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The US Attitude Towards Spain, 1971–1973

An Analysis of President Nixon's Newly Declassified Recordings

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ABSTRACT

Dopo una cruenta Guerra Civile, il generale Francisco Franco riuscì a prendere il potere in Spagna, instaurando un regime dittatoriale che durò fino alla sua morte, avvenuta per cause naturali il 20 novembre 1975. Durante questa lunga dittatura, lo stato spagnolo dovette affrontare specialmente negli anni appena successivi alla Seconda guerra mondiale una forte attitudine isolazionista da parte della comunità internazionale nei propri confronti, in particolar modo da Francia e Regno Unito, dovuta principalmente al regime non democratico instaurato da Franco, ai modi in cui il *Caudillo* arrivò al potere e ai suoi rapporti con Adolf Hitler e Benito Mussolini. Tuttavia, dopo aver escluso la Spagna dal Piano Marshall, all'inizio degli anni '50 gli Stati Uniti decisero di avviare una serie di contatti con Madrid vista la sua importanza strategica nella scacchiera geopolitica che andava delineandosi nella metà del XX secolo, vale a dire un sistema bipolare nel quale emergevano due superpotenze, USA e URSS, più comunemente conosciuto come Guerra Fredda. Nel 1953, vennero firmati una serie di accordi di stampo economico e militare tra Stati Uniti e Spagna, racchiusi in ciò che è conosciuto come il famoso Patto di Madrid. Da questo momento, i due Paesi iniziarono a stringere relazioni diplomatiche sempre più strette e che hanno portato gli studiosi a domandarsi se i rapporti fra Stati Uniti e Spagna avessero influenzato quest'ultima nel processo di transizione alla democrazia che ebbe luogo successivamente alla morte di Francisco Franco. I risultati di questi studi hanno poi dimostrato che gli USA non giocarono un ruolo fondamentale all'interno dell'instaurazione di un regime democratico in Spagna, ma influenzarono quest'ultima in maniera indiretta attraverso le relazioni stabilite tra i due Paesi nel corso della dittatura franchista.

L'obiettivo di questa tesi è dunque quello di andare ad analizzare le nuove fonti disponibili, ovvero una serie di registrazioni declassificate nel maggio 2020 nelle quali tra i vari argomenti trattati dall'allora Presidente degli Stati Uniti d'America Richard Nixon, si entra in contatto anche con le relazioni Stati Uniti–Spagna, lo stato di salute di Franco e i modi in cui la transizione politica sarebbe poi stata affrontata. Pertanto, il fine ultimo di questo lavoro è quindi quello di capire attraverso un'analisi dettagliata di questi nastri se ciò che sostiene la letteratura possa essere confermato o se al contrario

l'amministrazione Nixon ebbe un'influenza diretta all'interno del processo di transizione politica che portò la Spagna ad essere uno stato democratico.

Questo studio nasce principalmente da una fascinazione personale nei confronti dello stato spagnolo e della sua storia contemporanea, in parallelo con un particolare interesse per la politica statunitense e le relazioni internazionali da essi instaurate specialmente durante la seconda metà del XX secolo.

Per quanto riguarda la metodologia applicata, questo lavoro si basa sull'analisi di fonti sia primarie che secondarie. In merito alle fonti primarie, sono stati presi in considerazione in maniera particolare i trattati bilaterali firmati da USA e Spagna tra il 1953 e il 1976 e una serie di documenti declassificati e disponibili principalmente sulla piattaforma Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), comprendenti essenzialmente conversazioni, telegrammi e memoranda. Ad essi vanno poi ovviamente aggiunte le registrazioni recentemente declassificate, disponibili online negli archivi nazionali del Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. Per quanto invece concerne le fonti secondarie, sono stati presi in esame una serie di volumi, articoli accademici, documenti di lavoro e articoli di giornale che discutono ogni aspetto specifico delineato all'interno di questo lavoro. Il presupposto metodologico di questo lavoro è dunque caratterizzato da un'analisi dettagliata delle fonti secondarie con il supporto fondamentale della documentazione primaria, con un approfondimento finale sulle registrazioni da poco rese pubbliche.

La tesi è suddivisa in tre capitoli: all'interno del primo capitolo vengono analizzati gli inizi delle relazioni fra Spagna e Stati Uniti e i loro sviluppi durante le amministrazioni Eisenhower, Kennedy e Johnson; il secondo capitolo invece si focalizza maggiormente sul periodo storico compreso fra il 1969 e il 1975, ovvero fra l'instaurazione dell'amministrazione Nixon e la morte di Francisco Franco, con una successiva digressione sulla transizione spagnola dopo la morte del *Generalísimo*. Questa divisione tra i due capitoli è stata fatta con il fine di sottolineare la crescita dello stato spagnolo all'interno di queste relazioni bilaterali, dato che con l'accordo firmato nel 1970, Madrid ha maggiore voce in capitolo e riesce a ristabilire la propria sovranità nazionale sulle basi militari. Infine, l'ultimo capitolo esamina le fonti primarie disponibili prima dei nastri declassificati nel maggio 2020 e di conseguenza analizza la documentazione secondaria con il fine di capire le ragioni che hanno spinto i maggiori studiosi a definire marginale o

addirittura nullo il ruolo degli Stati Uniti all'interno del processo di democratizzazione spagnola, andando poi a focalizzarsi sui famosi nastri sopracitati al fine di mettere definitivamente la parola fine a questo quesito.

Il primo capitolo si concentra principalmente sull'inizio delle relazioni bilaterali fra i due paesi, che può essere situata alla fine del XVIII secolo, con la Spagna che accolse il primo *chargé d'affairs* statunitense William Carmichael il 20 febbraio 1783 in seguito alla firma del trattato di Parigi dello stesso anno che mise fine alla guerra d'indipendenza americana; due anni dopo, gli Stati Uniti accolsero il primo *chargé d'affairs* spagnolo sul loro territorio, Don Diego Gardoqui. Da questo momento, i rapporti fra Spagna e Stati Uniti rimasero stabili fino al 1898, anno in cui scoppiò la guerra tra i due paesi e che decretò l'indipendenza di Cuba e la cessione di diversi territori spagnoli agli Stati Uniti. Questo fu anche l'unico momento in cui le relazioni fra i due paesi entrarono in crisi. Dopo aver analizzato gli inizi dei rapporti fra Spagna e Stati Uniti, il primo capitolo va ad esaminare nel dettaglio un momento di svolta all'interno delle relazioni fra i due paesi trattati, vale a dire il cosiddetto Patto di Madrid firmato nel 1953. Come è risaputo, la Spagna venne esclusa dal piano per la ripresa europea, comunemente conosciuto come Piano Marshall, volto ad inviare una serie di aiuti economici e militari con il fine di aiutare gli stati dell'Europa occidentale nella ricostruzione post-Seconda guerra mondiale. A causa del regime autarchico instaurato da Francisco Franco dopo la Guerra Civile spagnola e a causa delle simpatie del *Caudillo* nei confronti del fascismo e del nazismo, la Spagna venne isolata dalla comunità internazionale, che condannava il franchismo e chiedeva l'instaurazione di un regime democratico. Gli Stati Uniti tuttavia decisero di approcciarsi alla Spagna all'inizio degli anni '50 a causa dell'importanza geostrategica che quest'ultima aveva nello scacchiere politico globale. Nonostante le proteste da parte principalmente di Regno Unito e Francia, neutralizzate poi dal carattere difensivo degli accordi tra Stati Uniti e Spagna, il 26 settembre 1953 venne firmato il Patto di Madrid, costituito da tre accordi, uno di natura economica e due di natura difensiva e militare. Attraverso questo patto, alla Spagna veniva garantito un sostanzioso aiuto economico che tuttavia non era agli stessi livelli di quello garantito dal Piano Marshall agli altri stati dell'Europa occidentale, mentre lo stato franchista si impegnava a concedere l'utilizzo delle basi militari all'amministrazione Eisenhower. Questo patto venne criticato poi da gran parte della letteratura, che considerò il sostegno economico statunitense esiguo e

sottolineò principalmente la forte perdita di sovranità spagnola sulle proprie basi militari. Tuttavia, questo patto risultò uno spartiacque nella storia contemporanea spagnola, ed è ampiamente riconosciuto in letteratura che le basi del futuro democratico iberico risiedono all'interno di questi trattati. La seconda parte del primo capitolo è poi dedicata al mantenimento dei rapporti tra Stati Uniti e Spagna durante le presidenze di Eisenhower, Kennedy e Johnson, e si focalizza principalmente sul rinnovo del Patto di Madrid, avvenuto nel 1963.

Il secondo capitolo si concentra prevalentemente sulle relazioni fra Spagna e Stati Uniti nel periodo storico compreso tra il 1969 e il 1975, quindi sotto l'amministrazione Nixon prima e Ford poi, fino ad arrivare alla morte di Francisco Franco. La seconda parte di questo capitolo è dedicata invece alla transizione spagnola alla democrazia, alle influenze esterne che la Spagna ebbe in questo periodo storico e che tracciarono il percorso poi intrapreso e infine, agli obiettivi raggiunti dalla Spagna democratica sia a livello domestico che a livello internazionale. Per quanto riguarda la prima parte, l'evento più significativo fu la firma del *Convenio de Amistad y Cooperación entre España y los Estados Unidos de América* avvenuta il 6 agosto 1970. Dal punto di vista spagnolo, questo accordo ebbe grande importanza perché lo stato franchista riconquistava la sovranità sulle basi militari persa con il Patto di Madrid del 1953, concedendo l'uso di esse agli USA soltanto in periodo di guerra. Inoltre, i due stati si impegnarono a collaborare non solo da un punto di vista militare e difensivo, ma anche in altri ambiti come per esempio scienza, cultura, agricoltura e ambiente. Questo patto venne poi rinnovato nel 1976, consolidando i rapporti fra le due parti anche dopo la morte del *Generalísimo*. Come affermato precedentemente, Franco morì il 20 novembre 1975. Due giorni dopo, il principe Juan Carlos venne incoronato Re di Spagna, iniziando dunque il processo di transizione politica spagnola. Processo che viene poi analizzato approfonditamente nella seconda parte del capitolo, specialmente per quanto concerne l'influenza di organizzazioni esterne come per esempio la *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* (FES), che fornì supporto logistico ed economico al *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE).

Infine, l'ultimo capitolo cerca di portare qualcosa di nuovo all'interno della letteratura, cercando di porre fine ad una questione che ha sempre interessato gli studiosi, ossia se gli Stati Uniti abbiano influenzato la Spagna nel suo processo di democratizzazione o meno. Nella prima parte del capitolo, la documentazione primaria

disponibile negli anni precedenti alla declassificazione delle nuove registrazioni viene descritta e inserita come supporto per l'analisi delle fonti secondarie, in modo tale da capire quale sia la risposta che la letteratura ha dato a questo quesito, ovvero che gli Stati Uniti non intervennero direttamente nella transizione spagnola alla democrazia, bensì la influenzarono in maniera indiretta e quasi inavvertita tramite i loro rapporti, incontri ed accordi. In ultima analisi, questo lavoro va ad analizzare i nastri declassificati nel maggio 2020 riguardanti i rapporti tra Spagna e Stati Uniti tra il 1971 e il 1973, nei quali si può vedere come l'amministrazione Nixon fosse fortemente interessata al futuro dello stato spagnolo e alle condizioni di salute del *Caudillo*. La paura più grande per l'allora Presidente degli Stati Uniti Richard Nixon riguardava principalmente la possibilità di rivolte violente in seguito alla morte del dittatore spagnolo, rivolte che avrebbero potuto portare nell'idea di Nixon ad un'ascesa del partito comunista all'interno dei confini spagnoli. Questa eventualità venne poi esclusa da Franco stesso durante un incontro avvenuto nel 1971 con il generale statunitense Vernon Walters, affermando inoltre che grazie alle nuove istituzioni, la Spagna avrebbe seguito un percorso di transizione politica pacifica, andando incontro al volere principalmente di Francia, Regno Unito e Stati Uniti. All'interno dei nastri analizzati al termine di questa tesi, si può dunque confermare la soluzione offerta dalla letteratura riguardo al ruolo degli Stati Uniti d'America nella transizione alla democrazia in Spagna, ovvero che essi non intervennero mai direttamente negli affari interni spagnoli durante gli ultimi anni del regime franchista.

In conclusione, la tesi avvalora la soluzione proposta dai maggiori studiosi riguardo il quesito affrontato durante l'intero lavoro, offrendo una risposta definitiva ad esso attraverso la documentazione ad oggi disponibile. Analogamente, questa tesi può considerarsi un prezioso punto di partenza nel caso in cui risultassero accessibili nuove fonti in futuro.

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INTRODUCTION

By focusing on the history of the XX century, it can be definitely asserted that both countries whose relations will be further analysed, i.e. the US and Spain, had an essential role in the geopolitical, economic and military scenario of a century on which historians, economists and analysts always argued about, originating controversial positions.¹ Concerning particularly the former, the role played during the XX century had an extreme relevance which influenced not only the historical period taken into account, but also the world each of us is living.²

This thesis confirms the interest of the US towards the Spanish domestic situation during the period in which Nixon was the US President. In fact, it will be demonstrated through the analysis of a number of tapes declassified in 2020 and regarding the years between 1971 and 1973 that Nixon was concerned with the state of health of the Spanish *Caudillo* Francisco Franco and as a consequence with the future of Spain after the departure of the *Generalísimo*, which had to take place in an atmosphere of order and stability. However, the recordings analysed in this thesis confirm the idea that literature already had about the US attitude towards Spain during the last years of Francoism: the US never directly influenced Spain in its transition of power. As a matter of fact, the US was an interested bystander and its relations with Spain at the very beginning of the 1970s were only focused in maintaining a relevant ally in Europe. In this respect, neither Nixon

¹ The XX century was defined by the British historian Eric Hobsbawm as the Short Century, delimiting it between the outbreak of WWI (1914) and the collapse of the USSR (1991), while on the other hand the Italian world-system analyst and economist Giovanni Arrighi fostered to call it Long Twentieth Century. In order to see the positions of the two scholars, see Hobsbawm E., *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century: 1914–1991*, Abacus, London, 1995 and Arrighi G., *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of our Times*, Verso, London, 1994.

² Several scholars have analysed the role of the US during the XX century and especially at the end of it: if some, such as McCain and Obama, focused on the concept of liberal world order or American World Order, others such as Sargent preferred to concentrate on the phrase Pax Americana, defining it as the successor to the Pax Britannica. For further information, see Sargent D. J., “Pax Americana: Sketches for an Undiplomatic History”, *Diplomatic History*, 42:3, 357-376, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhy019> [Accessed 5 January 2021] and Sargent D. J., *A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015.

nor any other member of his administration had an impact on the Spanish political situation after Franco's death.

Starting from the US perspective, it is known that after the WWI and the Paris Peace Conference, the League of Nations (LON) was founded, especially on impulse of US President Woodrow Wilson.³ However, the US was never part of the LON since the US Senate did not ratify the 1919 Treaty of Versailles; besides, in 1921 the Republican Senator Warren G. Harding won the elections, signalling a return to a policy of isolationism. The LON then failed mainly due to the absence of the US and because of the lack of a fair intervention during several periods of crisis.⁴ This failure was one of the main causes that led to the outbreak of WWII, summed to the condition in which states were in the aftermath of WWI and the economic depression of the late 1920s. Towards the end of WWII, economic and financial global system changed: through the Bretton Woods conference, a fixed exchange rate system more centred on the US dollar was established, and several monetary institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were created.⁵ Furthermore, a new international organisation, the United Nations (UN), was created, concentrating on the idea of pursuing a real global balance of power.⁶ This concept is essential in order to understand the global scenario

³ On 8 January 1918, US President Woodrow Wilson gave the famous Fourteen Point Speech, describing how the new world system should be once the Great War ended through fourteen points, among them the concept of national self-determination, the freedom of the seas, the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and finally the creation of an association of nations which would guarantee world peace and stability can be found. For further information, see *President Wilson's Fourteen Points Speech*, US Congress, Washington DC, 8 January 1918. Available from: <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-8-1918-wilsons-fourteen-points> [Accessed 5 January 2021]

⁴ Two examples can be the 1931 Japanese aggression in Manchuria and the 1935 Italian invasion of Ethiopia. See Eloranta Jari, "Why did the League of Nations Fail?", *Cliometrica*, 5, 27-52, 2011. Available from: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11698-010-0049-9> [Accessed 6 January 2021]

⁵ See Bordo M. D., "The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical Overview", in Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen (eds) *A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform*, 3-108, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993.

⁶ The UN was founded on 24 October 1945. Its structure includes different bodies, such as the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the UN Security Council (UNSC), created in order to maintain global stability and peace. See Lord Gladwyn Jebb, "Founding the United Nations: Principles and Objectives", in Jensen Erik

that characterised the XX century, known as bipolarism in world affairs, or more commonly the Cold War.⁷ The two superpowers that dominated the global scenario, the US and the USSR, never confronted directly, but were on the brink of total war several times, especially in October 1962 in the so-called Cuban missile crisis.⁸ In 1963, US history was dramatically assaulted: on 22 November, US President John F. Kennedy was shot to death, and the news was greeted with shock all over the world.⁹ US Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson became President. From a foreign perspective, Johnson administration focused mainly on the Vietnam War and on US relations with China.¹⁰ The 1968 US presidential elections were won by the Republican nominee and former US Vice President during the Eisenhower presidential term Richard M. Nixon, who took office on 20 January 1969. Nixon administration's actions were of great importance in outlining the international world system, both from a monetary and a geopolitical point

and Fisher Thomas (eds) *The United Kingdom – The United Nations*, 21-47, London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1990.

⁷ After being allied during WWII, the US and the USSR affected the international world system by giving birth to a bipolar world, in which these two superpowers influenced world affairs for more than forty years, starting from the telegram sent by US diplomat George Kennan to US President Truman. This situation then led to several policies which can be included in the so-called Truman doctrine, mainly represented by the European Recovery Program, better known as Marshall Plan. Both the US and the USSR formed alliances, giving respectively birth in 1949 to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and in 1955 to the Pact of Warsaw, giving birth to a global scenario of balance of power, or balance of terror as named by former US President John Kennedy. See Kennedy J. F., *Inaugural Address*, US Capitol, Washington DC, 20 January 1961.

⁸ See Brenner P., “Cuba and the Missile Crisis”, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 22:1, 115-142, 1990. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231965249_Cuba_and_the_Missile_Crisis [Accessed 8 January 2021] and Kennedy R. F., *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, New York, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1969.

⁹ See John Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to William Marvin Watson, White House Appointments Secretary, National Archives and Records administration, College Park, MD., USA, 12 January 1963 and “I was with Fidel Castro when JFK was assassinated”, *The New Republic*, 7 December 1963.

¹⁰ See Lin M., “China and the Escalation of The Vietnam War: The First Years of the Johnson administration”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 11, 35-69, 2009. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26923023> [Accessed 10 January 2021] and Chen J., *Mao's China and the Cold War*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC., 2001.

of view.¹¹ As regards the former, US President Nixon decided to unilaterally suspend the Bretton Woods system, while concerning the latter, he mostly focused on US relations towards China and to the relaxation of tensions with the USSR.¹²

Moving on to the Spanish situation throughout the same historical period, it has to be stressed that Spain entered the XX century in a difficult geopolitical situation.¹³ The uncertain historical, political and economic situation of Spain at the end of the 1910s and at the beginning of the 1920s led to the instauration of an authoritarian regime headed by Miguel Primo de Rivera, which lasted from 1923 to 1930.¹⁴ On 14 April 1931, the Spanish Republic was proclaimed, with Alcalá-Zamora appointed as Prime Minister, and lasted until 1939, even though it was in crisis since 1936.¹⁵ Between 1936 and 1939, Spain was

¹¹ One of the main topics issued by Nixon administration was the international monetary policy. See *National Security Study Memorandum 7*, Washington DC, 21 January 1969. Available from: https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_007.pdf [Accessed 11 January 2021]

¹² See *National Security Study Memorandum 3*, Washington DC, 21 January 1969. Available from: https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_003.pdf [Accessed 11 January 2021], *National Security Study Memorandum 14*, Washington DC, 5 February 1969. Available from: https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_014.pdf [Accessed 12 January 2021] and *National Security Study Memorandum 124*, Washington DC, 19 April 1971. Available from: https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_124.pdf [Accessed 12 January 2021]

¹³ In 1898, Spain lost its last domain overseas, namely Cuba, Puerto Rico and Philippines and therefore, on the ground of a lack of reasons and resources, Spain decided to remain neutral during WWI. See Martorell Linares M., “‘No Fue Aquello Solamente una Guerra, Fue una Revolución’: España y la Primera Guerra Mundial”, *Historia y Política: ideas, procesos y movimientos sociales*, 26, 17-45, 2011. Available from: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=3741450> [Accessed 17 January 2021] and Romero F., “Spain and the First World War”, in Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston (eds) *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*, 32-52, London, Routledge, 1999.

¹⁴ See Ben-Ami S., “The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera: A Political Reassessment”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 12, 65-84, 1977. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1177/002200947701200103> [Accessed 18 January 2021]

¹⁵ In the 1936 general elections, the so-called Frente Popular, which grouped together all the forces of the left, won against the Frente Nacional, that was the set of all the forces of the centre and the right, with a slight difference; moreover, the fact that Manuel Azaña was appointed as the Spanish President of the Republic and that several radical reforms against religions and especially the catholic one and against the

the battleground of one of the cruelest civil wars of contemporary history. The Spanish Civil War had a great relevance from an international point of view, since Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy directly supported the nationalists led by General Francisco Franco, whereas the USSR sent aids to the Republican side. Nonetheless, The US, Great Britain and France did not directly intervene, but remained on high alert for the threat to international peace, and for the security of European democracies hastening the outbreak of WWII and clarifying the alignments.¹⁶ The Spanish Civil War ended on 1 April 1939, with the win of the nationalist side. General Francisco Franco was appointed as the Spanish Head of State, and remained so until his death, on 20 November 1975. At the beginning of WWII, Spain declared neutrality mainly due to the economic and military damages caused by the Civil War recently ended. This *status* remained for less than a year: Spain switched in mid-1940 from neutral to non-belligerent.¹⁷ After the end of WWII, Spanish foreign policy was signed by a first ostracism towards Spain and its regime, justified by the way through which Francisco Franco took power, namely the fact Franco was helped by the Axis power during the Spanish Civil War.¹⁸ This was the exact

ownership of agricultural lands were fundamental in order to lead to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. See Jackson G., *La República Española y la Guerra Civil*, Crítica, Barcelona, 1975 and Ramírez Jiménez M., “Crisis de la Segunda República Española (Un Análisis Objetivo 75 años después)”, *Revista de Derecho Político*, 68, 13-28, 2007. Available from: <http://revistas.uned.es/index.php/derechopolitico/article/view/9009> [Accessed 18 January 2021]

¹⁶ See Frank, Jr. W. C., “The Spanish Civil War and the Coming of the Second World War”, *The International History Review*, 9:3, 368-409, 1987. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40105814> [Accessed 19 January 2021]

¹⁷ Spanish *Caudillo* Francisco Franco threatened to join the War on the Axis side in order to re-conquer Gibraltar, the European key to the Mediterranean. However, The position of Spain during WWII and its decision not to attack Great Britain in Gibraltar were essential in order to avoid the same events Japan experienced to happen in Europe. See Detwiler D. S., “Spain and the Axis during World War II”, *The Review of Politics*, 33:1, 36-53, 1971. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1406358> [Accessed 19 January 2021] and Churchill W., *Foreign Affairs Speech*, House of Commons, London, 24 May 1944. Available from: <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1944/may/24/foreign-affairs> [Accessed 19 January 2021]

¹⁸ See Powell C. T., “Spain’s External Relations 1898-1975”, in Richard Gillespie, Fernando Rodrigo and Jonathan Story (eds) *Democratic Spain: Reshaping External Relations in a Changing World*, 11-29, London, Routledge, 1995.

historical moment in which US–Spanish relations started to assume a huge relevance: in fact, due to its authoritarian regime, Spain was excluded from the Marshall Plan and from the UN. However, in September 1953, the US and Spain signed the Pact of Madrid, which comprised “[...] a defence pact, a commitment to mutual defence and a convention on economic aid”.¹⁹ The 1953 Pact of Madrid was a watershed in both Spanish domestic and foreign policies: on the one hand, for what concerns the former, in the years that followed Spain started to see an important economic growth, thanks also to the new government composed by technocrats appointed in 1957 and its 1959 Stabilization Plan, aimed at a “substantial liberalization of foreign trade and investment”;²⁰ on the other hand, regarding the latter, the domestic growth and the new view brought by the US allowed Spain to enter the UN in 1955. Nonetheless, in 1969 the Francoist regime known until that moment got into crisis mainly for two reasons: first, the fact that the *Generalísimo* Franco was too old to exercise his power as before; second, the presence of a new government led by Carrero Blanco, with López Bravo as Foreign Minister, brought to a wider opening of Spain and improved relations with both the European Economic Community (EEC) and the US.

Knowing the historical context of both the US and Spain is paramount for the aims of this work. As it can be seen above, relations between the US and Spain favoured the opening of the international community to the Francoist regime, which was always branded as a state helped by the Axis powers during its Civil War and then aligned indirectly with them during WWII. It has to be stressed that these relations are relevant for two main reasons: its duration, since Spain never had relations with other states that lasted this much, and for its effects: in fact, according to Viñas:

En primer lugar, los pactos de 1953 supusieron, en su día, la ruptura de la neutralidad de España que, dejando de lado la tentación franquista de alineamiento con el Tercer Reich, se había sostenido a lo largo del siglo XX. [...] En segundo lugar, abrieron la puerta a un fenómeno insólito en la larga y accidentada historia de España: una implantación militar foránea en territorio nacional de manera permanente. [...] En tercer lugar, para un régimen como el franquista cuyos únicos apoyos convencionales exteriores [...] habían estado constituidos por el denominado Bloque Ibérico, meramente declaratorio, o el Concordato con

¹⁹ Ibid., p.21.

²⁰ Ibid., p.22.

el Vaticano, los convenios con los Estados Unidos generaron consecuencias de gran trascendencia.²¹

Among these consequences and effects, it has to be stressed that the 1953 Pact of Madrid allowed Spain to enter the UN and its organisations, such as the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, which in 1961 became the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD) and the GATT. However, Spain failed to enter the NATO and the Economic European Community (EEC) until 1980s. In order to better understand the relevance of the 1953 Pact of Madrid for both the US and Spain, the words of General Vernon Walters can be analysed, “Los acuerdos firmados en septiembre de 1953 significaron cerca de 450 millones de dólares para España y permitieron que el país se convirtiera en una de las principales economías mundiales. [...] contribuyó a poner fin al expansionismo soviético”.²² Moreover, from the Spanish point of view, Payne stressed that the 1953 Pact was not a formal treaty, but executive agreements, so that the image of Franco within Spain would not have changed, and its regime would have been valued, while on the other hand US President Eisenhower was convinced that a formal treaty would have been blocked by the Senate.²³ Various criticisms against this Pact were made; as stressed by Niño, “los peores efectos fueron las cesiones de soberanía que incluían [...] y la condición clientelar a la que quedaba reducida la posición internacional de España”.²⁴ This led the Francoist regime to discuss and renew the Pact, especially during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. The Pact of Madrid

²¹ Viñas Á., “La Negociación y Renegociación de los Acuerdos Hispano-norteamericanos, 1963-1988: Una Visión Estructural”, *Cuaderno de Historia Contemporánea*, 25, 83-108, 2003, p.84. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/27588484_La_negociacion_y_renegociacion_de_los_acuerdo_hispano-norteamericanos_1953-1988_Una_vision_estructural [Accessed 20 January 2021]

²² Walters V. A., “El Acuerdo sobre las Bases entre España y Estados Unidos Cuarenta Años Después”, *Política Exterior*, 7:36, 158-167, *Estudios de Política Exterior S. A.*, 1993-1994, p.167. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20643388> [Accessed 20 January 2021]

²³ Payne S. G., “Los Estados Unidos y España: Percepciones, Imágenes e Intereses”, *Cuaderno de Historia Contemporánea*, 25, 155-167, 2003, p.161. Available from: <https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/CHCO/article/view/CHCO0303120155A> [Accessed 21 January 2021]

²⁴ Niño A., “50 Años de Relaciones entre España y Estados Unidos”, *Cuaderno de Historia Contemporánea*, 25, 9-33, 2003, p.24. Available from: <http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra/50-anos-de-relaciones--entre-espana-y-estados-unidos/> [Accessed 21 January 2021]

was renewed for the first time during Kennedy's presidential term in 1963, but its results were considered unsatisfactory by the Regime; according to Pardo Sanz:

No se alcanzó una garantía de seguridad: en vez de un tratado de defensa mutua se firmó una declaración política por la cual solo se reconocía que una amenaza a cualquiera de los dos países y a las instalaciones conjuntas afectaría a ambos estados. [...] no hubo reducción de la presencia militar norteamericana en España.²⁵

For these reasons, a new renewal of the Pact was discussed in 1968 during Johnson administration. However, the US image among the Spanish citizens was changed: Pardo Sanz focused this change mainly on the Vietnam War and racial discriminations;²⁶ moreover, always according to Pardo Sanz, “una de las pocas áreas de acuerdo entre los grupos políticos era el deseo de recortar la dependencia hacia EEUU y diversificar los lazos internacionales”.²⁷ A new agreement was therefore reached during Nixon administration in 1970, which especially provided with more Spanish sovereignty on the military bases. Nixon administration mainly focused on the Franco's state of health and the situation of the Spanish regime once Franco would die. In 1970, a new report on Spain requested by US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger observed that no short-term changes in Spain would be seen, despite the appointment of Don Juan Carlos as the successor of Franco with the title of King.²⁸ The Spanish transition became of great relevance in the US foreign policy; the 1970 renewal of the Pact of Madrid allowed President Nixon and US National Security Advisor Kissinger to meet Franco, and “[...] evaluar de primera mano a los principales protagonistas de la vida política oficial española”.²⁹ What matters to Nixon administration were the methods and the figures

²⁵ Pardo Sanz R., “Las Relaciones Hispano-norteamericanas Durante la Presidencia de L. B. Johnson: 1964-1968”, *Studia Historica. Historia Contemporánea*, 22, 137-183, 2005, p.138. Available from: <http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra/las-relaciones-hispano-norteamericanas-durante-la-presidencia-de-l-b-johnson-1964-1968/> [Accessed 21 January 2021]

²⁶ Ibid., p.182.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Powell C. T., “Henry Kissinger y España, de la Dictadura a la Democracia (1969-1977)”, *Historia y Política*, 17, 223-251, Madrid, Universidad CEU, 2007, p.230. Available from: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2385073> [Accessed 23 January 2021]

²⁹ Ibid., p.232.

through which this transition would have happened. In 1971, General Vernon Walters was actually sent by US President Nixon on a secret mission to Madrid in order to understand whether Don Juan Carlos would be crowned by Franco when he was still alive or not, and the *Generalísimo* guaranteed that the succession would be held orderly and that there was no alternative to Don Juan Carlos.³⁰ Francisco Franco died on 20 November 1975. The Spanish transition to democracy started immediately afterwards: on 22 November 1975, Don Juan Carlos became King of Spain. In 1977, the first general elections after forty-one years took place, providing the win of the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) led by Adolfo Suárez. In 1978, the new constitution was approved by referendum, finally realising what Franco assured to General Walters in their 1971 meeting.

As mentioned in the first lines of this introduction, this thesis will try to provide the reader with a detailed analysis of US–Spanish relations from their beginning situated at the end of the XVIII century to the years between 1975 and 1982, that is the historical period known as Spain’s transition to democracy. In particular, it will focus on the pacts and agreements which took place in the last twenty–five years of the Franco regime, namely the 1953 Pact of Madrid, its 1963 renewal, the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation and the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and the diplomatic relations and meetings that the two parties examined developed, such as the 1971 meeting between General Vernon Walters and Spanish *Caudillo* Franco or the 1973 meeting between US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Spanish political leading figures Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Minister for Foreign Affairs Gregorio López–Bravo and the *Generalísimo*. Literature has a huge asset of books and articles on them, but these pacts, meetings and diplomatic relations will result helpful for the final purposes of this thesis, that is to see US–Spanish relations during the last years of Francisco Franco under a new light, through newly declassified tapes of former US President Richard Nixon during the years of the Watergate Scandal and published in May 2020 in which among various topics such as the Cold War and US relations with China, US attitude towards Spain, the changes that should be done due to Franco’s illness and elderly and the meetings that would be organise in the years that followed in order to push the *Caudillo*

³⁰ Ibid., p.234.

to begin Spain's transition while still alive appear and extremely concerned former POTUS Nixon due to the geostrategic relevance Spain had. It can finally be stressed that the final target of this thesis will be to try to understand whether scholars' thoughts about an almost absent US influence on Spain's transition to democracy is still correct or in the view of these newly declassified recordings something else can be asserted.

In order to achieve this target, research on the historical period under consideration and on diplomatic relations between Spain and the US were made, with an in-depth analysis of covenants, books, papers and newspaper articles concerning this subject. Moreover, the works of the most important scholars on US-Spanish relations were examined, such as Charles Powell, Rosa Pardo Sanz, Ángel Viñas, Antonio Niño, etc. Finally, Nixon's newly declassified recordings were studied and analysed, and Spanish newspaper *El País* together with Spanish Spotify Podcast *XRey* assumed a great relevance for their work.

Reasons that led me to write this thesis are numerous: first of all, my unconditional admiration for Spain, a country where I spent one of the best years of my life, and as a consequence Spanish language and culture, to which I am very attached; second, my passion for history and especially for the Spanish one, with the transition to democracy that recurred a lot during my studies both in Italy and Spain and which I always found very remarkable; third, the great interest I developed for international relations during these last two years spent in Venice, a path which I chose not to follow during my previous academic studies, further experiencing cultural and linguistic mediation particularly from an economic and jurisdictional point of view, but that I decided to explore once I understood how relevant international relations are in describing the world we live in.

Readers will find a thesis which is articulated as follows: a first chapter on US-Spanish relations from their beginning to the end of 1960s is provided. Here, the first exchange of Ambassadors will be taken into account, with a subsequent analysis of the break of relations in 1898, its re-establishment and finally a focus on the relations between the two parties involved during the Franco regime, with a special examination of the pacts signed by Spain and the US in 1953 and 1963. In the second chapter, the attitude of Nixon administration first and then Ford administration towards Franco's Spain will be analysed; readers will be especially provided with an in-depth focus on the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the US and the 1976

Treaty. These first two chapters will examine US–Spanish relations also by taking into account their singular historical situation, stressing therefore US involvement in the bipolarism in world affairs after WWII and Spanish dictatorship and isolation from the international community. The third chapter will then focus on former US President Nixon newly declassified recordings, analysing them and trying to understand whether the US tried to influence Franco in delineating Spanish future after his death or not. Finally, the readers will be provided with a brief recap of the work made and the conclusions achieved on it.

