Master's Degree Programme

Comparative International Relations

Master's Degree Thesis

Ethnic conflict regulation in South Tyrol and Bosnia-Herzegovina: how consociational democracy arrangements led to different conditions and concept of peace.

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Academic Year
2021/2022

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank all the people that have helped me in the achievement of this degree, from the beginning of my journey to the final writing of my dissertation. Although they have been two difficult years, marked by the health emergency, and characterized by distance learning, with few moments of sharing and active participation in courses, I am grateful to all the people who have supported me on this work.

I would like, first, to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Öktem Kerem Halil-Latif, who assisted and guided me throughout this work. I would like to address a really big thank you for his professional help, for the precious feedback, corrections and for his human support. I would also like to thank the professor for his helpfulness and professionalism throughout the writing of the thesis, always making himself sympathetic and moreover for their insightful comments and suggestions. Moreover, I would also like to thank him for having inspire me through the realization of my thesis, since my last exam, held by Professor Kerem, was very stimulating, rich in current elements and case studies, and dragging for the completion of my course of study.

Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to all the people that have supported me in these two years. A big thank you goes also to all my family for their support and understanding, and for allowing me, each one according to their own possibilities and capabilities, to achieve this important milestone.

Finally, a big thank you also goes to all my friends, both to lifelong friends, who have always spurred me on in pursuits of my goals, and to those I have met along that path. I have learnt a lot form your determination and your dedication to business.

Introduction

Among the many challenges faced by modern states, one of the most demanding is to allow different ethnic groups to coexist in the same country or region. In the last century, the two World Wars first, and ideological opposition during the 'Cold war', with the dissolution of the Soviet Union then, have changed the European geopolitical scenarios. The course of history has therefore led several European regions to have to tackle the problem of coexistence between different ethnic groups and the resolution of ethnic conflicts. However, this does not mean that ethnic conflicts have never existed before. In the last few decades, the studies of several scholars have led to a more detailed analysis of what lies at the root of these conflicts, and which are the best answers to ethnic conflict resolution.

As stated by Coakley (2009, p.462), 'ethnic conflicts are not just a ubiquitous feature of modern life; they are also commonly characterised by an intensity that makes their resolution not just of exceptional importance but also of extraordinary difficulty'.

Ethnic conflicts and its practice of resolution is therefore the main topic which is at the basis of our research. The interest for this particular issue originates from the troubled situation which generated after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia when the formation of new independent states led the region to face with new political, economic and civic challenges. However, following some study research, I wondered about the fact that over the years other regions faced this challenge, however, by achieving different outcomes. In particular, a region which deserves particular attention, and which have been an example for other countries is the case of South Tyrol and its practices for the ethnic conflict resolution. For this reason, our dissertation will tackle the problem of coexistence and conflict resolution between different ethnic groups by offering power sharing practice and consociationalism theory as the main elements of our research. In our dissertation a comparative case study method will be used, through analyses and quantitative research, through archival papers, reports, articles, and official correspondence, in order to understand how and why particular programmes or policies work or fail to work in the Bosnian situation. Moreover, we should also consider a difference in timeline and historical situation between the two cases. South Tyrol conflict might be restricted from the end of WWI until half of the twentieth century while the Bosnian conflict could be limited from the end of the 'cold war' and early 2000s.

Starting from our research question we will tackle the issue by comparing the two cases under various levels and perspectives in order to achieve the expected outcomes and answer to our sub questions. Our main question is based on the fact that consociational democracy arrangements have led to a situation that Galtung has described as 'positive peace' in South Tyrol, whereas in the case of Bosnia-

Herzegovina, the same approach has only created conditions of an uneasy co-existence. In answering to our main question, both the historical and institutional context and several power sharing elements led the two case studies to achieve different outcomes in the course of the countries' historical and institutional evolution. In this regard, the main point about the thesis is to bring to the reader a clear vision of what the south Tyrol model is, which are the main elements and features which characterised the practice and how we can compare it to other existing case studies, in particular the Bosnian conflict, in order to understand conflict dynamics in different geopolitical regions, identified with divergent values and culture. Moreover, our comparative analysis

Starting from the research question, the main topic of our thesis is to analyse the two cases, south Tyrol, and Bosnia, in order to understand how the two models have reached respectively positive and negative peace. Moreover, we will try to comprehend more specifically which conditions on the local, national, and international level consociational democracy failed to produce a lasting positive peace in the Bosnian conflict while the South Tyrol model reached a successful condition of coexistence between several linguistic groups. Nevertheless, these concepts will be the result of an analyses about how the context played a significant role in the evolution of the two conflicts and which players had a key role in the management of the dispute, both national and international actors. Our research will develop therefore by considering some sub questions in order to ameliorate and deepen our analyses. Based on our comparative method between the two cases, we will try to comprehend which are the main differences in terms of historical background, arrangements, actors, and institutions. Starting from a literature review in the first chapter, where we will give the redear a detail description about the main concepts of power sharing, consociationalism and peace, in the second chapter we will provide the reader with a comparative design in order to arrange the basis for the comparative analyses that will be discussed in the third chapter. In this research design chapter will be outlined the main elements for our comparative analyses. Subsequently, the main power sharing conditions will be provided in order to understand why the same arrangements led to different outcomes. In a third section, the analyses will have focused on the distinct levels of governance since both case studies have been affected by external and international actors.

Furthermore, we will try to answer to other two engaging sub questions; the first concerns the Bosnian arrangement, in particular, we wonder if the BiH consociational arrangement can be improved or if it is doomed to collapse in the following years. The second question is strictly connected with the South Tyrolean model, and we wonder whether exists some feasible alternatives for the Bosnian region given the fact that emulation of South Tyrol has not produced the expected outcomes since the end of the conflict but has indeed strengthened the ethnic divide of the country. According to the first question we can state that to date, there is no definitive and clear answer with respect to the situation

in the country. What we can state is the fact that the model established after the end of the war is not politically sustainable; the Dayton accords stiffened the ethnic cleavage among the various groups, and for that reason the arrangements cannot be implemented given the decision-making capacity of individual groups, mainly the Serb Republic. On the other hand, however, it can be said that this model is also not doomed to fail in its entirety for the fact that the region is constantly monitored and viewed by both the European Union and other international powers and organizations. In this regard, the role of globalization has reduced borders and increased relations between countries' political and economical dynamics. Regarding the second question, what we can affirm is that there is no real replacement model that can be inspired by the example of South Tyrol and that can solve the internal political and economic evolution of a specific country. What we have understood is the fact that the temporary situation of negative peace can be implemented and converted to a situation of peaceful coexistence through the introduction of specific elements and conditions that characterize such a power-sharing practice. For this reason, in the third comparative chapter, we will provide the reader with the current political, economic, and social situation. However, before extending the analysis into the purely political and social situation, the paper will provide an historical background of the two cases, by outlining some specific concepts related to the historical context. In particular, we will analyse which elements, within each specific case, led the regions to ethnic conflict, deepening our research into specific dynamics of behaviour and attitudes. Consequently, actors and institutional arrangements will be the subject of analysis in order to perceive if and how the two cases managed and performed political developments.

Nevertheless, the following work includes some limitations. Since the comparative research is applied to two existing countries, the paper would have more credibility and a greater amount of data through a qualitative research method, based on field interviews, also in order to perceive and comprehend citizens feelings and tendency in their respective thoughts. Moreover, this method would have favoured the reader to understand how the different ethnic groups behave with each other and if there exist a distinction between elite political groups and masses.

Chapter One

Literature Review

Stability in deeply divided societies is a matter which encloses several theories and concepts. Over the years, the whole literature concerning this topic has significantly increased. In the last few decades, the notions of power sharing, consociationalism and consociational democracy are among those that found more research. For this reason, the main objective of the first chapter will be the study of these approaches and its relationship with the concept of peace research.

South Tyrol dispute and Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnic conflict will provide the two case studies which compose our dissertation in order to explain and define these theories and concepts. More specifically, our research question relies on the description of which factors explain the different outcomes in the two case studies. In fact, consociational democracy arrangements have led the two countries to a different situation that Galtung has described as 'positive peace' in South Tyrol, whereas in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the same approach has only created conditions of troubled cohabitation.

Analysis of such approaches is important for the fact that quite often the concepts of power sharing and consociationalism are considered synonyms. For this reason, the purpose of the first chapter is to give the reader some definitions about the main concepts and theories underlying our study in order to better understand the evolution of the two case studies and its path towards peace.

The chapter will first analyse and discuss the idea of consociationalism and its importance in the resolution of ethnic conflict, introducing its institutional framework and by listing the options for consociational arrangements. In relation with the theoretical approach of consociationalism, the paper will examine the favourable factors for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. The interpretation of these factors has been studied and researched extensively over the years, so much that these elements are among the most contested in the study of consociationalism. Since the first studies and research conducted by the main scholars on this field, consociational democracy's favourable factors have been debated in order to state which were essentials for the establishment and the preservation of a consociational democracy. Nevertheless, these factors are among the most challenged characteristics of consociationalism. According to Lijphart and others, over the years, favourable elements have been studied and highlighted. In the next paragraphs, the paper will offer a specific section to outline these factors. There are, however, negative factors and criticisms over this practice. The main common negative element is based on the fact that this form of democratic power sharing has in some cases fostered the increase of ethnic cleavage between the

various ethnic groups, probably because of imposed external practices and institutions which do not comprehend the real situation of the country, very often driven by other geopolitical reasons and that did not favour the consociative solution.

Moreover, the chapter will also discuss the difference between favourable factors themselves and their status, thus raising the question between two different approaches in consociational theory, the deterministic and the voluntaristic one. In relation with the establishment of consociational democracy, the chapter will also outline the distinction between the conditions which characterize the democratic transition process and the democratic consolidation process.

In a second section the concept of power sharing will be defined. In fact, if on one hand consociationalism and consociational democracy are the main characteristics of our two case studies, on the other hand, the practice of power sharing in conflict resolution encloses consociationalism as one of the two common theoretical approaches. It is thus important to make a distinction between the two terms, whereas power sharing is a method in conflict resolution, while consociationalism is a specific system of democratic power sharing. Additionally, both the elements of power sharing institutional arrangements and the conditions for a successful power sharing will be outlined.

The third section of this chapter will tackle the concept of peace and its theories related to the peace research. In particular, the definition of this notion will be important to comprehend the outcomes of our research question, and why two different interpretations of peace have been associated with the two case studies. To this regard, in order to better understand these two interpretations, the concept of personal and structural violence will be defined and analysed.

1.1 Resolution of ethnic conflict: consociationalism

In relation to these studies, the sensibility, and the awareness of the pervasive concept of ethnic conflict and ethnic diversity has considerably enhanced its position among intercultural relations.

Over the years different methods for the resolution of ethnic conflicts has been advanced and studied. In this first section what we are going to explore is a form of democratic power sharing which has been proposed and adapted to our two case studies, the South Tyrol dispute, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnic conflict. However, before analysing the main characteristics of this form of power sharing it is important to define the concept.

As stated by Rohwerder (2020, p.3) "consociationalism, a leading form of power-sharing, has been used in violently divided societies as a means to end wars and build peace by aiming to ensure the

widespread inclusion of all ethnopolitical groups in the processes of 'executive, legislative, judicial, bureaucratic, military, and cultural power". This form of democratic power sharing, different from the concept of power sharing in general, has been used as a model in order to build state capacity in post conflict societies. As we will see later in the next chapters, both South Tyrol and Bosnia-Herzegovina enclose this definition in their path towards the conflict resolution. However, the two case studies, as stated by our research question has led the two countries to different outcomes in terms of peace. For this reason, in order to better explicate these differences, it is important to underline the institutional framework of consociationalism by outlining which are the options for consociational arrangements.

1.1.1 Consociational institutional framework

As with all theoretical approaches, consociationalism also needs to establish an institutional framework in order to regulate and implement the precondition for the success of the approach.

However, before proceeding with the options that govern consociational arrangements, in the past few decades there has been an incompetence to expect, demonstrate and resolve ethnic conflicts. To this regard, Isajiw[1] attributes this inability to the preconceived frameworks and paradigms through which the ethnic phenomenon has been understood. In fact, the author defines three types of such preconceptions: the preconception of ethnic groups as pre-modern, the self-conception of the majority group in society as non-ethnic and the often assumed 'command' character of the mandate carried out by appointed administrators dealing with minority ethnic groups.

Moreover, what is even more important for the definition of consociational arrangements is the ability to acknowledge the significance of the principle of identity recognition, considered as a basic meta principle of interethnic relations. In fact, it is precisely the principle of identity recognition one of the key options for the adoption of consociational arrangements.

In order to better define this concept, Lijphart outlined four key institutional arrangements that consociationalism should have. As reported by Rohwerder (2020, p.3-4), in his consociationalism model Lijphart outlined executive power-sharing, namely grand coalition between elites of each pillar; proportionality rules in political representation based on population; mutual vetoes in order to

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[1] Isajiw, Wsevolod W (2000) 'Approaches to ethnic conflict resolution: paradigms and principles', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 24: pp.105-124.

favour minorities to successfully block the majority; group autonomy, meaning the right to run their own affairs and allow for different culturally-based community laws.

As a matter of fact, the compatibility between such arrangements and the ethnic composition of the question have led several disputes to a successful outcome over the years. As we will see in the next chapters, South Tyrol is a clear example of how these arrangements are seen as successful at bringing peace and ending violence. Furthermore, these provisions ensure political stability and minimize inter-group divisions, by establishing trust among the political elite.

Moreover, it should be said that consociational arrangements can differ through two distinct aspects. In particular, scholars accentuated the distinction between corporate and liberal consociationalism. As defined by Carlà (2018, p.252), "the former accommodates groups by identifying them in advance based on ascriptive criteria, thereby assuming group identities as fixed, whereas liberal consociationalism rewards groups that have emerged spontaneously in democratic elections, making room for a constructivist understanding of ethnic identity as fluid and flexible". In relation with our two cases, it can be said that both South Tyrol and Bosnia-Herzegovina are characterised by an elaborate political autonomy and corporate consociational measures to protect linguistic groups minorities as in the case of South Tyrol and ethnic linguistic, religious, and cultural divide in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Consociational arrangements have also been criticised on various grounds. Firstly, experts on the ground reported the problem of enforceability also due to undemocratic and ineffective provisions. Secondly, they argued that consociational arrangements led to government impasse and political instability. Thirdly, it consolidated divisive identities, which are at the basis of ethnic conflict, by empowering ethnic elites and thus diminishing incentives for cooperation and moderation. It should be borne in mind, however, that these criticisms cannot be generalized for all ethnic conflicts. Deeply divided societies are characterized by specific elements, and it is for this reason that we will analyse the notion of consociational democracy and its factors.

1.1.2 Power distribution through consociational democracy

The literature over this argument has led other scholars to try to define this theoretical approach and its way of governing ethnic divided societies through consociational democracy. This form of democratic power sharing is thus essential in order to maintain a stability by cooperation between subcultures at the elite level in a state or region where major internal divisions along ethnic, religious

or linguistic are persistent. In the next subsections we will thus analyse firstly which are the favourable factors that define this type of government and then how the literature have developed over this concept, focus the attention on other elements that favour the study of this form of power sharing.

This concept was first theorised by Arend Lijphart, one of the main experts and scholars in this field, when the path of the consociational research agenda was introduced in his article in World Politics, 'Consociational Democracy,' in 1969. "Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy" (Lijphart 1969, p.216).

In particular, based on Gabriel Abraham Almond's contribution, who wrote in 1956 the work 'Comparative Political Systems', where he determines three types of Western democratic system: Anglo-American political systems, Continental European political systems and a third grouping including Scandinavian and Low Countries, Lijphart improved and clarified what had been theorised by Almond. As reported by Lustick (1997, p.92), Lijphart argued that there was a need for a new category in Almond's typology of democracies, able to guarantee a heterogeneous society and stable democracy. Such a model is precisely what Lijphart offered in his 1969 World Politics article. He described it as a 'research note,' intended as a constructive attempt to refine and elaborate Almond's typology of democracies, a typology anchored in the expectation of democratic stability in socially integrated societies and of instability in fragmented societies. It is precisely based on Almond's work that a typology of political system emerged. In fact, in accordance with the theory of crosscutting cleavages, and to what have been stated by Almond in his threefold typology, one would expect political stagnation and instability for those countries with subcultures divided from each other by mutually reinforcing cleavages. However, contrary to what has been said, this deviant case of fragmented but stable democracies will be called by Lijphart as 'consociational democracies.' The analysis of this unusual attitude of some countries led the recognition of additional relevant variables. One of these factors, considered as one of the key elements of consociational democracies, is the behaviour of the political elites. In fact, as stated by Lijphart (1969, p.212) "the leaders of the rival subcultures may engage in competitive behaviour and thus further aggravate mutual tensions and political instability, but they may also make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and destabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation".

This contribution will thus characterise the concept of 'consociational democracy' and the elements that will make this theory important for the wider field of comparative politics.

1.1.3 The favourable factors for consociational democracy

Over the years, the study of this type of government, where elite behaviour played the key role to turn democracy with fragmented political culture into a stable democracy, has been revised several times, so much that Lijphart, proposed four different lists of favourable factors, the first published in 1968 and the last in 1985. It is also important to specify that the author has conducted this research inductively from the experience in consociational democracies, and not from consociational theory itself. Building on Almond's work on political systems, Lijphart's analyses focused on successful consociational democracies in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, and Lebanon, which favoured the inductive source of the favourable factors.

According to Bogaards[2], in the late sixties Arend Lijphart, considered as the leading authority on consociationalism, introduced the model of consociational democracy to explain political stability in plural societies. In fact, over the years Lijphart's work revised and enhanced Almond's study about his famous typology of political system, first expounded in 1956, advancing a series of favourable factors for consociational democracy. Nowadays, these factors are among the most contested elements of consociation, although consociationalism itself has received important criticism over the years.

Before going into the details of favourable factors it should be said that these four publications, 1968, 1969, 1977 and 1985 respectively, where Lijphart mentions a total of fourteen favourable factors, demonstrate firstly the lack of theoretical consistency and secondly what we have already said, that is to say a pragmatic disagreement in finding positive opinions among scholars and experts.

In the first list, in 1968, Lijphart presented six favourable factors. According to the author the favourable factors of consociational democracy to explain political stability in plural societies were: distinct lines of cleavage between subcultures, a multiple balance of power among the subcultures, external threats, a relatively low load on the system, moderate nationalism and popular attitudes favourable to government by grand coalition. The following year, this list was amended by adding two additional factors. In particular, after adding the length of time a consociational democracy has been in operation, the internal political cohesion of the subcultures and an adequate articulation of the subcultures interest, moderate nationalism's factor has been removed and the elite role has been replaced with a widespread approval of government by elite cartel. In 1977 when the author published

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[2] Bogaards, Matthijs (1998) 'The favourable factors for consociational democracy: a review', *European Journal of Political Research,* 33: pp.475-496.

his third list, after a detailed comparative research between some European consociational democracies, some changes have been analysed and introduced. To this regard, the link between size and consociationalism has gained more importance. In particular population size played a significant role in relation to conosciational arrangements, so much that in this list three of the four effects are regrouped under the heading of small population size. Furthermore, the author added the tradition of elite accommodation.

As reported by Bogaards (1998, p.478) the considerable work made by Lijphart during his studies led the author in 1985 to implement and enhance the list of these factors. Geographical concentration of segments, as first element of these factors, refers to a defined distinction between the different ethnic groups of a region and this factor exemplifies the feasibility of consociational practice. Another factor included into the list is no majority segment plus segment of equal size. This element implies the equal cooperation and political weight between ethnic groups without the overlap or dominance of one specific group. In addition, ethnic groups dimension and consistency are considered to be essential for this type of governance, as the leadership of a single group destabilizes the political stability of the country. Small number of segments, as stated in the previous factors, explains that the fewer the number of segments a country, the greater the possibility of establishing and achieving a better result in the practice of consociative democracy. The same reasoning can be applied to the small population size factor. In this regard, it is undeniable that populous states, characterize by different ethno-linguistic groups, are less likely to fulfil this requirement of consociational democracy. Another favourable characteristic includes external threats. In fact, it has been discussed that the presence of dangerous elements from outside led to the cohesion of subcultures both at mass and elite level, favouring the participation and assistance between groups. Consociationalism, defined as a form of democratic power sharing, requires however an essential element which is overarching loyalties. This feature offers the general political position among the groups and depicts the level of cohesion among the entire society or a particular section. The last two factors developed by Lijphart are the tradition of elite accommodation and socioeconomic equality. The first supports the activity of political leaders, by arguing in favour of a coalition rather than contradictory decision-making, while the second asserts the role of financial redistribution, by stating that elite cooperation can be threatened by relatively deprived segments.

However, although Lijphart's work have made a great contribution for the following literature and study research of consociational democracies, it should also be considered that efforts at consociationalism are not necessarily successful, given the several examples of consociational designs failed over the years.

1.1.4 Factors conducive to consociational democracy at different levels

Lijphart introduced the model of consociational democracy to explain political stability in plural societies, by highlighting elite behaviour as the missing link between a plural society and political stability. By defining consociational democracy as the general cooperation at the elite level with the intentional attempt of counteracting collapsing tendencies in the system, Lijphart stated that segmental leaders of some consociational democracies succeeded in achieving what he terms as a self-negating prediction or prophecy. What has been ascertained in the analysis of such theory is the fact that, if a specific circumstance is predicted, then actors involved in that specific situation will respond to avoid and counteract the elements that would lead to a tough situation, or as in our specific case, to ethnic conflict. In this regard, one of the purposes of our thesis is that of understanding the reasons why South Tyrol leaders turned this prophecy into positive cooperation, while in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, masses and political and ethnic leaders' relationship did not favour the establishment of such democratic practice.

For this reason, in order to better understand which conditions, favour the creation and the establishment of a consociational democracy, it is necessary to analyse this type of democratic power sharing on several levels. These have to do with inter-subcultural relations at the elite level, inter-subcultural relations at the mass level and elite-mass relations within each of the subcultures. All these three levels are crucial for the functioning of this practice since political stability in plural societies is significantly characterised by actor-oriented factors, in particular elites' behaviour. Inter-subcultural relation among elites' groups implies reliable cooperation and no predominance within ethnic groups cohabitation. According to the intercultural relations at the mass level, the more the masses are separated, with well-demarcated ethnic cleavage, the greater the probability for good practice of such a form of democratic government. The third level refers to overarching loyalties and political cohesion within ethnic groups, in particular, what is important to highlight is the political recognition for masses over elites cartel in order to favour consociational democracy.

