations especially from society's perspective, with the European civil society asking for Europe to distance itself from the USA:

> "Majorities in five of seven NATO countries surveyed support a more independent relationship with the US on diplomatic and security affairs. Fully three-quarters in France (76%), and solid majorities in Turkey (62%), Spain (62%), Italy (61%), and Germany (57%) believe Western Europe should take a more independent approach than it has in the past".[50]

Unfortunately, public opinion surveys showed only a partial picture of the national stance of European citizens, but the data collected still gives us interesting results. There exists

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[46] Rafeek, Bartie and Young, "Scotland and' The Coalition for Justice Not War' March, Glasgow, 15 February 2003.", *Oral History*, 2004, pp. 73-85.

[47] D. Della Porta et al., "No to the war", p. 200

[48] Thompson, Alexander. *Channels of power*. Cornell University Press, 2010.

[49] "Polls finds Europeans oppose Iraq war", *BBC News*, 11.02.2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2747175.stm (accessed 29.12.2021)

[50] See Pew Research Center, *Views of A Changing World 2003*, 3.06.2003, available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2003/06/03/views-of-a-changing-world-2003/ (accessed 29.12.2021)

plenty of information on the subject because no previous international conflicts ever had been so extensively covered through polls in terms of questions asked and topics discussed. Polling on the second Iraq War surpassed - by far - those of the 1991 Gulf War, which was previously called the "mother of all polling events".[51]

Data showed a dynamic situation, as European public opinion varied greatly over time showing national differences. In six European countries – the United Kingdom, Poland, Italy, the Netherlands, France, and Germany – public opinion surveys showed inconsistency on two main elements: different answers depended mostly on whether a potential US war in Iraq was with or without national military support and on the European perception of the approaching war. Public opinion polls conducted before the effective beginning of the war have been extensively used to properly understand the sentiment that the "European public sphere" – as Habermas called the European civil society as a whole – felt towards potential European support to the Bush administration in Iraq.

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[51] P. Everts and P. Isernia, "Trends: The war in Iraq.", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 2005, p. 264.

Chapter 2

Framing the Bush Doctrine: Promoting the "American" Democracy

1. Democracy or Democracies?

The numerous challenges that democracy faced during the centuries led to different adaptations of the term to the modern form of government.

From ancient Greece's "polis" to the contemporary nation-state, the historical, economic, and geopolitical specifics of each country rendered it more and more laborious to label a country as "democratic" in the Greek definition of *dēmokratia,* meaning "rule of" or "rule by" the people.[52] The idea and conception of "democracy" changed through time, acquiring new meanings as the global context evolved.

For Western countries, democracy today means "liberal democracy": a political system that has "free and fair elections, the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property".[53]

From the 1970s, the United States sponsored the promotion of democracy as the main strategy of foreign policy.

The set of the policies forming George W. Bush's doctrine, especially those aimed at battling terrorism as a response to the 9/11 attacks, focused on the importance of directly and indirectly supporting change in the form of government in Middle Eastern countries. The rhetoric and campaign for the future US war in Iraq stressed the urgency of the plan. The resulting American foreign policies of democratic promotion abroad met with the partial political opposition in Europe – especially from France and Germany - and an unprecedented hostility from the European civil society.

The societal response to the possibility of a pre-emptive war highlighted a change in both the cultural influence in Europe and the Transatlantic partnership. Furthermore, the European perception of the United States' strategy as "exporting" rather than "promoting" democracy underlined different conceptions of democratic values, putting

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[52] *"democracy"*, Britannica Official Web Site, available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/democracy (accessed 31.05.2022)

[53] F. Zakaria, *The future of freedom: illiberal democracy at home and abroad (Revised Edition)*, WW Norton & company, 2007, p. 15

into question the cultural assumption of approval of the Western political elites on what "democracy" is. To better understand the reasons behind the European social sentiment, I will define the theory, the terms, and the resulting application of the "American" democracy in the contemporary world.

To do so, I will paint a brief introductory picture of how democracy acquired different meanings through time, beginning from ancient Greece to the modern conception of democracy as an idea rather than a specific form of government. This will allow me to introduce liberal democracy and values as the democracy of the West. I will try to identify "market democracy" as the ultimate version of the American democracy to highlight a possible gap between the European and the American conception of democracy.

The second level of my analysis will focus on how the democratic American ideology and rhetoric impacted US strategy towards the Middle East, and why the American-sponsored war against Iraq in 2003 fuelled the social debate against the "promotion" – or rather "export" as the strategy was perceived in Europe – of democracy.

2. A brief history of democracy to identify the modern American democracy

Democracy arose from tyrannic governments in ancient Greece. The popular participation in the political life and decision-making processes was restricted to a limited elitist group of individuals rich enough to have free time, while women and foreigners were marginalized and had no say in the matter.[54] Despite the historical data proving the existence of fundamental flaws, nowadays ancient Greece is still perceived as the cradle of democracy, as it is one of the earliest examples of the "rule by the people" form of government.

Since Greece's "polis", the preoccupation of national political elites with geopolitical issues made the development of democratic countries challenging. European and Asian empires, with few exceptions, were more focused on expanding their commercial routes and markets rather than discussing civil and political rights for all.[55] The transition from empires to nation-states, and then to the democratic form of governments, took a very long time.

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[54]J.P. Euben. "Democracy ancient and modern.", *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 1993, pp. 478-481.
[55] J. Diamond, *Guns, germs and steel: a short history of everybody for the last 13,000 years*, New York and London, Random House, 2013, pp. 283 – 333

Civil and political rights came with what we now call "democratization processes", or as Huntington called them, "waves" of democratization. The "wave of democratization" phenomenon is defined as a series of transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes concentrated in a well-defined period. It has interested the United States as late as the 19th century when the US government granted its citizens the right to vote (even if only to white males, who constituted most US citizens). By 1918, the world counted 29 democratic countries. Huntington indicated other two "waves" that led countries to extend the right to vote to a larger part of the national population: the second one coincided with the end of the Second World War to 1962, and the third one lasted from the 1970s to the end of the 20th century.[56] A more recent definition of "democratization" is the one Charles Tilly presented. His model considers fundamental for the actuation of a regime change toward democracy three fundamental processes: the integration of interpersonal trust networks into the political sphere, the detachment of the latter from category inequalities, and the reduction of coercive autonomous power centres.[57] If "democratization" happens when these processes take place, then "de-democratization" occurs when the state moves in the opposite direction.

Especially in the modern era, the changes in society, political, and economic systems entailed a fundamental shift from participatory to representative democracy.
One of the major historical events marking a fundamental transformation of its common definition is to be found in the French Revolution began in 1789, when the Enlightenment ideal of "popular sovereignty" contributed to the concept of "voting by head" and not "by class".[58] During those years, democracy became associated with the support and promotion of "universal" human rights. This idea attracted 17th and 18th-century philosophers to debate on the "universal human rationality" as the pre-conception enabling individuals to agree on common moral rules and accept to live by them.[59] Another relevant event is the American independence of 1776 and the impact it had on democratic theories in Europe: Alexis de Tocqueville saw in the newly born US the possibility of creating a new democratic government largely inspired by the Greek system

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[56] S.P. Huntington, *The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press,* 1991, pp. 15 - 26

[57] C. Tilly, *Democracy*. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007. pp. 252 - 253

[58] C. Hobson, *The rise of democracy: Revolution, war, and transformations in international politics since 1776.*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2015, pp. 82 - 83

[59] L. Sanford, *Democracy: History, theory, practice*, New York, Routledge, 2018, pp. 30- 31

but perfected. He wrote that in America, he saw "the image of democracy itself", even though slavery still existed in the United States.[60] Philosophers such as Jan-Jacques Rousseau, John Locke, Benjamin Constant, and John Stuart Mill played a fundamental role in the identification of what scholars called "democratic theories", which provided us with a "classical" categorization of democracy.[61] Political philosophy massively contributed to a partial classification, helping us to distinguish and catalogue the "thousand" definitions.[62] These theories highlighted a theoretical attempt at interpreting and identifying the "worthy" democratic model countries should tend to. It would be interesting to underline that even if ancient Greece, 18th century France, and the newly born USA are still practical models of democratic improvements, none of those national situations fit in the contemporary ideals of popular sovereignty and promotion of human rights for all.

In the contemporary world democracy is no longer "just" a form of government, but rather a "way of life".[63] Because of that, each nation can potentially adapt it to a country's characteristics. As already stated, this entailed numerous difficulties in properly defining what modern and contemporary nation-states meant as "democracy", and consequently how political leaders embarked on social propaganda promoting democratic values and principles.

The contemporary challenges of democratic theory relied on how to justify modern political practices to classic democratic values.[64] Even today, "rule by the people" in democratic forms of governments does not mean "direct" participatory democracy, but it still supports the general idea of a democratic government because of the active participation to elections as the most exhaustive proof of social involvement in modern political decisions. The problem arose with the rise in the number of democracies in the West.

"Contemporary" conceptions of democratic theory – the so-called field of the "empirical" democratic theory - accused the classical theorization of being "detached" from reality.

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[60] See the introduction to A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America: And two essays on America*, Penguin UK, 2003

[61] For a general background on "classical" political philosophers and their contribution to the issue of "who should rule" and "the place of liberty" see J. Wolff, *An introduction to political philosophy*, New York, American Chemical Society, 2006, pp. 34 - 132

[62] M. Rejai, "The metamorphosis of democratic theory." *Ethics*, 1967, pp. 202-208.

[63] T. Jacobsen, "Primitive democracy in ancient Mesopotamia.", *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, 1943, pp. 159-172.

[64] D.C. Paris, "Fact, Theory, and Democratic Theory.", *Western Political Quarterly*, 1987, pp. 215-236.

Following the reasoning behind the contemporary democratic theory, scholars claimed that history itself proved the impossibility of the existence of a democratic form of government conceived as the "government of the people", or at least with the contemporary characteristics of the nations.[65] Nevertheless, democratic theorists aimed at diminishing the gap between the "classical" conception of democratic values and objective political actions.[66]

Nowadays, we can technically define modern democracy as:

> "a system of government in which leaders are chosen in competitive elections, where many parties and candidates participate and where opposition parties can attain power if they gain popular support. […] Together with elections, democracies are characterized by their protection of the human and civil rights of their citizens.".[67]

This definition is certainly a contemporary one because it considers new elements and an updated definition of democracy.

When talking about modern democracy in the United States, and in general about democratic values in the West, "democracy" is implicitly associated with the term "liberal".[68] The assumption that liberal democracy is the contemporary form of democracy in the West helps us frame the set of US foreign policies in the Middle East now known as the Bush Doctrine.

During George W. Bush's campaign to "promote democracy", the democratic values and institutions that Bush's foreign policy set to "export" had a precise meaning that the American political culture took for granted which theoretically justified the pre-emptive war in Iraq. The political debate that the US plan provoked highlighted a new contemporary discrepancy between the American idea of democracy as a set of values and the one perceived in Europe. To properly understand the reasons behind the net refusal of the European civil society of the American intentions for Iraq, I will define the idea of democracy promoted in the United States.

The triumph of Western democracy and Western democratic values after the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a theoretical classification of Transatlantic democracy as "liberal

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[65] M. Rejai, "The metamorphosis of democratic theory.", *Ethics*, pp. 202 - 208

[66] D.C. Paris, "Fact, Theory, and Democratic Theory.", *Western Political Quarterly*, 1987, p. 216

[67] For a general theoretical definition of the modern democratic state see K. Newton, and J.W Van Deth, *Foundations of comparative politics: democracies of the modern world*, Cambridge University Press, 2016.

[68] Thigpen, Robert B. "Liberalism & Democracy: A Relationship under Strain." *Polity*, 1986, pp. 733-743.

democracy".[69] In its American and European forms, liberal democracy translated into a form of government with free and fair elections, separation of powers, and the rule of law. Together with these technical elements, it also preaches the protection of civil and human rights such as freedom of property, speech, assembly, and religion.[70] These freedoms derive from Western history and can be identified as "constitutional liberalism", a term that connects the liberal idea of individual liberty with the importance of the rule of law in political decisions.[71]

At first, the so-called "common political tradition of modern Western culture" was a limited triumph that impacted a small portion of the American and European societies. Modern democratic elements such as public education, freedom of the press, and public transportation came later, with the globalization phenomenon which partially unified the Western world and its values.[72] Countries labelled as liberal democracies valued liberal policies and ideas supported by institutional bodies, with citizens actively participating in the political life through regular fair elections. The "positive" element of liberal policies in democratic political practices is that liberals value individualism and individuals' interests in a social framework of freedom and equality.[73] In a modern Western democracy, liberal policies translated into full support of individuals' choices and freedoms on both political and economic issues, in order to guarantee a "just" system.[74] The protection of the liberties of all citizens is commonly taken for granted, even though this aspect is relatively new within the conception of democracy.

Another aspect of liberal democracy is its "missionary roots", which emphasized the religious elements – especially the influence of Conversionary Protestants - behind the framing of democratic arguments such as the "limitations of state power, political pluralism, and electoral reform".[75] Along with the religious aspect, already-existing

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[69] K. Newton, and J.W. Van Deth, *Foundations of comparative politics: democracies of the modern world*, Cambridge University Press, 2016, pp. 58 – 64

[70] F. Zakaria, "The rise of illiberal democracy.", *Foreign Aff.*, 1997, p. 22

[71] F. Zakaria, *The future of freedom: illiberal democracy at home and abroad (Revised Edition)*, WW Norton & company, 2007, p. 15

[72] C Dawson. "The Birth of Democracy." *The Review of Politics*, 1957, pp. 48-61.

[73] J.M. Owen, "How liberalism produces democratic peace.", *Realism Reader*, Routledge, pp. 2014. 292-300.

[74] J.W. Meiser "Introducing liberalism in international relations theory.", *E-International Relations*, 2018, available at https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/18/introducing-liberalism-in-international-relations-theory/ (accessed 20.05.2022)

[75] R.D. Woodberry, "The missionary roots of liberal democracy.", *American political science review*, 2012, pp. 244-274.

democratic countries considered liberal democracy as the "worthiest" form of government, at least from a moral perception.[76]

When we analyse Western democracies in the light of liberalism, we must also take into consideration market and capitalism.[77] As soon as globalization eased the opening of the markets on a global scale, scholars frequently juxtaposed democracy to the economy of the markets.[78] In the words of Joseph Schumpeter, "modern democracy is essentially a capitalist phenomenon.".[79]

The coexistence of democratic forms of government and capitalism had been made easier during the post-Cold War years, with the global triumph of Western ideological values: during that era, the triumphalist conception of liberal democracy – the "pillar of the capitalist political order" - and the free-market economy were perceived as the "right formula" to implement to successfully reach economic and social growth.[80] The market in liberal democracies guaranteed freedom, and for this reason, the government had to allow it to effectively function using political institutions.[81] The strict connection between democracy and capitalism in the contemporary era made political failures linked to economic crisis inevitable, such as the one the international community experienced during the Great Recession.[82]

The "political shift" of capitalism became even more evident with the rise of neoliberalism as an economic response to the failure of Keynesianism. As the neoliberal policies took hold of Western democracies and political stances, they resulted in a slightly different conception of the free market with economic decisions and actions being not subordinated to any governmental institution.[83] Due to the end of the great economic growth of the years following the Second World War and to the expanding nation's capitalist scope on an international field to lift the economy out of the recession of the 1970s, neoliberal ideology invaded the economic and political fields of first the

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[76] A. Hacker, "Liberal democracy and social control.", *American Political Science Review*, 1957, pp. 1009-1026.

[77] S. L. Elkin. "Market and politics in liberal democracy.", 1982, pp. 720-732.

[78] U. Hoffmann-Lange, *The model of liberal democracy and varieties of capitalism*, 2011, pp. 97 - 114

[79] See citation of J.A. Schumpeter, "Capitalism.", *Socialism and democracy*, n. 3, 1942 in J.E. Elliott "Joseph A. Schumpeter and the theory of democracy." *Review of Social Economy*, 1994, p. 282

[80] X. Li, "The market-democracy conundrum." *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 2001, pp. 75-94.