CHAPTER 1

US–SPANISH RELATIONS FROM THEIR BEGINNING TO THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

From a historical, economic and geopolitical point of view, the US was the main actor of the XX century. In the first half, its entry into both World Wars changed the balance between the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance in WWI, and between Allied and Axis in WWII. Furthermore, the US was one of the main promoters of the League of Nations, created in 1920 primarily with the aims of preventing war through collective security, promoting negotiations between countries in order to fix disputes, improving international co-operation and enhancing global welfare.³¹ In the second half, the US was one of the two superpowers together with the USSR which influenced international relations in the global scenario known as bipolarism in world affairs, or more commonly the Cold War.³² Spain also had a great relevance in the international scenario during the XX century. After being neutral during WWI, Spain faced a cruel civil war between 1936 and 1939, clarifying the alignments of WWII, which would break out only five months later the end of the Spanish conflict, since German Nazis and Italian Fascists directly supported the Nationalists led by General Francisco Franco, whereas the USSR sent aid to the Republican side and the US, Great Britain and France remained on high alert for the threat to international peace, and for the security of European democracies. After WWII, in which Spain again remained neutral at the beginning and then non-belligerent, its international presence was firstly marked by a strong ostracism towards its regime, a view which changed especially thanks to the US and its efforts in order to improve Spanish international relations.

This chapter aims at explaining the causes and the reasons that led the US and Spain to sign the 1953 Pact of Madrid. It then focuses on the consequences of this agreement and its importance for both parties and finally, it concentrates on the development of US–Spanish relations between 1953 and the end of 1960s. This historical

³¹ See *The Covenant of the League of Nations*, 1920. Available from: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp [Accessed 10 February 2021]

³² See Leffler M. P. and Westad O. A. (eds) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

analysis will then result useful in order to understand why Spain had a great relevance in the US foreign policy during the Nixon administration.

1. From the beginning of US–Spanish relations to the 1953 Pact of Madrid

As is well known, the first half of the XX century is characterised by the two World Wars and by the creation of several international organisations with the aim of fostering international co–operation and guaranteeing world peace and stability, namely the League of Nations (LON) and the United Nations (UN).³³ This was also the period in which a new monetary system was created, the so–called Bretton Woods system, which marked the transition from the gold standard to a fixed exchange rate system more centred on the US dollar.³⁴ In this global scenario, the US imposed itself as one of the superpowers which dominated the international arena during the course of the XX century.³⁵ On the

³³ The League of Nations (LON) was founded in 1920 and based mainly on the fourteen points outlined by US President Woodrow Wilson in his famous speech given in 1918, among which the removal of all economic barriers, the freedom of the seas and the concept of self–determination had a relevant role. The LON then failed primarily due to the absence of the US, which did not ratify the 1919 Treaty of Versailles and besides, the 1921 Presidential elections were won by the Republican Senator Warren G. Harding, signalling a return to a policy of isolationism. Moreover, the LON was not able to act adequately during the several crises of that period, such as the 1931 Japanese aggression in Manchuria and the 1935 Italian invasion of Ethiopia. From the ashes of the LON, the United Nations (UN) was founded after the end of WWII, on 24 October 1945.

³⁴ In addition to move to a fixed exchange rate system based on the dollar, it also gave birth to several monetary institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB).

³⁵ From an economic perspective, the new international monetary system with the US dollar at the centre gave a huge relevance to the United States and its institutions, whereas from a geopolitical point of view, the US had a relevant role in the so–called European Recovery Program (ERP), or more commonly the Marshall Plan, which directed economic and military aid to democratic states in Europe in order to foster the European recovery after WWII. Beyond being essential for European states, the Marshall Plan was indeed relevant in order to contain the expansion of the sphere of influence of the USSR, which after being an ally during WWII, became a threat to the US and the democratic states, as stressed by US diplomat George Frost Kennan in 1946. The global situation led the US to sign a multilateral treaty which gave birth to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), an international organisation with the aim of co–operating in the field of defence. See Kennan G. F., *The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*, Office of the Historians, United States Department of State, 22 February 1946. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v06/d475> [Accessed 12 February 2021]. See

other hand, Spain entered the XX century in a critical geopolitical situation, and the first half of the 1900s saw continual ups and downs in the Spanish country from an economic, political and military perspective.³⁶

The beginning of US–Spanish relations can be tracked back to the end of the XVIII century. In fact, in 1779 the US sent Diplomat John Jay to Spain in order to convince it to recognise US independence with no success. Once Britain and the US signed the 1783 Treaty of Paris and put an end to the American Revolutionary War, Spain decided to officially recognise US independence and received US Chargé d’Affairs *ad interim* William Carmichael on 20 February 1783, whereas the first Spanish diplomat, Don Diego Gardoqui, was sent as Spanish Chargé d’Affairs to the US in June 1785. The diplomatic relations between Spain and the US broke only once due to the Spanish–American War of 1898, with the US Minister to Spain Stewart Woodford who decided to close the legation in Madrid on 21 April 1898, with the war which officially started on 25 April 1898. On 10 December 1898, Spain and the US signed the Treaty of Paris, which guaranteed the independence of Cuba, forced Spain to cede Guam and Puerto Rico and

The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, 4 April 1949. Available from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm [Accessed 12 February 2021]

³⁶ In 1898, Spain lost its last domains oversea, i.e. Puerto Rico, Cuba and Philippines. As a consequence, on the ground of a lack of reasons and resources, Spain remained neutral during WWI. Spanish uncertain political and economic situation led to the instauration of an authoritarian regime headed by Miguel Primo de Rivera, which remained in power until 1930. On 14 April 1931, the Spanish Republic was proclaimed, even though it was created in a situation of turmoil from both an economic and a political perspective. The Spanish Republic entered into crisis due to several radical reforms, leading to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, internationally important not because it was essential for the beginning of WWII, but because it hastened the European crisis and specified the alignment of the forthcoming world conflict. During WWII, Spain remained neutral until mid-1940, when is switched to a non-belligerent position, threatening to enter the war on the side of the Axis in order to re-conquer Gibraltar. Finally, Franco decided not to enter WWII, and its action was fundamental not as regards the tide of the war, but concerning the length and the cruelty of it, being therefore praised by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. See Bolloten B., *The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counterrevolution*, Chapel Hill, NC., USA, University of North Carolina Press, 1991. See Churchill W., *Foreign Affairs Speech*, House of Commons, London, 24 May 1944. Available from: <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1944/may/24/foreign-affairs> [Accessed 13 February 2021]

to sell Philippines to the US.³⁷ Relations between the two countries were then re-established in 1899, when the US appointed US diplomat Bellamy Storer as US Minister to Spain on 16 June and Spain named José Brunetti y Gayoso Duke of Arcos as Spanish Minister Plenipotentiary in the US on 15 April. The status of US envoy to Spain was then elevated to Ambassador in 1913, with US Diplomat Joseph E. Williard becoming the first US Ambassador to Spain and Spanish Diplomat Juan Riaño y Gayangos becoming the first Spanish Ambassador to the US. Finally, during the Spanish Civil War the US moved its embassy to France, re-establishing it in Spain on 13 April 1939.³⁸

Having underlined the very beginning of US–Spanish relations and its difficulties, it is now convenient for the purposes of this thesis to take a look at their relations after WWII. In order to help Europe recovering from WWII, the US implemented a strong military and economic plan called European Recovery Program, or Marshall Plan, which was thought in order to send aid to Europe to recover from the damages caused by WWII and to stop the expansion of the USSR. The Marshall Plan was the direct consequence of the so-called Truman Doctrine, which was developed by US President Harry Truman and was centred in addressing economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey, threatened by the communist threat.³⁹ Spain was excluded by these economic and military aid as well as from all initiatives of international cooperation begun after WWII essentially for the undemocratic nature of its regime.⁴⁰ However, as Carrasco–Gallego well stresses, most European democracies did not accept the Franco regime at the very beginning, but when

³⁷ The events that punctuated the 1898 Spanish–American War can be seen in *The Spanish–American War, 1898*, Milestones 1866–1898, Office of the Historians. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/spanish-american-war> [Accessed 13 February 2021]

³⁸ US–Spanish relations events from US independence until Spanish Civil War can be seen in *A Guide to the United States' History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Spain*, Office of the Historians. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/countries/spain> [Accessed 14 February 2021]

³⁹ See Truman H.S., *President Harry S. Truman's Address Before a Joint Session of Congress*, Washington DC, 12 March 1947. Available from: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp [Accessed 14 February 2021]

⁴⁰ Carrasco–Gallego J. A., “The Marshall Plan and the Spanish Postwar Economy: A Welfare Loss Analysis”, *The Economic History Review*, 65:1, 91–119, Hoboken, NJ., USA, Wiley–Blackwell, 2012, p.92.

WWII ended, Europe needed Spanish supplies, since after the Second World War European countries required a source of non-dollar supplies, bringing to the political aspects of the new regime to be overlooked.⁴¹ These political aspects turned out to be fundamental when the European reconstruction began. In fact, Spain was firstly addressed a blockade, started on 12 December 1946, day in which the UN General Assembly condemned Franco's dictatorship, recommending all embassies to be withdrawn. Moreover, in 1947 Spain was banned from the Worldwide Postal Organisation, the International Telecommunication Union, and the International Civil Aviation Organisation, and the exclusion from all of these international organization made the participation in world commerce more difficult for Spain.⁴² This obviously led to the fact that Spain was excluded from the Marshall Plan, signed in Paris on 12 July 1947 by the US and most of European countries, among which there were not Spain and Finland, the latter due to its special status towards the USSR. The exclusion of Spain was not based on its political system *per se*, since at that time Portugal and Greece also were dictatorships, but rather on the way Franco obtained the power. German Nazis and Italian Fascists support during the Spanish Civil War proved to be unacceptable in order to further include Spain in the new organisations and in the new treaties which were taking shapes after WWII. The idea of Spain inside the ERP was accepted by the US and by US Secretary of State George Marshall; however, Great Britain and France sided against it. In the words of Carrasco-Gallego, "The British could not accept the inclusion of Spain in the ERP because it would give weight to the negative image that the USSR was propagating about the ideology of the Marshall plan".⁴³ Furthermore, the French Communist Party was strong at that time, and it did not accept a possible inclusion of Spain in the ERP. Finally, despite the fact that, "Spanish economic policy from 1945 to 1947 was highly compatible with the goal of contributing to European recovery through trade",⁴⁴ Spain was excluded from the Marshall plan. It can therefore be asserted that Spain was excluded from the ERP because its roots were incompatible with European democracies' ideals; on the other hand, the US understood Spanish improvements,

⁴¹ Ibid., p.94

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid., p.95

⁴⁴ Ibid., p.96

especially for what concerns its economy, and it was therefore willing to work with the Franco regime in a bilateral way. For this reason, these two countries started to think about a bilateral treaty which culminated in the 1953 Pact of Madrid.

It is important here to analyse the main causes that led to the signature of the Pact of Madrid from both the US and the Spanish perspectives in order to better understand the relation which developed between the two countries in the years that followed. Starting from the Spanish point of view, it is needless to say that Spain was still recovering from the damages caused by the 1936–1939 Civil War. At the beginning of 1950s:

Spain's lackluster overseas trade, nearly non-existent economic growth, and the Francoist state's own autarkic economic policy had strangled the Spanish economy. The Franco regime desperately needed an influx of capital and used the Pact of Madrid as a means to rehabilitate the domestic economy, and thereby reinforce its legitimacy.⁴⁵

From this quote taken from Watkins' work *Not Just "Franco's Spain"*, it is possible to note that Spain needed a strong military and economic pact with the US not only in order to start a new economic growth, but also because the *Caudillo* needed to legitimise his power. In fact, Spanish economic situation was terrible due to the autarkic and therefore isolated regime established by the *Generalísimo*, who for this reason decided to look for an international agreement which could help him start to flourish, thereby improving Spanish citizens situation and as a consequence gaining consensus in order to avoid possible turmoil. The US understood Spain's position, as can be seen from a telegram sent by US Secretary of State Acheson to the US Embassy in Spain on 6 May 1952, in which Acheson underlined Spanish need to find economic aid, and therefore emphasised the possibility to find a *quid pro quo* for the United States, helping Madrid grow from an economic point of view, but at the same time earning a privileged position in Spanish

⁴⁵ Watkins J. F., "Not Just 'Franco's Spain' – The Spanish Political Landscape During Re-Emergence Through the Pact of Madrid", *Bulletin for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies*, 39:1, 55–107, 2014, p.63. Available from:

<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a9b8/9c428e669b017662a730254cfd61a14f57cf.pdf> [Accessed 16 February 2021]

military bases.⁴⁶ For this reason, a bilateral treaty between Spain and the Eisenhower administration was the perfect way to show to both Spanish citizens and the international community that the Franco regime was lawful despite its roots. Furthermore, Spanish dictatorship was trying to move towards a less conservative and more open attitude in order to begin its economic growth and at the same time legitimise Franco's power, and a bilateral agreement could be an important step enabling to be recognised by European democracies, especially by Great Britain and France, which were still uncertain about the Franco regime and about its integration in the international community. This is not a fact that should be taken for granted, since throughout history many regimes decided to continue with their isolation or at least without great international opening, such as for example Tiso's Slovakia during the years of WWII, dependent on Germany,⁴⁷ or most of Eastern dictatorships during the second half of XX century, dependent on the USSR. On the contrary, Franco was able to understand that there was no future for Spain in its isolationism and therefore a first aperture was required for his regime to remain stable. The importance of the 1953 Pact with the US for Madrid economy and politics was then explained by the Spanish press, underlining the fact that, "The Pact of Madrid was a step forward for Spain",⁴⁸ both from an economic perspective and also in order to reinforce Franco's power. Finally, it can therefore be asserted that the 1953 Pact finally marked the end of international ostracism towards Spain.⁴⁹

Moving on to the US perspective, it is needless to say that the 1953 Pact of Madrid followed the path of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan from a substantial point of view, both focused in sending military and economic aid to any free European state in order to build alliances and stop the expansion of the USSR and the Communist ideals. Due to the lack of freedom and democracy, Spain was not considered within this US programme of economic assistance, but having military bases within the Spanish borders

⁴⁶ No.855: *The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain*, Washington DC, 6 May 1952. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v06p2/d855> [Accessed 16 February 2021]

⁴⁷ See Ward J. M., *Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia*, Itaha, New York, Cornell University Press, 2013.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.105

⁴⁹ See Powell C. T., "Spain's External Relations 1898–1975", in Richard Gillespie, Fernando Rodrigo and Jonathan Story (eds) *Democratic Spain: Reshaping External Relations in a Changing World*, 11–29, London, Routledge, 1995

was crucial for the US and for this reason, Eisenhower administration decided to search for an agreement with the Franco regime; in fact, it has to be stressed that in the first years that followed the end of the Second World War, the US policy was, “to isolate the regime and hope for its peaceful downfall”.⁵⁰ This idea then started to change due to the growing tensions between the US and the USSR, and the beginning of the bipolarism in world affairs at the end of the 1940s, which led to a revision of American attitude towards Spain. In fact:

Planes based in Spain could reach their targets inside the Soviet Union yet still remain a safe distance away from the main theater of operations in Western Europe, which was expected to fall under enemy control should the Soviet Union launch a ground attack.⁵¹

Within this quotation of Calvo–Gonzalez, the reasons why the US began to consider Spain as an ally in the Mediterranean area are explained. However, Eisenhower administration was criticised for stating relations with Franco, especially abroad. In fact, as explained by Walters, negotiations between the US and Spain caused an almost hysterical reaction from France and Great Britain, which were then convinced by the defensive nature of the pact.⁵² On the other hand, the supporters of the Pact of Madrid emphasised in retrospect the fact that through this alliance, the US traced the route for Spanish modernisation, fundamental in order to pave the way for a modern and democratic society after Franco’s departure. In fact, according to Niño:

La modernización de España que inducían los pactos [...] ofrecía la mejor esperanza para que el cambio que más tarde o más temprano se abriría de producir fuese evolutivo antes que revolucionario. La presencia estadounidense contribuyó a abrir resquicios en la aislada sociedad española por los que empezarían a entrar los principios inherentes a las sociedades

⁵⁰ Calvo–Gonzalez O., “American Military Interests and Economic Confidence in Spain Under the Franco Dictatorship”, *The Journal of Economic History*, 67:3, 740–767, 2007, p.742. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4501186> [Accessed 17 February 2021]

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Walters V., “El Acuerdo Sobre las Bases entre España y Estados Unidos Cuarenta Años Después”, *Estudios de Política Exterior S.A.*, 7:36, 158–167, 1993–1994, p.161. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20643388> [Accessed 5 March 2021]

modernas, necesarios en todo caso para que, después de 1975, prosperasen las reformas políticas.⁵³

In a sense, the 1953 Pact of Madrid can be therefore considered ex post essential in laying the foundations of Spanish democratic future after Franco's death, and this results very important because not only did the US understand Spanish economic situation, but it also decided to send it military and economic aid in order to modernise the state and show it the way ahead. Taking a chronological step back, US President Truman first called for a normalisation in US–Spanish relations in 1948,⁵⁴ which at the very beginning was limited due to the strong ostracism of the international community. As written by Acheson to US Senator Connally,⁵⁵ the US did not consider Spain as a threat for international security and besides, Spain should not be isolated but rather helped to develop, otherwise a new civil war could break out.⁵⁶ It has however to be underlined that of course negotiations with a dictatorship such as the Spanish one was a controversial issue, and this was the reason why Acheson sent a letter to Connolly. It has also to be emphasised that Theodore Achilles, US Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, stressed to Spanish Director General for Economic Affairs Mariano Yturralde that better relations between the US and Spain were desired by the United States, but this could happen only through constructive actions taken by the Franco regime.⁵⁷ The first real step made by the US towards Spain with the aim of including it in the international scenario was made in August 1950, when the US Congress allowed Spain to receive from the US Export–

⁵³ Niño A., “50 Años de Relaciones entre España y Estados Unidos”, *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, 25, 9–33, 2003, p.22. Available from: <http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra/50-anos-de-relaciones--entre-espana-y-estados-unidos/> [Accessed 18 February 2021]

⁵⁴ See *The Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Achilles) to the Chargé in Spain (Culbertson)*, Washington, 5 January 1948. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v03/d641> [Accessed 4 March 2021]

⁵⁵ See *The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Connolly)*, Washington DC, 18 January 1950. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v03/d679> [Accessed 4 March 2021]

⁵⁶ Walters V., “El Acuerdo Sobre las Bases”, p.160.

⁵⁷ *Memorandum of Conversation, by Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Achilles)*, Washington DC, 24 January 1950. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v03/d680> [Accessed 5 March 2021]

Import Bank some concessional loans, providing for the very first time economic aid to Franco's Spain. Furthermore, in November 1950 the US voted in order to nullify the 1946 UN resolution which excluded Spain.⁵⁸ This rapprochement of the US towards Spain led then to a two-year bargaining process, which ended with three executive agreements on defence, economic assistance, and mutual defence assistance,⁵⁹ signed on 26 September 1953, constituting the so-called "Pact of Madrid".⁶⁰ It can therefore be concluded that both the US and Spain needed a bilateral treaty, the former in order to redefine its presence in Europe at the beginning of the Cold War, and the latter in order to legitimise Franco's power, to enter the international community and to find some economic aid so that it could recover from the loss caused by the historical events which took place during the first half of the XX century.

2. The 1953 Pact of Madrid

As mentioned above, the result of these international efforts made by the US and Spain was the 1953 Pact of Madrid, which was signed by US Ambassador to Spain Dunn and Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Artajo and provided as previously discussed with three different agreements: the first one had a defensive character, the second one was focused on economic support from the US to Spain, and the third one was about mutual defence, which means that this agreement followed the 1949 Mutual Defence Assistance Act signed by US President Truman and therefore focused on the delivery of economic and non-military support in exchange of military assistance and exchange of information. As explained by Del Rocío Piñeiro Álvarez, "De esta manera ambas naciones establecían

⁵⁸ See *Relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain*, A/RES/39(1), UN General Assembly, 1946. Available from: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f08d8.html> [Accessed 5 March 2021]

⁵⁹ Even though an agreement on defense and an agreement on mutual defense assistance may seem the same to the reader, they are different. In fact, if on the one hand a defence agreement generally involves military support from one signatory of the agreement to the other in case of necessity and vice versa, the mutual defence assistance is much more specific, since it was under the Mutual Defence Assistance Act signed by US President Truman and planned the delivery of non-military and economic aid to European countries in order to block the Communist threat during the very beginning of the Cold War. See Connery R. H. and David P. T., "The Mutual Defense Assistance Program", *American Political Science Review*, 45:2, 321–347, 1951. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.2307/1951465> [Accessed 5 March 2021]

⁶⁰ Calvo-Gonzalez O., "American Military Interests", p.744

un compromiso para la defensa de la paz y la seguridad internacional frente al ‘peligro comunista’”.⁶¹ For what concerns the US, the most important agreement among the three surely was the one on defence, which allowed it to build US military establishments in a relevant geostrategic country such as Spain. It has to be stressed that Franco was faulted for conceding part of the Spanish sovereignty to the US; however, the Spanish economic and political situation forced Franco to accept this compromise, since as asserted above Madrid extremely needed to leave behind the international ostracism which characterised it, and the only way to obtain economic support from the US was to grant it its military bases.

By analysing in depth the three covenants that are included in the Pact of Madrid,⁶² and by starting from the agreement on mutual defence, it can be seen that the US committed to send military, economic and technical aid to Spain in order to foster peace and international security. Marquina Barrio explains these outcomes, stressing that Spain obtained the US assurance of military assistance for Spanish defense, a parallel development of the aid programme and the construction of bases, the use of US military equipment in time of war after consultation with the United States, and the block in the use of military bases and military equipment in time of peace.⁶³ Furthermore, once Spain increased its economic conditions, it would engage in helping the US in maintaining international peace. The fact that this was not a balanced agreement can be seen in its length: in fact, Spain committed to these obligations on a ten-year period from which it could not escape; on the other hand, US obligations could be changed or even cancelled. Franco accepted tough conditions which were unknown to the public opinion, proving

⁶¹ Del Rocío Piñeiro Álvarez M., “Los Convenios Hispano-norteamericanos de 1953”, *Historia Actual online*, 11, 175–181, 2006, p.175. Available from: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2479566> [Accessed 5 March 2021]

⁶² See *Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Tax Relief Annex and Interpretative Note in Regard to Tax Relief Annex*, 26 September 1953. Available from: https://web.archive.org/web/20161112212234/http://photos.state.gov/libraries/spain/164311/tratados_bilaterales_2013/Defense_TIAS_2849.pdf [Accessed 6 March 2021]

⁶³ Marquina Barrio A., “Las Negociaciones entre España y los Estados Unidos (1953–1982): Algunas Cuestiones Centrales en Retrospectiva”, *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, 3, 2003, p.4. Available from: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4958825> [Accessed 15 March 2021]

that his regime needed that agreement more than anything.⁶⁴ Moving on to the economic covenant between the two parties, it is important to stress that Spain committed to give complete freedom to US press representatives so that they could actually check on the technical and economic programs implemented by Spain due to the covenant. Moreover, a fixed exchange rate between the Spanish *peseta* and the US dollar of 35pts/\$ was established. Finally, among the aims of this agreement, it can be seen that there is no question about economic development programs, but rather this agreement was concluded in order to prepare Spain to defend itself in the event of a war.⁶⁵ Piñeiro Álvarez well underlines the main difference between the ERP and the Pact of Madrid:

Europa a través del Plan Marshall se benefició de la ayuda económica norteamericana, la mayoría de ella concedida antes de la década de los cincuenta. España, en cambio, realizó unas concesiones de gran importancia visibles hasta la actualidad y, sin embargo, apenas se benefició económicamente.⁶⁶

Spain did not economically benefit from the Pact of Madrid as much as Europe through the ERP especially because as asserted above, European states such as France and Great Britain accepted bilateral relations between the US and Spain only for the defensive nature of the pact, and for this reason the real aim of the economic agreement between Franco and Eisenhower was to prepare Spain to defend its borders in case of war.⁶⁷ Differences between the European Recovery Program and the 1953 Pact of Madrid were also well examined by Carreras and Tafunell. The two Spanish economists stressed that economically speaking, Spain gained little from the Pact of Madrid if compared to the ERP. Moreover, according to Carreras and Tafunell, Spain did not benefit of the same externalities the other countries in Western Europe gained through the Marshall Plan. In their words:

La diferencia verdaderamente trascendental entre la ayuda americana que recibió España y la de los otros países europeos occidentales es que no generó las externalidades de las que sí

⁶⁴ Del Rocío Piñeiro Álvarez M., “Los Convenios”, p.178

⁶⁵ Ibid., 179

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

gozaron estos. España no se integró en las instituciones multilaterales que gestionaron y optimizaron la ayuda, instituciones que tuvieron un poderoso impacto tanto a corto plazo como a largo plazo sobre el crecimiento de las economías europeas. La ayuda a España no comportó la participación del país en las muchas redes de cooperación económica que estaban llamadas a tener un papel decisivo en el modelo de crecimiento de posguerra. La incorporación a las principales organizaciones económicas internacionales [...] no tendría lugar hasta 1958–1959, cuando los gobernantes españoles comprendieron que el modelo económico autárquico estaba totalmente agotado y buscaron el apoyo de aquellas instituciones para sustituirlo con urgencia.⁶⁸

In the idea of Carreras and Tafunell, the 1953 Pact of Madrid did not play a fundamental role in the Spanish economic take off, which was already started in 1951, but other important contributions were made, such as the increase in investments that generated after the bilateral pact with the US.⁶⁹ However, Walters asserted that Spain actually benefitted from this economic covenant. In fact, according to the US general and diplomat, “Los acuerdos firmados en septiembre de 1953 significaron cerca de 450 millones de dólares para España y permitieron que el país se convirtiera en una de las principales economías mundiales en un ambiente de libertad y democracia”,⁷⁰ underlining therefore the importance of the 1953 Pact of Madrid in laying the foundations for Spanish democratic future. A huge amount of money, which considering also the military assistance rose to 1.4 billion dollars throughout 1953–1961, converting Spain in the third largest recipient of American aid in Western Europe.⁷¹ The last covenant between Spain and the US is the one on defence. Here, it is important to stress the way in which this agreement is introduced, namely focusing on the fact that it was reached in order to face the danger that threatened the Western world.⁷² The US engaged in providing war

⁶⁸ Carreras A. and Tafunell X., *Entre el Imperio y la Globalización: Historia Económica de la España Contemporánea*, Barcelona, Crítica, 2018, p.247–248.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p.248.

⁷⁰ Walters V., “El Acuerdo Sobre las Bases”, p.167

⁷¹ Calvo–Gonzalez O., “Neither a Carrot Nor a Stick: American Foreign Aid and Economic Policymaking in Spain during the 1950s”, *Diplomatic History*, 30:3, 409–438, 2006, p.410. Available from: <https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/30/3/409/420829> [Accessed 7 March 2021]

⁷² Del Rocío Piñeiro Álvarez M., “Los Convenios”, p.178

material and assistance to Spain in case of war. On the other hand, Spain committed to yield territories to the US and allow it to build military bases under Spanish command.⁷³

By concluding on the 1953 Pact of Madrid, it can therefore be affirmed that these agreements were unbalanced and tended to privilege the US side, since inside military bases, “España ejercía jurisdicción cuando los EEUU renunciaban a ella, bien voluntariamente, bien a petición de las autoridades españolas, o cuando los delitos no fueran punibles según aquel código siéndolo, en cambio, a tenor de las leyes de España.”⁷⁴ However, cases in which Spain had jurisdiction on US representatives in the military bases were only a few; moreover, the US started to have a great military capacity on the Spanish territory in the case of a Soviet attack, but the aid it provided to the Spanish military forces was minimal, showing that in the case of other forces’ attack, Spain could not count on US support.⁷⁵ Furthermore, this idea of an unbalanced agreement is also stressed by Aguinaga. The historian focused on the covenants between Spain and the US, asserting that, “los Pactos de 1953 y la resultante subordinación política, militar, económica y cultural española como ejemplo ‘de manual’ del imperialismo americano”,⁷⁶ especially since in addition to promote peace within the Spanish borders, the US main goal was to have strong links and influences in the Mediterranean area in order to spot the Communist expansion, thought as the *quid pro quo* of the 1953 Pact with Spain. Finally, according to Powell not only did the 1953 Pact of Madrid represent the ultimate departure from Spain’s traditional position of neutrality, committing the Spanish country to the defence of the West, but at the same time also bound Spain to US dependency.⁷⁷ If on the one hand, the idea that this was an unbalanced agreement is widely spread, on the other hand, as regards the economic aid gained by Spain, it can be said that two different schools of thought exist: one which asserts that Madrid was provided with a large

⁷³ Ibid., 179–180

⁷⁴ Viñas A., *Los Pactos Secretos de Franco con EEUU: Bases, Ayuda Económica, Recortes de Soberanía*, Barcelona, Grijalbo, 1981, p.244

⁷⁵ Del Rocío Piñeiro Álvarez M., “Los Convenios”, p.181

⁷⁶ Aguinaga P. L., “Ecos Lejanos. La Historiografía sobre ‘Estados Unidos y el Mundo’ durante la Guerra Fría y la Historia de España”, in Delgado Gómez–Escalonilla L., Martín de la Guardia R. and Pardo Sanz R. (eds) *La Apertura Internacional de España. Entre el Franquismo y la Democracia (1953–1986)*, 87–125, Madrid, Sílex, 2016, p.118

⁷⁷ Powell C. T., “Spain’s External Relations”, p.21.

economic and military aid, and one which instead considered the Pact of Madrid not to be the right agreement in order to foster Spanish economic growth. In any case, through the Pact of Madrid, Spain started to be seen in a different way from the international community, and the ostracism which characterised Spanish political and economic history after WWII began to break apart. Furthermore, Spain then managed to solve the unbalanced situation during the beginning of 1970s, which will be further analysed in this thesis.

3. The Eisenhower administration and its relations with Spain

The negotiation which led to the 1953 Pact of Madrid was advanced by the Truman administration, but it was then concluded by the Eisenhower administration, since on 20 January 1953 the Republican Dwight Eisenhower became the new President of the US. The Eisenhower administration's foreign policy is usually associated with the slogan "trade-not-aid", which focuses on the fact that in the mid-1950s, International Cooperation administration President John B. Hollister wanted to cut US economic aid abroad by at least 20%.⁷⁸ However, the US attitude towards Spain did not follow this path: during the 1950s, economic aid was sent to Spain; moreover, some other agreements were reached between the two parties in order to foster the Spanish economy. An example can be the \$69.1 million agreement for agricultural sales concluded on 27 January 1958.⁷⁹ Furthermore, US-Spanish relations were also favoured by several meetings between American and Spanish diplomats during this decade: on 1 November 1955, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles visited Madrid, discussing with Franco principally on world affairs. The most relevant fact that has to be stressed here is that the US could not follow this foreign policy of "trade-not-aid" towards Spain because it came to the conclusion that, "the best way to prompt the adoption of economic policy reforms in Spain was the provision of further unconditional aid",⁸⁰ a condition that as explained above through the words of Niño was in fact fundamental in developing Spanish institutions, constituting therefore the ground for the establishment of a democratic future after Franco's departure.

⁷⁸ Calvo-Gonzalez O., "Neither a Carrot Nor a Stick", p.418

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.430

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.438

What the US did was to implement a foreign policy which was, as Calvo–Gonzalez asserts in his work, “neither a carrot nor a stick”⁸¹. In fact:

As long as the situation in Spain was stable, the US administration saw no need to explore ways in which further aid could be used as a “carrot” to induce economic reforms. On the contrary it concentrated on keeping aid expenditures to a minimum. When stability in Spain appeared threatened, the strategic military interests in Spain meant that the United States could not attempt to withhold aid as a “stick” to push for desired economic reforms.⁸²

US–Spanish relations during the Eisenhower administration were fundamental in improving economic policymaking within Spain; however, they were not relevant in shaping these policies, since there the US had limited influence, but because the 1953 Pact of Madrid and the agreements that followed had, “positive effects for the long–term development of economic policymaking in Spain.”⁸³ Moreover, the agreements between Spain and the US and the improvement in their relations helped the former to enter the Organisation for European Economic Co–operation (OEEC) first as an associate state and then on 20 July 1959 as a full member country.⁸⁴ Besides, in 1958 Spain also joined the IMF. Thanks to these Spanish progresses in its economic policy, the 1959 Stabilisation Plan was launched with the main objective of fixing the deficit in Spanish foreign balance.⁸⁵ Among the main objectives of this plan, it has to be stressed that several financial cushions were announced, such as:

(1) a stand–by arrangement of \$25 million with the IMF; (2) an additional \$50 million drawing against the Spanish IMF quota; (3) \$100 million credit by the OEEC; (4) \$71 million worth of loans by a pool of private American banks; (5) the commitment of European

⁸¹ Ibid., p.409

⁸² Ibid., p.438

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ See Rodrigo Luelmo F. J., “The Accession of Franco’s Spain to the OEEC”, *Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe*, 2016. Available from: https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2010/4/28/d811252e-2b8c-4824-b2de-d8038e1cfadc/publishable_en.pdf [Accessed 10 March 2021]

⁸⁵ Carreras A. and Tafunell X., *Entre el Imperio y la Globalización*, p.268.

governments not to demand payment of short-term debt that Spain had incurred through bilateral trade agreements; and (6) \$353 million of US assistance.⁸⁶

Besides, it has to be stressed that the 1959 Stabilisation Plan could be considered as, “an historical precedent of the measures contained in the Washington Consensus”,⁸⁷ since this paved the way to a new free-market allocation of resources. Furthermore, it also allowed Spain to foster growth and catching up with Western Europe.⁸⁸ As well explained by Prados de la Escosura, Rosés and Sanz Villarroja, this new plan and the policies illustrated at its core resulted in a growth in the Spanish economy, fostering the allocation of resources along comparative advantage and allowing sustained and faster growth. Moreover, without the 1959 Stabilisation Plan, Spanish GDP would have been consistently lower in 1975, when Franco died.⁸⁹ One final consideration on this plan that deserves to be underlined is the fact that, as well as the Marshall Plan relative to the European countries for which this support was intended, it resulted to be successful because Spain was already economically growing in 1959; besides, the Spanish government already decided to open its economy, reassuring economic agents on its commitment to free markets and international integration.⁹⁰

The Eisenhower administration was therefore essential in addressing Spain economic policies and as a consequence its economic and political growth, both on the domestic and the international level. As mentioned above, the US did not shape Spanish policies since it has a limited influence, but it actually helped Spain assuring it unconditional economic and military aid beyond the 1953 Pact of Madrid in order to reach certain objectives. The Eisenhower administration foreign policy towards Spain can be therefore associated with the one which helped Spain to get out from the international

⁸⁶ Calvo-Gonzalez O., “Neither a Carrot Nor a Stick”, p.434

⁸⁷ Prados de la Escosura L, Rosés J. R. and Sanz Villarroja I., “Stabilization and Growth under Dictatorship: The Experience of Franco’s Spain”, *Working Papers in Economic History*, WP 10-02, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2010, p.2. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46455561_Stabilization_and_Growth_Under_Dictatorship_The_Experience_of_Franco%27s_Spain [Accessed 11 March 2021]

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p.1

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.19

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.20

ostracism it was subject to, and in addition it was the one which paved the way for a development in the Spanish institutions and as a consequence set the stage for the Spanish democratic future.⁹¹ Finally, Spain entered the 1960s by starting to leave that isolationism that had characterised Spanish consideration abroad after WWII thanks to the 1953 Pact with the US, which legitimised the Franco regime and together with the 1959 Stabilisation Plan fostered Spanish economic development.