In fact as affirmed by Lijphart (1969, p.216), "successful consociational democracy requires: first that the elites have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures; secondly this requires that they have the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival subcultures; thirdly, this in turn depends on their commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability and finally, all of the

above requirements are based on the assumption that the elites understand the perils of political fragmentation". According to the first trait, relations among the elites of the subcultures is strictly related to the length of time a consociational democracy has been in operation. In fact, the more cohesive the cooperation at the elite level and the greater will be the consolidation of consociational norms. In fact, the establishment of elite cooperation favour the coexistence between ethnic groups and contribute to consolidate consociational norms in order to avoid competitive reactions to political challenge. Consequently, elite cooperation could acquire through time a strong degree of participation and assistance so much that these norms may become an essential element of the political socialisation of elites. The second characteristic refers to inter-subcultural relations at the mass level, the distinct boundaries among subcultures which distinguish consociational countries. Particularly, in redefining and reshaping Almond's work, Lijphart analyses the inter-subcultural relations at the mass level, thus evaluating an additional level and actor in the understanding of consociational theory. To this regard, the distinct lines of cleavage between subcultures appear to be more productive for political stability since ethnic divide may coexist without necessarily being in conflict. In fact, if on one side Almond's pattern of political cultures, like the Continental European type or the consociational type, are not so well defined, on the other side consociational countries have even clearer boundaries among their subcultures.

The third level is characterised by the elite-mass relation within the subcultures. Specifically, what gets highlighted is the cleavage lines' degree among subcultures, in particular the importance they have in terms of its contribution for consociational democracy, because they are likely to be complementary with a high degree of internal political cohesion of the subcultures. As stated by Lijphart (1969, p.221), "the elites have to cooperate and compromise with each other without losing the allegiance and support of their own rank and file. When the subcultures are cohesive political blocs, such support is more likely to be forthcoming."

1.1.5 The favourable factors and their status: determinism and voluntarism theory

During the twentieth century, favourable factors' debate has received a lot of attention to the extent that new theories have emerged. In this section, we will try therefore to outline determinism and voluntarism theory, by widening the research over the status of favourable factors.

However, we can distinguish real requirements for consociational democracy into two different lists, by using the concepts of factors and conditions in order to differentiate the terms of 'preconditions' and 'requirements'. According to the first list, "the 'prerequisites' for consociational democracy are the ability to recognize the dangers inherent in a fragmented system, the commitment to system maintenance, the ability to transcend subcultural cleavages at the elite level and the ability to forge appropriate solutions for the demands of the subcultures. On the contrary, the second list with 'requirements' for consociational democracy is substantially the same, basically altering their sequence" (Lijphart 1968, p.22-25).

Over the years this consideration has gained further relevance, so much that this debate relates to the importance of favourable factors themselves and also their status.

However, this concept of status, which is to say the role and the condition scholars and experts allocate to these favourable factors, has been discussed between two different conceptions in consociational theory, the determinism theory, and the voluntarism theory.

As previously mentioned, the status of factors is discussed between two different conceptions in consociational theory, determinism, and voluntarism, which are also named as 'orthodox' and 'latitudinarians.' Among the leading exponents of these two theories there are Adriano Pappalardo[3] and Arend Lijphart, the former considered as an 'orthodox' and the latter as a 'latitudinarian.'

According to Bogaards (1998, p.487) "the former considers the favourable factors as conditions, as sufficient and necessary conditions for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy, while the latter consider the favourable factors as nothing more than helpful circumstances, enhancing the probability that a consociational democracy will be established and can be maintained". In particular, the determinism theory has been remarkably important when Pappalardo argued in favour of only two favourable factors in order to establish and consolidate a consociational democracy. In fact, during his studies, the scholar analysed in detail the presence or the absence of these factors in three European consociational democracies, concluding that only stability among subcultures and elite predominance were considered as sufficient and necessary conditions for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. On the contrary, after having presented and discussed the favourable factors for consociational democracy listed by Lijphart, it can be said that neither the stability among subcultures nor the elite predominance are among the favourable conditions listed by the author during his four series of conditions.

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[3] Pappalardo, Adriano (1981) 'The conditions for consociational democracy: a logical and empirical critique', *European Journal of Political Research*, 9(4): pp.365–390.

In fact, according to Lijphart, one of the key points for his view on the status of the favourable factors is traced by using an elite-centred approach where factors are conditional variables based on elite decisions, not on consociational democracy itself, thus reducing the predictive value of the favourable factors. From that comparative investigation, the favourable factors occupy a prominent place in Lijphart's work on consociationalism, so much so that, in his three earliest major comparative publications, favourable factors assume more space than the characteristics of consociational democracy. This approach is confirmed by the author when in 1977, the list of favourable factors was redefined, after acknowledging some implications provided by the interpretation of Daalder, by adding a further element, the traditions of elite-accommodation. In fact, as believed by Daalder (1974, p.618), "if consociationalism presupposes the earlier existence of a special elite culture rather than intelligent choice by particular elites at a critical juncture of a nation's history, its transfer to other societies is likely to meet with greater difficulty". It can therefore be said that this double conception over the status of the favourable factors is that these elements do not tell us whether a country or a region, ethnically divided, is a consociational democracy, but rather if that country is prepared and has the key elements to become a consociational democracy.

However, in order to preclude the hostility between the two propositions in consociational theory, both determinism and voluntarism approach have been separated. In particular, the first approach, deterministic one, mainly referred to the category of favourable factors, while the voluntaristic theory has been associated with the notion of self-negating prediction.

In conclusion as stated by Bogaards (1998, p.490-491) "the favourable factors stand in an uneasy relationship with the voluntarism of consociational democracy. The favourable factors are meant to enhance the explanatory and predictive power of consociational theory, but this was bound to fail since in consociational theory elites are in the end autonomous in their decisions and their behaviour cannot be reduced to environmental variables."

We can therefore say that once the elements that favour a country or a region as a consociational democracy have been defined, the open question remains to understand which of the two approaches, deterministic and voluntaristic, prevails over the other.

1.1.6 The process of democratic transition and democratic consolidation

During the studies on the resolution of ethnic conflicts and the stabilisation of a consociational democracy, some different and relevant observations have been made by some scholars. First of all,

according to Lijphart (1990, p.499), "there is a distinction between power-sharing theory, or consociational theory, as an empirical theory and a normative theory, the latter advocating power sharing for multi-ethnic societies because it is the optimal, usually the only solution, regardless of whether the background conditions are favourable or unfavourable". For this reason, it can be said that the favourable factors do not have a complementary conjunction with the voluntarism of consociational democracy. Secondly, what has been stressed and accentuated is the distinction between the process of democratic transition and that of democratic consolidation. In fact, elements that favour the stability of a consociational democracy, namely democratic consolidation, are very often different from those features which characterise the existence of a new democratic system, or democratic transition. In particular the recent literature on consociational theory and democratization underline the different characteristics in order to tackle the process of democratic transition and democratic consolidation, stating that the factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence.

However, it can also be said that the study of these two processes in relation with this form of democratic power sharing, has never received much consideration from scholars' research in this field. What can be argued is that there is a distinction between power-sharing theory, or consociational theory, as an empirical theory and a normative theory. In fact, according to the latter 'power sharing for multi-ethnic societies because it is the optimal, usually the only solution, regardless of whether the background conditions are favourable or unfavourable.' For this reason, it can be said that the favourable factors do not have a complementary conjunction with the voluntarism of consociational democracy.

In fact, one of the first experts which emphasised this distinction between democratic transition and consolidation was Lehmbruch[4], when in 1975 he published 'Consociational democracy in the international system'. In particular, the author distinguished between what he called 'genetic conditions,' conducive to the 'take-off' of consociational democracy, and 'sustaining conditions,' conducive to its maintenance. The first category of conditions was intended as a model used by political elites in order to choose a proper consociational strategy to promote under specific social and political environments, with the aim of leading such divergences to the creation of a consociational democracy. On the other hand, 'sustaining conditions' are fundamental for the maintenance of this changes, even more so when the ethnic cleavages have lost much of their initial intensity. Moreover, as demonstrated for the favourable factors in Lijphart's work, even in this case the probability that a consociational strategy will be achieved is related to the fulfilment of one of

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[4] Lehmbruch, G. (1975). Consociational democracy in the international system, European Journal of Political Research 3(4): 377–391

these conditions. For this reason, 'genetic conditions' can therefore be distinguished between internal conditions and external conditions. According to Lehmbruch (1975, p.380) the most relevant internal conditions are: basic national symbols are accepted by all elite groups in the system; past violence among the subcultures is perceived as a traumatic experience; cooperative strategies are already strongly internalized by the elites as norms of conflict resolution due to the existence of strong 'conciliar' traditions; there exist among top elites intense informal communications across subcultures which may be closed to interference from non-elites and no compact majority group exists which is able to govern by a zero-sum strategy, particularly important in the case of conjunction between ideological, linguistic or religious groups. On the other hand, external conditions are strictly related to the perception of environments as threat. In this case, country size and the ability for elite to cooperate and pursue a strategy even after the perception of an external threat in order to self-regulating conflict direction are key conditions for the 'take-off' of consociational democracy.

However, it should be states that even though a distinction between 'genetic conditions' and 'sustaining conditions' is provided, the genetic factors, including elite accommodation, elite cooperation and absence of majority groups are equally productive in maintaining consociational democracy. In fact, to this regard Bogaards (1998, p.489) affirmed that "the model of consociational democracy originated as a deviant case from pluralist theory which held that political stability was impossible in societies characterised by mutually reinforcing cleavages, and pluralist theory thus specified one specific precondition for democracy".

In conclusion, as we have already seen with Lijphart's work during his drafting of favourable elements in order to establish consociational democracy in a given country, from the first list in 1968 to the last work in 1985, these elements should provide for expectations, on the basis of the presence or absence of some requirements, the opportunity of elite cooperation resulting in a plural society.

On the basis of the favourable factors, it should be possible to perceive and comprehend better the outcomes of an ethnic conflict in a given country, developments in the peace process, as we will see later by defining the concepts of positive and negative peace and in what way consociationalism in a specific country, region or plural society is more or less likely.

What can be finally said is that Lijphart's contribution about the favourable consociational democracy factors and characteristics will help in giving a better understanding of the typology of political systems and arrangements which have led to a different situation of peace research and process in our two case studies; a situation of peaceful coexistence between ethnic parties in South Tyrol, whereas in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the same approach has only created conditions of an uneasy cohabitation.

1.2 Power sharing practice

Power sharing, as the term itself says, is a specific procedure where the power is delivered not to single unit but to multiple groups.

Notwithstanding the fact that this method has become particularly prominent both in practice and academia since the end of the 'Cold War,' this concept of conflict regulation was mostly shaped during the 1970s by the work of other scholars, who called this practice as consociational democracy, consensus democracy, corporatism, and proportional democracy. However, over the years, scholars' review of the literature and practical guidelines of the term showed some differences between these terms, asserting that they should be treated and defined separately, as for the case of consociational democracy, since they share unique features and conditions for the implementation of these ethnic conflict resolutions. As previously mentioned, this practice of conflict resolution encloses different theoretical approaches which a specific situation can operate in order to tackle with political, religious or linguistic disputes. Consociationalism is one of these approaches, and thus, for this reason, it can be inferred the dissimilarities between these two concepts, where both consociationalism and consociational democracy should be treated separately from power sharing.

To this regard, in this section we will firstly define the concept of power sharing. Furthermore, in order to formalize this ethnic conflict regulation, institutional arrangement's elements should be initially established and described and then both conditions and aspects for a successful power sharing should be identified.

According to Schneckener (2002, p.203) "the key idea of any power-sharing structure is that two or more ethno-national groups have to jointly rule the common polity and take decisions in consensus". Consequently, groups' interaction provided for an access to political power and other assets extended to all groups, on the basis of any formal framework or informal pact that regulates the distribution of power between divided societies or communities.

However, after having analysed consociationalism and consociational democracy, of which our two case studies are examples, it is important to comprehend also which are the main conditions that determine a power sharing practice. In fact, if on one hand consociationalism is a theoretical approach of power sharing, the key idea of power sharing structure is that ethnic groups' separation has to jointly rule the common polity and take decisions in unanimity.

1.2.1 Institutional arrangements: elements of power sharing

Power sharing, as for the case of consociationalism, shared some institutional arrangements. As previously mentioned, these elements may include formalized and legally binding arrangements or unwritten rules and informal agreements.

To this regard, if on one hand we have said that consociational democracy is a type of theoretical approach that guarantees political representation to the different ethnic groups which are part of a deeply divided country or region, on the other hand the concept of power sharing is the practice that underlies a resolution of a conflict where several groups shared political, economic and military power according to agreed rules. For this reason, power sharing conditions will be presented in order to compare and comprehend in the following chapters how the two cases led to different outcomes of cohabitation and definition of peace.

As we have already said, both case studies are two notable examples of ethnic conflict resolution. Over the years, albeit in a separate way and context, these two models of consociational democracy have shown some aspects and features which are essential for ethnic conflict resolution.

As defined by Binningsbø (2013, p.89) "power sharing, mostly understood as including political opponents in a joint executive coalition government, is today a dominant conflict-solving approach". Although it is often described as a universal sovereign remedy, it has to be said that this model has been introduced and used in numerous countries where ethnic conflict prevailed between political parties. Certainly, these elements are important for the resolution of ethnic conflicts and in order to talk about a proper power sharing practice, the existence of all these elements is needed. These five elements of power sharing for maintaining and strengthening the institutional arrangements of this practice are: power-sharing executive, proportional representation, veto rights, segmented autonomy, and arbitration. The first element refers to the administration and decision of the country. In fact, as the name suggests, all relevant groups should have representatives in order to form a grand coalition and groups' leader participation is influential to guarantee the proper application of the practice. The second element deals with the equivalent quota of representation for all the segments. Concerning to our two case studies, ethnic quotas is one of the main elements of both South Tyrol and Bosnia Herzegovina. In particular this element is managed through a 'complex power-sharing' for the former and by a tripartite system in Bosnia Herzegovina. However, it is important to consider that ethnic groups' representation is significant not only within the executive but also in the parliament, the legal system, and the public service. The third element is related to the veto rights. The purpose of this element is easily understandable for groups' cohabitation in order to develop consensus-building and

make compromises. In fact, in the absence of agreement between the parties, each group has the possibility to block political decisions by using its veto rights.

Segmented autonomy is the fourth element for power-sharing system. This element can be seen as a feature of self-determination for the fact that each group possess some degree of self-government, elected bodies, institutions, and competencies. Both South Tyrol and Bosnia are organized on the basis of territorial arrangements, and these consociational arrangements correspond to a federal-type structure. Finally, the fifth element is considered as a deterrence for the conflict itself. It is thus important to develop mechanisms for conflict agreement thorough both informal meetings and formalized sessions.

1.2.2 Conditions for a successful power sharing

In his work, Binningsbø (2013, p.90) affirms that as a governing system, power sharing is mainly studied, suggested and implemented with two outcomes in mind: democracy and peace. However, as we have already seen before with the description of consociational democracy and then with the definition of 'positive' and 'negative' peace, both perspectives assume that the societies in need of such governance are conflictual, violent, or not, thus, in both cases the aim of power sharing is to avoid conflict and ultimately to achieve peace.

Of course, in order to achieve peace and avoid conflict between ethnic parties, some favourable conditions have to be met. As previously highlighted in the first section, one of the main contributors to the question of which factors foster cooperation and power-sharing is Lijphart. However, is on one hand we have analysed which are the elements that characterize the institutional arrangements of power sharing, on the other hand it is also important to differentiate the conditions which favour or not this form of conflict resolution. Of course, the presence or the absence of these conditions, and to degree they are performed, in the analyses of examples of ethnic conflicts is fundamental in order to perceive and comprehend the specific conditions and circumstances of that conflict, or as in our specific case the different achievement of peace.

According to Schneckener (2002, p.211), 'these conditions can be divided into structure-oriented and actor-oriented factors, the former being mainly concerned with existing or non-existing structures, such as size, economic matters, territorial borders or the shape of the party system, the latter with the behaviour, the constraints and perceptions of actors".

The first six structure-oriented conditions are: relative equilibrium, no significant socio-economic differences, territorial segmentation, overarching loyalty, cross-cutting cleavages, and moderate pluralism vs. national fronts. On the other hand, the five actor-oriented factors are: dominant elites, respecting the status quo, traditions of compromise and mutual understanding, comprehensive participation, and internal compromise vs. external pressure. What can be said about these conditions is that the more factors are fulfilled, the greater the chance that the power-sharing structure will be successful. However, region's situation should also be considered before ethnic conflict regulation. In fact, the more factors that are met before the conflict regulation, the more likely it is that a resolution will be found. Moreover, another important aspect of these conditions is their interrelationship. To this regard, the existence of one specific condition may have positive effects on the creation or the strengthening of other conditions.

Nevertheless, even though there are not conditions more relevant to others, according to Schneckener (2002, p.218) "the comparison at least shows that all actor-oriented factors seem more important than structural conditions".

1.2.3 Power sharing's doubts and criticisms

After having defined power sharing and its favourable factors, it should be said that this conception is relatively recent. In fact, as already stated previously, this system has become particularly widely known both in academic field and practice since last century, after both World Wars, with the dissolution of great empires, and then with the termination of the 'Cold War' at the end of the 20th century. For this reason, this model has also been questioned and challenged by some experts and scholars. In fact, according to some research, certain models of power sharing have failed ethnic conflict resolution.

To this regard, some doubts have been submitted by Krienbuehl (2010, p.8) who stated that "once an agreement is reached, a power-sharing peace agreement will freeze the war time balance of power between the armed parties, not allowing for the inclusion of political actors, which did not participate in the armed conflict and the negotiations". Therefore, power sharing cannot be considered a fixed element as it is necessary that excluded groups are subsequently included in the negotiations. However, considering what we have said before, not all ethnic conflict share the same conditions and elements, both at the beginning of the conflict and during the conflict resolution. For this reason, this

critique is quite generic, in the light of conditions a country possesses and manages, both structure-oriented and actor-oriented.

Another critique is related to Lijphart's work when the author established power sharing as a political model based on European examples, revising Almond's theory, and thus that it can only work in a very few specific European countries where political partitions in society are less critical. To this regard, it has also been claimed that very often power-sharing institutions end up in a stalemate, because they are exposed to government's contention and to rigorous elite groups which resort to their veto power to block decisions.

Nonetheless, after a brief introduction and definition of what power sharing means, also looking at its drawbacks, it is important to analyse and understand how this model of government has been proposed in our two respective case studies, how the actors and institutions involved reacted and which results and consequences the two countries have achieved.

It can be therefore said that if on one hand Larin and Röggla (2019, p.13) state that "South Tyrol's Autonomy Convention is a world-first as the only participatory process with the stated intent of amending an existing power-sharing arrangement, and at first glance it seems to represent a new type of consociational negotiation and governance", on the other hand Tzifakis (2007, p.85) affirms that "the post Dayton political organisation of Bosnia represents an exemplary illustration of the difficulties associated with the empirical application of the pluralist model of consociational democracy". These two examples thus confirmed what we have mentioned previously, highlighting how conditions and ethnic divide's features play a key role in the adoption of this conflict resolution.

Nevertheless, an attempt to answer to these criticisms is provided by the contribution of Lijphart when in 1981 the author recognized that societal pluralism is a question of degree and does not solve the problem of how to measure different degrees of pluralism (Lijphart 1981, p.356). To this regard, four criteria may be used to determine whether a society is completely plural or deviates from perfect pluralism to a greater or lesser extent on one or more of the four dimensions. These dimensions are, firstly that in a completely plural society, it must be possible to identify exactly the segments into which the society is divided; secondly, it must also be possible to state exactly what the size of each segment is, that is, how many people belong to each of the segments; thirdly, in a completely plural society, there must be perfect correspondence between segmental boundaries and the boundaries between the political, social, and economic organisations and as last point, political parties are one type of organisation covered by the third criterion.

In the next chapter a more detailed analysis about these conditions would be offered in order to understand the two case studies. What can be said about this concept is that the increasing number of negotiated settlements to end internal armed conflicts has brought about a great interest in the power-

sharing model, so much that power sharing literature spread globally. Undoubtedly, power sharing literature will be studied and further developed, considering that this practice has developed over the last few decades, but its evolution in comparative research has already offered several methods and theories in order to tackle with conflict resolution, practice particularly prominent both in academia and practice since the end of the 'Cold War'.

1.3 The concept of Peace

In this third section, I will focus on one particular aspect of our research question, which is important in order to answer and compare our two case studies. The concept that will be analysed is that of peace and its conceptions of 'positive peace' and 'negative peace.' For this reason, it will therefore be important to give the reader a detailed definition of peace, analyse peace research and the two distinctive definitions of 'positive' and 'negative' peace provided by Galtung, the concept of violence which is strictly related to that of peace and then contextualize our definitions with the two examples. What can certainly be considered is that the theories of conflict resolution and their enforceability to extended ethnic conflict provide a challenge to peace research in all respects. Peace-building process in ethnic conflict situations represents a great matter for both institutions, organisations, and actors.

To this regard, in defining the concept of peace, one of the experts and scholars who had the most influence in the discipline of peace and conflict studies is Johan Galtung. In 1959 Galtung founded the *International Peace Research Institute in Oslo,* also known as PRIO, the world's first academic research centre on peace studies and later in 1964 the *Journal of Peace Research* (Galtung et al. 2013, p.8). Actually, although the concept of peace can be perceived and identified with the notions of respect and order, there seem to be three guidelines of formulation of 'peace'. In fact, we can distinguish between an old idea of peace as a synonym for stability or equilibrium, intended as the human being's internal state. Then the second interpretation defines the notion of 'negative peace' as the absence of organised collective violence, between classes and racial and ethnic groups and thirdly there is the explication of 'positive peace' referred to as a synonym for all other good things in the world community, particularly cooperation and integration between human groups, with less emphasis on the absence of violence.

However, in relation to what has been conceptualised by Galtung, consociational democracy provisions created a twofold scenario where the definition of 'positive peace' can be related to our first case study, South Tyrol, whereas in the Bosnia-Herzegovina context, the same approach of

policy-making through the adoption of consociational policies, has only created conditions of a precarious co-existence, or what Galtung defines with the concept of 'negative peace'.

