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**The resurgence
of militant
Islamism in
Nigeria.**

A case study of Boko Haram

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ESTRATTO

Boko Haram ha assunto una forma nazionale all'inizio del 2000, come gruppo di ribelli islamici, operante principalmente nella parte nord-orientale della Nigeria con l'idea di trasformare la Nigeria in un paese islamico governato rigorosamente dalla Sharia. La missione del gruppo terroristico è stata la ricerca violenta della completa islamizzazione della Nigeria. Tuttavia, Boko Haram iniziò come una popolare organizzazione islamica che forniva servizi di assistenza sociale e insegnamenti spirituali in stretta aderenza alla Sharia nel nord-est della Nigeria, ma successivamente la sua ideologia radicale iniziò a entrare in conflitto con le autorità statali. Le violente agitazioni della setta sono arrivate a rappresentare una minaccia esistenziale per l'esistenza pacifica e l'unità del Paese.

Nel 2014, l'insurrezione di Boko haram aveva raggiunto il suo apice con oltre 2,5 milioni di sfollati dalle loro città e villaggi e 37.500 persone uccise come risultato.¹ Era lo stesso anno, il gruppo islamista ha attaccato un collegio femminile, rapendo 276 ragazze. Il rapimento ha provocato un'attenzione internazionale e una campagna sui social media con l'hashtag #BringBackOurGirls. Dal 2016 al 2017, il governo nigeriano è stato in grado di negoziare il rilascio di 21 ragazze, e successivamente di altre 82 ragazze attraverso uno scambio di prigionieri dei membri di Boko haram catturati, rimanendo 112 delle studentesse in custodia del gruppo terroristico.² Appena quattro anni dopo il rapimento di studentesse di Chibok, altre 110 studentesse sono state catturate dagli stessi militanti nella città di Dapchi, sempre nel nord-est della Nigeria. Successivamente, il governo nigeriano ha ottenuto il rilascio della maggior parte delle ragazze tranne una ragazza di nome Leah Sheribu che è rimasta fino ad oggi sotto la custodia di Boko haram a causa del suo rifiuto di convertirsi all'Islam.³

L'insurrezione è stata una preoccupazione di lunga data, non solo per il governo nigeriano ma per la comunità internazionale, soprattutto dopo l'attacco con autobomba del 2011 alla sede delle Nazioni Unite nella capitale nigeriana, Abuja, che ha provocato la morte di 18 persone.⁴ I militanti islamici stanno approfittando del processo di globalizzazione per portare avanti le loro aspirazioni, la setta si è espansa negli stati vicini (Ciad, Camerun e Niger). Tuttavia, i terribili attacchi terroristici dell'11 settembre 2001 negli Stati Uniti hanno giustificato lo spostamento della guerra globale al terrorismo in Nigeria, quindi, questo riposizionamento ha consentito al governo nigeriano di proscrivere Boko haram come gruppo terroristico il 4 giugno 2013, seguito dagli Stati Uniti il 13 novembre 2013. Ciononostante, Boko Haram rimane in gran parte imbattuto nonostante le affermazioni contrarie del governo nigeriano.

Ci sono state narrazioni contrastanti sulle cause della violenza di Boko Haram, la maggior parte delle ricerche attribuisce le cause alla religione e alla privazione economica, ma per comprendere meglio Boko Haram, questa ricerca affronta la domanda, quali sono le cause "alla radice"

¹ Council on Foreign Relation, Global Conflict Tracker,(January 21, 2021) <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/boko-haram-nigeria> , Accessed on January 21, 2021

² Stephanie Busari, several remaining missing Chibok schoolgirls escape from Boko Haram, CNN news (January 29, 2021), <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/29/africa/nigeria-chibok-girls-escape-intl/index.html> Accessed on January 21, 2021

³ BBC News, Kidnapped Dapchi schoolgirls freed in Nigeria, (22 March 2018) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43484146> Accessed on January 21, 2021

⁴ BBC news, Abuja attack: Car bomb hits Nigeria UN building, (27 August 2011) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14677957>, Accessed on January 21, 2021

dell'estremismo violento in Nigeria ?

Questa tesi esplora la visione secondo cui l'ascesa dell'ideologia islamica radicale in Nigeria che ha dato vita a Boko Haram non è un fenomeno nuovo e può essere compreso attraverso eredità storiche perché la Nigeria non è estranea ai conflitti religiosi in passato, ma il suo disturbo è diventato una preoccupazione maggiore a causa della sua frequenza dalla fine degli anni '70 agli anni '80 e '90. Alcune delle violenze religiose includono le rivolte distruttive del Maitatsine del 1980 nel nord della Nigeria che hanno portato a migliaia di morti, un'altra rivolta religiosa è stata innescata nel 1987 presso il College of Education di Kafanchan, nello Stato di Kaduna tra studenti cristiani e studenti musulmani, anche la crisi per la Nigeria, l'adesione all'Organizzazione della Conferenza Islamica nel 1986 ha scatenato un violento tumulto.

I nigeriani sono persone molto religiose nella misura in cui la fede religiosa influenza quasi ogni aspetto della loro vita personale e contribuisce indirettamente all'intolleranza. Tuttavia, la violenza religiosa è più frequente nel nord della Nigeria, comunemente perpetrata da musulmani che costituiscono la maggioranza religiosa in quella regione. La violenza religiosa è interreligiosa o intra-religiosa. La violenza interreligiosa si scontra spesso tra cristiani e musulmani che di solito sfocia in crisi interetniche. Alcune questioni socio-etniche sono mascherate in dimensioni interreligiose.

Questo progetto, inoltre, postula che la violenza del fondamentalismo è la risposta dal basso alla politica etno religiosa del governo nigeriano. I conflitti accusati di religione spesso ruotano attorno alle interrelazioni tra Islam e cristianesimo, che è il risultato di decenni di lotta per il potere politico che ha portato a una divisione etno religiosa surriscaldata e la lealtà etno religiosa a livello sia individuale che sociale nella politica regionale-nazionale che continua a rafforzare l'antagonismo interreligioso ed etnico sin dalla post-indipendenza nigeriana.

La Nigeria è uno dei paesi laici al mondo eppure ha abbracciato informalmente l'idea di mescolare lo stato con la religione. L'idea di funzionari eletti che utilizzano risorse statali per finanziare complessi ed eventi religiosi come mezzo per acquistare sostegno popolare ha spesso portato a una feroce battaglia per il controllo politico, nel frattempo, la crescente cultura del nazionalismo religioso in Nigeria, è la forza trainante della politica dell'identità. È il prodotto di anni di dominio senza compromessi dell'attivismo religioso, esacerbato dall'atmosfera di sfiducia reciproca, mancanza di tolleranza e sospetto prepotente. La maggior parte delle questioni nazionali vengono affrontate attraverso una lente etno-religiosa che ha portato a ripetuti disordini.

Questa ricerca sostiene che lo scopo della politica dell'identità non è solo vincere cariche politiche, ma utilizzare posizioni politiche per sostenere il corso dell'interesse religioso. La politica dell'identità ha sovraccaricato il modello di voto lungo linee etno religiose, mettendo in pericolo lo svolgimento delle elezioni per essere libero dalla violenza e corretto nel conteggio dei voti. La politicizzazione delle identità religiose polarizza gli elettori contro la coesione nazionale e ostacola l'elezione di leader credibili e competenti per il bene delle affiliazioni religiose. Sacrifica l'unità nazionale per l'appagamento dei motivi religiosi. I periodi elettorali sono sempre stati occasioni che offrono al pubblico l'opportunità di discussioni politiche per identificare le questioni socio-politiche ed economiche che devono affrontare, il modo migliore per affrontare questi problemi intrinseci e vari programmi politici di candidati in lizza per posizioni elettive. Una delle sfide che influenzano la discussione elettorale in Nigeria è l'insolito attaccamento dei sentimenti religiosi alla scelta dei candidati, in modo tale che i sostenitori della maggior parte dei candidati elettorali siano allineati in blocchi di voto di identità religiosa, ad esempio, "voto musulmano", "Voto cattolico", "voto anglicano", "voto pentecostale". Tuttavia, tali pratiche sono guidate da leader religiosi e organizzazioni religiose come l'Associazione cristiana della Nigeria (CAN) e il Consiglio supremo

nigeriano per gli affari islamici (NSCIA). Nella maggior parte delle questioni, la scelta di un candidato a una carica pubblica viene votata in riferimento all'affiliazione religiosa dei candidati. La politica dell'identità è anche perpetuata dalle società civili religiose in Nigeria che sono emerse per circostanze per propagare il loro interesse religioso nel timore dell'esclusione. Gli organismi religiosi hanno lo scopo di promuovere la coesione e la fiducia interreligiose, mentre servono come base per l'integrazione e la fratellanza tra i suoi aderenti, nonostante ciò, le organizzazioni religiose sono diventate l'opposto delle sue intenzioni. Il loro frequente bisogno di denunciare e criticare le politiche governative contrarie all'interesse della loro comunità religiosa indipendentemente dall'interesse nazionale le ha trasformate in strumenti nella politica nigeriana.