4. US–Spanish relations during the Kennedy administration

In 1960, the US Presidential elections were won by the US Democratic Senator John Fitzgerald Kennedy, who defeated the Republican Party nominee Richard Nixon, US Vice President during the Eisenhower administration. US President Kennedy held office only for one–thousand days, since on 22 November 1963 he was shot to death by former Marine Lee Harvey Oswald.⁹²

⁹¹ Dillon D., *Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Dillon to President Eisenhower*, FRUS 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2, Document 312, 4 June 1959. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v07p2/d312> [Accessed 12 March 2021]

⁹² Even though Kennedy’s presidency did not last long, it was intense and full of events. In 1961, the US tried to invade Cuba from the Bay of Pigs, which led Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro to find an agreement with the USSR in order to instal Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba. This agreement would have benefited both Cuba and the USSR, since the former would have had weapons to defend against a new US invasion, which according to Brenner was already planned, while the latter would have had some missiles pointed at the US, which could have responded to the ones the US had placed in Turkey and Italy. On 16 October 1962, US President Kennedy was informed about the Soviet bases that were being built in Cuba in order to place the missiles. This led to the so–called Cuban Missile Crisis, well explained by Robert Kennedy, who lived this event first–hand as US General Attorney. US President John Kennedy had a great relevance during the bipolarism in world affairs, and the news about its assassination was greeted by great shock both in the USSR and in Cuba. See Brenner P., “Cuba and the Missile Crisis”, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 22:1, 115–142, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.117. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231965249_Cuba_and_the_Missile_Crisis [Accessed 12 March 2021], Kennedy R. F., *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, New York, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1969, John Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to William Marvin Watson, White House Appointments Secretary, National Archives and Records administration, College Park, MD., USA, 12 January 1963. Available from: <https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-32204484.pdf> [Accessed 12 March 2021] and “I was with Fidel Castro when JFK was assassinated”, *The New Republic*, 7 December 1963. Available from:

The US was therefore facing one of the toughest periods of the Cold War, if not the toughest, during Kennedy presidency, which led the US President himself to define what was known as balance of power as, “balance of terror”,⁹³ since both superpowers had available nuclear weapons, which could have led to a possible total war between them, had it not been for the great skills of the negotiators involved, among them US President John Kennedy, US General Attorney Robert Kennedy, USSR Premier Nikita Khrushchev and USSR Diplomat Anatoly Dobrynin. On the other hand, Spain was finally leaving behind the condition of isolation to which it was condemned after WWII. Economically speaking, in the early 1960s Spain started to grow at a high pace, after the painful start that the policies imposed by the 1959 Stabilisation Plan caused.⁹⁴ From an international point of view, as mentioned above Spain entered the OEEC and the IMF at the end of the 1950s. The change that was happening in Spain, which was moving from a national and catholic totalitarianism to an authoritarian technocracy, was fundamental in the Spanish economic and political growth, since the technocratic elite was composed by individuals who acted as liaison between Spain, the international community and international organisations. This new technocratic government was obsessed with modernising Spanish institutions and with totally leaving behind the international ostracism that through the 1953 Pact of Madrid had started to blur, and for these reasons they implemented some policies with the goal of liberalise the Spanish economy and open it abroad. From a political point of view, these technocrats started to see Franco’s autarkic regime as the main obstacle for Spanish political modernisation, beginning therefore to work towards new relations with other countries and to the foundation of the future

<https://newrepublic.com/article/120460/fidel-castro-reaction-kennedy-assassination-cuba> [Accessed 12 March 2021]

⁹³ Kennedy J. F., *Inaugural Address*, US Capitol, Washington DC, 20 January 1961. Available from: <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/USG/USG-17/USG-17> [Accessed 12 March 2021]

⁹⁴ See Lieberman S., “Stimulants and Impediments in the Economic Boom of the 1960s”, in *Growth and Crisis in the Spanish Economy 1940–93*, 62–115, London, Routledge, 1995.

democracy.⁹⁵ Moreover, this change also led to an improvement in the educational field, which culminated in the General Educational Law at the end of this decade.⁹⁶

Focusing on the Kennedy administration's foreign policy,⁹⁷ it has to be stressed that his several programmes were given precise name, such as "New Africa" and "Alliance for Progress for Latin America. Concerning Europe, Kennedy's program was called "Grand Design", and was intended to be implemented in order to make Western Europe a more unified and helpful ally. Costigliola summarises the "Grand Design" by asserting that:

This ambitious plan included several goals: to ease Britain into the European Common Market, to increase exports by reducing trans-Atlantic tariff barriers, to persuade Europe to bear more of the burden of defense expenses, and to channel European nuclear aspirations into a Multilateral Force (MLF) under Washington's supervision.⁹⁸

This program was designed in order to deal with two issues that scared US President Kennedy the most, i.e., "nuclear war and the balance of payments deficit".⁹⁹ In fact, as well explained by John Major, a significant slow rate of growth and a huge deficit in the annual balance of payments characterised the US at the beginning of the 1960s, whereas on the other side Western Europe had managed to recover from the damages of the two World Wars thanks to the ERP, founding at the end of the 1950s the European Economic

⁹⁵ Encarnación O. G., "Spain After Franco: Lessons in Democratization", *World Policy Journal*, 18:4, 35–44, 2001–2002. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40209776> [Accessed 12 March 2021]

⁹⁶ See Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla L., "International Organizations and Educational Change in Spain during the 1960s", *Encounters in Theory and History of Education*, 21, 70–91, 2020. Available from: https://www.academia.edu/44567512/International_Organizations_and_Educational_Change_in_Spain_during_the_1960s [Accessed 12 March 2021]

⁹⁷ See Paterson T. G. (ed.), *Kennedy Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989. See Costigliola F., "US Foreign Policy from Kennedy to Johnson", in Leffler Melvyn P. and Westad Odd Arne (eds) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, 112–133, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

⁹⁸ Costigliola F., "The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars, and Berlin", in Paterson Thomas G. (ed.) *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963*, 24–56, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, p.27.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.30

Community.¹⁰⁰ The first years of the 1960s were therefore the better moment to foster US–European relations, also considering the fact that, as mentioned above, the bipolarism in world affairs was reaching the moment of highest tension, with the two superpowers on the brink of total war. In fact, these were also the years of the construction of the Berlin Wall, which started to be built on 13 August 1961. This then led US President Kennedy to give his famous speech, in which he remarked the well-known sentence, “Ich bin ein Berliner”¹⁰¹, underlining the differences in terms of freedom between West Berlin and East Berlin and therefore, between a government influenced by the US and a government influenced by the USSR.

Having underlined the historical background of both Spain and the US at the beginning of the 1960s and the main goals of the US President Kennedy’s foreign policy towards Europe, it is important now for the purposes of this thesis to analyse US–Spanish relations during the Kennedy administration. As affirmed by Powell, the US President Kennedy was, “less enthusiastic about his nation’s ties with Franco than his predecessor”.¹⁰² In his inaugural speech, US President Kennedy stressed that the US, “shall pay and price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”¹⁰³ Besides, US President Kennedy was the first US President to officially meet Prince Juan Carlos on 30 August 1962. Moreover, during the last year of the Kennedy’s presidency, Spain and the US began a new round of negotiations in order to revise the 1953 Pact of Madrid. According to Antonio Niño, what was really important in 1963 was to reconsider the use of those bases which were shared, even though it could turn out to be a problem. In fact, this historian asserts that:

¹⁰⁰ Major J., “President Kennedy’s ‘Grand Design’: The United States and a United Europe, *The World Today*, 18:9, 383–389, 1962, p.383. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40393435> [Accessed 13 March 2021]

¹⁰¹ Kennedy J. F., *Remarks of President John F. Kennedy at the Rudolph Wilde Platz*, West Berlin, 26 June 1963. Available from: <https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/berlin-w-germany-rudolph-wilde-platz-19630626> [Accessed 13 March 2021]

¹⁰² Powell C., “The United States and Spain: From Franco to Juan Carlos”, in Townson Nigel (ed.) *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959–1975*, 227–247, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p.229.

¹⁰³ Kennedy J. F., *Inaugural Address*.

en 1963 lo más urgente, como reconocían los propios funcionarios del régimen, era revisar las modalidades de utilización de las instalaciones militares conjuntas, pero una postura más firme y exigente hubiera puesto en peligro la estabilidad del régimen, y eso condicionó finalmente la toma de decisiones.¹⁰⁴

Furthermore, Niño sums up the thought of the majority of scholars, according to whom the presence of a strong relation between the US and Spain at the beginning of the 1960s fostered the appropriation of certain Spanish sectors of American values. In his words:

Hay quien, aceptando que la relación estratégica fortaleció al régimen, hace hincapié en el hecho de que la cooperación económica, educativa, tecnológica y cultural favoreció que amplios sectores de la sociedad española fueran apropiándose de ciertos valores asociados al modelo que representa la sociedad americana: el liberalismo, el respeto de los derechos de la persona, la libertad de iniciativa económica.¹⁰⁵

From this quote by Niño, it can be seen that US–Spanish relations started in 1953 with the Pact of Madrid and revised in 1963 during the last year of the Kennedy administration not only favoured the economic growth in Spain, but they also set the stage for the development of several values which would better develop after the fall of the Franco regime, namely the freedom of economic initiative and the respect of human rights.

The most important part of the Kennedy administration’s foreign policy towards Spain is certainly the revision of the Pact of Madrid, which was concluded after two years of negotiations on 26 September 1963 with the Spain–United States Renewal of Defense Agreement,¹⁰⁶ signed by US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernando María Castiella.¹⁰⁷ On this 1963 agreement, it can therefore be

¹⁰⁴ Niño A., “50 Años de Relaciones entre España y Estados Unidos, p.31.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ See *Declaración conjunta que establece una relación de cooperación entre España y los Estados Unidos de América*, ABC, 27 September 1963. Available from: <https://linz.march.es/Documento.asp?Reg=r-12987> [Accessed 14 March 2021]

¹⁰⁷ By analysing the main points of this revision of the 1953 Pact of Madrid, it can be seen that the two parties committed themselves to follow the path defined in 1953 for a new five–year period, and to include the bilateral agreement as a part of a security agreement for the Mediterranean and Atlantic area. This part

said that this was needed by both parties in order to reaffirm what had been decided during the round of negotiations of 1953 for what concerns precisely matters of common interest regarding the economic, the political and the military fields.

If the 1953 Pact of Madrid was helpful for the Franco regime in order to gain more than one billion dollars in economic and military aid, its renewal was essential Spain, which was reaching its economic recovery and its political legitimisation, and its economic prosperity and strength was clear in mid-1961, when the US noted that Spain, “repaid a \$50 million loan to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) far ahead of schedule, cancelled lines of credit with the IMF and American banks totaling \$96 million, and repaid \$24 million to the OEEC.”¹⁰⁸ It is then shown that Spain’s GNP started to exponentially grow in those years, with a yearly rate of 7.5% from 1960 to 1968.¹⁰⁹ The 1963 renewal of the Pact of Madrid provided Spain with MAP (Military Assistant Program) and FMS (Foreign Military Sales) credits of 311 million dollars. This provided of course the US with military installations in Spain that were considered part of the southern shore of NATO.¹¹⁰ In fact, Spain was not an official member of the Atlantic organisation because first it was not a democratic country and second, the agreement on mutual defense assistance with the US was more convenient instead of entering NATO, but of course the pacts signed with the US by Spain assured the former the support of Madrid in the defense of the Mediterranean area. If the effects of this renewal are evident

stressed at the very beginning of the joint declaration shows that the US is still pushing for a higher inclusion of Spain within the international community. Furthermore, it is very important to stress the fact that the US underline its recognition to the importance of Spain within the development and security of the Atlantic and Mediterranean area, emphasising not only the importance of including Spain on an international level, but also its relevance from a geostrategic point of view. Through the renewal of 1963 then, Spain and the US reaffirmed their friendship in order to establish closer cooperation to strengthen the common defense, and to continue regular meetings on political, economic and military issues which interested both of them. See Spain–United States Renewal of Defense Agreement [Signed September 26, 1963], *International Legal Material*, 2:6, 1055–1057, 1963. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20689694> [Accessed 14 March 2021]

¹⁰⁸ Captain Roberts J. T. and Captain Ruhmann E. P., IV, *Military Relationships Between Spain and the United States since 1953*, Master of Science in Logistics Management, School of System and Logistics of the Air Force Institute of Technology, Air University, 1979, p.33.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p.38

from an economic and military perspective, for what concerns the political one the effects may be more indirect: in fact, as explained by Captain Roberts and Captain Ruhmann, “Even though the pressures applied by the US did not force Franco’s early retirement, some evidence of the relaxation in Spain’s repressive policies became apparent as early as 1963 when Franco began to relax restrictions on Spanish press agencies”,¹¹¹ stressing the fact that as mentioned above while quoting Niño, the 1953 Pact of Madrid was needed by Spain in order to economically and military improve, but the 1963 renewal of US–Spanish agreement was fundamental in certifying the foundations laid through the previous pact.

Having seen the benefits obtained by Spain from the 1963 renewal of the Pact of Madrid, it is now relevant to analyse why the US wanted to revise the agreement. Here, it has to underlined that in fact, the main reason why the US needed this renewal was linked to the fact that the US had lost their military bases in Morocco in 1963, while in 1962 the negotiations with Portugal about US military installations in the Azores had had a breakdown, increasing the importance of the US military presence in Spain.¹¹² The 1963 renewal there, “provided the United States with a perpetuation of its presence as a deterrent to communist encroachment from the east. These bases in Spain provided with the ‘backbone of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) cold war defense in southwestern Europe’”¹¹³ The renewal of the agreement between Spain and the US also provided with the closure of the USSR and its allies into a semicircle.¹¹⁴ Antonio Marquina Barrio stresses the fact that if on the one hand, the US only wanted a prolongation of the agreements with Spain, on the other the Franco regime wanted to improve it, especially for what concerns the political aspects, such as the inclusion of Spain in the NATO, and the US support for the Spanish inclusion in the EEC. However, these positions could not be put on the table, as well as the nuclear weapon issue, since Spain presented these questions too late due to its lack of bargaining skills.¹¹⁵ Marquina Barrio then underlined the importance of the Joint Declarations signed by US Secretary of State Rusk and

¹¹¹ Ibid., p.74

¹¹² Ibid., p.32

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Marquina Barrio A., “Las Negociaciones”, p.6.

Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Castiella, which is considered to be the most important achievement of this round of negotiations. In fact, in the words of Marquina Barrio:

En realidad esta declaración, que contenía aspectos de cierta sustancia defensiva, fue la consecución más importante de las negociaciones, que por falta de tiempo y ante la cerrada posición norteamericana, no hubo posibilidad de rematar de otra forma, limitándose prácticamente a una prórroga de los acuerdos con unas contrapartidas económicas reducidas.¹¹⁶

Viñas is one of the most important scholars of US–Spanish relations. He focused on the 1963 renewal of the Pact of Madrid. In his ideas, this pact ensured the unbalanced relation which were provided by the 1953 Pact of Madrid, with the US which according to him managed to achieve the extension of certain concessions, especially for what concerns the military bases, that after the independence of Morocco from France in 1956 became of great importance, since the US military bases in the French protectorate in Morocco was supposed to be dismantled. In the words of Viñas:

La ronda de 1963, cortada a la medida de la debilidad estructural del régimen, se saldó a precio de ganga para Washington, a pesar de las muy variadas discusiones internas a la burocracia civil y militar del régimen que le habían precedido y en las que ocasionalmente el todopoderoso Jefe del Estado se había visto obligado a arbitrar.¹¹⁷

As can be seen, the 1963 extension of the pact of Madrid is topic which has been studied, analysed and discussed in depth throughout history, and it proved to be a very controversial issue, particularly with regard to its importance, to the requirement of more Spanish sovereignty on the military bases shared, and to which party involved gain the most from this agreement. In fact, concerning the latter, it can be seen that if on the one hand some scholars such as Niño and Captains Roberts and Ruhmann saw this renewal

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p.7

¹¹⁷ Viñas A., “La Negociación y Renegociación de los Acuerdos Hispano–norteamericanos, 1953–1988: Una Visión Estructural”, *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, 25, 83–108, 2003, p.94. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/27588484_La_negociacion_y_renegociacion_de_los_acuerdo_hispano-norteamericanos_1953-1988_Una_vision_estructural [Accessed 15 March 2021]

as a Spanish win, since Franco achieved to reach more independence from the US and new economic and military advantages which were supposed to legitimise his power and foster Spanish economic and political growth, on the other hand other scholars such as Viñas asserted that this extension of the agreement was a total win for the US, which managed to renew its control over several Spanish military bases at a low price, which assumed an even greater importance after the loss of US military bases in Morocco. Besides, other scholars such as Marquina Barrio remained neutral, claiming that the 1963 renewal of the Pact of Madrid was only a prolongation of the original agreements, with a reduced economic compensation with respect to the 1953 one. However, what is clear from the sources that have been chosen in order to examine this agreement is that both needed an extension of the covenants, and both benefitted from it. As a matter of fact, the US succeeded in renewing the 1953 Pact of Madrid with a limited expenditure, regaining the control on the Mediterranean, which in the early-1960s was essential in the geopolitical scenario, especially after the loss of its bases in the French protectorate in Morocco. On the other side, Spain managed to obtain new economic and military aid, and from a political point of view it began to gain knowledge of several rights, and this was clearly derived from the US influence, and from the liberty Kennedy mentioned in his inaugural speech. Furthermore, Spain started to put on the table its desire to have more sovereignty over its bases. It can therefore finally be asserted that even though this extension may seem like a mere prolongation of the first covenants, it allowed both Spain and the US to achieve several important goals, and both gained from it. Lastly, despite Kennedy administration lasted only two years, it had a great relevance in order to prepare Spain to a higher degree of self-government and to single-handedly face the responsibility of freedom,¹¹⁸ paving the way for Spanish domestic and international achievements in the late-1970s.

5. The Johnson administration's foreign policy towards Spain

¹¹⁸ Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla L., “Estados Unidos, ¿Soporte del Franquismo o germen de la Democracia?”, in Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla L., in Martín de la Guardia R. and Pardo Sanz R. (eds) *La Apertura Internacional de España. Entre el Franquismo y la Democracia (1953-1986)*, 263-307, Madrid, Sílex, 2016, p.278.

US President Kennedy unexpectedly died on 22 November 1963, when he was shot to death by former US Marine Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas, Texas.¹¹⁹ His assassination was greeted with shock and grief worldwide, so as to bring US historian Frank Costigliola to write that, “For a brief moment, the assassination of John F. Kennedy united most of the world’s peoples in a shared expression of grief.”¹²⁰ Furthermore, given his relevance in the geopolitical chessboard of the early–1960s, the news of his death was greeted with confusion and turmoil also in the USSR, where it, “had caused considerable shock”,¹²¹ and in Cuba, where Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro received the news by worryingly repeating for three times, “es una mala noticia”.¹²² US Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson took then office as US President on the same day of the assassination of John F. Kennedy,¹²³ and remained in charge until 20 January 1969, having won the 1964 US presidential elections.¹²⁴

US President Johnson’s domestic and foreign policies were introduced in his first Address to Joint Session of Congress which took place on 27 November 1963. In his words:

let all the world know and none misunderstand that I rededicate this Government to the unswerving support of the United Nations, to the honorable and determined execution of our commitments to our allies, to the maintenance of military strength second to none, to the

¹¹⁹ In order to better understand the events that took place in November 1963 and the importance of John Fitzgerald Kennedy within the United States, see Bugliosi V., *Four Days in November: The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy*, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2008.

¹²⁰ Costigliola F., “‘Like Children in the Darkness’: European Reaction to the Assassination of John F. Kennedy”, *Journal of Popular Culture*, 20:3, 115–124, 1986, p.115. Available from: <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1297348699/fulltextPDF/2B8AF150621241C3PQ/1?accountid=17274> [Accessed 16 March 2021]

¹²¹ John Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to William Marvin Watson, White House Appointments Secretary, National Archives and Records administration, College Park, MD., USA, 12 January 1963, p.2.

¹²² Daniel J., “I was with Fidel Castro when JFK was assassinated”, *The New Republic*, 7 December 1963.

¹²³ See Gillon S. M., *The Kennedy Assassination–24 Hours After: Lyndon B. Johnson’s Pivotal First Day as President*, New York, Basic Books, 2010.

¹²⁴ In order to better understand the life and the ideas of US President Johnson, see Dallek R., *Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004.

defense of the strength and the stability of the dollar, to the expansion of our foreign trade, to the reinforcement of our programs of mutual assistance and cooperation in Asia and Africa, and to our Alliance for Progress in this hemisphere.¹²⁵

During this speech, US President Johnson then confirmed that his administration would continue the work made by former US President Kennedy, “Today, in this moment of new resolve, I would say to all my fellow Americans, let us continue.”¹²⁶

Focusing on the issues faced by Johnson administration for what concerns foreign affairs, literature has plenty of documents and research that better explain those matters.¹²⁷ Among them, it is important to mention first of all the escalation of the Vietnam War. In fact, both former US Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy were reluctant to directly intervene in Vietnam, whereas new US President Johnson had a different position. After the so-called “Gulf of Tonkin incident”, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was approved on 7 August 1964 by the US Congress and entered into force on 10 August 1964. This resolution authorised US President Johnson, “to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.”¹²⁸ It can be seen that through this resolution, US President Johnson was directly authorised to send US troops to Vietnam, officially entering and as a consequence escalating the Vietnam War.¹²⁹ Furthermore, the Johnson administration sent US troops also in the Dominican Republic in May 1965, after that in late-1963 a coup replaced the official regime guided by Bosh, installing a military regime. This paved the way for the

¹²⁵ Johnson L. B., *Address to Joint Session of Congress*, US Capitol, Washington DC, 27 November 1963. Available from: <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-0> [Accessed 17 March 2021]

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ See Colman J., *The Foreign Policy of Lyndon B. Johnson: The United States and the World, 1963–1969*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2010.

¹²⁸ *H.J.Res. 1145 (88th): Joint Resolution to Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia*, US Capitol, Washington DC, USA, 10 August 1964. Available from: <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-78/pdf/STATUTE-78-Pg384.pdf> [Accessed 18 March 2021]

¹²⁹ See *US Involvement in the Vietnam War: The Gulf of Tonkin and Escalation, 1964*, Milestones 1961–1968, Office of the Historians. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/gulf-of-tonkin> [Accessed 18 March 2021]

so-called Johnson Doctrine¹³⁰, which was characterised by the fact that, “the United States would never again permit the establishment of a Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere.”¹³¹ Finally, a last very important topic that Johnson wanted to cover was the US relations with China, which broke its relations with the USSR in the early 1960s, leading it to open relations with the United States.¹³²

Focusing more on the Johnson administration’s foreign policy towards Europe, it has first to be stressed that Johnson was unpopular in Europe, especially for his policy towards Vietnam. This is also emphasised by the fact that Johnson only made one trip to Europe during his presidency due to the death of former German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. However, his administration preferred focusing on Asia, seen as, “the region of the future for America”.¹³³ Still, several policies were dedicated to Europe, and

¹³⁰ See US General Services administration, *Public Papers of the President: Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1965*, 469–474, Washington DC, USA, 1965. Available from: <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/4730960.1965.001?view=toc> [Accessed 18 March 2021]

¹³¹ Rabe S. G., “The Johnson Doctrine”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36:1, 48–58, 2006, p.48. Available from: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2006.00286.x> [Accessed 18 March 2021]

¹³² The Sino–Soviet alliance, which was considered as unbreakable and eternal, broke in the early 1960s, leading the US to an opening towards China. Needless to be stressed, it is obviously known that the Johnson administration still worked in the global scenario of the Cold War, within which US President Johnson tried to follow with the containment policy in order to block the Communist expansion, which explains the reasons of the Johnson Doctrine and the rapprochement to China. Furthermore, the Johnson administration managed to sign several multilateral treaties in order to reduce tensions with the USSR, such as the Outer Space Treaty deposited on 27 January 1967, which defined some rule as regards outer space, and the Treaty on the Non–Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed opened for signature on 1 July 1968, which aimed at promoting cooperation and a peaceful use of nuclear energy. See Schulzinger R. D., “The Johnson administration, China, and the Vietnam War”, in Ross Robert S. and Changbin Jiang (eds) *Re-examining the Cold War: US–China Diplomacy, 1954–1973*, 238–261, Cambridge, MA., USA, Harvard University Press, 2002. See Lin M., “China and the Escalation of the Vietnam War: The First Years of the Johnson administration”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 11, 35–69, 2009. Available from: <https://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article/11/2/35/13040/China-and-the-Escalation-of-the-Vietnam-War-The> [Accessed 19 March 2021]. See Chen J., *Mao’s China and the Cold War*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC., USA, 2001

¹³³ Schwartz T. A., “Europe”, in Lerner Mitchell B. (ed.) *A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson*, 406–419, Hoboken, NJ., USA, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2012, p.406.

particularly to its defense. First of all, it has to be stressed how the Johnson administration faced the most important internal crisis of the NATO, with the withdrawal of France in 1966. In order not to lose its influence in Europe, the US decided to start a Trilateral Discussion with Britain and Germany in order to force its alliances in Europe.¹³⁴ Besides, US President Johnson worked in order to achieve its bridge-building policies,¹³⁵ and therefore to relax tensions with the Soviet Union. Finally, the Johnson administration had a very important part also in the 1964 Cyprus crisis, avoiding a direct intervention of US troops and appointing two of his top Europeanist diplomats, George Ball and Dean Acheson, to settle some compromises between Greece and Turkey. Regardless, historians have always preferred to focus on the Vietnam War when analysing the Johnson administration's foreign policy, but some of them such as Thomas Alan Schwartz investigated in depth on the relations between the US and Europe during the Johnson's presidency, and devoted detailed studies and analysis in order to better understand US President Johnson's attitude towards Europe.¹³⁶

For the purposes of this thesis, it is now convenient to stress the Johnson administration's foreign policy towards the Franco regime. The first thing that has to be stressed is the cultural propaganda that the Johnson administration engaged in order to regain prestige in Western Europe. This took part in a much broader programme called cultural Cold War,¹³⁷ which focuses on determined cultural policies towards those America allies in Europe which were losing their trust towards the US, especially for what was happening in Vietnam. These policies were also addressed to the Franco regime, as well-analysed by Martín García, who focuses on the cultural program designed by the

¹³⁴ See Schwartz T. A., "NATO, Europe, and the Johnson administration: Alliance Politics, Political Economy, and the Beginning of Détente, 1963–1969", *NATO*, 2003. Available from: <https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/schwartz.pdf> [Accessed 20 March 2021]

¹³⁵ See Lerner M., "'Trying to Find the Guy Who Invited Them': Lyndon Johnson, Bridge Building, and the End of the Prague Spring", *Diplomatic History*, 32:1, 77–103, 2008. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24916056> [Accessed 20 March 2021]

¹³⁶ See Schwartz T. A., *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam*, Cambridge, MA., USA, Harvard University Press, 2003. See Schwartz T. A., "Europe", in Lerner Mitchell B. (ed.) *A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson*, 406–419, Hoboken, NJ., USA, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2012.

¹³⁷ See Saunders F. S., *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*, New York, The New Press, 2000.

US in order to regain trust among Spanish university students. Moreover, one of the main reasons why the US directed its cultural policies towards Spanish students is that during the years of the Johnson administration, the Spanish *Caudillo* Franco was already old and the US was starting to concern about the Spanish political future, trying to delineate it according to its interests. This idea was fundamental in both the Kennedy and especially the Johnson administration, which worked with Spain in order to ensure a political stability in the Franco regime, but also in order to try to influence Spain to establish, “a moderate government which supported the strategic priorities of the US.”¹³⁸ This is a key passage for the purposes of this thesis, since it can be seen that the US was interested in the Spanish political future after Franco’s death and acted in this regard, even though the cultural machine developed by the US had a minor part in the democratisation process. In order to influence Spanish students, the US entrusted the Spanish division of the United States Information Service (USIS), so that its propaganda would not be out in the open, but it would remain discreet. In 1964, the Youth Committee in Spain began a youth programme. This also encompassed the programme built by the USIS in order to persuade Spanish students particularly that Americans need to access Spanish military bases in order to defend the free world and Spanish security, that the US was the greatest power in the world and for this reason it has a strong responsibility in developing peace and human progress, that a strong Atlantic alliance was the best way in order to stop the expansion of Communism, and finally that in order to guarantee Spain a great future, it had to implement several American values, namely social pluralism, political liberalism, and free market economics.¹³⁹ This led therefore to the put into practice of the youth programme, which consisted in focusing its efforts on the promotion of education exchanges, the organisation of conferences in universities, the organisation of cultural activities, and the promotion of American cultural studies and English language in Spanish universities.¹⁴⁰ However, not only was the Vietnam War the main cause of the untrust among Spanish university students, but it was also the most important economic

¹³⁸ Martín García O. J., “A Complicated Mission: The United States and Spanish Students during the Johnson administration”, *Cold War History*, 13:3, 311–329, 2013, p.314. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2012.746664> [Accessed 21 March 2021]

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.317

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

reason why this youth programme had difficulties in order to be implemented, and therefore not to have the desired effects. In fact, during the Johnson's presidency, most of the government funds were directed to Vietnam, which implied that what the US and the USIS did in Spain in order to conquer Spanish minds was insufficient. It can therefore be concluded that US propaganda towards Spain did not achieve to regain trust among the Spanish youth. Furthermore, as examined by Martín García, these cultural policies turned out to be counterproductive, actually convincing Spanish students that once Franco was dead, the US and its values of Atlanticism and anti-communism would be no longer the guarantor of Spain's stability.¹⁴¹

Vietnam was central to Johnson administration's foreign policy, and as it was mentioned above, it was reflected in the whole US foreign policy during Johnson's presidency. Concerning Spain, it deserves some credits the exchange of letters between Johnson and Franco, which took place in 1965. In this letter dated 26 July 1965, Johnson stressed the important military and economic efforts that the US were making in Vietnam, asking for Spanish trust and support. In his reply, Franco first objectively analysed the situation in Vietnam not only from a political perspective, but also from a military point of view. In fact, he first criticised the use of the most powerful weapons, stressing then that conventional weapons are not useful in a landscape such as the Vietnam one. As it can be seen in his response, the *Generalísimo* tried to persuade Johnson to withdraw his troops from Vietnam. This idea is then emphasised by the fact that Franco gave Johnson a detailed analysis of the political situation in Vietnam, where he stressed that, "since this problem is eminently political in character, it is not solely possible to dispel this threat by the force of arms."¹⁴² Furthermore, here General Franco also underlined the fact that it is not by arm that the US avoid Vietnam to fall in the Communist threat, but by political means. In fact, according to Franco, new countries tended to prefer communism because it was the only effective path they could follow. For this reason, the *Caudillo* suggested to Johnson not to follow the military way, but rather solve the dispute through political means, in order to protect the interests of Vietnam and in general of the whole Southeast Asia, and the US. With this advice, Franco gave his loyal esteem to Johnson, but he did

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p.328

¹⁴² *Letter from General Franco to President Johnson*, Madrid, undated. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d184> [Accessed 22 March 2021]

not intentionally mention that Spain would help the US in the Vietnam war. Military aid from Spain to the US in Vietnam never came. On the contrary, Spain sent humanitarian aid, underlining as a consequence its beliefs about the Vietnam War. The Spanish attitude towards the Vietnam War is also analysed by Rosa Pardo Sanz, one of the most important historians of US–Spanish relations. Pardo Sanz stresses the importance of the Vietnam War in Johnson administration’s foreign policy, with most of the government funds devoted to it, allocating as a consequence a small share of funds towards other aspects of US foreign policy. Moreover, Pardo Sanz then focused on the Spanish role in the Vietnam War, pointing out that in spite of what Johnson asked General Franco, Spain decided to send to Vietnam four ambulances and a medical staff. As it can be seen in the works made by Pardo Sanz and also in the letter sent by General Franco to US President Johnson, Spain and its head of State were against a military effort in Vietnam. Besides, the Vietnam War made Western Europe question on the values of freedom and international security and peace that US was proud of, and Franco did not want to ruin his relations with the US, but at the same time he did not want to wholly submit to the US influence. With his attitude, General Franco managed both to maintain good relations with the US and to continue with the path he had started with the 1963 renewal of the Pact of Madrid, which expected Spain to regain its sovereignty and abandon its dependence from the US. Still focusing on Pardo Sanz document, it can be seen that the Johnson administration followed a neutral or at least cautious path for what concerns the Spanish foreign policy, both regarding Gibraltar,¹⁴³ and Morocco.¹⁴⁴ With respect to the latter, the local government did not want Spain to use the US assets in the exploitation of phosphate mining. The Johnson administration decided to warn potential investors of the risks caused by Morocco’s request and tried to avoid any governmental participation in this project.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, as regards the Morocco situation, one last exchange of letters between

¹⁴³ Pardo Sanz R., “Las Relaciones Hispano–norteamericanas durante la Presidencia de L. B. Johnson: 1964–1968”, *Studia Historica. Historia Contemporánea*, 22, 137–183, 2004, p.156. Available from: <http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra/las-relaciones-hispano-norteamericanas-durante-la-presidencia-de-l-b-johnson-1964-1968/> [Accessed 22 March 2021]

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.158

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

General Franco and US President Johnson took place in 1967.¹⁴⁶ In this year, Moroccan King Hassan II visited the US and the main fear for Franco was that Morocco was asking for some economic and military aid to Johnson administration. On the other side, US President Johnson reassured General Franco that no security guarantee had been made to Morocco, and that the aid that Morocco and the US had negotiated were subject to two conditions, i.e., a defensive use of them and the compromise for Morocco to peacefully settle all its territorial disputes in place.¹⁴⁷ Finally, an in-depth insight on the 1963 renewal of the agreements between the US and Spain is made. As it can be seen, US military aid between 1963 and 1968 were considerably lower than the amount that Spain expected. In fact, compared to the 250 million dollars that Spain requested in military aid, only 200 were provided, of which 100 million dollars were allocated for new military equipment, and 100 million dollars provided in official credits in order to buy US military equipment, but this latter amount of money was never spent. Furthermore, direct economic aid, which was expected from the first Plan of Development agreed in 1963, was no longer available. In contrast, granting loans through the US Export-Import Bank were eased, and the US maintained the support to Spain in the international economic organisations.¹⁴⁸ These conditions, summed to the fact that Spain did not manage to obtain its total sovereignty on its military bases shared with the US, were fundamental in considering the 1963 renewal of the Pact of Madrid unsatisfactory, and causing another round of negotiations in 1968 and 1969 during Johnson administration, leading to a new renewal signed in 1970 under the Richard Nixon's presidency. This bargaining process took place in a new geopolitical scenario compared to the one in which the 1963 agreements were made. As previously analysed in this chapter, a number of events were weakening the US bargaining power, such as the withdrawal of France from NATO, the Vietnam War, and the escalation of China in the geopolitical chessboards. In 1968, Spain had a total new strategy and power in its negotiations with the US. Moreover, the US image was severely affected not only by the Vietnam War, but also by the racial problem

¹⁴⁶ See *Letter from General Franco to President Johnson*, Madrid, 30 January 1967. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d204> [Accessed 22 March 2021]

¹⁴⁷ Pardo Sanz R., "Las Relaciones Hispano-norteamericanas", p.162.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 138-139

that were developing within the country.¹⁴⁹ As it will be examined in the next chapter, the 1970 renewal of the Pact of Madrid was a great success for the Franco regime, especially through the two biggest changes in the Franco's government, the first in 1967 when the *Caudillo* appointed Luis Carrero Blanco as Spanish Deputy Prime Minister, and the second in 1969, when Gregorio López-Bravo was designated as the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs. These two personalities proved to be fundamental in the last years of Francoism and were both seen as men of great political prestige by the US.

