



Ca' Foscari
University
of Venice

Master's Degree
Programme in
Comparative
International
Relations

Final Thesis

**The European Union as International
Actor:
The Case of the Diplomatic Engagement with North
Korea**

Supervisor

Ch. Prof. Antonio Trampus

Assistant supervisor

Ch. Prof. Stéphanie Novak

Graduand

Angelica Maria Musci

Matriculation Number 857681

Academic Year

2020 / 2021

**THE EUROPEAN UNION AS
INTERNATIONAL ACTOR**

**The Case of the Diplomatic Engagement with
North Korea**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- **ABSTRACT**
- **INTRODUCTION**
- **CHAPTER 1: THE BEGINNING OF EU-DPRK RELATIONS: EU'S ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND ASSISTANCE**
 1. Food Aid, Rural Development, Technical Assistance, Capacity Building and Humanitarian Assistance
 2. KEDO
- **CHAPTER 2: EU DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA**
 1. EU Foreign Policy Assessment:
 2. Eu Diplomatic Recognition of North Korea
 3. The EU and the Issues of North Korea's Nuclear and Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Counterfeit, and Cyber-Attacks
 - 3.1 Nuclear Proliferation as a Protection?
 - 3.2 International Community Against WMD: KEDO and Six-Party Talk
 - 3.3 The EU and the Nuclear Crisis
 - 3.4 EU's Strategy Paper Against the Proliferation of WMD
 - 3.5 Cyber-Attacks
 - 3.6 Counterfeiting and Drug Traffic
 4. EU-DPRK Political Dialogues and Human Rights Talks:
 - 4.1 Bilateral Approach:
 - 4.2 Multilateral Approach:
 - 4.3 EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime
 5. EU's Relations with North Korea: From Active Engagement to Critical Engagement to Active Pressure
 - 5.1 Active Engagement
 - 5.2 Critical Engagement
 - 5.3 Active Pressure
 6. Economic Sanctions against North Korea
 - 6.1 Eu Sanctions Against the DPRK
 - 6.2 The Effectiveness of Sanctions against North Korea

7. Conclusions

- **CHAPTER 3: THE EU-DPRK RELATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE**

1. Initial Theories about EU Engagement with North Korea
 - 1.2 Economic Objectives
 - 1.3 Independence From the US
 - 1.4 The EU as a Mediator Between Washington and Pyongyang
2. EU Policy Towards the DPRK with Trump
3. The Role of the EU
4. EU-ROK Cooperation
5. Credible Commitment

ABSTRACT

Questa tesi è incentrata sull'analisi delle relazioni diplomatiche tra la Repubblica Popolare di Corea e l'Unione Europea.

La Corea del Nord è un paese che dalla sua nascita è stato al centro delle preoccupazioni e delle dispute della comunità internazionale.

In realtà, tutta la regione dell'Asia orientale era diventata il luogo centrale delle dispute tra gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica, subito dopo la seconda guerra mondiale.

La penisola coreana era stata divisa a metà, occupata da sovietici (nord) e statunitensi(sud), i quali determinarono l'ideologia politica dei paesi che si svilupparono successivamente nella penisola, la Repubblica Popolare Democratica della Corea (Corea del Nord), e la Repubblica di Corea (Corea del Sud).

Con l'avvento della guerra fredda la penisola coreana diventò il luogo dei giochi di forza tra Washington, Mosca e Pechino durante tutto il periodo della Guerra Fredda.

La Corea del Nord era un paese estremamente povero, con un'economia poco sviluppata e dipendente da un sistema agricolo poco produttivo e incapace di sfamare la popolazione.

La Repubblica Popolare Democratica della Corea (RPDC) era uno stato basato sull'ideologia del *Juche*.

Questo pensiero politico si basava sui principi dell'autosufficienza e della diffidenza verso le altre nazioni. L'ideologia di stato nordcoreana era il risultato di una storia piena di guerre e occupazioni.

La presenza militare statunitense in Corea del Sud era una delle grandi minacce per il paese, di conseguenza gli Stati Uniti erano il nemico principale della Corea del Nord, insieme a tutti i paesi "capitalisti".

Il paese, infatti, riusciva a sopravvivere solo grazie agli aiuti dell'Unione Sovietica, che provenivano soprattutto dagli Stati dell'Europa dell'est.

Tuttavia, la situazione mutò con la caduta dell'Unione Sovietica all'inizio del XX secolo. L'aiuto sovietico cessò quasi del tutto e nel giro di pochi anni la Corea del Nord cadde in una profonda crisi economica, e una carestia che avevano dimezzato la popolazione.

Nonostante i tentativi del governo di risollevare l'economia, l'autosufficienza non bastava.

Le autorità nordcoreane e il leader, Kim Jong Il, furono costretti a chiedere aiuto alla comunità internazionale.

L'Unione Europea iniziò a farsi strada nella penisola coreana inviando assistenza umanitaria e cibo in Corea del Nord, attirata inizialmente dal potenziale economico che la regione possedeva.

L'UE inviava i propri aiuti sia bilateralmente, tramite programmi di assistenza e organizzazioni non-governative europee, che multi lateralmente, tramite istituzioni e organizzazioni internazionali come il World Food Program.

Inizialmente si trattava solo di programmi per mandare aiuti, ma successivamente l'UE si rese conto che la Corea del Nord aveva il potenziale per risollevarne la propria economia. Il problema non era la mancanza di materie prime, ma la politica interna e i metodi di produzione arretrati. Di conseguenza, la commissione europea mise a punto un programma europeo per la Repubblica Popolare Democratica di Corea, ossia il *EC-Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004*(2002).

Con questo *Paper*, l'Europa programmò i futuri obiettivi che intendeva raggiungere in Corea del Nord.

L'Unione Europea programmava di trasformare il programma di assistenza umanitaria in uno di riabilitazione agricola e dell'industria, con l'obiettivo di ottenere una migliore produzione che rendesse il paese autosufficiente almeno dal punto di vista alimentare.

Non avendo conoscenze sufficienti, l'UE decise di inviare esperti in Corea del Nord per identificare le aree in cui l'assistenza tecnica e la fornitura di beni erano più necessarie.

Nel corso della missione queste aree furono identificate con successo, la Corea del nord necessitava di modernizzare le proprie tecniche di produzione agricole e industriali.

Un altro campo in cui gli esperti notarono la necessità di assistenza tecnica era lo sviluppo di un sistema energetico sostenibile ed efficiente.

La Corea del Nord avrebbe potuto risparmiare una quantità significativa di energia dopo un'adeguata preparazione da parte di tecnici europei.

Lo scopo della Commissione europea, era quello di guidare la Repubblica Popolare Democratica di Corea nel processo di modernizzazione che avrebbe reso la nazione un paese sviluppato e ben inserito nel sistema commerciale internazionale.

La commissione europea aveva stanziato un budget dedicato ad una serie di progetti pilota di assistenza tecnica che avrebbero determinato i futuri programmi di assistenza europei in Corea del Nord.

Successivamente si iniziarono a sviluppare anche le relazioni diplomatiche tra UE e Pyongyang.

I progetti pilota, tuttavia, non partirono mai, in quanto nel 2002 gli Stati Uniti confermarono che la Corea del Nord continuava a portare avanti la sua attività nucleare in segreto. Anche se i progetti furono sospesi, l'UE decise di continuare i suoi progetti di assistenza umanitaria.

La questione della proliferazione nucleare divenne importante anche per Bruxelles, che decise di entrare a far parte della *Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)*, insieme a Cina, Giappone e Stati Uniti.

Lo scopo di questa organizzazione era quello di denuclearizzare la Corea del Nord.

L'organizzazione riuscì a convincere le autorità nordcoreane a sospendere le attività destinate alla produzione di armi nucleari.

L'Unione Europea contribuì alla causa del KEDO soprattutto sotto forma di finanziamenti destinati ai vari progetti, ma non ebbe un ruolo importante per quanto riguarda le decisioni dell'organizzazione.

A causa della crisi nucleare del 2002, tuttavia, anche il KEDO fu costretto a sospendere le proprie attività. L'organizzazione si sciolse definitivamente qualche anno dopo.

La Corea del Nord ammise di aver avviato un programma segreto di arricchimento dell'uranio destinato a produrre materiale per armi nucleari. Con la sospensione delle attività del KEDO, il governo nordcoreano riavviò ufficialmente anche tutte le attività nucleari precedentemente sospese e annullò tutti gli accordi presi con l'organizzazione e gli Stati Uniti.

Uno dei motivi per cui l'UE non ricoprì un ruolo importante all'interno del KEDO, era la scarsa coesione degli stati membri in materia di politica estera.

Infatti, i primi contatti dell'UE con la Repubblica Popolare Democratica di Corea iniziarono durante un processo di integrazione economica e politica interna di Bruxelles. L'obiettivo dell'Unione Europea era quello di diventare un vero e proprio attore internazionale ed espandere così le sue attività e la sua influenza al resto del mondo.

La ricerca di una politica estera comune dell'UE iniziò anche prima della firma del Trattato di Maastricht, nel 1991.

Nel 1970, i ministri degli Esteri della Comunità Europea (CE) hanno istituito la Cooperazione Politica Europea (CPE), al fine di coordinare le politiche estere degli stati

membri. La creazione della CPE fu anche un tentativo iniziale di raggiungere un'integrazione economica e politica.

Tuttavia, l'influenza della CPE non era forte, poiché l'organizzazione non era nata attraverso un trattato legale e quindi non era percepita come un'entità separata dalla Comunità Europea, e quindi sovranazionale. Pertanto, le questioni di sicurezza non erano considerate parte dell'agenda del CPE. L'influenza della CPE è cresciuta solo dopo l'istituzione della Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Comune (PESC) nel quadro del Trattato di Maastricht, che ha sostituito la CPE stessa.

È in questo contesto che le relazioni tra Unione Europea e Repubblica Popolare Democratica di Corea (RPDC) si svilupparono.

L'UE normalizzò le relazioni diplomatiche con la RPDC nel maggio 2001. Questa decisione fu fortemente influenzata da eventi precedenti.

Prima di tutto, Bruxelles inviò la prima missione diplomatica a Pyongyang nel dicembre 1998. Da allora, si susseguirono un totale di quattordici round di dialoghi politici (fino al 2015).

La Corea del Nord sembrava essere disposta a cooperare per la pace e la denuclearizzazione.

La decisione di uno stato membro europeo, l'Italia, di stabilire legami diplomatici con la Corea del Nord nel gennaio 2000 sembrò essere determinante. La scelta dell'Italia violava due decisioni del Consiglio, che sottolineavano l'importanza di una strategia degli stati membri coordinata verso la penisola coreana. Inoltre, l'avvio delle relazioni diplomatiche tra Italia e Corea del Nord iniziò quando il dialogo tra l'UE e la RPDC era ancora in corso e le relazioni diplomatiche non erano state ancora normalizzate.

Poco dopo, altri stati dell'UE seguirono Roma e stabilirono relazioni diplomatiche con la Repubblica Popolare Democratica di Corea: Il Regno Unito nel 2000; Paesi Bassi, Belgio, Spagna, Germania, Lussemburgo e Grecia nel 2001; Irlanda nel 2003. Nel 2006, la RPDC aveva relazioni diplomatiche con 24 dei 25 stati membri dell'UE.

Pertanto, nel febbraio 2001, la delegazione europea visitò Pyongyang, e la data della visita fu deliberatamente scelta per mostrare la buona volontà di Bruxelles verso il regime nordcoreano. La data scelta, infatti, coincideva con il compleanno del leader Kim Jong Il. Un'altra visita seguì presto nello stesso anno e le relazioni diplomatiche furono ufficializzate.

Dopo la decisione di intraprendere relazioni diplomatiche con la Repubblica Popolare Democratica di Corea, l'Unione Europea scelse anche di affrontare le minacce internazionali e i problemi che un paese così chiuso e diffidente come la Corea del Nord stava ponendo alla comunità internazionale.

L'UE si impegnò nella ricerca di una soluzione per le minacce della proliferazione nucleare e delle armi di distruzione di massa, così come per attacchi informatici e commercio di merci contraffatte.

Un altro degli obiettivi dell'Unione Europea, era quello di migliorare la situazione dei diritti umani in Corea del Nord.

La Corea del Nord aveva una pessima reputazione riguardo il rispetto dei diritti umani. Dalla sua fondazione, nel 1948, la Repubblica Democratica Popolare di Corea era per l'implementazione di una politica estremamente controllata nei confronti dei suoi cittadini

Ai cittadini della RPDC non era permesso di lasciare il paese o le loro città d'origine senza un permesso speciale, e quindi non avevano libertà di viaggiare a livello internazionale e nazionale. Inoltre, non avevano libertà di parola, e ogni sospetto di dissenso verso il governo provocava l'arresto e la detenzione in "campi di lavoro" dove i detenuti erano sottoposti a lavori forzati e alla fame a causa della scarsità di cibo. Spesso finivano per morire in condizioni pessime.

L'Unione Europea tentò di risolvere la questione dei diritti umani tramite dialoghi bilaterali. Inizialmente il leader nordcoreano sembrava accogliere le richieste di Bruxelles, ma con la crisi nucleare del 2002, la Corea del Nord divenne intransigente verso le richieste europee.

Quando l'UE si rese conto che l'approccio bilaterale era stato un fallimento, decise di fare appello alle Nazioni Unite. Anche l'ONU era interessato a promuovere l'importanza dei diritti umani nel mondo. Tuttavia, fu l'UE a presentare per la prima volta le violazioni dei diritti umani della Corea del Nord. Da questo momento in poi, sia l'ONU che l'Unione Europea, autonomamente, iniziarono a imporre sanzioni alla Repubblica Popolare Democratica di Corea.

Il sistema delle sanzioni era iniziato dopo la Prima Guerra mondiale, negli Stati Uniti. Era nato come metodo per risolvere le dispute internazionali in maniera pacifica.

Il loro utilizzo, tuttavia, aveva avuto successo poche volte, come nel caso della Corea del Nord.

La ragione dietro il fallimento del sistema delle sanzioni risiedeva nel fatto che molti stati in realtà non sostenevano gli embarghi sulle armi delle Nazioni Unite. Pertanto, le violazioni degli embarghi erano in gran parte il risultato di interessi politici. La corruzione dei funzionari statali, che spesso coprivano i trasferimenti di armi, si aggiunse alla lista delle cause del fallimento delle sanzioni.

La Repubblica Popolare Democratica di Corea faceva buon uso della sua posizione geopolitica favorevole, che metteva la Corea del Nord al centro delle controversie e degli interessi internazionali. Di conseguenza, è sempre riuscita a aggirare le sanzioni dell'ONU.

Dal 2015 in poi, una serie di eventi ha portato a nuove tensioni tra la Repubblica Popolare Democratica di Corea e la comunità internazionale.

Prima di tutto, il dialogo UE-RPDC sulla situazione dei diritti umani della Corea del Nord è stato definitivamente sospeso.

Poco dopo, negli Stati Uniti hanno eletto Donald Trump come nuovo presidente.

La politica dell'amministrazione Trump verso la Repubblica Popolare Democratica di Corea era particolarmente dura, e le tensioni tra i due paesi si sono intensificate.

L'Unione Europea potrebbe avere un ruolo decisivo nella comunicazione con la Corea del Nord per vari motivi.

Gli Stati Uniti e la comunità internazionale, tuttavia, non hanno mai dato all'Europa molta importanza come attore internazionale nella penisola coreana.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an analysis of the diplomatic relations between the European Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea).

I think that the choice of this topic for my thesis is a congruent conclusion to my university studies. I earned a bachelor's degree in Language, Culture and Society of Asia and Mediterranean Africa, curricula Korea. After that, I chose to pursue my studies in international relations, still focusing my studies in the Northeast Asian region.

Throughout my graduate studies, I had the opportunity to learn more about foreign policy and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea immediately caught my attention.

North Korea's foreign policy is quite unique, and it is fascinating to understand how a country as small as North Korea has shaken up world powers.

I found a lot of materials about US-DPRK relations or CHINA-DPRK relations. Studies about EU-DPRK relations throughout history, however, are evolving lately.

For this reason, the sources that I used to do the research for my thesis are mainly composed of articles, essays, papers, agreements and strategy papers.

Even if it has not been easy to find the information, I needed to write this thesis, I am satisfied with my research.

The first chapter introduces how and why the first contacts between the two parties occurred.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea fell into a severe economic crisis in 1995.

The crisis was the result of inappropriate internal policies and external changes.

The Soviet Union was the main source of food provision and humanitarian assistance for North Korea. The collapse of the USSR, in 1991, halted all of the help that North Korea was receiving from its fellow countries.

Since 1991, the country tried to raise the economy by its own efforts, but the government only ended up worsening the situation.

In 1995 and 1996, natural disasters hit North Korea and the population was in a severe status of famine. The leader Kim Jong-Il decided that it was the moment to ask for help the Western countries.

The European Union started providing food aid and humanitarian assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since 1995.

This engagement later brought to the normalization of EU-DPRK relations in 2001. After 1995, the EU became one of the main providers of assistance to North Korea, which was delivered both bilaterally and multilaterally (World Food Program). The assistance lately grew into agricultural rehabilitation and production assistance programmes.

The Union drafted the *EC-Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004*, in 2002. This Strategy Paper set the objectives that Brussels was aiming to achieve in North Korea.

A series of pilot projects were planned in the Paper, of which the outcome would have been decisive for the future EU activities and projects on North Korean territory. EU-DPRK relations, however started to deteriorate after the 2002 nuclear crisis. Washington announced that North Korea was secretly pursuing its nuclear activities. The EU decided to suspend its projects except humanitarian assistance.

The EU also engaged in the peace-keeping problem of the Korean Peninsula, which involved the issue of North Korea nuclear proliferation. Brussels joined the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), in 1997 alongside with the United States, South Korea, and Japan.

KEDO's main objective was to make sure that North Korea kept on observing the Non-proliferation Treaty and obviously the Geneva Agreed Framework. In order to achieve its goals, the Organization signed a formal contract with Pyongyang.

Even if the EU was a member of the Executive Board, it supported the Organization mainly with funds and heavy fuel oil supply.

The second chapter focuses on how the European Union's foreign policy was set out. After that, an analysis and presentation of how and when EU-DPRK diplomatic relations officially started is depicted.

Afterwards, the reasons that made EU-DPRK relations not stable are explained.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, during the 1990s was an isolated country in a state of serious economic crisis. The development of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction became the key of the regime's survival and the negotiation tool to obtain the provision of humanitarian assistance from the international community. Since it was not so easy to deal with a country like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Brussels decided to set out a Strategy Paper, more than once.

The improvement of the North Korean's human rights situation was one of the main objectives of the EU.

North Korea's authoritarian regime and isolation also caused a series of human rights violations that pushed Brussels to search for dialogue with Pyongyang.

Since talks with the DPRK were unsuccessful, the European Union decided to appeal to the United Nations, and so Brussels embraced the multilateral approach in foreign policy. The United Nations, as well as the European Union autonomously, started imposing sanctions against North Korea. As time passed by, the EU's policy towards the DPRK became harder.

The third chapter takes into consideration the role that the European Union had and still has in the Northeast Asian region.

Throughout the phase of research for this thesis, different articles and opinions about the role that the European Union was going to have in its engagement were found. As time passed by, the perception of the European Union as international actor changed, as well as the aims and decisions of Brussels itself and its member states.

This chapter focuses on the opinions of the international community about the role that the European Union was going to have in the Korean Peninsula.

After that, an analysis of the actual role that was given to Brussels by the United States, and other countries interested in the negotiations with the DPRK about the denuclearization is done.

An insight about the ROK-EU cooperation is presented.

It also deals with how the EU commitment in diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea changed throughout time, until today.

Finally, policy suggestions about the future of DPRK-EU relations are done.

CHAPTER 1

THE BEGINNING OF EU-DPRK RELATIONS: EU'S ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND ASSISTANCE

This chapter will deal with the reasons that brought the European Union to the decision of engaging in providing food aid, humanitarian and developing assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

At the beginning, the historical context of North Korea during the 1990s will be done, in order to understand why Pyongyang took the decision to open itself to the international community and to the capitalist world.

The chapter will mainly be an objective presentation of facts and it will focus on the assistance that Brussels provided to the DPRK¹.

The point of view of each part (EU and North Korea) and the reasons that brought to the beginning of official EU-DPRK diplomatic relations will be analysed in the next chapter.

1. Historical Context:

North Korea fell into diplomatic isolation as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1991. Therefore, the country was left alone in a capitalist-ruled world economy.

From the 1950s to 1991, Pyongyang's had had diplomatic ties almost exclusively with the Eastern European "Fraternal Countries" that were part of the Soviet Union (East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and other "people's democracies").²

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, ex-soviet countries began to transform their systems and to start their own foreign policies, out of Moscow's influence. As their foreign policies changed, the supply of outside resources to their "fellow" countries decreased. This obviously affected North Korea's economy, since Eastern European countries were the principal source of imported goods and financial aid.

These international changes worsened the economic situation of North Korea, which was already weak, and a serious economic crisis and food shortage broke out.

¹ North Korea, Pyongyang and DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) are used as synonyms.

² Matveeva, Natalia, *Diplomacy Among Comrades*, McFarland & Company, 2020, pp.9-10.