However, before analysing which are the main factors which explain the different outcomes in the two cases, it is important to define and contextualise these concepts first in their underlying essence and then in our specific context, related to the two case studies.

1.3.1 Peace research

Over the years, the study of peace has broadened its literature, so much that both peace research, intended as the study which try to optimize peaceful relations between defined groups, and peace studies are generally consider as landmarks for research and regulation of the causes of violence, including war and ethnic divide and the conditions of peace.

For this reason, the concept of peace should be considered by experts as a real and accessible objective and included as a key element in the political agenda of a nation-state or ethnic groups.

It should therefore be central to the political, scientific, and academic project of a country, in order to immediately steer one's attention towards problems which can then lead to ethnic conflict and violence. To this regard we can mention three principles which have been defined by Galtung in 1969. In fact, according to the author, "the idea of peace starts from three simple principles; firstly, the term 'peace' shall be used for social goals at least verbally agreed to by many, if not necessarily by most; secondly, these social goals may be complex and difficult, but not impossible to attain and as the last point, the statement peace is absence of violence shall be retained as valid" (Galtung 1969, p.167). As stated in this three principles, we can argue that as mentioned in this third point, the word 'peace' is usually associated with the other side of the coin, that is to say the notion of violence, or rather can be regarded as 'absence of violence', whereas in accordance with the first principle we can affirm that such a statement where the concept of peace is not necessarily associated as the opposite of war or violence, but that it has a broader vision where other values are brought to the forefront, has been studied and agreed by other scholars.

In fact, according to Diehl (2016, p.9) "the study of the term 'peace' requires, first and foremost, broader conceptions of peace". For this reason, it is therefore incorrect to concentrate on war and other violent conflict and thereby consider only negative peace intended as the absence of war or violence, but these conceptions should include considerations of justice, human rights, and other aspects of human security. Moreover, if we consider the concept of peace under a distinctive design,

separate from violence and conflict resolution, we might regard as 'positive peace' as an agenda in the global approach of a country and as a coherent purpose for the worldwide policymaking.

Peace research efforts, strictly related to the concept of 'positive peace' deal with non-traditional security issues that do not directly handle violence and pessimistic views. On the contrary, peace research study includes elements such as awards for promoting development, human rights, and the status of women in order to promote the structural integration of the society and prevent any form of distress. It is for this reason that 'positive peace' should require greater consideration by scholars and experts, as this term goes beyond the definition of absence of war, by incorporating other elements and values associated with this concept.

Moreover, as stated by Galtung, since the search for peace is concerned with the relations between groups, the author defines specific 'positive relations' in order to accomplish 'positive peace' (Galtung 1967, p.14). These 'positive relations' are: presence of cooperation, freedom from fear, freedom from want, economic growth and development, absence of exploitation, equality, justice, freedom of action, pluralism, and dynamism. Undoubtedly, all these values can be discussed both at the intra-national level of individuals and at the international level of nations. In fact, in the next chapters, our comparative research design will analyse the case studies on distinct levels.

In conclusion Diehl (2016, p.3) affirms that "the breadth of positive peace efforts is impressive, bringing in concerns with the environment, human rights, poverty, status of women, medicine, and economic development and emphasising that successful initiatives in this areas might decrease the prospects for war in the longer term, but their immediate purposes are to promote positive peace values such as dignity, justice, and the fulfilment of the human potential".

1.3.2 Peace and violence correlation

As already mentioned before, the concept of peace is very often associated with that of violence. As reported by Galtung in the explanation of the third principle which define the term peace, there is no denying in affirming that peace is absence of violence. As defined by Galtung (1969, p.168) "violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisations".

What can be inferred from the literature is that as for the concept of peace, also for that of violence exist different dimensions. In fact, we can distinguish six elements that associated with the term of violence can assume different connotations. The first contrast is between physical and psychological

violence; the second element consider the distinction between negative and positive approach to influence; the third consideration to be made reflect on the possibility that an object may or may not be injured; subsequently the fourth dimension of violence relies on whether or not there is an individual who acts; the fifth element refers to the difference between intended violence and unintended violence while the last point, probably the most important, is the distinction between manifest and latent violence. Moreover, among this last distinction, the concept of violence can assume two other implication, namely personal violence, and structural violence. This element is important for the fact that exists a correlation between these two forms of violence and the concepts of 'positive peace' and 'negative peace.'

To this regard Köhler and Alcock define the concept of structural violence as (1976, p.343) "whenever persons are harmed, maimed, or killed by poverty and unjust social, political, and economic institutions, systems, or structures". However, it must also be said that this type of violence, as well as causing death, is at the root of many problems for society, causing serious social, physical and psychological suffering. On the contrary, as defined by Galtung (2013, p.35), "the subject of violence can be any actor, as intended actor or direct violence". Thus, in contrast with structural violence, personal violence is visible and of a physical nature.

In particular, the author defined and combined the absence of personal violence with the notion of 'negative peace' and the absence of structural violence with the concept of 'positive peace.'

Moreover, it should be said that this distinction tends to radicalise the two views scholars and experts have about the concept of peace and violence, in relation to where the focus of the matter is placed, that is, on the absence of personal violence or on social justice.

To this regard, it can be affirmed that social injustice is maintained by means of both highly manifest and personal violence. Furthermore, the authorities usually try to maintain a status quo, whether it means effective maintenance of traditional social injustice that may have lasted for generations, or the forceful maintenance of some new type of injustice brought in by an attempt to overthrow the old system.

1.3.3 Brief contextualization of the notions

After analysing the concept of peace and violence and its different dimensions, it is important to give the reader a contextualization of both concepts in relation to the study of the specific two cases that will be analysed in the following chapters.

In fact, if on one hand South Tyrol is described by scholars as an efficient example of consociational democracy in bringing 'positive peace', on the other hand Bosnia-Herzegovina, albeit characterised by a similar model of consociational democracy as for South Tyrol, the country remains a very unstable territory, composed of different ethnicities, which has led over the years, first to the outbreak of a violent civil war and today to a problematic and unstable coexistence of three different ethnic groups, and that is why society lives in a 'negative peace'. As previously said, in both cases consociational institutions fostered the coexistence of two or more ethnic groups, stabilising the political situation of the country, as in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and of region as in the case of South Tyrol.

Over the years, these two different case studies have been examined and sometimes, as for the case of South Tyrol, used as model for other ethnic conflict resolution. To this regard, in 2014 in South Tyrol, according to survey, the statistics show that the degree of cross-group friendship is somehow limited. In fact, most of the German-language minority live in the countryside, while the Italian group populate cities and industrial area. Nevertheless, as confirmed by the outcome of this pool, "the majority of the South Tyrolean population has positive feelings towards cohabitation among the linguistic groups, plurilingualism and cultural diversity" (Carlà 2018, p.265).

On the other hand, in Bosnia-Herzegovina the transition from war to peace has encountered several problems, and one of the main problems is related to the notion of identity. In fact, as claimed by Kazansky et al. (2021, p.62) "the concept of diversity, of which Bosnia and Herzegovina is proud, can be constructive and, mostly at the same time, destructive". Moreover, the authors indicated corruption as one of the elements which characterise Bosnia as a transitional country, for the reason that the region has changed its political system from socialism to the current parliamentary system.

In conclusion of our first chapter, some important theories and concepts have been analysed and explained. In relation to our research question, consociationalism and consociational democracy have been illustrated, also by broadening the field of research to other concepts, and underlying critics and negative aspects. After that, it has been stated the theoretical notion of power sharing, which is the concept behind the literature concerning post-conflict administration, since one of the two common theoretical approaches to power sharing is precisely consociationalism. As third section, the dissertation has emphasised another key concept for our research question, the peace process. In fact, peace research is one of the aspects that influence the evolutionary process in ethnic conflict resolution, by regulating the degree of coexistence between different ethnic groups or minorities.

In the following chapters, through a comparative model research, these factors, and concepts and of power sharing and consociational democracy will be analysed in detail, in order to comprehend and

give an answer to our research question, specifically the reason of different outcomes, both in terms of arrangements and peace, despite the adoption of a single model of conflict resolution.

Chapter Two

Comparative Research Design

In this second chapter, the main aim of our paper is to define and guide the reader through the establishment of a comparative framework where in the third chapter we will outline the differences and similarities between the two case studies. For this reason, the dissertation starts by examining the definition of comparative research, which is the method at the basis of our work. Then, it will establish a comparative arrangement in order to understand, perceive and try to answer to our research question and sub questions. In fact, if on one hand we have state that consociational arrangements have led South Tyrol and Bosnia Herzegovina to different outcomes of peace, on the other hand it is important to understand which are the main differences between the two case studies, history, arrangements, actors and institutions; which are the limits of consociationalism with regard the two situations, and try to give answers on the possibility of finding other options to this model of democracy and understanding if and how the modalities used in Bosnia Herzegovina can be improved or if they are doomed to fail in the next years.

It is therefore important for our paper to establish a comparative scheme with some questions, issues, and topics in order to create a comparative design which will be discussed in the third chapter.

For this reason, this chapter will develop three sections. The first section will analyse the composition of the comparative matrix for the two case studies, by raising some questions in order to outline the main differences between the cases. In particular, we will distinguish between the structure of the two cases, the main actors, context and timeline of the two disputes, the external actors, the role and the importance of institutions in the conflict resolution and the organizational structure of the two case studies, which agreements have led to the current situation.

The second part will consider the concept of power-sharing, further analysing the conditions mentioned in the first chapter, the elements which characterize this model of democracy. In particular, this section will help the reader to understand the key differences which underlie this practice of conflict resolution, in order then to perceive the different patterns that distinguish these two case studies. In fact, since consociationalism is a theoretical approach of power sharing, the analyses of these conditions for the achievement or the implementation of this form of practice in conflict resolution should be mentioned. In particular, we will distinguish between two types of power sharing

conditions; the first category of environment is constituted by structure-oriented requirements while the other type of conditions is identified in actor-oriented ones.

In conclusion, the third section will try to broaden the aim of the two case studies by analysing the two examples on several levels of comparison, from the local and regional level to the international position the two cases in point have acquired over the time. In fact, since comparative studies are related to the ability to compare, analyse, and demonstrate differences and similarities between contrasting ideas and subjects, a multi-level approach is particularly important in order to widen the study research and implement the reliability of the paper.

2.1 Comparative matrix and research questions

The main research question of our thesis is based on the practice of consociationalism, in particular how consociational democracy arrangements have led to a situation that Galtung has described as 'positive peace' in South Tyrol, whereas in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the same approach has only created conditions of an uneasy co-existence. Moreover, we will try to outline which factors explain the different outcomes in the two cases, by answering to some sub-questions related to which are the main differences, the historical background, actors and trying to suggest which alternatives exist or if the Bosnian arrangement can be improved or it is doomed to fail. For this reason, the examination of two or more case studies of ethnic conflict resolution, where the same form of democratic power sharing has been employed, but with different outcomes achieved, require a study in order to explain and clarify how these differences have emerged.

Among the several types of research questions and comparative analyses, we can distinguish between four variety of research questions, which differ in the extent of research and have different precondition both in terms of qualitative and quantitative analyses of the cases. These research questions include descriptive, basic explanatory, comparison of relation and comparative explanatory questions. Our research question can be related to the comparison of relation and the comparative explanatory model. In the first case the study of different contexts, in the comparison of relation, provides a further investigation to determine whether a relationship holds in various situations. In the second type of research questions, however, the comparative explanatory analyses different relationship across several features by taking characteristics of those units into consideration.

To this regard, comparative research is one of the most common methods in social sciences, where the main priority is to make comparisons across different countries or cultures. This form of study,

has evolved and spread in the international arena in the mid-twentieth century, influenced by the phenomenon of globalization, so much that research methodology has greatly increased both research and comparison between different countries and cultures in the world. Furthermore, globalization's impetus has enabled greater production of quantitative data for comparison. In fact, one of the key characteristics of comparative research is based on quantitative analyses, which is much more frequently practiced than qualitative data. This outcome is probably determined by the information technology and the international communication which has facilitated data transmission.

According to Esser and Vliegenthart (2018, p.4) "Comparative research studies is conventionally understood as the contrast among different macro-level units, such as world regions, countries, sub-national regions, social milieus, language areas and cultural thickenings, at one point or more points in time". For this reason, elaboration and production of a comparative matrix provides a detailed conception of which features, and practice are included in the different two case studies. Based on this definition of comparative research and after having discussed and defined in the first chapter some theories and concepts related to the field of ethnic conflict resolution, the following list of questions provide a comparative arrangement which tries to systematize the reasons that led to success in the case of South Tyrol and difficult coexistence in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2.1.1 Case studies' formation

In this first question the analyses will focus on the composition of the two case studies. It is therefore important to understand how the two cases are composed in order to perceive and comprehend in the next chapter the different outcomes of cohabitation between linguistic minorities and ethnic groups. However, before defining the structure of the two examples, it should be state that both South Tyrol and Bosnia Herzegovina constitute an intensive analysis of an individual unity, in our specific case, the analysis of two communities characterized by specific elements with differences and analogies, where the main purpose of the paper is to stress factors of development in relation to a specific context, thus deciding what is important for our case study and what become significant for our environment.

Regarding our two situations, we can affirm that one of the main elements shared by both case studies is the approach adopted in conflict resolution, through the practice of power sharing, in particular the theoretical procedure of consociationalism. Nevertheless, it is also important to highlight the distinct

connotation in time, where South Tyrol dispute dates back to the early twentieth century, whereas the Bosnian conflict is relatively recent, since the peace process resolution was concluded in 1995.

The composition of the two case studies has however several distinct reasons of historical and political matrix. In fact, if on one hand we may identify the origin of South Tyrolean dispute through a linguistic minority model, on the other hand, the Bosnian ethnic conflict entails varied reasons. In this case, besides linguistic discrepancies which favoured the contradiction between ethnic groups, both political attitude and several religions played a key role in the partition of the country.

South Tyrol is a small disputed regional area between Italy and Austria. This territory has been contended between the two countries after the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire at the end of World War I. Bosnia Herzegovina, on the contrary, is composed by three different ethnicities. Society is particularly characterised by a clear ethnical cleavage which coincides with religious differences contented in a blurred region just shaken by the dissolution of former Yugoslavia in the late twentieth century. Regarding the ethnic and linguistic divide, South Tyrol was mainly characterised by a linguistic divide, formed by a German linguistic minority and the Italian population. In the Bosnian case study, the dispute has developed over an ethnic, cultural, and religious divide where the population was formed by three major ethnical groups: Muslim Bosniaks, Orthodox Serbs and Roman Catholic Croats. Case studies' construction is thus an element which tell us the main aspects of the two conflicts and provide the reader with a concise overview of some questions and issues that will be discussed and tackled in the following paragraphs.

2.1.2 Which are the main actors

Comparative research needs to identify the principal subjects which are involved in the case studies we compare. In our specific case, the definition of the main actors which are involved in both case studies acquire greater relevance, firstly for the description of the actors themselves, and secondly, probably more important, because conditions for a successful power sharing are characterised by some circumstances which are actor oriented. For this reason, we will distinguish the main subjects into primary actors and secondary actors in order to elucidate the specific degree of elites and political parties which composed the two cases.

In the first case, we can state that South Tyrol was composed by two main actors, the German-speaking population, and the Italian country. Austria, furthermore, played a key role in the dispute and for this reason the country can be considered as primary actor in the role of guarantor and

supporter of the German-speaking population, since it was part of the Habsburg Empire until World War I. Among these two factions of German and Italian population, we can differentiate other actors, which played a secondary role in the evolution of the conflict. If on one hand the Italian state was identified under the Fascist government, in particular the National Socialists party[5], on the other hand the main South Tyrolean party representing the German-speaking population was the SVP, Südtiroler Volkspartei[6]. Moreover, another secondary actor who played a minor role, but which nevertheless put some pressure and direct the conflict towards a different outcome, was the Ladin speaker's minority. This part of population can be considered a full-fledged minority within a minority.

In the second case, our primary actors are enclosed in a single country, which is Bosnia-Herzegovina, officially recognized as legally independent sovereign state in 1992 after the dissolution of the Yugoslav state. In fact, as already stated in the previous section, we can distinguish between three different ethnic groups, which developed after the referendum of independence. The three major actors were the Bosniaks, or Bosnian Muslims governed by Alija Izetbegovic, the Bosnian Croats, chaired by the president Franjo Tudjman and a third group, the Bosnia Serbs ruled by the president Radovan Karadzic. Along with these three factions, we can identify as secondary or indirect actors the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Croatia, which respectively offered ideological and military support to Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. Moreover, during the Bosnian conflict, a significant role was played by the army of the Republic of Serbia, chaired by the political leader Radovan Karadzic and The Scorpions[7], a paramilitary group lead by the colonel-general Ratko Mladic, the military leader of the self-proclaimed Serb Republic.

Of course, for both case studies, in the next subsections, we will analyse other actors, in particular external and international actors, organizations and alliances, which influenced these conflicts and determined in some cases the outcome of the peace process.

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[5] The National Fascist Party was an Italian political party, created by Benito Mussolini as the political expression of Italian Fascism and as a reorganization of the previous Italian Fasces of Combat. The party ruled the Kingdom of Italy from 1922 when Fascists took power with the March on Rome until the fall of the Fascist regime in 1943, when Mussolini was deposed by the Grand Council of Fascism.

[6] The South Tyrolean People's Party is a regionalist and autonomist political party in South Tyrol, an autonomous province with a German-speaking majority in Italy. Founded on 8 May 1945, the SVP has roots in the Deutscher Verband, a confederation of German-speaking parties formed in 1919 after the annexation of South Tyrol by Italy, which shared many of the same leading figures as the SVP.

[7] The Scorpions was a Serbian paramilitary unit active during the Yugoslav Wars, who were founded in 1991 by Jovica Stanišić, the head of Serbia's State Security Services.

Table 1: South Tyrolean and Bosnian main and secondary actors.

	SOUTH TYROL	BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
MAIN ACTORS	German speaking population	Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims)
	Austria (role of protector)	Bosnian Serbs
	Italian government	Bosnian Croats
SECONDARY ACTORS	Fascist government and National Socialist Party	Serb Republic
	Ladin speaker's minority	Croatian Republic
	SVP (South Tyrolean Party)	The scorpions

2.1.3 Context and timeline of the conflict

The third point of our comparative matrix focus on the context which framed the two conflicts. Through this interpretation it is possible, in the next chapter, to further developed differences and similarities between the cases and give the reader a deeper analysis about the timeline of the dispute, because as we shall see later, South Tyrol and Bosnia Herzegovina examples are enclosed in two specific historical periods.

However, what can be argued about these two case studies is that they differ in some dimensions, in power-sharing policies, which are applied during the peace process in post-civil war conflict management. There is no doubt that the nature of the two conflicts followed different paths in different periods. In fact, in the first case, we refer to the early years of the twentieth century when the South Tyrol region, after the end of World War I, was annexed by the Italian state. Subsequently, the region has undergone a process of changes, through the action of Italianization, thus fostering

migration and immigration flows both in Italy and Austria. Over the years, diplomatic agreements, the role of institutions and the adoption of consociationalism with the establishment of consociational democracy led the region to a beneficial peace process. On the contrary, the Bosnian war followed a unique way. After the Yugoslavian dissolution, the ethnic dispute spread from inter-state to intra state conflict, and the entire territory of Bosnia Herzegovina was shaped by an unstable state structure. These elements, considering the superpower sphere of influence during the 'Cold War,' favour foreign involvement and external interference.

According to Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, p.320) "although the political arena is important, it is not the only sphere in which competing groups may agree to share power. This is particularly true in the context of states emerging from civil war, where other dimensions along which power is exercised may have equal or greater significance to parties seeking to protect their interests in an inherently unstable environment." Other dimensions such as territorial division or access to economic resources can also be of importance. Power-sharing institutions can thus be of political, military, territorial or economic nature. Moreover, if on one side, like in South Tyrol, the region is contented between two states, on the other side, Bosnia Herzegovina faced with the coexistence of three different ethnic groups in a new-born state. For this reason, it can be stated that this practice of conflict resolution acted as peacebuilding in South Tyrol, whereas in the case of Bosnia Herzegovina, power sharing can be considered as means of enhancing democracy.

2.1.4 External actors and international involvement

The main actors of a conflict are those who constitute and struggle on the ground the conflict itself, while the external actors, very often, are those who determine and direct the outcome of a conflict, bringing the main players to the conclusion of both formal and informal agreements.

This is what happened in both cases, even though with different dynamics. In fact., the main aim of this paragraph is to give the reader a detailed presentation of external actors and give an overview about foreign involvement and external interference in both case studies.

Nevertheless, in the next chapter, the comparative research will further develop historical backgrounds and conflict evolution to understand and perceive why these different dynamics took place.

Starting from the South Tyrol situation, it can be easily inferred that both Austria and Italy had some interests in the outcome of the region itself and their respective German-speaking population and the

Italian-speaking minority. However, an essential element which frame the evolution of the conflict and give to it an international dimension was the end of the second World War, when Austria in 1945, following its liberation from the Nazi Germany, and after a few years of occupation by the Allies, in 1955 it regained its sovereignty. This transition, for the first time, after years of failed negotiations, offered to Austria the opportunity to act on its own in foreign policy issues, by focusing on the South Tyrol dispute in order to recognize the massive pressure from the Austrian population. In fact, as reported by a speech of the Austrian secretary of the foreign office, Steininger affirms that (2003, p.117) "Austria, as a free and sovereign state, would now be in a better position to fulfil its obligations as laid out in the Treaty of Paris to look after the interests of the South Tyroleans vis-à-vis the government in Rome". For this reason, for the first time in 1960, Austria brought the South Tyrol dispute to the United Nations General Assembly[8], in order to find some solutions through the peace instruments provided by the UN charter. The international dimensions urged the two countries to settle the conflict in some way. Based on the first peace treaty, the De Gasperi-Gruber agreement, signed in 1946, the Italian government enacted a second Statute of Autonomy to implement some measures and provide to German-speaking population a new political basis for autonomy.

We can thus affirm that UN assistance led the parties to implement their cooperation in order to achieve a compromise for the German-linguistic population, which asked for self-determination. In 1992, the role of mediator of the UN Secretary General conducted the parties to officially close the documents of the conflict.