[81] A.I. Vázquez-Arroyo, "Liberal democracy and neoliberalism: A critical juxtaposition.", *New Political Science* 30.2, 2008, pp. 127-159.

[82] U. Hoffmann-Lange, *The model of liberal democracy,* pp. 110 - 114

[83] X. Li, "The market-democracy conundrum." *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 2001, pp. 79 - 80

Transatlantic Partnership and then Latin America .[84] By the 1980s, it already influenced political and international decisions within the American administration. Neoliberalism is not only an economic ideology, but it also presented an "agenda" for a better restructuring of capitalist economies. To complete it, ex-liberal democratic countries needed updated institutions favouring the market. Especially in the United States, neoliberalism benefited enormously from the "depoliticized framework" that liberal democracy previously built.[85] In particular, international relations theories showed how impactful capitalist processes were in determining contemporary American politics, underlining a sort of "compatibility" between US "liberal democracy" and "capitalism".[86] US neoliberal policies aimed to diminish government control over the market and give more power to the private sector and private individuals over economic choices, enhancing free-market competition and protecting citizens' rights such as human rights but also as active agents in the market.[87]

In the 1980s, neoliberal policies massively impacted US national government and US foreign policies: at home, the Reagan administration led the country to institutional changes, while "pressuring" national states within the international community to do the same. Political elites in the United States embraced neoliberalism as the "market-compatible kind of democracy", unknowingly paving the way for a new political, economic, and moral theory: neoconservatism.[88]

Today, the American "market democracy" is what essentially defines the final combination of market neoliberalism and democracy.[89] Scholars advocated for it by claiming that the market historically allowed to create a space for civil rights to prosper. A clear example is that capitalist processes helped the surge of a middle working class interested in intervening against the state for the sake of their political, social, and economic rights. In their perception, this larger civil participation – as a democratic element - directly derived from the development of the market in the contemporary era.[90]

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[84] A.J. Ayers., and A. Saad-Filho, "Democracy against neoliberalism: Paradoxes, limitations, transcendence.", *Critical Sociology*, 2015, pp. 597-618.
[85] A.I. Vázquez-Arroyo, "Liberal democracy and neoliberalism: A critical juxtaposition.", *New Political Science* 30.2, 2008, pp. 127-159.
[86] D. Kuo. "Comparing America: Reflections on democracy across subfields.", *Perspectives on Politics*, 2019, 788-800.
[87] J. Bockman "Neoliberalism.", *Contexts*, 2013, pp 14-15.
[88] C. Crouch, D. della Porta, and W. Streeck. "Democracy in neoliberalism?", *Anthropological Theory*, 2016, pp. 497-512.
[89] X. Li, "The market-democracy conundrum.", pp. 75-94.
[90] M. McIntosh, et al., "Publics meet market democracy in Central and East Europe, 1991-1993.", *Slavic Review*, 1994, pp. 483-512.

From a rhetorical perspective, the existence of an "American democracy" conceived as a "market democracy" can also be found in the political language. The speeches US Presidents publicly held frequently associated the term "democracy" with the term "market". On January 25th, 1988, Ronald Reagan claimed before a joint session of the Congress on the State of the Union:

> "Today America is strong, and democracy is everywhere on the move. From Central America to East Asia, ideas like free markets and democratic reforms and human rights are taking hold.".[91]

In 1990, President George H.W. Bush declared:

> "Here in our own hemisphere, it is time for all the peoples of the Americas, North and South, to live in freedom. In the Far East and Africa, it's time for the full flowering of free governments and free markets that have served as the engine of progress. It's time to offer our hand to the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe so that continent -- for too long a continent divided -- can see a future whole and free. It's time to build on our new relationship with the Soviet Union, to endorse and encourage a peaceful process of internal change toward democracy and economic opportunity.".[92]

In 1993, Bill Clinton proclaimed:

> "The cause of peace is linked to the need for inclusive and lasting economic growth that gives more and more people a stake in stability and a voice in decisions that affect their lives. America's interest in enlarging the world's community of market democracies is echoed in the Preamble of the UN Charter, which calls for social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.".[93]

These speeches seem to prove that from the Reagan administration, the concept of "market democracy" relied on the assumption that democracy and free-market capitalism were strictly linked and, therefore, the strategy of democracy promotion in the US politics rhetorical language aimed at suggesting a certain order with certain political and economic characteristics as fundamental for the promotion of democracy abroad.

In a hegemonic – and nuclear – nation-state such as the United States of America, the interconnectedness between rhetoric language, and policy campaigning was inevitable to

[91] American Presidency Project, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-congress-the-state-the-union-0 (accessed 29.05.2022)

[92] American Presidency Project, available at: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-state-the-union-2 (accessed 29.05.2022)

[93] American Presidency Project, available at: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-6618-united-nations-day-1993 (accessed 29.05.2022)

legitimize the rationalization and justification of military interventions and use of force.[94] During those administrations, it reinforced the American "political culture" visioning the Unites States as the only capable actor to cover the hegemonic role within the international community.[95]

For a century, liberalism and democracy have been considered the latter as the natural continuation of the former. On the other hand, contemporary challenges showed that they are no longer entirely compatible once democracy has been pushed to the extremes of mass democracy.[96] The most recent adaptation of liberal democracy and the globalization of its values highlighted numerous flaws such as the democratic deficit, social and economic inequalities, and partial limitation on individual liberties.[97]

As a "flawed" liberal democracy developed, alternatives to liberal democracy started to enjoy an important revival: for instance, participatory democracy and deliberative democracy became the focus of social demands for a more equal global society.[98] The civic participation encompassed the national borders as peace movements coordinated demonstrations through means that travelled cross-border. Even before the global protests of February 15th, 2003, the now known as the "movement of movements" paved the way to new reasoning over a new possible shaping of the world and the international world order. The collective slogan "a new world is possible" referred to the need for an efficient and morally appropriate alternative to the economic and social model proposed.[99]

On one hand, knowing the kind of democracy helps us identify what the United States intended to do with the "promotion of democracy" counterterrorism strategy in Iraq. On the other, it is useful to note that liberal democracy, especially now, has been extremely challenged. This ideological, social, and political situation caused important repercussions on the debate on democracy in Europe.

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[94] B.C. Taylor, "'The means to match their hatred': nuclear weapons, rhetorical democracy, and presidential discourse.", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 2007, pp. 667-692.

[95] J. Monten. "The roots of the Bush doctrine: Power, nationalism, and democracy promotion in US strategy.", *International Security*, 2005, pp. 112-156.

[96] N. Bobbio. *The future of democracy: a defence of the rules of the game*. University of Minnesota Press, 1987, pp. 133 - 137

[97] B. de Sousa Santos, "Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre: toward a redistributive democracy." *Politics & society* 26.4 (1998, pp. 461-510.

[98] C. Pateman, "Participatory democracy revisited." *Perspectives on politics,* 2012, pp. 7-19.

[99] M. Franco, "Genova 2001 vent'anni dopo: un altro mondo è (ancora) necessario)", *MicroMega*, 8.07.2021, available at "https://www.micromega.net/genova-2001-ventanni-dopo-un-altro-mondo-e-ancora-necessario/

3. Everything on the Bush Doctrine

The US foreign policy under the Bush administration resulted from years of American beliefs, ideological stances, economic theories, and contemporary problems.

Even before 9/11, Bush's campaign drew certain ideological elements from past US administrations: it took inspiration from a heartfelt patriotism often leading to the right, the perception of the universality and the "rightness" of American principles, and the already-mentioned elements of liberal democracy and neo-conservative policies.[100]

The change that George W. Bush promised to bring to his country was – at the first stage of his presidency – to reaffirm the role of the United States within the international community without continuing the "international social work" of the Clinton administration.[101] In his 2000 slogan "Compassionate Conservatism", the future US President underlined his intentions on highlighting the benefits of capitalist conservatism in a country with limited government control over the market.[102] Another campaign slogan the Bush team used was "real plans for real people", a tactic of "rhetorical populism" envisaging plans for a more nationally centred strategy.[103]

President Bush showed little concern for international issues, with a partial interest in Russia, China, and the Middle East and how to deal with those states that did not embrace the American free market.[104]

After his election, US President George W. Bush did plan on continuing with a more isolationist approach.

Then, 9/11 happened, and the focus of US foreign policy completely shifted from "cautious realism" to the ideological and moral project of "ending tyranny in the world" through the "restructuring of terrorist countries".[105]

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[100] C. Hobson, "A forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East: US democracy promotion and the 'war on terror'.", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 2005, pp. 39-53.

[101] J. Rielly, "The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Legacy.", *Politique américaine* n. 3, 2008, pp. 73-86.

[102] T. Porter, "The winning slogan from every US Presidential campaign since 1948.", *Business Insider*, 2019, available at: https://www.businessinsider.com/every-winning-slogan-from-us-presidential-campaigns-1948-2016-2019-5?r=US&IR=T (accessed 15.05.2022)

[103] "The "Real People's Choice", *The Washington Post*, 15.09.2000, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2000/09/15/the-real-peoples-choice/48fa3ce1-e3b3-4a67-a896-78b5c12a75ac/ (accessed 15.05.2022)

[104] M.P. Leffler, "9/11 in retrospect: George W. Bush's grand strategy, reconsidered." *Foreign Affairs*, 2011, pp. 33-44.

[105] P.H. Gordon, "The end of the Bush revolution.", *Foreign Affairs,* 85, 2006, pp. 75.

The hegemonic status the United States boasted before and during the Bush II presidency faced a challenge in terms of strength and influence over the international community, but the changes the world was experiencing – also due to the globalization process – did not prevent the US from embarking on a "culturally" justified war aimed at remodelling the international system "after its own image".[106] The set of the policies put in place rested on four pillars:

> "a strong belief in the importance of a state's domestic regime in determining its foreign policy and the related judgment that this is an opportune time to transform international politics; the perception of great threats that can be defeated only by new and vigorous policies, most notably preventive war; a willingness to act unilaterally when necessary; and, as both a cause and a summary of these beliefs, an overriding sense that peace and stability require the United States to assert its primacy in world politics.".[107]

This set of US policies determined it as a "security doctrine" aiming at preserving national stability through the annihilation of external threats. From a historical point of view, American security doctrines stressed defensive and ideological elements which provided both the identification of the problem and its solution. Researcher Roxanne Sjöstedt described them as a

> "Publicly expressed set of statements regarding the constitution of the international system, the own state's role within that system, and how the system and the state are subjected to a threat.".[108]

Security doctrines in the United States provided the executive power with a set of actions in the agenda of US foreign policy. To reach the goal set by the Bush agenda, the Bush administration preferred to focus on a more unilateral approach within international organizations, always actively exploiting the American position of strength in both military and economic capacity. The Bush administration had to internationally prove that the planned unilateralist strategy was not just words during a campaign: at the beginning of 2002, the budget of the military increased by 48 billion American dollars, the US officials declared that they no longer opposed a necessary nuclear attack against non-

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[106] J. Pass, *American hegemony in the 21st century: A neo–Neo-Gramscian perspective*, New York and London, Routledge, 2019, p. 54
[107] R. Jervis, "Understanding the Bush doctrine." *Political science quarterly*, 2003, pp. 365-388.
[108] R. Sjöstedt, "The discursive origins of a doctrine: Norms, identity, and securitization under Harry S. Truman and George W. Bush.", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2007, pp. 233-254.

nuclear countries, and the American military secured its on-field presence in strategic territories in Eurasia.

The US rhetoric of pre-emptive and justified war aimed at expanding the goal of the "war on terror" to also include those states sponsoring terrorism, in order to have a public clear "enemy" to address. This strategy entailed the dehumanization of political leaders as the perpetrators of atrocities in their own countries, helping American citizens to better identify the object of the pre-emptive war. In the bigger picture the Bush presidency presented, rhetoric aimed at deflecting attention from the fact that the United States intended to embark on war first.[109] The frequent use of hyperbolic rhetoric codified specific terms to address specific audiences. In particular, the Bush administration called for the support of Christian right-wing groups: the public leader of al Qaida bin Laden was elevated to the role of "Satan", generating horror in the eyes of those drawing from that kind of mythology.[110]

Aside from the "religious" terminology, to justify initiating a pre-emptive war against Iraq meant - in rhetorical terms – to render the attack "just" on a moral level. The Reagan administration's support for "freedom fighters" against the advance of Communism already shaped American public opinion on potential US foreign conflicts, and the framing of the 2003 war in Iraq massively exploited the already-existing rhetoric, eventually connecting 9/11 with Iraq as the "enemy" to end.[111]

Political and economic ideologies played an essential role in establishing US foreign policy under the Bush presidency. The "heavy" ideological aspects associated with the "security" approach were perceived even within the same Bush administration as "dangerously ideological". The same assumptions were extremely transcendental in the tones and rhetoric, making it challenging to properly grasp the meaning and justification of a plan of democracy promotion in the Middle East and the North Africa region.[112]

The rhetoric the Bush administration put in place to justify US foreign policy before and after 9/11 not only highlighted the never-ending relevancy of American patriotism in US policy but also contributed to making the association of the terms "freedom" and "liberal

[109] C. Winkler, "Parallels in preemptive war rhetoric: Reagan on Libya; Bush 43 on Iraq.", *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, 2007, pp. 303-334.
[110] D Kellner, "Bushspeak and the politics of lying: presidential rhetoric in the "war on terror".", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 2007, pp. 622-645.
[111] A. Gershkoff, and S. Kushner, "Shaping public opinion: The 9/11-Iraq connection in the Bush administration's rhetoric.", *Perspectives on Politics*, 2005, pp. 525-537.
[112] H, Oz, "Bush's freedom agenda: ideology and the democratization of the Middle East.", *Democracy and Security*, 2008, pp. 268-289.

tradition" logical in the common American culture. The ideological foundation leading the Bush administration can be traced back to the political and ideological influences of Ronald Reagan when during the 1980s, right-wing populists and the neo-conservatives members inside the administration formed a particular alliance based on a shared national and religious devotion. Together with this aspect, both parties agreed on the importance of maintaining the market free from the state's control. The resulting "American political culture" heavily impacted Bush's campaign before and after the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.[113]

In the modern United States, the neoliberal and neoconservatism ideologies overlapped in certain aspects such as the undermining of civil freedoms and the rule of law to favour governmental decisions based on both "market criteria" and "state power". According to these ideologies, the legitimization of the state is limited to its moral side, as a plan to invest the US government with a virtuous element. This approach heavily undermines the American liberal democracy, restricting its modern values of "equity" and "liberty".[114] The focal point of the justification strategy was on the "novelty" element of the supposed war terrorism had declared on "freedom". The reasoning behind the highlighting of this element relied on the fact that if the war was different from the conflicts the US had ever experienced, also the answer had to be different.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Bush called New York City Mayor and Governor to express his solidarity, talking about a "new kind of war":

> "But make no mistake about it, my resolve is steady and strong about winning this war that has been declared on America. It's a new kind of war. And I understand it's a new kind of war. And this Government will adjust. And this Government will call others to join us, to make sure this act— these acts—the people who conducted these acts and those who harbor them are held accountable for their actions.".[115]

In hindsight, the re-direction of the Bush doctrine towards a "war on terror" was already evident with the use of the verb "adjust".

In October 2001, President Bush underlined again the concepts of "just war" and "novelty" element of the danger the USA was facing:

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[113] M. Brenner, "The European Union, The United States &'Liberal Imperialism'.", 2005, p. 27.
[114] W. Brown, "American nightmare: Neoliberalism, neoconservatism, and de-democratization.", *Political theory*, 2006, pp. 690-714
[115] The American Presidency Project, available at: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-telephone-conversation-with-new-york-city-mayor-rudolph-w-giuliani-and-new-york

> "I want there to be justice. I want there to be justice. And it's Al Qaida, but it's anybody who feeds Al Qaida, who houses Al Qaida, who encourages Al Qaida. Any other terrorist organization that is affiliated with Al Qaida is just as guilty, as far as I'm concerned. We're very patient people. The American people understand, and I know that the Chancellor understands, that this is a different kind of war.".[116]

At the social level, the Bush administration had to convince American citizens of the "rightness" of the war, especially after the failure of Vietnam.