Concluding, at the end of the 1960s the situation in which Spain and the US were living was completely different from the one that characterised the 1953 Pact of Madrid and its 1963 renewal. In these two decades, Spain managed to emerge from the economic crisis of the early 1950s. Furthermore, the Franco regime started to be recognised by the international community, gaining in terms of legitimisation. Finally, this authoritarian form of government definitely changed in terms of international opening. Furthermore, these agreements with the US provided Spain with the very foundations for the future establishment of human rights and more generally of a modern and democratic state, which would happen after Franco's death. On the other hand, after being on the brink of a total war against the Soviet Union at the beginning of 1960s, the US had worsened its international image through several reckless foreign policies implemented first by Kennedy and then especially by Johnson. In a particular way, the Vietnam War had a relevant role in this perception of the US worldwide. In addition, the withdrawal of France from NATO stressed all the limits and the fragility of the Atlantic alliance and put the US in a critical position. Finally, some internal affairs like the racial problems that were spreading along the country, summed to the escalation of the global social movements at the end of the 1960s, were a damage to the reputation of Johnson, who as a consequence announced on 31 March 1968 that he would not run for the 1968 US Presidential Elections. At the end of Johnson's presidency, this completely new situation led both the parties involved to a total uncertainty for what concerns the future of their bilateral relations. Besides, the Franco regime was drawing to a close, with the *Generalísimo* that was becoming increasingly old and sick. All these factors led then to the 1970 renewal of the Pact of Madrid, which, as will be seen in the next chapter, would finally provide with

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p.182

a more balanced agreement between the US and Spain, guaranteeing significant advantages for Spain in the last years of Francoism and a tighter relation between the two allies.

CHAPTER 2

US–SPANISH RELATIONS DURING THE 1970s AND SPAIN’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

The reasons that led the US to get closer to Francoist Spain despite the international ostracism it was experiencing were examined in order to understand the political and economic growth and development of Spain, and especially in order to comprehend several factors which are useful to the aims of this thesis, such as the importance for the US to have Spain as its ally in order to contrast the expansion of Communism in Europe, or the relevance that the US itself had in the economic and political choices of Spain in the mid–1900s, factors which will come in handy once this thesis approaches its conclusions.

Now, this work will move on from the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations attitude towards Spain to the historical period placed between the end of the 1960s to the 1980s, a period which as is well known resulted of great importance for Spain from a political, historical and economic point of view. In fact, scholars generally agree on the fact that this historical period marked a watershed in Spain’s history: on 20 November 1975, Spanish *Caudillo* Francisco Franco died after years of illness, and his death was immediately followed by Spain’s transition to democracy. As a consequence, the purpose of this chapter is to analyse certain relevant topic, such as the transition itself, but from the US point of view. The Nixon and Ford administrations relations with Spain will therefore be examined in an in–depth way alongside the political development that Spain experienced in these two decades. Finally, the reader will find the themes explained throughout chapter one and chapter two useful in the final chapter of this thesis.

1. The historical and political situation of the US and Spain at the dawn of the 1970 renewal of the Pact of Madrid

As explained in the last part of the previous chapter, the year 1970 was a watershed in the US–Spanish relations. The 1953 Pact of Madrid gave a huge impact to the development of Spanish economic and political situation, and its 1963 renewal assisted both Spain and the US in achieving their goals, namely a constant political and economic growth alongside an increasingly larger inclusion within the mechanism of the

international community for Spain, and the continuous control of the Mediterranean in the bipolarism in world affairs that the US was experiencing. However, the *Generalísimo* had always been criticised for the sovereignty he had to grant the US on the military bases in order to reach an agreement, and the year 1970 turned out to be the perfect moment for Spanish Head of State Franco in order to meet his goals.

Before entering the details of the 1970 renewal of the Pact of Madrid, it is useful for the purposes of this thesis to marginally focus on the American and Spanish political situation. For what concerns the US perspective, as mentioned before in 1968 the Republican nominee Richard Nixon won the Presidential Election, defeating the Democratic nominee Hubert Humphrey and the American Independent Party nominee George Wallace. Nixon had already been part of the US government during the Eisenhower administration, serving his country as Vice President.¹⁵⁰ Among the people who were part of the administration that was formed after the election of Nixon as US President, it is important to underline the figure of Heinz Alfred Kissinger, better known as Henry Kissinger, who was appointed first as US National Security Advisor and then as US Secretary of State.¹⁵¹ Focusing on President Nixon's foreign policy,¹⁵² his administration had then an important role in the Cold War relations: in fact, during the Nixon's presidency, the so-called period of *détente* started, which implied a relaxation of tensions between the US and the USSR.¹⁵³ Furthermore, staying on the Nixon administration's foreign policy, the Nixon Doctrine and the so-called *Vietnamisation*¹⁵⁴ deserve some credit: in the idea of Nixon, a progressive uninvolved of US soldiers in

¹⁵⁰ See Farrell J. A., *Richard Nixon: The Life*, New York City, Doubleday, 2017.

¹⁵¹ See Hanhimäki J., *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy*, New York City, Oxford, 2004.

¹⁵² In order to better understand the dualism Nixon–Kissinger and their foreign policy system, see Kohl W. L., “The Nixon–Kissinger Foreign Policy System and US–European Relations: Patterns of Policy Making”, *World Politics*, 28:1, 1–43, New York City, Cambridge University Press, 1975. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2010028> [Accessed 9 April 2021]

¹⁵³ See Litwak R. S., *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976*, New York City, Cambridge University Press, 1984.

¹⁵⁴ See Kimball J., “The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36:1, 59–74, Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2006. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2006.00287.x> [Accessed 10 April 2021]

the Vietnam War was needed by the American country, but accompanied by the defense of South Vietnam, the victory of the war, the pursuit of peace and the protection of the American honour. Moreover, the Nixon administration had a great importance in its attitude towards China, with the 1972 Nixon's visit to China that fostered US–Chinese relations.¹⁵⁵ As regards the Nixon administration's foreign policy towards Europe, it has to be stressed that at the time Nixon was elected President, US relations with Europe were, "at the lowest point they had been at any time since the end of World War II"¹⁵⁶ for several factors: first of all, NATO entered into crisis in 1969, since this treaty allowed members to leave after twenty years from its signature; second, a number of currency crises had hit US–Europe relations since 1958, severely hitting the Bretton Woods system; and finally, European integration was facing a deadlock, especially due to France, its refusal of Britain into the European Community and its withdrawal from the NATO. Nixon decided to give a boost to US–European relations by providing NATO a new dimension, primarily by changing its role from collective defense to collective security, since this alliance needed also a social dimension in addition to the strong military one.¹⁵⁷ Besides, European integration was at the core of US foreign policy, as may be seen in President Nixon's *First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s* (1970), when the new US President–in–office asserted that:

Our support for the strengthening and broadening of the European Community has not diminished. We recognise that our interests will necessarily be affected by Europe's evolution, and we may have to make sacrifices in the common interest. We consider that the possible economic price of a truly unified Europe is outweighed by the gain in the political vitality of the West as a whole.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ In order to better understand US–China relations and especially US rapprochement to China throughout Nixon administration, see Komine Y., *Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China*, New York City, Routledge, 2008.

¹⁵⁶ Nichter L. A., *Richard Nixon and Europe: The Reshaping of the Postwar Atlantic World*, New York City, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p.1.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p.6.

¹⁵⁸ Nixon R. M., *First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s*, US Congress, Washington DC, 18 February 1970. Available from: <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/first-annual-report-the-congress-united-states-foreign-policy-for-the-1970s> [Accessed 11 April]

As well explained by Nguyen, in order to meet this goal, the Nixon administration acted through a number of policies, “to keep London, Berlin and Paris under Washington’s influence”.¹⁵⁹ As a consequence, Nixon emphasised that a change in US–European relations could take place. This new attitude was stressed on 25 February 1971 in a radio address made by the President himself, asserting that:

In Western Europe, we [the US] have shifted from predominance to partnership with our allies. Our ties with Western Europe are central to the structure of peace because its nations are richer in tradition and experience, strong economically, vigorous in diplomacy and culture; they [Europe] are in a position to take a major part in building a world of peace.¹⁶⁰

Moving on to the Spanish perspective, as introduced at the end of the previous chapter Spain was facing strong changes within its government at the end of the 1960s. In fact, two relevant personalities for what concerns the Spanish foreign policy well-liked by the international community were confirmed in the eleventh and twelfth Spanish government of Franco’s dictatorship, namely Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, former Minister of Presidency during the tenth Franco’s government, who became the Spanish Vice President in 1967 and was confirmed in 1969, and Gregorio López–Bravo, “a neo-liberal, modernising technocrat”¹⁶¹ who was the Minister for Industry from 1965 to 1969 and then appointed as the Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1969.¹⁶² In concrete terms, the

¹⁵⁹ Nguyen H., “Foreign Policy Making and the US Vision of European Integration in the Nixon Era”, *Centre for International Relations Research (CIRR)*, 70, 55–81, 2014, p.69. Available from: <https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/cirr-2014-0006> [Accessed 11 April 2021]

¹⁶⁰ Nixon R. M., *Radio Address by President Nixon*, Washington DC, 25 February 1971. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d85> [Accessed 11 April 2021]

¹⁶¹ Powell C. T., “Spain’s External Relations 1898–1975”, in Gillespie R., Rodrigo F. and Story J. (eds) *Democratic Spain: Reshaping External Relations in a Changing World*, 11–29, London, Routledge, 1995, p.26.

¹⁶² In order to better understand these important figures, see De Peñaranda J. M., *Los Servicios Secretos de Carrero Blanco*, Barcelona, Espasa, 2015 and Agirre J. and Probst Solomon B., *Operation Ogro: The Execution of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco*, New York City, Quadrangle, 1975 for what concerns the life, work and death of the Admiral, whereas regarding Gregorio López–Bravo, see Alvarez Morales M., *Gregorio López–Bravo Visto por sus Amigos*, Madrid, Miguel Alvarez Morales, 1987 and Figallo B. J. and

latter had a particular importance in the Spanish foreign policy, implementing a number of policies helpful at dynamising Spanish presence in the global context, improving its international relations and maintaining a neutral position in the bipolarism in world affairs, which was needed in order to follow a path of a deep de-ideologisation in the foreign projection, following what is widely known as a permanent manifestation of *realpolitik* in the late Francoism.¹⁶³ Among the foreign policies that Spain pursued in the late-1960s and the early-1970s, the 1970 Preferential Trade Agreement between the EEC and Spain¹⁶⁴ allowed Spain to open, “EEC markets to Spanish imports without substantially disturbing Spanish protective tariffs”.¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, this agreement resulted in an increase in Spanish exports to the European Economic Community, with imports that maintained stable. As can be seen in the analysis provided by Carreras and Tafunell, exports contributed in an increase of 22% of the production of manufacturing industry, while the internal demand corresponded to 87.6%, with a -9.6% that represented substituting imports.¹⁶⁶ However, as well stressed by Nuñez Peñas, the 1970 Preferential Trade Agreement surely marked a greater Spanish integration in the European reality of the 1970s from an economic perspective, but for what concerns the political point of view, the agreement between the EEC and Spain did not bring about a change in the latter. On the contrary, “European institutions regularly condemned the lack of democracy and the violation of human rights in Spain”.¹⁶⁷ Finally, it has to be underlined that on 21 July

Henríquez Uzal M. J., “El Plan Iberoamericano del Franquismo. El Cono Sur y la Doctrina López Bravo”, *Estudios Latinoamericano*, 1:2, 22-48, 2009. Available from: <https://ri.conicet.gov.ar/handle/11336/113138> [Accessed 12 April 2021]

¹⁶³ Figallo B. J. and Henríquez Uzal M. J., “El Plan Iberoamericano”, p.27.

¹⁶⁴ See *Agreement between the Community and Spain*, 29 June 1970. Available from: http://aei.pitt.edu/30076/1/P_33_70.pdf [Accessed 12 April 2021]

¹⁶⁵ Powell C. T., “Spain’s External Relations 1898-1975”, p.26-27.

¹⁶⁶ Carreras A. and Tafunell X., *Entre el Imperio y la Globalización: Historia Económica de la España Contemporánea*, Barcelona, Crítica, 2018, p.292.

¹⁶⁷ Nuñez Peñas V., “Spanish Accession to the EEC: A political Objective in an Economic Reality”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 90, 59-70, 2015, p.59-60. Available from: <http://journals.openedition.org/cdlm/7883> [Accessed 12 April 2021]

1969, through the *Ley de Sucesión a la Jefatura del Estado*, Don Juan Carlos was named Prince of Spain, drawing the political future of Spain.¹⁶⁸

2. The 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the US

Having underlined the US and Spanish situations between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, it is now essential to focus on the 1970 renewal of the Pact of Madrid and the reasons why it is considered of great relevance by scholars. If on the one hand Spain wanted to regain its sovereignty on its military bases, it has also to be stressed that, as explained by Captain Roberts and Captain Ruhmann in their work about the military relationship between Spain and the US, Franco considered the US to be obliged to defend Western Europe, and Spain was an integral part of it.¹⁶⁹ Furthermore, Spain needed a new agreement which would have proved Madrid to be stronger in order to enter the European Common Market. Finally, the last two fundamental reasons which led Spain to reach a new agreement with the US was first of all the fact that the *Generalísimo* needed to modernise its military forces, and second the costs that would have been made in order to be a member of NATO were considered prohibitive in order to reach its standards, thus charging the United States for the use of bases was cheaper and favoured by the *Caudillo*.¹⁷⁰ On the other hand, even though the US considered no bases to be vital for the protection of Western Europe, it has to be asserted that first Johnson and then Nixon were concerned about the future of NATO after the 1966 withdrawal of France from the North–Atlantic Agreement, and Spain was considered to be, “an immediate replacement to strengthen Southwestern Europe”.¹⁷¹ Moreover, Captain Roberts and Captain Ruhmann also emphasised the fact that the Soviet Navy presence in the Mediterranean area was increasingly growing, nearly equalling the number of US vessels.¹⁷² Besides, a new agreement between Spain and the US was required by the latter also for Spanish geostrategic situation, since Spain was out of range

¹⁶⁸ In order to better understand the figure of Don Juan Carlos, see Powell C. T., *Juan Carlos of Spain: Self-Made Monarch*, London, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1996.

¹⁶⁹ Captain Roberts J. T. and Captain Ruhmann E. P., IV, *Military Relationships*, p.38.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.42–43.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.41.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p.42.

of the majority of Soviet ballistic missiles, making the Spanish country a staging area for the Americans and their allies. Finally, 1969 Juan Carlos nomination as Prince of Spain allowed the US to discuss an agreement with Madrid that would appear more comprehensible than the 1953 Pact of Madrid in the sight of the international community thanks to the fact that another person in lieu of Franco, i.e. the monarch, was uncharged to develop the constitutional apparatus without changing it.¹⁷³

The Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the US was signed on 6 August 1970 by Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs López-Bravo and US Secretary of State William P. Rogers.¹⁷⁴ The agreement started to be negotiated under the Johnson administration, but since the vast majority of US funds were directed to the Vietnam War, and the Presidential Elections were about to take place, the two parties reached an impasse. After Nixon's election as President of the United States, the two countries mutually agreed that the 1953 Pact of Madrid would be extended to 26 September 1970, and it had to be considered retroactive to 1968. As explained by Powell, this extension provided Spain with 50 million dollars in military aid and 35 million dollars in credits.¹⁷⁵ The new agreement was agreed to enter into force the same day the 1953 Pact of Madrid extension would end. By examining the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the US, it may be seen that after underlining the importance of a cooperation between the two parties in the first two articles, not only did this agreement provide with an economic and a defence cooperation, on which the treaty focused in Chapter VI (*Cooperación económica*) and Chapter VIII (*Cooperación para la defensa*), but it also emphasised the importance of a cooperation between Spain and the US in several other fields, such as the cultural one (Chapter II), the scientific one (Chapter III), the environmental one (Chapter IV) and the agricultural one (Chapter V). In fact,

¹⁷³ Bernecker W. L., "Monarchy and Democracy: The Political Role of King Juan Carlos in the Spanish transition", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 33:1, 65–84, 1998, p.69. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/260997> [Accessed 13 April 2021]

¹⁷⁴ See *Convenio de Amistad y Cooperación entre España y los Estados Unidos de América*, 26 September 1970. Available from: <https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1970-1039> [Accessed 13 April 2021]

¹⁷⁵ Powell C. T., "Henry Kissinger y España, de la Dictadura a la Democracia (1969–1977)", *Historia y Política*, 17, 223–251, 2007, p.229. Available from: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2385073> [Accessed 13 April 2021]

starting from the chapter on the cultural and educational cooperation, it may be seen that this agreement fostered cultural exchanges between Spain and the US; moreover, the US committed to invest in Spanish educational system in order to favor its expansion and improvement. Besides, the knowledge of both Spanish and American English was given an important role within both countries. Moving on to the scientific and technical cooperation, the two parties engaged themselves in a peaceful scientific development, especially by cooperating in the civil use of the atomic energy. As regards the cooperation on the environment and urbanism, the two governments recognised the threat brought by the constant degradation of the environment, committed themselves in cooperating to find new urgent measures in order to fight the problem of pollution and to protect the environment. Finally, for what concerns the agricultural cooperation, Spain and the US mutually agreed to exchange information on both their health and economic knowledges.

Focusing instead on the two chapters which were already taken into account during the 1953 Pact of Madrid and its 1963 renewal, i.e. the economic and defence cooperation, it may be seen that concerning the former, the US and Spain affirmed their willingness to foster their commercial relations, committing themselves to avoid as far as possible any kind of restrictions in trade. Furthermore, both governments considered of great importance a continuous flow of direct capital investments from the US to Spain. Third, having observed the relevance of credits provided to Spain by the US Export–Import Bank, the two parties engaged themselves in fostering the development of these financial relations. Finally, the Spanish government recognised the importance of being perfectly integrated in the European Common Market, and the US committed itself in working in order to favor the achievement this goal.

By analysing the agreed terms about the cooperation on defense, it may be asserted that beyond engaging themselves in continuing to assure the mutual defence, the two parties decided to create a Joint Committee on matters of defence, which both could be consulted by both governments in order to solve each contradiction that could emerge from this cooperation. Moreover, the military bases that were given to the US through the 1953 Pact of Madrid came back under Spanish sovereignty, with US troops that were allowed to use them through the Spanish legislation. This agreement was established to last five years, with the possibility to be renewed for other five years. Tongfi Kim analyses this agreement in an in–depth way, underlining that the Spanish bargaining power was

rising also because the increase in presence of the Soviets in the Mediterranean, leading therefore to the activation of the wartime clause requested by Madrid, which allowed the US to use Spanish military bases only during a period of war, returning the sovereignty Spain had been criticised to yield to the Eisenhower administration in 1953.¹⁷⁶

Giving some final considerations on the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the US, it can be stressed that scholars did not widely agree on the magnitude of it. In fact, if on the one hand there are scholars such as Marquina Barrio that considered the 1970 Agreement as a mere extension of the 1953 Pact of Madrid, with some modest benefits which nevertheless were not well developed by Spain,¹⁷⁷ or others such as Rosa Pardo Sanz that criticised the economic part of this convention, stressing that the economic aid for military purposes that the US would provide Spain were, “muy bajas”,¹⁷⁸ on the other hand others understood how fundamental it was. For instance, Powell underlined that after this agreement, the US would provide Spain with 26 million dollars per year in direct aid for defence, stressing the economic importance of the treaty and the reaffirmation of Spanish sovereignty on its military bases, highlighting the fact that with the 1970 Agreement the US could no longer activate the military bases without consultation or prior agreement with Spain in case of conflict, considering the new agreement a great improvement for Spain on a military, economic and political level.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, Viñas was of the same opinion, stressing that during the 1970 negotiations, Spain understood its mistakes made in 1953 and 1963 and decided to be more ambitious. In his words:

¹⁷⁶ Kim T., “Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom Entrap States”, *Security Studies*, 20:3, 350–377, 2011, pp.371–372. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2011.599201> [Accessed 13 April 2021]

¹⁷⁷ Marquina Barrio A., “Las Negociaciones entre España y los Estados Unidos”, p.8. Available from: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4958825> [Accessed 13 April 2021]

¹⁷⁸ Pardo Sanz R., “EEUU y el Tardofranquismo: Las Relaciones Bilaterales durante la Presidencia Nixon, 1969–1974”, *Historia del Presente*, 6, 11–41, 2005, p.27. Available from: <http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra/eeuu-y-el-tradofranquismo-las-relaciones-bilaterales-durante-la-presidencia-nixon-1969-1974/> [Accessed 13 April 2021]

¹⁷⁹ Powell C. T., *El Amigo Americano: España y Estados Unidos: de la Dictadura a la Democracia*, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutemberg, 2011, p.116–118.

Esta vez, la parte española fue mucho más ambiciosa y si bien los norteamericanos se dieron cuenta de que las sugerencias se habían preparado apresuradamente no tuvieron más remedio que responder a las mismas. Éstas denotaban que la intención española estribaba en restringir al máximo los márgenes de libertad de que gozaban los Estados Unidos en el uso de las facilidades.¹⁸⁰

further emphasising that, “el variado abanico de cesiones y facilidades protocolizado en 1953, y renovado en 1963, sólo empezó a desmontarse [...] a partir de 1970”,¹⁸¹ underlining therefore that with the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation, Spain finally managed to sign an agreement in which it would not grant too many concessions to the US.

Despite the conflicting opinions of scholars, it can finally be asserted that first of all, the 1970 Agreement focused on a wide ranging of fields, getting in touch not only with the economic and defence cooperation, but also with a different range of topics, pointing out that Spain was increasingly developing a modernising path pursued by the new government. Moreover, it may also be stressed that Spain eventually managed to become more independent from a political and economic point of view, signing therefore a new more balanced agreement,¹⁸² and that could show the international community its new pattern.

3. US–Spanish relations in the last years of Francoism and the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation

The beginning of the 1970s marked a watershed in Spanish contemporary history: as is asserted above, two international agreement were signed, the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the US and the 1970 Preferential Trade Agreement between Spain and the EEC, both characterised by the new modernising path that Spain had decided to follow, providing Madrid a new degree of openness and a new

¹⁸⁰ Viñas A., “La Negociación y Renegociación”, p.100. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/27588484_La_negociacion_y_renegociacion_de_los_acuerdo_hispano-norteamericanos_1953-1988_Una_vision_estructural [Accessed 14 April 2021]

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p.102.

¹⁸² Del Rocío Piñero Álvarez M., “Los Convenios Hispano–norteamericanos”, p.181. Available from: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2479566> [Accessed 14 April 2021]

level of acceptance within the international community, placing Spain far away from the strong ostracism that had featured it at the end of the first half of XX century. The year 1970 also marked the beginning of the last period of the Franco's dictatorship: as is well known, the *Generalísimo* named Don Juan Carlos as Prince of Spain on 21 July 1969, starting to delineate which political future Spain would follow after his death. Here, it has to be underlined that between 1969, that was the year a new government formed by neo-liberal technocrats such as Gregorio López-Bravo, and 1975, four different governments succeeded one another: the first one already discussed above saw the presence of two essential figures such as Carrero Blanco as Vice President and López-Bravo as Minister for Foreign Affairs, whereas the last three governments was mainly characterised by the fact that the *Caudillo* did not appoint himself in there as President. In fact, Franco maintained the status of Spanish Head of State, but his state of health and his age compelled him to name first Luis Carrero Blanco as Prime Minister of Spain, and in 1973 after the bloody murder of Carrero Blanco led by the Basque separatist and nationalist terroristic organisation ETA,¹⁸³ first Torcuato Fernández-Miranda *ad interim* and then Carlos Arias Navarro were appointed to replace him, the latter who was besides charged to finally guide Spain's transition to democracy.¹⁸⁴

On the other hand, during the period 1970–1975 the US also experienced some economic and political rises and falls: for what concerns the former point of view, the unilaterally end of the Bretton Woods system declared by Nixon administration in 1971 had a huge impact on the economic global system, while from the political perspective, the period of *détente* already explained above saw the relaxation of tensions between the US and the USSR from 1971 and started to become effective from 1972 with President Nixon's visit to General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev.¹⁸⁵ These were also the years of the US rapprochement with China, begun with

¹⁸³ In order to better understand the separatist organisation ETA, its history and its basis, see Egaña I., *Breve Historia de ETA*, Tafalla, Txalaparta, 2017.

¹⁸⁴ As regards the life and the political efforts made by Carlos Arias Navarro, see Tusell J. and García Queipo de Llano G., *Tiempo de Incertidumbre: Carlos Arias Navarro entre el Franquismo y la Transición*, Barcelona, Crítica, 2003.

¹⁸⁵ See Geyer D. C., *Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969–1972*, Washington DC, State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, 2007.

the 1972 visit to China by President Nixon.¹⁸⁶ The year 1972 also saw the 47th US Presidential Elections, in which incumbent President Nixon defeated the Democratic Nominee George McGovern. However, if on the one hand the year 1972 saw the beginning of the relaxations of tensions in international relations throughout the Cold War, on the other hand it was also the scene of the so-called Watergate Scandal, which brought Nixon to resign on 9 August 1974.¹⁸⁷ The presidency of the United States was commissioned to the then-US Vice President Gerald Ford, who remained in office until 1977, being then replaced by the Democratic new President Jimmy Carter .

As may be seen above, the historical period between 1970 and 1975 was characterised by political turmoil in both Spain and the US. In spite of that, the relations between the two countries in the same years and especially in the first half of this period are considered by scholars as quiet years.¹⁸⁸ In order to support US-Spanish relations, several travels were made by the most important political figures of the two countries between 1970 and 1971. In fact, as may be seen in the *Memorandum of Conversation 298* between Nixon and Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs López-Bravo dated 6 August 1970, the former assured the latter that by the following year he would travel to Spain with US National Security Advisor Kissinger.¹⁸⁹ On 2 October 1970, President Nixon and Kissinger landed at Madrid-Barajas airport and were received by Franco. In his detailed memoir, Kissinger described the Spanish situation and Spain relations with the US with the following words:

Encouraging a democratic Spain after Franco would be a complex challenge in the best of circumstances. Spain's history had been marked by an obsession with the ultimate, with death and sacrifice, the tragic and the heroic. This had produced grandiose alternations between anarchy and authority, between chaos and a total discipline. Spaniards seemed able to submit only to exaltation, not to each other. There was no precedent in Spanish history for change

¹⁸⁶ See MacMillan M., *Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World*, New York City, Random House Inc., 2007.

¹⁸⁷ See Stone R. and Colapietro M., *Nixon's Secrets: The Rise, Fall, and Untold Truth about the President, Watergate, and the Pardon*, New York City, Skyhorse Publishing, 2014.

¹⁸⁸ Pardo Sanz R., "EEUU y el Tardofranquismo", p.28.

¹⁸⁹ *Memorandum of Conversation 298*, Washington DC, 6 August 1970. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d298> [Accessed 16 April 2021]

that was moderate and evolutionary, not to say democratic rather than radical and violent. International ostracism ran the risk of making Spain a prisoner of its own passions. Throughout this crucial period of transition we maintained our friendship with the future King Juan Carlos, and with moderate elements in Spanish government and society. Indeed, America's contribution to Spain's evolution during the 1970s has been one of the major achievements of our foreign policy.¹⁹⁰

However, as reported by Powell, US Ambassador to Spain after Franco's death Wells Stabler noted that the United States could have dealt better with Spain's situation during the last years of the Franco regime, but it fostered the renewal of the treaty on military bases.¹⁹¹ In this sense, Powell affirms that the US acted in a passive way for what concerns the foreign policy towards Spain at the very beginning of the 1970s, but only preferred to maintain the privileged contacts with Madrid during this period in order to improve its influence after Franco's departure.¹⁹² Furthermore, the Spanish economic and political situation was analysed by Kissinger in a brief information note a few days their visit to Spain. As explained by Powell, Kissinger stressed the relevant socioeconomic growth that the Spain had experienced throughout the 1960s, with a GDP growth of 158%, whereas on the political side, small changes had been made, even though Don Juan Carlos was named Prince of Spain, a little democratization of *las Cortes* had taken place, and there had been a greater freedom of religion and press.¹⁹³

During the 1970 meeting in Madrid attended by Nixon, Kissinger, Franco, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs López-Bravo, General Vernon Walters and US Ambassador Hill and Spanish Ambassador Aragonés, a number of topics were touched. In fact, not only did the participants talk about US-Spanish relations, but they also got in touch with the Cold War scenario, the Middle East situation and the Latin America status, finally resulting in great satisfaction from all the attendees at the constructive nature of the

¹⁹⁰ Kissinger H., *White House Years*, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1979, p.1084.

¹⁹¹ Powell C. T., "International Aspects of Democratization: The Case of Spain", in Whitehead Laurence (ed.) *The International Dimensions of Democratization*, 285-329, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.289.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Powell C. T., *El Amigo Americano*, p.120.

meeting.¹⁹⁴ The strengthening of US–Spanish relations then had another milestone in the last days of January 1971, when Spanish Prince Juan Carlos visited the US, in which the two participants talked about the European Common Market, NATO, and the relevance that US–Spanish relations had in the idea of Franco. However, as can be seen in a comment made to the *Memorandum of Conversation 302*, Juan Carlos did not result very clear about his role in Spanish future, even though Nixon strongly underlined his interest in Spain’s future transition.¹⁹⁵ Before this meeting, Kissinger advised US President Nixon to have an almost philosophical discussion with Juan Carlos about the need to maintain the stability after Franco’s death, and as Powell stressed, Nixon therefore asserted that he believed:

... en la evolución y hasta si se quiere en la revolución, pero siempre sin entrar en el desorden. La revolución por medios violentos es destructiva y hay que evitarla. La evolución es sana y necesaria. [...] El gobierno de un país no puede ser permanente sin evolucionar, y lo importante es que mantenga siempre el equilibrio entre el grado de libertad que es dable permitir y el orden que es necesario mantener.¹⁹⁶

As may be seen in the passage quoted, Nixon was afraid that a not well–handled transition after Franco’s death could have led to disorder, revolution and anarchy in Spain, and the US could not afford such a situation in the bipolarism scenario. For this reasons, Nixon organised a secret mission, and sent General Vernon Walters to Madrid only a month after Juan Carlos’ visit to Washington DC.¹⁹⁷ General Vernon Walters, military attaché at the US Embassy in Paris, already joined US–Spanish relations, being the President Nixon’s interpreter during his meeting with Franco on 2 October 1970. As also explained by Walters himself, Nixon decided to send him to Madrid for his status of General, so that Franco could talk to a military peer. Victor Gavin analyses this meeting, underlining

¹⁹⁴ *Memorandum of Conversation 299*, Madrid, 2 October 1970. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d299> [Accessed 16 April 2021]

¹⁹⁵ *Memorandum of Conversation 302*, Washington DC, 26 January 1971. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d302> [Accessed 16 April 2021]

¹⁹⁶ Powell C. T., *El Amigo Americano*, p.130.

¹⁹⁷ In order to better understand the importance of this meeting between General Vernon Walters and Spanish Head of State Franco, see Walters V., *Silent Missions*, New York City, Doubleday, 1978.

the fact that Nixon would have liked Spanish *Caudillo* Franco, “while still alive, [to] take steps to make Prince Juan Carlos, Franco’s heir, head of state so that the dictator could oversee the transition and prevent the country sliding into anarchy”.¹⁹⁸ In the idea of Nixon, anarchy and revolution in Spain were likely to take place after Franco’s death, and the only way to be certain that Spain would have reached a political stability was given by strong relations between Madrid and the Euro–Atlantic area.¹⁹⁹ In an interview that General Vernon Walters gave to Spanish newspaper *ABC* on 15 August 2000, he asserted that President Nixon, “estaba muy preocupado con la situación en España”.²⁰⁰ As a consequence, Nixon sent Walters to Madrid, where he was received in the Palacio Real de El Pardo by López–Bravo and the *Generalísimo* himself. In this meeting, Franco assured General Vernon Waters that Prince Juan Carlos would become King, “porque no hay alternativa”.²⁰¹ Furthermore, the Spanish *Caudillo* guaranteed Walters that he would have not begun Spain’s transition of power while still alive, and that the US should not worry about the political process that was about to happen in Spain because in the idea of Franco, the Spanish middle class had been developing throughout his regime, and for this reason no civil war would have happened after his death. Concluding, the *Generalísimo* ensured Walters that, “España irá lejos en el camino que desean ustedes, los ingleses y los franceses: democracia, pornografía, droga y qué sé yo. Habrá grandes locuras pero ninguna será fatal para España.”²⁰² Powell finally reported Walters’ thoughts on this meeting, asserting that:

¹⁹⁸ Gavin V., “The Nixon and Ford administrations and the Future of Post–Franco Spain (1970–6)”, *The International History Review*, 38:5, 930–942, 2016, p.931. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2016.1146912> [Accessed 17 April 2021]

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.932.