Nel frattempo, l'impatto della politica religiosa ha caratterizzato l'interesse nazionale della politica estera della Nigeria che spesso genera conflitti interni e proteste tra musulmani e cristiani. La regione del Nord si riallinea per relazioni esterne più strette con i paesi islamici mentre le cristiane preferiscono relazioni più strette con Israele e l'Occidente.⁵ L'ostilità religiosa è arrivata a un punto di reciproco sospetto in cui quando un musulmano presiede la nazione o dirige un governo parastatale, allora un senso di minaccia è avvertito dalle cristiane con voci che presumono che stia usando la sua posizione d'ufficio per islamizzare la Nigeria, lo stesso al contrario quando un cristiano assume un ufficio.

Questo studio evidenzia come la politicizzazione dell'etnia religiosa in Nigeria abbia preso una svolta dimensionale quando la Nigeria ottenne l'indipendenza nel 1 ° ottobre 1960. La lotta per l'indipendenza nigeriana e il processo di costruzione della nazione della Nigeria emersero due distinti tipi di leadership: da un lato, la leadership da il Nord, che era un conservatore di orientamento islamico, vedeva l'indipendenza della Nigeria governata e controllata solo dalla classe dirigente islamica Hausa-Fulani ed era sostenuta dall'amministrazione britannica, e d'altra parte, dal Sud era una più istruita occidentale nuova generazione di leader la cui credibilità di leadership deriva dalla speranza data al popolo di essere liberato dalle catene del colonialismo in una futura indipendenza di libertà, prosperità e progresso garantiti nel nuovo nigeriano governato da uguali nigeriani. Quest'ultima leadership non godeva del patrocinio del governo britannico. Grazie all'eredità coloniale della demarcazione irregolare dei confini regionali che ha assicurato un forte potere politico perpetuo al centro da parte delle élite musulmane del nord, mentre la parte meridionale cristiana più alfabetizzata della Nigeria domina nel settore della pubblica amministrazione in Nigeria, tuttavia, le élite meridionali istruite in Occidente non erano contente del controllo politico neocoloniale orientato del nord musulmano e il nord si sentiva trattato peggio di fronte al dominio del servizio civile da parte del sud. Questo scenario ha portato a una lotta costante per il potere, il sospetto e l'inimicizia che ha politicizzato nel corso dei decenni il sentimento religioso per il controllo elettorale. Questi eventi si sono moltiplicati nel nazionalismo etnico religioso e nell'intolleranza sia dei cristiani che dei musulmani, che ha dato origine al terrorismo islamico in Nigeria oggi.

Il quarto capitolo si concentra sulle varie contromisure per limitare il terrorismo islamico avviato sia dal governo che dalla società civile in Nigeria. Questi organi della società civile funzionano principalmente in qualità di reti di risposta della comunità nella parte nord-orientale della Nigeria. Le reti di risposta sono orientate alla base e sono strumentali per rafforzare il dialogo interreligioso, la convivenza pacifica, le società civili aiutano la gente del posto ad affrontare alcune sfide colpite

⁵ Afe Adogame, The politics of religious violence in contemporary Nigeria, (11 August 2015), <https://doi.org/10.5339/rels.2009.commonground.13> Accessed on October 10 2020

dai conflitti offrendo bisogni psicologici, spirituali e di sviluppo a bambini e donne che ha perso i mariti a causa degli insorti, oltre a formare le vedove in competenze professionali. Questi impegni comportano la collaborazione di leader religiosi locali sia della fede cristiana che musulmana, leader tradizionali, donne, giovani e anziani.

La ricerca sottolinea anche gli sforzi antiterrorismo del governo nigeriano e alcune politiche di sviluppo economico avviate per aiutare ad affrontare il divario educativo e migliorare le riforme sociali nella regione nord-orientale, tuttavia questo studio evidenzia alcune sfide dell'antiterrorismo in Nigeria, come come ; casi di esecuzioni extragiudiziali e richieste di tortura contro l'esercito nigeriano, impunità finali di imprenditori del conflitto e corruzioni all'interno delle agenzie governative, che approfittano delle loro posizioni nella campagna antiterrorismo per appropriarsi indebitamente di fondi.

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INTRODUZIONE

L'indice del terrorismo globale del 2015 ha classificato Boko Haram come il gruppo terroristico più mortale del mondo nel 2014, ideologicamente Boko Haram è contrario all'occidentalizzazione che ritiene contraria ai valori islamici, tuttavia, la notorietà di Boko Haram ha attirato l'attenzione dei media globali quando ha rapito 276 studentesse in una città di Chibok, Stato di Borno il 14 aprile 2014.

Nel corso degli anni, Boko Haram ha aumentato il livello di insicurezza nel nord della Nigeria, non ha mostrato segni di declino piuttosto si è evoluto da una setta locale che ha intrapreso un confronto aperto mal pianificato con la sicurezza dello stato a un gruppo terroristico transnazionale che utilizza sempre più ordigni esplosivi improvvisati, guerriglia, rapimenti mirati, omicidi e uso coordinato di donne kamikaze nelle sue offensive.

Per capire l'ascesa del fondamentalismo religioso, così Boko Haram in Nigeria, è fondamentale esplorare come l'esperienza della politica dell'identità storica abbia stabilito un modello per il futuro l'Islam politico e ha consentito una graduale influenza dell'ideologia salafita della Jihad in uno stato laico come la Nigeria.

La ricerca è strutturata in quattro capitoli. capitolo uno intitolato "Eredità storica", questo studio è incentrato sul tracciare ed esaminare l'esperienza storica e le narrazioni che sono venute a plasmare l'Islam radicale nel nord della Nigeria, questo articolo è sul punto di vista che Boko Haram è nato da una società storica esistente infrastruttura religiosa ultraconservatrice che risale alla Jihad del XIX secolo di Usman Dan Fadio che portò alla fondazione del Califfato di Sokoto.

L'esito della Jihad è un effetto ideologico di intolleranza che rifiuta la pluralità religiosa e le innovazioni teologiche. Questa ricerca valuta anche l'impatto degli inglesi colonizzazione sulla struttura socio-religiosa nel sistema politico della Nigeria settentrionale, lo studio discute ulteriormente la rinascita e l'impatto dell'ideologia salafita della Jihad in Nigeria in cui riflette Boko Haram -credo e missione.

Il secondo capitolo è intitolato "La politica, guidata da sentimenti etnoreligiosi", esplora il contesto politico più ampio nella politica di potenza nigeriana, che è stata un catalizzatore per la violenza religiosa e uno spazio di allevamento per l'estremismo nel corso dei decenni attraverso lo spiegamento della politica dell'identità per raggiungere obiettivi politici finisce dai politici, tuttavia, questa ricerca dimostrerà come l'interazione tra religione, etnia e politica di potere in Nigeria sia stata un fattore abilitante per la divisione e il conflitto in Nigeria, inoltre, la ricerca traccia l'evoluzione della politica religiosa nella costruzione della nazione nigeriana e nel cause di conflitti etnoreligiosi che hanno minato la legittimità del governo e la fiducia per la coesione e la sicurezza sociale.

Il terzo capitolo è intitolato "Il caso di Boko Haram", questo studio esplorerà la fase iniziale e l'evoluzione dell'insurrezione di Boko haram, la razionalizzazione delle sette, le dottrine chiave di Boko Haram, i suoi metodi di reclutamento e la fonte di finanziamento , esaminerà anche la transizione di Boko Haram dall'insurrezione locale a un gruppo terroristico espansionista.

Il quarto capitolo è intitolato "Contromisure contro il terrorismo"

Questo capitolo spiegherà il ruolo che le società civili hanno svolto negli sforzi contro il terrorismo in Nigeria, quindi, la ricerca mostrerà varie risposte del governo nel contrastare i gruppi militanti islamici in Nigeria, inoltre, questo studio mette in discussione i vari approcci antiterrorismo dello Stato che stanno violando i diritti umani di cittadini, sospetti e detenuti di Boko haram. Inoltre, questo studio definirà le sfide che devono affrontare gli sforzi di lotta al terrorismo, nonché le raccomandazioni politiche.