The rhetoric used connected the war and the concepts of "war on terror", "responding to a national threat", and "humanitarian intervention" against Saddam Hussein, massively contributing to a general consent for the conflict.[117] The positive cultural and social response of American citizens was effective mostly because of the work the Bush administration conducted on the political language to link 9/11 with the need of attacking Iraq, shifting the potential blame on the United States.[118] Thanks to rhetoric, in the eyes of the public the US was not a belligerent country, but rather a morally invested superpower with the "responsibility" to "bring freedom" to the other countries.[119]

Through the wording of the Bush doctrine and the public expression and political campaign the Bush administration led before and after the war against Iraq, Bush successfully convinced his citizens.

To fully grasp the necessary elements of the European social and philosophical debate of 2002/2003, I will now analyse Bush's campaign to "promote democracy" through US foreign policy in Iraq.

Promoting democracy is a phenomenon that is rooted in the political culture of the United States.[120] This strategy had been at the centre of US foreign policy from 1972 onwards, with different interpretations from one administration to another.[121] Wilsonian "liberal internationalism" stated that US mission was, in fact, "for democracy"; Ronald Reagan and his plan of a "Campaign for Democracy" contributed to the American goal of "global

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[116] The American Presidency Project, available at: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-following-discussions-with-chancellor-gerhard-schroeder-germany-and-exchange-2
[117] Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, "Success matters: Casualty sensitivity and the war in Iraq.", *International security*, 2005, pp. 7-46.
[118] R. Luckhurst, "In War Times: Fictionalizing Iraq." *Contemporary Literature*, 2012, pp. 713-737.
[119] The American Presidency Project, available at: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-national-day-prayer-and-remembrance-service-0
[120] J. Monten, "The roots of the Bush doctrine: Power, nationalism, and democracy promotion in US strategy.", *International Security*, 2005, pp. 112-156.
[121] M.W. Fowler, "A Brief Survey of Democracy Promotion in US Foreign Policy", *Democracy and Security*, 2015, pp. 227-247

democratization" as supporting and funding democratic changes abroad; the Clinton administration planned a "democratic enlargement" focusing on US efforts abroad. For years, the promotion of democracy served to spread American ideals and values, especially those characterizing liberal democracy. Within those American administrations, US foreign policy elites did "fight" to save budget money to promote and support democracy abroad.

A concrete example is the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) founded in 1983, which is a non-profit organization that up till the George W. Bush presidency provided funding and support to help democratic institutions all over the world.[122] In a letter sent to the Westminster Address, President Ronald Reagan rhetorically reaffirmed the importance of US strength within an ideological plan:

> "Our military strength is a prerequisite to peace, but let it be clear we maintain this strength in the hope it will never be used. For the ultimate determinant in the struggle now going on for the world will not be bombs and rockets, but a test of wills and ideas, a trial of spiritual resolve: the values we hold, the beliefs we cherish, the ideals to which we are dedicated.".[123]

What changed during those years was the level of importance given to the strategy.[124]

It is important first to recall how influential the neoconservative ideology had been during the Bush presidency.

Neoconservatism factors that influenced the strategy of democracy promotion are the "vindicationist" sentiment with which the Bush administration justified the use of the whole US power – and even more, with the rise of the military budget – to bring liberal democratic changes abroad.[125] Second, the hegemonic status that the United States experienced during the early 2000s fostered the US feeling of "supremacy" in a unipolar world, fundamentally shaping the sentiments of "aggressiveness" and "excitement" behind the promotion of democracy through power. Third, along with the impact of the Wilsonian "liberal internationalism" on the Doctrine, international relations experts saw in the Bush administration a dormant, but visible American "neo-imperialism", which

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[122] The National Endowment for Democracy Official Web Page. *About the National Endowment for Democracy*, available at https://www.ned.org/about-the-national-endowment-for-democracy/

[123] The National Endowment for Democracy Official Web Page. *Text of President Ronald Reagan's Westminster Address.*, available at: https://www.ned.org/promoting-democracy-and-peace/ (accessed 25.05.2022)

[124] L. Diamond. "Promoting democracy: foreign policy imperative?", *Great Decisions*, 2012, pp. 19-32.

[125] Milne, David. "Intellectualism in US diplomacy: Paul Wolfowitz and his predecessors." *International Journal* 62.3 (2007): 667-680.

transpired through rhetoric and massively contributed to the rising in hostility of the European civil society.[126] I would not go so far as to say that modern democracy is synonymous with imperialism, but modern US foreign policies of democracy promotion rarely stick to the protection of civil rights.[127]

US foreign policy under Bush also had to respond to a direct attack on the nation. After 9/11, democracy promotion acquired the new modern meaning of efficient strategy to combat terrorism. The US campaign promoted the idea that Islamic extremism had been capable of imposing itself over Middle Eastern regimes because of the lack of democratic institutions and a democratic government.[128] The Bush administration identified the rise in religious radicalism as the obstacle to the possibility of growth in economic, social, and political terms, and the United States government under the Bush administration promised to favour a democracy campaign as the only "right" move to counteract terrorism.[129]

As the "promotion of freedom" abroad became an important pillar in contemporary US foreign policy, the controversial concept of "exporting democracy" invaded the political, philosophical, and social debate in Europe.[130]

In Europe, the use of "export" implied an "imposition" of democratic elements from a powerful hegemonic country with ideally illimited military power to another sovereign state. From an ideological standpoint, a country should not force another country to become democratic, especially if the strategy entailed an open and massive potential violation of civil and human rights.

The problem of "democratization" also relied on the absence of a clear academic consensus about what type of reforms a government should promote to support the emergence of democracy. Scholars agree on the fact that for a democratization process to take place, institutional, representative, and functional changes must happen.[131] In particular, institutions are fundamental to the development of democracy because they

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[126] D. Grondin, "Mistaking hegemony for empire: Neoconservatives, the Bush doctrine, and the Democratic empire." *International Journal*, 2006, pp. 227-241.
[127] T.C. Lewellen, "LIBERAL DEMOCRACY." *International Journal on World Peace*, 1991, pp. 17-23.
[128] J. Tures, "The democracy-promotion gap in American public opinion." *Journal of American Studies*, 2007, pp. 557-579.
[129] T. Carothers, "Promoting democracy and fighting terror." *Foreign Affairs.*, 2003, pp. 84.
[130] J.L. Windsor, "Promoting democratization can combat terrorism.", *The Washington Quarterly*, 2003, pp. 43-58.
[131] J. Grugel, ed. *Democracy without borders: Transnationalisation and conditionality in new democracies*. Routledge, 2002.

bear and spread its values and ideals. The same institutions have national specifics dictated by different social characteristics and evolve through time.[132]

Modern Western democracies could be similar as far as it concerned the form of government, but when it comes to the identification of the "liberties" and rights associated with the democratic values, the differences are enhanced. Within the rhetoric surrounding the campaign of the Bush Doctrine, the use of the word "freedom" did not necessarily intend the possibility of freely enjoying individuals' human rights. The rhetorical definition that Bush gave to "human rights" was extremely controversial because the concept was often paired with "free markets" and the protection of "economic freedom". The rationale behind the decision of linking these two terms had its roots in economic ideologies rather than social ones and rendered of the uttermost importance the establishment of a "free market democracy" to properly help foreign countries to regain their social, political, and economic rights.[133]

Democracy promotion could not and did not give the Bush administration the green light to declare war against Saddam Hussein. Even within the administration, it was clear that leaving rhetoric aside, the US moral stance on democracy promotion was just a façade for both the handling of potential direct threats and bigger plans for the "restructuring" of the world.[134]

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a manifestation of the Bush doctrine. How was it implemented in the complexity of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region? Were the strategies of Western liberal democracy in the Middle East the same for the United States and the European Union?

4. Differences and similarities in the American and European contemporary foreign strategy in the Middle East

George W. Bush's campaign for democracy promotion was not a rarity in US foreign policy. The American interests in the Middle East began with the political intentions of a deeper expansion of the US influence at a global level.

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[132] A. Béteille, "The varieties of democracy." *Economic and Political Weekly*, 2013, pp. 33-40.

[133] M.E. Stuckey, and J. Ritter. "George bush, and American democracy." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 2007, pp. 646-666.

[134] M.P. Leffler, "The foreign policies of the George W. Bush administration: Memoirs, history, legacy." *Diplomatic History*, 2013, pp. 190-216.

In particular, the United States–Iraq relations dated back to the first half of the twentieth century, when the then US administration planned to stabilize the Middle East in the context of the tumultuous Arab-Israel war.[135] By 1955, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan joined Iraq in the anti-communism partnership called the "Baghdad Pact".[136] Even as late as the Reagan administration, in 1982 Iraq could not be found in the list of countries supporting terrorism, virtually becoming a US ally.[137]

Before the 9/11 attacks, the initial American project for the Middle East was to cautiously aim to propose the United States as an intermediary for conflicts and disputes. The objective was to eventually consolidate the American role in that part of the world.[138] In Iraq, the US planned to ensure the country as a strategic partner for oil power and exports. As the Middle East region was, in the words of the US Department of State, "changing", it was strategically necessary to "rebuild" the American image. The MENA inhabitants and leaders showed a commonly shared perception of the West as an "imperial" force in the region. In Iraq, the US planned to ensure the country as a strategic partner for oil power and exports.[139]

The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) were two ad-hoc proposals highlighting the strategy of the US administration to sedate social and political chaos reigning in the region, the elements which in the American perception massively contributed to the rise of Islamic extremism. According to the American political elites, the MEPI gradually encouraged structural change while supporting economic and social development in the Middle East.[140]

On the other hand, the GMEI specifically addressed a series of reforms focusing on providing the Arab population with economic opportunities and promoting the building of good governance – as the Americans intended – and democracy through the financing of "democratic institutions" such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The role

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[135] E. Podeh, "Israel and the Arab Peace initiative, 2002–2014: A plausible missed opportunity." *The Middle East Journal*, 2014, pp. 584-603

[136] P. Hahn, "A century of US relations with Iraq.", *Origins*, 2012, available a https://origins.osu.edu/article/century-us-relations-iraq?language_content_entity=en (accessed 29.05.2022)

[137] See National Security Archive, available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/

[138] Aruri, Naseer H., and Fouad M. Moughrabi. "The Reagan Middle East Initiative.", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 1983, pp. 10-30.

[139] A.H. Cordesman, "America's Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf.", *Center for Strategic International Studies*, 2.01.2020, available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf

[140] Official Web Page of the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). *About MEPI*. Available at: https://mepi.state.gov/

of NGOs had two objectives: to regain the trust of Arab citizens, to disguise the involvement of the US in a way that countries of the Middle East could more easily accept it and promote education within the population.[141]

The "antipathy" the United States' political elite felt towards the role and the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq – feeling that in the 1980s had been put aside for the sake of US foreign policy – surfaced during the Gulf War and became evident during the George W. Bush administration, when US strategy shifted from soft to hard power.[142] The "deterrence" strategy used during the conflict in the Persian Gulf in 1990 gave way to a more active approach toward the "undeterrable" leader of Iraq.[143] In the aftermath of the September terrorist attacks on American soil, and as US foreign policy in Iraq shifted to "war on terrorism" as a central issue, the US-Iraq partnership changed.

I have already mentioned the ideological and moral stances of the US foreign policy George W. Bush promoted to "contrast terrorism" and "free" Iraqi citizens from the "tyranny" of Saddam Hussein.[144] Given that "promoting democracy" abroad in American terms meant supporting the possibility of fair competition and free-market even through the transfer of US arms abroad, it will be interesting to analyse how did mentality translate in terms of modern US foreign policy.[145]

In the early 2000s, Iraq represented the "main resistance" to the unilateral position of the United States and the American plan in the Middle East: for the Bush administration, radical Islamism was the principal concern outside of the US, and a not-to-be-missed opportunity to use America's exceptional power and re-establish US position.

Years of deterrence between Iraq and the United States made it easy for the Bush administration to "demonize" Iraq and centred the American rhetoric on the moral "fight" against the "evil".[146] President Bush called for a "forward strategy of freedom" as the American strategy against terrorism in the Middle East, addressing the nation through these words:

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[141] Mirkasymov, Bakhtiyar. "The US Greater Middle East Initiative." *Policy Perspectives* (2007): 1-20.

[142] S. Zunes, "Foreign policy by catharsis: The failure of US policy toward Iraq.", *Arab studies quarterly*, 2001, pp. 69-86.

[143] R. Williams, "Lessons in Deterrence from US Foreign Policy in Iraq, 1982-2003.", *Yale College,* 25.04.2017, pp. 12 - 13

[144] M. Bowden, "TALES OF THE TYRANT What does Saddam Hussein see in himself that no one else in the world seems to see?", *Atlantic Monthly*, 2002, pp. 35-54.

[145] S.L. Blanton, "Foreign policy in transition? Human rights, democracy, and US arms exports." *International Studies Quarterly*, 2005, pp. 647-667.

[146] R. Hinnebusch, "The US invasion of Iraq: Explanations and implications." *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, 2007, pp. 209-228.

"As long as freedom and democracy do not flourish in the Middle East, that region will remain stagnant, resentful, and violent – and serve as an exporter of violence and terror to free nations.".[147]

On the other side of the Atlantic, European countries reacted differently to the American rhetoric of the "exporting democracy" project in the Middle East during the George W. Bush administration. One of the reasons behind these differences relied on the heterogeneity of Europe, which is culturally and historically diversified. The European Union was sometimes considered as a "fragmented and heterogenous spectator" with a "wait-and-see approach" that in the long run impacted negatively on the Transatlantic partnership.[148] Issues such as debating and voting on a common European foreign policy underlined the mentality gap between EU members and challenged the European position both within the Transatlantic partnership and in its role in the Middle East. The 2003 war in Iraq and the philosophical and social debate on "exporting democracy" put in question previous European decisions on plain support of US actions in the MENA region.

Political elites in Europe did not consider democracy promotion as an American prerogative.

From the 1970s, the European Union strategically profited from human rights and "democracy assistance" aid projects abroad to expand its sphere of influence over the East.[149] In the post-Cold War years, EU foreign policy aimed at promoting European values as a geopolitical strategy, with projects such as the 1994 "European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights" (EIDHR) which received funding from the principal European countries, with Germany as the largest donor.[150] Similarly to the US Middle East Partnership Initiative, the EIDHR grouped European funding to nationally cooperate with NGOs to foster democracy and protect human rights with the final aim of preventing

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[147] The White House Archives President George W. Bush. News & Policies. *Fact Sheet: President Bush Calls for a "Forward Strategy of Freedom" to promote democracy in the Middle East,* November 2003. available at : https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-11.html#:~:text=In%20remarks%20at%20the%2020th,democracy%20throughout%20the%20Middle%20East

[148] See Master's Thesis J. Birch, *Democracy promotion in the European neighbourhood: an assessment of European neighbourhood policy as a framework for external democracy promotion*, A.Y. 2014/2015

[149] Lloyd, Lindsay. "European approaches to democracy promotion." *International Journal*, 2010, pp. 547-559.