²⁰⁰ “Nixon me envió a hablar con Franco sobre su muerte”, *ABC*, 15 August 2000. Available from: <https://personal.us.es/jponce/uploads/lecturas%20transición/Vernon%20Walters.pdf> [Accessed 17 April 2021]

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

²⁰² *Ibid.*

El militar norteamericano regresó a Washington con el firme convencimiento de que Franco permanecería en el poder hasta el final de sus días, y con la sospecha no menos firme de que el régimen no sobreviviría a su fundador.²⁰³

US–Spanish relations went on quietly in the years that followed the meeting between Spanish head of State Franco and General Vernon Walters. In 1973, Admiral Carrero Blanco was appointed as Spanish Prime Minister, but Minister for Foreign Affairs López–Bravo was replaced by Laureano López Rodó,²⁰⁴ who demonstrated to be a tough negotiator,²⁰⁵ a choice that was greeted with great surprise in Washington.²⁰⁶ In fact, if on the one hand new Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs López Rodó showed interest on Kissinger proposal of a new Atlantic Charter, on the other hand he wanted to start the bargaining process of the new US–Spanish agreement, since the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the US would end in 1975. Moreover, even though the personality of López Rodó was admired in the US thanks to his relationship with Carrero Blanco, a strong opponent of Communism, new US Secretary of State Kissinger was not pleasant about the Spanish attitude in the 1973 Yom Kippur War,²⁰⁷ during which Minister for Foreign Affairs López Rodó resulted against the use of Spanish military bases by the US troops, which led the US to break the 1970 agreement in order to use the basis placed in Torrejón.²⁰⁸ As a consequence, Kissinger travelled to Madrid in order to meet Franco, López Rodó and Carrero Blanco. The four met on 19 December 1973, and mainly discussed about the Mediterranean and the Middle East security, with Spanish Prime Minister Admiral Carrero Blanco which emphasised the fact that Spain could only cooperate with the Western countries on a basis of equality, and not

²⁰³ Powell C. T., “Henry Kissinger y España”, p.234.

²⁰⁴ In order to better understand the figure of Laureano López Rodó, see Cañellas Mas A., *Laureano López Rodó: Biografía Política de un Ministro de Franco (1920–2000)*, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2011.

²⁰⁵ Powell C. T., “Henry Kissinger y España”, p.234.

²⁰⁶ Pardo Sanz R., “EEUU y el Tardofranquismo”, p.34.

²⁰⁷ See Dunstan S., *Yom Kippur Arab–Israeli War*, Oxford, Osprey, 2007.

²⁰⁸ Powell C. T., “Henry Kissinger y España”, p.235.

with an exploitation made by the US troops of the Spanish bases.²⁰⁹ On 20 December 1973, Admiral Carrero Blanco was brutally assassinated by Basque organisation ETA. Since his murder happened the day after this meeting, a number of conspiracy theories about US inclusion and responsibility in it were made by several leading figures, such as Secretary–General of the Communist Party in Spain Santiago Carrillo, but as also stressed by Powell, there is no evidence on a direct or indirect collaboration between the US and ETA in the killing of Carrero Blanco.²¹⁰ Facts were explained by Kissinger to Nixon in a Memorandum, in which the impacts on the Spanish politics were also coped with. According to Kissinger, one–half of the dual succession that Franco had arranged to continue the transition was eliminated, underlining that in case of a widespread of terrorist activities, the *Caudillo* could decide to name as Spanish Prime Minister someone who is part of the Spanish military world, such as General Diaz–Alegria, or could retake the power he had been willing to concede at the beginning of 1973, and appointed himself again as Spanish Prime Minister.²¹¹ At the end, Spanish Vice President Torcuato Fernández–Miranda was appointed as Spanish Prime Minister *ad interim*, being then replaced by Carlos Arias Navarro on 3 January 1974. In this new Spanish government, Laureano López Rodó was also replaced by Pedro Cortina Mauri as Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.²¹²

Focusing on US–Spanish relations between the murder of Admiral Carrero Blanco and the death of Franco, it has to be stressed that already on 9 April 1973, a National Security Study Memorandum was directed to the then–US Secretary of State Rogers, US

²⁰⁹ The topics of which Spain and the US discussed about can be seen in *Telegram 6750 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State*, Geneva, 22 December 1973. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d195> [Accessed 18 April 2021]

²¹⁰ Powell C. T., “Henry Kissinger y España”, p.236.

²¹¹ *Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon* 196, Washington, 21 December 1973. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d196> [Accessed 18 April 2021]

²¹² In order to better understand the last years of Francoist foreign policy strategies led by Pedro Cortina Mauri, see Rodrigo Luelmo F. J., “De la ‘Gloria’ de Helsinki al Aislamiento Final. La Política Exterior de España en los Últimos Meses del Franquismo”, in Barrio Alonso Ángeles, De Hoyos Puente Jorge and Saavedra Arias Rebecca (eds) *Nuevos Horizontes del Pasado: Culturas Políticas, identidades y Formas de Representación*, Santander, Universidad de Cantabria, 2011.

Secretary of Defense Richardson and CIA Director Schlesinger on the US policy towards Spain, mainly based on the alternative lines that should have been made for the post-Franco era.²¹³ As a consequence, new US Secretary of State Kissinger wrote an undated Memorandum to Nixon, explaining that the Spanish wanted to begin talks about the renewal of the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation in April 1974, and calling for urgent adjustments in the US policy toward Spain after Carrero Blanco's death.²¹⁴ At the beginning of 1974, Kissinger travelled to Spain in order to meet Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs Cortina Mauri, so that the US and Spain could continue to talk about their agreement. Moreover, these relations were considered by the US even more significant due to the events that were taking place during that year in the Mediterranean area, especially in Portugal, with the Carnation Revolution,²¹⁵ and in Cyprus, with the Turkish invasion.²¹⁶ Furthermore, in July 1974 Kissinger came back to Madrid in order to finalise a Joint Declaration of Principles with Spain, based on the Declaration on Atlantic Relations better known as Ottawa Declaration signed on 19 June 1974,²¹⁷ so that Spain could commit itself in the defence of the Mediterranean area. The 1974–1975 round of negotiations between Spain and the US started under the Nixon administration and with Francisco Franco as Spanish Head of State and ended under the Ford administration and Spain which was beginning its transition to democracy under Juan Carlos, who was proclaimed King on 22 November 1975, two days after the *Caudillo* died. Within this round of negotiations, Kissinger tried to maintain the *status quo* of US–Spanish relations, and in the National Security Decision Memorandum 268 the targets of this bargaining process are underlined.²¹⁸ Among them, the US wanted to maintain access to all existing

²¹³ *National Security Study Memorandum 179*, Washington DC, 9 April 1973. Available from: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nssm-nixon/nssm_179.pdf [Accessed 19 April 2021]

²¹⁴ *Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 197*, Washington, undated. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d197> [Accessed 19 April 2021]

²¹⁵ See Varela R., *A People's History of Portuguese Revolution*, London, Pluto Press, 2019.

²¹⁶ See Drousiotis M., *Cyprus 1974: Greek Coup and Turkish Invasion*, Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 2009.

²¹⁷ *Declaration on Atlantic Relations*, Ottawa, 19 June 1974. Available from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_26901.htm [Accessed 20 April 2021]

²¹⁸ *National Security Decision Memorandum 268*, Washington DC, 10 September 1974. Available from: <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0310/nsdm268.pdf> [Accessed 20 April 2021]

facilities, to stop all the Spanish efforts to limit the use of military basis in future crisis, and not to take responsibility for what concerns nuclear issues.²¹⁹ As explained by Druckman, this round of negotiations was, “beset with ultimatum, stalemates, and crises”,²²⁰ also considering the political turmoil the two parties were facing, i.e. the death of Francisco Franco on 20 November 1975 in Spain and the Watergate Scandal which saw the resignation of President Nixon on 9 August 1974 in the US.

The new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed on 24 January 1976 and defined by new Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs Areilza a great gift to the Monarchy,²²¹ and then ratified on 18 September 1976 under the first government of Spanish Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez González,²²² with Marcelino Oreja Aguirre appointed as Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.²²³ This treaty was then published on the Spanish official gazette on 6 November 1976, and among the most important passages of the agreement, it has to be stressed that the two parties agreed on continuing their cooperation on condition of reciprocity, especially focusing on the economic perspective, given the increasing importance of international economic affairs. Spain and the US then decided to establish the *Consejo Hispano-Norteamericano* in order to facilitate the implementation of the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Moreover, this council was decided to have under its aegis a joint committee for economics, a joint committee for scientific and technological cooperation, a joint committee for cultural and educational affairs and a joint committee for political and military affairs. Finally, for what concerns the economic point of view, it may be seen that the two countries decided to continue the path started in 1970, emphasising the importance of the US Export–Import Bank in Spanish economic growth and also the importance of a complete Spanish

²¹⁹ Viñas A., “La Negociación y Renegociación”, p.93.

²²⁰ Druckman D., “Stages, Turning Points, and Crises: Negotiating Military Base Rights, Spain and the United States”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 30:2, 327–360, 1986, p.341. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/174257> [Accessed 20 April 2021]

²²¹ Powell C. T., “Henry Kissinger y España”, p.246.

²²² See Moran G., *Adolfo Suárez: Ambición y Destino*, Madrid, Debate, 2009.

²²³ See Oreja Aguirre M., *Memoria y Esperanza: Relatos de una Vida*, Madrid, La Esfera de los Libros, 2011.

integration in the EEC.²²⁴ Therefore, It can finally be concluded that the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation surely strengthened US–Spanish relations, but it did not provide with important changes from the 1970 Agreement, especially due to the fact that both countries were facing an internal political turmoil during the bargaining process: in fact, on the one hand the US saw the resignation of President Nixon in 1974, who was followed by former US Vice President Gerald Ford. However, during the 1976 US Presidential Election, Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter defeated the incumbent President, increasing the number of US Presidents in charge during the round of negotiations for the 1976 Treaty with Spain. On the other hand, this agreement started during the last years of Francoism, and on 20 November 1975 the *Caudillo* died after several years of illness.

During the negotiations, Spain saw the succession of six different governments, respectively led by Admiral Carrero Blanco, Torcuato Fernández–Miranda, Carlos Arias Navarro with tree different cabinets, and finally Adolfo Suárez González, starting the negotiations with Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs Laureano López Rodó and ending them with first José María de Areilza,²²⁵ and finally ratifying the agreement with Marcelino Oreja Aguirre. In this difficult political scenario, it can be finally asserted that the only sensible solution was therefore to confirm US–Spanish relations and the terms of the 1970 Agreement, waiting for Spain to finally conclude its transition to democracy and final integration in the international community, so that the two parties could then work together on a new agreement of cooperation.²²⁶

4. Spain’s transition to democracy and the impact of external influences on it

²²⁴ *Tratado de Amistad y Cooperación entre España y Estados Unidos de América*, Madrid, B.O. del E. 267, 6 November 1976. Available from: <https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1976/11/06/pdfs/A21911-21941.pdf> [Accessed 21 April 2021]

²²⁵ See De Areilza J. M., *Diario de un Ministro de la Monarquía*, Barcelona, Planeta, 1977.

²²⁶ As explained by Viñas, Spain and the US began a new round of negotiations in 1981–1982, and it was then followed by the 1986–1988 round, with Spain that finally was a member of the EEC, and its transition was completed. The two countries signed on 1 December 1988 an Agreement on Defence Cooperation, strengthening these lasting relations and stressing the important steps Spain made after Franco’s death. In order to better examine US–Spanish relations and treaties in the democratic era, see Viñas A., “La Negociación y Renegociación”, p.99–105.

As mentioned above, the Spanish *Caudillo* Francisco Franco died on 20 November 1975. In his biography edited by Paul Preston,²²⁷ the last days of the life of one of the most important dictators of the XX century are described. Here, it has to be stressed that the *Caudillo* at the end of his era changed his attitude within the country, going back to the cruel and bloody dictator he was in the first years of his regime, due to the sense of it crumbling.²²⁸ Between August and September 1975, several death sentences were confirmed, bringing about a crisis in EEC–Spanish relations.²²⁹ These resulted of great importance in the history of Spain: in fact, as explained by Preston in Franco’s biography, if on the one hand the pardons of 1970 emphasised the strength of his regime, the death sentences of 1975 underlined its terminal decline.²³⁰

At the end of October 1975, Francisco Franco’s health began to badly deteriorate. The Spanish *Caudillo* was suffering from Parkinson’s disease and from several heart attacks, which caused him a cardiac insufficiency, from stomach issues, which caused him a stomach haemorrhage, and abdominal distension. During the month of November 1975, internal haemorrhages multiplied. On 19 November 1975, the *Generalísimo* was alive, but fully dependent on a life–support machinery, so that his daughter Nenuca requested his father to die in peace. On 20 November 1975, at 5.25 am, Spanish Head of State Francisco Franco was officially declared dead, and the official cause was told to be an, “endotoxic shock brought about by acute bacterial peritonitis, renal failure, bronchopneumonia, cardiac arrest, stomach ulcers, thrombophlebitis and Parkinson’s disease”.²³¹ The news of Franco’s death was incredibly relevant that the first news source which achieved to break the news, Europa Press, announced it half an hour before the official time, at 4.58 AM on 20 November 1975. The journalist Marcelino Martín Arrosagaray decided to title his news by typing for three times in a row: “Franco ha

²²⁷ See Preston P., *Franco: A Biography*, New York City, Harper Press, 1993.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.840.

²²⁹ See Moreno Juste A., “The European Economic Community and the End of the Franco Regime: The September 1975 Crisis”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 90, 25–45, 2015. Available from: <http://journals.openedition.org/cdlm/7866> [Accessed 22 April 2021]

²³⁰ Preston P., *Franco: A Bibliography*, New York City, Harper Press, 1993, p.841.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, p.844.

muerto”.²³² The death of Francisco Franco was then announced by Spanish Prime Minister Carlos Arias Navarro, who also reported the *Caudillo*’s last will, namely, to ask his enemies’ pardon, and to ask the Spanish people to remain loyal to Juan Carlos, since he would be sworn in as King.²³³

As illustrated by Preston, “as the news of his death was flashed to every corner of Spain, many mourned and many rejoiced”.²³⁴ In fact, within the Spanish people this news was greeted with a some who felt a feel of melancholia caused by the death of a man who despite having established an autarkic regime, had governed Spain during thirty–nine years, giving it the longest period of peace, order and development of its history, and many more that felt high expectations and joy for the future Spain was about to experience.²³⁵

As regards European reactions, it has to be stressed that as an article redacted by *The New York Times* and published on 21 November 1975, reactions to Francisco Franco’s death were muted.²³⁶ In fact, most European countries did not go further routine diplomatic courtesies in which all of them underlined the hope for modern democracy in Spain, with European press that seemed to be less critical about Spain and its *Caudillo* than usual. Several Communist representatives, such as the Italian Luigi Longo and the French Georges Marchais, remembered the uncountable crimes committed by fascists, and hoped that with the death of the *Generalísimo*, Fascism would eventually come to an end.²³⁷ Moreover, as reported by *BBC*, no country in Western Europe sent a head of State

²³² “‘Franco ha muerto, Franco ha muerto, Franco ha muerto’: historia de la primicia mundial de Europa Press”, *Europa Press*, 20 November 2017. Available from: <https://www.europapress.es/nacional/noticia-franco-muerto-franco-muerto-franco-muerto-historia-primicia-mundial-europa-press-20151120045632.html> [Accessed 23 April 2021]

²³³ “Spanish dictator Franco dies”, *BBC*, 20 November 1975. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/20/newsid_4421000/4421636.stm [Accessed 23 April 2021]

²³⁴ Preston P., *Franco: A Bibliography*, New York City, Harper Press, 1993, p.857.

²³⁵ “1975: Memories of Franco’s Death”, *BBC On This Day*. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/bsp/about_this_site.stm [Accessed 23 April 2021]

²³⁶ “Reaction to death of Franco muted”, *The New York Times*, 21 November 1975. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/1975/11/21/archives/reaction-to-death-reaction-to-death-of-franco-muted-most-of.html> [Accessed 23 April 2021]

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

to the funeral apart from Monaco. Britain decided to send a representative of the government, Lord Sheperd, Leader of the House of Lords, and this decision was strongly criticised.²³⁸ For what concerns the US, President Ford released a statement in which offered condolences to the family of former Spanish Head of State. It is very relevant to assert that Ford here also wished Spanish Government and Spanish people well in the period ahead, stressing that the US would continue to work in US–Spanish relations based on friendship and cooperation.²³⁹ It may therefore be said that despite the political turmoil Spain was about to live, the US was willing to constantly work on their relations, which also considering the US fear mentioned above in the words of former US President Nixon of revolution and anarchy after Franco’s departure, assumed particular relevance.

Spain’s transition to democracy officially started immediately afterwards:²⁴⁰ on 22 November 1975, Juan Carlos was sworn in as King of Spain. Here, some previous events already mentioned above deserve some credits. In particular, the 1974 Portuguese revolution, which put an end to the so-called *Estado Novo* mainly represented by the figure of António de Oliveira Salazar,²⁴¹ the assassination of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, and the death sentences at the end of Francoism had a strong relevance, since resulted in a number of demonstrations and protests. Controversial opinions about King Juan Carlos as the right person who should guide Spain occurred in this period: in fact, within Spain, the PCE (*Partido Comunista de España*) saw the King as a continuation of the Franco regime, whereas from an international perspective, Juan Carlos was seen as a new, modern beginning for Spain, but with several doubts: González Urdaneta described the French idea of the new Spanish King taking as an example an article published on *Le Monde* on 21 November 1975, which depicted Don Juan Carlos:

²³⁸ “Spanish dictator Franco dies”, *BBC*, 20 November 1975.

²³⁹ Ford G. R., *Statement on the Death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco of Spain*, Washington DC, 20 November 1975. Available from: <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-death-generalissimo-francisco-franco-spain> [Accessed 23 April 2021]

²⁴⁰ Literature is full of books and articles concerning Spain’s n to democracy. In this part, milestones are explained in order to contextualise the historical moment. For further information about the political changes in Spain between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of 1980s, see Ruiz Carnicer M. Á. (ed.), *From Franco to Freedom: The Roots of the transition to Democracy in Spain, 1962–1982*, Eastbourne, Sussex Academic Press, 2019.

²⁴¹ See Ribeiro de Meneses F., *Salazar – Biografia Definitiva*, Rio de Janeiro, Leya Brasil, 2011.

[...] como indiscutiblemente liberal, moderno, abierto y sobre todo prudente. [Sin embargo] se insiste en el hecho de que cada paso que daba era vigilado muy de cerca por los que dominaban el poder, los de la ‘vieja guardia’ y por ciertos gobernantes de las naciones vecinas.²⁴²

Spanish King Juan Carlos worked therefore in order to free himself from the Francoist footprint that both the Spanish political personalities and the international community pin on him. However, following a path characterised by a total break from the Francoist institutions and figures could lead in the idea of Juan Carlos to an increase of rebellions within the Spanish borders, and for this reason he decided to gradually proceed by appointing as Spanish Prime Minister Carlos Arias Navarro, who formed a government which resulted in a mixture of Francoists and reformists. At the same time, former Spanish Prime Minister *ad interim* and defender of reformism Torcuato Fernández–Miranda was appointed as Spanish President of the *Cortes Españolas*, highlighting once again the route taken by the new Spanish King. Yet, Spanish Prime Minister Arias Navarro worked in order to maintain relations with the old regime, bringing about a political and social turmoil.

On 1 July 1976, forced by the King himself Carlos Arias Navarro resigned as Spanish Prime Minister. Juan Carlos designated Adolfo Suárez González, Minister–Secretary of the *Movimiento Nacional*, to form a new government, which resulted in the first real political detachment from Francoism: in November 1976, the *Ley para la Reforma Política* was adopted, putting an end to the former Francoist *Cortes* and establishing new bicameral *Cortes* elected by universal suffrage. In April 1977, the PCE was finally legalised, and the first Spanish democratic general elections took place in June of that year, with the victory of the UCD (*Unión de Centro Democrático*) led by Adolfo

²⁴² González Urdaneta L., “Franco Ha Muerto, Juan Carlos Ha Llegado: Representación, Lectura y Perspectivas del Cambio Político en España (*Le Monde* y *Le Figaro*, Noviembre y Diciembre 1975)”, *Quórum Académico*, 7:2, 89–113, 2010, p.104. Available from: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=3998131> [Accessed 24 April 2021]

Suárez himself. Finally, a new constitution was voted through referendum on 6 December 1978, the first after the 1931 constitution established by the Spanish Second Republic.²⁴³

A fringe of scholars tend to place the conclusion of Spain's transition to democracy in 1982, that is the year the UCD lost the Spanish elections against the PSOE (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*) and the year Madrid finally entered the North–Atlantic alliance.²⁴⁴ In these years, several events tried to jeopardise Spain's transition, such as the *Semana Trágica* during January 1977,²⁴⁵ and the coup d'état attempt on 23 February 1981.²⁴⁶ However, as the Spanish *Caudillo* Francisco Franco predicted General Vernon Walters during their meeting in February 1971, there would be great collective madness, but none of them would result deadly for the future of Spain because the Spanish middle class had grown throughout his regime. In fact, scholars agree on the fact that the so-called *infantilismo político*, i.e. the fact Spanish citizens did not emphasise the tension brought about these events and created through staying on the margin of political life for nearly forty years, deprived Spanish people of the right acknowledgement in order to develop a democratic society, resulting therefore useful in the most tragic events of the transition. This almost paradoxical situation is well explained by Mercedes Rivas Arjona, who asserted that:

En los años de la Transición, en algunos momentos, no vino nada mal esa característica de “infantilismo político”, per, una vez dado el paso a un régimen en democracia, éste exige conocimiento y compromiso continuado y firme por parte de la ciudadanía. Es muy conveniente conocer a fondo todos los mecanismos de funcionamiento de un régimen

²⁴³ The events analysed in this brief summary on Spain's transition to democracy are mostly extrapolated from the book of Ruiz Carnicer M. Á. previously mentioned and from Bonime–Blanc A., *Spain's transition to Democracy: The Politics of Constitution–Making*, New York City, Routledge, 1991.

²⁴⁴ Spain joined NATO on 30 May 1982, and four years later a referendum on its North–Atlantic alliance membership was held on 12 March. For further information, see Gooch A., “A Surrealistic Referendum: Spain and NATO”, *Government and Opposition*, 21:3, 300–316, 1986. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44483596> [Accessed 24 April 2021]

²⁴⁵ See “Los siete días que hicieron temblar la Transición”, *El País*, 29 January 2012. Available from: https://elpais.com/diario/2012/01/29/domingo/1327812756_850215.html [Accessed 25 April 2021]

²⁴⁶ See De Andrés Sanz J., “¡Quieto Todo el Mundo! El 23–F y la Transición Española”, *Historia y Política: Ideas, Procesos y Movimientos Sociales*, 5, 55–81, 2001. Available from: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=295762> [Accessed 25 April 2021]

democrático en sus limitaciones y sus potencialidades. En sus limitaciones, para no sentirse defraudado ante determinadas situaciones u acciones que un régimen democrático no puede solventar en su totalidad en sociedades complejas y, sirva de ejemplo, el acceso a una vivienda por parte de los ciudadanos. [...] En cuanto a las potencialidades, los ciudadanos si deben de exigir a los políticos lo que si puede y debe de ser.²⁴⁷

As can be seen in the work of Rivas Arjona, the fact that Spanish citizens did not participate in the political life of their country during Francoism helped the democratic regime to be established, allowing people to simultaneously and democratically grow with Spain itself.

Several forces, both within the Spanish borders and outside, had an impact in the success of Spain's transition to democracy. By starting from the former, it can be asserted that historical events of the beginning of the XX century had a particular relevance in establishing a democratic regime in Spain, especially the experience of the Spanish Second Republic and the Spanish Civil War that overthrew it. Moreover, figures that led the transition were active part of the Francoist regime, such as King Juan Carlos and Spanish Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, and the fact that Francoist laws and institutions were used in order to successfully manage to become a fully democratic nation was hugely important to avoid what US administrations feared at the beginning of the 1970s, namely rebellions and anarchy. Policies and behaviours put into practice by King Juan Carlos and by the government led by Adolfo Suárez strongly influenced the success of Spain's transition to democracy thanks to the fact that they were never considered to be an important rupture with the past, but rather an improvement of it, proceeding with the transition to democracy by progressive steps.

Another important force that influenced Spain's transition to democracy was Spanish press: in fact, it had been under a severe control and censorship between 1938 and 1966, when the *Ley Fraga* granted a limited freedom of expression to the press.²⁴⁸ After Franco's death, this law was maintained until 1977, when the *Ley anti-libelo* was

²⁴⁷ Rivas Arjona M., "La Transición Española: La Historia de un Éxito Colectivo", *Revistas Aequitas: Estudios sobre Historia, Derecho e Instituciones*, 4, 351–388, 2014, p.381. Available from: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4810067> [Accessed 26 April 2021]

²⁴⁸ *Ley 14/1966, de 18 de marzo, de Prensa e Imprenta*, Madrid, B.O. del E., 19 March 1966. Available from: <https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1966-3501> [Accessed 27 April 2021]

approved, allowing the freedom of expression, granted then in 1978 by the new constitution.²⁴⁹ Recognising the freedom of expression to all the citizens and to the press, the latter managed to become the most reliable source which described the political and social events that were occurring within Spain, and the former finally had some authority which could educate them in order to escape from that *infantilismo político* Rivas Arjona described. This political and mental development is well analysed by Redero San Román and García González. In their words:

Una vez avanzados los primeros pasos hacia la democratización del régimen, la prensa más aperturista, esta vez colocada como un producto cultural del lado de la oposición democrática actuará con enorme eficacia a la hora de incrementar el grado de concienciación política de los ciudadanos. Sus informaciones y comentarios acerca de la transformación sufrida por el régimen fueron suficientes para conseguir infundir en la población lectora y, por ende, en un espectro social más amplio, la sensación de que lo “inmutable” se estaba modificando y de que el silencio estaba siendo alterado por la discusión libre sobre aspectos esenciales de la vida pública.²⁵⁰

Focusing instead on the external forces that influenced the success of Spain’s transition to democracy, the role played by the international press deserves here some credits. In fact, taking France as an example, French newspaper *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* raised awareness within French borders about the importance of Spanish political events. Furthermore, after having analysed a number of articles published by the two French newspaper above mentioned, González Urdaneta concluded her work by asserting that, “España contaba con el apoyo incondicional de Francia para entrar en la gran comunidad de naciones a la cual estuvo excluidas por motivos políticos y la prensa [francés] luchó por divulgar ese deseo”.²⁵¹ Enormous credits for the success of Spain’s transition to democracy has to be given also to the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation (*Friedrich–Ebert–Stiftung*, FES), legally registered as a Non–Governmental Organisation (NGO)

²⁴⁹ *Real Decreto-ley 24/1977, de 1 de abril de 1977, sobre libertad de expresión*, B.O. del E., 12 April 1977. Available from: <https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1977-9008> [Accessed 27 April 2021]

²⁵⁰ Redero San Román M. and García González G., “Prensa y Opinión Pública en la Transición Política Española”, *Anales de la Universidad de Alicante: Historia Contemporánea*, 8–9, 85–120, 1991–1992, p.100. Available from: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=258797> [Accessed 28 April 2021]

²⁵¹ González Urdaneta L., “Franco Ha Muerto, Juan Carlos Ha Llegado”, p.111.

being a political foundation, even though counted on state financial support. It is close to both the SPD (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, the German Social Democratic Party) and the DGB (*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*, the German Trade Union Federation). Antonio Muñoz Sánchez intensely described the role played by the German foundation in Spain's transition to democracy and in financially and logistically reorganise the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) after the Francoist regime. As explained by Muñoz Sánchez, the historical PSOE had been reduced throughout Francoist regime, with their leaders sent into exile and a number of groups that in the 1970s affiliated to the new PCE, which at that time was illegal.²⁵² In April 1975, the relations between the PSOE and the FES began, with PSOE Secretary General Felipe González who was invited to talk in Bonn by the SPD, led by the then-Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Willy Brandt. At that time, the PCE was considering overthrowing the Francoist regime through the same path followed by Portugal with the *Estado Novo*, and Felipe González considered it, “unrealistic and even suicidal, for it would inevitably unleash a coup like the one in Chile”.²⁵³ In the idea of the PSOE Secretary General, the only way to reach democracy in Spain was to gradually dismantle Francoist regime, its laws and institutions, through the efforts of then-Prince Juan Carlos. In the meeting between the PSOE and the SPD, González showed all his ideas and thoughts to Brandt, providing a modern and real point of view which was rare among the opponents of Francoism, and for this reason the SPD decided to support the PSOE. Through the financial efforts made by German socialists, the PSOE and the UGT (*Unión General de Trabajadores*, the Spanish Trade Union affiliated to the PSOE) went from being formed by, “very few members, hardly any infrastructure and only two full-time officers, one of them the Secretary General himself”²⁵⁴ to achieving several results, such as the opening of a number of local branches in 1976, which were administered by secretaries whom salaries were paid by the FES.²⁵⁵ Moreover, the FES invested in the PSOE Central Office in Madrid, and since the PSOE

²⁵² Muñoz Sánchez A., “The Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Spanish Socialists during the transition to Democracy, 1975–1982”, *Contemporary European History*, 25:1, 143–162, 2016, p.146. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S096077731500051X> [Accessed 29 April 2021]

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.147.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.148.

was still illegal in April 1976, created the Electoral Techniques Institute (*Instituto de Técnica Electoral*, ITE) as a legal cover for the PSOE's Press and Propaganda Office.²⁵⁶

Thanks to the FES, the rise of the PSOE was exponential: in fact, it moved from being an illegal party formed by few members to winning the 1982 Spanish general elections, with PSOE Secretary General Felipe González who took office as Spanish Prime Minister from 1982 to 1996, a historical period which saw a number of achievements for Spain, such as the entry into NATO in 1982 and in the EEC in 1986, and:

the political, financial and technical support offered by the German Social Democrats, primarily channelled through the FES, was crucial in the PSOE's rebirth as a significant political organisation and helped to shape its image as the party best qualified to fulfil Spain's vocation for entering European modernity.²⁵⁷

Besides, not only did German Socialists help the PSOE due to Bonn's fear of a rise of Communist parties in the south of Europe or in order to defend Germany's interests within Spain, but also as an act of solidarity, since German Third Reich had helped the *Caudillo* to overthrow Spanish Second Republic and establish the Franco regime.²⁵⁸

Having stressed first the role of the international press and then of international foundations through the examples of *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* regarding the former and the FES for what concerns the latter, following a reverse funnel structure it is now essential to underline the role of the international context and of states in the Spain's transition to democracy. The causes and reasons that led international actors to enter Spain's transition are well explained by Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares, who stressed several important concepts, such as international actors from superpowers to international and local organisation, the way they promoted democracy, from transmission to citizenship, and the phases of intervention process, from an inaugural to a terminal phase.²⁵⁹ This article then focused on these factors on the case of Spain through its

²⁵⁶ Ibid., p.149.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p.162.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Pereira Castañares J. C., "El Factor Internacional en la Transición Española: La Influencia del Contexto Internacional y el Papel de las Potencias Centrales", *Studia Historica. Historia Contemporánea*, 22, 185–

transition to democracy, analysing the influence the most important international actors had on it.

Starting from the European context, it has to be stressed that the EEC pressured Franco's Spain to change its attitude throughout all the Francoist regime, and especially starting from the beginning of the 1970s with systematic aid to the democratic opposition of the regime, which brought to a greater tolerance within Spain itself. However, these pressures did not avoid the August–September 1975 death sentences, to which Europe harshly reacted by stopping negotiations, by recalling their ambassadors and even by suspending flights toward Spain.²⁶⁰

For what concerns France and Federal Republic of Germany, both supported a progressive transition to democracy, with the latter that as seen above through the FES, the SPD and the DGB sent financial and logistical aid to the PSOE, and the former which also supported PSOE Secretary General González before Franco's death, but with less confidence in it, especially from François Mitterrand, Secretary General of the French Socialist Party.²⁶¹

As regards the Soviet perspective, relations towards Spain only limited to diplomatic relations, which were hastened due to the fact that the USSR did not want Spain to finally experience a modern democracy, which could lead to Spain's entry into NATO and the EEC, but the Soviet Union was strict in refusing to recognise Spain's Monarchy until the PCE was eventually legalised, even if the PCE did not publicly bind itself to the Soviet attitude.²⁶²

Finally, focusing on the role of the US on Spain's transition to democracy, literature generally focused on it especially in the view of US–Spanish relations from 1953. As is well known by scholars, the main target of the US was not to foster USSR expansion and the domino effect in Europe. In the words of Powell:

224, 2004, p.192–198. Available from: <https://revistas.usal.es/index.php/0213-2087/article/view/5983>
[Accessed 1 May 2021]

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p.211.

²⁶¹ Ibid., p.211–216.

²⁶² Powell C. T., “La Dimensión Exterior de la Transición Política Española”, *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, 26, 37–64, 1993, p.44–45. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40585539>
[Accessed 2 May 2021]

Para los EEUU [the US], el objetivo prioritario en relación con España consistía en evitar que la muerte de Franco se tradujera en una alteración sustancial del equilibrio de fuerzas a favor de la URSS [USSR]. Ello requería garantizar la permanencia de sus bases militares en territorio español, y a ser posible obtener el ingreso de España en la OTAN [NATO], a lo cual se oponían diversos gobiernos debido a la naturaleza no democrática del régimen franquista.²⁶³

This was therefore the attitude put into practice by Nixon and Ford administrations, especially through its Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. As asserted by Powell in 1993, relations between Washington and the anti-Francoism opposition were limited during the last years of the Franco regime.²⁶⁴ The US mainly focused on avoiding Francoism crisis of the last years not to interfere in US-Spanish relations and in the agreements that were negotiated at the end of the 1960s and in mid-1970s. However, according to Kissinger himself, the severe attitude put into practice by the European governments towards Spain in 1975 after the death sentences was hypocrite, and for this reason the US did not follow this path, but rather hastened negotiations for the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.²⁶⁵

It can therefore be asserted that according to literature, what lied at the heart of the US foreign policy towards Spain during the last years of Francoism was to avoid the spread of the Communist threat within the Spanish borders. In fact, Kissinger committed himself in pressuring Spain not to legalise the PCE at least until the transition to democracy was over, a behaviour that partially changed with the election of Democratic Nominee Jimmy Carter.²⁶⁶ Both Powell and Pereira Castañares then asserted that the US boosted its relations with Spain after the first tense years of the transition, focusing especially on making Spain an official ally of the United States through its entry as member into NATO.²⁶⁷ For the purposes of this thesis, the fact that literature usually

²⁶³ Ibid., p.39–40.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., p.41.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., p.42.

²⁶⁶ Pereira Castañares J. C., “El Factor Internacional”, p.221.

²⁶⁷ Powell C. T., “La Dimensión Exterior”, p.43 and Pereira Castañares J. C., “El Factor Internacional”, p.224.

considered the influence of the US in Spain's transition to democracy to be moderate in particular during the period between the last years of the Franco regime and the first year of the reign of King Juan Carlos assumes great relevance, especially in the light of newly President Nixon recordings declassified in May 2020, which will be analysed in the next chapter.