È dell'opinione che questa ricerca fornirà un contributo accademico alla letteratura esistente fornendo un'approfondita analisi storica e politica dell'estremismo religioso e della violenza in Nigeria. Questa ricerca si basa per la maggior parte su fonti secondarie che includono articoli di riviste, documenti politici ufficiali, giornali basati sul web, statistiche ufficiali, libri pubblicati e post sui social media. Inoltre, lo studio utilizza materiali di Amnesty International e Human Rights Watch per analizzare le violazioni dei diritti umani negli sforzi contro il terrorismo

Recensione di letteratura

Diversi studiosi hanno fornito varie strutture teoriche per spiegare l'emergere di Boko haram, Epelle e Uranta su "Economia politica della violenza: l'interpretazione del Boko Haram nigeriano" ha spiegato i fattori causali dell'emergenza di Boko Haram attraverso un punto di vista marxista, ripetendo che, le pessime condizioni materiali delle persone, spingono la ricerca di Boko haram per il controllo del governo e dei mezzi di produzione.¹

Allo stesso modo, Ogunrotifa si allinea su quel punto di vista, che Boko haram è il risultato finale di una società della classe operaia in cui le difficoltà socio-economiche sono prevalenti. Ha sostenuto che l'ascesa di Boko haram è stata una ribellione contro l'istruzione occidentale perché ha creato istituzioni del capitalismo che hanno consentito la corruzione della classe dominante.² Mentre gli argomenti di Ogunrotifa, Epelle e Uranta convalidano una prospettiva marxista come fattore causale dell'origine di Boko Haram, tuttavia, questa prospettiva non risponde alla domanda sul perché gli attacchi ricorrenti di Boko Haram prendono di mira principalmente gli spazi che rendono la classe lavoratrice / i poveri il vittime piuttosto che le élite che controllano sia la macchina del governo che i mezzi di produzione.³

Akinfala ha suggerito che il successo di altri gruppi militanti delle regioni del Niger-Delta (dove si trovano le ricche risorse petrolifere nigeriane) a portare armi contro il governo nigeriano a causa dell'emarginazione socio-economica e successivamente soddisfare le loro richieste con l'amnistia serve da impulso a Boko Emergenza Haram. L'autore ha affermato che l'ascesa di Boko Haram è il risultato dell'alto tasso di disoccupazione, povertà e corruzione che utilizza i

¹ Epelle, A. and Uranta, I. *Political economy of violence: interpreting the Nigerian Boko Haram*. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, Vol 5 No 10, (June 2014), p.528-535. <https://www.mcseser.org/journal/index.php/miss/article/view/2922/2884> , Accessed on January 24, 2021

² Ogunrotifa, A, Class theory of terrorism: a study of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, (2013), vol 3, p.27-59. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235332802_CLASS_THEORY_OF_TERRORISM_A_STUDY_OF_BOKO_HARAM_INSURGENCY_IN_NIGERIA/citation/download Accessed on January 24, 2021

³ Solomon Timothy Anjide, *The Behaviour and Evolution of Boko Haram: A Multi-Level Analysis*, PhD thesis, University of Lincoln.(November 2018), p.24-49, <http://eprints.lincoln.ac.uk/id/eprint/35710/> , Accessed on January 24, 2021

bisogni fondamentali di cibo, riparo e sicurezza di Maslow per affermare che la mancanza di questi bisogni è culminata nella militanza in Nigeria.⁴

Maiangwa, Onapajo e Uzodike nel loro articolo, "Battesimo con il Fuoco", hanno sollevato la loro argomentazione utilizzando un approccio teorico di una tesi di fallimento dello stato e una tesi di frustrazione-aggressività - per analizzare il fenomeno di Boko Haram in termini di sviluppo, intento, ed estremismo. Gli autori hanno sostenuto che l'incapacità del governo di fornire beni politici e un quadro giuridico per facilitare la legge e l'ordine dà luogo alla perdita di legittimità dello stato agli occhi dei suoi cittadini, di cui attori non statali intervengono per migliorare la situazione delle persone povere lese che loro seguaci ricompensano con assoluta lealtà. Secondo gli autori, fattori gravi come la disoccupazione e la povertà fanno precipitare sentimenti di alienazione e frustrazioni che guidano le aggressioni all'interno delle persone che le rendono vulnerabili all'estremismo religioso, quindi suscettibili di manipolazione a insurrezione.⁵

Il direttore della ricerca del Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG), la dott.ssa Sope Williams Elegbe, ha commentato il fattore di deprivazione economica che:

La crescente povertà in Nigeria è accompagnata da un aumento della disoccupazione. La disoccupazione è più alta al nord che al sud. Mescola questa situazione con l'Islam radicale, che promette una vita migliore ai martiri, e puoi capire la crescente violenza nel nord. Le statistiche del governo mostrano che gli stati del nord hanno la più alta percentuale di persone non istruite. Se colleghi la mancanza di istruzione e la conseguente mancanza di opportunità a un'elevata popolazione giovanile maschile, puoi immaginare che alcune aree siano in realtà un terreno fertile per il terrorismo.⁶

È degno di nota che molti lavori accademici su Boko Haram forniscono una visione approfondita delle dinamiche delle cause del terrorismo islamico in Nigeria. La maggior parte della spiegazione causale di Boko haram identifica che le condizioni socio-economiche, la corruzione e la religione nel nord-est della Nigeria sono un fattore principale per l'ascesa dell'insurrezione. Sebbene questi siano fattori che contribuiscono all'emergenza di Boko Haram, tuttavia anche la

⁴ Akinfala, F. Akinbode G. and Kemmer, I. Boko Haram and terrorism in northern Nigeria: (A psychological analysis). British Journal of Art and Social Sciences, (2014), vol.17, issue 1, p.115-136.

⁵ Maiangwa, Uzodike, Onapajo, "Baptism by Fire": Boko Haram and the Reign of Terror in Nigeria, Africa Today, Vol. 59, No.2 (Winter 2012), p. 41, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africatoday.59.2.41> Accessed on January 24, 2021

⁶ Paul Rogers, Nigeria: The Generic Context of the Boko Haram Violence." Oxford Research Group. Monthly Global Security Briefing, (April 30 2012), p.1-5, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/143259/12-04.pdf>, Accessed on January 2021

povertà, la disoccupazione e l'ingiustizia sociale sono una caratteristica ben consolidata che colpisce ogni spettro della società nigeriana, quindi, se la povertà è il fattore causale dietro il reclamo di Boko haram, allora perché gli altri stati in Nigeria non sono coinvolti nel terrorismo ?

Le difficoltà socio-economiche hanno creato un ambiente favorevole che ha prosperato l'accettazione da parte del pubblico di Boko haram e ha svolto un ruolo chiave dietro il successo di Boko Haram nell'attrarre e trattenere le reclute. La teoria della deprivazione economica di Boko Haram spiega meglio "come" Boko Haram è in grado di ottenere reclutamenti diffusi, ma non è un precursore dell'emergere di Boko Haram. Olojo nella sua pubblicazione intitolata "Il nord travagliato della Nigeria: interrogatorio sui fattori del sostegno pubblico a Boko Haram⁷".

Gli studi nella letteratura esistente su Boko Haram sono vitali per comprendere i fattori che hanno influenzato o motivato l'esistenza di Boko Haram. La revisione della letteratura riporta alla domanda "quali sono le cause profonde di Boko Haram". Quindi, questo studio si basa sulla letteratura esistente sull'insurrezione di Boko Haram e tenta di colmare le lacune nella letteratura esistente rintracciando la causa principale dell'emergere di Boko haram e spiegando come le esperienze storiche dell'islamismo militante in Nigeria non rendano Boko haram un nuovo fenomeno, e come l'eredità storica dell'estremismo è arrivata a plasmare l'evoluzione della setta Boko haram attraverso la controversa politica dei sentimenti etno-religiosi. Tuttavia, vale la pena notare che la politica basata sull'identità religiosa ha sempre svolto un ruolo intrinseco in tutto il processo di costruzione della nazione della Nigeria che va dall'amministrazione coloniale all'attuale dispensa democratica. Tuttavia, Boko Haram è il prodotto di decenni di politiche di potere religioso forgiate dall'intersezione con esperienze storiche di estremismo religioso.

⁷ Olojo, Akinola, *Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram*, International Centre for Terrorism - The Hague 4, no. 7, (2013) <https://icct.nl/publication/nigerias-troubled-north-interrogating-the-drivers-of-public-support-for-boko-haram/>, Accessed on January 23, 2021

HISTORICAL LEGACY

All terrorist violence, ‘Islamic’ or otherwise, is unjustifiable, unforgivable, cowardly, and contemptible. But just because we condemn does not mean we should not strive to comprehend. We need to keep asking, ‘why’⁸.