Eastern European Countries' Financial Aid to North Korea, 1953-1960 (million rubles)

Table 1³

German Democratic Republic	122.7
Poland	81.5
Czechoslovakia	25.4
Romania	5.6
Hungary	5.6
Bulgaria	4.5
Albania	0.6



Figure 1 the effects of the famine in Korea in 1995

¹<https://www.pinterest.it/pin/682787993505936787/> last access: 16/06/2021

In 1995 and in 1996, two years of flooding hit the country, this brought to severe Famine and the situation became unbearable for North Korea to manage on its own. Finally, the country had to appeal for international aid.⁴

Even if the reason of the ending of years of Pyongyang isolation from the international community seemed to be the floods struck the country, North Korea was already wondering about getting help from western countries back in 1984. In the same

³ Ibid, p. 10

⁴ Yoon, Deok-Ryong, *Economic Implications of Improved DPRK-EU Relations*, Institute for National Security Strategy, 2001, pp. 324-326.

year, future North Korea's leader and son of Kim Il Sung⁵, Kim Jong Il, had some secret talks with South Korea in which he expressed his concerns about Soviet aid not being enough to feed the North Korean population. The reason why the government waited until 1995 could be explained with their "Juche" ideology, born in the 1950s, right after the establishment of the country. It meant "self-reliance" and it was created because Pyongyang feared that the influence of the Soviet Union would have undermined North Korea's autonomy as well as the leadership's authority. The *Juche* ideology stated that North Korea was a self-reliant country that would have reached auto-sufficiency under the rule of the Workers' Party of Korea (KWP)⁶ and its leader Kim Il Sung.⁷

This way of thinking brought the KWP to a tentative of saving their own economy by themselves, which obviously did not work.

As the Soviet Union collapsed structural economic problems and several bad harvests produced years of negative GNP growth: - 13.7% in 1990, -5.2% in 1991, -7.6% in 1992, -4.3% in 1993, and -1.7% in 1994. All of these years of negative GNP growth contracted the DPRK economy by over a fifth from 1990 to 1994. Exports halted while imports began to rise.

In 1993, the government was so desperate that it launched a "let's eat two meals a day" campaign and so admitted for the first time a failure in its policy.⁸

Lastly, in 1994, the party tried once again to save the country economy by setting a period of "adjustment" that would have lasted three years (1994-1996). It was announced during the 1994 New Year's Day message by the leader, Kim Il Sung.

⁵ Kim Il Sung was the founder and leader of North Korea. He ruled as a dictator from 1948 (establishment of the country) to his death in 1994. His successor was his son Kim Jong Il, who ruled from 1994 to his death in 2011 and he was also succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Un, the actual dictator.

⁶ The Workers' Party of Korea is the ruling and founding party of the DPRK.

⁷ Further information at

http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/3.html

Last access: 19/06/2021.

⁸ "After two years of preparation, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) finally launched its third Seven-Year Economic Development Plan (1987-1993) in April 1987. For a number of reasons, this may well be the most pivotal of all economic plans the DPRK has thus far implemented. First, it may be the last economic plan over which President Kim Il Sung, who turned 75, will preside. Its outcome, therefore, may help shape Kim's legacy. Second, it may test the mettle of his son and successor-designate, Kim Jong Il, who may play the role of its de facto helmsman from the outset. Finally, on the success or failure of the new plan may well hinge the viability of the North Korean regime itself; unless the DPRK can reinvigorate its sagging economy, it will face a legitimacy crisis of monumental proportions at home as well as a formidable challenge from the South." For further information read:

Koh, B.C., *North Korea in 1987: Launching a New Seven-Year Plan*, University of California Press, 1988, p. 1.

This period of “adjustment” was followed by “agriculture-first, light industry-first, and foreign trade-first” policies. Trade “adjustment” did not succeed in closing the gap between exports and imports. From January to June 1995 the trade deficit increased by 59%, it meant that it was increasing at a high rate in a short period of time. Trade deficit was accentuated by the continuing decline in trade with China, which used to be Pyongyang’s biggest trading partner.

Another cause was the weak competitiveness of North Korea’s products in the global marketplace, the shortage of hard currency⁹, and the impact of the devastating summer floods.

The agriculture-first policy was a failure, its output was so poor that the result was a severe food crisis, in 1995. Grain production was 4.1 million tons down than 1994’s one, with a 37% slide and it met only 42% of total grain demand. Rice production was also poor. In 1995, rice output was of 1.3 million tons, half of 1994’s production.

When floods worsened a pre-existing crisis, North Koreans authority started to seek for help outside of the country. The chairman of North Korea’s International Trade Promotion Committee, Li Song-rok, was the first to reveal the state of DPRK’s economy during a meeting in Tokyo with officials of the three parties of Japan. The chairman plead for assistance to a long-time enemy¹⁰, as he stated “We would like to ask Japan to lend as much rice as possible for a certain period of time”. That was the moment when Pyongyang officially abandoned its strict self-sufficiency policies and appealed to the international community for help.

The U.N. supplied \$491 million as emergency aid and started its own activities on the North Korean territory.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea allowed the U.N. and other foreign aid missions and organizations into the country to assess damages, the actual extent of which the state put at \$15 billion (75% of GNP for 1995).

⁹ Hard currency: “money that is valuable and can be exchanged easily because it comes from a powerful country”

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/hard-currency> last access 19/06/2021

¹⁰ Japan was historically a North Korea’s enemy, since all of the Korean Peninsula was colonized and successively annexed to Japan from 1910 to 1945.

The World Food Program made a shipment of 5,140 tons of rice. The North Korean authorities even allowed on-site assessments and monitoring.¹¹

Pyongyang's call for assistance also caught the European Union's attention so that since 1995, the EU engaged itself in various actions to help North Korea. Brussels' engagement with North Korea was the beginning of a cooperation that brought to the establishment of official diplomatic relations in 2001.

EU's assistance was supplied both bilaterally and multilaterally by financial aid to other institutions and organizations, like the World Food Program.

Brussels engaged mainly in providing help through food aid and humanitarian assistance and the European Union soon became one of the largest donors of assistance to Pyongyang.

1. Food aid, rural development, technical assistance, capacity building and humanitarian assistance

Food aid started being consistently provided by the Food Aid and Food Security budget since 1997, before even officialising diplomatic relations.

It was supplied both bilaterally, through the World Food Program (WFP)¹², as well as through European NGOs that operated directly in North Korea.

Over 4 years, the European Union provided a total of approximately €168 million.¹³

¹¹ Kim, Samuel S., *North Korea in 1995: The Crucible of "Our Style Socialism"*, University of California Press, 1996, pp. 64-65.

¹² "The World Food Programme (WFP) is the leading humanitarian organization saving lives and changing lives, delivering food assistance in emergencies and working with communities to improve nutrition and build resilience." Further details at <https://www.wfp.org/overview>
last access: 19/06/2021.

¹³ The sum was delivered as follows:

"Bilateral: €106.7 million including €6 million implemented by European NGOs and technical assistance monitoring and support

WFP: €50 million including €12 million of food aid products distributed by European NGOs and €5 million of food aid approved for the Commission's 2000 budget but not yet delivered,

NGOs: €11 million via 7 European NGOs, namely, CESVI, Concern, Children's Aid Direct, Action Contra La Faim, German Agro Action, Médecins Sans Frontières, Triangle. »

Further details at:

European Commission, *The EC- Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004*, European Union, 2002.

At first it was only a food aid programme, but then it slowly started to grow into an agricultural rehabilitation and production assistance programme aiming to obtain a greater food production and increase self-sufficiency to reach food stability. The choice was made after realizing that the food shortage was primarily a structural problem rather than the result of bad climatic conditions. Therefore, the Commission decided to start providing food aid associated with support to agricultural rehabilitation and production.¹⁴ This Food Security Project also included the supply of agricultural tools and machinery. The modernization of food production in North Korea was a challenge for the conditions of the country as well as the North Korean authorities that wanted to claim their control over every single initiative.

In the *EC- Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004*(2002), the European commission set out the future objectives and activities in North Korea.

In the Paper the European Commission considered that the EC Food Security Program should have worked in close cooperation with other donors and organizations (such as AREP/UNDP) to effectively sustain rural development and so gradually reduce the DPRK's demand for food assistance.

It is also recognized that cooperation alone would have not been enough to reach EC's objectives. Structural reforms in fact would have been necessary to obtain internal food security.

As regard of North Korean authorities, they seemed to have acted in line with the EC projects and so they allowed freedom of movement and access for programming purposes to the European Technical Assistance Team in Pyongyang.

The European Commission realized that a technical supervision of the real status of the county's industrial progress was necessary in order to help North Korea with ad hoc technical assistance projects.

Since the EU was lacking sufficient knowledge, it decided to send a first fact-finding mission to the DPRK in February 2001.¹⁵

The object of the mission was to identify areas where technical assistance and goods provision were needed the most.

¹⁴ European Commission, *The EC- Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004*, European Union, 2002, pp.13-14.

¹⁵ Ibid pp.18-22.

Throughout the mission these areas were successfully identified.

The outcome of the mission was exposed to a meeting in Brussels with the participation of EU Member States and other donors, which were the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia, International Financial Institutions (IFIs)¹⁶ and other donors, but also some officials of North Korea.

Throughout the meeting Pyongyang's priority needs were outlined:

- Training;
- Basic technical advice on how to manage their energy system;
- Rural development;
- Transport.

Training and energy system management were considered the most urgent matters, in order to understand how North Korea could progress in reform.

It was necessary to train North Korea because of its poor knowledge in almost every field, from agriculture to industrial management to sustainable energy development.¹⁷

The European Commission's intention, as well as all of the other donors', was to guide the Democratic People's Republic of Korea through the process that would have made North Korea a developed country well put in the international trading system.

The European Commission set out a budget of €5M per year in the 2002's Strategy Paper, divided into different fields: institutional support and capacity building¹⁸, sustainable management and use of natural resources, reliable and sustainable transport sector.

Technical assistance and the promotion for the development of a private sector in the economy would have been crucial to help North Korea become part of the world economy.

Brussels also believed that another key element for poverty reduction would have been a change in North Korean institutions and ministers.

The EC, in cooperation with other donors, would have provided extensive training activities in order to transfer knowledge to the institutions, especially on international

¹⁶ An International Financial Institution is a financial institution created by more than one country. It has to follow the international law. An example of IFI is the World Bank.

¹⁷ Frank, Ruediger, *EU-North Korean Relations: No Effort Without Reason*, East Asian Institute Columbia University of New York and University of Vienna, Austria, 2002, p. 98.

¹⁸ "Capacity-building is defined as the "process of developing and strengthening the skills, instincts, abilities, processes and resources that organizations and communities need to survive, adapt, and thrive in a fast-changing world.""

Further details at: <https://academicimpact.un.org/content/capacity-building> Last access: 19/06/2021.

finance and trade, economic relations and economic development principles. In the EC Strategy Paper (2001-2004) a budget of €1M was set to start a pilot project.

Aside from the EC program, other European countries were already involved in small scale training and scholarship programs (the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Sweden, Italy but also non-European countries such as the US, Canada, Switzerland and Australia).¹⁹

In 2002, a North Korean delegation with Foreign Trade minister Ri Gwan-Gun flew to Brussels, Rome, Stockholm and London in order to learn about EU policy models. As a result, Pyongyang was able to realize which were the areas that needed training in North Korea:

Table 2²⁰

Suggesting Institutions	Summary of Suggested Training Subjects
------------------------------------	---

¹⁹ Supra n.14, pp. 18-22

²⁰ Supra n.17, p. 99

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministry of Foreign Affairs • Ministry of Finance • Ministry of Foreign Trade • Foreign Trade Bank • University of National Economy • Kim Il Sung University, Faculty of Political Economy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • principles of international trade • settlement of trade disputes • multi- and bilateral treaties • economic and social structures of EU economies • international financial institutions • free market economy principles • international accounting standards • international debt management • corporate management training • trade information research • loans, credits and clearing systems • sovereign credit rating • sovereign risk management • insurance and re-insurance • relationship between government and private sector 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International law • EU institutions • FDI promotion • marketing • commercial contacts • intellectual property • standards • finance • export credit insurance • letters of credit • fx dealing • e-commerce • principles of taxation • corporate governance • stock market operations • double entry bookkeeping
---	---	---

EuropeAid²¹ also planned to start two pilot projects in the DPRK. The first project would have started in 2003 and it would have been a training aimed at giving institutional support

²¹ The EuropeAid Co-operation Office was instituted on January 1st, 2001. Its task is to implement the external aid instruments of the European Commission, which are funded by the European Community budget and the European Development Fund. EuropeAid is responsible for the whole project, in every phase (identification and appraisal of projects and program, planning of the financing decisions, implementation and monitoring, analysis of projects and programs). The Office is in charge of ensuring the achievement of the objectives of the projects established by the Directorates-General for External Relations and approved by the Commission.

and capacity building through a series of courses that would have been held in North Korea for ministers and other agencies. The aim of EuropeAid was to provide training for about 150-200 North Korean government officials, academics and other policy makers. The topics of the courses would have probably been international trade and market economy principles, but the actual schedule of the program would have been decided on the base of the outcome of researches and analysis of North Korean institutions and government staff. This analysis would have been done at the beginning of the project. The proposed budget for the pilot project was of 940,000 Euro. At the end of it, there would have also been the possibility for a small number of selected officials to travel to Europe for a study tour.

The positive or negative results of the pilot project would have been decisive for the planning of a possible new EC-financed project.²²

As regard of humanitarian assistance, the aim of the Union was to provide better access to sanitation and safe water as well as a proper personal hygiene.

In 1996, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)²³ opened a branch in North Korea.

Consequently, Brussels started to provide mainly medicines, water, sanitation, winter clothes and hygiene for those in most need.

ECHO supported hospitals and clinics of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by providing drugs and medicines via the Red Cross family.

In 2000, ECHO wrote the main objectives of its activities in North Korea in the *ECHO Strategic Guidelines for 2000*, which included:

- To obtain access to more people in need, living in rural and distant areas;
- To work on the improvement of working conditions in order to put them in line with the international standards;

²² Supra, n.17 p. 100

²³ "In line with the four principles grounded in International Humanitarian Law, EU humanitarian aid:
- addresses human suffering, with particular attention to the most vulnerable groups of people, while respecting the - - dignity of all victims (humanity);
- does not favour any side in a conflict (neutrality);
- is provided solely on the basis of needs, without any kind of discrimination (impartiality);
- is independent of any agenda, be it political, economic, military or else (independence). "Further details at https://ec.europa.eu/echo/who/about-echo_en last access: 16/06/2021

- To propel ambitious and effective projects of production of goods rather than only supporting the distribution of products;
- To increase the quantity of NGOs in the DPRK.

These purposes would have been firstly focused on the areas where water, sanitation, new projects and studies were needed the most.

By 2001 ECHO was the major source of medicines in the country. Its policy of adopting several ad hoc decisions rather than following a Global Plan seemed to work better. Thanks to ECHO policy, for the first time Pyongyang accepted to sign Letters of Understanding at the beginning of each project containing a clause of the EU where minimum humanitarian standards are laid out.

Another important humanitarian achievement of the Union in North Korean territory was the presence of NGOs, which not only helped in the humanitarian field, but also acted as an ice-breaker in the opening process of the country. NGOs were the only places where North-Koreans had access to the outside world, even if it was limited by the government control.²⁴

By 2003, ECHO was the last remaining organization to provide health, water and sanitation in North Korea and the Strategy Paper's objective in the humanitarian field was to continue to stick to the ECHO Strategic Guidelines for 2000.

The development of a sustainable management of natural resources was another field that needed technical assistance and the implementation of more knowledges in North Korea. Pyongyang needed to learn how to establish an efficient system of energy provision. Access to sustainable energy sources would have certainly helped with the progress of the country economy and industries.

An incorrect usage of energy sources, in fact, caused multiple problems. Industries and hospitals could not work adequately as well as the majority of schools and houses that were not heated properly or not heated at all.

Another problem that this situation was generating was the inconsistent production of goods and services that aggravated the plague of chronic hunger.

²⁴ *ibid* n.17

In addition to all of the problems mentioned earlier, there were environmental issues and pollution. Deforestation, for example, was proceeding very fast.

In the EC opinion, the most urgent matter was to transfer to North Korean authorities basic understanding of energy balance as well as institutional building and good governance. The DPRK government and institutions needed to realize how helpful for their own economy and population a rational management of the energy sector would have been. The country needed to set out proper policies in order to develop this sector and start to give importance to the energy saving aspect.

The European Commission understood that North Korea had a very high potential for energy saving, and that only by taking some practical measures Pyongyang could have already saved a significant amount of energy without recurring to a massive investment that would have needed the help of foreign founding.

In conclusion, the EC intention was to set out a pilot project that would have provided an assessment of the overall energy system in North Korea. After that, experts would have planned an efficient rehabilitation programme.

The project was set out to start in 2001 with a budget of €1M.²⁵

The EuropeAid also planned to start a pilot project in the Energy Sector. The objectives were:

1. The planning of an energy plan for North Korea, including the outline for a national energy balance.
An estimation of potential energy savings per sector was also included, if possible
2. The calculation of the costs of energy sector rehabilitation and possible obstacles as well as an assessment of the energy supply systems, which were production, transport and distribution
3. The institution of a centralized data network based National Energy information System
4. A feasibility study to rehabilitate a mining site and establishment of a program to implement a few initial rehabilitation actions. This includes the preparation of the technical specifications and the procurement of material/equipment for coal mines according to EC rules, as well as the supervision of its installation in the DPRK

²⁵ Supra n.14 p. 22.

5. The organization of a seminars and training sessions focusing mostly on short-term efficiency gains in the transmission and use of energy
6. The organization of a study tour to the EU for a small number of selected officials towards the end of the project
7. The provision of assistance in the identification and preparation of a possible EC-financed follow-up project
8. Subject to the remaining a priority: a review of the local conditions for setting up micro/mini power stations based on the use of indigenous energy resources, and the connection of such stations to the national electricity grid.

The outcome of all of these pilot projects would have been decisive for the EU future activities on North Korean territory. If the projects had received a good response, then the EU would have launched several similar projects and also expanded its engagement to other fields.

However, the launch of the pilot project itself was already difficult. There were problems that needed to be solved. First of all, the EU was lacking experts on the Korean Peninsula issue. European universities could not generate a sufficient number of specialists on the North Korean country, language and culture. This lack was a serious problem, since there were no people qualified to run the projects. The other obstacle was the instability of North Korean politics as well as of the relations with the international community.

The proposal of long-term EU projects and bilateral relations with the DPRK, at the beginning of EU-DPRK relations, was unlikely to happen because of the mistrust in the North Korean government and promises.²⁶

Despite the complications mentioned before, the EU officially established diplomatic relation with the DPRK in May, 2001. Many EU member states followed its example in 2001 and 2002.

Pyongyang seemed very interested in following the EU projects and enthusiastic to learn from Europe how to heal its own economy and develop into a modern country, through the implementation of structural reforms.

²⁶ Supra n. 17 pp. 101-102.

In 2002, the North Korean government dispatched a group of senior officials to Europe, in order to learn about EU economic policies and models.

North Korea and Brussels agreed to start standard regular exchanges.

After the officialization of diplomatic relations between the two parties, EU visits to Pyongyang also started to be more frequent.

EU Parliament delegations, headed by British MEP²⁷ Glyn Ford, visited North Korea many times and went showcasing markets, factories and hospitals.²⁸

EU-DPRK relations, however, started to deteriorate in the same year, since US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly after his visit to Pyongyang announced that North Korea was secretly developing nuclear programs.²⁹ As US-DPRK relations had a downfall, so the European Union suspended all of its programs.

The EU decided to suspend and not to completely cancel its projects with the intention to engage again in North Korean economy one day. Unfortunately, starting economical and technical assistance projects in the DPRK would not have been easy, since the EU Commission could not take for granted, that North Korea would have stuck to future potential agreements or decided to permanently dismantle its nuclear facilities.

Because of the bad reputation of the DPRK, known for not respecting the agreements, Brussels was not likely to expand its funds and financial aid to North Korea. In the 2002 Country Strategy Paper only €35 million were assigned to North Korean assistance programs. It was a very limited budget. But even if the EU decided to suspend its development programs it did not stop its supply of food and humanitarian assistance. The nuclear issues and North Korean wrong policies were separate matters from the population livelihood and needs. This choice was an autonomous one considering that the US and Japan decided to stop their supply of goods and services to Pyongyang.

Despite the EU will to provide basic needs to North Korea, Pyongyang strict regime policies sometimes hindered Brussels activities. This was due to the love-hate relationship between DPRK and NGOs, since the North Korean authorities did not fully tolerate the

²⁷ Member of the European Parliament.

²⁸ Berkofsky, Alex, *EU-North Korea Relations – Engagement Course on Hold*, Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2008, p. 65.

²⁹ Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, *North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002-December 2004*, CRS Report for Congress, 2005, p. CRS-2.

presence of foreign staff in their own territory, especially when NGOs operator let too much information flow out of the country.

Although the atmosphere was a little tense, Brussels still managed to provide help to the North Korean population, via the *Food Aid* and *Food Security Programs*. Through these programs the Commission was able to provide its aid non-stop since 1995. In 2008 the aid amounted to Euro 344 million of food, medical, sanitation assistance as well as the supply of some agricultural equipment.

In November 2006, the EU Commission started a new North Korea humanitarian assistance program with a budget of €8 million to support the health sector considering that it was, and still is, one of the greatest plagues of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. More than 50% of the population had no access to basic medical care. ECHO was in charge of delivering the EU funds to Pyongyang. ECHO also provided human resources for 5,000 local health care facilities, vaccination for 200,000 pregnant women and 200,000 children and non-food aid



Figure 2

<https://annamap.com/north-korea/> last acces: 16/06/2021

to flood victims. The EU 2006 programs were completed in 2008.³⁰

After 2008, the European Commission kept on providing assistance to the DPRK and invested Euro 35 million in long-term nutrition projects between 2007 and 2010.