[150] Centre for European Policy Studies, Democracy *Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy*, 2001, available at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/29697/167_Democracy%20Promotion.pdf (accessed 27.05.2022)

conflicts and rendering "third countries" more secure.[151] Another example of European strategy in the MENA region is the "Barcelona Process": this project was launched in 1995 and aimed at contributing to achieve and maintain stability in the Mediterranean by reinforcing the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.[152] It allowed political elites of the Mediterranean countries to meet and discuss regional cooperation and democracy to plan projects on education, environment, climate, and employment.[153]

On the European continent, the EU enlargement and integration of eastern and central Europe fuelled countries' interests for efficient support of institutions promoting democracy and human rights.[154]

On the negative side, the international role of the EU had been challenged several times over the years. An example is the Gulf crisis of the 1990s, which proved how national perceptions contributed to an "ineffective" European response. Another example is the failure of the EU diplomatic approach in the Balkans during the Yugoslavian wars. These conflicts highlighted the "vulnerability" of foreign policy within the EU and forecasted the future challenges that European countries had to face while debating for support of an American war in Iraq.[155]

The modern international role of the European Union is an extremely debated one. As the European power cannot be identified with military strength – or at least when compared to its Atlantic partner - the European power had to come from the economic, cultural, and ideologic potential impact of the EU abroad. In contemporary studies, there is almost consensus on the fact that the EU is a "civilian power", meaning that as a supranational organization frequently opts for cooperation to achieve international goals because of objective limited military strength. [156]

The international environment characterizing the 1990s left space for the EU to prove that the sponsored "human face of security" could be an efficient alternative to the American

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[151] Access to European Union Law. *European initiative for democracy and human rights (EIDHR) (2000-2006),* available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ar10110

[152] A.P Vallelersundi, "The Barcelona Process-A Euro-Mediterranean North-South Partnership." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs,* 2004, p. 145.

[153] See Union for the Mediterranean Official Web Page, "25th Anniversary of the Barcelona Process: Has the Mediterranean Vision Come True?", available at https://ufmsecretariat.org/25bcnprocess/ (accessed 27.05.2022)

[154] L. Lloyd, "European approaches to democracy promotion.", *International Journal*, 2010, pp. 547-559.

[155] W.C. Cromwell, "Europe, the United States, and the pre-war Gulf crisis." *International Journal*, 1993, pp. 124-150.

[156] G. Telatar, "The European Union's role in the maintenance of international peace and security in the 21st century." *SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe*, 2015, pp. 13-32.

showcase of power. The controversial conception of "humanizing" security and defence stood for a rational justification for the actual militarization of the European Union member states by the 1990s. The rhetoric of this decision rested on "how" a rise in military funding helped EU foreign plans in a perspective of "civilian power": how could the EU protect democracy and civil rights while increasing its military presence abroad?[157] Was the EU foreign policy different from the one sponsored during the first Bush administration in terms of promotion of democracy?

The literature on EU assistance of democracy abroad showed that European policies frequently favoured economic, social, and political development over democracy, opting for a more negotiating approach in the intervention of other sovereign states. On a national level, liberal democracies in Europe such as Great Britain, Sweden, and Germany funded national government agencies for development strategies. These domestic intentions, which on a smaller scale had proved to work for social and economic growth, were later showcased in the EU foreign strategy.[158] The development strategies can be traced back to a less "ideological" approach to foreign policy, and more practical "step-by-step" plans of integration.[159] The European Union did promote certain ideological values, but as a supranational organization, it had to rationally justify its actions to gather enough consent for the implementation of plans with the EU mandate.

Contemporary European foreign policy also had to keep into consideration the correlation between the need for "energy" and the promotion of democracy. European rhetoric frequently exploited the link between the political and social conditions of certain countries outside of the European Union and the necessity of importing oil and gas from those countries, stressing the importance of aiding other countries for the sake of domestic interests.

The oldest American organization "Freedom House" and EU 2008 data on energy policy collected information on the percentage of EU oil and gas supplies, underlining how dangerously dependent the EU was – and still is – on energy exports from countries governed by non-democratic governments.[160] The combination of the constant European need to pay for foreign energy and resources and the EU's "core responsibility" of

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[157] S. Stavridis, ""Militarising" the EU: the concept of civilian power Europe revisited." *The international spectator*, 2001, pp. 43-50.

[158] L. Lloyd, "European approaches to democracy promotion.", *International Journal*, 2010, pp. 557-559.

[159] See "European Union democracy assistance: an academic state of play.", 2018, pp. 4 – 5, available at https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8587335/file/8587336.pdf

[160] Wood, Steve. "Energy and democracy: the European Union's challenge." *Current History*, 2008, p. 133.

democracy and human rights promotion pushed Europe to maintain its presence in the North African and Middle Eastern countries, even though in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century the MENA region did not represent a particularly urgent challenge to force European countries into a more active role. The "passivity" Europe showed especially for the countries in the Gulf – which was partially dictated by the factual incapacity of the EU to effectively induce a structural change – deeply impacted the European political and social perception of the Middle East.[161]

After the 9/11 attacks and the Bush's campaign of democracy promotion to fight terrorism by "forcefully" promoting democracy in Iraq, the EU – as a formal US ally within the Transatlantic partnership – was implicitly asked for public support of the potential pre-emptive war. As I have already cited the internal political division that modern terrorism caused within the United Nations and the European Union, I will now present an analysis of the ideological and objective challenges that prevented the EU from presenting common blind support for the US foreign policy.

The main obstacles to the creation of a European common front as a response to the terrorist attacks against the United States derived from security and defence issues. How do EU member states define "security"?

The modern debate on European security resulted in the drafting of the official document "European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World" (ESS). This document had its final version in December 2003, and it contributed to the definition of the contemporary threats endangering European stability, namely weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, "failed states" or state failure, organized crime, and terrorism.[162] On June 13th, 2003, the European Council drafted the "EU rules on terrorist offences and related penalties", which defined terrorism as a combination of objective and subjective elements to legally and conceptually frame transnational terrorist offences to present a common and efficient European response to this new danger.[163]

The US and the EU coexisted in the region while promoting "more democracy" to sedate potential and active conflicts. In the past, before terrorist organizations became transnational, the Transatlantic partnership flourished on the common perception of

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[161] Youngs, and Echagüe,. "Europe and the Gulf: Strategic neglect.", *Studia Diplomatica*, 2007, pp. 29-41.
[162] See Institute for Security Studies, European Union, 2003, available at https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/copenhagen-brussels-european-defence-core-documents-volume-iv
[163] EUR-Lex. Access to European Union Law. EU rules on terrorist offences and related penalties. Accessed on 25.05.2022, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/LSU/?uri=celex:32002F0475

liberal democracy as "the" best conception of modern democracy. Like the US approach, the European Union asserted the "promotion of democracy" strategy as an obvious extension of its international identity and values, fostering democratisation in Europe and assisting Latin American countries in their development process.[164]

Countries in Europe were largely inspired by the end of the 1980s model of democracy promotion in the United States, especially the NED Ronald Reagan promoted during his European campaign.[165] In the already-mentioned letter to the British Prime Minister, we can note how the words used are in juxtaposition with the EU approach to democracy promotion:

> "No, democracy is not a fragile flower; still, it needs cultivating. If the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom and democratic ideals, we must take actions to assist the campaign for democracy.".[166]

By the 1990s, tensions within the two Atlantic partners grew.

Within the European Union, countries debated over the intensity of EU foreign policy in the Middle East. Should the EU use a more active strategy in the MENA region, or would it be better to favour a co-dependent partnership with the US for the sake of the Transatlantic relations? The different national interests in the outcome and handling of the Middle East crisis within the EU and between the EU and the US made extremely difficult a common Transatlantic support. This challenge eventually highlighted the internal division of the European Union also during the debate on European support for the American military intervention in Iraq.[167]

Furthermore, historical elements provided the US and the EU with fundamentally different conceptions of "security" and "defence". From one side, the US administrations profited from their hegemonic status to invest a vast majority of budgetary funds in the military and fully exploit moral and ideological rhetoric to justify security decisions. The lessons that European countries learned from the historical conflicts taught them to focus

[164] S. Rynning, "Providing Relief or Promoting Democracy? The European Union and Crisis Management.", *Security Dialogue*, 2001, pp. 87-101.

[165] L. Lloyd, "European approaches to democracy promotion.", *International Journal*, 2010, pp. 557-559.

[166] The National Endowment for Democracy Official Web Page. *Text of President Ronald Reagan's Westminster Address,* available at https://www.ned.org/promoting-democracy-and-peace/ (accessed 3.06.2022)

[167] C. Musu, "The EU and the Middle East Peace Process: A Balance." *Studia Diplomatica*, 2007, pp. 11-28.

less on ideology and more on rationality. To this day, the European Union did not formally approve of a common army.

I think it would be useful to recall that institutions such as the European Parliament were founded with the intent of supporting human rights and democracy as a "core responsibility", with the creation of a dedicated group of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to observe and overview the EU Parliament activities in this sense called the "Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group" (DEG).[168] The mandatory briefing on the European support for democracy all around the world – as the institution did not and cannot work autonomously – should ensure the objectivity of the EU foreign policy aiming at aiding countries in Latin America and the Middle East. Not only this entailed a certain level of objectivity, but it also proved the commitment to the EU foreign aid to development.

We now know that the "democracy as an alternative to terrorism" concept is a controversial one. Aside from ideological and political motivations, there was not – and still, there is not – a causal link in the Arab world between the rise of a democratic form of government with the war on terror.[169] What is also to consider is that not only foreign intervention was not granted to succeed in giving the Middle East political freedom, but there were also contemporary national situations that pointed to the possibility that change to "democracy" – and not necessarily the "American" one – will come because of national Islamist parties.[170] The American perception of US power as "benign" did not help foster a positive sentiment towards the United States.[171]

The Arab press frequently questioned the new "pro-democratic role" of the United States in the Middle East: Arab intellectuals claimed that the US history did not prove that the United States could succeed in providing countries like Iraq with social and political stability and ensuring economic growth and progress.[172] In their opinion, the MEPI and GMEI initiatives had no grasp on the reality of the facts, as the 2000s political, economic, and social condition of Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries had no space left for

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[168] Official Web Page of the European Parliament. *Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group (DEG),* available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/globaldemocracysupport/en/home/democracy-group
[169] D.D. Kaye, et al. *More freedom, less terror Liberalization and political violence in the Arab world*. Vol. 772. Rand Corporation, 2008, pp. 12 - 16
[170] M. Ottaway, and T. Carothers, "Middle East Democracy." *Foreign Policy*, 2004, pp. 22-29.
[171] J. Monten, "The roots of the Bush doctrine: Power, nationalism, and democracy promotion in US strategy." *International Security,* 2005, pp. 112-156.
[172] M. Ottaway, "Promoting democracy in the Middle East: The problem of US credibility", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, n. 42, 2004, available at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CarnegiePaper42.pdf

democratic "improvement" in the way the United States intended it. Bush's campaign to "export" democracy in the Middle East highlighted the presence of massive gaps, leading Arab intellectuals to think that the US administration was in no position to "lecture" the world on democracy.[173]

Within the Transatlantic partnership, the differences in approaches fuelled the American perception of the EU as "weak", and the European perception of the US as "imperialistic".[174] Furthermore, the clash between the two different interpretations of security within the Transatlantic Partnership massively contributed to both the perception of the danger, and the "right" responses to give as an international power. On one hand, the modern conception of security policy in Europe entailed the preservation of peace, the promotion of cooperation within the international community, the strengthening of international stability, and the development and consolidation of democracy.[175] On the other, the 2002 US National Security Strategy highlighted a fundamental shift from deterrence and "traditional" military defense to preventive action.[176]

Up until now, I presented the stances and challenges to the US-EU relationship, which partially fuelled an ideological fight for a global cultural influence of democratic values. In the first chapter, we saw that European politics could not agree on a common stand for a possible pre-emptive intervention in Iraq. For this reason, it will be interesting to focus on the response society gave through the demonstrations on February 15th, 2003.

5. The origins of the 2002-2003 debate in Europe

The debate on what democracy is and which past elements can still be found in its contemporary evolutions is controversial. The numerous different national conceptions of democratic values gave countries a certain degree of freedom in the field of promotion

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[173] S. Baroudi, "Arab intellectuals and the Bush administration's campaign for democracy: The case of the Greater Middle East Initiative.", *The Middle East Journal*, 2007, pp. 390-418.

[174] R. Kagan, *Of paradise and power: America and Europe in the new world order*. New York, Vintage books, 2007, pp. 85 - 103

[175] EU Official Web site, available at : https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/actions-topic/foreign-and-security-policy_en#:~:text=European%20foreign%20and%20security%20policy&text=EU%20foreign%20and%20security%20policy,for%20human%20rights%20%26%20fundamental%20freedoms (accessed on 20.05.2022)

[176] P.L. Dunmire, "9/11 changed everything': an intertextual analysis of the Bush Doctrine.", *Discourse & Society*, 2009, pp. 195-222.

of civil rights, especially because of institutional, bureaucratic, and political constraints.[177] The historical shift from the assumption of democracy as "direct" sovereign of the people to "representative" was dictated by the political need of professional expertise to handle and solve intricated new problems, especially in the economic field.[178]

The differences in strategies of two of the most prominent Western powers supporting and promoting liberal democracy on a national and global scale have called into question the assumption that liberal democracy is the final (and better) version of democracy. An intrinsic element of liberal democracy, the "democratization" plan within foreign strategy had proved to be flawed and uncertain as foreign countries, especially the most unstable ones, reacted differently to outside intervention.[179] Political debate in the West suggested that providing a full democratic transition of autocratic governments, especially those strongly influenced by religious principles, modern approaches are not enough. The future democratic revolutions in the Arab world – the so-called "Arab Spring" would prove that civil society in Muslim countries does tend toward democracy, but not necessarily the "American" one. Furthermore, those demonstrations showed that "exporting" democracy, and materially "imposing" a Western political, social, and economic conception, did more harm than good.

Domestically, the United States presented rising social and economic inequalities that objectively clashed with the ideological stance of democracy as respect for values such as civil and human rights.[180] The question arises: if the US cannot fully promote democracy at home, how can it support it abroad?

We should also consider that even if we continue to consider the United States a "democratic country", that same country in the 20th century promoted aggressive actions in the Caribbean, Indonesia, and the "Third World".[181]

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[177] D. Held, and A. McGrew, "Globalization and the liberal democratic state.", *Government and opposition*, 1993, pp. 261-288.

[178] J.P. Euben, "Democracy ancient and modern.", *Political Science & Politics*, 1993, pp. 478-481.

[179] A.T. Graham and R.P. Beschel, "Can the United States promote democracy?.", *Political Science Quarterly*, 1992, pp. 81-98.

[180] APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy. "American democracy in an age of rising inequality.", *Perspectives on Politics*, 2004, pp. 651-666.

[181] T. Graham and R.P. Beschel, "Can the United States promote democracy?.", *Political Science Quarterly*, 1992, pp. 81-98.

The "Vulcan" ideology of "democracy promotion" abroad as fundamental in US foreign policy clashed with European peaceful attitude in foreign policy.[182] From a social standpoint, the possibility of European governments materially backing American intention of "promoting democracy" through military intervention – de facto "exporting democracy" in the eyes of European citizens - was not an option.[183]

Now that we know the political European and American stances behind the strategy of democracy promotion as foreign policy, in the next chapter I will analyse how the George W. Bush's campaign impacted the social and philosophical debate on democracy in Europe, and how the February 15th demonstrations influenced future conversations and decisions on democracy promotion within the European Union.

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[182] M. Fowler, "A Brief Survey of Democracy Promotion in US Foreign Policy." *Democracy and Security*, 2015, pp. 227-247.
[183] "The dangers of exporting democracy." *The Guardian*, online edition, 22.01.2005, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jan/22/usa.comment

Chapter 3
The European Debate on Democracy

1. "February 15, or what binds Europeans together: a plea for a common foreign policy, beginning in the core of Europe.".

The "February 15, or what binds Europeans together: a plea for a common foreign policy, beginning in the core of Europe" manifesto that German philosopher Jürgen Habermas and French philosopher Jacques Derrida co-signed tried to frame the 2003 global demonstrations as "the birth of a European public sphere".

Through their words, they theorized the possibility of a re-visitation and upgrade of the EU foreign policy as it faced new contemporary challenges. Their message also focused on the issue of a collective "European identity" within a heterogeneous political environment.