1.1 INTRODUCTION OF ISLAM IN NIGERIA

Islam is predominately the religion of the vast majority of the people in Northern Nigeria today, the introduction of Islam to Nigeria goes a long way through the conquest of North Africa by Arabs in the seventh century that enabled the way for the spread of Islam into West Africa. At the onset, it was regarded as the religion of traders and only traders and the ruling families became Muslims.⁹ However, traders from Hijaz in present-day Saudi Arabia and Foreign scholars first introduced Islam in the Borno Empire Northeast of present-day Nigeria between the seventh and the eighth-century.¹⁰ Thus by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the influx of itinerant Islamic scholars from the trans-Saharan trade routes began to gain influence in the intellectual, cultural, political, and religious sphere of the entire Kanem-Bornu empire.¹¹

Nonetheless, their impact and connections to the ruling elites ascended them to key political positions as trusted advisors while some were employed by the local kings as judges despite their relatively small numbers as compared to the native religionists, in addition, the appointed judges who in turn applied Islamic law wherever possible in the administration of the kingdom. It could be argued, therefore, that although Islamic law was not completely enforced and did not lead to

⁸ Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), pp. 291–292.

⁹ Maliki, Abdul. "Islam in Nigeria ." *Islamic Quarterly* 9, no. 1 (1965): 30.

<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1304274045?accountid=17274>

¹⁰ Adeleye, R. A. "Hausaland and Borno" In Ajayi, J.F.A. and Crowder, M. eds, *History of West Africa*, 2nd. ed. London, Longman Group Ltd. 1971. Pg. 560.

¹¹ Peter B. Clark, "west Africa and Islam", *A Study of Religious Development from the 8th to the 20th Century* (London: Edward Arnold Ltd, 1982), p.71.

any radical transformations in those communities where it was administered, its overwhelming influence upon the people's lifestyle cannot be denied.¹²

The selected Muslim judges only exercised and discharged their duties in the application of Islamic law as required and to the interest of the rulers who appointed them.¹³ In view of that, Islamic law scholar Yushau Sodiq, argued that the Islamic scholars might not have preferred for the full application of Islamic law probably because of fear of losing their political positions, which they had won only because of their literacy. Therefore, they compromised with pagans and developed the attitude of tolerance, which the situation forced on them. Whether they were pleased with that circumstance cannot easily be determined. Nevertheless, the warm reception offered by the indigenous people to the Muslim traders on their first arrival to Northern Nigeria prevented the Muslims from developing a militant attitude towards the locals. The Muslims saw the indigenes as friends and co-religionists, even though the natives were idol worshippers.¹⁴

Yaji of Kano was the first Hausa ruler to convert to Islam in 1370,¹⁵ subsequently, the other Hausa states gradually converted to Islam, their conversion and adoption of Islam as state religion strengthened their image as spiritually powerful. This influence reinforced their own powers reaching as far to Sahara, Sudan and to North Africa, consequently solidifying their political and trade connections to the larger Islamic world which they could call upon for aid in battle or personal affairs.¹⁶

Borno empire and the Kings of the Hausa states developed a closer relationship with other far-reaching Islamic powers through the diffusion of ideas from the wide propagation of Islamic learning from Itinerant scholars who often settled for a long period of time to establish Islamic schools. This Qur'anic schools produced students trained to become part of the learned Islamic theologians and magistrates, nevertheless, the nobles made the annual pilgrimage or hajj to

¹² Peter B. Clark, "west Africa and Islam", p.71

¹³ A. A Gwandu, "Aspect of the Administration of Justice in the Sokoto Caliphate and Shaykh Abdullah ibn Fodio's Contribution to it", *Islamic law in Nigeria: Application and Teaching*, ed.S.K. Rashid (Lagos: Islamic Publication Bureau, 1986), p.11.

¹⁴ Sodiq, Yushau. "A History of Islamic law in Nigeria: past and present" . *Islamic Studies* 31, no. 1 (1992): p.88. Accessed July 11, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/20840064.

¹⁵ Spencer Trimingham, *A History of Islam in West Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p.107–8.

¹⁶ Toyin Falola and Mathew Heaton, *A history of Nigeria* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.71.

mecca not only to show their devotion but also to integrate with the Islamic world as well as, to explore trade opportunities.¹⁷

It is critical to note that association with Islam became a means to gain power and prestige as the religion became embraced and practiced by the Borno and Hausa elites but it remained only superficial as the vast majority of their subjects were not Muslims but ancestral worshipers, as such, in order for the ruling class to maintain the religious connection with their people who were practicing various indigenous beliefs, they infused Islam with the preexisting traditional beliefs and practice.¹⁸

1.2 THE JIHAD AND THE CREATION OF SOKOTO CALIPHATE

Shaihu Usman dan Fodio was known to be one of the most pious and eloquent intellectuals in Islamic reformation in West African in the nineteenth century. He was born in 1754, a descendant of the Fulani tribe from Senegal. He studied traditional Islamic practices after which he became an itinerant Islamic teacher and preacher which took him to various cities of Hausa land,¹⁹ however Dan Fodio grew critical of how the Hausa ruling class and natives practiced Islam which was a mix of pre-existing native custom practices and cultural beliefs that were central to the identity of Hausa people . These practices were considered by him to be Islamically impure, he also accused the Hausa rulers of corruption and its injustices for its exorbitant livestock taxes on mostly the Fulani pastoral farmers, determined to make a change to ensure the public institutions were in line with Islamic principles, Usman dan Fodio began not only to enlighten the people which aimed at promoting stringent adherence to the traditional

¹⁷ Toyin Falola and Mathew Heaton, *A history of Nigeria*.p.71-72

¹⁸ Toyin Falola and Mathew Heaton, *A history of Nigeria*.p.73

¹⁹ Sodiq, Yushau. *A History of Islamic law in Nigeria* .p.88-89

Sunni-Maliki school of thought but also started to create sociopolitical awareness for the Fulanis who were treated as aliens despite having settled in the Bornu and Hausa land for centuries.²⁰

Dan Fodio began a fiery religious purification and social justice campaigns across the Hausa land which spread his popularity among the people, his assertive teachings and increase in followers²¹ as he connected more with ordinary people, began to raise suspicion amongst the ruling class, and subsequently, resistance from Hausa rulers whose status quo felt threatened. Nevertheless, tensions started to mount from both the religious and political leaders who became against Usman dan Fodio's Islamization agenda, as a result, the Hausa kings enacted legislation, openly denouncing the preaching of Islam to the people, rejecting the call for men to wear turban and women to wear a veil as dictated by the sharia law and mandating all converts to revert to their ancestral worship except those born under Muslim families who could only be allowed to practice Islam.²²

The escalation of the tension between the rulers and the Muslim community represented by the charismatic preacher Usman dan Fodio led to a failed assassination attempt on his life forcing him to flee Degel to Dugu, from where he assumed the title of Amir al-Munin (Commander of the believers against unbelievers). This movement is often interpreted as almost in equivalence in Islam to the 'Hijra', that is, the flight of the Prophet Muhammad from the corruption of the city of Mecca to set up a religious community in Medina.²³

The Hausa kings waged war, Usman dan Fodio declared Jihad, a holy war against the Hausa dynasty in 1804, this shares an almost similar pattern of Jihad Boko Haram declared against the Nigerian Government following the extrajudicial killing of its founding leader Muhammed Yusuf while in police custody,²⁴ however, historians like Afigbo argue that Usman dan Fodio's Jihad was a holy war declared and prosecuted with a prospect of establishing an unadulterated form of

²⁰ Nachande, Caroline Kaluba. "Beyond Terrorism and State Polity: Assessing the Significance of Salafi Jihad Ideology in the Rise of Boko Haram." *Journal of Pan African Studies* 10, no. 9 (2017):p. 112-113. Gale Academic OneFile (accessed July 13, 2020).

²¹ Peter B. Clarke, *West Africa and Islam* (London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1982), p.113

²² Hunwick, J.O.. "The Nineteenth Century Jihads". *In Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, edited by Anene J.C and Brown, G.N, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press,(1966) p.291-304.

²³ Nachande, Caroline Kaluba. "Beyond Terrorism and State Polity: Assessing the Significance of Salafi Jihad Ideology in the Rise of Boko Haram." *Journal of Pan African Studies* 10, no. 9 (2017):113. Gale Academic OneFile (accessed July 13, 2020).

²⁴ Nachande, Caroline Kaluba. "Beyond Terrorism and State Polity,p.113

Islam in a predominantly polytheistic society²⁵. Nonetheless, Dan Fodio followers were devoted and well-coordinated in fighting to preserve their essential belief of pure Islam justice and fairness. After four years of the holy war, Dan Fodio and his followers emerged victorious from an all-out bloody war bringing the entire Hausa land under the control of the Jihadist ending to the Hausa dynasty thereby establishing the Sokoto Caliphate in 1808.²⁶

It is argued that the socio-economic and political marginalization of the Fulani people in Hausa and Borno created cohesion among them that nursed deep feelings of resentment against the existing ruling elite, which became more a desire for Fulani nationalism than a religious purification, nevertheless, this deep resentment may have been harnessed and rallied upon by Usman dan Fodio into socio-political justice for the Fulanis, however, the distribution of power after the Jihad permits credence to this political undertone as the Caliphate was mostly ruled by the Fulani's.²⁷ Moreover, Dan Fodio's religious charge coincided with the prevalent economic grievances of the peasants too, the broadness of his message gave an appeal in which many underlying grievances of the lower class found their expressions that attracted Shaihu more followers and supporters.