On July 04, 2011 the European Commission announced that the EU would have provided emergency food aid to a number of around 650,000 people at risk of dying from serious malnutrition in DPRK.

The decision was taken after some dialogues with the North Korean government and a visit of humanitarian experts from the European Commission in June, 2011. The humanitarian experts went to hospitals, clinics, kindergartens, nurseries, markets

³⁰ Supra n. 29. pp. 70-71.

cooperatives and farms and they also monitored the state of food distribution centres. They noticed an extremely deteriorating situation with severely malnourished children in hospitals and nurseries where no treatment was available. The areas considered more at risk were identified mainly in the Northern and Eastern provinces of North Korea.

The EC set a budget of Euro 10 million that would have been managed by the Thematic Food Security Programme and European NGOs. The main target for assistance were hospitalized children under five with severe malnutrition, children in residential care, pregnant and breastfeeding women, hospital patients and elder people.

After dialogues with North Korean authorities, it was decided that the EC would have kept under strict monitoring the food assistance operation, since Pyongyang was well-known for not respecting agreements.

In case the EU discovered that assistance was not provided to the right target all of the operations would have been immediately stopped.³¹

EU's humanitarian and food assistance to North Korea never really stopped despite all of the diplomatic incidents and bad behavior of the country that brought to an insane number of sanctions from the international community and from the European Union itself and its member states.

One of the reasons is that the North Korean population livelihood was continuously dragged down by natural disasters, mainly floods, which hit the country in different provinces in 2012, 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2018.

In 2018, the provinces of North and South Hwanghae were not only struck by a flood but also by landslides. In 2019, an early seasonal drought hit North Korea.

Throughout these years the European Commission always provided help to the hit areas. Between 2014 and 2015 it provided €72,000 as part of a multi-country initiative on disaster preparedness across Asia. The initiative was in collaboration with FAO³² and its objective was to promote better agricultural and farming techniques that would have reduced the damages provoked by natural disasters.

In 2015, after the floods in the cities of South Hwanghae and North and South Hamgyong provinces, the EC distributed €200,000 in humanitarian aid.

³¹ European Commission, *The European Commission Will Give Emergency Food Aid to North Korea*, European Commission – Press Release, 2011, pp.1-2.

³² "The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations that leads international efforts to defeat hunger." Further information at: <http://www.fao.org/about/en/>.



Figure 3

2016, Damage caused by the flooding of the Tumen river in North Hamyong Province. The damage was so serious that it was difficult for volunteers to reach these areas.³³

In 2016, the EU allocated €300,000 in an initiative led by the Finnish Red Cross that aimed at teaching to the population living in the rural areas how to control future floods and droughts. In the same year, EU also provided €300,000 for the supply of life-saving relief items to families affected by flooding.

In 2018, the EU gave €100,000 to assist people suffering for the floods in the provinces of North and South Hwanghae.

In 2019, The European Union provided €55,000 to help the International Federation of the Red Cross in providing assistance to the most vulnerable families in North Korea hit by natural disasters.³⁴

³³ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37335857> last access: 17/03/2021.

³⁴ European Commission (2020), "North Korea (DPRK)", *European Civil Protection Aid Operations* https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/asia-and-pacific/north-korea_en last access: 20/03/2021

Tabella I³⁵

Period	Imports			Exports			Balance Value Mio €	Total trade Value Mio €
	Value	€M	%	Value	€M	%		
	Growth EU	% Extra-		Growth	% Extra-EU			
<u>2009</u>	50		0.0	73		0.0	23	123
<u>2010</u>	97	94.6	0.0	68	-6.8	0.0	-30	165
<u>2011</u>	113	16.0	0.0	42	-38.2	0.0	-71	155
<u>2012</u>	20	-82.6	0.0	47		0.0	28	67
<u>2013</u>	117	493.1	0.0	29	12.6	0.0	-88	145
<u>2014</u>	15	-87.1	0.0	17	-39.3	0.0	2	32
<u>2015</u>	11	-29.4	0.0	19	-40.1	0.0	8	29
<u>2016</u>	6	-41.6	0.0	21		0.0	15	27
<u>2017</u>	5	-23.6	0.0	12	9.0	0.0	7	16
<u>2018</u>	2	-48.5	0.0	6		0.0	4	8
<u>2019</u>	2	-34.6	0.0	5	13.4	0.0	3	7
					-45.5			
					-48.3			
					-17.6			

1. KEDO:

The EU also engaged in the peace-keeping problem of the Korean Peninsula, which will be better explained in the next chapter. However, to better understand the EU actions and opinion about this matter it is necessary to introduce the history of North Korean nuclear crisis.

³⁵ https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_north-korea_en.pdf last access: 20/03/2021

On 2 December 1985, North Korea decided to join the Non-proliferation Treaty.³⁶ It was seen as a first step toward a denuclearization of the DPRK. After joining the NPT though, Pyongyang did not immediately sign a safeguards agreement with the Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA³⁷). A safeguards agreement with IAEA had to be made, under Article 3 of the NPT, which stated:

“1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.”³⁸

North Korea had a period of 18 months to reach the agreement with IAEA. Meanwhile, the Cold War tensions seemed to cool down, and the U.S. President George Bush announced the withdrawal of the US nuclear weapons from South Korea. At the same time, Pyongyang and Seoul talks started and lately brought first to the “Agreement on

³⁶ “The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States”. Further information at:

<https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/> last access:20/03/2021

³⁷ “The IAEA was created in 1957 in response to the deep fears and expectations generated by the discoveries and diverse uses of nuclear technology. The Agency’s genesis was U.S. President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 1953.” Further details

<https://www.iaea.org/about/overview/history> last access:22/03/2021

³⁸ <https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html#:~:text=Article%20III&text=The%20safeguards%20required%20by%20this%20Article%20shall%20be%20applied%20on,out%20under%20its%20control%20anywhere>. Last access : 22/03/2021

Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation” and the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and then to the “Denuclearization Statement 1992”.

The Joint Declaration was a sign of progress towards the establishment of a permanent dialogue between the two Koreas as well as towards the denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

By signing the Declaration, North Korean Premier of the Administration Council, Yon Hyong-muk, and South Korea Prime Minister Chong Won-sik assured that both countries would have halted and forbidden to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.” Following the NPT and Joint Declaration, Pyongyang had an ulterior motive to allow IAEA inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities. Consequently, the DPRK signed an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1992.

Therefore, inspections started but they soon had to deal with North Korea authorities and their strict control policies. Pyongyang refused to allow special inspections of two unreported facilities suspected of holding nuclear waste. From this moment on, tensions between North Korea and the international community (especially the U.S. and South Korea) started to grow, since the suspect of Pyongyang’s nuclear activities undermined both the NPT and the Joint Declaration.³⁹

In 1992 and 1993, the International Atomic Energy Agency claimed that North Korea was not sharing all of the information about its activities and it demanded for an inspection at two plutonium storage facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex⁴⁰. This brought the U.S. to consider military actions against the DPRK and North Korea was about to withdrawal from IAEA.⁴¹

As the UN Security Council was informed of the situation, it acted as a mediator between DPRK and International Atomic Energy Agency in order to encourage dialogue aimed at a proper settlement of inspections on North Korea nuclear activities.

³⁹ Doh, J. Y., *The EU Foreign Policy towards the Korean Peninsula Crisis, 1993-2006* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Université libre de Bruxelles, Faculté des Sciences sociales et politiques – Sciences politiques, 2011, pp. 106-107.

⁴⁰ North Korea’s major nuclear facility, allocated in the north of Pyongyang region.

⁴¹ Berkofsky, Axel, *EU’s Policy Toward the DPRK – Engagement or Standstill?*, European Institute for Asian Studies, 2003, p.5.

On May, 1993, The UN Security Council Resolution 825 requested North Korea to respect the NPT and so allow the IAEA inspectors to have access to all of the DPRK's nuclear sites.

The UN Resolution was not accepted by Pyongyang and tensions grew even more.

Meanwhile, Washington and Pyongyang also started a series of bilateral talks in New York. Dialogue was not easy and it actually brought to a diplomatic deadlock when Pyongyang broke off negotiations with Seoul. Moreover, North Korea threatened to go to war in case of sanctions by the international community.

At this point tensions were at their peak and the US virtually prepared for a military conflict.⁴²

The situation cooled down only after former U.S. president Jimmy Carter's visit to Pyongyang in June, 1994. Carter was able to persuade North Korea to freeze its nuclear facilities and reopen dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang.

The negotiations lead to the Agreed Framework in October 1994. It was *de jure* a bilateral agreement although *de facto* it was a multilateral agreement that also addressed the interests of South Korea and Japan.

The Agreed Framework was not a binding treaty but it set a series of guidelines to follow. As a result of the talks, the activities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex were frozen.⁴³

The main points of the agreement were:

1. Freeze of all of Pyongyang's nuclear activities and replacement of the DPRK's nuclear reactors with light-water reactors (LWR)⁴⁴ power plants. The US was in charge of organize under its leadership an international consortium that would have financed the construction of LWRs.
2. Normalization of political and economic relations between North Korean and the United States.
3. Cooperation in order to reach peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

⁴² Supra n. 41, pp. 108-109.

⁴³ Supra n. 41, p.5

⁴⁴ "Light-water reactors (LWRs) are power reactors that are cooled and moderated with ordinary water. There are two basic types: the pressurized-water reactor (PWR) and the boiling-water reactor (BWR)." Further details at : <https://www.britannica.com/technology/nuclear-reactor/Types-of-reactors#ref155185> last access: 25/03/2021

4. Cooperation of Washington and Pyongyang for strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.⁴⁵

In order to support the aim of the agreement, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established on March 9, 1995, alongside with South Korea and Japan.

The institution of KEDO was officialized by the signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization by the Executive Board (US, South Korea and Japan). It was recognized as a legal international organization, “whose activities are mandated through international agreements and guided by political, technical and economic consideration, which relies heavily on consensus, compromise and confidence building.”⁴⁶

KEDO’s main objective was to make sure that North Korea kept on observing the Non-proliferation Treaty and obviously the Geneva Agreed Framework. In order to achieve its goals, the Organization signed a formal contract with Pyongyang on December 15, 1995. The contract stated that:

1. KEDO agreed to help North Korea construct two light-water reactors (LWR), provide an alternative source of energy in the form of 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil each year for heating and electricity production until at least one of the two light-water reactors would have been ready. Moreover, Washington would have provided for the implementation of any measures deemed necessary to accomplish the objective of the Agreed Framework.

KEDO’s activities would have been conducted under the IAEA supervision.

2. Pyongyang had to KEDO for the construction of LWRs in equal, semi-annual instalments, free of interest, over a 20-year term after the completion of the project. Moreover, the DPRK was not responsible for covering the costs of additional tasks and items needed to complete the project.
3. The LWR project was set to be completed in 2003. This original deadline was later moved to 2008 due to delays in the construction of the LWRs.

⁴⁵ US-DPRK Agreed Framework, Geneva, 21 October 1994.

<https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1994/infcirc457.pdf>
28/03/2021

⁴⁶ further information at: http://www.kedo.org/au_organization.asp Last access:19/06/2021.




Figure 4 Yongbyon nuclear complex

Kerr, Paul (2003) *KEDO Suspends Construction of Nuclear Reactors*, Arms Control Association, pp.1-2.

By accepting KEDO's project, the DPRK had to allow the implementation of safeguards agreement and so allow the IAEA to monitor that North Korea was actually freezing its nuclear activities.⁴⁷

The US requested the European Union to contribute financially to KEDO in order to reach the promised quantity of supply of heavy fuel oil to Pyongyang. After discussing the request in the European Parliament, the EU decided to participate to KEDO.

On 04 October, 1996, Brussels announced that it would have provided \$18.9 million annually to the Organization for the following five years.

Brussels officially joined KEDO as a member of the Executive Board, represented by the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC)⁴⁸, in 1997. By becoming a member of the Organization, EU did not only help financially, it made KEDO more credible to Pyongyang since it confirmed that the US had intention to really respect the Agreed

⁴⁷ Hong, So-Il, *KEDO as a Semi-Institutionalized Security Organization in Northeast Asia*, Ilmin International Relations Institute, 2003, pp. 200-204.

⁴⁸ "The European Atomic Energy Community created in 1957 to further European integration and tackle energy shortages through the peaceful use of nuclear power. It has the same members as the European Union and is governed by the Commission and Council, operating under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice." Further information at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI%282017%29608665 last access: 30/03/2021

Framework.

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
ROK	1,800	8,865	3,000	50,590	6,408	308,872	271,063	288,715	333,019	137,095
Japan	5,800	19,000	6,930	3,597	3,590	130,010	108,600	82,080	87,471	33,962
U.S.	9,500	22,000	25,000	50,000	65,100	64,407	74,879	90,500	3,720	-
EAEC	-	6,262	28,392	17,640	15,570	14,225	-	36,840	1,328	1,090
Finland	94	123	94	91	92	75	76	-	-	-
Netherlands	500	290	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
U.K.	1,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	-	1,011	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Greece	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
France	-	-	-	504	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italy	-	-	-	-	1,821	-	-	-	-	-
Others	7,614	4,882	3,181	2,020	2,217	3,270	2,153	2,018	-	-

Table 4 Financial Support to KEDO (thousand USD)⁴⁹

In terms of funding, South Korea and Japan were the main contributors to KEDO and heavily financed the construction of the LWRs.

Seoul contribution in the project was up to 70% and Japan's 20% of the total amount of KEDO funds, which carried a total of 90% of the overall costs for building the LWRs.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ KEDO Annual Report, 2003 pp. 12-15.

⁵⁰ Ko, Sangtu, *Vanguard of European Politics: The Role of Member States in the EU's Foreign Policy toward North Korea*, Institute of International Affairs, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, 2008, p. 53.

Moreover, the building of the reactors was mainly in the hands of South Korean companies, such as Hyundai Engineering & Construction Company, Dong Ah Industrial Company, Daewoo Corporation, and Korea Heavy Industry & Construction Company.⁵¹ As Table 3 shows, financial support was also provided by non-member States. Canada, New Zealand and Brunei were among the largest supporters of the Organization. The support of those States showed that KEDO project was largely approved by the International Community. Even EU member States themselves were donor countries. In 1995, Finland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom gave their contribution to KEDO, and 1996, also Germany and Greece joined. It happened before the European Atomic Energy Community entered in the Organization's Executive Board.

The contributions of EU member States stopped as soon as the EAEC officially took on the responsibility of financing the KEDO project in 1997, except for France and Italy, which contributed respectively in 1998 and 1999, and Finland, which remained a donor from 1995 until 2001.

The earlier participation of EU member States to the KEDO project reflected that those countries played a vanguard role in the EU's participation to KEDO.⁵²

As it was mentioned before, Brussels contribution to KEDO was very modest, it amounted to only 2% of the overall costs of the project and it was almost a contradiction that such a small financial support still assured a seat on the KEDO's Executive Board. The poor contribution of the EU was even recognized by Brussels itself in the Strategy Paper of 2002, which stated that one of the reasons for joining KEDO was the EU's recognition of the importance of "maintaining regional security in North-East Asia and also upholding the international nuclear non-proliferation regime".

Brussels acknowledged KEDO as "the major international initiative to promote non-proliferation and peace in the Korean Peninsula" and even if the EU affirmed that for its modest contribution, the European Union had "secured influence, visibility and leverage on the scope and direction of the project, largely through its role as a Board Member and the involvement of EU staff in the KEDO Secretariat."⁵³

Even if KEDO project was highly supported by the international community and Brussels, the Organization had to face a failure that brought to the dismantling of KEDO, in 2006.

⁵¹ Supra, n.39, pp. 142-143.

⁵² Supra, n.50, pp. 54-55.

⁵³ Supra n.14 pp. 14-15.

On November 21, 2002, KEDO's Executive Board announced the suspension of fuel oil deliveries to North Korea. But the Organization also announced that during the fuel oil delivery suspension it would have kept on maintaining some of its duties, which were the maintenance of the LWRs construction sites. The reason for it was a consequence of Pyongyang's admission of having a clandestine uranium-enrichment program intended to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. North Korea's response to the suspension was the official resuming of all nuclear activities and the withdrawal from the Non-proliferation Treaty.⁵⁴

In 2003, one year later the delivery of fuel oil stopped, KEDO decided to suspend also the construction of the light-water reactors. This decision unofficially marked the end of KEDO's project.

In May 2006, the light-water reactor project was officially terminated and in 2007, the KEDO Secretariat in New York was also closed.

Even if the decision to suspend the LWRs construction project came after it was discovered that North Korea was violating the principles of the Non-proliferation Treaty, KEDO activities never worked properly. The Organization was always late in its schedule for providing North Korea with the promised heavy fuel oil and the construction of the light-water reactor was proceeding too slowly. The main problem for slowing the project schedule was the missing funds and political will to actually terminate the project. When it became clear to North Korea that the construction of the LWRs would have never been completed, Pyongyang decided to resume its nuclear energy production. Moreover, KEDO's failure became an ulterior motive of anti-western propaganda for the North Korean authorities, who claimed that such a long delay of the construction of the light-water reactors obliged Pyongyang to turn to nuclear energy.

As regard as EU's role in the KEDO project, Brussels lacked the power and the will to actually make a difference in the Organization decisions and it was never reported a request for a more rapid implementation of the KEDO process in general and the construction of the light-water reactors in particular. At the European Union's eyes, it became soon clear that KEDO's project was only a huge waste of money and this was probably the reason that brought Brussels to invest only a small amount of money into

⁵⁴ Ibid n.49

the project, which still supported the international community's view of the non-proliferation mission but also saved the EU's funds from being wasted.⁵⁵

The 2002's Strategy paper claimed that the EU's reason for joining KEDO in 1997 was the recognition of the Organization's role in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but in reality, there was more. The EU and the US were tied with New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint Action Plan of 1995, which required both parties to pursue jointly sharing responsibility in the world, such as the Korean Peninsula peace-keeping issue as well as the matter of non-proliferation and international disarmament and arms transfers. So, it was clear that EU's support to KEDO was also a result of Brussels' relations with the US. In addition to that, the asymmetry of power in the international community played a major role in the EU's decisions. For this reason, multilateral institutions, as KEDO was, took often place under conditions of significant asymmetry. A dominant super power like the United States heavily influenced the decision-making process of an organization as KEDO.⁵⁶

This chapter presented the first connections between the European Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and presented the international context in which the EU-DPRK relations started. The next chapter will take an in-depth look at the dynamics that influenced the relationship between the two parties.

⁵⁵ Berkofsky, Axel, *EU-North Korea – Engagement Course on Hold*, Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2008, pp. 74-75.

⁵⁶ *Supra* n.39, pp. 143-144.

CHAPTER 2

As seen in the last chapter, it seems that the European Union meticulously engaged itself in the North Korean issue.

This chapter focuses on how the European Union's foreign policy was set out. After that, an analysis and presentation of how and when EU-DPRK diplomatic relations officially started is depicted.

Afterwards, the reasons that made EU-DPRK relations not stable are explained.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, during the 1990s was an isolated country in a state of serious economic crisis. The development of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction became the key of the regime's survival and the negotiation tool to obtain the provision of humanitarian assistance from the international community. Since it was not so easy to deal with a country like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Brussels decided to set out a Strategy Paper, more than once.

The improvement of the North Korean's human rights situation was one of the main objectives of the EU.

North Korea's authoritarian regime and isolation also caused a series of human rights violations that pushed Brussels to search for dialogue with Pyongyang.

Since talks with the DPRK were unsuccessful, the European Union decided to appeal to the United Nations, and so Brussels embraced the multilateral approach in foreign policy. The United Nations, as well as the European Union autonomously, started imposing sanctions against North Korea. As time passed by, the EU's policy towards the DPRK became harder.

1. EU's Foreign Policy Assessment:

EU's diplomatic ties with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) began during a time of a decades-long process of Brussels' internal economic and political integration. The objective of the European Union was to become an actual international actor and so expand its activities and influence to the rest of the world.

The research for a common EU's foreign policy started even before the 1991's Maastricht Treaty⁵⁷.

In 1970, the European Community (EC) Foreign ministers established the European Political Cooperation (EPC⁵⁸), in order to coordinate foreign policies of member states. The creation of the EPC was also an initial tentative to reach an economic and political integration.

Nonetheless, the EPC's influence was not strong, since the organization did not originate from a legal treaty and so it was not perceived as a separate entity from the supranational European Community. Therefore, security issues were not considered as part of the EPC's agenda. It started to become more influential only after the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP⁵⁹) in the framework of the Maastricht Treaty, which replaced the EPC.

The EU's way to cooperate and make decisions on foreign policy issues was, and still is, describable in two ways. The first possible way to consider the process is through a decision taken at a national level from EU member states. The second one is relatable to a decision taken through EU organizations acting on behalf of EU member states. By

⁵⁷ The Maastricht Treaty (1992) enshrined the foundation of the European Union. It was signed by the twelve members of the European Community.

⁵⁸ "European Political Cooperation (EPC) is the forerunner of today's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU. It covers the period 1970 to 1993, during which the member states of the (then called) European Communities (EC) developed a genuine system of cooperation in the field of foreign policy. Its main purpose was to secure and even increase the influence of European countries on the international scene in times of growing global political and economic interdependencies."