So far, it can be seen that a number of internal and external actors influenced Spain's transition of power, either through financial support or through statements and support from head of states. Before taking a look to Nixon recordings above mentioned and before analysing them in order to understand whether literature is correct about United States limited influence in Spain's transition or not, a brief focus on Spain's democratic achievements between the end of the 1970s and the 1980s is provided, so that the reader may fully comprehend the magnitude of Spain's transition in the contemporary history of the Spanish country.

5. Democratic Spain's achievements in the international scenario

Focusing on Spain's achievements after the beginning of its transition to democracy, it is correct to divide them into two different branches: internal achievements, namely what Spain did within its borders in order to full become a modern democratic country, and external achievements, that are those which entirely integrated the Madrid in the international community.

Starting from the former, Omar Guillermo Encarnación well analyses the most important steps that Spain did during the transition and the years immediately afterwards.²⁶⁸ By beginning from the year 1976, that is the year in which the Francoist *Cortes* essentially voted against themselves through several political reforms that provided Spanish citizens with democratic achievements such as political parties, trade unions, private associations and general elections, a number of progresses were made: firstly, in June 1977 the first general elections occurred, with the UCD led by Adolfo Suárez which emerged victorious. In December 1978, the Spanish people ratified through referendum the new constitution, which stressed both in the preamble and in the first

²⁶⁸ Spanish domestic policies and achievements were analysed through the reading and analysis of Encarnación O. G., "Spain After Franco: Lessons in Democratization", *World Policy Journal*, 18:4, 35–44, 2001–2002. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40209776> [Accessed 3 May 2021]

articles the democratic nature of the new state, underlining especially in Article 1 that, “Spain is hereby established as a social and democratic State, subject to the rule of law, which advocates as the highest values of its legal order, liberty, justice, equality and political pluralism”.²⁶⁹ The first essential and almost obvious achievement for the new Spanish democratic state was the possibility to have free and competitive elections, which meet their requirements in 1976 and even better in 1982, when the first transfer of political power from the Right (UCD was a centre–right party) to the Left (PSOE) took peacefully place.²⁷⁰ Furthermore, Spain finally managed to achieve a civil control of the military and to consolidate the observance of the rule of law, emphasised in the article of the 1978 constitution above mentioned.²⁷¹

Another important achievement that Spain managed to complete was to decentralise the State. Throughout the Franco regime, the *Caudillo* worked in order to create a homogeneous nation, limiting secessionist powers, especially in the Basque Country. On the other hand, from 1978 Democratic Spain decided to divide the country in seventeen autonomous communities plus two autonomous cities, Ceuta and Melilla, regulated by part three of the constitution. Several freedoms were given to the autonomous communities, and especially the new Spanish democratic country decided in its constitution to make other Spanish languages such as Catalan and Basque official in their communities through Article 3.

For what concerns the Spanish economy, it may be seen in the article written by Encarnación that Spain followed also here a progressive route, agreeing between 1977 and 1984 to adhere to Keynesian economic prescriptions. As a consequence, the new Spanish democratic state accepted to foster policies which went against the high unemployment, which favoured the expansion of the welfare state and job creation of the public sector, even if this meant to be at risk of increasing the public deficit.²⁷²

Regarding the social point of view, the role of women has been hugely fostered after the beginning of the transition, with the new democratic political system that

²⁶⁹ *The Spanish Constitutions*, Madrid, 27 December 1978. Available from: <https://www.boe.es/legislacion/documentos/ConstitucionINGLES.pdf> [Accessed 3 May 2021]

²⁷⁰ Encarnación O. G., “Spain After Franco”, p.36.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.37.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p.41.

favoured the gender equity especially in education, work and politics, being, “[...] responsive to the principle of equality of opportunity”.²⁷³ These domestic outcomes were only possible thanks to the 1977 Moncloa Pacts (*Pactos de la Moncloa*), a series of economic and political agreements among all the new political figures, which in the words of Encarnación, “[...] committed actors across the political spectrum – from conservatives to communists and from centralists to regionalists – to the dismantlement of Franco’s institutional legacy and the creation of a new political regime in as nonconfrontational a manner as possible”.²⁷⁴ As well explained by Cabrera, the 1977 Moncloa Pacts were a milestone in Spain’s transition to democracy not so much for what the pacts provided with *per se*, but rather for the society they managed to lay the foundation for.²⁷⁵

Moving on to the international results Spain achieved after the beginning of its transition of power, the two most important goals that Spain managed to achieve were the 1982 entry into NATO, confirmed by the 1986 referendum, and the 1986 entry into the European Community. By starting from the former, the process of normalisation of international relations that Democratic Spain began after Franco’s death was hugely fortified by the accession to the North–Atlantic organisation. During the Franco regime, Spain had been excluded from entering NATO. Moreover, the decision to enter it in 1982 was controversial.²⁷⁶ The Centrist government led by Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo decided to hastily join NATO, a decision which was justified by the fact that the Spanish government was worried about potential conflict with Morocco cause by the Ceuta and Melilla situation. Moreover, the Spanish accession to NATO complicated the relations between Spain and Portugal, being the latter afraid of its role in the North–Atlantic organisation to

²⁷³ Camps V., “The Changing Role of Women in Spanish Society”, *RSA Journal*, 142:5452, 55–63, 1994, p.55. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41376543> [Accessed 3 May 2021]

²⁷⁴ Encarnación O. G., “Spain After Franco”, p.39.

²⁷⁵ Cabrera M., “Los Pactos de la Moncloa: Acuerdos Políticos Frente a la Crisis”, *Historia y Política*, 26, 81–110, 2011, p.109. Available from: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=3741463> [Accessed 4 May 2021]

²⁷⁶ Both the domestic and foreign perspectives on Spain’s membership into NATO are well explained in Carothers T., “Spain, NATO and Democracy”, *The World Today*, 37:7/8, 298–303, 1981. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40395494> [Accessed 4 May 2021]

be overwhelmed.²⁷⁷ As a consequence of its controversial nature, during the 1982 election campaign, PSOE Secretary General Felipe González promised Spanish people to submit the membership of Spain in NATO to the citizens in case he won the elections, being González himself against the North–Atlantic organisation, but changing his mind once the PSOE actually won the 1982 general elections.²⁷⁸ With the PSOE ruling through the figure of González, on 12 March 1986 Spanish citizens voted in favour of its permanence in NATO, with a turnout of 60%. Voters in support of Spanish permanence in the North–Atlantic organisation were 53%, while 40% voted against it and 7% of the ballots were spoiled or blank.²⁷⁹ This vote was not a plebiscite, but it was enough to guarantee Spanish membership in the Atlantic Alliance, and the news was well received within the organisation itself and especially by the US, as can be seen in the article *The New York Times* published on 13 March 1986.²⁸⁰

Changing into Spain’s accession to the European Community, the bargaining process that led Spain to enter the EC started in 1979, and the Treaty was signed on 12 July 1985. The negotiations lasted a long time not so much due to the different positions between Spain and the European Community, but rather because Spain had to meet the *acquis communautaire* in order to participate in the EC budget and in EC institutions, which included, “(1) the customs union; (2) the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); (3) a unique system for purchase taxes (i.e. VAT); and (4) external trade agreements”.²⁸¹ On 1 January 1986, Spain became an official member of the European Community, and the political and economic impacts in the short run were not as planned, especially in the

²⁷⁷ Maxwell K., “Spain’s transition to Democracy: A Model for Eastern Europe?”, *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, 38:1, 35–49, 1991, p.40. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1173811> [Accessed 4 May 2021]

²⁷⁸ Gooch A., “A Surrealistic Referendum”, p.301.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.315.

²⁸⁰ “Spain votes to remain in NATO in dramatic victory for González”, *The New York Times*, 13 March 1986. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/13/world/spain-votes-to-remain-in-nato-in-dramatic-victory-for-gonzalez.html> [Accessed 5 May 2021]

²⁸¹ Tovas A., “Spain in the European Community”, in Richard Gillespie, Fernando Rodrigo and Jonathan Story (eds) *Democratic Spain: Reshaping External Relations in a Changing World*, 85–102, London, Routledge, 1995.

trade balance,²⁸² while on the other hand, by focusing on the long-term effects, it may be seen that Spain benefited from entering the European Community.²⁸³ What is certain is that the accession of Spain in the European Community was the logical conclusion of a political and economic development, which fully Madrid in the global system. In the words of Powell:

To a large extent, Spain's accession to the European Community may be seen as the logical culmination of the gradual process of socio-economic and political convergence which had begun some years previously. At a social-economic level, the turning point was probably the Stabilisation Plan of 1959, while in the political arena it was Franco's death in 1975 that marked the point of no return.²⁸⁴

By concluding, it can therefore be asserted that after Franco's death, Spain worked on its transition to democracy by following gradual steps in order to avoid repercussions and rebellions both from those who were still attached to Francoism and from those who fostered an immediate establishment of a democratic regime. King Juan Carlos revealed to be the adequate person to lead Spain's transition, utilising Francoist laws and institutions in order to achieve his goal. Furthermore, an essential role was also played by first Minister-Secretary General of the *Movimiento Nacional* and then UCD President Adolfo Suárez, who throughout his mandate as Spanish Prime Minister managed to maintain the correct balance in order to progressively remove Francoist institutions from the inside, without acting in a strict way which could have led to difficult consequences.

The Spanish press was relevant in order to educate a population which had just come out from almost forty years of dictatorship and therefore suffered from *infantilismo político*, and it progressively managed to show Spanish citizens what was happening

²⁸² Ibid., p.90.

²⁸³ In order to understand the long-term economic benefits that Spain had through its accession to the EC, see Piedrafita S., Steinberg F. and Torreblanca J. I., *20 Years of Spain in the European Union*, Madrid, Elcano Royal Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2006.

²⁸⁴ Powell C. T., "The Long Road to Europe: Spain and the European Community, 1967–1986", *Elcano Royal Institute*, Working Paper 9, 1–24, 2015, p.22. Available from: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/dt9-2015-powell-long-road-europe-spain-european-community-1957-1986

[Accessed 6 May 2021]

within the Spanish borders and at the same time to teach them how to behave before political events that were taking place. Still focusing on press, international newspaper and mass media were important in Spain's transition of power thanks to the fact that they raised awareness in other countries, emphasising the importance of a new democracy in Western Europe.

Institutions and organisations were essential in the success of Spain's transition through financial and logistical aid, which allowed several Spanish parties to grow, to be elected and then to complete Spain's integration in the international community.

Last but not least, other states' attitude towards Madrid was relevant for Spain in order to understand whether the route it was following was the one which could bring Spain to be totally accepted by a community which was finally understand Spanish enormous potential and importance in being part of the global system.

As the Spanish *Caudillo* Franco predicted to military attaché at the US Embassy in Paris General Vernon Walters, Spain followed the path desired by the US, Britain and France, playing therefore a great role in the balance that characterised the age of bipolarism in world affairs in its last years.

As mentioned above, literature always considered US attitude towards Spanish transition of power as limited, additionally stressing that the way in which the transition from dictatorship to democracy completed itself was the one and only possible solution. In light of newly tapes declassified in 2020 and recorded between 1971 and 1973, in the next chapter readers will be provided with a thorough analysis of the recordings in order to understand whether literature's position may be confirmed or not.

CHAPTER 3

US-SPANISH RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWLY DECLASSIFIED TAPES

US–Spanish relations from the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation to the beginning of Spain’s transition to democracy were previously analysed in order to make readers see how important these relations were for both countries: in fact, on the one hand the US maintained its role in the Mediterranean area in a difficult historical moment in the bipolarism scenario, which included several diplomatic, financial and economic crises such as the 1973 oil shock and the 1979 second oil crisis,²⁸⁵ but also the relaxation of tensions with both the USSR and China; on the other hand, Spain continued with its incorporation within the international community, finally leaving behind that tough ostracism that characterised its international relations especially during the 1950s. The relations between the US and Spain in this historical period can therefore be considered as a win–win solution for the two parties, since the US continued to strengthen its position in the Mediterranean area, while Spain internally developed from the economic and military point of view.

During this section, the thesis will linger on US–Spanish relations during Nixon administration, examining first of all how literature always considered the US President Nixon’s attitude towards the Spanish domestic affairs during the last years of the Franco

²⁸⁵ The 1973 Oil Shock and the 1979 Second Oil Crisis are two topics that were not considered and analysed during the first two chapters due to their irrelevance for the purposes of this thesis, but they both had a huge relevance in the history of XX century. For further information on the former, see *Oil Embargo, 1973–1974*, Milestones 1969–1976, Office of the Historians. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo> [Accessed 10 May 2021] and Bini E., Garavini G. and Romero F. (eds), *Oil Shock: The 1973 Crisis and its Economic Legacy*, New York City, IB Tauris, 2016. As regards the latter, see *Oil Shock of 1978–1979*, Federal Reserve History. Available from: <https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/oil-shock-of-1978-79> [Accessed 10 May 2021] and Middle East Institute Viewpoints, *The 1979 ‘Oil Shock’: Legacy, Lessons, and Lasting Reverberations*, Washington DC, Middle East Institute, 2009. Available from: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/1979-oil-shock-legacy-lessons-and-lasting-reverberations> [Accessed 10 May 2021]. In order to have a complete view on the oil crises that characterised the end of the XX century and therefore also the 1980s, see Basosi D., Garavini G. and Trentin M. (eds), *Counter–Shock: The Oil Counter–Revolution of the 1980s*, London, IB Tauris, 2018.

regime, providing an in depth analysis of these relations with respect to the previous chapter and especially focusing on the attempts of Nixon to persuade Spanish *Caudillo* Franco to start the power transition while still alive, but also on the ways the *Generalísimo* always tried to handle the issue without external influences. Secondly, this work will provide the reader with an in-depth overview of the newly declassified tapes of Nixon recorded made public in May 2020, in which among the different topics that concerned the US Republican President, Spain and its power transition are mentioned. Finally, a detailed comparison between the usual considerations of literature about this issue and the newly declassified recordings will be provided, so that some final conclusions on the US attitude towards Spain and its domestic affairs can be offered to the reader. These conclusions will try to comprehend whether literature's thoughts about the influence of the US on Spain's transition of power were actually marginal or not, attempting to put an end to an issue that has always been relatively controversial.

1. An analysis of available primary sources before 2020 regarding US–Spanish relations and the Spanish transition of power

Within the previous chapter, the relations between Spain and the US during Nixon's presidency were described. The historical period this thesis previously got in touch was the one between the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation, which saw Spain gaining its sovereignty over its military bases, and the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which was signed during domestic turmoil in both countries and therefore essentially confirmed the pact agreed six years earlier. Now, this section will analyse both primary and secondary sources on US–Spanish relations during the Nixon's presidency so that readers may be provided with a comprehensive view on the US attitude towards Spain for what concerns its domestic affairs during the Nixon administration as literature has always intended before the 2020 declassified tapes.

As can be seen from the *National Security Study Memorandum 46*, the Spanish political future after Franco's death was an important concern for US President Nixon since 1969. In fact, on 21 April 1969 a study to be made on the US foreign policy towards Spain was directed by Nixon. In particular, in addition to a new extension of the Base Agreement, which then culminated in the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation, here Kissinger wrote to US Secretary of State Rogers, US Secretary of

Defense Laird and the Director of Central Intelligence Helms that an examination of the pros and the cons of various feasible policies on the short term, but also on the long term, including the post-Franco era, should be prepared within 29 May 1969, underlining the fact that the US was really interested in the Spain's future from the very beginning of Nixon's presidency.²⁸⁶ The US interest for the future of Spain after Franco's death can also be seen in a Telegram sent by the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State, in which the subject was the succession as Spanish Chief of State.

In this telegram dated 1 August 1969, US Ambassador in Spain Robert Hill told the Department of State about his meeting with Juan Carlos, who was just named as Prince of Spain.²⁸⁷ Within the meeting, Hill and Juan Carlos discussed a number of issues, but they mainly dwelled on the future of Spain. In fact, the Spanish Prince asserted that one of his main projects was to re-establish the image of the Monarchy, which was not popular, and the US Ambassador suggested to the Spanish Prince to concentrate himself especially on the Spanish youth and working class in order to gain support within the Spanish borders. For what concerns the international recognition, Juan Carlos then stressed the fact that the image of Spain abroad was centred on the person of Franco, and he therefore committed himself to make trips to major capitals in order to project the new image. Within the last comments made by Hill, it can be seen that Prince Juan Carlos appeared willing to schedule a number of meetings with Nixon, underlining the fact that the US recognition of Spanish Monarchy was essential for the future of Spain. Moreover, Hill commented the person of Juan Carlos, describing him as an intelligent and interested man, but also sensitive to his political limitations within the Franco regime. Finally, Hill emphasised the fact that Juan Carlos would try in every way to modernise Spain from a political point of view as soon as he could, providing therefore the US Department of State an excellent view on the person who would guide the power transition of Spain.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁶ *National Security Study Memorandum 46*, Washington DC, 21 April 1969. Available from: https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_046.pdf [Accessed 11 May 2021]

²⁸⁷ In order to see the diplomatic career of Robert Charles Hill, see *Robert Charles Hill (1917–1978)*, People, Department History, Office of the Historian. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/departments/history/people/hill-robert-charles> [Accessed 11 May 2021]

²⁸⁸ *Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State*, Madrid, 1 August 1969. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d285> [Accessed 12 May 2021]

Following the chronological path, a first response to the *National Security Study Memorandum 46* was provided on 31 December 1969, since the examination of the US foreign policy towards Spain was postponed due to final negotiations with Madrid on the base agreement. Here, some Spanish domestic political affairs were underlined, such as the fact that the *Caudillo* had named Juan Carlos to become Chief of State after his death and had appointed a new cabinet which would mainly focus on the economic modernisation and better relations with Western Europe, emphasising that this was an appropriate moment to see new policy alternatives towards Spain in the long term. Among the various topics that were stressed in this response to the *National Security Study Memorandum 46*, four of them had a particular relevance: first of all, this study gave great importance to the figures of Spanish Vice President Carrero Blanco and Spanish Economic Minister López Rodó, indicating them as probable successor of Franco as head of Government, and stressing the fact that if so, an ascendancy of technocrats with respect to falangists could be expected, fostering therefore a more democratic transition. Second, the role of Spain in the Western security in Europe was reaffirmed, with Spain that shared the US interest in avoiding an expansion of the Soviet influence in the Arab World and an increase in the Soviet naval presence within the Mediterranean area. Third, this study took into account the preferential trade agreement that Spain was negotiating with the EEC, showing concern since the US was the larger supplier of goods to Spain, the largest market for Spanish exports and having investments there amounting to over 500 million dollars. Finally, this study stressed the ultimate goal of US foreign policy towards Spain, namely, to get Madrid into NATO, an issue which may become more possible after Franco's death. The study then concluded with three possible options: first, to attempt to maintain military facilities to the maximum extent; second, to reduce them in different alternative ways; third, to totally withdraw US military presence from Spain.²⁸⁹ Decisions were agreed on 16 January 1970 during a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) Review Group chaired by Henry Kissinger. Here, the NSC Review Group lingered on the base agreement, and it postponed the discussion on the future evolution of Spain. However, this document results very important for the purposes of this thesis: in fact, the last point of the summary of decisions established that, "A separate paper would be

²⁸⁹ *Response to National Security Study Memorandum 46*, Washington DC, 31 December 1969. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d287> [Accessed 12 May 2021]

prepared by State and submitted in “a few weeks” on the future evolution of the Iberian Peninsula, including the direction in which we [the US] want the Spanish to go, the range of choices, and the extent to which we can influence their course.”²⁹⁰

As can be seen within this meeting, already in 1970 the US main concern in its foreign policy towards Spain was its future, and how the United States could influence it. Moreover, according to primary sources, it can be seen that from 1970, each report to Nixon about meetings with the *Generalísimo* ended with an analysis on the state of health of the latter. In fact, on 29 May 1970 a meeting between Spain and US representatives took place in Madrid and is described in a Memorandum of Conversation. A final comment is precisely dedicated to the condition of Francisco Franco, who appeared to be in poor mental and physical state, even though a tremor in his hand and leg was noticeable.²⁹¹ This issue was then stressed also by new US Ambassador in Spain Horacio Rivero, who in a telegram sent to the Department of State about a conversation with the Spanish *Caudillo* and Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs López-Bravo, gave his impressions about the state of health of Franco, emphasising the fact that even though the tremor of his hand had not worsened and his mind was clear, the *Generalísimo* had major difficulties in speaking, leaving therefore room to López-Bravo. According to Rivero, Franco was losing the control of his speech.²⁹² It can finally be asserted that during the first term of Richard Nixon as US President, a keen interest in the US attitude towards Spain was especially given, in addition to the negotiations for a new base agreement, to Franco’s state of health and therefore to the Spanish future after the *Generalísimo* would die. As a consequence, great relevance was given to the ways in which the US could affect the Spanish transition of power. Concerns which were less but still vivid during the second term of Richard Nixon, which as is well known only was in charge until 1974 due to the Watergate Scandal and was succeeded by then-US Vice President Gerald Ford.

²⁹⁰ *Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting*, Washington DC, 16 January 1970. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d289> [Accessed 12 May 2021]

²⁹¹ *Memorandum of Conversation 295*, Madrid, 29 May 1970. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d295> [Accessed 12 May 2021]

²⁹² *Telegram from the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State*, Madrid, 31 October 1972. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d308> [Accessed 12 May 2021]

In fact, a new National Security Study was directed to US Secretary of State Rogers, US Secretary of Defense Richardson and Director of Central Intelligence Schlesinger from Kissinger about the US policy towards Spain, asking for a new study that should update the one made in response to the National Security Study Memorandum 46. Here, in addition to an assessment of the US interests in the long term about the bilateral relations with Spain which would also consider both the European Community and NATO, and in addition to an analysis on the strategic importance of US military bases within the Spanish borders, a new assessment that should be prepared by the Central Intelligence on the Spain's domestic system and foreign policy orientation was requested. Moreover, Kissinger also called for an examination of US alternative policies towards Spain in the post-Franco era, considering these assessments, but also the good relations with Spain that characterised the 1970s.²⁹³

As a consequence, the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe redacted a study on the US strategy on foreign policy towards Spain. This study first focused on the assassination of Spanish Prime Minister Admiral Carrero Blanco, and the transition of power to Carlos Arias Navarro, underlining the serenity in which this succession was made and also the political value of the new Spanish Prime Minister. Furthermore, this study also analysed the situation in the Middle East and the attitude Spain wanted to implement. Finally, it lingered on the base negotiations, asserting that within the US goals, an extension of the pacts made in the past should be achieved through reasonable payments.²⁹⁴ For the purposes of this chapter, the parts on the Middle East and the base agreement do not play a central role. However, on the other hand it can be seen from the study prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe that a great relevance is assumed by the transition of power from Luis Carrero Blanco to Carlos Arias Navarro. In fact, the new Spanish Prime Minister stressed the importance of US-Spanish relations and his intentions to continue the bilateral agreements achieved during previous government. Moreover, the first lines of this study suddenly emphasised the fact that the

²⁹³ *National Security Study Memorandum 179*, Washington DC, 9 April 1973. Available from: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nssm-nixon/nssm_179.pdf [Accessed 13 May 2021]

²⁹⁴ *Summary of a Study Prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Europe*, Washington DC, undated. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2Ed2/d198> [Accessed 13 May 2021]

transition to a new government, “took place in an atmosphere of calmness and confidence”,²⁹⁵ which was a fundamental issue for the US since this event could be the prologue of the power transition after Franco’s death.

The state of health of the *Generalísimo* then recurred within a Memorandum from Kissinger to new US President Ford during the first days of his charge, on 12 August 1974. As can be seen, Kissinger provided Ford with all the information about Franco’s hospitalisation which took place one month earlier, stressing that according to Juan Carlos, Franco was not expected to live after Christmas. After this introduction, the issue of Spanish succession was handled. According to Kissinger, the transition of power from the Spanish *Caudillo* to Juan Carlos would happen without serious challenge brought by rivals. Moreover, the role of Juan Carlos’s father, Don Juan, is emphasised. In fact, Kissinger underlined the fact that Don Juan would not oppose to his son’s succession. Furthermore, Don Juan would provide his son with a program for democratic reforms in order to guide Prince Juan Carlos throughout Spain’s transition to democracy. Finally, Kissinger asserted that Juan Carlos would be expected to succeed Francisco Franco with the support of the *Caudillo* himself, the recognition of the constitutional law and the support of the armed forces, without being challenge in his accession to the throne.²⁹⁶ Within this memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, two issues deserve some credits: first of all, the importance given to the state of health of Franco and to the transition of power from the *Generalísimo* to Juan Carlos, which had great relevance in the US attitude towards Spain in the first half of 1970s. Second, the day in which President Ford was provided with these pieces of information; in fact, as is well known, former President Nixon resigned on 9 August 1974, after the speech he made on 8 August. This means that Ford started his charge on the same day Nixon resigned, and the memorandum was provided to him after only three days of office, underlining therefore how important the future of Spain was within the US foreign policy in the geopolitical scenario of the 1970s.

In mid-1975, when the end of the Franco regime was approaching, an analysis on the problem of the Spanish succession was provided by the US National Intelligence.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ *Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford*, Washington DC, 12 August 1974. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2Ed2/d200> [Accessed 13 May 2021]

Here, readers can see that uncertainties were predicted both on short-term succession and on long-term political developments, since each real change that could be imagined carried several threats. In this direction, in the short term the US started to realise that radical upsets were unlikely to take place and that a controlled and moderate opening up of politics was more probable. Moreover, it was emphasised that both the avoidance of radical turmoil and the political opening were more likely to take place once the *Caudillo* passed away, since new institutions were required and could not be built during his regime. Besides, military forces were considered to be united and available to a political change, and therefore prepared to intervene if a threat to law and order developed. However, on the other hand a radical polarisation of Spanish politics could not be excluded. In fact, both Franco's family and the more radical left were considered as a threat to the succession. The right wing supported by the military forces was nonetheless thought to be more likely to succeed to the Franco regime. If the short-term problems did not concern so much the US National Intelligence, the long-term issues were more problematic. In fact, in addition to all the problems stressed for the short-term period, an increasing in liberalisation had to be considered here, which would definitely lead to a growth of the leftist and moderate strength and, as a consequence, to an increase in turbulence in the Spanish political transition.

What was considered to have a great relevance in the long-term period was the attitudes and foreign policies towards Spain put into practice by both Western Europe and the US, which would certainly influence the Spanish political orientation. Lingering on US-Spanish relations, this memorandum also underlined the fact that even though the image of the US was changing within the Spanish borders, with some that saw US bases in Spain as a symbol of support for Francoism, Madrid would have no alternative but to look to the US for the majority of its military armaments, either it would be isolated from Europe or it would improve its relations towards the EC.²⁹⁷ As can be seen from this memorandum, the Spanish succession was taken very seriously by the US, and both the short and long-term problems were analysed. In the short term, there were several issues that worried the US, but the odds these would actually verify were really low. On the

²⁹⁷ *Key Judgments of National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum 27.1-1-75*, Washington DC, 15 May 1975. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2Ed2/d202> [Accessed 13 May 2021]

other hand, the long-term issues were less predictable and therefore concerned more the United States, with the National Intelligence that pushed for good attitudes and policies to Spain in order to influence its political and economic future. The fact that the short-term problems of the Spanish transition did not concern so much the US is also emphasised in a memorandum of conversation dated 3 November 1975.²⁹⁸ Here, US Secretary of State Kissinger discussed with Spanish diplomat Manuel De Prado, one of most trusted man of Prince Juan Carlos.²⁹⁹ De Prado stated to Kissinger that the Spanish *Caudillo* would not last another month, and if he died, the transition would be easy. In his words:

As I was saying if Franco dies, the transition is easy. The constitution says that during the eight days following his death the Prince should be sworn before the Cortes. In fact, it has been decided that he should be sworn in after three-day mourning period and that the funeral should be held the next day. Then seven days later there will be a religious ceremony – a Te Deum – to which top people from all over the world will be invited and this will be equivalent of a formal talking of office by the Prince.³⁰⁰

Furthermore, in this conversation between Kissinger and De Prado the long-term issues were discussed. In fact, if on the one hand, the transition would be easy from a constitutional point of view, De Prado also stressed the fact that once Franco died, Juan Carlos would have several difficulties in establishing his political idea within the country. In fact, De Prado said to Kissinger that:

[...] if Franco dies, the Prince will have difficulty getting his ideas across. He has to handle the situation very carefully because of the continued presence of strong Franco people. He will talk a little about democracy but open doors only a little. He will not be in favor and will accept legalization of the Communist party. He wants his first government to integrate political opinion but he does not wish it to move too far to the left.³⁰¹

²⁹⁸ *Memorandum of Conversation*, Washington DC, 3 November 1975. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2Ed2/d206> [Accessed 13 May 2021]

²⁹⁹ In order to better understand the life of Manuel de Prado, see Apezarena J., *Todos los Hombres del Rey*, Barcelona, Plaza & Janés, 1997.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*

From the words of De Prado, it can therefore be understood that first of all, the US wanted to know all possible information about the way in which the succession of Franco would take place and secondly, that Juan Carlos would have several struggles in making Spanish people and Spanish politicians understand his idea about the future of Spain and that he would deal with the transition in the most careful way in order to avoid a strong rise of the Left wing. The last two primary sources that deserve here a mention are dated after Franco's departure, namely a memorandum of conversation,³⁰² which included US Secretary of State Kissinger, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Hartman,³⁰³ US Ambassador in Spain Stabler,³⁰⁴ and US Counsellor of the Department of State Sonnenfeldt,³⁰⁵ dated 28 November 1975, and a telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain, dated 2 December 1975.³⁰⁶ For what concerns the first one, a huge relevance is given to the figure of the new King Juan Carlos, and a constitutional comparison with the *Generalísimo* was expressed by Stabler, which asserted that if on the one hand Franco had had the power to issue decrees, Juan Carlos did not, leading to Kissinger's fear of Juan Carlos becoming only a figurehead. Then, the figure of Carlos Arias Navarro also had great importance in this conversation, since he was thought to be the person who would chair the first Spanish government after Franco's death. Finally, some considerations must be given to the fact the political transition should follow progressive step in order not to pave the way to eventual turmoil. Two last

³⁰² *Memorandum of Conversation*, Washington DC, 28 November 1975. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2Ed2/d209> [Accessed 13 May 2021]

³⁰³ The career in foreign policy of Arthur A. Hartman can be seen on *Arthur Adair Hartman (1926–2015)*, People, Department History, Office of the Historian. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/hartman-arthur-adair> [Accessed 13 May 2021]

³⁰⁴ In order to see the diplomatic career of Wells Stabler, see *Wells Stabler (1919–2009)*, People, Department History, Office of the Historian. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/stabler-wells> [Accessed 13 May 2021]

³⁰⁵ See *Helmut Sonnenfeldt (1926–2012)*, People, Department History, Office of the Historian. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/sonnenfeldt-helmut> [Accessed 13 May 2021]

³⁰⁶ *Telegram 283446 from the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain*, Washington DC, 2 December 1975. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2Ed2/d210> [Accessed 13 May 2021]

important passages within this conversation are underlined by the words of Stabler and Kissinger. The first one understood that the US was in a position in which should support and even tell how to move to King Juan Carlos in order to peacefully continue the Spanish transition, stressing that the US, “bear a very heavy responsibility”,³⁰⁷ and the second one was of the same opinion, asserting that:

Someone must tell him [King Juan Carlos] what to do. I don't know Spain but I know enough of its history and of revolution to know that if he tries to move from weakness or if the moves too fast, the lid will blow off. I agree he can't stay where he is, but before we encourage him to move, it must be clearer where he will be going.³⁰⁸

emphasising that the future of Spain did not lie in accelerated democratisation, but between this and the situations that took place in Italy and Portugal, in which the authority should be present and in which the US position should be known.³⁰⁹

Only a week had passed since Franco's death, but Kissinger was already in the front line in order to intervene in supporting Juan Carlos throughout Spain's power transition, so that the US path could be illustrated to the new Spanish King. The second source that remains to be analysed, i.e. telegram 283446, essentially resumed the same passages indicated within the memorandum of conversation just examined, mainly focusing besides on the fact that the King should maintain political and economic stability, without moving too fast in order to achieve democracy, but he should also immediately take some actions to establish himself as the undisputed leader of Spain and to create a new Private Council that should analyse in depth the situation and then prepare studies and options to take for him. Finally, the telegram ended with an important address

³⁰⁷ *Memorandum of Conversation*, Washington DC, 28 November 1975.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

to Stabler from US Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll,³¹⁰ viz. to provide Spanish King Juan Carlos with all the support he needed from the US.³¹¹

Within all the primary sources shown, it appears clear that the US attitude and foreign policies towards Spain during the last years of Francoism and the first years of its transition of power were in the US vision as crucial as US–Spanish negotiations on base agreements throughout all the meetings that took place and documents exchanged among politicians. In fact, on the one hand base agreements could improve their relations and the US image within the Spanish borders and were relevant during the Franco regime in order to lay the foundation for the future of Madrid after the *Generalísimo* would die; on the other hand the Nixon and Ford administrations had to concentrate on Spanish political present, and political turmoil had to be avoided by all means, especially considering the global geopolitical scenario of the 1970s. However, this does not mean that the US under the Nixon and Ford’s presidencies influenced Spain in taking the democratic route, but it only shows the US feelings towards the possible future that Madrid would face within a few years. In fact, as will be seen in the next section, scholars who analysed these sources had a common view about the US influence in Spain’s power transition, i.e. a relative disinterest in changing Spanish regime, moving it from being a dictatorship to open its door to democracy, but this point will be better analysed and explained later in this thesis.

This in–depth analysis of primary sources concerning meetings, telegram, studies, analysis and memoranda on the US behaviour towards Spain is full of meaning for the purposes of this thesis for two reasons: first, it provided the reader with all the considerations the US had on the Spanish future after Franco’s departure and the importance the United States gave to it; second, it also showed the documents which were available to scholars once they decided to approach 1970s US–Spanish relations until 2020, which will result useful in the next lines, where the reader will find a general overview of scholars research on the topic and their ideas on it.

³¹⁰ See *Robert Stephen Ingersoll (1914–2010)*, People, Department History, Office of the Historian. Available from: <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/ingersoll-robert-stephen> [Accessed 13 May 2021]

³¹¹ *Telegram 283446 from the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain*, Washington DC, 2 December 1975.