The success of the Jihad resulted in a federal theocratic state structure divided into two divisions, Eastern section with Sokoto as capital administered by his son Muhammed Bello and the West section under the administration of Abdullah his brother. The Caliphate also included over 30 different emirates under its political structure with extensive autonomy for the emirates who recognize the spiritual authority and pledges allegiance to the caliph, the state was extensively focused on economic and military expansion with an organized Islamic jurisprudence. In 1811, Usman dan Fodio retired from administration to devote himself to religious studies. His son, Muhammed Bello, succeeded him after his death in 1817CE as Amir al-Mu'minin (Leader of the Faithful) and became the ruler of the Sokoto Caliphate which was the most powerful and largest state south of the Sahara at that time before the arrival of the British colonists.²⁸

²⁵ Afigbo, A.E. The Causes of Jihads of the 19th Century in Western Sudan, in Anene, J.C. ed. *Essay in African history 19th and 20th centuries*. Ibadan: Onibonoje (1999). p.65-119.

²⁶ Sodiq, Yushau. "A History of Islamic law in Nigeria: past and present". p.90

²⁷ Afe, A. (2003). "Political Changes in the Nineteenth Century" in Arifalo S.A and Ajayi, G. (eds), *Essays in Contemporary Nigerian History*, Vol 1, Lagos, First Academic Publishers

²⁸ Thomas Hodgkin, "Usman dan Fodio", *Encyclopædia Britannica*, January 01, 2020
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Usman-dan-Fodio> (Accessed 20 July 2020)

1.3 THE IMPACT OF THE JIHAD ON THE RISE OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

Despite the fact that the Jihad led by Usman dan Fodio was primarily, on the aspiration of Islamic purification, His successor's motivations were on the need for power and material interests posing behind religious vigor, thus, Islam became the appealing instrument of engaging in socio-economic and political rancor. Iwuchukwu argues that, just like the 1804 Jihad had toppled political leadership of cities beyond Hausa land and installed Fulani as emirs, that is how other succeeding groups especially Boko Haram have sought to dethrone every leadership not instituted by them²⁹.

Omolewa maintained that Usman dan Fodio mobilized his followers to use force in possessing lands occupied by those he regarded as infidels. Resorting to the concept of Dar al-Harb, the author further stated that just as Usman dan Fodio called on his warriors to turn the lands of Hausa states and beyond into the lands of the faithful-Dar al-Islam, that has been the approach undertaken by these religious-militant movements who have terrorized the country.³⁰ This further buttresses that Usman dan Fodio promoted revolutionary doctrines that encouraged and emboldened Muslim's rejection of a religious and political state of affairs that conflicted with pure Islamic principles.

Sahara Reporter columnist Remi Oyeyemi came across an excerpt from West African Pilot Newspapers dated on December 30, 1964, and the then Kaduna-based "The Parrot" newspaper dated October 12, 1960, in which Sir Ahmadu Bello who was the Sarduna of Sokoto and first premier of Northern Nigeria was quoted saying

The new nation called Nigeria should be an estate of our great grandfather, Usman dan Fodio. We must ruthlessly prevent a change of power. We must use the minorities in the

²⁹ Iwuchukwu, M. *Exploring Religious and Cultural Pluralism as Assets Towards Muslim-Christian Relationship in Northern Nigeria* Bulletin of ecumenical theology, 26. (2014). p.7-34

³⁰ Omolewa, M. *Certificate history of Nigeria*. Longman:Ikeja.(2008),p.116

North as willing tools and the South as conquered territories and never allow them to rule over us or have control over their future -Sir Ahmadu Bello.

The conquest of the sea is now in sight. When our god-sent Ahmadu Bello said some years ago that our conquest will reach the seashores of Nigeria, some idiots in the South were doubting its possibilities. Today, have we not reached the sea? Lagos is reached. It remains Port-Harcourt. It must be conquered and taken. –Mallam Bala Garuba, West African Pilot Newspaper, December 30, 1964.³¹

The effects of the post Jihad in Northern Nigeria is an assimilation of Islamic consciousness into Hausa sociocultural identity. The Islamization of this identity enforced and policed by the Jihad leaders and its successors still holds sway in the influence and contribution of the rise of several radical Islamic movements and religious violence, which notable among them are- the Izala movements, the Maitatsine uprising, the Shiites, the Sharia warlords, Herdsmen Militia and Boko Haram. While this proposition may be arguably denied, it is a fact that extremist sects like Boko Haram are in pursuit of a mission of instituting and enforcing strictly Islamic puritanism of the Sharia rule over a secular state Nigeria. both goals were similar in the objective behind Shaihu Usman dan Fodio’s Jihad and establishment of a caliphate which showed an unmistakable dejection with the practice of Islam without Sharia, it is noteworthy that this idea was the basic doctrine Dan Fodio commented upon in his numerous pamphlets, for instance, he wrote that,

A Muslim should not willingly dwell in a land of unbelief, but if he has the means at his disposal, should migrate from it to the abode of Islam, should wage the jihad against those in the Abode of war (the unbelievers). This is the more urgent if the unbelievers are making a pretense of Islam which may lead others astray or are claiming their actions to be in the name of Islam while in fact, they contradict the law of Islam. Furthermore, Muslims should come to the aid of other Muslims who are being attacked or oppressed by unbelievers.³²

³¹ Remi Oyemijan, Àmòtèkùn: Malami, Go To Hell! By Remi Oyeyemi · January 15, 2020 <http://saharareporters.com/2020/01/15/%C3%A0m%C3%B2t%C3%A9k%C3%B9n-malami-go-hell-remi-ovevemi> Accessed July 20, 2020

³² Hunwick, J.O . “The Nineteenth Century Jihads “ in Anene J.C and Brown, G.N (eds), *Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press, (1966). pg.296

From the above statement, it is significant that the most important triumph of the 1804 Jihad was its ideology of which, its burning torch has been a core motivating factor for past and present religious intolerance against the secularism of Nigerian polity, that has served as bases for rise of radical Islam in Northern Nigeria.

1.4 THE IMPACT OF COLONIALISM ON THE RISE OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

The British incursion to colonialism started when they began to police the African coast to suppress the slave trade which was outlawed in 1807 in Britain. As an alternative to the slave trade, commerce in the lucrative palm oil, cotton, rubber, cocoa was increased and internal infrastructure was developed to facilitate the safety and profitability of these markets. By 1820, the British had already made contacts with the Sokoto Caliphate and the discovery of quinine against malaria in the 1950s made it easier for the colonial missionaries and explorers to push further into the hinterland making treaties and trade policies in both south and Northern part of Nigeria³³.

The British outreach and influence in the region increased gradually over the 19th century through its military intimidation and conquests of the natives, on the other hand, the rest of the European powers came to acknowledge the British dominance in the area after the Berlin conference of 1884-1885 which led to subsequent effective control the region. However, before 1900, all the Northern part of Nigeria came under the administration of the British Government through the Royal Niger Company, by January 1st, 1914 the colony and protectorate of southern Nigeria and Northern Nigeria were merged together and named Nigeria³⁴

³³ Harvard Divinity School, *The Colonial Era* (1882-1960), <https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/for-educators/country-profiles/nigeria/colonial-era-1882-1960>. Accessed on 23 July 2020

³⁴ Ezeogidi, Cynado, *British Conquest, Colonization and Administration in Nigeria* (March 28, 2020). <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3563173> Accessed on July 22, 2020

The British colonists were known to adopt a system of administration in the northern Nigeria called Indirect rule,³⁵ which the first Governor-General of Nigeria Lord Lugard explained as

The policy of the government was that these Chiefs should govern themselves not as independent but as dependent rulers,³⁶

However, the Caliph came under the British rule while the emirs were appointed by the Colonial governor and made in charge of the native administrations. This policy was used because the Caliphate already had a developed system of administration based on Islamic principles which cannot easily be abolished,³⁷ and it was a very low cost for the colonial administration to run. The divide and rule system of the British administration marked a distinct ethno-religious contrast among Nigerians that has made religion and ethnicity a marker of identity rather than national consciousness which has been a divisive factor, often exploited by faith-based identity politics to trigger extremism and violence in the Nigerian polity.