On the other hand, Bosnia Herzegovina external actors and international involvement require a different view from the previous dispute, both for the distinctive nature of the conflict itself but also for the foreign involvement. In this case the role heads of state and international organizations played as special negotiator in the conflict resolution has proved fundamental to end the conflict, even though, as we well see later, no 'positive peace' has been achieved.

In this case, both geographical position and political pressure from the European community and other international organizations, led the conflict to take an international dimension, so much so that the international community, especially the European Union and the United Nations[9], is still very much engaged in this country through various institutions which we will analyse later.

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[8] The UN General Assembly (UNGA) is the main policy-making organ of the Organization. Comprising all Member States, it provides a unique forum for multilateral discussion of the full spectrum of international issues covered by the Charter of the United Nations. Each of the 193 Member States of the United Nations has an equal vote.

[9] The United Nations Organization, or just United Nations (UN) is an intergovernmental organization whose purpose is to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations, achieve international cooperation, and be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.

Another important external actor who contributed to the conflict management was the NATO[10] intervention. In fact, this military organization conducted its first major crisis response operation during the Bosnia conflict.

After the Dayton Peace Agreement, signed in 1995, external actors' interference in the region, both militarily and economically, has decreased. The problem of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement is also related with that of corruption. If on one hand financial support has decreased so that tackle this problem, on the other hand the adoption of various institutions to prevail over this bad governance and assist the country in the European integration, by regaining its status quo as modern and functional nation is one of the purposes adopted by European community and other international organizations.

Table 2: International involvement: the role of external actors.

SOUTH TYROL	BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
Austrian secretary of foreign office	European Union
United Nations General Assembly (one of the six principal organs of the UN)	United Nations
UN Secretary General (head of the UN Secretariat)	NATO

2.1.5 Role of institutions

Conflict resolution approach between two or more parties usually need a peaceful solution so that actors can find a compromise and negotiate to resolve the disagreement. In our first chapter we analysed some of the most important practices and theories in conflict resolution. However, one of

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[10] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, also called the North Atlantic Alliance, is an intergovernmental military alliance between 30 member states, 28 of which are in Europe and the other 2 being part of North America.

the most important characteristics for a region or a country during its peace process towards a peaceful coexistence between the parties is the role institutions practice during the reconciliation phase.

In this subsection, and according to our two examples, we will provide the reader with a first view about the two cases to better understand, in the following chapter, the main reasons of why the peace process have followed different path between the distinct cultures.

For this reason, we will analyse between some options in order to establish a clear institutional framework which implement a consociational arrangements design, which is the practice adopted by both the case studies.

The first feature is about the executive power of the country. This authority can be organized according to a cabinet or a presidential system. While the former implies the creation of a collegial system, the latter indicate a direct popular vote for the head of state. In this case, we can affirm that South Tyrol is guided by a cabinet system, since the region is ruled by a formal coalition between the largest elite parties on both linguistic groups. On the other hand, Bosnia Herzegovina executive power is characterised by a presidential system, where each of the three ethnic groups nominate and elect its own representative. In this case, the weak element is constituted by the possibility for the minority to block any legislation by using the veto rights. The second element of our analyses is the political representation of all groups in executive, judicative, administrative, and legislative bodies. To this regard, even in this field, we can distinguish between a difference in the executive and legislative representation of the two cases. In fact, South Tyrol region is represented by a twofold proportional system, where divisions in an electorate are deliberated proportionately in the elected body. On the contrary, Bosnia Herzegovina performs an over-represented system in the executive, where, as previously said, Bosnian presidency have a higher position and status, while for the legislative power, elections as for the majority of parliaments, take place on the basis of proportional voting. The third feature is related to the option of using the veto rights. There are three types of veto: delaying veto, indirect veto, and direct veto. According to the institutional arrangements of South Tyrol, each parliamentary groups can be availed in delaying veto and indirect veto, while in the case of Bosnia, even the direct veto can be employed, and this enable groups to declare each matter to be of essential interest and thus block any political action against the groups' interest themselves. The fourth aspect is about segmental autonomy, key characteristic in creating a sense of individuality and allows for different culturally based community laws. This quality, mainly used in consociational practices, is based on the principle of territoriality or on personality. The former implies both case studies, since the two examples are characterised by territorial autonomy, while the principle of personality is realized through 'special' chambers or as in the case of South Tyrol, thorough private institutions. However, for as regard segmental autonomy, institutional equality should be acknowledged for

proper operation in power sharing and consociational arrangements. It is therefore important to consider the fact that these private institutions should not undermine the role of central institutions. The last element is performed by arbitration. Consociationalism theory and consociational practices require a significant effort of mediation and settlement mechanisms so that ethnic and linguistic groups coexist in a peaceful way. Conflict mediation and cooperation require however both formal and informal talks and meetings. In fact, we can distinguish between political arbitration and juridical arbitration. The former embrace parliamentary and extra parliamentary measures, like informal assembly and specialized commissions, while the juridical arbitration include binding decisions in constitutional courts or quasi-judicial arbitration commissions. South Tyrol, as we will analyse in the next chapter, cooperate through political and juridical bodies. Bosnia Herzegovina, on the contrary, is based almost entirely on juridical arbitration.

Moreover, in South Tyrol, the 1972 statute provides for considerable autonomy of the provincial authorities of South Tyrol, mainly the province of Bolzano. Furthermore, the statute stipulates formal rules for cooperation between the ethnic groups in the autonomous authorities. In particular, these special measures, to protect the German-speaking population, were followed by a further implementation, which is to say the use of the so-called ethnic quota system, the distribution of public positions and public resources among the linguistic groups. The autonomous authority is provided by a provincial parliament and a provincial government. In conclusion, a remarkable aspect about institutions' function in South Tyrol is the provision stipulating a far-reaching proportionality in various fields of the public sector which is enclosed in the 1972 statute. The proportionality provision is not limited to the provincial government. It covers almost all appointments of politicians and civil servants in the public and semi-public sectors, in proportion to the relative size of the ethnic groups among the South Tyrolese population. The proportionality principle is also playing a key role in the distribution of funds and subsidies. The ethnically proportionate distribution resulted in the end of the dominance of Italians in the public sector, by promoting linguistic groups cohabitation.

2.1.6 Organizational structure and agreements

The last comparative matrix's argument is related to the peace process agreements established in the two case studies and the organizational structure the two societies achieved in the following years. In this section we will introduce the two-conflict resolution path adopted by the main actors in order to resolve the dispute. According to the previous elements, and to what have been stated in our research

question, we can affirm that South Tyrol and Bosnia-Herzegovina operated and settled the linguistic and ethnic cleavage in two diverse ways. These discrepancies are clearly due to the important of context. In fact, in the first case, South Tyrol institutions played a key role in the democratization of the central state, which favour the implementation of the framework of consociational practices and the inclusion of regional and national bodies. Institutional equality and cooperation between the parties, mainly elite assistance and participation at state and international level led South Tyrol to achieve a feeling of equal treatment, through the participation of German-speaking minority in negotiations and decision-making processes. To this regard, the present consociational political and societal order in South Tyrol was realized in the framework of the Second Autonomy Statute. It appears that a far-reaching adoption of consociational practices and institutional arrangements was necessary for the reconciliation of the German ethno-national movement with the Italian state. Furthermore, historical, and political context inspiration came from the political culture and system in Austria that also was a consociational democracy.

In South Tyrol consociational democracy implies mutual cooperation and power sharing in combination with considerable autonomy and independence of the groups in societal organizations. To this regard, we can distinguish two levels of cooperation between the parties. In fact, if on one hand the Italian government negotiated with Austria at the international level, bringing the case in front of the United Nations, on the domestic level an important measure has been achieved when the Commission of the Nineteen has been created. According to Schulte (2019, p.40) "On the basis of this political change, cooperation efforts intensified within democratic-inclusive institutions and regional networks. One milestone was the 19-Commission appointed by the Italian Council of Ministers under the leadership of Christian Democrat Scelba and chaired by Social Democrat Rossi". Based on a tripartite system, composed by Italian, German-speaking minority and Ladin authorities, the delegation offered representation and political status to the local population. In fact, these political changes improved the Italian government action by promoting new political basis for autonomy.

In this respect the 1972 statute, called the second Statute of Autonomy, brought about major changes, by creating an advanced power sharing system based on consociational elements. This outcome led the Austrian government in 1992 to declare at the UN the resolution of the conflict.

However, one must realize that in a democratic context the adaptation and reorganization of a wide range of organizations and institutions cannot be completely regulated by political and constitutional arrangements. Autonomous and independent operations of the groups are allowed and enhanced as a consociational practice, but they also originate from the organizational structuring of civil society. The organizational structure of the South Tyrolese society is characterized by many consociational ethnic organizations and multi-ethnic organizations applying consociational rules. The only non-

consociational ethnic organizations are radical German-Tyrolese and Italian nationalistic political parties and an Italian nationalistic labour union. These developments show us an institutional restructuring tending toward consociational ethnic organizations and multi-ethnic organizations with consociational rules.

The Bosnian ethnic conflict, on the contrary, involves a completely different peace approach, where both context and timeline were influential in the initiatives and negotiations.

After three years of violent ethnic war, in 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed. This initiative, compared to the other case, received an international position, for both geopolitical interests between superpowers, immediately after the end of the 'Cold War,' and for ethnic polarization. In fact, alongside the main parties of the agreement, the three Republics of former Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the peace process was presided by Presidents or Prime Ministers of United States, France, Britain, Germany, and Russia.

In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina there was chosen for a federal system in where the national ethnicities were separated by territory. These two entities are represented by the Federation and the Republic of Serbia. In this ethnic solution we can distinguish between four levels of governance. The first level is constituted by the nation, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second level is composed by the two entities, the Federation, and the Republic of Serbia; the third level include the provinces in the Federation while the fourth level of governance deals with municipalities and local authorities.

There is significant autonomy granted to both entities, since they each have their own presidents, parliaments, and other governing bodies, which are responsible for policymaking on the entity level. However, if in South Tyrol, elite consensus for cooperation played a decisive role in the implementation of some measures, in this case, power sharing arrangements did not establish trust between the parties. As affirmed by Marko (2005, p.7) "instead of a positive elite consensus for co-operation making state reconstruction work, a negative consensus after the principle of 'divide et impera' prevailed so that the Presidency and the Parliament were blocked along ethnic lines and were unable to adopt the necessary decisions and laws for the reconstruction of the state and the war-torn economy". Over the years some attempts have been made in order to implement state cooperation, with the introduction of two institutions, the High Representative and the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, the significance influences federal subjects have in the political arena is related to the vertical structure of power-sharing, Due to this vertical power-sharing, created by the House of Representatives, there is vertical accountability present in Bosnia-Herzegovina which limits the sole executive power of the other House in parliament. Here the intention is to guarantee the protection of the national groups who are divided among these federal subjects.

In the following section will be presented the conditions which favour this practice in conflict resolution. It is therefore important for our comparative framework to have a broad overview at diverse levels of questions about the design of the two cases, of power sharing conditions and elements of consociational model, which favour or not the establishment of two peace processes that develop in different situations.

2.2 Power-sharing framework

Power sharing, as has been defined in the first chapter, is one of the most common practices adopted by national governments and international organizations in conflict resolution. According to our research question, and as it is for one of the main objectives of the dissertation, there exist some factors which affect the practicability of this method. In fact, according to some scholars and experts, this is also one of the main aspects which determined the fulfilment of power sharing provisions in both case studies.

As for the comparative matrix, also this list of conditions will be important for our comparative research. In fact, in the following subsection, in order to implement our comparative research design, where in the next chapter the two models will be compared, we will analyse a set of conditions, key characteristics for power sharing fulfilment, and we will distinguish them into two patterns: structure-oriented conditions and actor-oriented factors.

It is quite predictable that these conditions demonstrate, in certain ways, the existent status quo of a country, both in terms of cohabitation between the population and also of governance management.

To this regard, power sharing functionality is demonstrated in our two examples by the precarious peace achieved in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this case, agreements and compromises between the ethnic groups have been established under the divide and rule policy. It can be therefore affirmed that power sharing practice did not create the right attitude for the implementation of cooperation and peaceful coexistence, but rather it has emphasized political disagreements, economic grievances, like corruption, and social disaggregation between the minorities. On the other hand, due to specific conditions and favourable elements, positive elite consensus has somehow replaced negative compromise which undermined the South Tyrol dispute, by achieving with the implementation of the Second Autonomy Statute, a harmonious welfare between the population, thus being one of the wealthiest areas of the country.

Over the years, definitions and analyses have been provided on both the concept of power sharing and consociationalism. This conflict regulation practices, however, have been performed in many countries with different actors, in specific contexts and during particular historical periods. For this reason, although favourable conditions exist in the adoption of this practice, the study of power sharing regulations cannot be widespread in an isolated model, but rather, every particular case should be analysed for its specific characteristics. What can be stated, however, is the fact that the more factors that are complied, the more likely it is that a power sharing structure will be successful. This evidence suggests two different hypotheses. First of all, the more factors that are met before the regulation of the dispute, the more likely it is that a positive outcome will be achieved, and some solutions will be found. Secondly, the more conditions that are sufficiently fulfilled over time, the better the probability are that a solution and a peaceful coexistence will last. Government responsibility for choices and compliance in the adoption of these conditions will certainly affect state structure, ethnic or linguistic groups' relationship and probably the most important element of power sharing practice, the main parties involved in the dispute.

Nevertheless, there exist some differences between the two patterns. According to some study research and comparative analyses, actor-oriented conditions provide for a higher degree of importance than structure-oriented factors. This statement can be affirmed by the comparative work conducted by Schneckener, based on some cases of power sharing in Europe. In particular, the author demonstrated, through the fulfilment of all actor-oriented factors, that countries are facilitated in the administration of this practice of conflict regulation. Before analysing the specific factors, which outline the comparative model for our two case studies, two observations underpin this thesis. According to Schneckener (2002, p.218) "First, in the success case of South Tyrol, all actor-oriented factors are basically fulfilled. Second, the significant difference between Northern Ireland in 1973 and successively in 1998, is mainly due to the fact that, in 1998, a number of actor-oriented conditions were largely accomplished, or there were, at least, tentative signs of improvement. In other words, in the 1998 peace agreement, these factors figured much more prominently than in the 1973 solution". On the contrary, the precarious peace established in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a clear example of what have been stated by the author about the importance of actor-oriented factors. In fact, in this case a number of favourable structural conditions exist, such as the relative stability between the Federation and the Serb Republic after the Dayton Peace Agreement or the territorial segmentation among the groups. However, in relation to the importance of actor-oriented factors, there are hardly any indications so far that these conditions could be fulfilled. The historical background, and also the external interference, with boundaries defined, in a sense, by external actors, moderate and weaken

the importance and role of dominant political actors of the region, undermining the actors-oriented conditions.

2.2.1 Structure-oriented conditions

Our comparative analyses, although focused on specific case of consociational arrangements, need to be expanded on the main conditions which lead and regulate the power sharing system. For this reason, in this section, we will firstly analyse structure-oriented conditions and then actor-oriented conditions for a successful organizational model of power sharing.

As suggested from their title, it can be easily inferred that structure-oriented conditions refer to those factors which constitute the basis for the organization of the society, through institutional arrangements and the formation of political bodies. On the contrary, actor-oriented conditions are mainly concerned with actors' actions and attitude, trying to comprehend their perceptions and restriction in the administration of the community. The six structure-oriented conditions are: relative equilibrium, no significant socio-economic differences, territorial segmentation, overarching loyalty, cross-cutting cleavages, and moderate pluralism vs. national fronts.

The first condition, relative equilibrium, refer to the symmetry between the two or more groups that shape the community. It is quite clear that for a successful power sharing practice, the state or the region cannot be distinguished by an absolute majority of one group in term of size, but rather the condition implies a relative balance so that no group can prevail over the others.

In our specific examples, it can be stated that the relative equilibrium factor is fulfilled in both cases, although in an unusual way. In fact, if on one hand, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, after the conflict, the Federation encompasses 51% of the state territory and the Serb Republic with the 49%, and none of the ethno-national groups, Muslims or Serbs or Croats represents more than half of the inhabitants, on the other hand a different stabilizing model can be identify in the case of South Tyrol. In this case we can distinguish between province of Bolzano and the entire region of South Tyrol-Trentino. In the first case, there is a dominant position by the German-speaking population and the ratio is two-thirds speaking German, one-third speaking Italian. On the contrary, within the Region of South Tyrol-Trentino, Italian speakers are in a dominant position. It can be therefore affirmed that Bosnia is characterised by a homogeneous equilibrium between groups, while South Tyrol region disparities are counter-balanced by the province of Bolzano, where a clear prevalence of German-speaking population exist. In the following chapter we will analyse the reasons of these discrepancies between

the two case studies in order to understand whether these differences may have also affected the different outcomes in terms of peace and cohabitation between the groups.

The second condition refers to socio-economic differences. Consequently, a region or a country with no significant socio-economic divergences will be more likely to develop and apply power sharing practices and consociational provisions. In this specific factor, the economic and financial characteristics of our two case studies differ significantly. In the case of South Tyrol, economic discrepancies have grown close over time. It might be affirmed, however, that both historical background and external involvement, mainly for the Bosnian situation, played a key role in the evolution and achievement of this economic status.

According to the financial situation in South Tyrol, after the process of creating an autonomous government with special measures to protect German-speaking population, socio-economic differences decreased, so that both German and Italian linguistic groups could favour of similar fiscal and commercial resources. In relation with these measures, as the Paris Agreement, signed in 1946, German-speaking population gained more opportunities and autonomy, by achieving over time a great economic and financial outcome. In fact, during the 1960s, German population share of industrial workers and employees in trade and services reached the Italian level. Subsequently, with the implementation of other measures, as the 'package,' enacted in 1969 and the Second Autonomy Statute, signed in 1972, between the South Tyrolean party SVP and the Italian and Austrian governments, no significant socio-economic differences differed German and Italian groups, but nonetheless the Italian population were economically still better off. This situation, however, had changed significantly by the end of the 1970s, when the Italian state provided the province with generous finance system, thus developing a vast and effective bureaucratic apparatus and functioning social services, by experiencing a remarkable economic growth. These changes led South Tyrol to achieve full employment and a relatively high standard of living for all groups.

On the other side, Bosnian situation developed in a different way. The path that signed socio-economic differences both before the ethnic war and also at the conclusion of the conflict, with the Dayton Peace Agreement, witnessed a similar economic situation for all groups. In fact, although one of the causes of the state conflict was related to economic inequality and corruption, the post-war situation was characterised by economic difficulties for all ethnic groups. Regarding this specific power sharing condition, it could thus be argued that the factor is met by Bosnia, since no significant socio-economic differences exist between the groups, but on the contrary, it can be affirmed that this financial distress is not conducive to positive economic activity and peaceful cooperation between the parties.

The third element we consider is the territorial segmentation. According to consociational democracy provisions, definite territorial separation between the groups, favour the practice of this form of democratic power sharing. To this regard, since one of the aims of consociationalism is governmental stability, this factor allows the implementation of regional self-rule through territorial arrangements. It can be stated therefore, that the more a region is territorially segmentate, the more likely it is that a power sharing structure will be successful.

Regarding our first case, South Tyrol, also due to historical developments, is territorially divided in three specific areas, which belong to the three linguistic groups, Italian, German and Ladin. This is confirmed by the South Tyrolean 'double autonomy', which granted more competencies to the province of Bolzano with its German-speaking majority than to the total region of South Tyrol-Trentino, where there is a predominance of the Italian linguistic group. Territorial segmentation, for the purpose of a successful power sharing, is significant also for the Ladin-speakers, considered as a minority within a minority, which over the years obtained some economic and political profit.

This condition is fulfilled also by Bosnia's federalization, even if the multi-ethnic boundary line established during the Dayton Peace is blurry. It can therefore be said that territorial segmentation has been made possible through the external interference of international organizations and superpowers, immediately after the war and also for the following years, through the practice of ethnic polarization, but nowadays there are some multilingual and multi-ethnic areas which undermine the cohabitation of the different groups, such as the Muslim-Croat federation[11]. Paradoxically, the ethnic cleavage between the groups has been emphasized by this rigid territorial segmentation, so much so that, in the last years, the Serb Republic demanded for the right of secession. Of course, the Serb intention to leave the country is not only due to these conditions, but there are so many other justifications as the contention over constitutional reforms.

Another important condition, related to the structure of a country, is the overarching loyalty. This condition is based on the ability for the different ethnic or linguistic groups which live in a specific region, to share a common loyalty. This is probably the most challenging factor to be met in ethnic conflict regulation. This disagreement is due to the fact that very often conflicts and ethnic dispute generated from different attitudes towards symbols, institutions, values and ideals in the same country. For this reason, the common feeling of belonging to one country is undermined by this opposed conviction. There are, however, different measure of overarching loyalty. In South Tyrol, overarching loyalty has been undermined since the beginning of the dispute, for the reason that the

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[11] The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the two entities within the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other being Republika Srpska. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of 10 autonomous cantons with their own governments and legislatures.

region was characterised by two different ethno-linguistic groups, and therefore the sense of belonging to a single nation never existed. The notion of shared regional identity has been then filled with elite cooperation and mutual understanding between the Italian and Austrian government, even though it cannot be claimed that a common sense of citizenship exists. To this regard, the same name of the territory, 'Sud Tirol,' has become an active political symbol for some German groups' identity, making it impossible for other political parties, even Italian, to identify with it. This event clearly refers to a specific identification of this region by the German-speaking population. In this case, also the toponymy, suggest us that the German speakers clarified that they still consider the region a part of Tyrol, as it was before the World War I with the Habsburg Empire. Another example in favour of this statement is the fact that until the late 1960s, the term 'Sud Tirol' never appeared in Italian official documents.

Over the years, there are, however, some encouraging signs that an overarching regional identity could be developed. According to Schneckener (2002, p.213) "the project of multinational regionalism is primarily fostered by small, bicommunal parties such as the Greens[12]".

On the contrary, the condition of Bosnia before the war, was characterized by a common sense of brotherhood and unity, focused on citizenship based on the concept of identity. In this case, the general loyalty was fully fulfilled. After the Yugoslavian dissolution, and consequently after the war, this common feeling of affiliation between the groups has degenerated, to the extent that the post war mentality has been characterised by an identity based on ethnicity and religion.