Further information at:

<https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1478>, last access: 18/06/2021

⁵⁹ "EU Member states have committed themselves to a Common Foreign Security Policy for the European Union. The European Security and Defense Policy aims to strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management."

Further information at: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-foreign-security-policy-cfsp/420/common-foreign-and-security-policy-cfsp_en, last access: 18/06/2021.

observing the European foreign relations, two main theories have been evolved: intergovernmentalism and supranationalism⁶⁰.

These theories explain very well the decision-making process of the EU in foreign policy as well as internal matters.

Intergovernmentalism refers to a resolution, that starts from a cooperation or will of EU member states and not from supranational bodies, like the European Council. It can happen that member states' cooperation with a matter of common interests could influence an EU final decision.

When a situation like the one just mentioned takes place, states are free to cooperate or not, and they express their will through a veto, which can also block any proposal presented by other states⁶¹.

As the intergovernmental theorist Joseph M. Grieco pointed out, this strategy of cooperation has been often the result of the influence of a powerful state. The resolutions that have come out of those type of collaborations often benefitted all, but provided greater benefits to the stronger states. Intergovernmental theorists also stated that even the establishment of international institutions can be often seen as a consequence of the will of dominant nations, whose power and interests have determined the outcome of the cooperation.

In the EU, strong countries that usually have influenced Brussels decisions have been Germany, the United Kingdom and France.

Supranationalism is the opposite of intergovernmentalism⁶². It refers to a decision-making process where states choose to delegate the authority for planning a resolution to a body that stands above the nation state. In this case, states lose the right to veto and agree to cooperate and accept almost all of the decisions of the supranational body. It means that sometimes states may have to cooperate and follow a policy that contravenes their own interests and preferences.⁶³

⁶⁰ Ko, Sangtu, *Vanguard of European Politics: The Role of Member States in the EU's Foreign Policy toward North Korea*, Institute of International Affairs, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, 2008, pp. 48-49.

⁶¹ <http://hum.port.ac.uk/europeanstudieshub/learning/module-4-theorising-the-european-union/intergovernmentalism-and-supranationalism/>, last access: 18/06/2021.

⁶² Supra n.60 p. 49

⁶³ <http://hum.port.ac.uk/europeanstudieshub/learning/module-4-theorising-the-european-union/intergovernmentalism-and-supranationalism/> 18/06/2021

In the case of the EU, supranationalism alludes to the activities of supranational EU actors, which are the European Commission and the European Court. This decision-making process may be the solution that stops powerful states from being excessively influential inside the EU, since supranational EU actors can constrain the power of stronger states and allow all member states to play a leadership role.

To sum up both theories, it can be said that intergovernmentalism is led by an interest-bargaining mechanism and supranationalism is led by a problem-solving mechanism. Even if they seem to be different and opposite decision-making processes, they still coexist in the European Union, since some member states are interested in influencing Brussels policies and some states fear the power of dominant states like Germany.⁶⁴

European structures are neither perfectly intergovernmental or supranational, and different institutions can be more or less intergovernmental/supranational at different times. A clear example is the European Commission, which should be totally supranational, when in reality, it happens that sometimes it follows the lead of more powerful member states. At the same time, it also happens that the Commission is the driver of European policy, taking the lead ahead member states.

Even if, as time passes by, the European Union is becoming more supranational, some states are still interested in maintaining a more intergovernmental approach⁶⁵.

However, the coexistence of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism cannot be simply explained by interest-bargaining or problem-solving mechanisms: the relationship between them is a complex set of dynamics that contains both intergovernmental and supranational aspects.

This can be made intelligible by the fact that there is a bi-directional relationship between the EU institution and its member states.

⁶⁴ Ibidem n. 62

⁶⁵ <http://hum.port.ac.uk/europeanstudieshub/learning/module-4-theorising-the-european-union/intergovernmentalism-and-supranationalism/> 18/06/2021




Figure 5 *Ibidem* n. 60

As figure 1 shows, in the first case, CFSP policies and decisions impact foreign policy of EU member states (downward direction). As the professor of European Politics Robert Ladrech states, the EU influence on its states policies can be seen as a “Europeanization of domestic politics”, in which the EU’s political and economic dynamics determine the shape, direction and organizational logic of national politics and policy-making.

In the second case, the engagement of Brussels in external affairs is the result of the influence of initiatives of member states (upward direction). This dynamic can be named “Vanguard of European Politics”.

Having now explicate these two dynamics, the relationship between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism might be clearer. However, a closer observation of the Europeanization of domestic politics and Vanguard of European Politics reveals an even closer connection between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, which can be seen as part of a four-stage procedure of foreign policy cooperation in the decision-making process of the EU foreign policy.

Intergovernmentalism is the initial stage of international cooperation, whereas supranationalism is only achieved at the final stage of cooperation. The Europeanization

of domestic politics and the Vanguard of European Politics can be seen as intergovernmentalism and supranationalism's intermediate stages⁶⁶.

2. EU DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF NORTH KOREA

After the Second World War, the Korean Peninsula doubtlessly became one of the hotspots for the international relations, and it had also been at the center of U.S.-Soviet Union disputes during the Cold War.

Moreover, international eyes were drawn to the Korean Peninsula because of North Korea's nuclear proliferation.

The EU officially started having diplomatic relations with the DPRK in May, 2001. This decision was heavily influenced by previous events.

First of all, Brussels itself had its first political meeting with Pyongyang in December, 1998. Since then, a total of fourteen rounds of political dialogues followed (until 2015). In addition to the opening of EU-DPRK talks, the historic inter-Korean Summit⁶⁷ ultimately led to the "Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula" during the ASEM⁶⁸ summit, which was held in October 2000.

That event was particularly important for the EU, as well as for the international community, since it showed that North Korea was willing to cooperate for peace.

Furthermore, the South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung⁶⁹ proposed to the EU a sojourn to North Korea during his visit to Stockholm, where he received the Nobel Peace Prize. Even if those two events encouraged Brussels to have diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, the decision of a member state, Italy, to establish diplomatic ties with North Korea in January, 2000 was conclusive. Italy's decision was against two Council Conclusions of October and November, 1999, which underlined the importance of a more

⁶⁶ Supra n. 60, pp. 49-50.

⁶⁷ The "historical" Inter-Korean summit was held in Pyongyang in June 13-15, 2000, and it was the first after the end of the Korean War in 1953. It is called "historical" since it was the first time that the two Koreas were willing to cooperate for peace on the Peninsula. Further information at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/14/northkorea3>, Last access: 18/06/2021.

⁶⁸ the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was created in 1996. Further information at: https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/asia-europe-meeting-asem/2051/asia-europe-meeting-asem_en, Last access:18/06/2021.

⁶⁹ He was the President of South Korea from 1998 to 2003.

coordinated strategy toward the Korean Peninsula. In addition to that, Italy's diplomatic engagement with North Korea started when the political dialogue between the EU and DPRK was still ongoing and diplomatic relations were not normalized.

Even if the decision of Rome seemed to go against Brussels' strategy towards North Korea, it was triggered by Italy attempt to prevent Pyongyang from transferring missile technology to North African countries.

Soon after, other EU states followed Rome and established diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: The United Kingdom in 2000; the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Germany, Luxemburg, and Greece in 2001; Ireland in 2003. In 2006, the DPRK had diplomatic relations with 24 out of 25 EU member states.

In this case, the EU's final decision of initiate ties with North Korea was the result of the influence of member states. Therefore, in February, 2001, delegations from the European Parliament visited Pyongyang, and the date of the visit was deliberately chosen to show Brussels goodwill toward the North Korean regime. The chosen date, in fact, coincided with the leader Kim Jong Il's birthday.

Another visit followed soon in the same year. This time the EU's delegation was formed by the Council President and Swedish Prime Minister Persson, CFSP High Representative Javier Solana, and External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten.⁷⁰

The May 2001 visit occurred only after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agreed to meet four conditions:

1. There had to be discussions with the leader, Kim Jong-II;
2. North Korea promised to implement the North Korea-South Korea June 2000 Joint Declaration;
3. North Korea had to set a second North Korea-South Korea summit as soon as possible;
4. Discussions had to include urgent issues such as human rights, confidence-building measures, North Korea's missile programme, etc.

As the EU delegation arrived in Pyongyang, it received a commitment from Kim Jong-II to honour the inter-Korean Joint Declaration signed in Pyongyang at the June 2000

⁷⁰ Supra n. 60, pp. 50-51.

summit. The leader promised to maintain a moratorium on missiles testing until at least 2003. In addition to that, the DPRK also renewed its commitments within the Agreed Framework.

The U.S. administration response to the EU visit to North Korea was initially negative since the visit was defined “opportunistic”. This was due to the delicate situation that US-DPRK relations were going through at the time.

The United States-North Korea relations were stuck in a phase of “reviewing”, which basically meant that they were suspended. This happened after the inauguration of the Bush administration. Furthermore, the US negative response might have been driven by the groundless fear that the EU purpose was to become a stronger and independent international actor, out of the United States sphere of influence.

Therefore, the EU immediately justified itself since it had no intention to lose Washington trust. Brussels chose not to reveal that the May 2001 visit had been requested by South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung and that during the talks the delegation of Brussels underlined its intentions of developing an independent policy from the US one. The European Union stated that the visit, was held in respect of its long-standing relations with the US and South Korea. Besides, the EU emphasized that Brussels had no intention to provoke any kind of competition with the US.⁷¹

Washington began to think that Brussels could become a good mediator between the United States and the DPRK and that its dialogues with Pyongyang could help reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. For this reason, Bush administration decided to support the European Union in its diplomatic engagement with North Korea.

After only two weeks after EU visit to Pyongyang, the European Commission decided to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK through the unanimous approval of all member states.⁷²

It was clear that the European Union had the intention of expanding its political influence in East Asia through its engagement in the Korean peninsula issue. At the same time, the EU did not seem to have any intention of becoming more influential than the US or of being a competitor for Washington.

⁷¹ Berkofsky, Alex, *EU's Policy Towards the DPRK – Engagement or Standstill?*, European Institute for Asian Studies, 2003, pp. 19-20.

⁷² Supra n. 60, p. 50.

The EU planned to play a supplemental and supporting role in coordination with all of the other countries that were interested in the region, such as South Korea, the U.S. and Japan.

The international community had great expectations from the role that the EU was going to play in the Korean peninsula. Brussels comprehensive approach towards North Korea could have been complementary to the hardline stance of the US. The assistance that the EU was planning to provide to North Korea would have alleviated the pressure of US economic sanctions. Moreover, the EU approach was expected to encourage North Korea to enter in the international community. Brussels might have also contributed to the stability and security of the Korean peninsula by mitigating the harsh policy of the U.S. South Korea had similar hopes. In fact, president Kim Dae Jung himself demanded Brussels to visit Pyongyang. Seoul believed that a more active role of the EU, would have contributed to the improvement of inter-Korean relations. Moreover, the engagement of Brussels would have relieved South Korea from the international pressure of pushing North Korea towards a democratization. Seoul assistance to North Korea was expanding, but the increasing economical help was not corresponding to an engagement in humanitarian assistance. For this reason, South Korea was heavily criticized for pouring too much aid into North Korea.

Besides, even though Seoul was providing economic help, it was unable to freely implement measures for economic development. The reason behind this can be found in the enforcement by the international community that economic development had to be accompanied by the DPRK internal reform and democratization.

The role of the EU was expected to relieve the South Korean government from both economic and political pressure.⁷³

⁷³ Yoon, Deok-Ryeonng, *Economic Implications of Improved DPRK-EU Relations*, Institute for National Security Strategy, 2001, pp. 336-341.

3. The EU and the Issues of North Korea's Nuclear and Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Counterfeit, and Cyber-Attacks

After the decision of starting diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the European Union also chose to face the international threats and problems that such an uncommon country like North Korea was providing to the international community.

The EU engaged in the menaces of nuclear and weapons of mass destruction proliferation, as well as cyber-attacks and trade of counterfeit merchandise.

3.1 Nuclear proliferation as a protection?

As it was explained in the last chapter, North Korea's ideology, called "Juche", shaped the country's internal policy since its establishment. The ideology, based on self-reliance, was also the consequence of a long history of long and violent occupations and war with several states, such as China and Japan.

The turbulent past of the DPRK also influenced the foreign policy of the country, so that its strategy was characterized by fear and distrust and based on the fact that the world would have never recognized the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as an independent country. The "Juche" ideology implied as little relations with the other countries as possible, since there was a constant fear of being occupied again.

United States were considered the main threat by the North Korean regime, due to the fact that after World War II they entered in South Korea and never left. The fear of being attacked was one of the main reasons that brought Pyongyang to invest almost all of its economic resources in the military and in the acquisition and production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

The DPRK possessed a significant amount of chemical and biological weapons to which the nuclear weapons programme was added.

Furthermore, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic self-reliance policy turned out to be impossible to apply to a nation like North Korea. As it is, North Korea did not possess enough raw materials and the attempts of feeding the population through an improved agricultural production failed many times. Despite its ideology, the state was forced to open up to the world for its own survival.

Nevertheless, this time the regime had to find a new strategy, since the countries to which it intended to ask for assistance had a completely different ideology from the DPRK. The North Korea's nuclear programme had a decisive role in its aid-seeking policy.

The nuclear threat had a "blackmail function" to pressure the other states to provide assistance to North Korea. In addition to that, the blackmailing strategy was aimed to help the DPRK to be recognized by the international community as a legitimate nation and so protect the regime. Therefore, Pyongyang, unlike other countries that hid the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction until the weapons were ready to use, did not keep secret its nuclear activities.

The reason why Pyongyang was able to set out this blackmailing strategy was because of its geopolitical position. All of North Korea surrounding states had their own reasons to avoid military conflict with the DPRK. South Korea was one of them, and with Washington being its ally and recognizing the vulnerability of Seoul, the military threat of the United States was avoided.

North Korea understood the importance that the international community was giving to the stability in Northeast Asia and so it used the "instability card" to extort larger and larger concessions from the other states during negotiations.⁷⁴

Given this explanation, which is based on a Western point of view, it is important to consider that North Korean statements never actually matched with the Western theory. Pyongyang affirmed on many occasions that nuclear proliferation was not a bargaining tool, or a way to obtain "US dollars". The regime intentions were clarified when the North Korean Constitution was revised, in April 2012. The Supreme People's Assembly decided to make the Democratic People's Republic of Korea a "nuclear-weapon State". It was the first country that institutionalized the possession of weapons such as WMD. In addition, in 2013, the regime announced that the institutionalization of WMD was a part of a new national strategy, the "Byungjin Line".⁷⁵

The word "Byungjin" (병진노선) meant "parallel development". The translation was "Line of Simultaneous Economic and Defense Build-ups": North Korea's objective was to

⁷⁴ Van der Meer, Sico, *Geopolitics and Nuclear Weapons: North Korean Provocations as a Tool for Regime Survival*, Egmont Institute, 2011, pp. 53-60.

⁷⁵ Bondaz, Antoine, *From Critical Engagement to Credible Commitments: a Renewed EU Strategy for the North Korean Proliferation Crisis*, EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, 2020, pp.1- 7.

reach simultaneously economic stability and military power⁷⁶. This strategy was inspired by the communist slogan “a gun in one hand, and a hammer and sickle in the other”, which meant that the economic development had to be done while protecting the regime⁷⁷. The “Byungjin Line” should have ended in April 2018. The enforcement of the military power and the proliferation of nuclear weapons strengthened the hereditary system and the legitimacy of Kim’s family. The leader was able to show its citizens that North Korea was able to become a “nuclear power” and so be as powerful as the “oppressor”, the United States.

North Korean nuclear proliferation never completely stopped, and on November 29, 2017 the DPRK announced that the country had finally reached the state of nuclear force. In addition, Kim Jong Un stated that the country nuclear state was so advanced that it was able to contain the nuclear threats from the United States and guarantee the country long-term security⁷⁸.

Nuclear proliferation is still progressing today, and no international or bilateral initiative have been useful or successful. However, Europe made some efforts in order to persuade North Korea to denuclearize their own country.

⁷⁶<https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artid=ART002128351> last access: 18/06/2021.

⁷⁷ <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/walking-the-byungjin-line-north-korea-in-the-eurasian-century/> Last access:18/06/2021.

⁷⁸ Bondaz, Antione, *From Critical Engagement to Credible Commitments: A Renewed EU Strategy for the North Korean Proliferation Crisis*, EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, 2020, pp. 1-7.




Figure 6 <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/> last access: 18/06/2021.

3.2 International community against WMD: KEDO and Six-Party Talk

One of the first big steps of the international community in the search of a dialogue with North Korea about its nuclear activities was the establishment of KEDO, in 1995.

During the years of KEDO, tensions between North Korea and the other countries seemed to diminish.

However, with the nuclear crisis of 2002 and the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 the situation changed. The US became inflexible due to the fear of terrorism and did not look for a dialogue anymore. Instead, they adopted a hardline policy.

Washington started pressuring harder on Pyongyang in order to stop nuclear proliferation and even stated that the DPRK was part of the “Axis of Evil”⁷⁹.

⁷⁹ “Axes of Evil” is an expression invented by the Canadian-born US presidential speechwriter David Frum and Michael Gerson during the drafting of a speech for US President Georg W. Bush, in 2002. The expression was referred to the violent attitude of some countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. For further information: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/axis-of-evil> last access: 18/06/2021

Nevertheless, the DPRK responded to the US hardline policy by continuing their threatening foreign policy and isolating once again. North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reactivated all its nuclear activities.

As a consequence, the search for a peaceful dialogue with North Korea started again. The outcome was the establishment of the “Six-Party Talks” (SPT), the first round of which took place in August 2003 in Beijing. The SPT member states were China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States. The EU decided not to take part directly, but to fully support it.

The first round set out the topics of discussion for the next rounds and the parts decided to adopt six points of “consensus” but without signing an official agreement.

The six points were the following:

1. to overcome the nuclear issue through peaceful means and cooperation;
2. to transform the Korean Peninsula in a nuclear-free zone and to solve the security concerns of North Korea;
3. to set out a general plan to resolve the nuclear issue;
4. to avoid engaging in actions that could alter the peaceful negotiations;
5. to establish trust, reduce differences and broaden common ground in order to resolve the nuclear issue dialogue;
6. to commit to the six-party talks;⁸⁰.

The second and third rounds were held in February and June 2004. In these events the discussion was about the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through a peaceful setting of measures that would have required the collaboration of all states. The outcome of the second and third round of the Six-Party Talks finally produced a joint statement on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which was drafted during the fourth round. The Joint Statement of September 19, 2005 was released in Beijing by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Wu Dawei.

The text contained six points that the participating states agreed to respect in order to reach the stability on the Korean Peninsula:

⁸⁰ Doh, J. Y. (2011) *The EU Foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula crisis, 1993-2006 (Unpublished doctoral dissertation)*. Université libre de Bruxelles, Faculté des Sciences sociales et politiques – Sciences politiques, Bruxelles., p. 222.

1. “The Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.

The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.

The ROK reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while affirming that there exist no nuclear weapons within its territory.

The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented.

The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of light water reactor to the DPRK.

2. The Six Parties undertook, in their relations, to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of international relations.

The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies.

The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

3. The Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally.

China, Japan, ROK, Russia and the US stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK.

The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12th 2005 concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK.

4. The Six Parties committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

The Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

5. The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action".
6. The Six Parties agreed to hold the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in early November 2005 at a date to be determined through consultations.⁸¹

⁸¹ <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm> last access: 18/06/2021.



Figure 7 Representatives from the member states of the Six-party Talk in 26 July, 2005⁸²

The Joint Statement of September 19, 2005 seemed to succeed in making North Korea interested in freezing its nuclear activities in exchange for energy assistance and other concessions from the other five parties.

The situation, however, negatively changed again after the first session of the fifth round of talks. The reason was the discovery of North Korean illicit activities, such as being associated with clandestine nuclear development programs. The US immediately imposed sanctions on Pyongyang trading entities, as well as on Banco Delta Asia of Macau. North Korea used the US sanction as a justification for resuming its nuclear activities. Pyongyang also undertook a long-range rocket test as well as its first underground nuclear explosion in 2006. This situation put the Six-Party Talks at a standstill.

Even if the parties seemed not to be ready for a new round of talks, China efforts to re-open the dialogue between the five parties succeeded, and two more rounds of the Six-Party Talks were held. China willingness to restart the Six-Party Talks was crucial, since the country persuaded Pyongyang to rejoin the SPT.

⁸² http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/home/2005-09/09/content_476294.htm last access: 18/06/2021.

The sixth round of talks took place in February 2007, and the discussion was focused on the research of a solution for the difficulties that were halting the participant states from cooperation. The objective of the sixth round was to set out a strategy for the implementation of the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement. Talks also led to an agreement with North Korea on disabling its ageing reactor and other plants at Yongbyon and removing thousands of fuel rods under the surveillance of US experts.

The restart of the SPT, nonetheless, did not last long. The final round of talks was held in 2008. The breaking point of the talks was Pyongyang's refusal to allow inspections to verify compliance.

Soon after, in 2009, the UN Security Council accused the DPRK for the failed satellite launch in a Presidential Statement. The choice of Kim's regime, was to oppose to the international pressure by resuming its nuclear-enrichment programme. All of the following attempts to resume the SPT were useless and talks were left at a standstill once again.

3.3 The EU and the nuclear crisis

As it was mentioned before, the EU did not take part in the Six-Party Talks.