Retracing its history and traditions, the German philosopher underlined the religious and cultural elements that heavily influenced European countries to the point of shaping the "sensitivity of citizens to the paradoxes of progress", contributing to a contemporary constructive approach to new ideological challenges. They claimed that the demonstrations indicated that individuals in Europe had developed a sort of collective "identity" capable of binding "Europeans together":

> "Only the consciousness of a shared political fate, and the prospect of a common future, can halt outvoted minorities from the obstruction of a majority will. The citizens of one nation must regard the citizens of another nation as fundamentally "one of us." This desideratum leads to the question that so many skeptics have called attention to: are there historical experiences, traditions, and achievements offering European citizens the consciousness of a political fate that has been shared together, and that can be shaped together?".[184]

The strong opposition to a potential EU support for the American pre-emptive war seemed to prove a fundamental general agreement of "Europeans" on international issues. The fact that participants in the protests recognized themselves in certain values was possible because what was considered an intrinsic European "sentiment" was the result of

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[184] Habermas and Derrida. "February 15 or what binds Europeans together:"

individuals discussing through forums, such as the European Social Forums, digital platforms, and mass media**.**

The European Union partially contributed to it, designing a project aimed at fostering a collective identity through a "Europeanization" plan. The aim was to deal with the heterogeneity represented by national public spheres through a process of "politicization" of the EU identity by employing mass media:

> "The more the same (European) themes are controversially debated at the same time at similar levels of attention across national public spheres and media and the more similar frames of reference, meaning structures and patterns of interpretation are available and in use across national public spheres and media.".[185]

Even though the European philosophers recognized a similar moral attitude within the West, they also underlined how historical events deeply moulded European countries differently from other Western countries:

> "However, in response to the destructive power of this nationalism, values and habits have also developed which have given contemporary Europe, in its incomparably rich cultural diversity, its own face. This is how Europe at large presents itself to of non-Europeans. A culture which for centuries has been beset more than any other by conflicts between town and country, sacred and secular authorities, by the competition between faith and knowledge, the struggle between states and antagonistic classes, has had to painfully learn how differences can be communicated, contradictions institutionalized, and tensions stabilized. The acknowledgement of differences – the reciprocal acknowledgement of the Other in his otherness – can also become a feature of a common identity.".[186]

From their philosophical perception, the F15 demonstrations undoubtedly marked the birth of a "Eurosphere" having historical, cultural, and ideological elements that were both similar and different from the American ones.
In their opinion, this situation contributed to the ideological gap shown during the debate on a possible European moral and objective support for a pre-emptive war in Iraq. The philosophical and intellectual establishment of a strong civil society, identified as "European" through certain historical and social criteria, is fundamental for the building of a stable democracy, as it allows citizens to directly discuss and debate domestic issues.

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[185] Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. "Governance without a state: Can it work?" *Regulation & Governance* 4.2 (2010): 113-134.
[186] Habermas and Derrida. "February 15 or what binds Europeans together:"

The unprecedented social response caused a heated debate among the intellectuals.

As I have previously laid out the basis of the American ideology behind the justification for a pre-emptive conflict, I will now analyse in what terms the US foreign policy under the Bush administration provoked such a strong social response in Europe, and the repercussions of the demonstrations of February 15th, 2003, had on the European philosophical and intellectual debate.

Then, I will work on both the intellectual and philosophical discussion on the ideological gap between the United States and the EU, to finally analyse if Habermas's words and his work and the F15 protests had an effective impact on the European Parliament and future decisions.

Eventually, the 2002-2003 social debate on George W. Bush's campaign to militarily "promote democracy" in Iraq shrank on whether the USA – and later European countries supporting the Bush administration – should embark on a war to remove Saddam Hussein. For this reason, most opinion poll questions were devoted to exploring that issue.

2. The European intellectual and philosophical debate

The analysis Habermas conducted on the birth of a European public sphere (EPS) is both admired and contested. To better understand this concept, I will first introduce his definition of the "public sphere".

In his early work "The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere", the German philosopher originally described the "public sphere" as a public space for "the perception, identification, and treatment of problems affecting the whole society".[187] He identified the first of its kind in what he called the "bourgeois public sphere" of the 18th century, a tangible space where bourgeois citizens could discuss social issues..[188] This early modern public sphere emerged as the Enlightenment idea of the importance of citizens "putting reason to use" in a new national environment where capitalism and the free-market advanced, privatization policies spread, and nation-states increased in number. During those years, civil society emerged as an intermediary element between state power and

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[187] Koller, Andreas. *The public sphere and comparative historical research: An introduction*, Social Science History 34.3 (2010): 261-290.
[188] Habermas, Jurgen. *The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society*. MIT press, 1991.

the economy as the social attempt to "rationalize" politics and the state's actions.[189] Habermas also aspired for the emergence of a "global public sphere" supported by efficient global institutions and a technologically advanced communication network. The argument helping this statement had its roots in the universalization of factors such as human rights, security, and social justice, that are easily passed on through media, press, and the internet.[190]

According to Habermas, his definition of a public sphere can also be extended to the EU and its potential civil society. Even if his analysis was conducted in the second half of the 20th century, he concluded that the most indicative element of the existence of the EPS is the massive participation of citizens within the EU in the protests.

Research over the possibility of a "Eurosphere" sharply increased in the mid-1990s.[191] The plea that Derrida and Habermas co-signed implied a positive approach to the crisis Europe was experiencing at the economic and political levels, and a philosophical intent to frame the European Union and its problems in the light of the new collective social rise of the February 15th protests.

In the European arena, the debate developed on two different fronts. On the one hand, the European states considered the position of the United States to be correct and supported it. On the other, European civil society was strongly opposed to the war. European philosophers and intellectuals such as Habermas, Umberto Eco, Fernando Savater, Gianni Vattimo, and Harold James supported the latter position. Answering Habermas' call, on 31st May 2003 European intellectuals published in national newspapers essays on the future of Europe and the Transatlantic relations.[192] The essays resulted from the personal reasoning of those involved. For instance, in his essay published in the Italian newspaper "La Stampa", Gianni Vattimo decided to focus his reasoning on the differences in the perception and conception of "democracy":

> "As we continue to reflect upon why we feel European and not American, we are
> bound to encounter a different view of existence, a different notion of what constitutes
> a "good life", a different existential plan. And we are also bound to encounter a vision

[189] A. Koller, "The public sphere and comparative historical research: An introduction.", *Social Science History*, 2010, pp. 261-290.

[190] M. Castells, "The new public sphere: Global civil society, communication networks, and global governance.", *The annals of the American academy of Political and Social Science*, 2008, pp. 78-93.

[191] C. Bärenreuter, et al. "An overview of research on the European public sphere.", *Eurosphere. On-line working paper series*, 2009.

[192] Levy, Daniel, et al. *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War*. Verso, 2005.

of participatory democracy that excludes the rigid hierarchies that originate (almost) necessarily in societies where natural differences, rather than being corrected by the State, are cultivated and utilized for the "development of the system.".[193]

Fernando Savater wrote to "El Pais" that to efficiently work, the European "civilizing project" of promotion of human rights needed to focus on establishing the Enlightenment principles at the institutional level. Umberto Eco wrote to "La Repubblica" about the "uncertainty" of the future of Europe, and how important for the survival of the EU was to find strategies based on common values and a common identity.[194]

In all those works, intellectuals brought up the challenging issue of the EU enlargement process, differentiating Europe into "old", "new", and "core". As countries from Eastern Europe planned to join the EU, Habermas and Derrida wrote on the importance of the "core" of Europe to promote the "real" democratic values as fundamental to successfully reaching the fulfilment of the project. According to them, the "core" of Europe was France and Germany (the only two countries that at a political level obstructed the American proposal to the United Nations), and the European re-birth had to begin from them.

The discussion also concerned the establishment of a common foreign policy. After the debate Habermas initiated, Harold James commented that defence and security had to result from the "Europeanness" sentiment and identity and had to surely be different from the one the Bush administration promoted to handle the challenges of the 21st century:

> "Old-style foreign policy should be replaced by the adoption of a policy aimed at controlling the dangers of capitalism addressed to a universal civil society.".[195]

The debate on a possible pre-emptive war against Iraq entailed a massive shift in the moral, ideological, and historical perception of what is "right" and what is "wrong", especially for what concerns the "exporting democracy" element within foreign policy strategies.

As previously stated, the "democracy promotion" strategy belongs both to the American and the European foreign policy, with successful and unsuccessful recent stories on the two sides. The agitation about the Bush's campaign and rhetoric for "promoting freedom"

[193] Levy, Daniel, et al. *Old Europe,* p. 33.
[194] Levy, Daniel, et al. *Old Europe*, pp. 15 – 20.
[195] Levy, Daniel, et al. *Old Europe,* p. 60.

in the Middle East led to a – often exaggerated - distinction between the two approaches.[196] Both policies have as a starting point the conception of "democracy promotion" as giving countries the necessary autonomy to freely vote in fair elections and contributing to the emergence of institutions and governmental bodies. The gap between the idea and the objective application of this strategy is one of the reasons behind the concerns for the US foreign policy in Iraq, as it is frequently perceived as the grant of power from a stronger to a weaker country.[197]

When a government decides to use military means to promote democracy, there is a strict contradiction between the way the strategy comes alive, and the ends used to implement it. For instance, the differences between a despot waging war to promote peace and a government using violence to "secure democracy" are too small not to consider:

> "The effects that a military intervention will have in a democratic state should be considered. When at war, every state is compelled to sacrifice some of its freedom. Citizens are sent into battle, civil liberties are decreased, and the capabilities of the armed forces and intelligence agencies are increased at the expense of transparency and civilian control.".[198]

To this day, the European Union's most evident event of "democratic promotion" is the process of enlargement that served as a "pull" for the promotion and consolidation of democratic institutions and practices in ex-USSR countries in the East. As much as the EU strategy was perceived as "cooperative", the one Bush promoted was understood more as "pushing democracy" with an emptier impact on the moral level and a coercive "quality" as in the previous cases of Iran and Cuba.[199] The idea that the United States was entitled to promote democracy through military intervention heavily contributed to the negative perception of the US foreign policy through the years, and during the Bush administration.

British historian Eric Hobsbawm pondered on the dangers of promoting "Western" democracy, and on the impossibility of accurately foreseeing how the military

[196] J. Glenn, "Myth of "exporting "democracy: Lessons from Eastern Europe after 1989.", *The German Marshall Fund of the United States*, 21.04.2009.
[197] D. Chandler, "Back to the future? The limits of neo-Wilsonian ideals of exporting democracy.", *Review of International Studies,* 2006, pp. 475-494.
[198] D. Archibugi, "Can democracy be exported?", *openDemocracy*, available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/democracy_exported_4052jsp/ (accessed 29.05.2022).
[199] M. Amichai, T. Risse, and M. McFaul, eds. *Promoting democracy and the rule of law: American and European strategies.* Springer, 2009.

intervention and imposition of structural changes will impact national situations. He also addressed the paradox of a country such as the United States standing up for democracy in the Middle East when at home the American government faced contemporary challenges detrimental to democratic values:

> "The effort to spread standardised western democracy also suffers a fundamental paradox. A growing part of human life now occurs beyond the influence of voters - in transnational public and private entities that have no electorates. And electoral democracy cannot function effectively outside political units such as nation-states. The powerful states are therefore trying to spread a system that even they find inadequate to meet today's challenges.". [200]

Another interesting stance is the debate on how "promoting democracy" counts as counterterrorist action. Scholars consider this idea flawed: in fact, guaranteeing security is just a prerequisite to democracy as it does not imply any democratic element; and terrorism of Islamic origins has no direct causal link to the detriment of democracy, but there exists factual proof of how counterterrorist actions can be dangerous for democracy. When governments, even democratic ones, engage in a security and defence plan, historically it meant a justified intrusion in domestic liberties.[201] Because of this, "exporting democracy" as a counterterrorism strategy is not an idea that holds, at least within the intellectual debate.

Luciano Canfora theorized the existence of an unbreakable bond between "exporting democracy" and "power politics", two elements that in Bush's campaign appeared under the slogan of "just cause". He also described how the past strategy of US foreign policy became unbearable as it was universal in scope, pushing the American administration to redirect it toward a specific enemy. Rhetoric and mass media heavily contributed to the western culture's tendency to juxtapose "radical Islamism" with "terrorism".[202]

In his 2006 book "American Vertigo", French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy strongly accused the neo-conservative involvement in US foreign policy of "exporting democracy at the point of a bayonet.". According to him, the "messianic fantasy" that the use of force

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[200] "The dangers of exporting democracy.", *The Guardian*, online edition, 22.01.2005, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jan/22/usa.comment

[201] S. Engelmann, "Barking up the wrong tree: Why counterterrorism cannot be a defense of democracy.", *Democracy and Security*, 2012, pp. 164-174.

[202] L. Canfora, *Esportare la libertà: il mito che ha fallito*. Mondadori, 2007, pp. 58 - 61

would succeed in bringing freedom in the Middle East had no grasp on reality and no proof of working.[203]

If we perceive "promoting democracy" more as "imposing democracy", then it would certainly entail that the US strategy was "imperialist" in nature. The use of the term "impose" highlights the violent element, but it also underlines that there exists a great possibility of failure, as for being really "democratic", the decision to do so would be of the national "people".[204]

On February 15th, 2003, intellectuals and philosophers started to wonder if the massive European social response could contribute to the debate. Others went even further, wondering whether the demonstrations in Europe could not present a new angle from which to analyse the issue. In the manifesto, the philosophers pointed out that if the EU was to not fail, member states will have to endorse the "strengthened cooperation" mechanisms introduced in Nice. In their opinion, the massive participation in the demonstrations in Europe proved the existence of a European public sphere (EPS) and, therefore, they marked a new phase for the European Union from an ideological and political stand. The alleged "Eurosphere" highlighted the presence of a "post-war European mentality" of distinguishable traits such as "more social justice", "sensitivity to personal and bodily integrity", and the "domestication of state power demanding a mutual limitation of sovereignty" took hold in the perception of what a "worthy" society entails.[205] Following this reasoning, "being European" now should mean something in terms of a collective European sentiment, a collective European identity, and common foreign policy resulting from shared ideals.[206] Scholars claimed that if there was a common public sphere, EU member states would have collective European narratives, collective European actors, and collective European institutions.

Even though scholars could agree on the contribution of "The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere", the manifesto Habermas and Derrida wrote met with strong opposition. One of the main opposing arguments on the presence of a European public sphere was: how can there be a common EPS if there is not a real European identity yet?

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[203] "It's Time to Take Bernard-Henri Lévy Seriously", *Foreign Policy*, 9.04.2021, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/09/bernard-henri-levy-bhl-france-philosophy-public-intellectual/ (accessed 10.06.2022).
[204] V. Tadros, "Unjust wars worth fighting for." *Journal of Practical Ethics*, 2016, pp. 72 - 77
[205] Habermas and Derrida. "February 15, or what binds Europeans together"
[206] J. Lacroix, "Does Europe need common values? Habermas vs Habermas." *European journal of political theory*, 2009, pp. 141-156.

Transnational social and political processes did boost a collective "sentiment" on certain issues, but not all citizens of EU member states feel represented as Europeans. To fit the criteria of a public sphere and a sentient civil society, theoretically, individuals should have in common socio-cultural elements.[207]

The fragmentation and heterogeneity between European nations – from "old" and "new" Europe – heavily impacted the possibility of a collective unity under the same morals and ideologies.

Another argument against the Habermasian affirmation came with its early work: historians and sociologists resisted the time, the identification of the bourgeoisie class as the origin of the "ideal" public sphere, and the most problematic case of the building of a collective identity objectively excluding specific social categories of minorities from the public debate and consequently from the political life.[208]

3. A democratic challenge for the EU

The manifesto Habermas and Derrida wrote highlighted a monumental problem for the EU: the "democratic deficit". This concept highlights a "discrepancy between *what is* and *what ought to be* in terms of democracy in the EU.".[209] The existence of a "democratic deficit" endangers the European Union's legitimacy, posing a threat to its influence over collective political and economic decisions.