It can therefore be stated that the existing but weak relations among the ethno-national groups were finally eradicated in the course of conflict. Following the declaration of independence, supported by the Bosniaks, namely the Muslim Bosnians, and the Bosnian Croats, it is only after the war that the Bosniaks identified themselves as the main titular of the Bosnian State. On the other hand, both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, largely did not identify themselves with a common state and claimed for the creation of an independent state. Following external interventions and agreements, there were decades of relatively peaceful coexistence, although this historic background and troubled experience did not perform as a point of reference for developing an overarching loyalty both after the Yugoslavian dissolution and neither in the following years.

The fifth condition which affect power sharing practice, and ethnic divided societies ruled by consociational system, is the cross-cutting cleavages. This condition is clearly at the basis of consociational societies since consociationalism deals with those state which has major internal

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[12] The Greens are a regionalist, green political party, with self-proclaimed social-democratic tendencies, active in South Tyrol. The Greens are inter-ethnic and strive to improve relations between the three language groups of the Province: Italian, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_languageGerman and Ladin-speakers.

divisions along ethnic, religious or linguistic principles. In fact, generally, one of the characteristics of democratic societies, is the political division. In this regard, it can be said that stable consociational democracies are distinguished from weak governments when the most important political representations of a country overlap each other. This specific condition requires not only the commitment between the political factions to overlap but also other factors that favour cooperation between the different parties are important, as for example the electoral behaviour or the reliability of voters in selecting parties on the basis of linguistic or ethnic criteria, or rather that on the basis of other coalition, in terms of economic, professional or social factors.

In our two specific cases, this condition is hardly met by both South Tyrol and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The two main political parties, the South Tyrolean Party in South Tyrol and SDA[13] in Bosnia, are represented and elected by German-speaking population for the former and by Muslims for the latter. In both cases, existing multi-national parties, as we have already seen for the Greens in the case of South Tyrol, are in a clear minority position.

Participation and empowerment are thus two important concepts which are at the basis of cross-cutting cleavages in order to guide civil society to cooperate and behave with greater tolerance and mutual respect. However, the creation of local NGOs[14], backed by the international community and external donors, has somewhat accentuated the ethnic groups' cleavage, by generating a top-down approach. In fact, according to Belloni (2001, p.174) "By using NGOs as cheap implementing agencies, their potential as agents of change towards reconciliation and democratization is critically undermined. Thus, the attempt to generate participation through a top-down process of planning and organization might paradoxically create obstacles to participation."

The last structure-oriented condition we consider is the relationship between moderate pluralism and national fronts. Starting from the fact that there exist pro and cons for both moderate pluralism and national fronts, this opposition is the typical division between the representation of different political parties, which usually characterizes a democratic state, and a single and rigid national front or movement. In ethnic divide societies, generally each group is internally characterized by political pluralism. This characteristic is normally due to the contrasting views on issues or political and social strategies within each segment. These discrepancies are then manifested through a moderate multi-party system, which can usually be organized on the basis of two different approaches. The first

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[13] The Party of Democratic Action is a Bosniak nationalist, conservative political party in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Party of Democratic Action is the primary stronghold for right-orientated Bosniaks, especially for nationalists, and conservatives, and thus they have been described as national-conservative. On foreign stances they also tend to be Atlanticist and supportive of the accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to NATO and the European Union.
[14] A non-governmental organization (NGO) is an organization that generally is formed independent from government. They are typically non-profit entities, and many of them are active in humanitarianism or the social sciences.

approach is related to the traditional opposition between right and left political parties. The second approach refers to the moderate, radical, and multi-communal forces.

In South Tyrol prevails a system characterized by a multi-party system composed of moderates, radicals, and multi-communal forces. This outcome has been achieved over time thorough cooperative efforts between the forces, which intensified in the 1970s during the creation of democratic-inclusive institutions and regional networks. In fact, after the introduction of the 19-commisison, the cooperation was successfully maintained in mixed commissions to develop implementing regulations and provisions. The consequences of this condition meant that the South Tyrolean society could be represented in both chambers of the Italian Parliament.

In Bosnia, the conflict evolution and the peace process led the country to a political divide, so that both approaches of political representation can be performed. In fact, the Bosnian political system corresponds to both political methods. In fact, if on one hand, the peace process tried to encourage and stimulate the establishment of a multi-party system within each group, testified by the fact that over the last decade, several parties emerged in Bosnia, on the other hand there exist the three main nationalist parties, the Party for Democratic Action SDA, the Serb Democratic Party SDS[15] and the Croat Democratic Union HDZ[16], that have enjoyed the support of their respective ethnic communities since before the war. What can therefore be affirmed is that international involvement and peace process strategies, mainly due to the establishment of multiple levels of government, created a moderate pluralism, even though internal pluralism should not lead to fragmentation or extremist views which undermine groups' cooperation, and which would aggravate power-sharing practice.

In conclusion, these were the six structure-oriented conditions for a successful practice of power sharing. As previously mentioned, and according to some study research and comparative analyses, these conditions are relatively less influential than actor-oriented factors in the power sharing exercise.

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[15] The Serb Democratic Party is a Serb political party in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Radovan Karadžić founded the Serb Democratic Party in 1990. The party aimed at unifying the Bosnian Serb community, and staying part of Yugoslavia in the event of secession by those two republics from the federation.

[16] The Croatian Democratic Union is the major conservative, centre-right political party in Croatia. The HDZ governed Croatia from 1990 before the country gained independence from Yugoslavia until 2000 and, in coalition with junior partners, from 2003 to 2011, and since 2016.

Table 3: Structure-oriented conditions fulfilment.

	SOUTH TYROL	BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
RELATIVE EQUILIBRIUM	Satisfied	Satisfied
NO SIGNIFICANT SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES	Low degree of compliance	Satisfied
TERRITORIAL SEGMENTATION	Satisfied	Satisfied
OVERARCHING LOYALTIES	Low degree of compliance	Low degree of compliance
CROSS-CUTTING CLEAVAGES	Low degree of compliance	Low degree of compliance
MODERATE PLURALISM VS. NATIONAL FRONTS	Satisfied	Low degree of compliance

2.2.2 Actor-oriented conditions

The fulfilment of actor-oriented conditions favours the practice of power sharing. This is mainly due to the fact that actors and socio-political parties are the key elements both in conflict dispute and also in conflict regulation. However, these conditions should not be considered as empirical rules for successful consociational democracies. What can be argued is that the combined effect of favourable conditions is a reliable measure to identify the achievement or the failing of a consociational democracy. To this regard, the implementation, over time or during the peace process, of some

political regimes, as the establishment of power sharing institutions, play a key role in the promotion of these conditions.

Starting from the first actor-oriented condition, namely dominant elites, this is also one of the major elements that characterize consociationalism. In fact, this form of democratic power sharing is based on the consultation among the elites of each ethnic group.

In this case the social elite influence is based on decision-makers in both the public and private sectors of society. As stated by Price (2004, p.19) "elite membership thus depended on the mutually reinforcing combination of economic, social, and political power, which gave its members both status and authority". For this reason, the fulfilment of this condition implies the internal approval for political leaders of each group throughout compromises and the negotiations in political agreements. In order to fulfil this condition, one can argue about a twofold situation. Contrary to our two specific case studies, the first scenario refers to a clear partition between elites and supporters. In this case elite activity is less related to their representatives, who can behave more independently during the negotiations. We normally refer to this situation when major political parties are involved, by collectively negotiating and implementing some political decisions.

On the other hand, the second way in order to fulfil this condition is by the cooperation between elites and supporters. However, as we will see in our two cases, this method may not always lead to the implementation of this power sharing factor. One of the reasons which could undermine this condition is related to the fact that elites' supporters are allowed to veto political decisions and, thus, the main political leaders' capacity for negotiation is relatively confined. Specific political decisions, as it was for the implementation of some measures in South Tyrol, need to be agreed by both elites and supporters or, at least, by the majority of party members. In this situation, elites have to convince their audience in order to overcome internal resistance.

In fact, in South Tyrol cooperation of elites at state and international level, through the implementation of inclusive institutions by the Italian government led the region to a successful process of power sharing. This development, and consequently the acceptance of the autonomy system by political elites, was achieved through clientelist interdependence, concrete institutions, and inclusive policies. In particular, elites and supporters' relationship and cooperation can be witnessed by the fact that in 1969, the South Tyrolean People's Party SVP voted in favour of the adoption of the 'package' programmes. A slight majority was achieved in this case by the action of the Governor Magnago who mediated the pressures of radical forces.

In Bosnia, since the Dayton Peace Agreement, which paradoxically soured and institutionalised ethnic divergences, nationalist parties' attitudes nurtured the same divergent aspirations which conducted the country in the ethnic conflict. Even in this case, nationalist parties' leadership hardly

reached compromises, both among national parties and between elites and supporters. What then differentiates the two case studies is the complexity for Bosnian elites to convince their supporters in political agreements, thus having to make clear their strong persistence in order to perform governmental compromises in the face of internal criticisms and opponents. Dominant elites should therefore try to influence and persuade their backers, by highlighting the positive aspects of the agreements reached, in order to be adequately assist and encouraged during the negotiations.

Another important conditions for power sharing practice, since political, military, and economic power is regulated according to agreed rules, is the observance of the status quo.

In fact, what characterize a successful power sharing from a precarious and unstable political country is the concern for all ethnic or linguistic groups in keeping the agreed status quo. According to this statement it can be initially inferred the different outcomes of our two comparative case studies. If in the South Tyrol case consociational solution is not questioned by any side, since consociational measures were implemented and achieved through the cooperation of both parties, the current status quo which characterize the Bosnian State was defined, for other reasons, through the imposition of external forces. Power sharing practice and consociational measures are therefore seen by the ethno-national identities as incomplete and inadequate for the different groups' demands. It can be therefore affirmed that the status quo is met to a large extent in the South Tyrol region while in the Bosnian case the status quo observance is not fulfilled. South Tyrol territorial borders, challenged by the requests for self-determination by the South Tyrolean population, and which undermined the integrity and sovereignty of the Italian State, were resolved, over the time by the implementation of some political and institutional measures. In fact, after the 1972 Second Autonomy Statute, which recognized the German-speaking population as a distinct ethnic group, neither the SVP nor the DC[17] ever disputed the high degree of autonomy for the province of Bozen. In Bosnia, after the Dayton Peace Agreement, territorial borders were defined and institutionalised through the third article of the treaty, where the parties endorsed the boundary demarcation between the two new entities. In this territorial subdivision, it was possible to identified four levels of governance, from the state level to the local level of provinces and municipalities. However, as claimed by Marko (2005, p.17) "Sovereignty and independence of smaller and smaller ethnically divided territorial entities cannot cope with the challenges of globalisation, but only autonomy and integration, which is to say only a flexible federal system from the local to the supra-national level can adapt to the new

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[17] Christian Democracy was a Christian democratic political party in Italy. The DC was founded as the ideal successor of the Italian People's Party. A Catholic-inspired, centrist, catch-all party comprising both centre-right and centre-left political factions, the DC played a dominant role in the politics of Italy for fifty years, from its inception in 1944 until its final demise in 1994.

interdependencies". To this regard, this seem to be one of the key problems which affect the territorial integration of this region, consequently affecting the status quo of the State.

The achievement of the recent negotiations in Bosnia will therefore be determined by the ability of the parties to further develop the status quo disposition, in order to overshadow nationalistic campaign which could compromise the current status quo and the territorial integrity of the region.

Traditions of compromise and mutual understanding is another essential condition in favour of the consociational approach. In fact, in consociational democracies, the decision-making mechanism of the political system is not primarily concerned with the principle of majority as it is for 'competitive democracy,' but rather it aims at achieving friendly understandings and compromise solutions between the parties. This process involves all the main parties, and these factions participate, in proportion to their electoral power, in the distribution of political positions and other governmental assignments. To this regard, elites' relationship is fundamental since compromise is the settlement of differences between two or more groups by mutual concession. This condition, however, does not allow both factions to reach the best agreement desired, but it is necessary to maintain a stability between the parties within a region or a state. Over the years, there have been some examples of elite cooperation which have demonstrated these traditions of compromise. Among these historic compromises we can distinguish between two different situations: one of political nature and the other which instead refers to the consociational approach of our paper. The first condition relates to the Historic Compromise reached in the 1970s, as political accommodation, between the Christian Democracy DC and the Italian Communist Party PCI[18]. This policy, however, never led the Communist Party to participate in the government in a grand coalition under the theories of consociationalism. On the other hand, consociational practices were favoured by some compromises in both Belgium and South Tyrol. In the first case, among the two linguistic groups, Flemish and Francophone, elites' cooperation has enabled a law to pass that requires the two languages in Belgium on an equal condition since the end of the 19th century. In the case of South Tyrol, despite one can hardly speak about traditions of compromise, mutual understanding between elites' parties, in particular a provincial coalition between the SVP and the local DC, made it possible to reach a compromise in 1969, for the implementation of the 'package' solution.

In Bosnia, traditions of compromise and mutual understanding between the three ethic-cultural groups was completely achieved during the Yugoslav period, when Bosnia was one of the six republics of former Yugoslavia. After the country dissolution, where they have succeeded each other four years

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[18] The Italian Communist Party was a communist political party in Italy. The PCI was founded as Communist Party of Italy on 21 January 1921 in Livorno by seceding from the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). In 1991, it was dissolved and re-launched as the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), which joined the Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists.

of war and ethnic cleansing, this condition has completely failed. The post-war period remains equally complicated, and this situation make it very difficult for all sides to re-establish comparatively peaceful inter-ethnic cooperation. In fact, historic compromises, as we have seen for South Tyrol may help countries to ease tensions and achieve some outcomes, but the real problem of this conditions relies in the fact of inculcate mutual understanding in the common political culture in order to guarantee reciprocal comprehension also between future generation.

Comprehensive participation and political inclusion are the fourth element in which the main parties of a dispute are directly involved for the fulfilment of power sharing practice.

This condition in addition to being essential during the peace process, where all relevant groups should be represented in the mediation talks, also need implementation and a proper functioning in the following years, when all political parties should comprehend in the institutionalized power-sharing system. We can thus distinguish between comprehensive participation during the peace process period and political inclusion after the conflict regulation, when consociational arrangements have been adopted. Starting from the first situation, it can be already inferred some differences. South Tyrol peace process has affected all the relevant groups, which were always represented and consulted among the Italian and the Austrian governments. On the other hand, the Bosnian peace process, had to be regulated by external actors and international organizations, which established a general framework agreement along some binding articles. Although this treaty also involved the main parties of the country, affirming the unity of the Bosnian State, on the other hand it has somehow institutionalized the political division of this country in two distinct entities, the Croat-Muslim Federation, and the Serb Republic.

In this first situation we can therefore say that this condition is met by both the case studies. However, by analysing the post-war process, there are in both cases some elements that do not identify with any of the linguistic or ethnic groups, and which are defined as 'others.' This group have, however, strong incentives to align themselves with the ethnic governance in which they live, being somehow excluded from the political activity of the society. Even when described as outdated and rigid, as in South Tyrol, or an 'ethnocracy,' as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnic alignment seems to be the option most practised in order to enjoy the benefits of a wealthy region as South Tyrol, or to 'survive' as in Bosnia, the ethnic power-sharing system. Nevertheless, contrary to South Tyrol, Bosnia needs a constitutional reform in order to perform with comprehensive participation.

In fact, according to Piacentini (2021, p.32) "not only 'Others' are discriminated by virtue of the ethnic mechanisms of representation and participation, but injustices are also being perpetrated on an ethno-territorial base".

The last condition to develop a successful power sharing system somewhat summarizes some of the previous conditions, and in particular this factor refers to the relationship between internal compromise vs. external pressure. According to this condition, the power sharing practice, and in particular the consociational approach requires an agreement or a negotiation where major internal divisions along religious, linguistic or ethnic nature, are regulated and remain well-founded through the internal compromise reached by the consultation among the elites of these groups. On the other side, 'enforced' consociational democracies, established by the external pressure of other actors or international organizations, focus in some way on the achievement of a 'short-term' outcome, that is to say the conflict regulation, even though, in the long run it will not produce the necessary requirements to establish a peaceful and harmonious relationship between the various groups.

In the first case, South Tyrol consociational solution was developed by the groups themselves and not forced upon them by external powers. It can be said however that both the Austrian and the Italian governments supported and regulated the conflict. If the former has acted as 'protective power' of the German-speaking population, also bringing the conflict in front of the United Nations, the latter implemented through some measures (Commission of the Nineteen, Package, Second Autonomy Statute) the fulfilment of a consociational democracy in a 'positive peace' environment.

Contrary to the Bosnian peace process, where external pressure prevailed over the internal compromise, for the fact that conflict regulation design were primarily discusses with the supporter states, namely Croatia and Serbia, and to a much lesser extent with the actually concerned ethnic groups, in South Tyrol the three different linguistic groups agreed themselves on each particular feature and political disposition of the planned power sharing system. An important aspect in this dispute, was the bond of cooperation, rather than opposition between the internal compromises of the elites' groups and the external pressure. Certainly, both governments exerted some pressure on the conflicting parties, made draft proposals and held reciprocal peace conventions, but the respective elites' cartel were always engaged and notified.

In the next paragraph, we will try to expand our comparative research into an international dimension of conflicts and governance, starting from the local level and questioning the international level by outlining the concept of multi-layered governance.

Table 4: Actor-oriented conditions fulfilment.

	SOUTH TYROL	BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
DOMINANT ELITES	High degree of compliance	Unfulfilled
RESPECTING THE STATS QUO	High degree of compliance	Unfulfilled
TRADITIONS OF COMPROMISE AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING	High degree of compliance	Low degree of compliance
COMPREHENSIVE PARTICIPATION	Satisfied	Unfulfilled
INTERNAL COMPROMISE VS. EXTERNAL PRESSURE	High degree of compliance	Unfulfilled

2.3 Case studies at different levels of governance

In our comparative research design, we have therefore firstly established a comparative matrix where different questions and topics have been analysed in order to compare in a more detailed way our two case studies. Secondly, we have defined the key conditions for a successful power sharing practice, and in particular the consociational approach both cases have adopted in their conflict resolution, by emphasizing the factor-oriented classification. Furthermore, on the basis of these specific conditions, we briefly mentioned and compared the two cases in order then, in the following chapter, to have a more detailed overview of the context.

In this section we will analyse our two case studies at distinct levels of governance, by also tackling the issue of the international dimensions of ethnic conflicts. In fact, nowadays one of the key questions asked by scholars and experts refer to the relationship, which is at the basis between ethnic conflicts, generally a dispute between two or more contending ethnic groups within the same region or state,

and international conflicts, which refer to conflicts between different nation-states or between people and organizations located in different countries.

To this regard, some study research conducted by experts defined over the years the ethnic conflict dimensions and correlation worldwide. In fact, as stated by Burton (1987, p.5) "The conflicts which are of global concern involve deep issues of ethnic and cultural identity, of recognition and of participation that are usually denied to ethnic minorities in addition to issues of security and other values that are not negotiable".

This consideration can be reiterated, after having analysed concepts and characteristics of our two case studies, by both ethnic conflicts. In fact, both in South Tyrol and Bosnia-Herzegovina, a correspondence between ethnic conflict and international dimensions exists, even though it can be comprehended in reverse processes. In fact, if in the first case the global dimension of the conflict has been acquired during the dispute itself, by bringing the case in front of the United Nations, in the case of Bosnia, the Bosnian war is rightfully considered to be an international armed conflict. Only after the peace agreements, international dimension has faded, both in terms of economic and geo-political importance, so much that the different ethnic groups are claiming their ethnic values and live in condition of uneasy co-existence.

For this reason, after having defined a comparative matrix and highlighted the key conditions which characterize the conflict regulation practice of our two cases, it is important to understand how the two representative cases handle and manage the different political context.

In particular, in the following subsections, we will approach the three different degrees by comparing the two cases at the local or regional level, at the national level and in conclusion the international status these conflicts acquired over the years.

According to Cottier (2009, p.678) "Multi-layered governance is built, and depends, upon the identification of core values which are shared, and which are able to offer a common framework for all layers equally". What is then important for our comparative research, is that a multi-layered governance needs to be studied and evaluated on both structures and procedures of a given context, rather than ideas and views based on speculative conventions. This is one of the reasons we will try to explain the two cases on these three political levels, by analysing and emphasizing structures and policies adopted by actors in order to comprehend factors and design that have led to different outcomes of peace and coexistence.

However, international relations between nation-states' governments differ very often from the domestic political processes of individual countries. A common multi-layered governance hardly ever is met between countries, except in limited cases, as it can be for some specific treaties or organizations, as in the case of the European Union. Each country acts in the global sphere, by

pursuing their nationally defined interests, also according to their own national constitutions and values. As it is for our two case studies, ethnic conflict regulation has been achieved through two different approaches, which involved on several levels, numerous actors.

Table 5: Levels of governance.

LEVELS	SOUTH TYROL	BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
LOCAL	- Institutional equality through power-sharing practice and the Second Autonomy Statute - Positive elite general agreement	- From inter-state to intra-state ethnic conflict - Dissolution former Yugoslavia and unstable state structure
NATIONAL	- Democratization of the central state - Implementation inclusive institutions - Special administrative region	- Lack of cooperation within the model of Federalism - Tripartite power sharing system and decentralization - The boundary between civil war, state formation, and international intervention is extremely complicated and vague
INTERNATIONAL	- Role of Austria which bring the case in front of the UN, enhancing the dispute to an international level - No other international powers were involved	- Foreign involvement and external intervention, both financially and politically - Polarization by International Powers and Institutions; the role of US and Soviet Union before the war and EU after conflict resolution

2.3.1 Local and regional level of governance

The first level of governance within our comparative research design focuses on the local and regional structure of a region or a country. This layer usually corresponds to the cooperation and participation between local governmental actors, in our case studies, the role of elites and political parties, and a central government. At the regional level, governmental institutions should operate in complete transparency, since they closely represent the community, and they share, though at a lower level, some functions of the central government. Regional and local institutions usually manage their own financial asset, by raising taxes or cutting departmental program spending, in order to implement their ability to concentrate monetary profits in accordance with public services and local policies.

Ethnic conflict resolution and regulation, as previously highlighted, needs however a cohesive and coherent governance approach in order to tackle issues and decisions in compliance with international actors, national governments and local communities or ethnic groups. Nevertheless, considering the fact that all governance levels are fundamental for regulatory and political matters both in domestic and international scale, the local level is probably the main factor for a successful ethnic conflict resolution within the framework of an ethnic conflict agreement. This is probably due to the fact that the more autonomy local actors have, the more likely it is that a good governance and a form of democratic society will be successful. From the previous analyses, this statement can be confirmed by the example and the experience of our two case studies, even though in the following chapter, a more detailed comparative evaluation will be treated.