Brussels supported the SPT and its objectives in different ways, since North Korea nuclear crisis was a concern also for the EU. The support of the EU for the SPT could be summarized in three points:

1. The EU's tended to support multilateral frameworks as a method for overcoming regional conflicts because of its normative power. Brussels thought that multilateral dialogues were more effective than bilateral talks. Bilateral dialogues had the tendency to be guided by power politics and national interests. On the contrary, multilateral dialogues were more unlikely to let national interests prevail, since there was the need to find an acceptable solution for all parties.
2. Even if the SPT broke down, the EU still tried to persuade North Korea to cooperate with the members of the Six-Party Talks but also to engage in actively being part of the international community. Moreover, Brussels intentions and

support of the SPT were also shown at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)⁸³ and at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)⁸⁴.

A nuclear-weapons-free zone on the Korean peninsula was among the main objectives of the ARF since the mid-1990s. The forum stated that the SPT was an important mechanism to deal with the North Korea nuclear issue and pressured Pyongyang to cooperate with the member states.

3. Brussels supported the SPT objectives by cooperating with the international society. The EU joined international attempts to condemn North Korea actions, this included the participation in the international impositions of economic and political sanctions and UN resolutions that denounced North Korean nuclear activities⁸⁵.

3.4 EU's Strategy Paper against the Proliferation of WMD

From 2000, the EU tried to adapt its foreign policy to the global changes. The nuclear threat and terrorism were among the most urgent concerns of the international community, as well as of the European Union. For this reason, the European Council set out a strategy and a plan that organized and defined the European engagement in the most prominent international issues.

On December 2003, the same year of the beginning of the first round of the Six-Party Talks, the CFSP adopted a new strategy, which was explained in "A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy".

The paper underlined Brussels intention of sharing the aim of reaching global security with the international community in order to create a "better world". Moreover, the paper emphasized that the only way to reach global security was through a multilateral approach,

⁸³ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): "The ARF could become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region. In this context, ASEAN should work with its ARF partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the Asia Pacific." For further information: <https://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about-arf/> last access: 18/06/2021.

⁸⁴ "The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an intergovernmental process established in 1996 to foster dialogue and cooperation between Asia and Europe." For further information: <https://www.aseminfoboard.org/about/overview> last access: 18/06/2021.

⁸⁵ Lee, Moosung, *The EU and the Six-Party Talks*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2017, pp. 2-8.

because today's international concerns were too complex to be handled by a bilateral approach or a country on its own.

Another important concept that the Strategy paper underlined was that "Security is a precondition of development". A country in a state of economic crisis was more likely to develop political problems and violent conflicts. In addition, war would have encouraged criminality and illegal investments, and so hindered normal economic activity.

The Security paper identified five main problems, which were:

- Terrorism:

Terrorism was described as the most urgent concern in the EU's agenda. The ESS (European Security Strategy) paper highlighted the fact that terrorism was the cause of huge economic problems. In addition, it put lives at risk and threatened the openness and tolerance of societies.

- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:

The ESS paper considered the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as the second greatest threat. In addition to that, the paper mentioned the missile technology and the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons.

In this regard, on 12 December 2003, the European Council approved a "Strategy against the proliferation of WMD". The paper underlined that WMD and missile proliferation were a serious threat for the EU Member States, their citizens and the EU's interests around the world.

The case of North Korean nuclear proliferation was part of the challenges that Brussels was willing to face in its fight against WMD. The attention towards the DPRK nuclear activities intensified even more when it was discovered that there might have been some connection between Iran nuclear weapons and Pyongyang technical assistance to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

Suspicious started to grow because of the 2002 inaugural meeting for Korea-Iran friendship in Pyongyang, in which the vice-chairman of the Korean Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Choe Jong-hwan, sustained the Islamic revolution and the efforts that Iran had made to achieve its goals.

The remaining issues identified in the Strategy Paper were:

- Regional conflicts

In particular, the EU addressed the problems that the Korean Peninsula state was creating to the European Union's interests directly and indirectly.

- State failure

The EU stated that State failure was the result of bad governance. The matter was often linked to problems of organized crime or terrorism.

- Organized crime

After identifying the concerns, the EU explained the objectives and the strategy that it intended to pursue in order to face the threats mentioned before.

Firstly, the EU reaffirmed the importance of the multilateral approach. Moreover, Brussels displayed that the EU was already dealing with international threats.

The Union approved the European Arrest Warrant after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and adopted a nuclear non-proliferation policy. In addition, the paper underlined that the WMD and terrorism issues in Asia were considered a threat, as much as the nuclear proliferation in North Korea.

Secondly, the paper affirmed that the engagement will be primarily focused on the areas that are geographically closer, as the Mediterranean area. Brussels' objective was to promote well-governance.

At the end, however, the EU clarified that even if not geographically close, global threats were still influencing the EU security. Brussels restated that stronger and functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order were necessary to reach international security. Multilateralism was the key. For this reason, the paper underlined the EU's commitment to the United Nations and clarified that the UN Security Council was the main institution that carried the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security⁸⁶.

3.5 Cyber-attacks

Today, nuclear and weapons of mass destruction proliferation are not the only threats for the European Union and the rest of the international community.

The European security is constantly menaced by a possible cyber-attack of the army of North Korean hackers, who work for the DPRK's authorities.

⁸⁶ Supra n. 80, pp. 224-228.

The international community reported Pyongyang for stealing military contingency plans, robbing bank accounts, gaining access to industrial control systems and other cybercrimes⁸⁷.

The cyber army of the DPRK was put together as a tool for spying the movements of Seoul and later evolved in an international rubbery machine. Pyongyang's cyber-attacks have stolen billions of dollars. Moreover, the hackers are becoming more and more efficient lately. For example, they hacked Google and were able to infect users' Chrome browsers⁸⁸.

The EU decided to use sanctions to stop North Korea's cyber threat. On July 30, 2020, Brussels approved its first sanction against the DPRK's cyber-attacks. The EU did not only sanction North Korea, but also China and Russia for the same reasons.

The EU sanctioned the DPRK- and the North Korean company Chosun Expo in particular- for:

“Targeted restrictive measures against cyber-attacks with a significant effect which constitute an external threat to the Union or its Member States are among the measures included in the Union's framework for a joint diplomatic response to malicious cyber-activities (the cyber diplomacy toolbox) and are a vital instrument to deter and respond to such activities. Restrictive measures can also be applied in response to cyber-attacks with a significant effect against third States or international organisations, where deemed necessary to achieve common foreign and security policy objectives set out in the relevant provisions of Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union.”⁸⁹

Chosun Expo was accused of having provided help for the Cyber-attack to the Polish Financial Supervision Authority, as well as other cyber-attacks that affected the European Union.

This sanction was Brussels' message to the DPRK that new cyber-attacks would have been punished by new and stricter sanctions that would have targeted every individual or entity suspected of having an active role in the cyber-attacks.

⁸⁷ Pardo, Ramon Pacheco, *North Korea in Focus Towards a More Effective EU Policy*, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 2018, p. 4.

⁸⁸ <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/15/north-korea-missiles-cyberattack-hacker-armies-crime/> last access: 18/06/2021.

⁸⁹ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32020D1127&from=EN> Last access: 18/06/2021.

EU's cyber sanctions were written following the example of the United States' own North Korea cyber sanctions⁹⁰.

3.6 Counterfeiting and drug traffic

Today, North Korea is also famous for its counterfeiting activities. The country counterfeits pharmaceuticals, cigarettes, and so on. It is apparently very good at counterfeiting US dollars.

The problem is that North Korea's counterfeit merch is making its way outside of the DPRK and it is looking at Europe. It would not be a surprise, in fact, if North Korea would be discovered being involved in the production of fake euros, since the European Union is the second-largest worldwide economy.

The case of the DPRK is a particular one, since the counterfeiting is a state-led activity and it is not only run by ordinary citizens.

Apart from counterfeiting, North Korea is also well-known for its drug trafficking since decades. The DPRK's profit from drug trafficking is around millions of euros per year.

At the beginning, the main drug sold in North Korea was opium. However, lately the more lucrative crystal meth has become the main produced and exported drug from North Korea. Even this time, Pyongyang's drugs are suspected to have made their way to the European territory, but it is still not confirmed. However, in many areas - like Western Africa - it is confirmed that the region is affected by North Korean drug trafficking and, also in this case, it is not a business led by normal citizens, since among the people accused of drug trafficking there are DPRK's diplomats⁹¹.

⁹⁰ <https://www.38north.org/2020/09/rpachecopardo091020/> Last access: 18/06/2021.

⁹¹ Supra n.87, p. 4.

4. EU-DPRK Political Dialogues and Human Rights Talks:

4.1 Bilateral approach:

Before talking about the engagement of the European Union in the North Korean human rights issue, it is necessary to understand why this caught the attention of Brussels first, and then that of the international community.

First of all, the meaning of “human rights” was defined by The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), approved by the UN General Assembly in 1948.

The UDHR set out the fundamental human rights and it declared that they had to be universally protected. It was, and continues to be, the base of all international human rights law. It is divided in 30 articles and provides the principles and building blocks of current and future human rights conventions, treaties, and other legal instruments⁹².

Human rights include political and civil rights, such as freedom of speech, life, religion, equality, and all the natural rights that everyone has on existence basis.

Among human rights, basic human rights like economic, cultural, and social rights are also included (social security, work and education). In addition, every human being must be free to exercise collective rights such as personal growth and self-determination. Everything that mines the freedom of individuals - such as imprisonment, torture, and execution - is considered a violation of human rights.

North Korea has always lacked in terms of human rights. Since its foundation in 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been known to have an extremely strict controlled policy towards its citizens. North Koreans are subdued to a never-ending propaganda, and they are completely isolated from the rest of the world.

The DPRK’s citizens are not allowed to leave the country or even their own hometowns without a special permission, and so they do not have freedom of international and national travel. In addition, they have no freedom of speech, and every sign of disagreement with the government causes the imprisonment in “labor camps” where the detainees are subjected to slave labor and starvation due to the scarcity of food. They often end up dying in very poor conditions.

⁹² <https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx> last access:18/06/2021.

Since a disclosure from Pyongyang about internal matters is very unlikely to happen, most of the information about human rights violations in North Korea come from the defectors that succeeded in escaping the oppression of their own country. Moreover, additional evidence of human rights violations is disclosed in several publications.

North Korea is estimated to hold between 150,000 and 200,000 political prisoners in six large camps all over the country. These camps are in secluded mountain valleys in central and northeastern North Korea⁹³.

The poor human rights record of North Korea immediately caught the European Union attention since the 1990s. Therefore, in the EU Council resolutions from October and November 2000, the EU set its future strategy and approach for relations and dialogues with Pyongyang: Brussels decided to have a different approach from the strict and threatening one that Washington was pursuing. The Council resolutions expressed the intention of a more slow and comprehensive approach toward a delicate situation like the DPRK one. Moreover, the EU was willing to expand its relations.

However, the decided approach would have been unchanged on a condition, which was that of a North Korean response to the request of the international community. The international concerns referred to the inter-Korean reconciliation, non-proliferation issues, achievement of a better human rights condition and improvement of the economic and political situation in the DPRK.

In the first chapter, it was presented the help that the EU gave to North Korea in terms of food aid, humanitarian assistance, sustainable development and capacity building.

Apart from that, the EU also wanted to push North Korea to the respect and implementation of democratic principles and human rights, and Brussels planned to achieve that through the dialogue with North Korean authorities.

As it was mentioned before, Brussels started having political dialogue with North Korea in 1998, and it happened before normalizing diplomatic relations, in 2001. However, serious talks about human rights only started in 2001, due to the reluctance of Pyongyang to discuss the topic. Even if the EU was initially enthusiast and focused on guiding North Korea toward the democratization, the “dream” ended soon⁹⁴.

The first two political dialogues were respectively held in 1998 and 1999.

⁹³ Ulferts, Gregory and Howard, Terry L., *North Korean Human Rights Abuses and their Consequences*, McFarland & Company, 2017, pp. 85-84.

⁹⁴ *Supra* n.71, pp- 17-18.

The 1998's dialogue took place in Brussels and it was used as a planification of the future's topics that talks with Pyongyang would have discussed - such as human right, security issues like the nuclear threat, economic reforms, etc.

The second political dialogue was held in Berlin and talks went on smoothly since it was also a good moment for the US-DPRK relations. It seemed that missile negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang were progressing.

Throughout the meeting both the EU and North Korea agreed to the intention of setting up regular channels of contact that would have brought to the start of diplomatic relations in 2001.

After the inter-Korean summit of 2000, a third round of political dialogue was held in Pyongyang, on November, 2000.

The European Union, this time, fully expressed its concerns over human rights issues in North Korea. Brussels' straightforwardness was the result of the achievement of a more fixed and reinforced common identity and strategy of its member states.

Right before holding the third meeting with Pyongyang, the EU was going through a moment of internal discrepancies of opinions regarding the strategy that Brussels would have pursued in convincing North Korea improving its human rights state.

France was extremely focused on the human rights issue, which was seen as priority in talks with North Korea. Whereas, for countries like Germany and the United Kingdom priority was the establishment of diplomatic relations with the DPRK. After achieving that, the EU would have had a better influence on North Korea and it would have benefitted talks about human rights issues.

In order to find a common strategy and reach an equilibrium between the member states' opinions, the *EU Lines of Action Towards North Korea* was published. It contained a common line that member states had to follow in dealing with North Korea.

After the third round of political dialogue, the May 2001's visit was especially fruitful in terms of human rights, since North Korea actually agreed to open to human rights talks.

As it was mentioned before, the EU delegation pointed out that the future of EU-DPRK relations would have been strongly influenced by the improvement of the human rights situation in North Korea.

After the May 2001's visit, a first human rights dialogue was held between the Troika⁹⁵ and representatives of the North Korean Ministry of Foreign affairs in Brussels in June, 2001.

The EU highlighted the importance of cooperation between Pyongyang and the United Nations' human rights mechanism, in order to work on North Korea's humanitarian issues. The two parties also decided that human rights talks would have been included in the following political dialogues instead of holding separate humanitarian talks.

The fourth round of political dialogue was the first one after the establishment of formal EU-DPRK diplomatic relations on May 14, 2001.

It took place in Pyongyang. The dialogue was criticized for not producing any substantial results in regard of human rights. Moreover, after the dialogue Brussels asked Pyongyang information about how many people were working in "re-education camps" and to make amendments to its criminal code to adapt to the international standards. However, North Korea did not cooperate.

The fifth political dialogue took place in June, 2003. Even this time the outcome was completely delusional for Brussels. After the failure of the fifth dialogue and the outbreak of the nuclear crisis, the EU gradually admitted that its bilateral talks with the DPRK on human rights were not producing any substantial result⁹⁶.

Since then, Pyongyang refused to open up on the human rights issue again, even if the EU tried to restore the discussion by saying that the subject was a "natural topic" with North Korea given the poor conditions in which people live in the country.

At the end, EU-DPRK dialogue about human rights stalled and became fruitless. An actual implementation of human rights in North Korea would have happened only if the regime had committed itself to the cause.

However, Brussels did not surrender and presented a resolution on human rights in the DPRK to the UN, with support of the US and Japan, in 2003.

The resolution highlighted the seriousness of the human rights situation in North Korea. Widespread abuses, such as torture and public executions, as well as all of the strict

⁹⁵ Informal decisional group made by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

⁹⁶ Lee, Moosung, *A step as normative power: the EU's human rights policy towards North Korea*, Springer-Verlag, 2012, pp. 47-51.

restrictions on freedom of thought and expression were denounced as matters of great concern.

The EU resolution was accepted by 28 against 10, with 14 abstentions. South Korea decided to not get involved in the vote because of the impact that supporting the resolution could have had on such a delicate situation like the relations between North Korea and South Korea. China did not accept the resolution. The North Korean response immediately came from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)⁹⁷, which accused Brussels of “political provocation” and announced that the EU resolution was going to have a “negative impact” on future EU-DPRK cooperation⁹⁸

Therefore, Pyongyang announced the suspension of the human rights dialogue first, and then the halt of the political dialogue in 2004.

Since the nuclear issue was becoming more and more concerning, the EU decided that political and human rights dialogue with the DPRK would have remained off the agenda until the resuming of the Six-Party Talks.

Later on, political dialogue was resumed until its actual suspension in 2015. EU-DPRK dialogues count 14 meetings up to today.

4.2 Multilateral approach:

When the EU realized that bilateral dialogues had been a failure, it decided to appeal to the United Nations. The UN was also interested in promoting the importance of human rights, just like the European Union. The EU already presented over more than 200 resolutions on specific human rights situations in UN forums since 1991.

Before the 2003 UN resolution, Brussels already tried to inform the UN about the human rights situation in North Korea. It happened in 1997, when the EU tabled its first EU resolution as regard the human rights in North Korea at the *53rd UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR)* in Geneva.

The EU denounced the abuses of the North Korean authorities on its citizens in a special UN report. However, the first UNCHR resolution with regards on the human rights situation in North Korea was the 2003’s one. It was a great moment for the EU as international actor, since the 2003 UN resolution was not an US proposal, but the result

⁹⁷ North Korea’s national news service. For further information: <https://kcnawatch.org/article/163> last access: 18/06/2021.

⁹⁸ Supra n.71, pp.17-18.

of years of talks within the EU. Moreover, after 2003, the human rights issue in North Korea became part of the official agenda of the UN as a prominent matter.

After the 2003 UN resolution on human rights situation in North Korea, two more resolutions followed in 2004 and 2005, respectively.

The issue was transferred to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) after the third UNCHR resolution. However, after Pyongyang admitted the possession of nuclear weapons in the first half of 2005, the EU's attitude towards the DPRK changed, and it became more pressuring. Therefore, the EU for the first time introduced a resolution, in which Brussels denounced the DPRK's human rights record to UNGA, in November 2005.

The resolution was adopted, and it applied more political pressure on North Korea than the other ones. However, the EU did not stop, and started denouncing the difficulties that European NGOs and humanitarian aid agencies were facing because of the restrictive measures imposed by North Korean authorities. In addition, the EU expressed its desire to engage with the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in North Korea, in order to come up with better ideas to get North Korea to cooperate in improving its human rights situation. Moreover, Brussels attempted to persuade Pyongyang to halt the use of death penalty, in 2006.

In both the 2005 and 2006 cases, the decisions of the EU were supported by all of the 25 members. The cohesion of the Union on the human rights issues gained the trust of the international community and gave the EU more influence as international actor. For this reason, Brussels was able to reach out to new allies and persuade more countries to engage in the human rights issues.

The multilateral activities of the EU for the North Korea human rights issue halted only for one year, in 2007, due to the nuclear crisis.

On March, 2008, a new UN resolution tabled by the EU was adopted, following the meeting held at the Human Rights Council in the same year. The resolution pressured North Korea to improve its human rights situation and permitted the extension of the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in North Korea.

In March, 2009, another meeting regarding the human rights record in the DPRK was held at the Human Rights Council to deal with the same issue all over again. The

meeting's outcome was the 2010 UN resolution tabled by the EU and Japan to denounce human rights violations in North Korea.⁹⁹

It is very important to acknowledge that the DPRK's human rights issue was brought to the attention of the UN and all of the international community thanks to the EU.

Since 2003, the UN adopted a resolution almost every year. However, Pyongyang rejected all of them, saying that all the allegations were fabricated and politically motivated.

The human rights issue in North Korea became so important for the UNGA that it did not stop. A stronger UN resolution was adopted on March 24, 2017. This resolution condemned North Korea for crimes against humanity adding that North Korea had no equivalent in the modern world. It addressed Pyongyang for violations of human rights, such as enslavement, execution, killing, rape and other sexual offenses, forced starvation, and disappearance of citizens, all of which were often sanctioned at the highest levels of the government¹⁰⁰.

4.2 EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime

The planning of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime started with the launch of a preparatory work in December, 2019.

On 17 November 2020, the "EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024" was adopted by the Council. Even though the COVID-19 pandemic slowed down this process, the EU Council decided to establish a global human right sanctions regime, on December 7, 2020.

The EU set out a plan that presented how Brussels intended to "target individuals, entities and bodies responsible for, involved in or associated with serious human right violations and abuses worldwide, no matter where they occurred¹⁰¹".

Sanctions would have been applied in form of travel bans and freezing of funds. Moreover, targeted individuals or entities in the EU would have been forbidden from making funds available, either directly or indirectly.

⁹⁹ Supra n.96, pp. 49-53.

¹⁰⁰ Supra n. 93, p. 87.

¹⁰¹ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/07/eu-adopts-a-global-human-rights-sanctions-regime/> last access: 18/06/2021.

Anything that involved actions such as genocide, crimes against humanity, torture, slavery, arbitrary detentions or arrests, extrajudicial killings, and other human rights abuses, were considered reasons for imposing a human rights sanction.

The sanctions list would have been established, amended, and reviewed by the Council¹⁰² and it was inspired by the 2016's "Global Magnitsky Act"¹⁰³ of the United States.

On March 22, 2021, Brussels adopted its first human rights sanctions on North Korea, under the protection of the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime.

This first round of sanctions, imposed restrictions and accused several DPRK persons and entities:

- The North Korean ministry of State Security and its minister Jong Kyong Taek, were condemned for contributing, as a powerful institution of the DPRK's regime, to the human rights abuses of the government and to its repressive policies. The ministry of State Security, in particular, was hold responsible for the suppression of any kind of dissension towards the North Korea's leadership or state ideology.
- The minister of Social Security Ri Young Gil, and its minster were held responsible for the implementation of repressive tactics, such as torture, interrogation, punishment of North Korea's defectors, prison camps and labor detention centers.
- The North Korea's Central Public Prosecutor's Office was accused of being involved in criminal proceedings, including investigation, interrogation, and trial¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰² <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/07/eu-adopts-a-global-human-rights-sanctions-regime/> last access: 18/06/2021.