The ideological and moral challenges resurfaced as a response to the American campaign for an international reorder underlined the necessity for a re-definition of what democracy in Europe meant. The intellectual and philosophical debate sparked in Europe had a generally positive perception of the role of the European Union in the re-establishing of democracy in other terms. Joss Hands wrote:

> "The legacy of the global movement, the aggregated, networked smart crowds of 15 February, may well be found in the phrase invoked and repeated in their many languages, that 'this is what democracy looks like'. I believe that what we witnessed on 15 February was not the birth of a European public sphere but another step forward for a global civil society for which democracy is not just a matter of better schools

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[207] E.O. Eriksen, "An emerging European public sphere.", *European journal of social theory*, 2005, pp. 341-363.
[208] A. Adut, "A theory of the public sphere.", *Sociological Theory*, 2012, pp. 238-262.
[209] K.D. Azman, "The problem of "democratic deficit" in the European Union.", *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 2011, pp. 242-250.

and roads, but global justice, universal human rights, a belief that there is such a thing as society, and that our solidarity must extend to the people whom our governments and corporations bomb, exploit and poison.".[210]

To come into existence, the European Union must understand how to move within the criteria of Western liberal democracy. Habermas and Derrida described liberal democracy in their public plea:

> "Insofar as Christianity and capitalism, natural science and technology, Roman law and the Code Napoleon, the bourgeois-urban form of life democracy and human rights, the secularization of state and society have spread across other continents, these legacies no longer constitute a *proprium*. The Western form of spirit, rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition, certainly has its characteristics features. But the nations of Europe also share this mental habitus, characterized by individualism, rationalism, and activism, with the United States, Canada, and Australia. The "West" encompasses more than just Europe.".[211]

Habermas claimed that the February 15th protests proved that the European Union could effectively and fully come into existence. To do so, the EU institutions needed to re-focus on those values that are specific to European history and reject those that caused structural and identity crises. In particular, the insistence of the German philosopher was on the idea that Europe had its roots in multiculturalism and philosophy, which helped construct its cultural and social heritage in a way that fundamentally distinguished Europe from any other political entity.

He theorized that the only way to reach the European "project" was through what he called the "cosmopolitanism" – rather than the "globalization" - of values, meaning the fostering of the idea of Europe as a transnational organization embodying democratic values of freedom and human rights.[212] One issue highlighted in the discussion focused on the EU foreign policy as the bearer of democracy not in the American terms – namely "exporting democracy" through military intervention - but rather aiming at a "cosmopolitan" democracy.[213]

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[210] J. Hands, "Civil society, cosmopolitics and the net: The legacy of 15 February 2003.", *Information, Communication & Society,* 2006, pp. 225-243.

[211] Habermas and Derrida "February 15"

[212] V. Tonči, "Europe On the Edge: Revisiting Habermas And Derrida", 27.11.2021, available at: https://tvrdja.com/political-theory/europe-on-the-edge/ (accessed 7.06.2022).

[213] Levy, Daniel, et al. *Old Europe*, p. 159

Habermas hoped for a strengthening of democracy in Europe starting from the collective identity demonstrated during the F15 protests and moving to European reforms consolidating political and economic unity. This idea is extremely controversial, as it did not consider a series of factual deficiencies within the EU.[214] The Habermasian theory of the fundamentality of the religious element has been torn to pieces by many intellectuals, including Paolo Flores d'Arcais.[215]

To better understand the evolution of both the material application and the conception of democracy, this thesis considers Robert Dahl a good point of departure.

Dahl identified three great transformations in the history of democracy. The first two are the shift from non-democratic to democratic city-states in ancient Greece, and the shift to representative democracy and political practices and institutions supporting it as nation-states emerged by the late twentieth century. The political institutions of representative democracy are perceived as necessary (but not sufficient) to the existence of democracy. By the end of the twenty-first century, the third transformation happened, providing us with the historical background for liberal democracy and, eventually, for the definition of what is now known as "post-democracy". During this phase, transnational systems emerged to the detriment of the autonomy of national states, which heavily impacted the direct influence of citizens over domestic decisions. The question that Dahl posed is if there is the possibility that now that democracy is on a transnational scale – the United States and the European Union as the most relevant cases – will the West need a new set of political institutions and democratic practices? The greater the scale of democracy became, the more challenging it was to adapt the elements of representative democracy.[216] National constitutions alone do not have enough power to protect and promote democracy, they need strong effective democratic norms.[217]

According to Dahl, Western democracy as "liberal democracy", is coming apart. The turmoil caused by the Iraq war deeply impacted the EU on the political, social, and ideological levels. The "frailty of democracy" comes from its structural changes which

[214] Alfonso Liguori. "Le Undici Tesi di Paolo Flores d'Arcais 'Contro Habermas'", *MicroMega*, available at: https://www.micromega.net/flores-darcais-contro-habermas/ (accessed 12.05.2022).
[215] Paolo Flores d'Arcais, « Unidic Tesi contro Habermas", *MicroMega,* available at https://www.micromega.net/contro-habermas-flores-darcais/ (accessed 12.05.2022).
[216] Dahl, Robert A. "A democratic dilemma: system effectiveness versus citizen participation." *Political science quarterly* 109.1 (1994): 26 - 27.
[217] Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. "The Crisis of American Democracy." *American Educator* 44.3 (2020): 6.

dictated the zeroing of conflict through the elimination of antagonisms. Without antagonisms, there is no fair competition, no dialogue.

The modern form of liberal democracy in the West, representative democracy, is subject to distrust and disinterest directly linked to individuals' perception of international institutions.[218]

> "Inequalities, crisis of representation of organised interests, movements and populism, democratic innovation and innovation and political communication are at the centre […] of one great challenge: to make democracy survive in the West and recover its vital backbone to bring it into the new millennium, updated and readapted to the challenges of contemporaneity. Any attempt to revitalise the democratic spirit can only pass through the admission that, of all the unfulfilled promises of this political system, today we can first of all identify that of the real decision-making capacity of citizens around their destinies.".[219]

Challenges to liberal democracy and the way countries handled them highlighted differences within liberal democracies and their actions.

According to some commentators, the debate highlighted a new situation of "post-democracy", and a need for a profound revision of what the West calls democracy if it wished to propose it as a universal value through the foreign strategy of democracy promotion.[220] In this sense, it is interesting to note the gap between democracy "in principle" and democracy "in practice", especially when it comes to the American and the European reaction to the probability of a war against Iraq.[221] The debate on "exporting democracy" enlarged the Transatlantic gap of the conception of democracy. The problem is partially linked to the American conception of "human rights":

> "He often pairs "human rights" with the phrase "free markets." By linking these terms, Bush's construction of human rights carries with it a strong connection to economic neoliberal ideology and neoconservativism, both of which privilege free enterprise, privatization, deregulation, deterritorialization, and particular economic

[218] "La fragilità della democrazia", Einaudi Blog, 12.08.2021, available at https://www.einaudiblog.it/la-fragilita-della-democrazia/ (accessed 21.05.2022)

[219] N. Urbinati, W. Merkel, J. Subirats, R. Fioravante, S. Puttini, "Democrazia Minima", Fondazione Giacomo Feltrinelli, 2018

[220] "Un'idea di democrazia: normativa o consolatoria?", *MicroMega*, 30.09.2021, available at: https://www.micromega.net/democrazia-normativa-o-consolatoria/#_ftn1 (accessed 22.05.2022).

[221] M. Gilens and B. I.Page, "Critics argued with our analysis of political inequality. Here are 5 ways they're wrong", *The Washington Post*, 23.05.2016, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/23/critics-challenge-our-portrait-of-americas-political-inequality-heres-5-ways-they-are-wrong/ (accessed 22.05.2022).

"rights" above political "rights." Neoliberal and neoconservative conceptions of "democracy" are thus inherently tied to how human rights function in Bush's discourse; that is, market fundamentalism and neoliberal orthodoxy are the "democratic" freedoms and rights to which Bush refers, and these rights become debased into the freedom to consume under the veneer of a certain "moral" order. A large part of the American myth, then, is one of economic competition embedded within an ideology of consumerism that Bush brings to the fore in his use of human rights.".[222]

Even before the war, the world assisted to a rise in what is known as "illiberal democracy", as in the words of Pellizzetti writing for "MicroMega", meaning a form of government that formally identifies with "democracy" but in reality, is an empty shell leaving space for practices that make it difficult to indicate as democratic.[223]

Provided that the US is a liberal democracy, the US foreign policy should be a direct representation of liberal and democratic values, among which we can find the support of individual liberties.

Not only the campaign to "export democracy" draw a line between the perception of democratic values between the EU and the US, but it also puts in question the theory of a "Western democracy" that identifies collective values and collective actions. The political and philosophical debate on the war led the rising European public sphere to distance itself from what the United States represented in terms of democratic international role and resulted in a collective call for the emerging of a "new democracy" inspired on both past and new democratic elements that could be adapted to a changing world but could still be identified as promoting individual liberties both at home and abroad. In this sense, the EU could potentially play a fundamental role, also thanks to the contribution of Habermas and his fellow intellectuals.[224]

In the next part, I will analyse the internal discussions of the EU Parliament to find if both the peace demonstrations and the Habermasian conception and positive vision of the European "project" entered the political discourse and impacted future foreign policies.

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[222] M.E. Stuckey, and J. R. Ritter. "George bush, and American democracy.", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 2007, pp. 646-666.

[223] "Un'idea di democrazia: normativa o consolatoria?", *MicroMega.*

[224] Arienzo, Alessandro. "La commissione Europea e il tema della legittimità politica nel Libro Bianco sulla governance europea." (2003).

4. The consequences of the F15 demonstrations on the EU Parliament

The Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Jannis Sakellariou cited the demonstrations during a March 2003 session:

> "Since we last met here in Strasbourg, substantial progress has been made, and impressive events have taken place, the most important of which has been, without a doubt, the European peoples' referendum on 15 February. I use the word 'referendum' because calling it a demonstration does not do anything like justice to what happened on that day, when the peoples of Europe made very firm demands for two things, the first being, quite simply and unequivocally, 'No War', and the second, a common European foreign policy capable of stopping this one. This is where I agree with Mr Poettering's words earlier, to the effect that 'It is not that there is too much of America – there is not enough of Europe.' Such a foreign policy is what we need.".[225]

Starting from this speech, I will focus on the main element that MEP of the Party of European Socialists (PSE) Sakellariou brought at the Parliament session: the hope for a common foreign policy to face the global terrorist menace. His words echoed the speech his fellow MEP Poettering pronounced during the same session:

> "If we redouble our efforts towards this end – which will involve common action rather than each country of the European Union going its own way – we will be able, on the global stage, to achieve something for our values of freedom, democracy, and peace.".[226]

Analysing the discussion of the European Parliament, we can assist to a shift in the agenda, as defining "terrorism" and counterterrorism policies became crucial. Before 9/11, there was no collective action over "terrorism", if not on the political and domestic level in France, Greece, Spain, and Italy. The emergence of more terrorist cells and the evolution of terrorist groups led to the drafting of the "Watson report" presented on September 5th, 2001.

The impact that this had on the EU Parliament was partial, as most of the members of the European Parliament (MEPs) considered "terrorism" and its potential dangers as "hypothetical". After 9/11, the general sentiment pushed for the boosting of collective

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[225] European Parliament debates, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-5-2003-03-12-ITM-001_EN.html (accessed 29.05.2022).
[226] European Parliament debates, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-5-2003-03-12-ITM-001_EN.html (accessed 23.06.2022)

cooperation to enable a quicker and more efficient judicial and legal response to what was now perceived as the "most imminent global threat".[227] As the global US propaganda of the "war on terror" became more and more persistent, and as the EU presented various internal divisions on counterterrorist actions, discussions within the EU Parliament became more heated:

> "What are we being told about the mobilisation of public opinion, the new super-power? Why can we not understand that the public's determination to take to the streets was based on the conviction that not only would war not dry up the springs of terrorism but also that a unilateral pre-emptive war would give rise to new terrorism? It is on the basis of what the demonstrating people of Europe are telling us that we should be acting in the Security Council, and it is unacceptable that, within the United Nations, after we had committed ourselves to disarmament by means of international pressure and after we had found that the process works under the constraints we established together, we should then, in midstream, change the rules and set an ultimatum.".[228]

I have previously introduced in what terms the EU foreign policy in the Middle East differed from the one the US sponsored. The aim of this part is to work on the possibility that the contemporary EU foreign policy is the result of a new perception of the European "project" as in the Habermasian and Derrida's manifesto.

As the Transatlantic partnership deteriorated, the EU Parliament discussed the moral necessity of re-establishing the European international role in the world. The talks over a possible collective support to the United States highlighted a situation of dangerous disunity between the EU member states at the political level. The heterogeneity in opinions showed massive differences between the national ideas on how to handle new international threats, "dividing" Europe between those who supported the United States with the UN mandate, those who supported the US "just war" without the approval of the UNSC, and those who opposed the American plan in all its forms.

The plea of the "February 15th" manifesto underlined that, as the political contrasts meant nothing when compared to the social opposition to the war, then the future of the EU was to be found in fundamental structural changes and the re-affirmation of what he considered as "European" common values.

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[227] A. Tsoukala, "Democracy against security: the debates about counterterrorism in the European Parliament, September 2001–June 2003.", *Alternatives*, 2004, pp. 417-439.

[228] European Parliament debates, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-5-2003-03-12-ITM-001_EN.html#top (accessed 30.05.2022).

In a way, foreign policy has an "identity". A common foreign policy would share the language, the notions, the actions, and the procedures. The building of a strong collective idea of the European plan for the international community had to start from shared values and a shared history.[229] In March 2003, the President-in-Office of the Council Mr Papandreou claimed:

> "As I said, the Iraqi crisis is throwing up new issues or is perhaps highlighting the problems of the times we live in: how to deal with countries with weapons of mass destruction, how to address the fear that weapons of mass destruction might fall into terrorist hands; I think that, here too, Europe has a vital role to play. Europe is a community of values. Europe is experienced in integrating countries that have lived through dictatorships and autocratic regimes, it has shown that it knows how to integrate countries into an area of real democracy and freedom and to contribute to peace on the continent of Europe as a whole. This invaluable experience can guide us and give us an important base from which to deal with new problems in other regions of the world. I do not see this experience as a sign of weakness, which is a criticism often levelled at Europe; I see it as a very strong point and I think we should make use of this very strong point to raise a loud, united voice at international level. The presidency will continue to work in this direction with all its partners, with the Fifteen, as well as the Twenty-Five and the Twenty-Eight and, of course, with the European Parliament.".[230]

The intellectual debate also focused on how the "democratic deficit" of the EU also impacted the perception of democratic values specific to the history of Europe. The ideological distinction made between what is "American" and what is "European", a distinction that in the past was less evident, had also consequences on the discussions in the European Parliament:

> "Iraq is only the first country which will be the victim of an offensive to allow US capitalism to globalise its economic, and therefore its military, supremacy, converting people into goods and cannon fodder. Afghanistan, Colombia, the Philippines, Venezuela, Palestine – no one is to be spared. Yet, on 15 February, another upheaval occurred. Thousands of people invaded the streets of our capital cities to say no to war, and they will do so again on 15 March. Democracy means taking up this challenge, and not a single elected representative or government can escape that fact.

[229] M.E. Smith, "Institutionalization, policy adaptation and European foreign policy cooperation.", *European journal of international relations*, 2004, pp. 95-136.
[230] European Parliament Debates, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-5-2003-03-12-ITM-001_EN.html#top (accessed 29.05.2022).

The veto is now on the streets. Here and in the USA, we all have to decide which side we are on.".[231]

What is interesting is the fact that years before and after the effective beginning of the war, the European Parliament frequently discussed what "democracy" and "promoting democracy" meant. This situation highlighted a possible re-definition of what "exporting democracy" meant in European terms. On March 2004, MEP Morgantini talked about the Middle East and the European involvement:

"Let us now think about that great plan, rather than a working paper, that the United States has prepared for the G8 Summit in June. In fact it is an arrogant, imperialist project and, although it provides for the development of democracy, democratic processes, preambles, aid and support, it does so without any discussion with anybody.

We cannot export democracy – apart from the fact that we should begin to think about our own democracies – since democracy is a continuous process in which we too are inadequate, in which we too sometimes have gaps and differences.