The British colonists restricted missionary work and western education in the Northern part of Nigeria for the sake of preserving order and colonial interest. More so, the British did not want to have an educated group of people challenging their colonial regime, hence, they built schools which were the few schools infused with Islamic ideas yet they were not popular with the people as the Quranic schools.³⁸

During the decolonization process which involved countless constitutional conferences that prepared Nigeria for Independence in 1960, one of the considerable concerns was on the structural differences between the Northern and Southern colonies of Nigeria. Decades of the colonial policy of the British administration curtailing western education and the spread of Christian missionaries in the Northern region, unfortunately, resulted to a very poor human capital in the Muslim North as compared to the Christian South and an institutionalized Islamic way of life that is incompatible with civil demands of the Nigeria State. A central question that was a considerable concern and contention was whether the Islamic law was to be subordinated

³⁵ L, D, King, (2016). "The Civilizing Mission and Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria: A Contradiction". *International Journal of Social Sciences*, 4(8), 1-8. <https://doi.org/10.11114/ijss.v4i8.1688> July 24 2020

³⁶ A.H.M. (Ed), Kirk-Greene. (1968). Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria: A Documentary Record; A reprint of the Report by Sir F.D. Lugard on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria 1912-1919. London: Frank Cass and Co.p.70

³⁷ Hallouch, Nadjouia. 2018. "British indirect rule and Islam in Northern Nigeria (1900-1940)". *people: International Journal of Social Sciences* 4 (2). https://doi.org/10.20319/pijss.2018.42.249267_pg10 July 24, 2020

³⁸ Hallouch, Nadjouia. *British indirect rule and Islam in Northern Nigeria* .p13

to the criminal code of common law, however, the 1951 constitutional conference, later known as the Macpherson constitution charted a legal ground to accommodate the Sharia law³⁹. Today Islamic law is recognized as one of the three main legal systems in Nigeria which includes as follows English, Native, and Islamic laws.⁴⁰ Furthermore, in the year 2000, the 12 Northern states in Nigeria adopted the Sharia law as their basis of governance while the Southern part of Nigeria dominated by Christians maintained the British legal system, an order the British colonizers knowingly imposed to create and nurture an identity consciousness culture to advance their interests.⁴¹

1.5 ASSESSING SALAFI-JIHAD IDEOLOGY

In order to understand Salafi Jihadism, we have to explore the principal beliefs of Salafism and the catalysts that triggered its evolution from Salafism to Salafi-Jihadism. Salafism is basically, a theological movement in Sunni Islam whose interest is in purifying the faith,⁴² they consider themselves as the purest Muslims because of their complete dedication to imitate the life of Prophet Muhammad.

The term Salafism literally means pious forefathers, which is understood to refer to the first three generations of Muslims.⁴³ The basis of this understanding can be found in Sahih al-Bukhari's compilation by Persian scholar Muhammad al-Bukhari, which cites the Prophet Muhammad as saying :

The best of my community [i.e. Muslims] are my generation, then those who come after them and then those who follow them.⁴⁴

³⁹ Olufemi Vaughan *Religion and the making of Nigeria* Duke University Press Durham and London 2016. p.89-90

⁴⁰ Mahmud, Sakah Saidu.. "Islamization in West Africa – Nigeria". *African Studies Review*, 47(2),2004. p.83-95

⁴¹ Osaghae E.E and Suberu R. T. 2005." A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria". *Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity*, Working Paper No. 6. University of Oxford,p.16-17

⁴² Haykel, Bernard "On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action," in Meijer, Roel, *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement*, London: Hurst, (2009), pp. 143-168.

⁴³ Graeme Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*, (New York, NY: Random House, 2017), p.6.

⁴⁴ Bernard Haykel, "On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action," in *Global Islam's New Religious Movement*, ed. Bernard Haykel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p.34.

However, The Sunnis strongly believe that those who were the companions to Prophet Muhammad were in the truest form of Islam and as such, hold their words and actions in the highest regards and authority with the Hadiths (a written collection of traditions based on the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad).⁴⁵ It is important to note that Salafism exclusively derives its theology and law from both the Quran and Hadiths and strictly follows its rules, guidance, and literal interpretations. It seeks a return of these authentic beliefs and practices of the first three generations of Muslims, which rejects any innovative religious thoughts or man-made religious law and on the other hand, the Salafist-Jihadists share this similar beliefs and practices with Salafism. In fact, it is how they derived many of its violent scriptural references which serve as justification for their methodology and behavior.⁴⁶

Politically, the Salafism movement does not have a homogenous orientation, rather it is broadly divided into three categories: purist Salafism, activist Salafism, and Jihadist Salafism.

Purist Salafism: This group often called quietists are also referred to as scholastic Salafism (*al-Salafiyya al- 'ilmiyya*), they focus on educating individuals about the teachings of Salafism and admonishing those who steer away from its teaching.⁴⁷ Through teachings, education (*tarbiya*), cleansing (*tazkiyah*), and da'wah among Muslims, they oppose the reinterpretation of Islamic principles and promote segregation between Muslims and non-Muslims,⁴⁸ as well as between men and women. In addition, The Purist Salafists are apolitical and use nonviolent methods in their propagation, they are often aligned with the Saudis religious elites who emphasize obedience mindedness especially to the political ruler of the Saudi State.⁴⁹

Activist Salafism: These groups are also called politico-Salafist, they agitate against the democratic process such as voting in elections which they consider to be irreconcilable with Islamic faith and practices, they are very active in societal social issues and seek to exact control in some areas, usually taking a strong opposition against authorities and campaign against political leaders whom they seek to undermine. However, they desire to impose Islamic reform

⁴⁵ Haykel, "On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action," 34.

⁴⁶ Kelvington, Michael "Global Salafi-Jihadism Ideology: The "Soft Power" of the Enemy", International Institute of Counter-Terrorism, https://www.ict.org.il/Article/2366/Global_Salafi-Jihadism_Ideology#gsc.tab=0

⁴⁷ Bernard Haykel, "On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action.p.49

⁴⁸ Svenska Dagbladet, " Islamologists: Jihadists are in the minority among Salafists"

<https://www.svd.se/islamologer-jihadisterna-ar-i-minoriteten-bland-salafisterna> Accessed on July 27 2020

⁴⁹ Magnus Ranstorp, "A practical introduction to Islamist extremist", *The RAN center of excellence*. p.7

upon the State structure, oftentimes, they target their rhetoric on Western regimes as the far enemy while the bash Arabs and the godless nations as the near enemy.⁵⁰

According to Bernard Haykel, this group advocates non-violent political activism in Muslim and non-Muslim countries, they have adopted some of the teachings as well as the political consciousness of the Muslim Brotherhood is seeking to effect political reform and in aspiring to power.⁵¹

Jihadist Salafism: According to Wiktorowicz, “although there is consensus among Salafists about this understanding of Islam, there are disagreements about the use of violence.⁵² The Jihadist Salafist falls into this militant spectrum that believes in arms struggle against their far enemies and near enemies, they are known for their notoriety to employ the use of violence against their enemies and the existing political order which they radically pursue as a political goal for the establishment of a Caliphate.⁵³ Nevertheless, they are inspired by history to pursue an Islamic state aspiration, Salafi-Jihadists reject the conventional rules of the declaration of Jihad which can only be declared when invaders pose a threat to the Muslim community.⁵⁴ It is Islamically forbidden to kill the vulnerable, for instance: the women, children, old people, the wounded and as well as it is Islamically expected to show mercy to the peaceful who offer no resistance, but contrary to these traditional rules, the Salafist-Jihadist opt for total war, suicide bombings and indiscriminate slaughter of men, women, and children.⁵⁵

Al Qaeda, ISIL, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab et cetera are largely famous examples of Jihad-Salafist motivated terror groups whose extremist and violent quest is to revert back to the sacrosanct first-generation Islamic system. However, the catalyst that triggered the evolution of Salafism to Salafi-Jihadism ideology can be traced to the Egyptian intellectual reformist movements of the early 20th century, which were brought about by the anti-colonial sentiments sweeping across the Arabian States after the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate, in which the

⁵⁰ Magnus Ranstorp, A practical introduction to Islamist extremist. p.8

⁵¹ Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action.p.48

⁵² Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (2006): p.218.

⁵³ Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action.p.49

⁵⁴ Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, *Reliance of the Traveler: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law*, ed. Nuh Ha Min Keller (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 1994), 599; Oliveti, *Terror’s Source*, p.46.

⁵⁵ Al-Misri, *Reliance of the Traveler*, 603; Hasan Al-Banna, “Jihad,” in *The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America*, ed. Jim Lacey (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), p.9.

Salafists desired to restore the golden age of Islamic fundamentalism practiced by the first-generation Muslims.⁵⁶ Subsequently, one of the most notable Islamic social reformers and theorist of Salafi-Jihadist ideology was Sayyid Qutb, whose belief was that Islamic laws and religious values have been corrupted by Western influence, materialism and faithlessness and subverted by apostate Muslim regimes. He demanded a strict puritanical interpretation of Islamic principles through Jihad by overthrowing these regimes.