¹⁰³ The "global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act" set out Washington's regime of human rights sanctions. For further information: <https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-global-magnitsky-faq.pdf> last access: 18/06/2021.

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.38north.org/2021/03/pressure-and-principles-the-eus-human-rights-sanctions-on-north-korea/> last access: 18/06/2021.

5. EU's Relations with North Korea: from Active Engagement to Critical Engagement to Active Pressure

The EU's strategy towards North Korea can be divided in three phases: active engagement (1995 – 2002), critical engagement (2002- 2013) and active pressure (2013- today)¹⁰⁵.

5.1 Active engagement:

This phase corresponds with the years when Brussels provided food, humanitarian and development assistance, as well as trade and political dialogue.

Before starting its engagement with North Korea, the EU already published a strategy paper, the "Towards a New Asia Strategy" paper, in 1994. Brussels recognized that Asia was an area of growing economies, and so it attracted western countries. The paper affirmed that the situation was going to change the "balance of economic power" by the year 2000.

For this reason, the EU realized that it was necessary to include Asia in its agenda with a higher priority. The first main objective that the strategy paper underlined, was that of establishing a stronger EU presence in the area. The Union needed to build its presence in different regions of Asia, in order to "maintain its leading role in the world economy" and so become a leading economic power in Asia by the beginning of the 21st century.

The first step was to establish a dialogue with the countries. The Asian area had just come out of the Cold War which divided the states in two main spheres of influence: Soviet Union and United States. After the end of the Cold War, some areas -such as th

Korean Peninsula- were facing security issues. The strategy paper stated that the EU's objective was to positively contributing to the regional security and the economic developments, focusing primarily on the area of arms control and non-proliferation. The "positive contribution" of the EU would have been reached through an engagement in matters like good governance, human rights, humanitarian assistance, and so on.

After Brussel's contribution, Asia would have become a favourable environment for business and the EU's trade. The "European participation in these changes both at the

¹⁰⁵ Supra n.75, p. 9.

institutional and at the private sector level, will contribute to reinforce mutual understanding and economic links”¹⁰⁶.

The Korean Peninsula was one of the areas where regional security needed to be reached. The EU immediately engaged in providing humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. Unlikely the US, Brussels was convinced that humanitarian assistance was a separate matter from North Korea’s nuclear proliferation issue¹⁰⁷.

The EU’s policy was in close cooperation with the principles of the South Korean “Sunshine Policy”.

The Sunshine policy was implemented during Kim Dae-Jung’s presidency and announced in 1998. The actual name of the policy was “Comprehensive Engagement Policy towards North Korea”. It then took the name “Sunshine policy” from a fable of the Greek storyteller Aesop, “The North Wind and the Sun”. The moral of the fable was that force or violence was not a good strategy while persuasion was the right one. So, following the moral of the fable, Seoul was aiming at opening a dialogue with North Korea without using violence or pressure.

The Sunshine Policy was derived from the German Ostpolitik, which had been West Germany’s policy towards East Germany: West Germany had decided to recognize East Germany as an independent country and a close nation. West Germany had also economically supported East Germany. Since West Germany’s policy had been successful and had brought to the unification of Germany, president Kim decided to create a strategy based on Ostpolitik to deal with North Korea.

Kim Dae-Jung won a Nobel Peace Prize, thanks to the implementation of the Sunshine Policy, in 2000. The policy lasted until the end of No Moo-Hyun presidency, in 2008.¹⁰⁸ As West Germany did, South Korea tried to reopen relations with North Korea through investment and communication with North Korean authorities.

The EU’s strategy matched with the principles of the Sunshine Policy, and so Brussels tried to gain the trust of the DPRK’s regime through the provision of assistance and the contribution to the development of the industry and economy. The EU also expanded its

¹⁰⁶ Towards a new Asia strategy. Communication from the Commission to the Council. COM (94) 314 final, 13 July 1994, <http://aei.pitt.edu/2949/> pp. 1-3. Last access: 18/06/2021.

¹⁰⁷ Alexandrova, Iordanka, *The European Union’s Policy Toward North Korea: Abandoning Engagement*, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 2019, pp.37-40.

¹⁰⁸ For further information: <http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/min2/> last access: 18/06/2021.

trade relations with North Korea. Brussels provided preferential market access via relaxation of regulations for certain products. The EU created demand for DPRK's exports and soon became North Korea's third largest trading partner.

After the normalization of diplomatic relations with the DPRK, the EU issued a new Country Strategy Paper. The paper underlined that economic, humanitarian and development assistance were a top priority for the EU. The improved economic situation would have made the DPRK a country capable of being competitive in the world economy. The 2002's Strategy Paper affirmed that the European Commission had the resources to help North Korea through their economic and political growth.

This phase of active engagement was initially successful, since North Korea seemed to accept the EU's presence in their own country. The reason was that the EU had had no conflicts in the past with the DPRK. In addition, Brussels showed no interest in establishing a permanent presence on the Korean Peninsula, like the US did.

North Korea was interested in receiving the EU's assistance and the country's media began publishing pro-EU articles, in which the journalists praised the fact that the EU policies were not influenced by the United States' actions. The articles stated that the EU was "the only superpower" that could keep the influence of the US at bay.

The EU was able to successfully aid North Korea, and to open a series of dialogues on human rights¹⁰⁹.

The active engagement of the EU, in fact, operated on four different levels: diplomatic, humanitarian, economic and multilateral.

The diplomatic engagement was pursued through the opening of diplomatic dialogue and in coordination with South Korea's Sunshine policy, in 1998.

The EU's aim was to improve the political situation of the country and to solve the human rights issue through the implementation of reforms.

On an economic level, the EU was one of the countries that consistently provided the DPRK food aid, humanitarian assistance and industry development assistance. As regard of trade, as it was explained before, the EU became the third largest trading partner of North Korea.

¹⁰⁹Supra n.107, pp. 40-44.

On a multilateral level, the EU joined the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1997, in order to deal with the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula and provide energy assistance to North Korea¹¹⁰.

5.2 Critical Engagement:

The phase of “critical engagement” (2002-2013) began with the second nuclear crisis of North Korea, in 2002.

The DPRK admitted its nuclear activities. Moreover, the EU presented a Resolution on Human Rights denouncing the gravity of human rights situation in North Korea, in 2003. As a result, Pyongyang the halt of EU’s assistance and all dialogues between Brussels and Pyongyang were suspended. In addition, economic assistance and humanitarian aid decreased. The EU decided to stop its political engagement with North Korea and decided to support the United States decisions and the UN resolutions.

The EU published a new common security strategy: in 2003, The European Security Strategy was the result of the necessity to find a common European position on foreign policy matters.

The EU always had an unclear position on security issues, and for a long time too many EU institutions, member states or individuals were allowed to have a voice in EU’s foreign policy matters - such as the Foreign Ministers of member States, the European Commission, the Secretary General of the Council, and individual delegates with specific tasks. This unclear foreign policy brought to a complicated making-decision process. The international community tended not to trust the EU as an international actor in high politics matters. A clear example can be seen in the EU’s involvement in KEDO. Japan, the United States and South Korea benefitted from the EU’s funds but never allowed it to have a proper role in KEDO’s decisions-making process.

That is why, in 2003, the European Security Strategy clearly pointed out its concerns and objectives. The greatest issue that the EU underlined, was the proliferation of WMD. The North Korean nuclear issue was lined to the proliferation of WMD in the Middle East, which was a serious threat for Europe. The nuclear and missile technology was quickly expanding and Iran stated that its nuclear programme was proceeding. The Iran’s announcement worried Brussels, and it decided to issue a separate document regarding

¹¹⁰ Supra n.107, pp.9-10.

the WMD proliferation. The document affirmed that the EU had the intention of putting all of its efforts in the fight against the proliferation of WMD.

The 2003's Security Strategy also emphasised the importance of cooperating with the US to deal with security threats. Therefore, the Security Strategy's objective was to maintain the alliance with the United States. Moreover, The EU reaffirmed its commitment to international cooperation and to a multilateral approach as a mean for solving the world's threats.

After 2003, EU's actions became more consistent, and Brussels acted according to its Security Strategy. The EU engaged against the proliferation of WMD in the Middle East, as well as in the Korean Peninsula, supporting Washington's policy and decisions. Member States also contributed to the funds of the International Atomic Energy Agency and promoted a stricter monitoring of nuclear material. The EU position towards North Korea's nuclear proliferation became more and more intolerant. Brussels left South Korea's Sunshine policy soft approach with North Korea and embraced Washington's hard policy. Therefore, the EU decided to stop economic and technological assistance to the DPRK, in order to prevent the strengthening of North Korea's leadership.

The EU's strategy toward North Korea, in fact, could be described in two points: intolerance and support to the US.

As regard of the intolerance, Brussels realized the need of a harder policy against nuclear proliferation, in form of economic sanctions and trade restrictions.

Following the DPRK's first nuclear test in 2006, the EU began adopting restrictive measures against North Korea's nuclear proliferation. It transposed the majority of UN sanctions, such as freezing of assets, arms embargo and a travel ban on individuals related to the nuclear programme. In addition, Brussels started expanding its ban on imports and exports.

Moreover, the EU reinforced the UN sanctions regime with a series of autonomous restrictions, like the restriction of exports of additional items or the halting of the assets of individuals suspected of helping to the WMD proliferation programme of the DPRK. The second main point of the EU's strategy toward North Korea was, as it was already mentioned before, the consistent cooperation with Washington. The support that Brussels showed toward the UN sanctions gave credibility to the EU as an international actor.

As North Korea's nuclear activities advanced, the EU responded with stricter measures, and this attitude was also a way to demonstrate to the US Brussels' commitment to the battle against WMD proliferation¹¹¹.

The EU, however, still tried to open a dialogue with the DPRK with the aim of improving the human right situation of the country. Brussels' strategy of sanctioning North Korea, while trying to restart a dialogue was called carrots and sticks. In fact, despite the support that the EU showed to the United States, their policy was less harsh.

Even if the engagement of Brussels in the assistance to the development of North Korea drastically decreased, the EU was, and still is, one of the few countries that did not completely halt the provision of humanitarian aid, unlike the United States, which gradually reduced its assistance to North Korea.

The EU main fields of assistance were food provision, clean water and sanitation, and they were mainly provided through European organisations or UN bodies like the Food and Agriculture Organisation. Humanitarian assistance also became a channel for not closing completely the communication with the North Korea's regime. So, the term "carrots and sticks" meant that the EU did start having a harder position towards the nuclear activities and WMD proliferation of North Korea, and the result was the imposition of both UN sanctions and EU's autonomous restrictions against the DPRK.

On the other side, Brussels tried to compensate its harder policy with humanitarian assistance, in order to keep pursuing its objectives, which were the peace on the Korean Peninsula, nuclear and weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation and the improvement of the human right situation in the DPRK¹¹².

5.3 Active Pressure:

The phase of active pressure (2013-today) was an evolution of the carrots and sticks strategy. Since Pyongyang seemed not to cooperate with the international requests of non-proliferation, the EU abandoned its attempt to reopen a dialogue with North Korea and embraced the Japan' and United States' maximum pressure strategy. Even on the human

¹¹¹Supra n.107, pp. 47-53.

¹¹² Supra n.87, pp. 8-9.

right level, the EU, in cooperation with Japan, began presenting a series of human rights resolutions to the United Nations, since March 2013.

The EU resolution brought the UN to the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry with a one-year mandate to investigate human rights abuses in the DPRK. Moreover, the UN sanctions were not only accepted by the European Union, but also by its member states individually, which adopted the UN and the EU restrictive measures.

EU member states put a ban on trade in goods, services and technology, but also on EU investment in the DPRK, on the sale of refined petroleum products and crude oil, and the states blockaded the assets of named people and entities.

As regard of EU-DPRK dialogue, Brussels definitely stopped the talks after the June 2015's session. Some member state still tried to keep the dialogue open, like Spain in 2017 and Sweden. However, those attempts failed, since the EU diplomatic influence on the Korean peninsula weakened. Forasmuch as the EU played as a separate entity from the US, Brussels was a potential economic and diplomatic partner for Pyongyang, which praised the independence of the EU on foreign policy matters. Nonetheless, since the EU embraced the US hard policy and decided to cooperate both with Washington and the United Nations, Brussels was no more a key player in the Korean peninsula.

North Korean perception on the European Union as an international actor completely changed and the regime stated that Brussels was no longer a neutral player, but it was biased by Washington¹¹³.

6. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA:

An economic sanction could include restrictions on different things, such as commercial relations, trade, investments, and other activities. A sanction is either unilateral or multilateral. If the sanction is introduced by one country against another country, then we talk about unilateral sanction. When the sanction is the result of the cooperation of at least two states, it is called multilateral sanction. The UN sanctions, for example, are multilateral sanctions, which are imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations.

¹¹³ Supra n.75, pp. 9-11.

From 1990, multilateral sanctions became the preferred mean to prevent, manage, or resolve situations of violent conflict or threat to the world's security. After the approval of a UN sanction, every UN member state has to implement the sanction against the targeted country.

The case of North Korea's nuclear and WMD proliferation is considered to be one of the foreign policy problems that requires sanctions.

The United Nations, as well as countries autonomously, began to sanction North Korea in 2006, after the DPRK set out its first nuclear test. The UN Council imposed the Resolution 1695, which condemned any missile-related, nuclear-related and WMD-related activity of the DPRK and demanded for the application of restrictive measures that would have limited Pyongyang's access to missile-tested materials or technology to all of the UN member states.

In addition, the Resolution imposed a series of bans on trade and travel and other restrictions. The UN resolutions against North Korea became stricter as the DPRK showed no intention of actually denuclearizing the country. The following resolution, imposed inspections on North Korea cargoes, ban of travelling in the countries which were members of the United Nations for persons and entities which were connected to the nuclear-related or WMD-related activities.

The European Union, as a member of the United Nations, implemented the restrictions required by the UN sanctions against North Korea, but also added autonomous restrictions¹¹⁴.

6.1 EU Sanctions against the DPRK:

Since 2006, during its phase of critical engagement, the EU started to adopt a series of sanctions against Pyongyang.

All the updated restrictions are listed below.

¹¹⁴ Kim, Suk Hi and Martin-Hermosillo, Mario, *The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions Against North Korea*, McFarland & Company, 2013, pp. 100-101.

- **20 November 2006**

“First adoption of restrictive measures against the DPRK: transposition of UN sanctions (UNSC resolution 1718)”.

It was the transposition of most of the UN sanctions against North Korea, which had been previously outlined in UN Security Council resolution 1718 of 14 October 2006. In addition, Brussels added some autonomous sanctions. The restrictions included:

- arms embargo.
- freezing of assets and a travel ban on persons involved in the DPRK's nuclear programme.
- a ban on a range of imports and exports that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.
- export and import ban on luxury goods.

- **27 July 2009**

“Adoption of additional restrictive measures against the DPRK: transposition of UN sanctions (UNSC resolution 1874) and further EU autonomous measures.”

Introduction of additional restrictive measures against the DPRK, which were the following:

- UN interdiction to enter new commitments for financial assistance, or concessional loans to North Korea.
- UN ban to help North Korea through financial services or any financial or other assets or resources that could provide funds for nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other WMD-related programmes. In addition, the EU will set out a system of monitoring over the activities of financial institutions with certain banks and financial entities linked to North Korea.
- UN prohibition to issue public financial support for trade with the DPRK, in order to avoid a possible contribution to the DPRK's nuclear-related or ballistic missile-related or other WMD-related programmes.

- Inspection of all cargoes to and from North Korea, directed to the member States. if the State concerned has enough proofs that denounces that the cargo might contain items whose supply, sale, transfer, or export is prohibited under UNSCRs, supplemented by an EU measure of prior pre-arrival or pre-departure information requirement on all cargoes to and from the DPRK.
- UN obligation to inspect vessels on the high seas, if a Member State has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items whose supply, sale, transfer, or export is prohibited under UNSCRs.
- UN obligation to seize and dispose of items whose supply, sale, transfer, or export is prohibited under UNSCRs.
- UN prohibition to provide bunkering services, or other servicing of vessels, to DPRK vessels if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that they are carrying items whose supply, sale, transfer or export is prohibited under UNSCRs.
- UN obligation to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals of disciplines which could contribute to DPRK's proliferation of sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
- an EU ban on exports of further items which could contribute to DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.¹¹⁵

- **04 August 2009**

“Transposition by the EU of first UN designations”

Brussels adopted the UN Sanctions Committee's verdict to list the first five persons and eight entities subject to asset freezing and a travel interdiction.

¹¹⁵ Further information at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/history-north-korea/> last access: 18/06/2021.

- **22 December 2009**

“EU export ban on dual-use goods and first EU autonomous designations”

Approval of an export ban on all dual-use goods and technology catalogued in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. In addition, Brussels labeled the first persons and entities subject to asset freezing and to a travel ban. The reason was the support of North Korea's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related and other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or the provision of financial services or other resources that could contribute to nuclear proliferation.

- **29 June 2010**

“Adoption of a revised list of goods and technology banned for export and import”

The Council approved a regulation that presented a revised list of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that could support the DPRK's nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related or ballistic missiles-related programmes, that are subject to an export and import ban in order to maintain the effectiveness of the measures.

- **22 December 2010**

“New EU autonomous listings”

The EU added more persons and entities to the list of those subject to asset freezing and travel ban, bringing the total number to 14 persons and 10 entities.

- **19 December 2011**

The EU added even more person and entities to the list of those subject to asset freezing and travel restrictions.

- **18 February 2013**

“Transposition of UN Security Council resolution 2087 (new UN measures and designations) and additional EU autonomous measures”.

The EU adopted additional restrictive measures against North Korea, in order to respect the UN Security Council resolution 2087 of 22 January 2013.¹¹⁶

The EU added 4 persons and 9 entities to the list of person and entities subject to asset freezing and travel restrictions. This decision applied the UN Sanctions Committee decision.

- a restriction on export of defined goods which could contribute to the DPRK's weapons of mass destruction proliferation,
- a restriction on trade in gold, precious metals, and diamonds with North Korea,
- a restriction on delivery of new North Korea's banknotes and coins to or for the interest of the Central Bank of DPRK,
- a ban on the institution of branches and subsidiaries of North Korean banks or cooperation with them.
- Interdiction of issuing or purchasing DPRK public or public-guaranteed bonds.
- a ban on the launch of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of North Korean banks in the European Union. A prohibition on the institution of new joint ventures or the taking of an ownership interest by North Korean banks with banks in the EU.
- interdiction for EU financial institutions to establish representatives' offices or subsidiaries in the DPRK.

- **22 April 2013**

“Transposition of UN Security Council resolution 2094 of 7 March 2013”.

The European Union added 3 persons and 2 entities to the list of those subject to freezing of assets and to travel ban, in order to respect UN Security Council resolution 2094 of 7 March 2013.

The EU approved further limitations against Pyongyang, following the UN Security Council resolution 2094 (2013). These measures included:

¹¹⁶ Further information at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/history-north-korea/> last access: 18/06/2021.

- the adoption of ulterior asset freezing measures to individuals or entities that would have violated the sanctions.
- restrictions for EU financial institutions regarding the establishment and maintenance of cooperation and relations with the DPRK banks.
- interdiction to allow access to EU ports for DPRK, in case of suspicions about the vessel carrying prohibited items. An inspection needed to be done, in order to allow the vessel's access to EU ports.
- interdiction to allow any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, in case of suspicious that the aircraft might have carried prohibited items.
- enhanced vigilance over North Korea's diplomatic personnel.

- **14 April 2014**

“Review of the EU autonomous listings and updates of the UN sanctions list”.

The EU Council effectuated a review of EU autonomous listings. The Council decided that there was no longer the necessity of keeping one of the persons and one of the entities on the list.

In addition, the Council updated its previous sanctions to match them with the technical updates of the UN Sanctions Committee of December 2013.¹¹⁷

- **8 October 2014**

“Addition of one entity to the sanctions list transposing UN decision and de-listing of a deceased individual from the EU autonomous list”.

The Council decided to add one more entity to the list of those subject to asset freezing, following the July 2014's determination by the UN Sanctions Committee. Moreover, the Council updated its previous sanctions to match them with the technical updates of the UN Sanctions Committee of July 2014.

- **2 July 2015**

¹¹⁷ Further information at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/history-north-korea/> last access: 18/06/2021.

“Addition of one entity and six persons to sanctions list (EU autonomous listings)”

On 2 July 2015, the Council included one entity and six persons to the list of those subject to EU autonomous freezing of assets and travel ban.

- **4 March 2016**

“Addition of 16 persons and 12 entities to the sanctions list: transposition of UN listing (UNSC resolution 2270)”.

The Council decided to put sixteen more persons and twelve entities to the list of those subject to freezing of assets and travel restrictions, in order to transpose the updates imposed by UN Security Council resolution 2270. This resolution was approved on 2 March 2016, following the North Korea’s nuclear test on 6 January 2016 and its rocket launch on 7 February 2016.

- **31 March 2016**

“Further restrictive measures adopted: transposition of new UN sanctions (UNSC resolution 2270)”.