Moreover, at the local level, ethnic conflicts divergences not always differ in the linguistic, religious or ethic principles, but very often the dispute is related to a matter of degree where the groups' main parties fail to reach a compromise.

In our specific case, from a provincial point of view, it can be affirmed that regional governance in South Tyrol and Bosnia-Herzegovina differed both during the peace process and also after the resolution of the conflicts. As mentioned before, global context played a decisive role in the outcomes of the two regions, favouring in the case of South Tyrol, the intersections between local measures and global regulations. Nowadays, in fact, South Tyrol's autonomy is based on three fundamental papers which explain this solid and harmonious multi-layered governance: the Italian Constitution, at the national level, the Paris Treaty, also known as the Gruber-De Gasperi agreement, as bilateral treaty between Austria and Italy and the Second Autonomy Statute, where the region receives de facto the

status for a territory whose legislative and administrative autonomy is higher than political and governmental capacity under normal statute.

On the other hand, the Bosnian peace process, and the evolution of the conflict type, determined a different degree between both local actors and institutions' importance, by causing an unstable state structure, both at the national and regional level. Contrary to South Tyrol, the non-regulation of identity issues and identity-based discriminations, led the Bosnian war from a national level, inter-state conflict, to the local level, intra-state dispute. Even after the Dayton Peace Agreement, local and national institutional cooperation failed to implement civil society participation. To this regard, civil society participation is fundamental both as a mediator between state and individuals and as an actor in order to reach a compromise for political and governmental decisions.

From a regional viewpoint, in relation to what has been affirmed, Belloni (2001, p.168) argued that Bosnian civic leaders and individuals are often confused by who is responsible for what and approach the international community rather than local officials to address their needs and although the international community praises the advocacy role of local organizations and groups, the overarching outside influence in the country makes such a role extremely difficult.

This statement confirms the fact that for a successful power sharing practice or democratic system of government a coherent governance between international, national, and local elements is needed.

2.3.2 National level

The second level of governance in which the two case studies will be analysed concerns the national relationship and cooperation between state government and local authorities. In this case, before considering our two case studies approach it is important to understand the difference between government and governance. While the former reflects a 'top-down' national government-driven approach, the latter, governance, considers the importance of multi-level and multi actor approaches. Government policies refers to national government-driven action through formal or binding tools, as they can be laws, regulation, and enforcement directions, where the national government is the key actor. In this case, in order to implement a cohesive and coherent partnership between national and local actors, the process of decentralization play an important role. In particular, through this process, policies and activities of an organization or a government, mainly those regarding planning and decision-making, are distributed or delegated from the central authority to regional and local authorities, thus by deploying more powers to peripheral administration.

On the contrary, when we talk about governance, these interaction processes is in fact in line with the idea that new forms of governance are evolving, probably due to the phenomenon of globalization, and they sit both 'above' the state level, as for example international organizations or INGOs[19], and 'below' the state level, as it is for political parties, citizens or local authorities. To this regard, relation between the two factors is a key element we have to consider in facing complex issues as it is for ethnic conflict resolution.

The starting point is the acknowledgement of 'complexity' and 'uncertainty,' which is the acceptance that 'vested interests,' interest of different economic and political actors, are important and no effective action can be taken without the interaction between different level of governance and citizens' support. To this regard, consociational democracy practice can be considered as an effective way to tackle the issues. State remains, however, probably the most important actor, but the cooperation and a composite business involvement and citizens participation are required.

In the first case, South Tyrol model of governance have been implemented through continuous cooperation, and further rapprochement provided by intergroup relationship. The importance of being a special statute region play now a leading role, but these changes have been introduced over time through the democratization of the central state, the implementation of inclusive institutions and international lobby groups administration. On the other hand, the ongoing situation of negative peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina which are now again exploding, is related to the fact that the boundary between civil war, state formation, and international intervention is complicated and vague.

This model of federalism, characterize by four levels of governance, is constantly jeopardized by political disagreements between the three ethnic groups, economic grievances related to external financial aids and social disaggregation, also within the provinces and local authorities in the federation. As stated by Belloni (2001, p.172) "Political power is not simply in the hands of local elites but has become even more alien and inaccessible, removed from those local officials whose accountability is increasingly directed upward, towards the international community, rather than downward, towards civil society which has become the weak link in the chain of power that is inaccessible and obscure to most Bosnians".

2.3.3 International status

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[19] An international non-governmental organization (INGO) is an organization which is independent of government involvement and extends the concept of a non-governmental organization (NGO) to an international scope.

The third level of comparison refers to the international status and context the two case studies adopted and tackled in the resolution of the conflict dispute. Starting by the fact that all three levels are strictly interconnected between themselves, there are however two crucial factors which influenced and determined the outcome and the approach to the ethnic conflict. In particular, the international dimension of the two case studies refer to the historical period the two conflicts started and developed over time and the geographical framework the two countries are embedded. In fact, if in relation with the first factor, geopolitical dynamics and history evolution differ significantly for the two case studies, since, as we have already mentioned, superpowers first and international organizations later played a significant role in the outcome of the conflicts. Nevertheless, the second aspect must also be considered and carefully taken into account, since some relevant dynamics influenced the conflict resolution path.

Regarding the first element, if in the case of South Tyrol, the ethnic conflict developed during an inter-war period where the role of nation state was still prevalent, the Bosnian situation exploded during a period of geopolitical tension where governments' decisions and policies was affected by polarization and conflicting position of several new international actors. In particular, during that period, national sovereignty had been eroded because of the role of globalization in different domains. The historical period should therefore be taken into account to understand the different reconciliation phases that brought South Tyrol into a long-term peaceful cohabitation and Bosnia-Herzegovina through a short-term violent engagement. On the other hand, geographic location element is based on the fact that the South Tyrol dispute is placed in a specific consolidate background, which is to say the European Union, whereas the Bosnian conflict arises from a rough social condition where the Yugoslav peninsula was at the centre of a bipolar world. In particular, regarding our first case study, South Tyrol, and based on this specific condition, in 1992 all measures of the South Tyrol package have been implemented. The outcome of this settlement favoured both ethnic linguistic minorities relationship and the interaction between Italy and Austria. In fact, to this regard on 1st January 1995 Austria became a member of the EU, by signing the same year the Schengen Agreement. As a result of these applications, the geographical context has surely favoured the coexistence between these different linguistic groups, so much so that in 1998 the border posts at the Brenner pass were removed. On the other hand, one of the most relevant types of evidence about the strategic geopolitical position of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the activities promoted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as OSCE[20]. This organization, as the name suggests, was engaged in this region

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[20] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the world's largest regional security-oriented intergovernmental organization with observer status at the United Nations. Its mandate includes issues such as arms control, promotion of human rights, freedom of the press, and free and fair elections. It was created during the Cold War era as a forum for discussion between the Western Bloc and Eastern Bloc.

as mediator and supervisor for both second post-war general elections and also to establish a democratic and impartial political environment through the functioning of some specific offices concerned mainly in human rights projects and democratization action. Moreover, the end of the ethnic conflict, signed with the Dayton Peace Agreement, favoured OSCE activities in the regional stabilization through the implementation of confidence-building measures and arms control arrangements in accordance with Annex 1-B of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Articles II and IV)[21].

In conclusion, in this comparative research design I have outlined the main factors and arguments that will then be deepened in order to compare in a more detailed way our two case studies. What have been analysed is a general framework on the main elements of the two ethnic conflicts, the main characteristics about the practice of power sharing, a key element together with the theory of consociationalism of our research study, and thirdly, the different level of context and governance in which the two case studies are consolidated.

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[21] OSCE (1998) 'Democratization Department Annual Report' *Annual Report 1998 on OSCE Activities,* December November, Sarajevo, July, p.17.

Chapter Three

Comparison of the two case studies

In this third chapter the main aim of the section will be focused on the comparison of the two case studies. Based on the previous chapters, where I have provided some definitions of the main concepts of our research study and after having defined some questions and conceptions for our comparative research design, we will try to answer to our research question deepening the research on the comparison of cases.

In the first part of the chapter, I will outline the historical background of the two ethnic conflicts, by highlighting and try to answer to the previous comparative matrix questions. In particular we will try to give the reader a more detailed overview of the main differences about arrangements and cultural and linguistic views. This first part will therefore help us to examine the incompatibility of goals between linguistic minorities, in the case of South Tyrol, and ethnic cleavages, in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and understand which are the reasons that brought the two regions to national grievances first and ethnic conflict then. The second part refers to some sub questions that broaden the study of research and questioned consociationalism as form of democratic power sharing. In particular, based on our primary research question, and given that the Bosnia region is characterised by the concept of 'negative peace', we will try to comprehend better the Bosnian arrangement, wondering whether this practice is likely to be improved or if it is doomed to fail. Based on this comparative perspective, we will try to answer to this question, by asking which alternative exist. In fact, if on one hand external aid and international organizations were crucial to the initial state-building peace process, in the following years consociational governance structure have proved to be at the basis for creating conditions of an uneasy coexistence.

Moreover, in relation to the Bosnian conosociational model, and in accordance with our comparative research, we will try first to understand if and how the South Tyrol model can be exported to other conflicting situation, in particular the Bosnian one, and then which are the limits of consociational democracy, since some problematic elements remain in the successful practice of power sharing in this region, in particular by the adoption of corporate consociationalism rather than the liberal one.

Thirdly, we will tackle the current situation which affect both regions, by analysing expectations and outcomes in the present-day society. We will firstly focus on the political structure of the two countries, always considering and comparing the two case studies. After that, we will analyse the

actors and the institutional agreements, both comparing over time the internal dynamics in each region and then analysing the two cases collectively.

In conclusion we will examine the structure of the society and their social circumstances, by considering the political dimension and the degree in which individual freedom is seen as primary in order to understand how and in what way the living conditions have improved or worsened in the respective countries.

3.1 Historical Background

As previously analysed in the comparative research design, our comparison involves different timeframes. To this regard the two main elements for our research are space and time since we compare two different regions in two different historical periods. For this reason, before arguing and highlighting the reasons and the main differences between the two cases in order to answer research questions, it is important to give the reader a brief historical background of both cases, so as to examine and understand which were social, political and economic conditions during a certain time and place. Comparative research is therefore no longer sufficient in comparing present-day cases without specific elements of time and place, since are precisely those factors which help us to analyse and comprehend past ethnic conflicts, and even more to perceive these dynamics in order to prevent similar future circumstances.

South Tyrol and Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnic conflicts, although characterized by two hugely different situations both in time and process, it can be said that the two regions were distinguished by a complex historical background, marked by an historical common element. In fact, during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, both regions were part of this dual monarchy. If on one hand, South Tyrol, along with the Austrian province of Tyrol and the south region of Trentino was under the northern and western parts of the former Austrian Empire, on the other hand, under the Kingdom of Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovina was governed from 1878 from the dual monarchy, by forming a third part of the union under the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia.

However, South Tyrol, following the historical timeline, is the first of the two case studies to be analysed. In this case, South Tyrol conflict can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century, in particular, World War I. In fact, until the outbreak and the end, in 1919 of the WWI, South Tyrol was part of the Habsburg Empire for almost half a century. Specifically, this portion of territory formed during the Habsburg Empire, the so called 'Tyrol Heartland.'

At the end of the World conflict, after the empire dissolution, this region was annexed to Italy with the Peace Treaty of Saint Germain in 1919. This outcome led the region to a first linguistic and partially ethnic cleavage, since majority of the province's inhabitants were culturally Austrian, with German as their first language. In the following years, precisely in the 1922, the National Fascist Party, led by the Italian politician Benito Mussolini took the power and governed the country until 1943, when PNF[22] was replaced by the Republican Fascist Party until the end of the Second World War in 1945. Based on specific political characteristics, such as dictatorial power and suppression of opposition, during these years, the region was marked by a process of 'Italianization' and 'homogenization' where Austrian place names was abolished, and German language was banned from school lessons and public offices. It is for this reason that Bozen became the provincial capital of this political design where the city was conceived as the main example of this authoritarian ultranationalism and where nowadays it represents one of the worst periods in the history of this region.

Those years also witnessed a period of mass immigration where fascist politics provided for a rapid growth of Italian citizens through a forced import of Italian migrants. This 'project' of mass immigration, as reported by Benedikter (2021, p.4) 'reached its peak in 1961 with 34.3 per cent of the population', while at the outbreak of the first world war and in particular before the fascist Italianization politics, the Italian-speaking inhabitants in South Tyrol reached the 2.9 per cent of the population. Second World War changed again geopolitical scenarios and the outcome of this regional dispute. In fact, at the end of the World War, the defeat of fascism with the subsequent rise of Great Powers, opened a first effort for a negotiation process between the two countries, Austria, and Italy.

In 1946, favoured by the international pressure of the Great Powers, the Austrian and Italian Foreign Ministers Karl Gruber and Alcide De Gasperi signed the so-called Paris Treaty. This compromise between the two-country provided for a creation of an autonomous government with a special measure to protect the German-speaking population. However, during the 1950s, ethnic dispute worsened due to the fact that Italian government did not fulfil Paris Treaty obligations. To this regard, we can distinguish between two diverse levels. In fact, if on one hand, from an international level, in 1959 the ethnic dispute was brought in front of the UN Security Council by the Austrian Foreign Minister, from a regional level, some separatist South Tyrolean political parties resorted to violent actions. These situations of ethnic and nationalist movements reached its peak in 1961 when pro-Austrian separatists launched a series of bomb attacks against symbols of the Italian state, for what is remembered as the 'South Tyrol Night of Fire'.

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[22] The National Fascist Party was an Italian political party, created by Benito Mussolini as the political expression of Italian Fascism and as a reorganization of the previous Italian Fasces of Combat.

In the following years, significant improvements in terms of negotiations and compromises were reached, and in 1969 a 'Package agreement' was signed between the two governments. The enactment of this new agreement included some important measures which implement the autonomy of the region signed in the Paris Treaty. In particular, this settlement included the transfer of legislative and administrative power to the province, the principle of ethnic proportions in relation to state and semi-state bodies and a compromise for financially support the province. The final enhancement of this ethnic conflict, which informally stated the ethnic pacification was the ratification of a new 'second' Autonomy Statute in 1972. South Tyrol received the 'de facto' status of a region whose legislative and administrative autonomy is far greater than the competencies of a region governed under normal statute. Moreover, in order to implement the new statute, two special commissions were created. In this special bodies, namely the Commission of Twelve and the Commission of Six, linguistic groups are represented as equal partners, and they became important in the decision-making arena within the region. In 1992, the conflict was officially resolved with a declaration of dispute resolution by mutual agreement between the two countries. At the international level, the release was signed by Italy and Austria in New York, in front of the United Nation.

Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnic conflict, in terms of time, enclose a more recent historical development since the Bosnian war was fought in the 1990s. However, although, as we have already stated, it was part of the Habsburg Empire, as in the case of South Tyrol, following World War I, this region experienced a period of social and economic unrest over property redistribution. Following the Second World War, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia[23] came into existence. To this regard, Bosnia was one of the six republics which formed this country. During this period, characterized by the 'Cold war,' the socialist country after having sided with the Eastern bloc of the dispute, subsequently engaged in a policy of neutrality. However, social, political, and economic situation in the Yugoslav state, changed in 1980, following the death of the president Tito. In particular, all the various ethnic groups that had been reunified under the dictatorship of Tito, began to claim their ethnic nationalism. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, after the fall of the Communism bloc during the 'Cold war' situation within the country worsened and the federation dissolved along the borders of federated republics, thus marking the start of the Yugoslav wars[24] and the formally dissolution of the federation in 1992. It is precisely in this period that following the fall of the state, the majority of the Bosnian population voted in favour of independence and in 1992 the state came

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[23] The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, commonly referred to as SFR Yugoslavia or simply Yugoslavia, was a socialist country in Central and Southeast Europe that existed from its foundation in the aftermath of World War II until its dissolution in 1992 amid the Yugoslav Wars.

[24] The Yugoslav Wars were a series of separate but related ethnic conflicts, wars of independence, and insurgencies fought in the former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 2001, leading up to and resulting from the breakup of the Yugoslav federation in 1992.

into formal existence. To this regard, Bosnian social status changed dramatically from a citizenship-based identity during the Yugoslav period to a condition of extreme nationalism and ethno-national divide within the same republic. The three main parties of Bosnian Muslims, namely Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats formed the three ethno-nationalist social and political parties which governed the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the independence referendum, where Bosniaks, 44 per cent of the population, and Bosnian Croats, 17 per cent, voted in favour of the creation of an independent state, the Bosnian Serbs, formed by the 31 per cent of the population, rejected the project and declared the separation of the Serb territory from the Bosnian state. The political design carried out by the Bosnian Serb leader Milosevic provided for a full-fledged 'ethnic cleansing' in order to establish a spatial relationship between all Serbian areas and create a single ethnic population. In the following years, tensions increased also between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, to the extent that in 1993 Bosnian Croats ask for separation thus creating a second conflict line. Both ethnic conflicts were characterised by ethnic cleansing, like the Srebrenica massacre and indiscriminate shelling of besieged cities resulting in large death toll to civilians, such as the Siege of Sarajevo.

Contrary to what happened in the resolution of the South Tyrol dispute, a first aspect of the international status the Bosnian war acquired in the global arena was the Washington Agreement[25], which signed the end of the Bosniak-Croatian 'war within war' by establishing a federation between the two ethnic groups. However, if in the Washington Agreement, signatories parties was formed by Bosnian and Croatian statesman, with US as the only supervisor of the agreement, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement, signed in 1995, and which determined the end of the war between the Federation and the Serbs, has been ratified also by the most important heads of state. What has been achieved through the agreement is the political division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into two federal entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The main purpose of the initiatives was the mutual recognition of the two territorial bodies, through a comprehensive settlement in order to promote and achieve an enduring peace and stability in the whole country. As reported in the conflict regulation, the whole territory was equally portioned between the Federation and the Serb Republic. A third portion between the two entities was composed by the self-governing district of Brcko, which is actually under international supervision.

The analyses of the historical background of the two cases are therefore important to interpret and examine how developed the past events, what were the key elements and differences of the dispute

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[25] The Washington Agreement was a ceasefire agreement between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, signed in Washington, D.C. on 18 March 1994 and Vienna. Under the agreement, the combined territory held by the Croat and Bosnian government forces was divided into ten autonomous cantons, establishing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and ending the Croat-Bosniak War.

and to understand whether the conflict could be prevented. Indeed, in multi-ethnic societies, where freedom of speech is protected, ethnic conflict can be a daily feature of pluralistic democracies. To this regard, democracy and power sharing methods have probably been the missing feature of these two cases which has escalated terribly in the Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnic war.

In the next paragraph we will try to outline the cases from an internal perspective, by highlighting the concept of goal incompatibility, notion which stands at the basis of conflicts, and also by considering the legacies of past violence and the need for national reconciliation.

3.1.1 Goal incompatibility and national grievances

After analysing the historical context of the two cases, we will try to identify some important concepts related with the notion of conflict which determine the characteristics of every single dispute. One of the first elements scholars usually consider when studying ethnic conflicts is the goal incompatibility. In fact, a conflict is generally defined as that condition in which two or more groups, both socially defined and politically structured, share purposes that are not socially sustainable for the functioning of the same region. In particular this ethnic groups' condition of inconsistency for the achievement of certain objectives implies such divergence in which actors think that the realization of one or more of their objectives is blocked by the other party's attempt to reach its own respective goal.

It is however important to specify that this concept is related to a dynamic process which is involved in this specific action. Goal incompatibility can be therefore considered as the ultimate stage of different views and interests between two or more groups within the same region. However, as we have already outlined in the historical background, conflict, intended as a process, entails more extensive elements rooted in the framework and history of a specific country. To this regard, the conflict situation is preceded by a state of awareness of the situation where actors clearly defined their role in the dispute. There is then the concrete manifestation of conflict, where usually the opposing groups struggle in order to achieve their objectives and beliefs. After that, the conflict can end with a resolutions, negotiations, and provisions in which the parties reach a compromise or through the intervention of external forces. The last phase of this process implies post conflict implications for the whole of society and in this case, groups may emerge from the conflict in separate ways. As in our specific case, the two examples show how ethnic conflicts in South Tyrol and Bosnia-Herzegovina provoke an opposite socio-political scenario, which is object of our research question.

However, in addition to goal incompatibility we can distinguish between two more component parts which shape conflict dynamics, namely attitudes and behaviour.

The first feature, attitudes, refers to psychological states, attitudes and emotions which characterize a particular group in their decisions. In particular this condition defines groups' mental tendency evaluations and perceptions, which are accountable for the way the group think or feel for any particular situation. In this case different feelings of anger, distrust, fear, and suspicion emerge, and these circumstances create the condition for the conflict situation. As a consequence, the second feature relates to groups' behavior. In particular this property implies the actions or functions of a subject towards other people. In a conflict situation we refer to actions undertaken by one party in aimed at the opposing party with the intention of making that opponent abandon or modify its goals. Moreover, after having defined these three elements of conflict situation, any theory of action must incorporate the importance of roles in human behavior. Ethnic groups' national grievances presuppose to understand why a particular action require to situate the specific faction within its social and institutional position. For this reason, instead of studying human action as motivated solely by utilities, this condition can be perceived as the outcome of a more complex set of norms, rules, and institutions. We will try therefore to grasp the main differences between the two cases for what concern expected outcomes, group's attitude, and behavior and also the social role of ethnic groups in the conflict situation. This analyses will be important also to understand the current situation in both countries, where on one hand a set of normative expectations attached to a social position have been fulfilled, thus favoring a peaceful coexistence between the different ethnic groups, while on the other hand, social and political expectations, imposed in some cases by external actors, have institutionalized ethnic cleavage, establishing a continuous class struggle where nationalism is constantly under threat.

3.1.2 Dynamic triad: goals, attitudes, and behaviour

In this second section we will compare in detail the main differences between the two cases, highlighting the notions previously described, in order to have a broad comparative picture of both South Tyrol and Bosnia for the next paragraphs' sub questions. Moreover, what is important to emphasize is the difference that underlies the main drivers of conflict. To this regard, it can be said that in South Tyrol the right to self-determination and the linguistic protection for minorities played a crucial role as key factor for the ethnic dispute, while in the Bosnian war, extreme nationalism and

instrumentalization of religion for ethno-nationalist purpose may be assigned as the main driver of conflict, even though, as we will see later, there are more deeply rooted convictions within each ethnic groups which shaped conflict dynamics.