Qutb attributed the cause of the crisis in the Muslim world to the Western civilization that is soulless, immoral, and dehumanizing which is pushing Muslim states into *Jahiliyyah* (Pre-Islamic period, or ignorance). He proposed for a Muslim vanguard to lead the global Jihad against the Apostate Muslim regimes and the West, thus Sayyid Qutb laid the doctrinal foundation that conceptualized Salafi-Jihadist Ideology⁵⁷. According to Sayyid Qutb:

This movement uses the methods of preaching and persuasion for reforming ideas and beliefs; it uses physical power and jihad for abolishing the organizations and authorities of the *Jahili* system which prevents people from reforming their ideas and beliefs but forces them to obey erroneous ways.⁵⁸

The influence of Sayyid Qutb is frequently cited by Salafi-Jihadis, al-Qaeda, and ISIS when they demand for the removal of *Jahiliya* government based on the Quranic verse:

Whoever does not rule by what God hath sent down—they are unbelievers” (5:48).⁵⁹

Salafi Jihad ideology began to take shape due to three pivotal events in the late 1970s, the siege of the grand mosque in Mecca, the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion. However, King Faisal's plan to secularize and modernize Saudi Arabia infuriated the Saudis Salafists who accused him of westernization and betraying Islamic principles, this led to the seizure of the grand mosque in Mecca by a group of militant Salafists.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002), p.55

⁵⁷ Richard H. Shultz, *Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement*, USAF Institute for National Security Studies USAF Academy, Colorado April 2008 p.59

⁵⁸ Qutb, Sayyid. *Milestones*. Damascus: Dar al-Ilm, 1964.p.55.

⁵⁹ Al-Misri, *Reliance of the Traveler*, 599; The Koran, 72; Quintan Wiktorowicz, “A Genealogy of Radical Islam,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28 (2005): 80.

⁶⁰ ThoughtCo, *1979 Seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca the Attack and the Siege That Inspired Osama bin Laden*, <https://www.thoughtco.com/seizure-of-grand-mosque-in-mecca-2353586> Accessed on July 29 2020

Dr. Afshin Shahi, a senior lecturer in Middle East studies at Bradford University explained that:

The Egypt–Israel peace treaty and the recognition of Israel by Egyptian president Anwar Sadat finally paved the way for the demise of Arab nationalism. The end of Arab nationalism as a powerful mobilizing force, in turn, set the stage for the empowerment of Islamist ideologies, which began to drastically change the socio-political landscape of the Arab world. At this stage, we began to see further politicization and instrumentalization of Islam to fill that ideological gap. More importantly, in 1979 the Iranian revolution took place and resulted in the downfall of the secular-nationalist Shah of Iran. The Iranian revolution realized the immense political potential of Islam in modern times, and the demonstration of the political capacity of Islam by the Iranian revolution militarized the regional political culture, which resulted in further instability in the region. Activist movements with either a political or religious agenda were now convinced Islam was a winning card that could be employed as a potent mechanism to politicize, mobilize and radicalize the masses in order to confront authoritarian states across the Middle East.⁶¹

Saudi Arabia's relationship with the United States led to Ayatollah Khomeini's attacks on the Al-Saud family's legitimacy as a departure from Prophet Muhammed principles, his question on the Saudi's credibility as the guardian and custodian of Islam's holiest places further deteriorated the relationship between the two nations. The Islamic Republic of Iran called the Saudis :

a bunch of pleasure-seekers and mercenaries and asked how long must Satan rule in the house of God.⁶²

Iran's policy to spread revolution throughout the Muslim world intensified the traditional enmity between the Shia and Sunnis.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 contributed to the formation and exportation of Salafi-Jihad ideology. The Afghan war gave a sacred cause to mobilize and unite Muslims to join the mujahideen in Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet forces. Salafi-Jihad inspired terror groups like Al Qaeda which emerged from the mujahideen in

⁶¹ Fanack, "The Seizure of the Grand Mosque: The Event that shook Saudi Arabia", <https://fanack.com/religions/seizure-of-the-grand-mosque/>, Accessed on July 29 2020

⁶² Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 234

the 1980s under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden, in fact, evidence shows that Osama Bin Laden invested about \$3 million in northern Nigeria to promote Salafi Jihadism.⁶³

Both the Islamic revolution in Iran and the embarrassment suffered from Salafi-Jihadist siege of the Grand Mosque directly challenged the legitimacy of the al-Saud monarchy as the source of Islamic leadership and devotion. Such pressure forced the Saudi government to support and initiate various strict domestic Salafi reforms, Salafi education, and to fund the export of Salafi-Jihadism in Muslim countries and the Afghan war as evidence of its commitment to pure Islam. The Muslim opposition of Soviet occupation in Afghanistan turned Afghanistan to a training camp of numerous Islamists who gained experience in combat and a new understanding of Islam in a context of Salafi-Jihadist Ideology that eventually mutated into Al-Qaeda and the global spread of Salafi-Jihadism.

1.6 THE IMPACT OF SALAFI-JIHAD IDEOLOGY IN NIGERIA

Salafism ideology has established a thriving inroad as the fastest growing strand of Islam in Africa,⁶⁴ which has been made possible over the decades by Saudi Arabia's propagation and funding of countless grassroots religious centers, provision of scholarship opportunities, building schools, Mosques and funding Mass media such as-Sunnah Tv, which its vibrant presence has increased the general acceptance of Salafism over other Islamic movements specifically Sufism.

What becomes concerning is the Salafi narratives that have been built around historical precedents that are exploited to revive and justify Jihadism in Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa. However, It is important to note that, there is a methodological variance between the pre-colonial Jihads and the Islamic resistance groups against colonialism in the Sahel-Sahara on one end, and

⁶³ Nachande, Caroline Kaluba. "Beyond Terrorism and State Polity: Assessing the Significance of Salafi Jihad Ideology in the Rise of Boko Haram." *The Journal of Pan-African Studies* 10 (2017): p.121.(accessed July 29, 2020)

⁶⁴ Ousmane Kane, *Moderate Revivalists: Islamic Inroads in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Harvard International Review 29, no. 2 (2007): 64-68

the present-day Jihadists in the region on the other end. These contemporary Jihadists have effectively replicated and crafted distinct theological and Jurisprudential works of classical Sahel-Sahara scholars on Jihad to their own purpose and presented it as teachings and writings in a way that gives Salafi-Jihadism narrative a legitimacy that makes it easy and appealing to transmit in Islamic schools.⁶⁵

Salafism in Northern Nigeria originated from the sermons and writings of Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi,⁶⁶ who had a lifelong relationship with Saudi Arabia. In 1978 in the city of Jos, *Jama'atu Izalatil Bid'ah Wa Ikamatis Sunnah* (The Society for the Removal of Innovation and the Establishment of the Sunnah), commonly known as the Izala movement was founded under the leadership of one of Gumi's disciples Malam Isma'ila Idris which relies dependently on the teachings of Sheikh Abubakar Gumi. The organization was an outspoken wide-reaching influence in Northern Nigeria that spread across the neighboring countries. Izala and Gumi received significant funding from Saudi Arabia which enabled the organization to embark on a radical campaign to attack Sufism and seek to replace it with Salafist doctrines,⁶⁷ which has never happened in the history of Islam in Nigeria.

Aside from the Izala movement's strong criticisms of the well-established Sufi tradition (*Qādiriyya and the Tijāniyya*) in Northern Nigeria, members of the Izala movement were very intolerant to the Sufi brotherhoods, often acted violently against Sufi followers by destroying or occupying their mosques. The movement also sought to prohibit all un-Islamic practices, interpretations, and beliefs that are not derived from the Quran and Sunnah, religious innovations (*bid'ah*), and enshrine the implementation of the Sharia law, and as a result, the movements were very appealing to the youths and students.⁶⁸

The first wave of Izala's history was marked by its anti-Sufi movements, while the second generation of Izala members was characterized by the influence of returned graduates of the

⁶⁵ Abdulbasit Kassim & Jacob Zenn, *Justifying War: The Salafi-Jihadi Appropriation of Sufi Jihad in the Sahel-Sahara*, <https://www.hudson.org/research/13480-justifying-war-the-salafi-jihadi-appropriation-of-sufi-jihad-in-the-sahel-sahara>. Accessed 1, August 2020.

⁶⁶ Umar, M. S.. Changing Islamic identity in Nigeria from the 1960s to the 1980s. In L. Brenner (Ed.), *Muslim identity and social change in sub-Saharan Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press (2015a).p.158–165

⁶⁷ Ramzi Ben Amara, "The Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship to Sufis and Perception of Sharia Re-Implementation", PhD thesis, Universität Bayreuth, Bayreuth Graduate school of African Studies, (2011), p.157-170.