The Council added more restrictions against North Korea, following the UN Security Council resolution 2270, adopted on 2 March 2016, which included:

- an addition of export and import restrictions (except food or medicine) that could provide help to the development of the North Korean armed forces.
- an examination of all merchandises to and from North Korea and an interdiction of travelling on flights carrying prohibited items.
- a restriction on imports of some type of minerals from North Korea and exports of aviation fuel to North Korea.
- the banishment of North Korean representatives and third country nationals involved in the DPRK's illicit activities.
- additional monetary sanctions such as an obligation to branches, subsidiaries or representative offices of DPRK banks.

The Council also revised the list of individuals and entities subject to EU restrictions against North Korea by putting one entity, taking off another entity and updating the entries for six persons.¹¹⁸

- **19 May 2016**

“Addition of 18 persons and one entity to sanctions list (EU autonomous listings)”

The Council put eighteen more individuals and one entity to the list of those subject to EU autonomous restrictions against North Korea. The extension of the EU measures to more persons and entities brought the total number of persons subject to EU autonomous restrictions to thirty-two and thirteen entities.

- **27 May 2016**

“New restrictions on trade, financial services, investment and transport (EU autonomous sanctions)”.

The Council adopted additional restrictions against North Korea based on the belief that its actions are a serious threat to international peace and security in the region and worldwide. These restrictions complement and reinforce the sanctions regime imposed by UN Security Council resolutions on 2 March 2016, which include:

- in the trade sector: interdiction of the import of petroleum products and luxury goods from North Korea. Restrictions on the supply, sale or transfer of items, materials or equipment which are related to the dual-use goods and technology; prohibition of any public funds provision for trade with North Korea.
- in the financial sector: interdiction of transfers of financial support to and from North Korea. It is allowed only in case of previous agreements that authorized the transfer of funds in advance.

¹¹⁸ Further information at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/history-north-korea/> last access: 18/06/2021.

- in terms of investment: investments of North Korea in the EU are not allowed; as well as the investment by EU individuals or entities in the mining, refining and chemical industries sectors.
- in the transport sector: ban on any aircraft operated by North Korea carriers or developed in North Korea. These aircrafts are not allowed to do any activity: they cannot land in, take off or overfly over the EU territory. In addition, it is forbidden to vessel owned or managed by North Korea to berth in EU ports.¹¹⁹

- **8 December 2016**

“Addition of 11 persons and 10 entities to the sanctions list: transposition of UN listings (UNSC resolution 2321)”.

The Council updated the list of those subject to asset freezing and to travel bans and decided to insert ten more persons and ten entities, following the UN Security Council resolution 2321 of 30 November 2016.

- **12 December 2016**

“Council conclusions on the DPRK condemn nuclear tests”.

The Council condemned the nuclear tests and multiple ballistic missiles launches operated by North Korea in 2016. It is also stated that North Korea should re-engage in a dialogue with the international community, end its provocative behavior, and halt its nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation.

- **7 February 2017**

“Additional sanctions against the DPRK: transposition of UN sanctions (UNSC resolution 2321)”.

¹¹⁹ Further information at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/history-north-korea/> last access: 18/06/2021.

The Council adopted further restrictions against North Korea, in order to follow the UN Security Council resolution 2321 of 30 November 2016. The restrictions include:

- prohibition on transactions in coal, iron, and iron ore from North Korea.
- interdiction of imports of copper, nickel, silver, zinc, and statues from North Korea.
- interdiction on export of new helicopters and vessels to North Korea.
- existing restrictions became stricter in the transport sector and in the financial sector.
- regulations to prevent specialized training of North Korean citizens in fields which could contribute to the country's nuclear or weapons of mass destruction proliferation.
- regulations to freeze scientific and technical cooperation, except for medical exchanges.

- **6 April 2017**

“Additional sanctions against the DPRK (EU autonomous sanctions)”.

The Council adopted more restrictions against North Korea. The restrictions include:

- the addition of new interdictions on investments in North Korea, especially in sectors like the arms-related industry, metallurgy and metalworking, and aerospace.
- a ban on the provision of specific services to individuals or entities in North Korea, such as computer and technological support, as well as services connected to mining and manufacturing in the industry related to the proliferation of nuclear programmes and weapons of mass destruction, and services in the other areas prohibited for investment from the Union.
- the addition of four persons to the list of persons targeted by the EU's restrictive measures.

These measures complement and reinforce the sanctions regime imposed by United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The updated EU lists contains thirty-nine individuals and forty-two entities designated by the EU autonomously, which were added to the persons and entities targeted by the United Nations.

- **8 June 2017**

“Addition of 14 persons and 4 entities to the sanctions list: transposition of UN listings (UNSC resolution 2356)”.

The Council decided to put additional persons and entities to the table of those subject to an asset freeze and travel bans. This decision was the result of the UN Security Council resolution 2356 of 2 June 2017, approved after North Korea’s growing nuclear activities and weapons of mass destruction proliferation.

In addition, more persons and entities, previously targeted by the United Nations, are added to the table of those subject to restrictive measures against North Korea. Moreover, forty persons and six entities are labeled by the EU autonomously.

- **10 August 2017**

“9 persons and 4 entities added to the sanctions list: transposition of UN listings (UNSC resolution 2371)”.

The Council decided to put more six persons and four entities to the table of those subject to an asset freeze and travel bans.

This update was made with the objective of implement part of the new sanctions approved on 5 August 2017 by the UN Security Council resolution 2371 (2017).

62 persons and 50 entities, listed by the UN, are currently subject to restrictive measures against the DPRK. In addition, 38 persons and 5 entities are designated by the EU autonomously.¹²⁰

- **14 September 2017**

“Transposition of sectoral sanctions imposed by UNSC resolution 2371 (2017)”

The Council decided to change its restrictive measures, in order to impose stricter punishments against the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea. The implementation of a harder policy was the result of the transposition of the sectoral sanctions of the United Nations Security Council 2371 of 2017.

These new restrictive measures were focused on the interdiction of exporting specific merchandise, such as:

- coal
- iron
- iron ore
- seafood
- lead and lead ore

Additional sanctions target the DPRK's arms smuggling, joint ventures with foreign companies, banks and its ability to generate revenue and to access the international financial system.

Besides, the European Union adopted ulterior sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, they were sanctioned for:

- arms smuggling
- joint ventures with foreign companies, banks
- the DPRK’s ability to gain profit by the access to the international financial system.

¹²⁰ Further information at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/history-north-korea/> last access: 18/06/2021.

- **10 October 2017**

“Transposition of sectoral sanctions imposed by UNSC resolution 2375 (2017)”.

The Council decided to change its restrictive measures, in order to impose stricter punishments against the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea. The implementation of a harder policy was the result of the transposition of the new UN Security Council resolution 2375 of, which included:

- Prohibition of the sale of natural gas liquids to North Korea.
- Prohibition of the import of textile materials from the DPRK.
- Restrictions on the sale of refined petroleum products and crude oil to North Korea.
- Interdiction to give work authorisations to citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for EU member states.
- Member states approved not to renew work authorisations for North Korean citizens operating on their territory, except for refugees and other persons currently under the international protection.

The Council also put additional individuals and entities to the lists of those subject to an asset freeze and travel bans.¹²¹

- **18 October 2017**

“Council adds 4 vessels to sanctions list: transposition of UN listings (UNSC resolution 2375)”.

The Council, following the decision of the UN Security Council Committee in October 2017, inserted four vessels to its sanctions list, which are not allowed to enter EU ports.

¹²¹ Further information at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/history-north-korea/> last access: 18/06/2021.

- **8 January 2018**

“Council adds 16 persons and 1 entity to sanctions list: transposition of UN listings (UNSC resolution 2397)”.

Addition of six-teen individuals and one entity to the lists of those subject to an asset freeze and travel bans. This update was made in order to implement part of the new sanctions adopted by UN Security Council resolution 2397 of 22 December 2017.

- **22 January 2018**

“Council adds 17 persons to sanctions list (EU autonomous sanctions)”.

The Council has put more nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to its list of those subject to an asset freeze and travel bans.

The North Korean citizens were accused of being involved in illicit trade activities, as well as of having facilitated the evasion of UN sanctions.¹²²

- **26 February 2018**

“Additional sanctions against the DPRK: transposition of UN listings (UNSC resolution 2397)”.

The Council transposed the latest UN Security Council resolution 2397 into EU law:

- Stricter measures on the exports to North Korea. Among the forbidden merchandise there is all refined petroleum products, of which the allowed number of barrels went from 2 million barrels to 500,000 barrels per year.
- interdiction on imports from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of food and agricultural merchandise, as well as machinery, electrical equipment, earth and stone, and wood.
- interdiction on exports to North Korea of all industrial machinery, transportation vehicles, and expansion to all iron, steel, and other metals.

¹²² Further information at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/history-north-korea/> last access: 18/06/2021.

- ulterior restrictions on vessels where there are suspicions of the vessel being involved in the breach of UN sanctions.
- imposition to send back all North Korean workers abroad within 24 months, subject to applicable national and international law.

- **6 April 2018**

“Council adds 1 person and 21 entities to sanctions list: transposition of UN listings (UNSC resolution 1718)”.

The Council decided to put more individual and entities to the list of those subject to an asset freeze and travel bans. This update of the table was made in order to transpose May 2018’s decisions of the UN Security Council Committee.

- **15 July 2019**

“EU renews autonomous sanctions on individuals and entities”.

The Council updated its autonomous table of individuals and entities subject to restrictive measures and sanctions against North Korea and decided to confirm the validity of the existent sanctions, which were the imposition of an asset freeze and a travel restriction to the listed persons and entities. To 15 July 2019, the number was fifty-seven individuals that were targeted by the European Union autonomously and nine entities.

- **30 July**

“EU confirms autonomous sanctions for a year”.

Confirmation of the table of persons and entities subject to the restrictions and sanctions imposed by the European Union autonomously against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The number amounts to fifty-seven persons and nine entities, which were sanctioned for the accusation of being involved in nuclear activities, ballistic missiles programmes and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in North Korea. In addition,

some of the listed entities or individuals, were accused of attempting to evade the sanctions¹²³.

6.2 The Effectiveness of Sanctions against North Korea

The use of economic sanctions against targeted countries started after World War I, by the United States. The US President, Woodrow Wilson, declared that the implementation of sanctions was a peaceful method to solve foreign policy matters and keep the world far from violent conflicts. From the World War I on, many countries followed the example of the United States and the adoption of sanctions became one of the most used foreign policy strategies.

The United Nations adopted the sanctions as the main method to reach the denuclearization of North Korea.

However, empirical studies on the effectiveness of economic sanctions by Pape, showed that economic sanctions rarely succeeded and that in the majority of the cases they only caused a severe economic cost to the targeted countries but apart from that this strategy did not change the political behavior of the targeted country.

Pape, as well as others, was very skeptical about the effectiveness of economic sanctions to achieve major foreign policy goals, such as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the 1990s, the UN imposed thirteen embargoes, but none of them was actually helpful in halting the trade of weapons of mass destruction and the embargoes were systematically violated. However, only a few embargo breakers were adequately persecuted.

The reason behind the failure of the sanctions system lied in the fact that a lot of powerful states actually did not support the UN arms embargoes. Therefore, the violations of the embargoes were largely guided by political interests. Corruption of the state officials, who often cover up arms transfers, added to the list of the causes of sanctions and embargoes failure.

UN sanctions against North Korea also did not seem to work. The reason of this nonsuccess, especially in the case of the DPRK, was that UN sanctions against Pyongyang

¹²³ Further information at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/history-north-korea/> last access: 18/06/2021.

were strongly supported only by the United States. The UN sanctions, lacked of clarity. For example, when the ban on luxury good for North Korea was introduced, it was not defined what was considered to be a “luxury good”.

Therefore, the European Union had to autonomously make a list of banned items, which included expensive cigars, vehicles, and other stuff.

However, not every UN member state did a proper list of banned items, countries like China remained very vague about what a luxury good was. The RPC, in fact, sold more than \$136 million worth of luxury goods to the DPRK in 2009 alone, and China sold items like computers, cars and tobacco.

The attempt of destabilizing and manipulating the North Korean regime through a consistent imposition of sanctions turned out to be ineffective in putting an end to the development of weapons of mass destruction.

As regard as other UN member states, they seemed not to care about the sanctions. For this reason, more than 10 states failed to meet the requests of the UN sanctions.

In addition to that, the North Korea’s regime was always able to find a way to circumventing sanctions.

The UN did not realize that the DPRK was a country where sanctions were unlikely to work. First of all, as it was mentioned before, there were countries that never meticulously followed the UN sanctions and so sustained North Korea’s foreign trade, such as China and South Korea. A country like South Korea, was unlikely to impose severe sanctions on Pyongyang because Seoul was interested in maintaining a peaceful situation in the region. Despite this, South Korea was not really afraid of a military conflict with North Korea, since Seoul believed that nuclear proliferation was just a shield for the survival of the North Korean leadership. Moreover, Seoul was afraid of a possible reunification of the Korean Peninsula because of its economic cost and social chaos that it would have caused. Consequently, South Korea was very interested in preventing the collapse of the DPRK. As regard of China, the country had no intention to put North Korea in a difficult situation, since it would have brought the burden of dealing with an influx of North Korean refugees. Both China and South Korea had strategic, economic, and social reasons to keep on helping the DPRK. Therefore, North Korea kept on expanding its trade with the RPC and Seoul, and this relieved the country from the pressure of the UN sanctions.

The support of China was necessary in order to make the sanctions useful. Beijing was Pyongyang's main provider of fuel and food¹²⁴.

Conclusions

Throughout this chapter it was presented and explained how the interactions and relations between North Korea and the EU developed through the years, in every field.

This analysis has shown how such an isolated and diffident country made its way into the international community and the European Union, in particular.

After this analysis, it is clear that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has always been able to take advantage of its favourable geopolitical position, which has put North Korea at the centre of international disputes and interests.

The European and the international community's efforts to improve the human rights situation of the DPRK seem to have failed. Even if for some short periods of time North Korea accepted to open human rights dialogue sessions, in the end the country decided to stick to its authoritarian and oppressive policies.

As regards of nuclear and weapons of mass destruction proliferation, the situation has not improved. UN', US', and EU's sanctions have been imposed several times against the DPRK. The sanction regime and a stricter policy, however, has not produced any fruitful result.

¹²⁴ Kim, Suk Hi and Martin-Hermosillo, Mario, *The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions Against North Korea*, McFarland & Company, 2013, pp- 100-105.

CHAPTER 3

THE EU-DPRK RELATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Throughout the phase of research for this thesis, different articles and opinions about the role that the European Union was going to have in its engagement were found. As time passed by, the perception of the European Union as international actor changed, as well as the aims and decisions of Brussels itself and its member states.

This chapter focuses on the opinions of the international community about the role that the European Union was going to have in the Korean Peninsula.

After that, an analysis of the actual role that was given to Brussels by the United States, and other countries interested in the negotiations with the DPRK about the denuclearization is done.

An insight about the ROK-EU cooperation is presented.

It also deals with how the EU commitment in diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea changed throughout time, until today.

Finally, policy suggestions about the future of DPRK-EU relations are done.

1. INITIAL THEORIES ABOUT EU ENGAGEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA

As soon as the EU engaged in providing assistance to the DPRK and drafted the Strategy paper, the international community started to observe this new international actor in Northeast Asia.

1.2 ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

The papers and publications of the early 2000s underline that the European Union had no intention to engage in high politics matters that regarded the Korean Peninsula. Brussels' interests were mainly focused on creating trade and economic ties in the Northeast Asian region, since it was the new hotspot for the world economy.

Another reason that made that attracted the European attention turn to the Korean peninsula was the idea of being recognized as a trustworthy international actor by the international community.

The initial objectives of the European Union could be found in the 2002's Strategy Paper, which confirmed that Brussels had mainly economic interests in North Korea. As it was explained in the previous chapter, the Strategy Paper was drafted during a period of assessment of the EU common foreign policy.

This point of view was sustained by the evidence that the EU was neither geographically nor strategically bound to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. So even though the EU began providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea from 1995, and appeared to be serious about helping Pyongyang, the data showed that the aid that Europe was providing to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was derisory compared to other EU assistance programmes. North Korea was receiving only the 3.8% of the total amount of EU funds destined to food aid and humanitarian assistance programmes.

From 1998 on, however, the situation started to change. EU-DPRK trade volume increased and the EU quickly became one of the main trade partners of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Moreover, the EU started to understand the threat that nuclear proliferation could be for the international security. Even if it still did not autonomously engage in the nuclear issue (since it was a matter of high politics), the EU joined KEDO and fully supported the international community's commitment to the resolution of the nuclear threat.¹²⁵

1.3 INDEPENDENCE FROM THE US

Another early theory was that after the Cold War, the European Union was trying to settle a foreign policy that would have made the EU independent from the United States' influence.

This view started to grow after the September 11 terroristic attack, which hardened the policy of the US towards the DPRK. The United States decided to halt assistance

¹²⁵ Frank, Ruediger, *EU-North Korean Relations: No Effort Without Reason*, East Asian Institute Columbia University of New York and University of Vienna, Austria, 2002, pp. 103 - 108

programmes destined to North Korea and started sanctioning the country for its nuclear activities.

Washington new attitude towards Pyongyang became different from the one that Brussels decided to pursue.

After the terroristic attack, facing the threats of nuclear and weapons of mass destruction proliferation became a priority for both the European Union and the United States.

However, the policies were different. Washington hardened its policy and halted any provision of assistance to North Korea.

On the other side, after the North Korean nuclear crisis of 2002, the European Union decided to start its policy of critical engagement.

Europe's critical engagement was characterized by a carrot and sticks strategy, which meant that the EU was actually hardening its policy, through the imposition of sanctions and the halting of a lot of developing programmes. At the same time, Brussels did not stop providing humanitarian assistance and it did not abandon its intention of opening a peaceful dialogue with the North Korean regime.

The European Union thought that the US harsh strategy would have only led the DPRK to isolate itself again. Brussels policy-makers were convinced that a country in a state of economic crisis like North Korea could not change its domestic and foreign policy if it did not first improve its economic status.

So humanitarian assistance was not only a negotiation tool and a way of keeping the EU presence in the North Korean territory.

A curious information was that the 65% of the Europeans actually believed that the Union should have become a superpower and so be at the same level of the United States as an international actor. This was discovered by a survey of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, which also found out that only 14% of the Europeans agreed that the United States should have remained the only superpower.

Even if it seemed like the European Union was trying to get out of the Washington's influential sphere, it was Brussels itself that clarified its position and affirmed that the European Union had no intention to compete with the US. In addition to that, the EU stated that the Union would have supported the United States' decisions. It is

understandable that the EU remained on Washington side. At the time, the Union had a weak cohesion and a non-existent common foreign policy. Brussels was in phase of assessment, so it was impossible to be a competitor for the United States.

A possible response for the EU decision to engage with the Korean Peninsula lied outside of Europe. Since the Korean Peninsula issue was a threat for the United States, it was likely that Brussels was naturally dragged towards that region. The European interests in East Asia has to be seen in a context of global alliance between the United States and the European Union. Japan also played an important role, since it was a strong ally of Washington. It can be said that there was a sort of US-Japan-Europe triad. It was almost impossible for Brussels not to be involved in diplomatic relations with the DPRK.

This seems to be the right explanation for the beginning of EU-DPRK relations.¹²⁶

The EU commitment in the peace and security issue of the Korean Peninsula was probably a consequence of the US-Japan-Europe triad. Lately, as it was explained in the previous chapter, it also became a serious threat for the security of the European Union.

1.4 THE EU AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND PYONGYANG

At the beginning of EU-DPRK relations, the international community hoped the Union would have played the role of mediator between the harsh policy of Washington and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The EU had no strategic interests or military presence in the Korean Peninsula, so it seemed to be the perfect international actor that could have helped the international community to find a peaceful solution to the international threats of North Korea. It was also believed that Brussels could have helped South Korea to put an end to the Inter-Korean conflict by opening a dialogue with the DPRK.

These expectations, however, turned out to be hopeless for different reasons.

First of all, as it was mentioned before, the EU had no initial intention to be involved in high politics matters. The European Union decided to play a side role and focused on

¹²⁶ Ibidem pp. 108-112

low politics issues, such as humanitarian assistance and industrial development assistance.

Secondly, the United States were unlikely to give the Union the mediator role.

The fact that the EU's presence in the North Korean territory was initially welcomed by the regime, could have been used as a "hidden trump card" by the United States, which could have used the Union as a tool for its interests on the DPRK.

Nevertheless, this hypothesis never became reality.

Moreover, the European Union was still extremely weak as international actor, to play the role of mediator between Washington and Pyongyang.¹²⁷

North Korea decided to start diplomatic relations with the Union was mainly because of the need for economic help after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Nonetheless, initially the North Korean regime had different expectations from Brussels. Pyongyang hoped that Brussels could have counterbalanced the US influence in world politics.

However, as soon as the EU affirmed that it had no intention to compete with Washington, North Korea's leadership disappointment brought the regime to exclude the European Union from talks and negotiations about the resolution of the nuclear issue and the Inter-Korean matter.

On the other side, the Democratic people's Republic of Korea still welcomed EU's humanitarian assistance.¹²⁸

This initial situation eventually evolved in a series of EU-DPRK dialogues, so Brussels was actually able to open such an isolated country like North Korea to the dialogue and develop diplomatic relations with DPRK, that also involved talks about high politics issues, such as human rights and nuclear proliferation.

¹²⁷ Berkofsky, Alex, *EU's Policy Towards the DPRK – Engagement or Standstill?*, European Institute for Asian Studies, 2003, pp. 9-11

¹²⁸ *Ibidem* pp. 12-15.