Before starting with the analyses of the differences between the three components parts of every conflict within our two cases, what stands out immediately is the dissimilar composition of the parties. To this regard, it can be said that the goal incompatibility management of the various groups is generally more problematic when the parties involved are more than two. Compromise and negotiations between German linguistic minorities and Italian government have proved to be easier than the achievement of an ordinary agreement between the three ethnic groups in the Bosnian war. Mediation by external actors and international organizations confirm the complexity encountered by national institutions in finding a peaceful solution for the three groups.

Moreover, we can distinguish different type of violence between the two cases and also within the same conflict. South Tyrol dispute, after the Italian troops occupied this region, experienced some years later, with the rise of the Fascist ideology, the so called 'Bloody Sunday.' In fact, on the 24th of April 1921, South Tyrolean citizens suffered an Italian fascist attack, where some of them were wounded and the German speaking teacher Franz Innerhofer was murdered. After this brutal occurrence of physical violence, during the Fascist dictatorship the region underwent a different type of coercion, namely psychological violence. In particular, during those years the region was characterized by institutional and symbolic imposition, with the proclamation of the 'Italianization' of South Tyrol, a process where Italian symbolic elements were placed in the most important countries of the region and the names of South Tyrolean towns were changed with an Italian alternative. Moreover, in 1939, psychological condition of South Tyrol people was disrupted by the Italian and German leaders 'Option' decision, where Mussolini and Hitler agreed on the fact that South Tyrolean citizens to decide between either German or Italian citizenship. In particular the decision was about lose their homeland or lose their national identity.

According to what we have defined in the previous paragraph, it can be affirmed that what has changed during the conflict period has been the behaviour of South Tyrolean citizens. While the attitude of the German population possessed a profound sense of belonging to their roots and at the same time fear, suspicion and anger towards Italian government, the South Tyrolean behaviour changed in the second half of the century, when beliefs for the right to self-determination increased and political parties gained more power and influence in the regional scenario. Fascist method of oppression followed this change of mentality, through repression, scornful treatment, provocations, and defamations. In 1961, a second violent physical confrontation has impacted in this ethnic conflict. During the so called 'Night of Fire,' where electricity pylons were destroyed by the separatist

movement of the South Tyrolean Liberation Committee, in the following years, throughout the 1960s, other series of attack were planes and carried out by this group. In particular, these developments led the South Tyrol dispute to have a greater attention both at national and international level. In this regard, the implementation of some measures for the autonomy and the ratification of the second Autonomy Statute developed a feeling of mutual trust since the 1970s.

In conclusion it can be said that the dispute in South Tyrol has followed a discontinues path of conflict, where psychological violence and to a lesser extent physical threat, have followed one another over time, even if the series of attacks during the 1960s changed definitely the Italian perception about this region, promoting and implementing measures and political provisions.

Contrary to the history as a territory and as a country of South Tyrol, Bosnia-Herzegovina has always been very unstable and characterised by ethnical diversity. Nowadays the Bosnian war is probably considered the most dramatic event in the history of this country, but different ethnical background characterised this region even during the two World Wars and the Yugoslav period. What has changed during those years has been the attitude and behaviour of the different ethnic groups to each other.

Over the centuries, the region has been influenced by a rich history of rules under different empires, such us the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian ones, and political ideologies, German occupation, and the former Yugoslavia. These historical influences, favoured probably by the strategic geographical position between the East and the West, led the region to a multifaceted blending of religions and cultural behaviours. To this regard, in a region where Muslims constitutes approximately 51 per cent of the population, Orthodox Christians 31 per cent, Roman Catholics 15 per cent and Protestants and Jews 3 per cent, instrumentalization of religion for ethno-nationalism purposes is in fact one of the key elements which changed Bosnian people attitude.

During the Yugoslav period, the various ethnicity within the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina succeeded in live together and people attitudes focused on citizen-based identity, where the president Tito was the most powerful actor in the country. However, during the 1960s and 1970s, some discrepancies emerged, and public opinion started to change. During the protests of 1968, some students in Belgrade affiliated with the worldwide escalation, protesting against state militaries, while some years later Bosnian elites gained more power in the political arena. Nevertheless, the death of Tito in 1980 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989 are the two turning points in the history of this region. The pre-war mentality, based on a common communist doctrine and powered by the figure of the political leader Tito, has given way to rising nationalist views, which led subsequently former Yugoslavia to dissolve and Bosnia to obtain independence in 1992. It can be therefore said that the 'tolerance through law' doctrine which served South Tyrol to resolve the dispute, was no

longer sustainable in the Bosnian region, thus creating an opportunity for nationalist elements to spread their influence and change their approach towards 'hostile' ethnic groups.

After the outbreak of the war, the Bosnian Serbs approach, and subsequently that of the Bosnian Croats towards the Bosniaks group, dramatically soured, so much that these methods of ethnic cleansing are consider among the brutal acts of forced violence since the end of the World War II.

In conclusion, contrary to the sporadic South Tyrolean rivalry, intensified due to specific historical developments, the ethnic Bosnian cleavage marked this region since the mid-15th century, when the Ottoman empire settle Islamic religion to the region.

During the 20th century, in particular with the outbreak of the internal armed conflict, who according to Kazansky et al (2021, p.58) was led by three decisive factors (the breakup of former Yugoslavia, the Serb President Milosevic's political ambitions and military capability, and ethnic territorial nationalism), both Serbs and Croats attitudes and behaviour have found the right historical context to execute and implement these ethnic splits and gain territorial power.

To conclude, it is quite clear how the two cases entail different historical path and how ethnic and linguistic groups diverge in the sense of belonging. South Tyrolean claims, mostly based on the rights of the German linguistic group within the region, are by nature more compromised than the desire for territorial and ethnic domination adopted by Bosnian ethnic groups throughout history.

3.1.3 Conflict resolution: the role of new institutions

In this third section, the comparative analyses will focus on the main institutional bodies which were created for both ethnic conflicts in order to achieve the expected results. As we will see later, if in the case of South Tyrol, these new bodies strengthened institutional cooperation between both ethnic groups and countries government, on the other hand, new actors have been functioning only partially. In fact, it can be said that the new Dayton order had somehow created an ethnic security vacuum. In this regard, Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2015, p.1) affirms that 'the result is an ethnic security paradox in which the idea of individual safety, linked to the protection of ethnic identity in the form of an ethnified state, unsettles both collective and individual security alike'.

As regarding the historical way of behaving and the main drivers of ethnic conflicts, also institutional bodies entail considerable differences both for its composition and function.

Starting from our first case South Tyrol, one of the key elements for the achievement of a peace resolution between the parties was the establishment of mutual trust-building between the main actors throughout years of bilateral negotiations both at national and regional level.

In 1961, one year later Austria brought the South Tyrol question to the UN General Assembly, the so called 'Commission of Nineteen' was established. For the first time since the enactment of the first Autonomy Statute, a specific body, composed by Italian, German and Ladin speakers' representatives, aimed at improved and developed efficient legal and technical measures in order to settle the conflict. The role of this commission favoured the achievement of the implementation of the Autonomy Statute through the enactment of the so called 'Package,' where important measures was discussed and approved and later with the ratification of the Second Autonomy Statute, for the adoption of the self-Government. Moreover, other two commissions emphasize the work and cooperation this region has established over the years, and still today. In particular, after the improvement and introduction of some measures to implement the autonomy of the German minority, these two so called 'Commissions of Twelve' and 'Commission of Six' were responsible for the regional and provincial implementation of the new regional regulations. In particular the Commission of Twelve provided for the regulation of issues regarding the entire region, while the Commission of Six focused their efforts on issues regarding the autonomous province of Bozen. The importance of these Commissions for the region is underlined by the fact that today they still operate as ordinary instrument of government. As stated by Alber et al. (2016, p.10) 'the Commission of Six is not only a successful trust-building instrument, but also justifies the fat that its decisions prevail over laws democratically adopted by the Italian parliament'.

Bosnian institutional developments are characterised instead by a different direction. From a design level, Bosnian new bodies have been created and redefined under the legal basis of the Dayton Agreement and for this reason they do not fully reflect ethnic groups expectations. Questions about democracy and public space have been undermined by the effect of post-Dayton compulsory recognition. If in South Tyrol, the role of Commissions improved and guarantee cooperation between the parties, in Bosnia two institutions were considered as the main bodies which acted against the collapse of state and society, namely the High Representative and the Constitutional Court of BiH.

The role of the High Representative, in charge of the Office of the High Representative, foresees the implementation and compliance with the GFAP[26]. Nevertheless, this figure has never played a role of active interaction and participation with Bosnian institutions, but only provided for mediation and

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[26] The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Agreement or the Dayton Accords, is the peace agreement reached near Dayton, Ohio, United States, on 21 November 1995, and formally signed in Paris, on 14 December 1995. These accords put an end to the three-and-a-half-year-long Bosnian War, one of the Yugoslav Wars.

conformity with the international agreement. In accordance with the purposes of the GFAP, the High Representative adopted some specific measures, even by removing some public Bosnian officials. In this case, contrary to South Tyrol, both Bosnian institutions and ethnic groups' political parties have been overshadowed by the decision-making power of international bodies, which have imposed a political and territorial management provision unable to meet the 'ethnic compromise.'

To this regard, as a consequence of the conflict resolution, and strictly related to the role of the High Representative, international community established the PIC, a Peace Implementation Council. Based on the implementation of the Dayton accords, the council promoted peace process through financial and military assistance. Similarly, to peacekeeping operations, this body should have had control of the country until an independent status was achieved, with Bosnian institutions politically and democratically stable. Nonetheless, contrary to the initial expectations agreed by the international community, the Dayton structure is still considered to be an essential and integral part of the Bosnian constitution, and what the country needs to survive as a unified country.

The second institution which was redefined after the ratification of the peace agreement was the Constitutional Court of BiH. The key role of this body is to enforce and guarantee the integrity of the Constitution of the country, also availing itself with the appellate jurisdiction. In particular, dispute arising under conflict of jurisdiction, shall be settled by the Constitutional Court, which shall also prevail over constitutional courts within both the Republic of Serbia and the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina, as well as for other institutions under the Bosnian constitution. As stated by Marko (2005, p.13) 'the Constitutional Court went on to counterbalance the effects of ethnic cleansing and the domination of the ethnic principle by referring to the necessity of state functionality and the citizenship principle'. In addition to these two important organisms, some years later after the Dayton Peace, a State Court was established. This judicial body is actually the highest court of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In conclusion, a third body established during the Yugoslav wars, which firstly issued an allegation against the Bosnian-Serb military leader was the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. It was a body established by a statute issued by the UN Security Council in order to prosecute war crimes that have been committed during the Yugoslav war. In particular this ad hoc tribunal, which, unlike the Constitutional Court, was dissolved in 2017 because of its temporary mandate, investigated over violations laws or customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity for the ethnic cleansing method used by the Serbian and Croatian military powers during the three years Bosnian war.

In the next paragraph, the comparative analyses will focus on finding answers to specific sub-questions in order to comprehend how the Bosnian context changed over time, what challenges the Dayton Peace Agreement has brought with it and what the prospect for a constitutional reform is.

Regarding the notion of 'negative peace' we will try to understand which and if some alternatives are feasible for the region, by comparing it with the successful experience of South Tyrol. Moreover, based on the consociational arrangements adopted by South Tyrol, we will try to understand if this model can be defined as an example for other ethnic crisis context, and thus 'exported' to other regions. Nevertheless, even the South Tyrol design encloses certain deficiencies. For this reason, according to the distinction between corporate and liberal consociationalism, we will try to comprehend which are the limits in both cases.

3.2 BiH arrangement: improved or doomed to fail management

Concerning our main research question, it is necessary to ask if the Bosnian arrangement, based on power sharing practice and consociational theory, can be improved or it is doomed to fail. It is important for this reason to try to answer to some specific questions in order to suppose with some reflections about the current situation. Considered by many scholars as the most cruel and violent conflict since the end of the Second World War, it is undeniable that the Dayton Peace Agreement was fundamental from the perspective of conflict resolution. However, in the last two decades, although the region has not experienced any forms of physical violence between the various ethnic groups, the Bosnian arrangements, built on the basis of external powers provisions and views, does not clearly reflect those European and American ethic principles, consisting of democracy and human rights protection. On the contrary, social, and political compromises have created an ethnic security vacuum for individuals, strengthened by the ethno-national political elites which actually are the two leading parties of the Federation and the Serb Republic and possess more power than the Central government. This ethnic security dilemma contributes to the ethnic cleavage, provoking a status of 'negative peace' and enhancing the fear of loss of group identity and distress of repression of ethnic tradition. Moreover, if on one hand the GFAP contributed to resolve the conflict, on the other hand, from a local and regional viewpoint, Dayton provisions never directly tackled the main domestic obstacles which still today afflict the social, political, and economic situation of the region. Corruption is endemic and growing it has degraded the country's governance, undermined its democracy (Hamilton, 2019).

Corruption is however a consequence of the post-war dynamics, stemming from the problem of national identity where the country's constitution has been embedded in the Dayton Agreement. Moreover, over time, the role of the so called 'guarantors of peace,' namely US and EU, has gradually

diminished both in term of financial resources, military intervention, and European integration. Concerning the economic aid, the sum of international grants and loans, including externally financed state investment projects, had stood at nearly 27 per cent of Bosnia's total state income in 1998 but decreased steadily to around 10 per cent in 2005 (De Guevara, 2009:17). On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the democratic transition, the European integration project is constantly undermined by the ethnic-nationalism political discourse within Bosnian political leaders. Nowadays the current status for the accession to the European Union define Bosnia as potential candidate country, after the application was formalized in 2016. Nevertheless, European integration path appears to be particularly complicated because of constitutional deadlocks which compromise political elections and paralysed regional decision-making. To this regard, both the Croatian sabotage in the last elections and the Serbian abstention to national institutions are clear example of how difficult and fragile the situation of the country is. The consensus-based political institutions of the consociational model imposed on the country not only created an environment that favours politics along ethnic lines but also a system vulnerable to blockages, abuses, and violations of the rule of law (Zdeb, 2022).

It would be therefore important to understand if other sustainable solutions are achievable so as to weaken the nationalistic support backed by Bosnian Serbs and Croats, which since the end of the war have endorsed Dayton provisions for autonomy and they strongly rejected national institutions and the transfer of competences to the Bosnian government.

3.2.1 Bosnia in comparative perspective

In this section a comparison of the Bosnian and South Tyrolean consociations outlines some common discrepancies between consociational structures and liberal democracy. Moreover, we will try to broaden our research by analysing other specific ethnic cases, in order to have a clear overview about our comparative study, also in order to answer to our sub questions.

The historical background of ethnic conflict mainly developed in the early of the twentieth century. The outbreak of the First World War changed for the first time the geopolitical dynamics for both European empires and international superpowers. The fall of all continental empires in Europe and the widespread unrest and revolutions spread throughout the continent. These events brought the victorious allied countries of the war, first to the partition of the territories of the old empires and secondly to manage with the creation of new independent countries.

As previously defined in the historical environment, both case studies formed part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After the end of the First World conflict, the Bosnian region was annexed to the new-born Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and then in 1929 to the so-called Kingdom of Yugoslavia. During the centuries, the different ethnic groups have always been merged by defined political projects, as it was with the empire and later with the Yugoslavian design. Subsequently, World War II also altered geopolitical dynamics, since the totalitarian regimes divided the country by provoking some nationalist feeling and altering ethnic groups dynamics. The creation of the Banovina of Croatia, an autonomous province within the Yugoslavian region, backed by the Nazi and Fascist regimes, is one of the examples of an ever-increasing aggressive attitude that will prove to be then one of the key elements in the ethnic conflicts in this region. In fact, in 1991, however, when the war in Yugoslavia began, the ground for armed conflict had been fertile for years, even among its constituent peoples. When the economic crisis of the federation began to undermine the foundations of 'union and brotherhood,' individual national leaders began to accuse each other, exacerbating ethno-nationalist dialectics. In this regard, power sharing power and elites' groups, key characteristics of consociational democracies, have functioned for their own political and economic interests, and thus enhancing the ethnic cleavage with the support of group populations.

The Bosnian case can be somehow compared to the situation of Northern Ireland, which dates back to the 1921 Government of Ireland Act[27] when the country was created and partitioned by Ireland. Both cases, compared with the South Tyrol region, featured different conditions for power sharing structure, which nevertheless did not favour the practice of this conflict resolution. According to what have been stated by Schneckener, where actor-oriented conditions constitute an essential part for the power sharing implementation, the Bosnian and Northern Ireland governments' examples have proved to be over time deficient both in the adoption of such conditions and also in a common agreement between the various ethnic groups, the latter key feature which distinguishes consociational democracies. Concerning the case of Ireland, during the years, the country constitution has been amended and in 1998 the Belfast Agreement[28] was signed. This second arrangement has somehow implemented the first Northern Ireland Constitution Act enacted in 1973 with the aim to cease the ethno-nationalist conflict started during the 1960s, also known as 'The Troubles'. However, similar to the external interference which led to the approval of the Dayton Peace Agreement,

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[27] The Government of Ireland Act 1920 was an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The Act's long title was an Act to provide for the better government of Ireland. The Act was intended to partition Ireland into two self-governing polities: the six north-eastern counties were to form 'Northern Ireland', while the larger part of the country was to form 'Southern Ireland'.

[28] The Good Friday Agreement (GFA), or Belfast Agreement, is a pair of agreements signed on 10 April 1998 that ended most of the violence of the Troubles, a political conflict in Northern Ireland that had ensued since the late 1960s. It was a major development in the Northern Ireland peace process of the 1990s.

Northern Ireland experienced the attempt to establish a power-sharing design with the so called 'Sunningdale Agreement', where, however, the British government would preserve the legislative and financial power. One year after signing the agreement, and following a general strike, in 1974 the Sunningdale agreement was abolished. In this regard, if in the Bosnian case the adoption of power sharing practice, although several favourable conditions were not fulfilled, has been supervised by the territorial distribution and military intervention of international organizations, Northern Ireland agreement immediately failed because the British government proved unwilling to the use of force and because the agreement failed to meet favourable conditions, strong commitment and cooperation between elite groups. The political role both Protestant loyalist and Irish nationalists played in the dispute was fundamental for the collapse of the 1973 arrangements.

This threefold comparison of different ethnic conflicts, both as regards the historical period and the nature of the conflict, once again emphasizes the importance of fulfilling design's conditions in order to ensure as in the case of South Tyrol, long-term stability.

In this regard, considering the favourable factors for power sharing practice, the observance of both actor-oriented conditions and structure-oriented conditions were fundamental for the achievement of a status of 'positive peace' and subsequently peaceful coexistence.

3.2.2 What can be learned from the South Tyrol model

The South Tyrol model conflict resolution is one of the most relevant examples of power sharing and consociational arrangements. In this section we will try to understand if this theory of power sharing practice can be a reliable example for other European crisis regions, in particular what the Bosnian situation can benefit from a similar ethnic conflict regulation.

However, what is clear from the end of the 'Cold war,' when several regions gained independence, is a contradictory condition between territorial integrity and right to self-determination. In fact, in most of these regions, mostly in the former Yugoslavia, public international law fails to provide the social and political compromise reached in the South Tyrol model. This political and legal vacuum, namely European 'paradox,' is therefore the main challenge to tackle for the Bosnian country, trying to create an institutional harmony between autonomy and integration (Marko et al. 2007).

Based on our comparative research, it can be inferred that this ethnic conflict resolution cannot be exported since each specific case possess distinct characteristics and definite political and social conditions. In fact, according to what said in the previous paragraphs, both options for consociational

arrangements and the favourable conditions for power sharing outline the limited characteristics each country and region should possess. Moreover, each political system differs from case to case. In fact, regarding our two comparative cases, if on one hand the Italian politics has been regulated since 1946 by a parliamentary republic based on the principle of separation of powers, on the other hand the Bosnian political system is embedded between the Dayton Agreement and a parliamentary representative democracy, in which the initial aim to ensure a multi-ethnic democratic government has been constantly threatened by the ethnocratic policies of elitist groups.

The example of South Tyrol may constitute a model for the regulation and administration of other conflicts, however. In particular, this peculiar case of ethnic conflict resolution could provide more elements of ethnic conflict resolution and management, particularly during the 1990s, when the geopolitical scenario was changing, and the regional situation of many countries was precarious. Indeed, although the conflict has an historical process dating back to the early twentieth century, the South Tyrol dispute was officially declared closed in 1992, when a declaration of dispute resolution was achieved by mutual agreement between Austria and Italy, by signing the release in front of the United Nations building.

In this regard, according to Marko (2005, p.379), 'within the framework of systems theory and the comparative method, based on the search for functional equivalences, the possibility does in fact exist to comparatively analyse institutional models and, at the same time, also consider the transferability of legal and political proposals'. It can be therefore said, in order to answer to the question about the exportation of the model, that some of the South Tyrolean arrangements can be actually transferred to the present-day ethnic conflict's situations, even though the specific territorial and historical autonomies path of each region denies the possibility of exporting the resolution model in its entirety. This statement can be also confirmed by the attempt made in 2020 by the Azerbaijan's President Aliyev, in order to bring peace to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, when he proposed the South Tyrol model and the mediating interference of Italy, as a possible strategy to the Azerbaijani dispute. In this case, as reported by Benedikter, the main difference between the South Tyrolean conflict resolution and the current ethnic dispute in Azerbaijan, is given by the fact that the protective power of the German-speaking group in South Tyrol, that is to say Austria, was characterised by a geopolitical attitude and government's structure system totally different compared to the two protecting Azerbaijani powers, Russia and Turkey, where the political designs of the current leaders are particularly different from those adopted by the Austrian government.

Moreover, it should be appropriate to establish specific norms as regard the transferability of successful South Tyrolean arrangements in order to negotiate and provide appropriate provisions on the ground for the specific region and ethnic groups and to understand what is feasible implementable

and what cannot be influenced. For example, in our comparative research, both traditions of compromise and mutual understanding and the groups' comprehensive participation in the negotiations, has particularly influenced the evolution of the resolution of the Bosnian conflict, while in the case of South Tyrol, these characteristics have been implemented and attenuated during the negotiations. Concerning these two elements, extreme nationalism and the instrumentalization of religion for ethno-nationalist purposes played a decisive role, and they are among the elements that distinguish a given situation or region and that cannot be affected.