2. The US attitude towards Spain's domestic political affairs: an analysis of the existent literature

As readers might notice throughout the reading of this thesis, one of the most important scholars on Spain and its relations with the US is certainly Charles Tito Powell, who wrote a large number of works on this topic. Among them, one in particular stresses the US attitude towards Spain and whether some attempts were made by the Nixon and Ford administrations in order to influence changes in Spain's domestic affairs or not.³¹² Spain was definitely one of the main objectives of the US foreign policy of democratisation. According to Powell, throughout the last years of the Franco regime, the US attitude towards Spain was to strengthen existing ties with the then-Spanish government especially in the defense agreement, without identifying with the *Caudillo*. Moreover, Powell also reported that in the short term, the succession of Franco could have clearer and better consequences, but in the long term uncertainty was predominant, with Juan Carlos and Spanish Prime Minister Arias that would have to mediate between those who would want to maintain the *status quo* and those who would pressure to loosen control, and the fear within the US government was the fact that alone, Spain could not manage to do it, and therefore needed external aid. Moreover, Kissinger had also a relevant role in the dispute between Spain and Morocco, since Juan Carlos asked for the help of the US once Morocco and King Hassan II planned a march of half a million volunteers to conquer Spain Sahara in early October 1975. Through the help and mediation of Kissinger, Juan Carlos was able to fly to El Aaiún in order to promise Spanish troops a negotiated withdrawal. This event was essential because in the idea of Juan Carlos, an armed conflict in the political turmoil that Spain was experiencing could destabilise and divide the army, and he needed it to be unite in order to successfully achieve the political succession.

The US proved to be inclined to change its attitude towards Spain alongside the events that were taking place, but its consideration of the Spanish Communist party remained the same during all the months that preceded and succeeded Franco's death, i.e.

³¹² The analysis of historian Charles Powell examined in this paragraph can be found, as asserted within the thesis, in Powell C. T., "The United States and Spain: From Franco to Juan Carlos", in Townson Nigel (ed.) *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959-75*, 227-247, New York City, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

not to have any formal dealings with it. This resulted essential in the Spanish political scenario of the second half of 1970s because even though the PCE became legal, the PSOE was the party that gained more international authority and consideration, winning then the Spanish general elections of 1982.³¹³ For what concerns the US policy towards Spain after Franco's death, Kissinger worked in first line in order to find a new agreement with Madrid, which resulted in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1976.

Despite the fact that in 1976 Kissinger and Ford did not pay so much attention to events within the Spanish borders due to US Presidential Elections, it has to be stressed that relations between the US Secretary of State and King Juan Carlos proved to be extremely tight; in fact, Kissinger changed his idea on the Spanish King, considering him very able to handle Spanish situation, while on the other side King Juan Carlos even considered Kissinger not, "only as a friend but as a King-friend".³¹⁴ The PCE issue remained topical also in the years that followed Franco's departure, with the US that continued not to have formal relations with it, but suggested Spanish government to see whether to legalise it or not, since in the idea of Permanent Under-Secretary of State Sir Michael Palliser some people belonging to the left side within Spain would consider its legalisation as a new step towards liberalisation.³¹⁵ Powell then concluded his work on the US attitude towards Spain during its political transition of power by asserting that according to him, the US did not influence Spain political events of late-1970s. In his words, "It is thus probably not unfair to conclude that Washington did not contribute significantly to the undermining of authoritarianism, and played only a modest role in promoting democratization, essentially through its support for Juan Carlos".³¹⁶ Moreover, always according to Powell, the difficult task that the US found itself facing was indeed to wriggle out from the Franco regime without jeopardising the US access to Spanish military bases, which led Kissinger to give full support to Juan Carlos.

³¹³ Powell C. T., "The United States and Spain: From Franco to Juan Carlos", in Townson Nigel (ed.) *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959–75*, 227–247, New York City, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp.234–239.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.241.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 239–243.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.243.

Regarding the US attitude towards Spain during its political transition of power, Charles Powell concluded by asserting that Kissinger never showed great concern in conquering Spanish democrats, on the one hand because he did not have the necessary instruments to follow that path, but on the other hand especially because he did not put the Spanish democratisation within its priority objectives.³¹⁷

Another important scholar of US–Spanish relations is Victor Gavin. He also stressed US–Spanish relations and especially US attitude towards Spain during the last years of the Franco regime and the years that immediately followed, underlining the fact that in the US mind, even though a democratic future for Spain was likely to take place after Franco’s departure, disorder and instability were also very probable. In this order of ideas, the US committed itself to guarantee stability within the Spanish borders, even if this would mean a slower establishment of democracy. This also happened because the United States understood that Francoism could not survive without the *Caudillo*, thus with his departure, his regime would naturally disappear, leading therefore to a more liberal society, which was something that the majority of Spanish society was requesting. Gavin is indeed of the same opinion of Powell, stressing that a radical change in Spain could not happen since this could generate tensions and rebellions, and since there was no need to hasten the transition to democracy being this the only one solution, a gradual and controlled political change was required in order to keep stability, which was vital for the US to keep its military bases in Spanish territory. Furthermore, Gavin also stressed the fact that Spain fostered to be accepted first by Western Europe, i.e. to become a full democratic country in order to wholly normalise its relations with all of them, instead of following the path imagined by the US, that was to establish a dictatorship guided by Juan Carlos which would control the political liberalisation of Spain before becoming a wholly democratic state, emphasising therefore the fact that the US did not persuade Spain to

³¹⁷ Powell C. T. “Henry Kissinger y España, de la Dictadura a la Democracia (1969–1977)”, *Historia y Política*, 17, 223–251, 2007, pp.249–250. Available from: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2385073> [Accessed 16 May 2021]

follow its route and as a consequence underlining the lack of influence by the US administrations in the Spanish transition to democracy.³¹⁸

Following the idea explained by Gavin, namely, US fostering of stability in lieu of democratisation in Spain, Chislett is more cynical on US influence in Spanish's transition, actually stressing the fact that the United States could do more in order to promote the establishment of a democratic society within the Spanish borders, while instead preferred to develop relations in order to guarantee the sign of a new agreement on military bases, emphasising the fact that, "the US government placed little importance on the fate of Spanish democracy".³¹⁹ An idea that for what concerns especially the last years of the Franco regime was also reported by Liedtke, who underlined that, "[...] during this last phase of the Spanish dictatorship, there had been no noteworthy attempts by Washington to ensure that the next regime in Spain would be one based on democratic principles".³²⁰ In fact, the US was more interested in maintaining stability within the Spanish borders and less on the establishment of a democratic regime, since political stability was considered to be more crucial than democratisation in the short term.

The Spanish democracy is considered to be more a Western European discourse than an Atlantic one also according to Robles López, who also focuses on the fact that first the Nixon and then the Ford administrations focused more on the security of Spain than to its democratisation, emphasising in addition that the US administrations acted more through a chronological opportunism than as a consequence of diplomacy. By underlining the same thoughts of the scholars analysed until now, Robles López noted that, "Afterall, US means were different, but security objectives remained being the same",³²¹ stressing therefore that the US did not centre its foreign policy towards Spain

³¹⁸ Gavin V., "The Nixon and Ford Administrations and the Future of Post-Franco Spain (1970–6), *The International History Review*, 38:5, 930–942, 2016, pp.937–940. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2016.1146912> [Accessed 17 May 2021]

³¹⁹ Chislett W., *Spain and the United States: The Quest for Mutual Rediscovery*, Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, Madrid, 2005, p.31.

³²⁰ Liedtke B., "Spain and the USA, 1945–1975", in Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston (eds) *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*, 229–244, Routledge, London, 2002, p.242.

³²¹ Robles López A., "For or Against NATO? The Spanish transition into Democracy as a New Challenge for the US State Department, 1975–1977", *Granada Historia Contemporánea*, 1–13, 2019, p.11. Available

on its democratic transition, but rather on its stability in order to integrate Spain within NATO, which according to Robles López was US main objective in this regard. Rizas also underlined the limited influence of Kissinger in the transition of Southern Europe to democracy, emphasising besides that Kissinger's, "views and the premises of his response to democratization were rather outdated",³²² with the predominant thought not to pressure a rapid democratisation within the Spanish borders.³²³ Moreover, Rizas as well as Robles López asserted that Spanish inclusion within NATO was the main goal, and the US administrations needed to work properly and gradually in order not to compromise the Spanish commitment to the Western side, especially by guaranteeing a new treaty on defense cooperation, whereas the US attitude towards Spain's democratic transition was considered to be reserved.³²⁴

The US role in Spain's domestic affairs was analysed also by Jonathan Story, who also gave priority to the European position than to the US one, emphasising therefore the fact that Madrid preferred to follow the European idea of reaching a full democratisation instead of continuing with a dictatorship while forging democratic institutions within its borders, i.e. the path suggested by the US, but also underlining that, "The United States remained a crucial ally",³²⁵ especially in what was the US main goal according to most of the scholars, namely, the Spanish accession into NATO, notably fostered by US-Spanish relations as regards in particular the various base agreements signed by the two countries.³²⁶ This US benign indifference towards Spanish democratisation, as described

from: <https://blogs.ugr.es/jovenesinvestigadores/wp-content/uploads/sites/46/2019/08/ROBLES-LôPEZ-Asensio.pdf> [Accessed 19 May 2021]

³²² Rizas S., "Henry Kissinger and the transition to Democracy in Southern Europe", *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 17, 61–80, 2019, p.78. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s42738-019-00006-0> [Accessed 18 May 2021]

³²³ Ibid., p.75.

³²⁴ Ibid., p.74.

³²⁵ Story J., "Spain's External Relations Redefined: 1975–89", in Richard Gillespie, Fernando Rodrigo and Jonathan Story (eds) *Democratic Spain: Reshaping External Relations in a Changing World*, 29–48, London, Routledge, 1995.

³²⁶ See Rodrigo F., "Western Alignment: Spain's Security Policy", in Richard Gillespie, Fernando Rodrigo and Jonathan Story (eds) *Democratic Spain: Reshaping External Relations in a Changing World*, 49–64, London, Routledge, 1995.

by Maxwell,³²⁷ did not pass unnoticed within Spain, where many people and especially the Socialists thought about it as a hostility towards the Spanish transition to democracy, particularly because during the Franco regime the US was very present, underlining the controversial American attitude. An indifference that was criticised by Rosa Pardo Sanz, who analysing US–Spanish relations at the end of the Franco regime, blamed the US not to establish right links with the Spanish democrats and not to maintain the right distance from the Spanish dictatorship, facts that persuaded therefore Spain to follow the path illustrated by Western Europe, with the US which postponed its improvement in the relations with Spain until the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, when Spain had already decided how to take its next steps towards democracy.³²⁸ Moreover, the issue of NATO was also analysed by Maxwell, asserted as controversial as well as US base presence within the Spanish borders.³²⁹ Finally, Maxwell concluded his work by stressing that US presence in Spain through their relations, their agreements and especially their pacts together with Spanish political democratisation were fundamental within the Spanish borders. In his words, “Pact making was critical to Spanish success by involving the unions, the church, business, and political parties from the left and the right, thus creating an atmosphere conducive to constitutional negotiations and restructuring the economy”.³³⁰

Actually, some scholars thought that the US tried to compromise Spanish democratisation: Navarro analysed in fact US–Spanish relations from a political point of view, underlining the fact that even though the Spanish accession into the Common Market could benefit the US business interest within the Spanish borders, there was no concern on Spain becoming a democratic state; indeed, the US was not reluctant of a new dictatorship led not by a real dictator, but by a King. Besides, according to Navarro, the

³²⁷ Maxwell K., “Spain’s transition to Democracy: A Model for Eastern Europe?”, *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, 38:1, 35–49, 1991, p.39. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1173811> [Accessed 19 May 2021]

³²⁸ Pardo Sanz R., “EEUU y el Tardofranquismo: Las Relaciones Bilaterales durante la Presidencia Nixon, 1969–1974”, *Historia del Presente*, 6, 11–41, 2005, pp-40–41. Available from: <http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra/eeuu-y-el-tradofranquismo-las-relaciones-bilaterales-durante-la-presidencia-nixon-1969-1974/> [Accessed 19 May 2021]

³²⁹ Maxwell K., “Spain’s transition to Democracy”, pp.39–40.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.48.

most important concern for the US was the renewal of base agreements, while the Spanish democratisation was the least of its concerns. Furthermore, Navarro underlined that the US would have preferred to maintain the Franco regime with the *Generalísimo* still alive instead of if with a country which started to face an uncertain democratic process.³³¹

Even though of the same opinion of prior scholars, Ambassador Mark L. Asquino tried to focus not on the US attitude towards Spain during the last years of Francoism and immediately after Franco's death, but by providing a general overview of US–Spanish relations from the 1953 Pact of Madrid. In fact, he stressed that in his idea, even though the US did not interfere so much in Spain's democratisation during the 1970s, its role was fundamental in contributing in the Spanish successful transition to democracy, not only from a military, political and economic point of view, but especially from a cultural perspective and through public affairs activities. The pacts and agreements made during the last thirty years were essential according to Asquino in order to illustrate the route Spain should follow once Franco passed away.³³²

The last scholar that deserves here some credits is Lorenzo Delgado Gómez–Escalonilla, who on the line of Asquino also focused on the importance of US–Spanish bases agreements, which were fundamental in maintaining political stability within the Spanish borders once Franco died. Delgado Gómez–Escalonilla then goes against the position of Asquino, asserting that, “[US] Public diplomacy messages did not evade the promotion of democracy, but tried not to establish a direct relationship with the Spanish political system”,³³³ emphasising the behaviour of *wait and see* put into practice by the US towards Spain. Furthermore, Delgado Gómez–Escalonilla underlines the reasons why

³³¹ Navarro V., “How the U.S. Schemed Against Spain's transition to Democracy”, *Counterpunch*, 1–3, 2007. Available from: <https://www.counterpunch.org/2007/09/15/how-the-u-s-schemed-against-spain-s-transition-from-dictatorship-to-democracy/> [Accessed 19 May 2021]

³³² Asquino M. L., “US Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain: A Practitioner's View”, in Rodríguez Jiménez Francisco Javier, Delgado Gómez–Escalonilla Lorenzo and Cull Nicholas J. (eds) *US Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain: Selling Democracy?*, 191–199, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp.198–199.

³³³ Delgado Gómez–Escalonilla L., “Consistency and Credibility: Why You Cannot Collaborate with Dictatorships and Sell Democracy”, in Rodríguez Jiménez Francisco Javier, Delgado Gómez–Escalonilla Lorenzo and Cull Nicholas J. (eds) *US Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain: Selling Democracy?*, 200–228, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p.211.

the US did not take advantage, which were essentially based on the fact that the US and Spain had extremely close relations and the US did not want to endanger them by fostering one political system or the other. As asserted also by other scholars analysed before, also Delgado Gómez–Escalonilla especially centred his position on the fact that the Spanish regime in force immediately after Franco’s death, namely, a dictatorship led by Juan Carlos, guaranteed stability and social peace, fundamental in order to maintaining the US access to Spanish military bases.³³⁴

As can be seen from the sources analysed above, according to literature the most common thought about the US attitude towards Spain for what regards its transition of power focused especially on the fact that the Nixon and Ford administrations acted in a limited way within the Spanish borders. In fact, during the period 1969–1975 and the first years after Franco’s death, what most concerned the US was to assure its access to Spanish military bases in order to maintain its strategic advantage in the Mediterranean area, particularly through the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation and the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. As regards instead the Spanish democratisation, scholars widely agreed that the US did not attempt to interfere in Spanish domestic affairs. In fact, the US administrations did not refuse the Franco regime; on the contrary, dictatorship in Spain guaranteed order and stability, fundamental in the thoughts of the United States and especially of Kissinger in order to maintain privileged relations with Spain. Some scholars underlined the great importance the US had in the Spanish transition of power, but this did not happen through a certain attitude the US had with respect to Spain during the end of Francoism, but rather through the bilateral relations that had been developed after WWII, especially from the 1953 Pact of Madrid, an agreement which coincided with the beginning of the end of the ostracism put into practice by the international community against Spain. As a result of the analysis of secondary sources redacted throughout this section, it can be asserted in addition that the US fostered a policy of non–intervention with respect to Spain. Indeed, according to literature the US administrations preferred to wait and see the developments of historical events once Franco passed away because it feared that by interfering in the Spanish democratisation

³³⁴ Ibid., pp.211–212.

process, it could endanger its relations with Madrid and therefore jeopardise its privileged position in Spanish military bases.

By concluding this analysis, it can therefore be said that according to literature, the US did not interfere in the Spanish democratisation since it is widely accepted that the US preferred the stability ensured by the regime, but rather helped it indirectly through a series of pacts, treaties, agreements and meetings to choose the path of democracy. This is the thought of traditional literature about the US attitude towards the Spanish power transition. In May 2020, new tapes recorded during the Nixon's presidency were declassified: among the various topics with which President Nixon got in touch, relations with Madrid and the future of Spain after Franco's departure were discussed. It is now time for the purposes of this thesis to analyse them in order to understand if traditional literature was correct or if in fact, Nixon and the US actually intervene in order to trace the route of the Spanish democratisation.

3. President Nixon's newly declassified recordings on Spain: an overview

As mentioned above, it is time now for the final purposes of our thesis to analyse President Nixon's newly declassified tapes in order to understand whether the US tried to influence Spain in its transition of power or not.³³⁵ These new tapes are available on the site of Richard Nixon Presidential Library.³³⁶ Furthermore, two secondary sources deserve here some credits: the Spanish newspaper *El País*, which worked in order to transcribe these new recordings and then it published them few days after their declassification, so that as many people as possible could interact with these new pieces of information,³³⁷ and the Spanish historical podcast *XRey*, which aim at narrating the

³³⁵ The transcriptions of every newly declassified tape regarding US–Spanish relations analysed in this section can be found in the annex of this thesis.

³³⁶ Every tape recorded during Richard Nixon's presidency which were declassified and published can be heard on *White House Tapes*, Richard Nixon Presidential library and Museum, National Archives. Available from: <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/white-house-tapes> [Accessed 22 May 2021] and on *Oval Office Sound Recordings*, National Archives Catalog. Available from: <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/17409633> [Accessed 22 May 2021]

³³⁷ The article that provides with both the tapes and the transcriptions of them is available online. See “Los secretos sobre el final de Franco que ocultan las cintas de Nixon”, *El País*, 8 June 2020. Available from:

history of King Juan Carlos through a series of interviews and analysis of primary sources and which took these newly declassified recordings in order to explain the relations between Nixon and Franco and the role of Juan Carlos.³³⁸ Both these sources resulted useful during the drafting of this thesis, since they offered an additional and interesting point of view. However, it has to be underlined that by reading the article offered by *El País* and listening the podcast of *XRey*, the analysis provided by the two sources might result excessively subjective and one-sided, since they both offered the Spanish perspective. Furthermore, *El País* belongs to Spanish editorial group *Grupo PRISA*, which has always been associated with the PSOE, the Spanish socialist party, especially under senior partner Jesús de Polanco,³³⁹ enough to be accused from several other Spanish media such as *El Mundo* of having created a monopoly within the Spanish means of communication and having used its influence in order to support the Spanish socialist party during the 1982 general elections, with their relations which that got better or at least remained the same until Polanco's death in 2007.³⁴⁰ This political orientation of the *Grupo PRISA* started to change after the departure of Jesús de Polanco, increasingly striving toward a more centred ideology. Either way, both these sources were worthwhile in order to better understand the issue since they provided with the full transcription of the recordings, and for this reason their work is worth being mentioned.

Starting from the very beginning of these newly declassified tapes, the first two are monologues of White House Chief of Staff Harry R. Haldeman, who usually recorded his voice as a reminder. On the first one dated 26 January 1971 Haldeman described the meeting which took place that morning between Nixon, Prince Juan Carlos and his wife, Sofia of Spain. This first tape has not great relevance, it is very short, but it could be

<https://elpais.com/espana/2020-06-08/los-secretos-sobre-el-final-de-franco-que-ocultan-las-cintas-de-nixon.html> [Accessed 22 May 2021]

³³⁸ This podcast is directed and narrated by Spanish investigative journalist Álvaro de Cózar, famous for having worked for *El País*. See *XRey*, *Capítulo 5. Un tipo de refresco*, June 2020. Available from: <https://open.spotify.com/episode/65Zunj169cgV3g6OmQi7DD> [Accessed 22 May 2021]

³³⁹ See Cabrera M., *Jesús de Polanco (1929–2007)*, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg, 2015.

³⁴⁰ “Jesús de Polanco: el editor del poder”, *El Mundo*, 23 July 2007. Available from: <https://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2007/07/22/obituarios/1185077606.html> [Accessed 23 May 2021]

interesting to notice that this meeting resulted important for Nixon, who was pleased with the content of the conversation.³⁴¹

The second tape recorded by Haldeman is dated 6 February 1971 and focused on two main issues: the first one is about Assistant Director Goldstein of the Bureau of Labour Statistics, who criticised Nixon administration's effort in the drop in unemployment, and Nixon wanted to take some actions against him. The second issue is instead very important for the purposes of this thesis, since Haldeman asserted that Nixon had told US National Security Advisor Kissinger to get a private message to Franco in order to push for having Franco assuring his succession both with Juan Carlos and the Prime Minister before he could worsen his state of health, and the perfect solution was to call back General Walters from Paris and then send him to Madrid, which as is well known, happened a few days after this conversation.³⁴²

The first tape in which the voice of Nixon can be actually heard talking about Spain is the one dated 6 April 1971. Here, Nixon talked with US Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Elliot Richardson, who was about to leave and go to Europe, in particular London and Madrid, in order to attend some conferences on education. After some first pleasantries, Nixon was particularly clear on one issue: any people Richardson would see especially in Spain had to know Nixon and Richardson had talked before he left, a fact that Richardson guaranteed, asserting in addition that the words of Nixon would have particular value within the Spanish borders. In this tape, it could be seen that Spanish situation was really important for Nixon administration, and that Nixon wanted by all means making Juan Carlos understand the relevance the relations between the United States and Spain had in Nixon's mind.³⁴³

³⁴¹ This recording can be heard at *H. R. Haldeman Diaries: 1971*, 26 January 1971. Available from: <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/haldeman-diaries/37-hrhd-audiotape-ac03b-19710126-pa.mp3> [Accessed 26 May 2021]

³⁴² This tape can be heard at *H. R. Haldeman Diaries: 1971*, 6 February 1971. Available from: <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/haldeman-diaries/37-hrhd-audiocassette-ac04a-19710206-pa.mp3> [Accessed 26 May 2021]

³⁴³ The issues this tape got in touch can be seen at *Conversation 042-024, 501-29*, National Archives, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. Available from: <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/white-house-tapes/042/conversation-042-024> [Accessed 27 May 2021]

On 19 May 1971, a conversation between Nixon, Kissinger and an unidentified person took place in the Oval Office.³⁴⁴ Here again, the issue of the discussion is the succession of Franco and the choice of the new US Ambassador in Spain. At the very beginning of this talk, Admiral Carrero Blanco was brought up, underlining that he was a smart man and could be a great choice as Spain Prime Minister, but unlikely to happen according to Nixon, who also stressed the fact that the next Spanish Prime Minister could be López-Bravo, on whom Nixon asserted that he, “liked him”.³⁴⁵ The last topic these three people discussed was the name of the next Ambassador to Spain, and Nixon brought up Kenneth Rush, the then-US Ambassador to West Germany, who was very popular. In order to understand why Nixon was proposing Rush as the next US Ambassador to Spain can have great relevance within this discussion, it has to be stressed the tight relationship the US President and Rush had. In fact, Nixon preferred for example to deal with him instead of with US Secretary of Defense Laird at the very beginning of the 1970s due to a grater trust in him, who had become the US Deputy Secretary of Defense. Rush was therefore one of the most important men for Nixon in his administration and was appointed as Deputy Secretary of State after Nixon’s re-election in November 1972.³⁴⁶

Knowing this background is important because it can be seen how important the future of Spain was for Richard Nixon at the very beginning of the 1970s, enough to propose one of the men he trusted most. One of the longest and most important conversations recently declassified regards the issue of Franco’s state of health. This conversation took place on 11 June 1971 between the US President and US Ambassador to Spain Robert C. Hill.³⁴⁷ Here, the latter told the President that some days before Franco had been near to die and that his state of health had strong fluctuations, since in addition

³⁴⁴ The issues this tape got in touch can be seen at *Conversation 501–29*, National Archives, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. Available from: <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/white-house-tapes/501/conversation-501-029> [Accessed 27 May 2021]

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ See *Kenneth Rush – Richard Nixon Administration*, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Available from: <https://history.defense.gov/DOD-History/Deputy-Secretaries-of-Defense/Article-View/Article/585237/kenneth-rush/> [Accessed 28 May 2021]

³⁴⁷ This tape can be heard at *Conversation 517–012*, National Archives, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. Available from: <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/white-house-tapes/517/conversation-517-012> [Accessed 30 May 2021]

to Parkinson's disease, Franco had some digestive problems which made him throw up continuously. The discussion then went on and got in touch with the person who would have to substitute Hill as US Ambassador to Spain, and here Hill stressed that if this person was a left winger, it would have killed the US. At this point, Nixon screamed and explicitly banned the idea of proposing one left winger as US Ambassador to Spain, especially since the USSR was making an enormous effort according to him in order to try to get into Spain. Nixon obviously preferred to have a right winger in that position, but on the other hand Hill proposed an unclear name who was considered a moderate, a fact that seemed not to be liked by the US President. The last topic that Nixon and Hill discussed about was again who was going to be the next Spanish Prime Minister, an issue that was considered the key to the Spanish future. The two names that were brought up were obviously the ones of Carrero Blanco and López-Bravo, both considered two brilliant men. However, in the idea of Hill, Carrero Blanco was too dependent from Franco's opinion and that had he become Spanish Prime Minister he would not have the power to behave as he wanted to. On the other hand, always according to Hill, López-Bravo was too terribly bright but also terribly narcissist. Through this conversation, it can be seen how important the Spanish situation was at the beginning of the 1970s, especially for what concerns its future after Franco's departure.

The *Generalísimo's* state of health remained a topic issue for Nixon, who wanted to try to understand for how long Franco could resist. Moreover, this conversation took place during Summer 1971, which means that the meeting between Walters and Franco already took place. For what is known about this meeting, Franco did not assured Walters about his succession, but as already mentioned in the previous chapter he guaranteed that at his departure, Spain would be prepared to face the political turmoil without any rebellions or anarchy, following the path wanted especially by Great Britain, France and the US. In this way, Nixon's concern about who the next Spanish Prime Minister would be and about who would replace Hill as US Ambassador to Spain assume greater relevance: in fact, even though Franco had not given Walters any assurance about his successor, he practically ensured the US general that Spain would not fall under anarchy and violent protests and that the transition of power would follow a difficult but peaceful route. Nevertheless, Nixon remained worried about the Spanish situation and for this

reason, he absolutely refused to put a left winger as the next US Ambassador to Spain and considered in addition inadequate a moderate to be appointed for this charge.

On 22 June 1971, Spain and its future came back within Nixon's thoughts: this time, the US President talked with US Vice President Spiro Agnew, who is supposed to leave in a few days to go to Spain and to Morocco.³⁴⁸ At the very beginning of this conversation, Agnew underlined the fact that he would be in Madrid soon and therefore, Nixon made immediately sure that Agnew would be particularly warm to him, since in the idea of the US President that could be the last time that some of the US administration could see him due to his health conditions. At this point, Agnew asked about the succession of Franco, which after the meeting between Walters and Franco became more and more recurring. In fact, if on the one hand there were little doubts about Juan Carlos becoming King of Spain once Franco died, on the other hand there was great uncertainty about the name of the next Spanish Prime Minister. In this tape it could be understood that even though both Carrero Blanco and López-Bravo were two smart and brilliant men, Nixon would have preferred Carrero Blanco to be appointed as the new Spanish Prime Minister, emphasising the friendship between the then-Spanish Deputy Prime Minister and Nixon himself. Moreover, the fact that Carrero Blanco was more conservative than the other candidate, López-Bravo, was underlined during this conversation, hinting therefore that a more conservative Prime Minister would lead to a more conservative transition of power in Spain, a situation that was considered as the best one by the US.

Nixon and Agnew talked then about the meeting between the US Vice President and Franco on 28 July 1971.³⁴⁹ In this tape, it can be seen that as soon as Agnew named the Spanish *Caudillo*, Nixon immediately asked how he was and if during the day spent with Agnew he had felt good, underlining once again the relevance for Nixon of Franco's state of health. The conversation then went on with Nixon and Agnew that talked about how smart Franco was at that time, and that despite his physical weakness, mentally he

³⁴⁸ The key themes of the conversation between Nixon and Agnew can be seen at *Conversation 527-009*, National Archives, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. Available from: <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/white-house-tapes/527/conversation-527-009> [Accessed 31 May 2021]

³⁴⁹ This conversation can be heard at *Conversation 549-025*, National Archives, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. Available from: <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/white-house-tapes/549/conversation-549-025> [Accessed 1 June 2021]

was one of the men that impressed Agnew the most. At the end of this conversation, the issue of the next Spanish Prime Minister was brought up. Nixon wanted to know if Agnew had had the possibility to get in touch with Carrero Blanco in order to understand what view Agnew had had about him. This conversation ended with US Secretary of State Rogers, who was also present in the Oval Office together with Kissinger, and who underlined the fact that Juan Carlos needed to be prepared for Franco's departure. From this conversation, it can be seen once again that Franco's health conditions were an issue that worried Nixon a lot, since his first concern about Spain was the way in which this country would behave once its dictator would die in order to understand if anarchy was a possibility or if it was avoidable. Moreover, Carrero Blanco was named once again as in various previous conversations together with López-Bravo, whom description here in this conversation is unfortunately unclear. In any case, what is important in this tape is also the fact that Nixon administration started to see that Carrero Blanco was beginning to understand he could be the next Spanish Prime Minister due to Franco's state of health. In fact, Agnew told Nixon that he had had the chance to ask the Spanish Deputy Prime Minister if Franco was ready to delegate the work he had to a competent Prime Minister despite the fact the *Generalísimo* was still capable, and Carrero Blanco appeared eager to help him. This part of the recording is important because it hints the fact that Carrero Blanco was beginning to see him as Spanish Prime Minister, and of course the US would appreciate this situation, since Carrero Blanco appeared to Nixon administration as more conservative than López-Bravo.

Agnew however was not the perfect delegate to make Spain understand the importance it had within the US administration. In fact, as can be seen in a newly declassified conversation between Nixon and one of his advisors, Murray Chotiner, which took place on 29 July 1971, Chotiner told Nixon that Agnew did not even know who the Spanish Chief of State was.³⁵⁰ In a sense, this conversation results important because the visit of the US Vice President to Madrid was important in order to show Spain the importance of these relations for the Nixon administration, and if on the one hand this story told by Chotiner can result embarrassing, on the other hand it can be stressed the

³⁵⁰ This conversation can be heard at *Conversation 551-003*, National Archives, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. Available from: <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/white-house-tapes/551/conversation-551-003> [Accessed 2 June 2021]

anxiety of Agnew in not making futile mistakes that could ruin these relations. Furthermore, this indecision of the US Vice President shows once again how intricate the political situation in Spain was in those years.

All the conversations that have been analysed until this point are characterised mainly by two uncertainties: first, who the next US Ambassador to Spain would be. This choice was believed to be fundamental for US–Spanish relations especially considering the historical period Spain was experiencing, as can be seen in the conversation already examined above between Nixon and Hill and also in a conversation that took place on 29 November 1971 between Nixon and White House Chief of State Haldeman, in which an unidentified person which is likely to be the American businessman Cornelius V. Whitney was recommended not to be appointed for this charge since he was not liked by both Juan Carlos and López–Bravo; second, who the next Spanish Prime Minister would be, since Francisco Franco had not named anyone yet. Both these doubts were then solved during 1972. In fact, on the one hand Horacio Rivero was named US Ambassador to Spain, while on the other hand Carrero Blanco was announced the next Spanish Prime Minister.

The following conversation took place on 5 December 1972 between Nixon and Rivero and a part of it was already declassified and then analysed by Charles Powell,³⁵¹ but today this recording is finally entirely available, and its analysis may result fundamental for the purposes of this thesis.³⁵² This meeting between the US President and the US Ambassador to Spain opened with the importance of having chosen a Spanish speaker as Ambassador, a fact that the Spanish politicians had really appreciated, and could improve even further the relations between the two countries. The issue that was covered immediately afterwards was Franco’s health conditions, with Rivero that underlined that sometimes the Spanish *Caudillo* struggled to speak. Here, Rivero reassured Nixon about the most important topic the US President worried about as regards Spain: the Civil War was still a memory that the Spanish citizens did not want to repeat, and therefore violent rebellions were unlikely to take place after Franco’s departure.

³⁵¹ Powell C. T., *El Amigo Americano: España y Estados Unidos: de la Dictadura a la Democracia*, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg, 2011, pp.146–148.

³⁵² This conversation can be heard at *Conversation 818–003*, National Archives, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. Available from: <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/white-house-tapes/818/conversation-818-003> [Accessed 3 June 2021]

Furthermore, Rivero was convinced that a peaceful transition of power would have happened since the army, the police and the Civil Guard were on the side of the Spanish government unless Carrero Blanco made a mistake. This is not really clear within the audio, but since Rivero was talking about radical communists and socialists, it can be interpreted as the legalisation of the Spanish communist party and the PSOE, an issue that the US did not want to happen in the short term especially for what concerns the former.

However, it is important to stress that this is an interpretation and it should be taken as such. Nixon and Rivero then talked about the main objective Spain would have liked to achieve once Franco was dead, namely, Spanish entry in the common market, considered almost as a taboo while the *Generalísimo* was still alive. Here, a very important consideration was brought about by the US President, who told Rivero to make clear to Franco, Carrero Blanco and López-Bravo first how much this friendship between the US and Spain meant to him and second that he considered Spain as one of the five great powers of Europe together with Britain, France, Germany and Italy, while the common idea was that there were only four great powers in Europe. This is very important because it emphasises the relevance Nixon gave to Franco and the Spanish country and also underlines how important maintaining great relations with Madrid was for the Nixon administration. Besides, this idea of the US President also stresses the economic progresses Spain made during the last twenty years, applauding therefore the work of Franco and his government as regards the economic field.

The last tape that was declassified is dated 11 April 1973, and it is a conversation between Nixon and Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs López-Bravo.³⁵³ Within this meeting, Nixon tried to lay the foundations for the future of US-Spanish relations. The US President actually underlined that the two countries could not base their relations on an agreement signed twenty years before, since both had changed during those years, and the world with them. Spain had developed in that period and for this reason, also US-Spanish relations should be developed in this sense. A very important point that Nixon emphasised is the fact that as well as US-Spanish relations should be based on this new world, and therefore also Spanish internal affairs should focus on this consideration. This

³⁵³ This tape can be heard at *Conversation 893-012*, National Archives, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. Available from: <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/white-house-tapes/893/conversation-893-012> [Accessed 3 June 2021]

meeting then ended with the usual concern of Nixon, i.e. Franco's state of health, with López-Bravo who assured US President that he was doing well.