2. EU POLICY TOWARDS THE DPRK WITH TRUMP

From 2015 on, a series of events brought to new tensions between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the international community.

First of all, the EU-DPRK dialogue about North Korea's human right situation was definitely suspended in 2015.

A year later, in 2016, the United States changed administration and elected Donald Trump as their president.

Trump's administration policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was no different from the previous administration one.

Washington kept on pursuing its hard policy, and it became even harder. Compared to prior presidents, Trump was the first to take into consideration a military strike against North Korea.

The threat of a possible conflict was actually a strategy that recalled the "madman theory". It was the name given to former US President Nixon's attitude during the Cold War. The objective of this strategy was to use the threat of the military attack as a negotiation tool that would have scared the opponent and provided a sense of recklessness and unpredictability.

In Trump's case, the President wanted to obtain the denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by menacing the regime with a military strike.¹²⁹

The "madman" strategy characterized for a while the policy of Trump's administration towards the DPRK. This attitude, however, was not successful.

The North Korean regime responded to the US threat with another threat, and President Kim Jong Un decided to show how powerful its military forces became.¹³⁰

The tensions between US and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea culminated in a nuclear crisis, which hit in 2017.

The crisis began with the testing of ballistic missiles and two intercontinental-range tests. In addition to this, Pyongyang conducted its sixth and largest nuclear test.

¹²⁹ Further information at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/madman-theory-trump-north-korea/542055/>

Last access: 13/06/2021

¹³⁰ Further information at: <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/beyond-the-2017-north-korea-crisis-deterrence-and-containment/>

Last access:13/06//2021

This response showed that Kim Jong Un was not afraid of Washington's intimidations. The determination of Pyongyang was also confirmed by the declarations of its Foreign Minister, Ri Yong Ho, who claimed that North Korea was planning to conduct a hydrogen bomb test explosion over the Pacific.¹³¹

Relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea became extremely tense during the 2017 nuclear crisis.

Some European member states harshly criticized the threatening attitude of the United States. German foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel stated that President Trump's reckless attitude was causing the risk of a nuclear war.

The European Union never changed its opinion of searching for a diplomatic solution.¹³²

3. THE ROLE OF THE EU

Today, the European Union could make a significant contribution to the international community regarding the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The international community, and specifically China and the United States, never took in consideration the European Union as an important actor for the resolution of North Korea's nuclear and weapons of mass destruction proliferation.

A clear example was the Korean Peninsula Energy Development (KEDO), joined by the EU in 1997. Brussels was never involved in the decision-making process of the organization, and the EU was only used as a provider of funds.

There are several reasons, however, that confirm that a partnership with the the European Union can be decisive for the denuclearization of North Korea.¹³³

¹³¹ Further information at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-11/focus/north-korean-missile-crisis>
last access: 13/06/2021

¹³² Oertel, Janka, *Europe's Options on the Sidelines of the North Korea Crisis*, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2017, pp. 1-2.

¹³³ Further information at: <https://www.38north.org/2019/04/rpachecopardo041719/>
last access:13/06/2021

First of all, it is important to underline that the European Union had achieved a great objective in EU-DPRK relations, since it was the only international actor that was able to hold a series of dialogues with North Korea on human rights. Rounds of talks stopped only recently, in 2015.

Secondly, EU member states are among the few countries that have their own embassies in Pyongyang. Swedish government has had diplomatic relations with North Korea for a very long time, since the 1950s. The United States have often used the Swedish embassy in Pyongyang to delegate work on behalf of Washington.¹³⁴

All of EU member state have ongoing diplomatic relations with the DPRK. Moreover, these countries have held autonomous dialogues with Pyongyang and never stopped providing humanitarian assistance.

Even if EU-DPRK dialogue on human right has been suspended in 2015, Brussels has always been ready for the opening of new rounds of talks with the DPRK.

Thirdly, it is important to underline that the European Union has no military presence in Northeast Asia. The absence of the military threat is one of the reasons that made interactions between the European Union and the DPRK easier.¹³⁵

These reasons make the EU the perfect partner for Washington, Seoul and Beijing.

The United States, South Korea and China, however, are still trying to solve the issue of the nuclear proliferation on their own. After several consultations among them, The United States decided to look for a dialogue with Pyongyang,

Between 2018 and 2019, President Trump and the North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un made history with the opening of the US-North Korea summit in Singapore.

This first meeting (2018) was concluded with the signing of a joint statement.

The two leaders expressed the will of establish new relations based of peaceful cooperation.

Years of threats seemed to have ended and President Trump also promised the halting of US-South Korea military exercises.

¹³⁴ Supra n. 132 pp. 2-4.

¹³⁵ Further information at: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/european-external-action-service/opinion/thurs-the-eu-is-irrelevant-in-the-korean-peninsula-right-wrong/>

Last access: 13/06/2021

In response Kim Jong Un affirmed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would have engaged in a complete denuclearization of the country.¹³⁶

In 2019, a second US-North Korea summit was held in Hanoi. This meeting, however, ended with no agreement and the summit broke up earlier.

It was asked a further step towards the dismantling of his nuclear arsenal to Kim Jong Un, but the North Korean leader had no intention to actually engage in the denuclearization of the DPRK. It was clear that Kim Jong Un was only looking for more concessions from Washington.¹³⁷

President Kim was willing to shut down the Yongbyon nuclear facility, in exchange for some sanctions relief. This exchange, however, was not equal, since Kim Jong Un asked for the elimination of several sanctions.

After the summit, some European countries, such as France, expressed their desire to contribute to the dismantling of North Korea's nuclear sites.

Nonetheless, the majority of US government officials were skeptical about the utility that an EU involvement in the matter could give to the denuclearization of the DPRK.

Washington believed that the dismantling of nuclear sites should have been done by North Korean engineers, since they built both the weapons and the associated infrastructure. The US wanted to supervise these engineers during the process.

Moreover, adding more actors to the negotiation table could have slowed down the process. European experts should have been informed about all of the stages that needed to be done, such as centralizing, disabling and destroying nuclear weapons, fissile material stocks and fissile material production facilities slated for elimination.¹³⁸

4. EU-ROK COOPERATION

The European Union and South Korea always had a similar view regarding the policy to follow in the engagement with North Korea. At the end of the 1990s, Brussels supported the implementation of Seoul's *Sunshine Policy*. This policy's main feature was that the

¹³⁶ Further information at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessment-singapore-summit>
last access: 14/06/2021

¹³⁷ Further information at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/27/politics/donald-trump-kim-jong-un-vietnam-summit/index.html> Last access: 14/06/2021

¹³⁸ Further information at : <https://www.38north.org/2019/03/rpachecopardo032619/>
Last access: 14/06/2021

South Korean government decided to look for dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

This characteristic has always been part of Seoul's strategy towards the DPRK.

In 2011, South Korean former president Park Geun Hye launched the *Trustpolitik* strategy towards Pyongyang. It was even more similar to the EU's policy of critical engagement.

South Korea's *Trustpolitik* was also a mixture of carrots and sticks.

Brussels publicly supported this new policy through the signing of the EU-South Korea Framework Agreement, in 2010. This agreement set out the areas of EU-ROK cooperation.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was never mentioned in the document, but many articles were easily attributable to North Korea's threats.

The agreement stated that the two parties confirmed that they would have cooperated on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cybercrime, money laundering, illicit human traffic, WMD delivery, and human rights abuses.

After the agreement, Brussels also supported ROK's establishment of the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI)¹³⁹ and the proposals that Seoul brought to the Organization, which involved the creation of inter-Korean relations based on trust.

The EU decided to promote the stability of the Northeast Asian region by publicly showing its support to NAPCI. In addition to that, the EU helped the Organization by sharing its experience with multilateralism. The European Union is the result of the cooperation and the ideas of several states into one organization. At the same time, Brussels could help the countries of Northeast Asia to establish a similar Organization by sharing its experience and its model of integration. This Organization could help the region reaching peace and security.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative was founded by the former South Korean President Park Geun Hye. "NAPCI is a multilateral process. It aims to build trust by accumulating conventions of dialogue and identifying areas of cooperation in non-traditional security related issues, as well as enlarging the scope of cooperation in traditional security related matters. The core tenets of NAPCI include: overcoming the Asia Paradox, pursuing East Asia's joint peace and prosperity, establishing a liberal international order within East Asia, and creating a vision for the Asian community."

Further information at: <https://theasanforum.org/the-northeast-asia-peace-and-cooperation-initiative-napci-a-vision-toward-sustainable-peace-and-cooperation-in-northeast-asia/>

Last access: 15/06/2021

¹⁴⁰ Pardo, Ramon Pacheco, *The EU and Korean Peninsula: Diplomatic Support, Economic Aid and Security Cooperation*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2017, pp. 4-5

5. CREDIBLE COMMITMENT

The European Union's critical engagement towards the DPRK needs to transform into a strategy of credible commitment. The engagement of Brussels should be divided in four different areas: political engagement, nonproliferation, implementation of restrictive measures and engagement with the DPRK's populations.

It is important that all of the EU member states understand the importance of a more serious engagement of the EU in the international commitment against nuclear proliferation. Nonproliferation is one of the key objectives of the EU Global Strategy, but not all of European states are aware of the seriousness of the North Korea's nuclear threat. The European Union does have a common foreign policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but all of the member states need to understand the seriousness of the DPRK's nuclear threat and so implement the EU policies and decisions in their own countries.

Ramon Pacheco Pardo, who currently is the Associate Professor in International Relations at King's College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Institute for European Studies of Vrije Universiteit Brussel¹⁴¹, wrote in one of his publications, what should the European Union do, in order to become more influential in the international context and so have a more efficient foreign policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He listed in points what the EU should do:

- Since the EU and its member states were able to normalize their relations with the DPRK, they should share their experience with the international community, in order to help other countries to understand what policy to pursue to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea.
- Have a more influential role in the international engagement for the denuclearization of North Korea.

¹⁴¹ Further information at: <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/people/ramon-pacheco-pardo> Last access: 17/06/2021

➤ Use the possibility of opening bilateral human-rights dialogue with the DPRK to improve the human rights situation in North Korea. Moreover, the EU should try use its dialogues to talk about other issues, such as the nuclear proliferation.

➤ Re-engage in the assistance to the development of the industry and economy of the DPRK.

Brussels should also focus on the development of sustainable energy by supporting the building of proliferation-resistant light-water reactors.

➤ Launce more EU projects on the North Korean territory, in order to cover more areas where assistance is needed, such as trade, investment, and energy.

➤ Engage in activities aimed at the denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.¹⁴²

¹⁴² Pardo, Ramon Pacheco, *The EU and Korean Peninsula: Diplomatic Support, Economic Aid and Security Cooperation*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2017, pp. 11-12.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agov, Avram, *North Korea's Alliances and the Unfinished Korean War*, Duke University Press, 2013
- Agreed Framework Of 21 October 1994 Between The United States Of America [sic] And The Democratic People's Republic Of Korea*, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1994
- Alexandrova, Iordanka, *The European Union's Policy Toward North Korea: Abandoning Engagement*, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 2019
- Anderson, Magnus and Bae, Jinsun, *Sweden's Engagement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, McFarland & Company, 2015
- Ballbach, Eric J., *The end of Critical Engagement: on the failures of the EU's North Korea strategy*, Elcano Royal Institute, 2019
- Berkofsky, Axel, *EU-North Korea – Engagement Course on Hold*, Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2008
- Berkofsky, Alex, *EU's Policy Towards the DPRK – Engagement or Standstill?*, European Institute for Asian Studies, 2003
- Bondaz, Antoine, *From Critical Engagement to Credible Commitments: a Renewed EU Strategy for the North Korean Proliferation Crisis*, EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, 2020
- Canyon, Deon and Cho, Sungmin, *Why We Need a Regional Approach for Crisis Management with North Korea*, Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2020
- Casarini, Nicola, *Promoting Security Cooperation and Trust Building in Northeast Asia The Role of the European Union*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2017
- Cha V.D. and Kang David C., *The Debate over North Korea*, The Academy of Political Science, 2004
- Chamberlin, Paul F., *Six-Party Talks: Time For Change*, Georgetown University Press, 2007
- Cherry, Judith, *Making Friends with the Hydra European Expectations of the EU—Korea Free Trade*, Brill, 2011
- Commission of the European Communities, *Towards a New Asia Strategy*, Brussels, 1994
- Connolly, Daniel and Hynd, Alexander M., *Learning to Share? A Cold War Solution for Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula*, McFarland & Company, 2019
- Dehshiri, Mohammad Reza and Shahmoradi, Hossein, *The EU's Role in Korean Peninsula Stability: Secondary But Important*, Global Asia, 2019
- Dingman, Roger, *Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War*, The MIT Press, 1988-1989

- Esteban, Mario, *The EU's role in stabilizing the Korean Peninsula*, Elcano Royal Institute, 2019
- European Commission, *The EC- Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004*, European Union, 2002
- European Commission, *The European Commission will give emergency food aid to North Korea*, European Commission – Press Release, 2011
- Feffer, John, *North Korea and the Politics of Engagement*, Peace Review, 1999
- Su, Fei and Saalman, Lora, *Report Part Title: Opportunities for Chinese—European cooperation on engaging with North Korea*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017
- Frank, Ruediger, *EU-North Korean Relations: No Effort Without Reason*, East Asian Institute Columbia University of New York and University of Vienna, Austria, 2002
- Hallinan, David, *Approaching Credibility: the EU as a Political Actor and Strategic Partner in Northeast Asia*, Royal Irish Academy, 2015
- Harrison, Selig S., *Did North Korea Cheat?*, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Mar 28, 2005
- Hong, So-Il, *KEDO as a Semi-Institutionalized Security Organization in Northeast Asia*, Iimin International Relations Institute, 2003
- Jung Jin-Heon and Lee Eun-Jeung, *Division and Unification*, GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, 2019
- Kang, Jin Woong, *Human Rights and Refugee Status of the North Korean Diaspora*, McFarland & Company, 2013
- KEDO Annual Report, 2003
- Kerr, Paul, *KEDO Suspends Construction of Nuclear Reactors*, Arms Control Association, 2003
- Kihl, Young Wan, *U.S.-DPRK Nuclear Accord And KEDO, {lrp}*, 1997
- Kim, Samuel S., *North Korea in 1995: The Crucible of "Our Style Socialism"*, University of California Press, 1996
- Kim, Suk Hi and Martin-Hermosillo, Mario, *The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions Against North Korea*, McFarland & Company, 2013
- Klose, Stephane, *The Role of External Security Actors in East Asia: How the EU and the United States shape regional security relations*, Egmont Institute, 2017
- Ko, Sangtu, *Vanguard of European Politics: The Role of Member States in the EU's Foreign Policy toward North Korea*, Institute of International Affairs, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, 2008

- Koh, B.C., *North Korea in 1987: Launching a New Seven-Year Plan*, University of California Press, 1988
- Lachmann, Niels, *Rivalry, Community, or Strained Partnership?*, L'Harmattan, 2013
- Lee, Hun Kyung, *North Korea's Desired Strategy and Approach toward the European Union*, McFarland & Company, 2007
- Lee, Moosung, *The EU the Six-Party Talks*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2017
- Lee, Moosung, *A Step as Normative Power: the EU's Human Rights Policy towards North Korea*, Springer-Verlag, 2012
- Lee, Shun-wha and Park, Chun Young, *Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy for Human Security: A Global and Regional Approach*, Institute of International Affairs, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, 2017
- Matveeva, Natalia, *Diplomacy Among Comrades*, McFarland & Company, 2020
- Moret, Erica, *Effective Minilateralism for the EU: What, when and how*, European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2016
- Musu, Costanza, *The EU and the Middle East Peace Process: a Balance*, Egmont Institute, 2007
- Oertel, Janka, *Europe's Options on the Sidelines of the North Korea Crisis*, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2017
- Pardo, Ramon Pacheco, *The EU and Korean Peninsula: Diplomatic Support, Economic Aid and Security Cooperation*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2017
- Pardo, Ramon Pacheco, *The EU and North Korea: stopping bombs, encouraging shops*, Real Instituto Elcano, 2014
- Pardo, Ramon Pacheco, *North Korea in Focus Towards a More Effective EU Policy*, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 2018
- Peters A., Eoyang M., and Twardiowski A., *What You Need to Know About Negotiations with North Korea*, Third Way, 2018
- Seliger, Bernhard, *The EU and North Korea – More than “Funding the Bill”?*, Institute for National Security Strategy, 2008
- Smith, Hazel, *‘Opening up’ by default: North Korea, the humanitarian community and the crisis*, The Pacific Review, 1999
- Steven E. Miller, Stephen W. Bosworth and Siegfried S. Hecker, *Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Program*, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2012
- Ulferts, Gregory and Howard, Terry L., *North Korean Human Rights Abuses and their Consequences*, McFarland & Company, 2017

Umezawa, Hana, *EU-ASEAN Cooperation in Transnational Security Threats: Prospects for Inter-regional*, Egmont Institute, 2014

Van der Meer, Sico, *Geopolitics and Nuclear Weapons: North Korean Provocations as a Tool for Regime Survival*, Egmont Institute, 2011

Westerman, Jaqueline, *Putin and North Korea: Exploring Russian Interests around the peninsula*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2018

Yoon, Deok-Ryong, *Economic Implications of Improved DPRK-EU Relations*, Institute for National Security Strategy, 2001

Web References

http://www.kedo.org/au_history.asp Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.iaea.org/about/overview/history> Last access: 20/06/2021

https://ec.europa.eu/echo/who/about-echo_en Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.wfp.org/overview> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://academicimpact.un.org/content/capacity-building> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.britannica.com/technology/nuclear-reactor/Types-of-reactors#ref155185>
Last access: 20/06/2021

https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/asia-and-pacific/north-korea_en Last access:
20/06/2021

[http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/
3.html](http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/3.html) Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/hard-currency> Last access:
20/06/2021

<http://www.fao.org/about/en/> Last access: 20/06/2021

[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI%28
2017%29608665](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI%282017%29608665) Last access: 20/06/2021

[http://hum.port.ac.uk/europeanstudieshub/learning/module-4-theorising-the-european-
union/intergovernmentalism-and-supranationalism/](http://hum.port.ac.uk/europeanstudieshub/learning/module-4-theorising-the-european-union/intergovernmentalism-and-supranationalism/) Last access: 20/06/2021

[https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-1478](https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1478) Last access: 20/06/2021

[https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-foreign-security-policy-cfsp/420/common-
foreign-and-security-policy-cfsp_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-foreign-security-policy-cfsp/420/common-foreign-and-security-policy-cfsp_en) Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/14/northkorea3> Last access: 20/06/2021

[https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/asia-europe-meeting-asem/2051/asia-europe-
meeting-asem_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/asia-europe-meeting-asem/2051/asia-europe-meeting-asem_en) Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx> Last access:
20/06/2021

<https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm> Last access: 20/06/2021

<http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/min2/> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/history-north-korea/> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/15/north-korea-missiles-cyberattack-hacker-armies-crime/> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.38north.org/2020/09/rpachecopardo091020/> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32020D1127&from=EN> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/07/eu-adopts-a-global-human-rights-sanctions-regime/> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-global-magnitsky-faq.pdf> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2021:099I:FULL&from=EN> Last access: 20/06/2021

http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari101-2019-ballbach-the-end-of-critical-engagement-on-failures-of-eus-north-korea-strategy Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.britannica.com/topic/axis-of-evil> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.aseminboard.org/about/overview> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://kcnawatch.org/article/163> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/madman-theory-trump-north-korea/542055/> Last access: 20/06/2021

<http://en.asaninst.org/contents/beyond-the-2017-north-korea-crisis-deterrence-and-containment/> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-11/focus/north-korean-missile-crisis> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.euractiv.com/section/european-external-action-service/opinion/thurs-the-eu-is-irrelevant-in-the-korean-peninsula-right-wrong/> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.38north.org/2019/04/rpachecopardo041719/> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessment-singapore-summit> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/27/politics/donald-trump-kim-jong-un-vietnam-summit/index.html> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.38north.org/2019/03/rpachecopardo032619/> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://theasanforum.org/the-northeast-asia-peace-and-cooperation-initiative-napci-a-vision-toward-sustainable-peace-and-cooperation-in-northeast-asia/> Last access: 20/06/2021

<https://www.kcl.ac.uk/people/ramon-pacheco-pardo> Last access: 20/06/2021

Images

Figure 1: <https://www.pinterest.it/pin/682787993505936787/> Last access: 20/06/2021

Figure 2: <https://annamap.com/north-korea/> Last access: 20/03/2021

Figure 3: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37335857> Last access: 20/06/2021

Figure 4: Kerr, Paul, *KEDO Suspends Construction of Nuclear Reactors*, Arms Control Association, pp.1-2.

Figure 5: Ko, Sangtu, *Vanguard of European Politics: The Role of Member States in the EU's Foreign Policy toward North Korea*, Institute of International Affairs, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, 2008, pp. 48-49.

Figure 6: <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/> Last access: 20/06/2021

Figure 7 : http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/home/2005-09/09/content_476294.htm

Tables

Table 1 : Matveeva, Natalia, *Diplomacy Among Comrades*, McFarland & Company, 2020, pp 9-10.

Table 2: Frank, Ruediger, *EU-North Korean Relations: No Effort Without Reason*, East Asian Institute Columbia University of New York and University of Vienna, Austria, 2002, pp. 99

Table 3: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_north-korea_en.pdf

Table 4: kedo annual report, pp. 12-15