3.2.3 Limits of consociational democracy in South Tyrol

The practice of power sharing and consociationalism have always been defined by our comparative research as a convincing and rational model for the regulation of ethnic conflicts.

South Tyrol, although considered by many scholars as one of the most important examples of power sharing, has shown over the years some limitations. In this regard, we can associate this theory and model of conflict regulation with the complication that have arisen as a result of the Bosnian provisions, immediately after the ratification of the Dayton Accords. For this reason, these deficiencies may highlight some common ground between the two cases.

While it is a fact that consociational arrangements have brought positive peace in South Tyrol, through the work of acceptance and compromise performed by the elites, leading then the ethnic cleavage in the ordinary political debate, it is equally true that South Tyrolean citizens are now experiencing inadequate cultural and linguistic homogeneity.

In fact, as reported by Carlà (2018, p.267) 'South Tyrolean institutional mechanisms to protect minorities have created a bilingual territory but not a completely bilingual population, and most of the population still live in their own linguistic circles and develop in separate cultural worlds, and many ethnic grievances are still raised, especially by the Italian-speaking group'. These dynamics can therefore be compared to the 'Dayton paradox.' In fact, the primary purpose for international organizations, besides the end of the war, was the territorial division between the two entities and the formation of a federal state based on mutual cooperation. However, the Dayton rhetoric led the country to discourage cross-ethnic affiliation and unity, mainly between ordinary people, while elites political leaders brought to the fore corrupt bureaucracy and a politically dysfunctional system.

Furthermore, both in the South Tyrol regulation and Bosnian arrangements, institutional actors provided for consociational democracies through the assumption of corporate consociationalism. In

this regard, it can be affirmed that this type of conflict regulation, if on one hand is functional to bring peace and terminate any ethnic dispute, on the other hand, in the long run, corporate's elements do not favour integration and development of a common identity as regards South Tyrolean territory and economic order, political representation and country stability in the case of Bosnia.

Corporate consociationalism actually takes action by defining fixed group identities, which are internally homogeneous and externally bounded. German linguistic minority and the Italian population, along with the fixed Bosnian ethnic groups, the Federation, and the Serb Republic, constitute this political design. On the contrary, liberal consociationalism favourites the political entity that emerges in a democratic election. What is necessary therefore, based on the experience of another institutional crisis, mainly in the Middle East, is a rearrange from corporate to liberal consociation. In the last century, consociational study research developed and advance other institutional arrangements. Among this study research Salloukh et al. argued about the fact of transforming power sharing practice from corporate to hybrid consociation, particularly in the post-war crisis in Lebanon.

Ethnic conflict regulation and positive peace promotion, finally, should be establish by both corporate and liberal practices. The first feature, as we have already seen in many cases, is fundamental in order to end violence and stimulate mutual cooperation. The second aspect is equally important for the recognition and the inclusion of 'invisible' categories, which do not identity with any of the ethnic groups and for this reason they are not considered in the mechanisms of the conosciational practice. Even South Tyrol, key example of consociational democracy, should try to innovate their institutions in order to assist and contribute to the inclusion of 'Other' as political group, able to interact and participate to the provincial and municipal political activities of the region.

3.3 Expectations and outcomes in the societies of South Tyrol and BiH today

This conclusive section will analyse and discuss the comparative current situation of the two cases, having special consideration for the Bosnian situation, since political and social scenario seem unstable. We will therefore try to analyse and compare each specific condition in order to understand which elements and actors changed over the years, which is the current social situation and life prospects in both countries, considering also the notions of borders and migration, two elements which are now affecting these regions but that very often are not well defined.

Starting from the South Tyrol case, it is undeniable to affirm the historical success of this region. Despite the conosociational negative aspects highlighted above, where the system, based on ethnic proportionality, exclude from the political system all those who do not identify with one of the ethnic groups, the economic and high quality of life and social peace, confirms that this region is one of the most successful realities of conflict resolution and ethnic groups coexistence. In terms of comparison with the Italian country, South Tyrolean population constitutes only 0.8% of the entirety Italian population. Nevertheless, as referred by Lechner et al. (2012, p.25), 'South Tyrol contribution to Italy's GDP[29] is higher than average, at 1.2%.

It is equally true, however, that the key to the success of this region, in addition to the institutional work of cooperation, mediation and mutual understanding, even within elite groups, was partly due to the special provisions the region acquired during the conflict regulation. South Tyrol is in fact covered by a special status, provided by the Constitutional Charter which, in view of specific historic and geographical reasons, guarantees particular forms of autonomy, implemented then with the Second Autonomy Statute in 1972. Economic policy in South Tyrol is therefore influenced by some specific provisions which make the regional legal framework efficient to develop more functions and obtain greater provincial budget. In the economic sphere, although the Italian state is accountable for introducing and managing taxes, it is important to underline the fact that on the basis of its autonomous status, the provinces establish two important basic criteria with regard to restoring taxes and administering public spending. Firstly, nine-tenths of taxes collected in both the provinces are made available to the provincial government. Secondly, capital allocation of the province must occur on a regular basis in order to provide the province expenditure in complete autonomy (Lechner et al. 2012). For this reason, South Tyrol's economic and political challenges for the present day and future generations, is the current stabilisation of economic prosperity and high standards of living, taking into consideration also sustainable development, by implementing quality growth rather quantitative development and operate in order to tackle challenges and mitigate the process of corporate consociationalism.

On the other hand, the Bosnian situation is a bit more complicated and involve also other fields of study research, which are in the last years central to European Union policies, which is to say displacement and migration peoples. Contrary to the South Tyrol situation, which records employment rates and living standards among the highest in the country and Europe, the social degree of the Bosnian population is extremely complicated. One of the key factors which determined over the years this social status for the Bosnian population, is the extreme impediment for ethnic groups

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[29] Gross domestic product (GDP) is a monetary measure of the market value of all the final goods and services produced in a specific time period by countries.

to restore the pre-war situation, both in terms of territorial borders, further demarcated by the Dayton territorial division and also to tackle the issue of refugees and displaced persons. In this regard, another principal issue, strictly related to the problem of refugees is the high rate of unemployment. The economic structure has been ruthlessly deteriorated during the three years war and the financial and institutional aid of external actors through the establishment of fixed arrangements, only partially provided for the restoration of the pre-existing situation. Moreover, concerning the economic and financial structure of the country, if the South Tyrol example proved to us the institutional progress made over the years between national and regional players, by the continuously implementation of regional and provincial autonomy for minorities and linguistic groups, throughout the comprehensive work of positive elite consensus, on the other hand the material and social status of Bosnian population has been undermined by an inadequate tax system.

As reported by Foco (2001, p.42) 'The non-existence of a common BiH border and customs service has been a long- standing obstacle to the normalisation of economic development, the establishment of a tax system, and the prevention of corruption and different forms of crime'.

3.3.1 Political South Tyrolean and Bosnian developments in the new century

In this section, our dissertation will broaden the study research by comparing with the current political situation and structure of the two cases. Although the comparative study assumes the comparison of two subjects, it would however be inaccurate to assume the two cases on the same level. As mentioned above, the exportation of the South Tyrol model to other regions, cannot be considered as a reproduction in its entirety, but the feasibility of the creation of autonomous regions is based on the constitutional order of each specific situation.

The present-day South Tyrol politics is organized through a parliamentary democratic autonomous province with a multi-party system. This system is in fact based on a democratic form of government, where the greatest political representation in the parliament will constitute the government. This form of government is usually represented by a single party, or a coalition of several parties. Moreover, contrary to the one-party-dominant or two-party system, the multi-party system allows all political parties to participate and compete for national elections, in our case for the regional and provincial government. Furthermore, this political system provides all parties to have the capacity to gain control of government offices. Based on this form of government, separation of powers refers to the division of a state's government into branches, where each power holds individual responsibilities. In our

specific case, executive power is exercised conjointly by the regional government, led by the governor. Legislative power is instead firstly conferred to the regional council and subsequently to the provincial government. The third state power, the judiciary, is independent both to the legislative and executive power. The region, after having obtained the autonomous province status within the Italian Republic in 1948 with the De Gasperi-Gruber agreement, the current local government system is based upon the measures of the Italian constitution and the Autonomy Statute of the region. However, what is important to emphasize, concerning the present-day political structure, is the achievement and establishment of the second Statute of Autonomy. According to this statute, in addition to implementing provision for the protection and recognition of German linguistic minorities, these arrangements transferred most legislative and executive competences from the regional level to the provincial level, so much so that today we can consider the two provinces as two separate entities. Since 2014, the South Tyrol governor's role is headed by Arno Kompatscher[30], member of the South Tyrolean People's Party, a political party which had a key function and position in the evolution of the history of this region, particularly for a greater acquisition of autonomy and ethnic protection for the German-speaking minority.

The Bosnian constitutional framework is instead considered as one of the world's most complicated system of government. Firstly, we should mention that the present-day situation of the region, which is indeed recognised by the international community, is the result of the Dayton agreements. The peace process has given rise however to a very unstable centralized institutional architecture and in which the power distribution is strictly based on ethnic cleavage between Bosniaks, Croats and Bosnian Serbs. In this regard, one can speak of Bosnian country in all respects, even if the two entities which formed the region are distinct and autonomous, with individual territorial and institutional functions.

In this case, while the South Tyrol institutional design, although divided into the two autonomous provinces, is characterised by the provincial council and provincial government, which constitute the legislative and executive bodies of South Tyrol, the central institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina include a directly elected tripartite presidency, which rotates every eight months between the three ethnic groups. To this respect, Malcom et al. (2022) affirms that 'the central institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina are weak, with the bulk of governmental competencies residing in the two entities and that internationally led efforts to replace the unwieldy and costly constitutional structure of the region with a more functional one, capable of integrating into the European Union, have been opposed by the country's nationalist leaders'. This is one of the reasons why in the last few months, the Serb

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[30] Arno Kompatscher is an Italian politician and governor of South Tyrol, a predominantly German-speaking province. From 15 June 2016 to 7 July 2021 he also was president of the region of Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol.

Republic has again threatened the government to secede from the region, by provoking further unrest, pressure, and threat of a conflict.

3.3.2 Actors and institutional arrangements

The current institutional arrangements in South Tyrol differ very clearly from the Bosnian situation. In this paragraph we will try to delineate which are the main differences between the two cases, thus understanding the different notion of peace achieved by the two regions until today. Regarding the South Tyrol provisions, it is undeniable to affirm that exists a special relation with the Italian central government, which favoured over the time the establishment of certain specific arrangements in order to guarantee a successful consociational model of power sharing practice. Since 1948, with the ratification of the first Autonomy Statute, South Tyrolean institutions already differentiated from ordinary regions through the adjustment of specific provisions in order to fulfil the South Tyrol context and the two autonomous provinces. Only in 1969, with the 'Package' and then in 1972 with the second Autonomy Statute, autonomous provinces completely gained the status of regions, by acquiring substantial powers from the regional to the provincial level. Nevertheless, after reaching full implementation of the second statute in 1992, with Austria and Italy which signed the effective conclusion of the dispute, in 2001 an important Constitutional Reform amended some provisions by enlarging the sphere of power within the two provinces. A first institutional change was guaranteed by the role of the Government's Commissioner. As stated by Woelk (2007, p.129) 'after the Constitutional Reform of 2001, with the cancellation of Article 124 of the Constitution, the abolition of preventive control and the new provision regarding the appeal against regional laws (Art. 127 Constitution), the important functions of the Commissioner in the control procedure of regional and provincial legislation ceased to exist'.

Moreover, during the 1970s, along with the approval of the Second Autonomy Statute, the region experienced some implementations also in the judicial area with the introduction of a Regional Administrative Court in the province of Bozen. The introduction of this additional provincial body has thus increased the guarantee in the equality between the two linguistic groups. Furthermore, according to the specific regional situation, South Tyrol institutional arrangements have been modified with the introduction of two institutions. Specifically, the Court of Audit and the State Legal Service have been established in order to fulfil with the proportional quota system and bilingualism so that to enforce the judiciary system and the provincial administration of the region. In particular,

if the former has been detached from the Courts of Audits in Trento, guaranteeing more specific supervisory and judicial functions related to public and administrative accounting, and ensuring the proper management of the provincial public expenditure, the latter has strengthened the system of legal protection of the rights and interests of the province, companies and provincial bodies.

In the last fifty years, the South Tyrol model has thus generated a 'positive peace' condition, by creating an efficient institutional apparatus and by guaranteeing ethnic and linguistic groups cohabitation through targeted procedures and specific laws which have actually improve both economic and social growth, to the extent that today South Tyrol is one of the wealthiest regions in the country.

The Bosnian institutional arrangements are however marked by limited levels of governance, and the current stability of democratic institutions are undermined by the role ethnic groups. As reported by the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index both performance of democratic institutions and commitment to democratic institutions has decreased significantly over the last decade. For this reason, in a country where the political system is embedded in different levels of government, the Bosnian constitutional framework is constantly challenged, so much so that in recent years, the country's integrity has been undermined predominantly by the willingness for secession on the part of the Republika Srpska and the promotion of the Croatian party for the division of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into Bosniaks and Croats. In this regard, we can affirm that if on one hand the promotion and the pursuit for democratic institutions worsened over time, by affecting the power sharing mechanisms, on the other hand the social and political integration of the country has experienced in the last years a growing number of political parties that have thus further questioned the party system of the country. Moreover, as affirmed by Donner et al. (2022, p.18) 'governing parties' rule over deeply entrenched patronage systems based on access to administrative resources, particularly employment in public administration and state-owned enterprises, while the party membership and activism is primarily motivated by material interests, and party programs play a secondary role'.

3.3.3 Societal circumstances

This last section will tackle the social condition factors which influence the two case studies in order to give an overview for the future developments. In the last decade, economic and social status developed in a completely opposite directions, by shaping South Tyrolean living conditions in a

positive way, whereas in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the social situation remains precarious and deciding in the future of the country.

Concerning the Bosnian situation, in the last decade two of the main issues which are affecting the country is related to the high rate of unemployment and migration. Since the end of the war, the Bosnian political and economic structure have been strictly related to external aid and provisions. In this regard, the initial plan and arrangements provided for the establishment of a central state with the two entities, over the years revealed to be counterproductive, since inter-state cooperation and agreements have deteriorated, thereby exacerbating state structure through corruption, lack of transparency and politicisation of economy. Moreover, high rate of unemployment has been favoured by the institutionalisation of ethnic cleavage through the post war agreements which enhanced ethno-nationalist pressure and weakened economic and business restoration of the country. Furthermore, the decrease in revenues provided since the end of the war by external subjects has contributed to internal obstacles, and even entities at difference levels of governance failed to institute financial assets to restore pre war situation. On the other hand, the second critical issue which is affecting the country lies in the migration flows within the country. This issue is mainly due to the post war devastation and the impossibility for several citizens to return to their pre war situation. According to the Dayton Peace Process, and after the introduction of the High Representative, some improvements have been achieved. In this regard, one of the key instruments of the Dayton Agreements is represented by the Annex 7, which precisely concerns the agreement on refugees and displaced persons. This agreement foresees two chapters divided into several articles where the three parties, namely the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of BiH and the Serb Republic shall comply with those provisions. Moreover, looking at the Bosnia and Herzegovina internal borders, we cannot trace a process of 'desecuritization,' as it was for the South Tyrol case with the Second Autonomy Statute, since the non-existence of a common BiH border and customs service have led the country to a slow process of economic development. Furthermore, this specific situation also affected the establishment of a tax system and the prevention of corruption and other different forms of crime, which are now the main obstacle concerning the economic and political path of the country. Even though in 2000 it has been established a common State Border Service under the supervision of the High Representative, the working process of that body is constantly conditioned by forces operating within the Entities. According to Foco (2001, p.42) 'the amount of control exercised is still insufficient and not all forces have been involved in the protection of the internal order and the normalisation of relations with neighbouring countries'.

On the contrary the South Tyrol condition is characterised by a series of actions which encouraged the adoption of policies and measures for inclusion and peaceful cohabitation. This specific social

status facilitates both the internal coexistence between the different ethnic and linguistic groups and also the recent development in border crossings, represented by new minorities arriving from foreign countries. The common concept adopted by the region is based on the idea of offering all those who live in South Tyrol a communal and local citizenship, detached from fixed ethno-nationalist-based characteristics and in support of the promotion of equality and non-discrimination. Moreover, the mutual understanding and consciousness between the main parties, understood as civic responsibility, would enable also other minorities, such as the Ladin speakers, or migrants to cooperate and fully participate in society. Besides the several actors and political decisions which marked the path for the success of this region as example of power sharing practice, we can outline some main elements of civic citizenship which contributed to the establishment of a 'positive peace' and to the growth in living conditions. The promotion of diversity, the enhancement of events to foster cooperation, the consciousness and acceptance of the linguistic dimension of the region and the exaltation for the participation and equality of citizens are among the main elements in order to develop a civic citizenship.

3.3.4 Which alternatives exist in the Bosnian context

In the first paragraph the Bosnian arrangement analyses focused more on the failure of the country management. In this section the purpose of the paper will try to answer and outline some feasible solutions in order to understand if the state structure can be improved so as to avoid state collapse and the exacerbation of other ethnic conflicts.

After the Bosnian war, international actors incorporated the country into a fixed practice of power distribution and demarcated borders. However, what has not been considered by external actors is the state-building approach which characterise this specific case. In fact, contrary to the South Tyrol conflict resolution, enclosed in an existing state and thus in a different political context, and where power sharing practice produced positive outcomes between the parties, Bosnia-Herzegovina post-war context was marked by technocratic features of the three ethnic groups which shaped the outcomes of the peace process. The post-war process of nation-building backed both financially and militarily by international intervention, with the purpose of creating a multi-ethnic liberal country, has not considered what is one of the cornerstones of state-building process; that is to say historical and cultural background of a specific country. This massive international intervention has somehow retraced the plans of US geopolitical influence, key characteristics in the post 'Cold war' era.

What we will then try to analyse and propose are some political and institutional adjustments in order to design a state structure able to develop the notion of positive peace, built on sustainable investments in economic development and institutions as well a societal attitude that foster peace.

One of the first problem to tackle is the post-war rhetoric. In this regard, a change of mind within this speech-making, where a fixed divisive nationalist design was created after peace and where political actors threaten national governance is fundamental. In fact, ethnic groups' reluctance and frustrations about constitutional change is grounded in the establishment of the Dayton Agreements, and almost after thirty years, the first constitution, designed for the state-building approach, remains a benchmark for the Bosnian ethnic groups. Moreover, the historical path, which saw Bosnia as one of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the political leadership of President Tito, led the region to the ethnic fragmentation and the subsequent scramble for power, which resulted first in the Bosnian war and later in a parallel power structure. Of course, it is not easy to find valuable solutions in the short time, as can be for example through some political reforms at higher levels of government, since the dynamics of this parallel power structure are firmly rooted in the political conformation of the country. In fact, the initial solution of creating a federal state with four levels of horizontal governance, has been then replaced by a decentralized and disjointed tripartite power sharing. The region would therefore need to an external intervention as it did during the war with the deployment of military forces and at the same time a re-establishment of legislative, judiciary and administrative power by strengthening the rule of law in order to ensure political and territorial stability in a new, more defined constitution. Regarding the first element, territorial security has been guaranteed since the peace process by the Implementation Force, known as IFOR[31], the SFOR[32] and since 2004 by the EUFOR[33] Althea, which is actually active in the Bosnian territory.

Nevertheless, from a purely political viewpoint, the introduction of two institutions, as we analysed in the previous paragraph, do not ensure the complex institutional structure of the state bureaucracy, where both organised crime and corruption are the main problems.

According to Marko (2005, p.16) 'Strict proportional representation in the public service is seen as one of the pillars of the Autonomy Statute of South Tyrol which enabled the resolution of the ethnic conflict there'. In this regard, also the European integration process would constitute a great path in order to strengthen Bosnian institutional structure and create a self-sustainable economy within a

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[31] The Implementation Force (IFOR) was a NATO-led multinational peace enforcement force in Bosnia and Herzegovina under a one-year mandate from 20 December 1995 to 20 December 1996 under the codename Operation Joint Endeavour.

[32] The Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) was a NATO-led multinational peacekeeping force deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Bosnian war.

[33] Operation Althea, formally the European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR), is a military deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina to oversee the military implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

functioning state independence. However, the creation of external institutions and the implementation of the Dayton Agreement only secured the region from a military viewpoint given to the region a status of 'semi-protectorate' country under the umbrella of European and American actors. In fact, the initial purpose of creating a federal independent state with a genuine institutional structure where multi-ethnic groups would have shared the same rights is nowadays undermined by political groups of fixed elites' cartel, within a parallel state structure.

In the next paragraph we will try to analyse the consociational arrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina in a comparative perspective in order to understand better why consociational and power-sharing principles erode liberal democracy's promotion of individuals and a full political participation of citizens.

Conclusion

This concluding section will evaluate the study by summarising the key research findings in relation to the main purposes and objectives of the work, by answering to questions and discussing the contribution and significance of the same elaborate.

This dissertation aimed to investigate the different outcomes achieved by the two case studies although it has been established the same institutional arrangement, namely consociational democracy. The results indicate that power sharing conditions played a key role in the definition and practice of these theories and methods, by emphasizing actor-oriented conditions as main drivers for a proper consociational arrangement. Further findings show that political and historical context determined in a significant way the different concept of peace achieved during the years, and that in the case of Bosnia, the conflict resolution through a multi-actor system shaped and embedded the region into a negative conception of conciliation. In our thesis we deepened and asked the possibility to improve and tackle other regional conflicts dispute, by taking the South Tyrolean model as an example. In this regard, it was found that the South Tyrol model cannot be exported to other ethnic conflicts or unstable regions, as it was discussed by Benedikter, regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh situation, but rather it can be applied the transferability of legal and political proposals in order to change or ameliorate some specific conditions of the region. Moreover, among the various features we described and listed regarding the possibility of transferring elements to other models of conflict resolution, the following work analysed and proposed some criticisms and limits which have been found and highlighted also in the South Tyrolean model.

End on a note that a more meaningful, positive peace in Bosnia is extremely important for security and democracy in Europe, particularly considering the War in Ukraine. The South Tyrol model cannot be exported, but it stands as a reminder that hardened ethnic conflict can be resolved, when political elites eventually take the masses with them and when the international environment is conducive.

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