As it has been put forward, the Greater Middle East initiative is a plan that will certainly not help the growth of democracy. It will probably help some accomplice or subservient regimes, but it will not contribute to the reconstruction of Arab countries that do in fact need to free themselves from oppressive regimes and really need democracy. Not with arrogance and imperialism, however, please! I think the European Union's decision to opt for the long term and not to aim for immediate results by cutting the Gordian knot of old is the right one. We therefore need time to reflect and to build relationships.".[232]

In a lively debate, the EU also discussed the possibility of allocating funds for a collective militarization of Europe. The Iraq war partially contributed to the question of an EU army that General Morillon justified using the following statement:

"If the governments of the Member States were to continue leaving it to the Americans to conduct any potential wars, contenting themselves with shouldering affairs of peace, the Union would have to resign itself to playing the part of the

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[231] European Parliament Debates, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-5-2003-03-12-ITM-001_EN.html#top (accessed 29.05.2022).
[232] European Parliament Debates, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-5-2004-03-30-ITM-005_EN.html (accessed 30.05.2022).

Athenians in Ancient Rome: acceptance of being subject, in the last resort, to the will of a new empire.".[233]

During that session, one of the most significant responses to the association of "Europe" to "the military use of force" was given by the MEP Gahrton:

"It is *peace* that is the EU's special characteristic. The United States should be left to wage the wars until the Americans themselves are consumed in blood and fire, just as the Romans were. Let us instead take Athenian culture and democracy as our starting point.".[234]

The contemporary European debates, especially during the philosophical assertions on "just war", "democracy" and "democracy promotion", are to be read keeping in mind the strong influence of liberal values described in the Treaty of the European Union.

The European campaign to "promote democracy" came to a stalling point as the EU failures increased in number. The question of what strategy to implement "haunted" Europe: democracy "by design" or democracy "by example"?

The American combination of liberal democracy and power politics seemed not to work when translated into Europe, as the heterogeneity in ideological and political stances made challenging to prove the legitimacy of active interventions in the name of democracy "promotion". As the EU came to terms with the obstacles to becoming a "liberal power", the philosophical plea for a common foreign policy on security and defence, along with the "development" plans in the Middle East and Third World countries, translated as a plea for structural changes aimed at integrating EU members on ideological and historical grounds.[235]

Habermas' work on the theorization of a European identity and the philosophical and intellectual debate that it provoked influenced the EU plan for fostering the "Europeanness" element and contributing to political unity.

To survive the crisis of "democratic deficit", the European Union needed to justify its legitimacy. The impact of the philosophical and intellectual debate Habermas promoted and sponsored left a mark in the political discussions over the managing of the structural problems internal to the EU. During discussions in the EU Parliament, Habermas' name

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[233] European Parliament Debates, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-5-2003-04-09-ITM-005_EN.html (accessed 29.05.2022).
[234] European Parliament Debates, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-5-2003-04-09-ITM-005_EN.html (accessed 29.05.2022).
[235] S. Rynning,. "The European Union: towards a strategic culture?", *Security dialogue*, 2003, pp. 479-496.

is often pronounced in reference to major issues. From 2003 to this day, the EU debated on how to use the "Europeanness" to re-define "democracy" in European terms. In 2011, MEP Jo Leinen said:

> "Democracy involves discourse and deliberation, as Professor Habermas used to say. That is exactly our problem. The political class has a national system of discourse. The debates remain in the national realm. We have no overarching European debate, no European political realm, and the European lists would force the political class to come together and to think in European terms, to argue from a European point of view and also to make the alternatives clear to citizens with regard to the forms of Europe they have to choose from in the elections.".[236]

Still, during the 2013 State of the Union MEP José Manuel Barroso cited Habermas: "The other day, one of Europe's greatest philosophers, Jürgen Habermas, said that the document the Commission has presented so far is the most comprehensive political project on the future of Europe. We will continue to develop it step by step, in line with this guiding vision.". [237]

When we focus on their words, the speeches held in the European Parliament citing Habermas and his contribution would suggest similar cultural and political backgrounds and tendencies. It is surprising to note that those MEPs belonged to different groups: from group of the Alliance of Liberals and democrats for Europe to the group of the Greens, then the group of the European People's Party, the Party of European Socialists, the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, and the Confederal Group of the European United Left.

Even as far as 2020, a study the European Parliament commissioned on "Europeanising European Public Spheres" cited Habermas's work on the public sphere and its adaptation to the European environment. Thanks to his contribution and his commitment to the European "re-birth", the EU had new tools to revisit its approach to reform proposals that consider the legitimization of the EU influence.[238]

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[236] European Parliament Debates, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-7-2011-07-07-ITM-004_EN.html (accessed 29.05.2022).

[237] European Parliament Debates, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-7-2013-09-11-ITM-004_EN.html (accessed 1.06.2022)

[238] A study commissioned by the European Parliament's Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, "Europeanising European Public Spheres.", 2020, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/IPOL_STU(2020)654628 (accessed 15.06.2022)

Even though the protests impacted the philosophical and political debate on the future of Europe, not all intellectuals supported the movement against the war. At the same time, not all national politicians praised the social movement, especially in those countries where leaders justified the US military intervention. Even after all those arguments against the morality of the conflict, individuals still partially or fully agreed on the US plan for Iraq and the Middle East.

5. When is war justified?

Debating on the "ethics" of war is not a recent nor a simple phenomenon. Already in ancient times, and then during the following centuries, individuals have tried to give themselves a set of behaviours to adhere to in war, which have changed over time according to national political needs.

However, the idea of the possibility of embarking on a "just war" is implicit in the Western culture since the beginning of its existence.[239] The emergence of the nation-states and of the establishment of the sovereignty principle to manage the relation between states led to a re-definition of the criteria before, during, and after a military conflict.

If two hundred years ago, democracy was not a feature of the rhetoric for the justification of military intervention, after the Second World War the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights featured prominently in the justification of military action.[240] As the protection and promotion of human rights are intrinsically connected with the values of Western liberal democracy, the "updated" version of the doctrine considered the use of force legitimate because is the only means to put an end to human rights violations. Recent humanitarian interventions in Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda heavily contributed to the rationale behind the "obligation" to intervene to protect civilians in foreign countries.[241]

The new "humanitarian" justification for waging war, as Italian intellectual Danilo Zilo identified it, is itself a tool of war. Zilo argued that in the case of military interventions in the name of protection of human rights, the legitimization of war stands on the premise

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[239] As a reference D.A. Wells, ed. *An encyclopedia of war and ethics*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996.

[240] M. McFaul, "Democracy promotion as a world value.", *The Washington Quarterly*, 2004, pp. 147-163.

[241] J.T. Johnson, "Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq: Just War and International Law Perspectives.", *Journal of Military Ethics*, 2006, pp. 114-127.

of the universalist claim of the Western doctrine on human rights and fundamental liberty. That same premise is what legitimized supranational institutions to act as an "impartial" judges in the ruling of "humanitarian" interventions, such as the example of the NATO attacks in Yugoslavia.[242]

The now known as the "just war doctrine" fits an "ethical framework" dictating when conflict is accepted. It relies on two elements: *jus ad bellum* as "the justice of going to war" for self-defence or to defend someone else, and *jus in bello* as the "just conduct of war".[243] If that is the case if states waging war wish to get the approval – or at least the green light - of other states to attack another country, they should comply with the conditions that morally justify their actions.[244]

In "The Ethics of War and Peace", Paul Cristopher established six *jus ad bellum* elements that summarized both the moral and legal contemporary justifications for war: just cause, right authority, right intention, reasonable prospect of success, proportionate cause, and war as the last resort.[245] His contribution provided us with one of the most recent cultural and ideological backgrounds for the understanding of the contemporary application of the "just war doctrine".

Within the international arena, as alternative forms of conflicts and threats have appeared, contemporary challenges changed the doctrine to adapt the criteria to the new environment.[246] The Charter of the United Nations publicly validated the "use of force" against another nation only in the case of "peace enforcement, sanctions enforcement, self-defence, protection of civilians, protection of humanitarian activities, and intervention in civil conflicts.".[247]

In the 2009 edition of his book "Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations", American philosopher Michael Walzer tried to assess a political and moral theory of "just war" updated to the most recent historical events. According to him, being able to establish norms of "just war" which can be applied to new geopolitical

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[242] D. Zolo, and T. Mazzarese, "Dialogo: Guerra, diritto e ordine globale." *Dialogo: Guerra, diritto e ordine globale*, 2001, pp. 1000-1014.

[243] C. Enemark, and C. Michaelsen. "Just war doctrine and the invasion of Iraq.", *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, 2005, pp. 545-563.

[244] M. Bojang, "The Hidden Agenda Behind the Invasion of Iraq: The Unjust War Over Iraq in 2003.", *Central European Journal of Politics*, 2016, pp. 1-14.

[245] Cited in Christopher, Paul. "The ethics of war and peace: An introduction to legal and moral issues.", 1999.

[246] M. Girgenti, "La Rinascita della guerra giusta.", 2017, p. 8.

[247] M. Goulding, "The use of force by the United Nations.", *International Peacekeeping*, 1996, pp. 1-18.

characteristics is the only efficient way to successfully set boundaries for the war and favour peace.[248]

His view clashed with the rising of global social movements against the war, especially the one on February 15th, 2003. In *La libertà e i suoi nemici*, Michael Walzer answered the interviewer's questions about the protests condemning their actions as "naive" and "inefficient":

> "There were two ways of opposing the war, the first simple but wrong, the second right but difficult. They chose the first.
> The tyranny and brutality of the Iraqi regime were widely known and impossible to deny.
> The right way to oppose the war was to support the establishment of a containment and control system that could work.
> Of course, it would not have been an easy policy to defend, but it would have been the right one.".[249]

All these factors can help us frame the debate around Bush's campaign to internationally justify the pre-emptive war against Iraq.

The American rhetoric of "just war" was extremely controversial: by not finding the WMDs in Iraq, the United States could not prove the *jus ad bellum* criteria of self-defence to justify a pre-emptive decision, nor it had planned how to protect unarmed civilians while bombing. According to Walzer and Hauerwas, the rhetoric George W. Bush used to endorse a "just" war was a mere cover for an "immoral" military campaign based on power politics.[250] Even years after the beginning of the war, US President Bush justified the war as a moral constraint to wage "war on terrorism" to bring "freedom" to Iraqis citizens.[251]

In Europe, at least on the philosophical and political level, the American strategy for gaining support allowed the USA to partially legitimize the military intervention in Iraq.

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[248] M. Walzer, "Guerre giuste e ingiuste. Un discorso morale con esemplificazioni storiche.". Editori Laterza, 2009.

[249] Walzer, Michael, and Maurizio Molinari. *La libertà ei suoi nemici: nell'età della guerra al terrorismo*. Editori Laterza, 2003, pp 39-41.

[250] M. Girgenti, "La Rinascita della guerra giusta.", 2017, p. 8.

[251] "Bush: Motivi sbagliati ma la guerra è giusta", *Il Corriere della Sera*, 14.12.2005, available at https://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Esteri/2005/12_Dicembre/14/bush.html

The ethical framing of the war, but especially the framing of the "enemy" endangering Iraq, the Middle East, and the "free" countries of the West, largely contributed to the political support to the war.

On a social level, the debate also focused on the conception of a moral and ideological difference between Europe and the United States, which showed as the EPS strongly rejected the war, identifying the American decision as "unjust" and "immoral". In particular, the distinction was on the "pre-emptive" element: as the Bush administration advocated unprecedented measures for unprecedented dangers, Europeans were still convinced of the validity of the rule of law as the best security practice. A "pre-emptive" war was not only far from "just" within the ethical framework previously discussed, but it also loudly clashed with the vision the US proposed. In other words, individuals in Europe asked for a fundamentally different approach to the "war on terror" that the US waged against Iraq.[252]

In Europe, the protests also concealed an aversion for the American seemingly unlimited power and the political decisions after 9/11. The opposition acquired different meanings: from the rejection of a perceived imperialistic plan to the refusal of diplomatic strategies and therefore multilateralism and the rule of law.[253] Talking about an "anti-Americanism" sentiment is limited, as it is more disdain for the US decision to favour hegemonic unilateralism.[254]

After the beginning of the war, scholars like David Fisher claimed that the Iraq war was an "unjust" war because the justification for the attack did not fit the criteria for a "just" war. First, Iraq was not a direct threat to the United States as there was no objective assessment of the presence of the supposed weapons of mass destruction. Second, the US war cabinet did not conduct assessments to ensure the safety of civilians before the bombings started. Third, the use of force as a response was not what Fisher called "the last resort", as both NATO, the UN, and the EU pushed for other diplomatic interventions.[255]

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[252] M. De Goede, "The politics of preemption and the war on terror in Europe.", *European journal of international relations*, 2008, p. 168.

[253] P. Quaranto, ""The World Says No to War": Transnational Mobilization and Implications of February 15, 2003.", *Notre Dame, Journal of undergraduate research-University of Notre Dame*, 2006, pp. 1 - 12

[254] W.E. Scheuerman, "Review Essay: Global Governance without Global Government? Habermas on Postnational Democracy", *Political Theory*, 2008, pp. 133-151.

[255] D. Fisher, and N. Biggar. "Was Iraq an unjust war? A debate on the Iraq war and reflections in Libya.", *International Affairs*, 2011, pp. 687-707.

The new *jus ad bellum* criteria of the justified response to the unpredictable actions of transnational terrorism massively contributed to the ideological gap between the United States and the European Union on both the political level – represented by the firm opposition of France and Germany alliance – and the social level.

Furthermore, the contemporary interpretation of the "just war" doctrine politically promoted around the premise of what Zilo called the idea of "universal fundamental rights" led to a re-considering of the doctrine. If from an ethical and philosophical perspective intellectuals tended to agree on the previously mentioned doctrine, the US campaign to "export democracy" and protect liberty through military means questioned the American democratic role and practices, including their legitimization to wage war.

The societal opposition highlighted an already-existing dubious approach toward the legitimization of conflict in an era that has been called the "democratic era". The challenge relied on the difficulty of individuals to accept the rhetoric on the assumption that "military" and "democracy" are and can be juxtaposed for the "greater good".

As the concept of humanitarian interventions began to waver after the failure of the establishing of *jus post bellum* conditions in Yugoslavia, the American propaganda to justify the war against Iraq heavily contributed to the hostility toward war as a democratic response to injustice and violations of human rights.

In a way, the February 15th, 2003, protests marked a fundamental change in the American influence on European culture and politics. The Transatlantic partnership was already showing signs of ruptures, but the push that the social demonstrations gave to the EU project contributed to an added motif for the distancing.

Conclusion

Not only did the social demonstrations in Europe mark a material estrangement between the European Union and the United States, but it massively contributed to the rise of two different conceptions of what "liberal democracy" is, and what it stands for within the international community. When commenting on the consequences of the American decision to embark on pre-emptive war, Robert Kagan said:

> "A great philosophical schism has arisen in the West: instead of mutual indifference, a strong antagonism has developed between America and Europe which threatens to weaken both partners in the Atlantic community. This schism, coming at a time in history when new dangers and crises are proliferating rapidly, could have serious consequences. dividing from a strategic point of view has already proved deleterious enough for Europe and the United States. but what will happen if disagreement over the concept of world order were to affect the foundations of what we consider the liberal west? Will the West remain liberal?".[256]

The "antagonism" relied on a specific issue: how can a democratic country allow the use of military force as an expression of democratic values? Even within Western liberal democracy, and their social translation, the military, and democracy are opposites.

To explain how the two can and had been combined, British diplomat adviser Robert Cooper talked about "imperial liberalism" as the historical modification of a modern liberal democracy playing the role of the hegemonic power in a "unipolar" system.[257] At the peak of the unipolar system – post decline of the USSR - the US hegemonic condition allowed the US administrations to exercise their power and still be politically and morally legitimized by those countries that recognized the American status.

The debate originated from the Iraq war highlighted a new condition of "post-modernity" entailing new ideological stances promoted and supported by the EU and the United States under the Bush administration. A strong American "democratic rhetoric" led to what Canfora identified as "democratic extremism", heavily contributing to a distinction into which country is "bad" and which one is "good".[258] As long as countries recognized

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[256] R. Kagan, *Il diritto di fare la guerra: il potere americano e la crisi di legittimità*. A. Mondadori, 2004, pp. 5 - 6

[257] R. Cooper, "Imperial liberalism." *The National Interest*, n. 79, 2005, pp. 25-34.