4. The Nixon administration's role in Spain's transition of power: was it marginal?

After this general overview on the newly declassified tapes about US-Spanish relations, some final considerations are needed in order to finally conclude this work. As can be seen throughout all the recordings examined before, the Spanish future was a major topic within the Nixon administration. In particular, Nixon's concerns were mainly about maintaining good relations with Madrid, about Franco's state of health and about the person who would be appointed as Prime Minister. A number of meetings and conversations took place especially between 1971 and 1973 in order to obtain information about the Spanish future and also in order to keep these relations strong. However, it can be surely asserted that at no point of these tapes there is evidence that the US tried to influence Spanish domestic affairs and the Spanish political future after Franco's death during the presidency of Richard Nixon. In fact, Nixon definitely cared about US-Spanish relations and he was worried about possible anarchy in Madrid after Franco's death, but never did he or anyone of his administration try to draw the path Spain should have followed. With these words, it should be understood that no part of Nixon administration interfered in the process of political transformation Spain was facing in the second half of the 1970s, and not even a possible attempt was made; in fact, on the one hand Spain managed to maintain a peaceful environment within its borders mainly thanks to its institutions and to the *infantilismo político* that characterised the Spanish citizens immediately after Franco's death. On the other hand, the US had no interest in making Spain a democratic country. Its only concern on the Spanish power transition regarded the context in which it would take place, namely, without violent rebellions that could have led to anarchy. In this sense, once the US comprehended that this situation could not verify and once it knew who would guide Spain after Franco's departure, it shifted its focus on Franco's state of health in order only to understand when this transition of power would start.

Throughout all these recordings, what can be affirmed is that Nixon always tried to maintain privileged relations with Spain, and even though he obviously preferred that Spanish political future would be guided by some conservative politicians such as Carrero

Blanco, he did not try to impose his idea or even influence Franco to follow his will. Nixon's choices towards Madrid such as the designation of Horacio Rivero as US Ambassador to Spain were of course made in order to show Spain what kind of consideration it had within the US borders, but this does not mean that the US President affected Franco's decisions nor hurried the Spanish *Caudillo* to take them.

Finally, it can therefore be stated that these newly declassified recordings can confirm the solution offered by literature about US–Spanish relations during the last years of the Franco regime: the US never directly influenced Spain in taking the democratic route, but it rather affected it in an indirect way. In fact, all the pacts that were signed from the 1953 Pact of Madrid, all the meetings that took place in these years, and essentially all the efforts put into practice by the US in order to improve US–Spanish relations set the basis for the Spanish democratic future. However, this happened accidentally and without an actual attempt made by the US in order to enter the Spanish political transition. In this order of ideas, it wants to be emphasised that even though it has been demonstrated that the US never affected Spain in becoming a democratic country through actions directly addressed to Franco, Juan Carlos or anyone else, their relations were one of the factors that helped Madrid in taking this route mainly thanks to two reasons: first, the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation had a great role in this context. In fact, it focused on a number of fields such as the scientific one, the environmental one, the agricultural one and in particular the cultural one, in contrast for example with the 1953 Pact of Madrid that surely helped Spain to grow, but it only had an economic and military nature and it was used by Franco in order to legitimise its power. Second, the cultural diplomacy that developed in these years between Spain and the US allowed the two states to exchange ideas and information. In this sense, not only did the relations between Spain and the US allow the former to grow from an economic point of view, but it also ensured Madrid to culturally and institutionally grow. In this respect, the cultural development that US–Spanish relations favoured before the death of Francisco Franco can be considered one of the factors that led Spain to take the democratic route. For this reason, it can be claimed that the US indirectly and accidentally affected to some extent Spain in its transition.

By concluding, it can therefore be asserted that these newly released recordings support the thesis advocated by literature, that is that the US never affected Spain's

internal decisions as regards its political and democratic future. It should rather be affirmed that the order and stability provided by the Franco regime were welcomed by the Nixon administration, whose main fear was in fact that possible violent rebellions and anarchy after Franco's death could take place, giving an additional boost to the spread of Communism within the Spanish borders, and Nixon therefore made all his decisions towards Spain in order to promote the US interests in Europe, but never in order to encourage the establishment of a democratic regime in Madrid. In this sense, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi's words spoken on 8 April 2021 during a press conference perfectly fit with this situation. In fact, when talking about Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his behaviour towards European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen, Draghi defined Erdogan as a dictator who is needed despite differing in political views.³⁵⁴ This is how US–Spanish relations during the last years of Franco's dictatorship can be defined: even though Nixon and Franco were different, Franco was a dictator that was needed by the US in order to defend its own interests. For this reason, Nixon cared about his relations with Franco. However, after an in–depth listening of these newly declassified recordings, it can certainly be confirmed the thesis supported by Powell, Gavin, Liedtke and all the scholars that analysed US–Spanish relations in the past, that is to say that never did Nixon directly affect Spain's transition of power.

³⁵⁴ This definition of Turkish President Erdogan given by Italian Prime Minister Draghi can be heard at *Conferenza Stampa del Presidente del Consiglio Mario Draghi*, Rome, 8 April 2021. Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLM4VOr5Wps> [Accessed 4 June 2021]

CONCLUSIONS

At the very beginning of this thesis, the reasons that led me to investigate this particular topic and the line that would be followed were explained. For what concerns the former, it can surely be asserted that the work that has been done perfectly fitted with the points had emerged throughout the very first pages. As regards the latter, it was underlined the fact that this thesis would be divided into three chapters: a first historical analysis which analysed US–Spanish relations from their very beginning until the end of the 1960s, with Lyndon B. Johnson as President of the US; the second chapter instead focused on US–Spanish relations during Nixon and Ford administrations, that was the same time Spain was experiencing the last years of the Franco regime. It also examined Spanish progresses made after the *Generalísimo*'s death. Finally, the third chapter centred firstly on the general knowledge of literature on the US attitude towards Spain in trying to draw its political future and analysing thereafter the newly declassified recordings in which Nixon discussed about Spain, Franco's health and the politicians who would have controlled the Spanish situation after the *Caudillo*'s departure.

Within the first chapter, an in–depth analysis on the most important pact made by the US and Spain during the second half of the XX century, i.e. the 1953 Pact of Madrid, and its 1963 renewal was provided in order to make the readers understand how the relations between the two countries were within the Cold War scenario. The second chapter then mainly focused on the period 1970–1975. This historical division was made in order to emphasise the differences between the first part of these relations, particularly centred on the economic and defensive agreements, and a second part in which if on the one hand these agreements were renewed, on the other hand a keen interest on Spain's internal affairs rose among countries and therefore within the US, since Franco's health conditions were worsening and uncertainties on Spanish political situation were manifesting. Moreover, actors which are already known to have affected the path that Madrid followed after Franco's death were examined, and therefore Spanish achievements at the very beginning of its new political regime deserved some space. Finally, in the last chapter literature's thoughts about the US attitude towards Spain in the last years of the Franco regime and in the first years after the *Generalísimo*'s death in

order to understand what the general idea was before analysing the newly declassified tapes.

The overall concept among scholars was that the US never directly influenced Spain's transition of power, but it rather indirectly affected the Spanish political future before Franco's death, laying the foundations through all the pacts that had been signed and that were analysed throughout this thesis. After having repeatedly listened all these newly released recordings, having transcribed them and having then analysed them, it can be definitely affirmed that literature was right, and its general idea can be confirmed: the US and the Nixon administration in particular never attempted to influence the Spanish political future during the last years of Franco's death. In fact, order and stability guaranteed by the Franco regime were valued by the US, whose biggest fear for what concerns the Spanish situation was possible anarchy and rebellions caused by the instability that could emerge after Franco's death. The analysis of these newly declassified tapes can therefore confirm this idea: Nixon was really worried about Franco's state of health. The Spanish future was one of his main concerns regarding the European situation, but there was no evidence that neither Nixon nor Kissinger or Rogers told the Spanish government how they wanted its political future to be handled. The only strong action that the Nixon administration made towards Spain was to organise the 1971 meeting between Franco and General Vernon Walters in order to understand how the *Caudillo* wanted to deal with the future of its country after his departure. However, this rendezvous failed to yield useful information to the US.

Concluding this thesis, it can therefore be asserted that the issue analysed by Powell, Gavin, Pardo Sanz and all those scholars who focused their studies on US–Spanish relations and analysed therefore the US attitude towards Spain reaches a well–defined conclusion: the Spanish transition of power was not affected by the US, which was almost afraid by the possible violent implications that an abrupt establishment of democracy could imply. However, in the case of new sources about this topic, further studies will be needed in order to enhance what literature already knows.

ANNEX

Transcription of the tapes declassified on 13 May 2020.

26 January 1971: Registration of White House Chief of Staff Harry R. Haldeman

Tuesday, January 26th.

State visit day with Juan Carlos and Sofia of Spain after the first of this week's four Congressional breakfasts. Apparently, the breakfast went very well, the President was pleased with both the format and the content of the briefings. The rest of the morning was devoted to Juan Carlos and then there is a State Dinner with him tonight.

6 February 1971: Registration of White House Chief of Staff Harry R. Haldeman

Saturday, February 6th.

The President had no schedule today because he had planned to go to Camp David last night but was weathered out. He used the morning for some general review and a lot of general chat with me in between sessions with Kissinger, Ziegler, Ehrlichman and Ed Morgan, etcetera. He was very much upset about the way Assistant Director Goldstein of the Bureau of Labour Statistics had shot down our whole effort to make the point of the great progress in the drop in unemployment, as released by the statistics yesterday. He wanted some action taken immediately to get rid of Goldstein, who he feels is the same guy who screwed us back in the later years of the Eisenhower administration. I talked with Shultz about this. He got into quite a bit of discussion with Henry [Kissinger] on the whole subject of the Laotian invasion plans. He wants to be sure we are doing adequate diversionary tactics, and that Laird gets out a strong warning that if the enemy steps up infiltration, we'll bomb the checkpoints. He doesn't want any backing off or appearances of weakness to be allowed to creep out in the follow-up or as a reaction to the aftermath of the Sunday night move. He told Henry to set up a method by which he can get a private message to Franco to urge Franco to spell out his succession, both with the Juan Carlos move and the new Prime Minister before he has another stroke or before he dies, otherwise there will be anarchy in Spain. The solution was to have General Walters come in and meet with the President, then carry a special letter to Franco and a long verbal message.

6 April 1971: Conversation between Nixon and US Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Richardson

Richardson: Secretary Richardson.

Nixon: Hello. Hi. I wanted to just wish you well before you took off for Europe

R.: That's awfully nice.

N.: Are you on your way to the airport now?

R.: In about an hour.

N.: Oh, I see. I see. Well, get over there and go to Paris and you know, sort of drink it up a little while. You deserve it.

R.: Actually, I'll be just in London and Madrid, a conference in London and then and education conference [got interrupted]

N.: Don't tell me about the excuses. You've got to go. You just have a little fun. You know, I don't need to know. The main thing is really enjoy [unclear] but if you get a chance to drop over and see Bruce [unclear] you might find it interesting.

R.: It certainly would be. Anne is going with me. My wife Anne.

N.: Oh, great, great. Oh, well, then, by all means, go to Paris. You got to take her to Paris. But also, you know, take a lot of money. No, take an extra day and go over to Paris. Be nice. Tell her that I ordered it. Fair enough? Nobody should go to Europe with a woman without taking it to Paris. If you were going to just as a man, then I'd just go to Rome, but for other reasons. Ok?

R.: Yes, Sir, thank you very much for the call.

N.: Ok. And give my... oh, Elliot [Richardson]?

R.: Yes, Sir.

N.: Any people you see over there, for example if you happen to see people like Alex Hume, or Heath or, of course, the government people and of course, in Spain, eh... I mean any of those people, I have to be sure that you and I have chatted, and I've asked you personally and all that jazz, you know.

R.: Yes, Sir.

N.: Ok.

R.: I think in Spain, in fact, does have some real value. It arose out of the fact that when Juan Carlos was here, he put it on me very hard attend the conference they were having on education, as you remember, in the development of the relationship with us in

education with one of the big things they wanted. And so I will have that at least. And it will have a lot to be able to say, just what you mentioned.

N.: Good. You say it.

R.: Ok. Thank you Sir.

N.: You have complete power of attorney. Ok.

R.: I shall do my best. Thanks very much.

N.: Bye.

19 May 1971: Conversation between Nixon, US National Security Advisor Kissinger and an unidentified Advisor

Unknown: The Vice President, Carrero Blanco of Spain...

Nixon: He's smart too.

U.: He is very smart.

N.: Too bad he's so old [unclear], you know, Franco. Did you notice though how fast his mind work in his quicky talk? I was terribly impressed, he's a fine man, fine man, but he will not be chosen Prime Minister. I think it would be the other one, López-Bravo, I like him.

Kissinger: We've got to [unclear] successor [unclear] fine, just talk [unclear] successor.

U.: We gotta hurry [unclear] impressions about the different embassies and the different ambassadors.

K.: Which is which?

N.: Which is the best? Rush?

U.: Rush is very good.

N.: Popular.

U.: Yeah, [unclear] in Yugoslavia he used us [unclear]

11 June 1971: Conversation between Nixon and US Ambassador to Spain Robert C. Hill

Hill: As I wrote in my letter, the old general had a [unclear] on Monday of this week, he had one of his worst days since I've been in Spain he looked like death warmed up yet the day before, on Sunday, he was great...

Nixon: Goes up and down

H.: Goes up and down.

N.: What does he have?

H.: He's got Parkinson's disease

N.: Oh, it's Parkinson's disease...

H.: And also he has recently started to have attacks where he heaves and his digestive process does not work, and he starts throwing up, but he could go on for a long period of time. The one thing on that Spanish situation, transition, when you choose who ever goes over there, it's a left winger it will just kill us...

N.: A left winger? For Spain?

H.: I mean if you gotta to...

N.: Why? Hell no. Never.

H.: If the left is interested in [unclear]

N.: Hell no. Never. The other thing that's important is we want you to leave a, you must leave a good honest staff there, a group of staff [unclear]. On Saturday, Frank and Bob to have a talk with Kissinger in this respect, I want you to analyze your staff.

H.: Right.

N.: [unclear] whatever you want, we will impose [unclear]. If your [unclear] is good enough, gotta find the right person, but he's not strong enough... There, he has to go [unclear] behind [unclear] how the system works in Spain, what's important, you [unclear]. I will make the recommendations [unclear]. You have to assess that this guy will do just what we say, that's what I have in mind, and he will be a right winger, by right winger I mean he ain't gonna be a left winger.

H.: He's a moderate. He would be a moderating influence in Spain.

N.: Eh, moderate.

H.: The damn "Ney York Times" is after us warning day and night, they tried to cause trouble to Admiral Moorer coming to the victory parade, but they got scared off, what they are trying to do, you see the Russians, the Russians we know are making a mayor push to try to get into Spain, and the leftists will make a mayor push to try to affect the transition government if anything happens to General Franco [unclear]. And the key of Spanish future is who is gonna be the Prime Minister. The present time Vice President of the country, Luis Carrero Blanco, a tough member of Franco's elite, can be depended on as a friend of the United States...

N.: And López–Bravo?

H.: López–Bravo is the future of Spain, if he could get off... looking in the mirror too much.

N.: He's bright.

H.: He is terribly bright.

N.: [unclear], be careful, I have a question for you [unclear], apart from being one hell–of–an impressive pallbearer, Carrero Blanco, could he take support?

H.: Yes, yes, he's all right but the unfortunate thing about Carrero Blanco is he doesn't know how to fight at all, he says, "I'm only here as long as Franco wants me here". It's hard to believe, he doesn't have it in his system. I had a dinner party for him the other night, he said, "You know, I can't wait until the General is [unclear] the Prime Minister so that I can get back to my rancho at least..." [unclear]

N.: Oh, Christ.

H.: It's incredible. He hasn't the power...

N.: Thank you very much [unclear], the reports and everything. The report to [unclear], "you have our support whatever you do, you know that all the way, all the way,

H.: Don't worry, I'll tell López when I see him.

22 June 1971: Conversation between Nixon and US Vice President Spiro Agnew

Agnew: [unclear] and we are going out to Spain, and that is where I will meet Judy and Susan and Kim, who will have been touring in Europe and that is the day that Franco had when he leaves Madrid and goes to the country to his summer palace as I think for a social event he has to go to.

Nixon: Yeah, great.

A.: And there we go from there... [got interrupted]

N.: Be particular warm to him if you will. You just say that I mentioned it, and of course people like [unclear] state business and will be talking about [unclear], be so warm about it, so forth and so on. [unclear] you might go over that Organization of African Unity, That's [unclear] while you are there.

A.: I [unclear] to Rabat.

N.: Morocco?

A.: Yes.

N.: That is good. You are going to love that. [unclear]. Rabat is a great place to go, you will get a great reception there. They, you know on and off, they are supposed to come here in seven days, but they had to cancel because of an Arab Summit, and we had too. This holds out the hand of friendship to them. I worked with the king and his father when he was king, both live in Rabat. I was Vice President [unclear], but this, Franco, particularly mention, this will probably be the last time any of us see him, that the, he, all are essential to the world. Great [unclear] in the [unclear] history of our countries.

A.: Will Juan Carlos be his successor?

N.: Well, he is supposed to be, but he has to get two. Juan Carlos will be head of State and he has to name a Prime Minister. The Prime Minister could be Blanco, or... [got interrupted]

A.: or López-Bravo.

N.: the Foreign Minister, yeah, despite their [unclear] competition. They are both very capable men, but... [got interrupted]

A.: I know López-Bravo.

N.: Yeah, well Blanco is a man who is one of Franco's oldest associates. He is a brilliant fellow though much more conservative than López-Bravo, more conservative than [unclear], more conservative than the crown prince. You'll like him. You should talk to him, you should talk to both, but Blanco is a very strong friend of ours, to me personally. López-Bravo is too but be sure that you emphasize to all of them I feel a personal closeness to all [unclear].

28 July 1971: Conversation between Nixon, Agnew, Kissinger and US Secretary of State Rogers

Agnew: Franco...

Nixon: How was he?

A.: ... was receptive of the China initiative.

N.: How was he? Good. Good. How did he look? Did he have a good day?

A.: He's a little bit, well [unclear] he had a good day he was [unclear] for words...

N.: Oh. Well that is much better than when we [unclear] was one of the most painful times we ever had, we hadn't actually, we had dinner, he went and met us at the airport in order to do it, but we went for [unclear] and he sat there almost like a toad.

[unclear] like a mummy [unclear] remember that is why his [unclear] stepped in and was talking all the time.

A.: He is physically weak, you can tell. He has palsy and all that, but he talked and talked about the world. He did a lot of talking.

N.: He's smart.

A.: He is smart. He's modern. Very modern man. He impressed me.

Kissinger: Well, he kept falling asleep [unclear]

A.: The next day we went out to that big celebration [unclear].

N.: How was that?

A.: It was interesting. I was telling Bill an interesting thing that happened there [unclear] all the diplomats were there, and Franco took me around the line and all these ambassadors were [unclear] way down to the end of the line where the Cuban associated shook hands with Franco and then he saw me and then moved back into the line. He didn't shake hands [unclear]

N.: What did you think of, who is the, who, did you get enough of a feel of Spain to see how they are doing?

A.: I [unclear] was about as progressive as anyone I have ever met. He thought [unclear] was having a [unclear]. Frankly, Franco... [got interrupted]

N.: Do you meet the Vice President [unclear]?

A.: I spent about an hour.

N.: He is a capable officer.

A.: You don't think it when you first meet him.

N.: Did you notice his [unclear] just like that? I did. Strong.

A.: ... and [unclear]. In the conversation at one time I saw a chance that [unclear] and I said, and the President still seems capable, but he has seen fit to entrust a lot of work to a capable Prime Minister and [unclear] because Franco has held on [unclear] head of government and [unclear] eager for him to do something.

N.: They sure are pressing on Franco, aren't they Juan Carlos versus...

Rogers: It is funny that [unclear] Juan Carlos, that he is, his supporters are pushing Franco to do something more about Juan Carlos to get more power. López-Bravo [unclear]. Juan Carlos has to be poised for Franco's death.

29 July 1971: Conversation between Nixon and his advisor Murray Chotiner

Chotiner: Now, getting that things [unclear] are near the breaking point on this thing in Madrid, in fear that he may say or do something that could be embarrassing, Bob Hill tells me about when we had that dinner there in Spain for the Vice President and Prince Juan Carlos and so forth, that near the end of the dinner the Vice President got up from the dinner, motioned for the delegations to come on out, so we went out into the hall and looking around, and the Vice President says to Hill [unclear] who is the chief of state here? You think he would know that, so Hill says of course Francisco Franco is the chief of state. And Prince Juan Carlos is scheduled to succeed him. Of course, the Vice President is here so any toast you might be offering must of course include the Vice President of Spain, and Bob Hill told me the Vice President said I didn't ask you for your advice. He said, I just asked you who was the chief of state. So Hill could see that, yeah, he was really bottled up really tight.

29 November 1971: Conversation between Nixon and Haldeman

Nixon: [unclear] Spain, the Spanish Ambassador? The Ambassador to Spain thing? [unclear]

Haldeman: We got a... [got interrupted]

N.: What's going on?

H.: The Spanish gentleman doesn't want him...

N.: Why don't they?

H.: The... [unclear] This stupid guy visited Spain in September, entered his kid into Spanish school and ran around telling everybody that he was going to be the next US Ambassador before we had gotten the [unclear] and all that stuff. So Juan Carlos and López-Bravo independently have both objected based on his age.

N.: [unclear] ... the Spain, what is going on between [unclear].

H.: Rogers and Kissinger both strongly recommended we don't nominate him. [unclear] Mitchell and... or [unclear] made the deal with them.

5 December 1972: Conversation between Nixon and the new US Ambassador to Spain Horacio Rivero Jr.

Nixon: Well are the [unclear] good or the [unclear]?

Rivero: [unclear].

N.: I ask [unclear], I read here at the start of your [unclear], what you are doing is concerned with [unclear] you know, you have got to [unclear] and you just got to hold their hand. We are not trying to be unfriendly or anything, but on the other hand even if the, it doesn't matter how Japan gets, [unclear] Korea, what you call them, problem with the French and the British common market. You know it is really a question of, I mean in their case more than in any other they react so emotionally, [unclear] emotions, [unclear] so much invested, in fact we have to consult our interests and they have to consult theirs, and that is where we are, but it will be hard, but I think it is... [got interrupted]

R.: Well I find that a lot of receptivity, I think there is friendship towards the United States, and admiration.

N.: Right.

R.: ... and, personally for you, I will say this, quite frankly, here is, a number of people have said this to me [unclear] General Franco and when, and a tremendous number of people to congratulate, it's mutual [unclear]

N.: [unclear] two million? A million and a half? [unclear]

R.: [unclear]

N.: Two and a half?

R.: Very warm, even General Franco, [unclear] an old friend...

N.: Sure

R.: ... coming back [unclear]. And the fact that I [unclear] communicate with him in Spanish, helped me...

N.: Oh sure

R.: Nobody has ever done it.

N.: Of course.

R.: They tell me that most of the Ministers prefer that, although when I come to something formal I say it in English. [unclear] don't want the language to trip me up but I haven't had too many occasions to do that except for joint committee meetings, besides reading the word in English and Spanish for meeting in Spanish is parlay. Often Foreign Minister has said to me I want to talk with you in Spanish to have a real chat [unclear] importance for entrance. In fact, [unclear] I want to sit down and talk to you in Spanish.

N.: López-Bravo?

R.: And I can trust him.

N.: Good.

R.: He has enacted, he is a hard bargainer.

N.: Oh yeah.

R.: But once he gives his word, or agrees to something, I think [unclear] you can rely on him [unclear]. Twice already [unclear] he has mentioned the fact that Spain has a special relationship with the Arabic speaking countries, [unclear] only country in Europe the Arabs trust, and I would like to offer my good services [unclear] the United States wants to move towards pursuing good relations with the Arabs. Twice he asked me to send [unclear]. I think he is sincere about it.

N.: Good.

R.: Everyone asks me what is going to happen when Franco... [got interrupted]

N.: Of course, well I was, we would like to know too.

R.: I would say this [unclear].

N.: Sure, sure.

R.: Well, I have been there just five weeks, [unclear] in six months, maybe I would feel a bit of trepidation about it, I would not want to make a prediction, but I think sometimes the first impressions of people, that [unclear] maybe it is better [unclear] sometimes his [unclear] is slurred. Lines can get blurred.

N.: Yes, yes.

R.: If you wish me to, I think that if he, the main thing in Spain that acts is the built in favor of stability [unclear] the Civil War, it is a memory people do not want to repeat. So all that [unclear].

N.: Right.

R.: ... truth to that.

N.: Yeah.

R.: Their progress is tremendous. They have tripled their standards, their per capita income in the last ten years. Tripled. It is over a thousand dollars now. [unclear] less than three hundred dollars.

N.: That's good.

R.: They are doing an actual redistribution of income, so they are getting more at all levels, so that it impression of the social problems. They have a lot of smart people

learning the economy and fine-tuning it. And yet [unclear] four year plan very, very detailed. As long as they have economic sector growth so that social aspects are built into the plan, housing and [unclear] all these things, income distribution, so they are managing that with a lot of expertise. This is another factor [unclear] and I think, especially, this is not for change great popular feeling [unclear] are getting.

N.: Are the people doing pretty well?

R.: Well, personal, what affects a man personally, [unclear] 90% of the population, what determines his ideological orientation, I think it is doing very well. [unclear] going the wrong way [unclear] would be reluctant to support any kind of radical change [unclear]. Franco has already, as you know, announced Juan Carlos for the Chief of State and Carrero Blanco for the government So, I think there will be a peaceful transition although they'll be [unclear] by some of the radical socialists, communists and come of the workers commission to take advantage of the change, but they will be quickly suppressed by the army, police and Civil Guard. They have very great control of the government, so it will not spread, unless Carrero Blanco makes a stupid mistake [unclear].

N.: Yeah.

R.: And provide some issue that would allow many of the groups to rally together, and then, in that case, then you may have a lot of problems [unclear].

N.: He is brilliant.

R.: He is a very intelligent man, and he knows it.

N.: Tough, strong, quick.

R.: He is very [unclear]

N.: Would López-Bravo accept that, or will he try to compete?

R.: Well sir, I... [got interrupted]

N.: I have always heard he [unclear].

R.: Oh, he is one of them, there is a number of them, Laureano López Rodó, he's the author of the plans and he works [unclear] he's a planner and a programmer, and he is a Carrero Blanco's man, very intelligent, very capable, incidentally he is a member of Opus Dei who had taken a vow of chastity so his whole life is devoted to his work, also very influential. He is also the sort of rival of López-Bravo, and he is probably favored by Carrero Blanco. I think, sir, that these people really believed that they must something to get into Europe, the common market. That is the number one.

N.: Yeah.

R.: That is the number one objective. [unclear]. I think that they are all smart enough to realize that in order to get into the common market they are going to have some liberalization. They know that this is not possible when Franco is alive. This will change once he goes, I think there will be some attempt. Carrero Blanco is smart enough to [unclear]. If he doesn't they will just wait [unclear].

N.: He is smart enough to do it, and [unclear] particular. Always keep [unclear] Franco, that's too bad. It is not fair.

R.: You are right, sir.

N.: The damn communists were rivals against them, nobody holds that against them they fought too in the Civil War, but they blame Franco because he won, and he wasn't a communist.

R.: Also many socialists in Europe fought in the Spanish Civil War and Franco was the enemy.

N.: Oh sure. A lot of American did too [unclear].

R.: they... Dutch, Danish, French.

N.: That is part of the British problem. They are always hung up on Franco.

R.: I think there will be a change and I do not think there will be too much liberalization because Spain is becoming a very substantial market.

N.: I think it will be a heck of a market, and I think we should just play it right to the hilt.

R.: Yes, sir.

N.: No reason for us not to just play it to the hilt. Europe doesn't want it, we do. I want you to be sure to impress upon Franco, and Carrero Blanco and López-Bravo, first, you know, the warmth and friendship and the rest, and remember to tell how grateful I am [unclear] and of all my years of travel abroad and I, from time to time, [unclear] welcome from the American people. Secondly, that they have a friend here, that we [unclear] in trade policy, and the rest, that is not personal, it is just that we have to do this in order to have an even hand policy with everybody and that we want to be, we want to be us, have the closest possible cooperation with the, that we consider, I consider Spain, you know they all think that Europe now is four great powers through Europe, actually I mean the Germans, the French, the Italians and the British, well I would put Spain in that

category too [unclear]. Spain is one of the great powers of Europe. It is not a four-finger hand, it is a five-finger hand.

R.: Oh, they will love to hear that sir. That is very good...

N.: Tell them this: that I consider Spain one of the five great powers and, because also as I said when I was there, in twenty-five years I think Spain may well outstrip two or three other countries because they work hard, the Spanish they work. They are a poor country and God, if they only had oil [unclear] be great. They have taken that barren country and done an enormous amount with it, and if they could get oil and other things, and so forth, they would do very well, they are doing pretty well with what they've got...

R.: ... and they are well organized.

N.: They are well organized, right.

R.: ... and they are intelligent people.

N.: Intelligent, hard working.

R.: First class [unclear] country

N.: On the mid-east, as you know, they have always wanted to sort of play a role, everybody wants to [unclear] and so forth, but as you well know there are no [unclear] committees, at this point, but just say that we welcome their, you know, their interest and we [unclear], and they need to keep their close ties to the Arab countries, but that's the best thing, so that we for reasons of our affinity with Israel which they will understand necessarily up to a point, politically up to a point, as far as I am concerned, but they have to remember that I personally there's nothing I would not do to remove or at least reduce the tensions so that the United States can, can renew a friendly relationship or at least some sort of reasonable relationship with Egypt, and with the other mid-eastern countries that they are presently lined up basically as hostile, Egypt, Algeria, the [unclear] in Morocco, of course we have the Russians in Iran, [unclear] Sudan. I consider this as a goal, this a nice message to take back to them [unclear]. That's our view.

R.: [unclear]

N.: And it would be good to have great power like Spain talking to them, you know, acting as a bridge, they know the problems of these guys, they can say can we squeeze the Israelis well [unclear] what about the Russians, Egyptians, there is no answer at this point, but it will come. They cannot stay there forever because neither the Soviet Union or the United States can allow that thing to continue to fester or one day the nuts

on both sides will draw us into shooting at some point. That is what it is all about [unclear] attempts at peace.

R.: The attempts for peace. That really makes a difference, you can't deny it.

N.: Listen, one of the reasons many Europeans were so concerned about the [unclear] talked about cutting down 6th fleet [unclear] scared to death, moving out the gleet, and all that sort of thing, that's they would have go back to massive retaliation, and massive retaliation, military retaliation, is not a credible policy where any other major countries are involved. Who the hell is going to go to nuclear war?

R.: Nobody.

N.: Nobody, [unclear] included. That's the point.

R.: It is like you can touch the fleet too [unclear]. You can talk to the United States but [unclear].

N.: Nuclear [unclear] is so lost that virtually it is to the point that it is almost not credible at all. That is why you have to think in conventional terms. You can act [unclear] world. These people can say we an [unclear]. If you squeeze your conventional forces down too much then it means you do not have a credible foreign policy towards any of the [unclear] part of the world except for a direct conflict between the US and Soviets, or a direct conflict between the US [unclear] China, right?

R.: [unclear].

N.: Well, I [unclear] here's your presidential cup [unclear].

R.: Thank you sir.

N.: ... all ambassadors get that.

R.: [unclear] your name [unclear] Juan Carlos.

N.: I remember my wife and I had his visit here and the wonderful impression he made.

R.: [unclear]

N.: And tell Franco that I wish him well, and good health and [unclear].

11 April 1973: Conversation between Nixon and Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs López-Bravo

Nixon: Mr. Gregorio, how are you? Good to see you again, very good to see you again. Sorry to have kept you waiting, I have a little business with the Congress right now, the veto [unclear]. How have you been?

López-Bravo: Good, I have lost a little weight.

N.: I noticed, I noticed.

L.: [unclear]

N.: Yeah, I can see that [unclear] visit four years ago, really appreciate that. I appreciate these four years of friendship; it was a great dinner. Now that we have this great relationship, and that the next four years can see a breakthrough. Well, I'd like to start right now, so that we know where we are going, so not to have a crisis later, to set up a working group now, and see where we're gonna go. [unclear]. What kind of plan do you have in mind?

L.: [unclear] early October. The Spanish view is that the solution could be possible to [unclear]. Nevertheless, the most important thing is that my country in '75 must be absolutely different from the country with you started this relationship.

N.: It already is.

L.: In '53 we have the GDP per capita below 300 dollars, in '75 Spain is very close to 2000 dollars.

N.: Really?

L.: Really.

N.: Great.

L.: Within the Spanish government, we have decided to share more in the common responsibility of defense.

N.: of Europe.

L.: and the world. In this case, I'm not asking for money, I'm not asking for help, [unclear] but we need quiet [unclear] security from the United States. It is the only country [unclear] we have full confidence.

N.: [unclear]. One of my objectives in this administration and one of my projections as far as the future is concerned is that Spain, the time has come for Spain to play a full role in the Atlantic community. Now, the question is how that can be worked out, you know, there's still the problem of, we don't know [unclear] 25 years ago, go back 30 years [unclear]. On the other hand, anyone, I've seen the modern Spain, anybody who

sees the progress, anybody sees its dynamism, and anybody knows it's just silly to have a Europe without Spain, that's what we are talking about. Spain is part of Europe geographically, but it's not a part of Europe economically, and even more important in my opinion politically and otherwise. I think that has to come now. As far as I'm concerned, I'd like that this talk needs to be conducted in that spirit, not just [unclear] re-do an agreement that was made based on the facts that were 35 years ago, I want to look to this future, [unclear]. What we can do here [unclear] I know the General, he is a practical man, he knows, and I know [unclear]. We set our goals; we work hard [unclear]. There are two problems here: one is [unclear] the Spanish-US agreement, the other of course is Spain relations with Europe. As far as I'm concerned, I would like to work constructively towards both goals. [unclear] Actually, as a matter of fact, just between us [unclear]. How long has it been since the Spanish Civil War? 30 years?

Kissinger: 33 years.

N.: 33 years. Now, two thirds of all the people living in Spain has been born since the war was over. And it's just ridiculous to continue this... [got interrupted]

L.: I was a boy at that time.

N.: Of course. That's my point. My point is just like our new policies [unclear]. This is a whole new world, we have to build on that world, and you have to get around of thinking that way about Spain. [unclear] Spain is a different kettle of fish, [unclear], but as far as I'm concerned [unclear]. We will set up a working group on a high level. Is October all right?

L.: Fine, yes. It's great.

N.: [unclear] I hope the next four years we'll make a breakthrough not just in our relations with Spain, but a breakthrough in Spain's relations to Europe. [unclear] the same progress you made in the last [unclear] years. [unclear]. Is that fair enough? Is it a deal?

L.: Yes.

N.: With all the problems we [unclear] you take care. How is the General? Is he doing well or?

L.: He's good.

N.: He was so nice to us; I would like to [unclear].

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