[258] L. Canfora, *Critica della retorica democratica*, Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa, 2014, pp. 17 - 31

the US and the terms of their democratic "propaganda", they contributed to the legitimization of American actions even in terms of military intervention in other sovereign states.[259] The "exporting democracy" strategy of US foreign policy was presented as the "definitive solution" to the threats the Bush administration identified – terrorism, WMDs, attacks on freedoms and liberties – and intrinsically linked democratic values and American interests.[260]

The February 15th, 2003, demonstrations highlighted a fundamental shift in the global social perception of the American power as guided through democratic virtues, leading to a de-legitimization of US foreign policy at the international level.

The impact that the European civil society had on the EU was the prelude to a broader change at the global level.

The year 2003 seemed to mark "the end of the Atlanticism", as the planned "new Europe" embodied the wish for a re-affirmation of liberal democracy elements that the US forcefully juxtapose with an imperialistic dimension. [261]

Fast forward 20 years, did the Bush doctrine successfully "free" and democratically "restructured" Iraq? Did the Transatlantic partnership survive the ideological division that the American rhetoric caused?

Almost 20 years later, the American global war against terrorism ended. From the 9/11 attacks to the rhetoric and propaganda of the Bush administration, from the failure of the UN multilateralism to the rising anti-American sentiment in Europe, the conflict caused unpredictable consequences to the international environment. After the signing of a deal between the US and the Taliban, the American army left Afghanistan by May 1, 2021.[262] On December 31, 2021, the US completed the operation of withdrawal of US troops from Iraq.[263] Even though the pictures of the US leaving Iraq and Afghanistan are mostly symbolic, given that part of the troops will remain in the Middle East as an advisory and

[259] See for instance the US intervention in Latin America

[260] M.H. Santos, and U.T. Teixeira, "The essential role of democracy in the Bush Doctrine: the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.", *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional,* n. 56, 2013, pp. 131-156.

[261] M. Heffernan. "The end of Atlanticism: Habermas, Derrida and the meaning of Europe in the twenty-first century.", *Geopolitics*, 2005, pp. 570-575.

[262] N.A. Youssef, "Last U.S. Troops Leave Afghanistan After Nearly 20 Years", The Wall Street Journal, 30.08.2021, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/last-u-s-troops-leave-afghanistan-after-nearly-20-years-11630355853 (accessed 21.06.2022)

[263] "The US withdrawal from Iraq and its impact on Baghdad, Erbil, and the relations between them.", *ISPI*, 18.10.2021, available at https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/us-withdrawal-iraq-and-its-impact-baghdad-erbil-and-relations-between-them-31958 (accessed 21.06.2022)

training actor, the factual influence America can exercise over national governments, minority groups, and extremist cells, fundamentally decreased.

How did the United States leave those two countries?

The US foreign policy in the Middle East has been labelled as a "failure", as both Iraq and Afghanistan experienced increased political instability leading to the reinforcement of extremist groups and social division. The American focus in the Middle East proved to be flawed, a real-life example of the dangers of contemporary imperialist strategies justified through democratic rhetoric.[264]

In hindsight, the results of the practical and moral plan drawn in the US foreign policy did not hold long enough for an efficient "reconstruction": already in the early stages of the military intervention, both the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and the one for Iraq talked about the "lessons" for the United States to learn. The difficulty encountered to maintain and sustain the progress made in areas such as education and health care deeply undermined the reasons for an American presence in the Middle East, especially after the Bush's campaign for "exporting democracy".[265] The ethical legitimization previously introduced not only did not fit the *jus ad bellum* criteria, but the war against Iraq failed to cover the *jus post bellum* moral paradigm, as the US troops left Iraq in an unstable state, allowing the re-emergence of past threatening elements.

Translated in today's narrative, the already contested "exporting democracy" plan is still controversial. The United States left Iraq both because on a domestic level there was no ethical legitimization, and because of a shift in the conception of national interests as more important than a US commitment to international issues.

Contemporary issues and changes in the US administrations' approach to foreign policy led to considering conflicts such as the one in Iraq and Afghanistan as "wrong" and expensive in terms of money and human lives.[266]

What is even more relevant is the speech US President Biden gave as the US troops left Afghanistan. On the 16th of August, Biden commented on the issue:

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[264] L. Canfora, *Critica della retorica democratica*, Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa, 2014, pp. 17 - 31

[265] See the Official Web Page for the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, available at https://www.sigar.mil/interactive-reports/what-we-need-to-learn/index.html

[266] See for instance the survey on individuals' perception of Biden's decision to withdraw US troops: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/08/31/majority-of-u-s-public-favors-afghanistan-troop-withdrawal-biden-criticized-for-his-handling-of-situation/

> "Our mission in Afghanistan was never supposed to have been nation building. It was never supposed to be creating a unified, centralized democracy. Our only vital national interest in Afghanistan remains today what it has always been: preventing a terrorist attack on American homeland. I've argued for many years that our mission should be narrowly focused on counterterrorism — not counterinsurgency or nation building. That's why I opposed the surge when it was proposed in 2009 when I was Vice President. And that's why, as President, I am adamant that we focus on the threats we face today in 2021 — not yesterday's threats.".[267]

On the 31st, the US President reiterated how the war in Afghanistan was only about the "global" fight on terrorism:

> "As we turn the page on the foreign policy that has guided our nat- — our nation the last two decades, we've got to learn from our mistakes. To me, there are two that are paramount. First, we must set missions with clear, achievable goals — not ones we'll never reach. And second, we must stay clearly focused on the fundamental national security interest of the United States of America. This decision about Afghanistan is not just about Afghanistan. It's about ending an era of major military operations to remake other countries.
>
> We saw a mission of counterterrorism in Afghanistan -getting the terrorists and stopping attacks — morph into a counterinsurgency, nation building - trying to create a democratic, cohesive, and unified Afghanistan - something that has never been done over the many centuries of ~~Afghans'~~ [Afghanistan's] history.". [268]

The new American political agenda focused on re-establishing the role of the United States as the "champion of democracy" within the international community.

The Biden administration convened a forum named the "Summit for Democracy" to discuss a collective plan to promote human rights and fight corruption at the global level. The controversial element to an unseeingly common event was the list of participants the United States invited. If the assumption was that democratic countries all over the world could participate, how did the US ended up asking to come to known non-democratic countries and not ask certain democratic countries?[269]

[267] The White House Speeches and Remarks, 16.08.2021 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/16/remarks-by-president-biden-on-afghanistan/

[268] The White House Speeches and Remarks, "On the end of the war in Afghanistan", 31.08.2021 available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/

[269] "Usa: Summit for Democracy o for Biden?", ISPI, online edition, 10.12.2021, available at https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/ispitel-usa-summit-democracy-o-biden-32633 (accessed 20.06.2022)

The American decision puts into question the identification of what democracy is. One example is the labelling of the State of Israel as "the only democracy in the Middle East" despite the numerous proofs of governments' violation of human rights and liberties of the minorities and, as an extreme, the Palestinian situation.[270]

After the Bush's campaign to forcefully promote democracy failed, the strategy changed in favour of a cooperative and colloquial attempt at establishing a "universal" democracy.[271] The project on the international future of democracy is sponsored by both the US and the EU, and it relies on the assumption that the higher the number of democratic countries is, the higher the chances to have democracy flourish at the international level. Even if the goal is similar, as it is intrinsic to the contemporary practice of Western liberal democracy, the way it is carried out is different.

The European debate on a possible distinction between the "American" and the "European" idea of (liberal) democracy, and consequently the distinction within liberal democracies in Western terms, made it difficult to properly draw a clear line between liberal and "illiberal" democracies. Especially in Europe, the modern discussions on what democracy "should be" and how a democratic state should act deeply contributed to national differences in practices and values.[272] Here it is interesting to note the work of "cultural policy measures" the EU sponsored to foster a "cultural democracy", meaning the promotion of a collective identity without repressive methods. This project partially contributed to spreading specific democratic values.[273]

Unfortunately, not all countries members of the European Union enjoy strong democratic governments in terms of legitimization. This situation led to a rise in the influence of political parties fostering anti-European sentiments, that in turn led to a problem for the EU and its influence.

A "post-democracy" condition is increasingly possible, but it is up to liberal democracies to decide in what terms democratic practices can be adapted.

The discussion on what "type" of democracy should Western countries "export" between the American market democracy and the European one is still relevant to this day. As the

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[270] M. Beck. "Israel: A Democratic State." *E-International Relations*, 2019

[271] D. Gallo, "Splendori e miserie dell'Occidente", *MicroMega*, 9.12.2021, available at: https://www.micromega.net/splendori-e-miserie-occidente/

[272] Here I am referring to the descriptive background Jonathan Wolff provided in "An Introduction to Political Philosophy"

[273] M. Mokre, "European cultural policies and European democracy." *The journal of arts management, law, and society* 37.1, 2007, pp. 31-47.

American strategy failed resoundingly, the discussion also focused on possible alternatives to the project: how about we leave countries and national civil societies to find their way toward democracy?[274]

For instance, the 2011 Arab Spring partially proved that the "waves of democratization" phenomenon can still take place without a direct – forceful – intervention. One of the lessons we learned after 20 years of conflict is that war cannot promote human rights and liberties. Up to date, there is no historical proof of the validity of the "exporting democracy" strategy using force.

To this day, the United States can still count on the Transatlantic partnership. The political class of European countries – Italy in pole position – materially supported the US foreign strategy for years and as governments changed. The American failure in Iraq and in Afghanistan also highlighted a failure in the international role of Europe as a "champion for democracy".[275] Even though the European strategic support during the wars did happen, there is a rising awareness about the impossibility of "promoting democracy" by military means.[276]

In Europe, we recently assisted to another international event that shook the foundations of Europe and the Transatlantic partnership: the Russian military intervention in Ukraine.

"The transatlantic partnership stands stronger and more united than ever".[277] On the 25th of March 2022, the President of the European Commission von der Leyen issued a public statement re-establishing the solidity of the cooperation between the European Union and the United States. The reason behind a renewed public US-EU partnership is the Russian decision to invade Ukrainian territory on February 24.[278]

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[274] C. Sciuto, "Esportare la democrazia non si può. Promuoverla e difenderla di deve.", *MicroMega*, 18.06.2021, available at https://www.micromega.net/esportare-la-democrazia-non-si-puo-promuoverla-e-difenderla-si-deve/ (accessed 22.06.2022)

[275] "E sono ancora tutti lì", *MicroMega*, 23.08.2021, available at https://www.micromega.net/e-sono-ancora-tutti-li/ (accessed 22.06.2022)

[276] "I talebani? Ora si rischia un effetto emulazione. Coinvolgere più Paesi per cercare vie d'uscita", *Il Corriere della Sera*, online version, 9.09.2021, available at https://www.corriere.it/esteri/21_settembre_09/gabrielli-talebani-attacchi-occidente-c46e43b2-10dd-11ec-ab7a-b73971e4222a.shtml (accessed 22.06.2022)

[277] European Commission, Press Corner, "Statement by President von der Leyen with US President Biden", 25.03.2022, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_22_2043 (accessed 22.06.2022)

[278] "From the Maidan protests to Russia's invasion: Eight years of conflict in Ukraine", *France24*, 28.02.2002, available at https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220228-from-the-maidan-protests-to-russia-s-invasion-eight-years-of-conflict-in-ukraine

Talking about the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 can be useful for two main reasons: to contextualize the contemporary form of the Transatlantic partnership, and to see if there are still traces of the European social and philosophical debate on democracy.

Addressing his nation, Russian President Putin spoke about a familiar topic, referring to the "end of the unipolar condition".[279] His words recalled the never-ending geopolitical issue of a "unipolar" world where the United States plays as a hegemonic power and exercise influence over cultural, political, and economic aspects. It is no secret that the geopolitical analysis of a "unipolar" global condition has been recently challenged and theorized the rise of "polar" powerful countries such as the People's Republic of China, and now Russia.

The difference with the US war against Iraq is not only in the rhetoric used but also in the way it is perceived. Make no mistakes: Western countries do not consider Russia a democracy.[280] The Russian de-democratization experience and transition to a more authoritarian regime is part of a "setback" in-between the "waves of democratization".[281] A non-democratic country invading a – "transitioning" – democratic state, and the framing of the war as an "attack on democracy", leaves us with questioning the validity of the "just war" ethics.[282] Is a war "just" according to a collectively imposed set of norms, or is a war "just" because of certain rhetoric and propaganda? If we analyse both Iraq and Ukraine, the key problem in both cases is not to wage a "war on terror" or effectively start a "de-Nazification" process, but rather an "imperialist" tendency.[283] In this sense, it would be interesting to recall the gaffe former US President George W. Bush made, calling out Russian President Putin's "decision […] to launch a wholly unjustified and brutal invasion of Iraq", confusing Ukraine with the 2003 war against Saddam Hussein.[284]

As in the case of Iraq, organizers of the European Social Forum issued a statement "to the organizations, groups and networks from all over Europe that took part in the first

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[279] CNN YouTube channel, "Putin speech delayed by "massive" cyberattacks, according to Kremlin", available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OjszRJSQJj4 (accessed 22.06.2022)

[280] Freedom House classified Russia as "not free". See Freedom House, *Russia*, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/russia

[281] M. McFaul, "Russia's Road to Autocracy", *Journal of Democracy*, October 2021, available at https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/russias-road-to-autocracy/

[282] See statement issued by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi available at https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/vladimir-putin-assault-on-ukraine-is-attack-on-democracy-nancy-pelosi-122022400029_1.html (accessed 22.06.2022)

[283] T. Bilous, "La guerra in Ucraina, la sicurezza internazionale e la sinistra", *MicroMega*, 31.05.2022, available at https://www.micromega.net/guerra-in-ucraina-sinistra/

[284] Associated Press YouTube channel, "George W. Bush confuses Iraq with Ukraine in gaffe", available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eH3QqcUJnBY&t=1s (accessed 22.06.2022)

European Social Forum held in Florence in 2002, to the new generation of European collective actors and social movements, to all networks, organizations and associations across the whole Continent which might be interested" to meet on the 12th and 13th of November of this year and discuss a collective response to the conflict and the role the EU should play as a democratic power. [285] From one side, the social European component asks for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, from the other it praises the quick response of the EU and the solidarity shown to Ukrainian citizens.[286]

"Just" or "unjust" wars, unipolar and bipolar, this terminology is often associated with the "power politics" realm. The European social and philosophical debate on democracy first put into question the idea that all democracies could ensure a peaceful international environment, and then proposed a re-establishment of the concept of "democratic practices". The updated definition of the "liberal democracy" the EU sponsored - which is neither new nor fundamentally different from the American one – rejects hegemony and hegemonic actions. Nevertheless, with the public framing of the legitimation of the support to Ukraine in terms of exporting arms, the EU indirectly entered the conflict side by side with the US.

A possible projection of the European debate on democracy and the promotion of democratic values must consider the invasion of Ukraine as an essential component. The so-called "derailment of democracy" negatively impacted strategies of democracy promotion, shifting the focus on how to protect unstable new democracies rather than how to turn authoritarian countries into democracies.[287]

Only time will tell if the European Union will be capable of channeling the lessons of the failure of the American plan for Iraq and Afghanistan. Overall, the European debate on George W. Bush's campaign to "export democracy" is still relevant to this day, as it provided us with an alternative vision of democratic values and practices.

As the talks on the EU enlargement are making a comeback, it will be interesting to see how the expansion will end up in terms of development of democratic ideals.

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[285] See the call posted on https://ripess.eu/en/home/european-social-forum-firenze-2022-call-for-participation/ (accessed 22.06.2022)

[286] See "EU's response to the war in Ukraine | May 2022 | European Commission", available at https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/browse/all/series/301000 (accessed 22.06.2022)

[287] "Supporting Democracy After the invasion of Ukraine", available at https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/06/14/supporting-democracy-after-invasion-of-ukraine-pub-87290

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