⁶⁸ Afriquedecryptages, *From Rebellion to Cooperation: The Evolution of the Izala Movement in Nigeria* <https://afriquedecryptages.wordpress.com/2019/06/14/from-rebellion-to-cooperation-the-evolution-of-the-izala-movement-in-nigeria/>. Accessed on 1 August 2020

Islamic University of Medina, Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s. This new generation shifted from local Islam affairs to a form of more radical African Salafism largely influenced by Wahhabism that led to a faction in the movement, a sub-movement called *Ahlussunnah* was led by one of the most important radical theological figures by the name Adam Ja'afar.⁶⁹

One of the students of Adam Ja'afar and a member of the sub-branch of Izala's *Ahlussunnah*, named Muhammed Yusuf, developed more radical ideas of Islam, that he rejected all secular aspects of Nigerian society, forbade his students from western education and working for the government.⁷⁰ However, this caused a rift between Izala preachers and Yusuf which eventually led to Yusuf's breakaway from Jaafar's teachings to start his own movement called *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad*, popularly known as Boko Haram. The main difference between Boko Haram and the teachings of the Izala movement is that the former uses violence to implement its ideology.

In 2007, Ja'afar was assassinated by members of Boko Haram as the conflicts between the two groups became irreconcilable and violent, the Izala movement has distanced itself from Boko Haram and from Jihadism but it is still blamed by the locals and elites for stoking the flame of violent rhetoric into Nigerian Islam which led to the birth of Boko Haram.⁷¹

Another Islamist group with a great number of followers that have influenced political Islam for decades in Nigeria is the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (I.M.N). The group is a Shia minority sect founded by Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky in the 1980s. Al-Zakzaky's Islamic activism started as a Muslim Brotherhood influenced student leader in Ahmadu Bello University, Kaduna State, in the 1970s⁷². He became interested in the Iranian model of the Islamic revolution of 1979 and seeks to replicate a similar Islamic ideology through the propagation of Shia Islam. Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) has approximately four million followers. The movement rejects the secular authority of the Nigerian government which it claims to be an ungodly system and views itself as

⁶⁹ Roman Loimeier, *Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria*, Africa Spectrum, Vol. 47: 2-3, (2012), pp.96

⁷⁰ Gérard Chouin et al. "Body count and religion in the Boko Haram crisis", in Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (ed), *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria*, African Studies Centre: Leiden, (2014), pp. 213-236, p. 215.

⁷¹ Afriquedecryptages, *From Rebellion to Cooperation: The Evolution of the Izala Movement in Nigeria*.

⁷² Jacob Zenn, A Shia "Boko Haram" Insurgency or Iranian Proxy in Nigeria? Not So Fast, *Terrorism Monitor*, (Volume: 17 Issue: 15, July 26, 2019), <https://jamestown.org/program/a-shia-boko-haram-insurgency-or-iranian-proxy-in-nigeria-not-so-fast/> Accessed on 16 July 2020

an optional government⁷³. In the course of the cold war era, the organization was known for its strong advocacy for an Iranian-style Islamic state system as an ideological alternative to Socialism and capitalism. The sect calls for the abrogation of the Nigerian constitution in their rallies using a nonviolent approach and agitates for an Islamic revolution that focuses on enlightenment and Islamic studies⁷⁴.

According to the 2019 Human Right Watch report, numerous activists and senior members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) have been violently cracked down by the Nigerian State security which has cost the lives of Zakzaky's six sons. However, in 2015, more than 300 members of the sect were killed when they attempted to obstruct the convoy of the Nigerian army chief⁷⁵. Although, the group's confrontations with the government were less frequent and less bloody than any other Islamist groups in Nigeria.

On 26 July 2019, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (I.M.N) was banned by the Federal government of Nigeria on the premises of terrorism after the sect's protest against the government's detention of Zakzaky since 2015 which led to the death of eleven protestors, a police officer, and a journalist⁷⁶. Muhammed Isa observed that, recently, the group's influence among Islamists in Northern Nigeria has been replaced by the mainstream Sunni Wahhabi movement⁷⁷..

Furthermore, a historic antecedent to the rise of Boko Haram was the Maitatsine uprising, however, the rising wave of Islamist enthusiasm in Nigeria was not only attributed to the success of the Fulani Jihad but also the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran which became a contemporary model for reviving political Islam in Nigeria. One of them was the Maitatsine

⁷³ Haruna Shehu Tangaza, Islamic Movement in Nigeria: The Iranian-inspired Shia group, 5 August 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49175639> Accessed on 16 July 2020

⁷⁴ Faiza Mawani, *Persecution of the Shia Islamic Movement of Nigeria*, UAB Institute for Human Rights Blog, October 19, 2020, Accessed on 16 July 2020

⁷⁵ Saad Hasan, *Who is Ibrahim El Zakzaky - the cleric embroiled in Nigeria violence?*, (25 July 2019) <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/who-is-ibrahim-el-zakzaky-the-cleric-embroiled-in-nigeria-violence-28519> Accessed on 16 July 2020

⁷⁶ Human Right Watch, *Nigeria: Court Bans Shia Group*, (July 30, 2019), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/30/nigeria-court-bans-shia-group> Accessed on 16 July 2020

⁷⁷ Muhammed Kabir Isa, "Militant Islamist Groups in northern Nigeria," in *Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa*, edited by Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2010), p. 328.

riots, which was perhaps the longest and widespread Islamic extremism dissension in modern Nigeria history until Boko Haram.

Maitatsine terror started in the early 1980s in the city of Kano which subsequently spread to other northern states in Nigeria, its ringleader was the charismatic, persuasive and forceful Quran teacher Mohammed Maitatsine Marwa, who was a fanatic Salafist preacher educated in Islamic theology. He migrated from Northern Cameroon to the city of Kano, Nigeria in 1945 where he became radicalized and committed to reviving Usman dan Fodio's ideology. Maitatsine Marwa was exiled by the colonial authorities due to his provocations and disdain for constituted authority but returned back after Nigeria independence.⁷⁸

Marwa was completely against Western influence and Western education but unlike Dan Fodio, he also rejected the Hadith, Sunnah and the Prophethood of Muhammad. He repudiated certain parts of the Quran and allegedly proclaimed himself as the prophet by replacing the name of the Prophet Muhammad with his own name in the copies of his own Quran, he labeled Muslims who disagreed with his teachings as infidels.⁷⁹

Maitatsine's anti-establishment rhetoric attracted a large following among the youths, socio-economic marginalized people and the unemployed city dwellers, however, these followers were incited out of the teachings of Marwa and began acting out their frustrations against the law enforcement and religious figures. His group burned down Mosques, Churches, Markets, Police stations, and Schools. Marwa also took part in these violent activities of his group, which eventually cost him his life in an altercation with the security forces in 1980. It is important to note that before Marwa went completely rogue, he enjoyed political influence in Kano state that made it politically challenging for the security forces to contain his group's violent activities.⁸⁰ However his death transformed him to a revered martyr which grew the influence of the group, deepening their grievances against the government and this animosity escalated the terror, vandalism and religious killings between 1980 and 1992 which cost thousands of lives and

⁷⁸ Adegbulu, Femi. 2013. "Boko Haram: The Emergence of a Terrorist Sect in Nigeria 2009–2013." *African Identities* 11 (3): 260-273. doi: 10.1080/14725843.2013.839118. p.265. Accessed on August 1, 2020

⁷⁹ Nmar, Patrick. "Religion Fanaticism, a Threat to National Security: The Case of Boko Haram Sec". *African Journals Online*, Vol. 13 No. 1 (2012).<https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ujah/article/view/83233> p.121. Accessed on August 1, 2020

⁸⁰ Aghedo, Iro and Oarhe Osumah. 2014. "Old Wine in a New Bottle: Ideological and Operational Linkages between Maitatsine and Boko Haram Revolts in Nigeria." *African Security* 7 (4): 229-250. Doi: 10.1080/19392206.2014.977169. p.236, Accessed on August 1, 2020

extrajudicial killings in the Northern cities of Nigeria.⁸¹ In the aftermath of the riots, it was reported that an estimation of 4000 people were killed in the uprising, that it took the police three days to get the bodies off the street.⁸²

1.7 DISDAIN OF WESTERN EDUCATION IN THE NORTHERN NIGERIA

The northern region of Nigeria had its first Western education established in Kano in 1909 by a missionary and explorer, Hans Vischer who was sent to Nigeria by the British colonial office.⁸³ The colonial government's need to set up schools was motivated out of the necessity to transform Northern elites children into future administrators for the colony but the Hausa-Fulani aristocratic elites and spiritual leaders resisted the building of schools. The leaders were skeptical about the desire of the Colonial Office to establish Western schools in their regions because they thought it was a ploy to derail the locals from Islam which was their true calling, obliterate Islamic culture and replace it with Christianity, as a result, the new education projects were dubbed *Boko*. The word *Boko* became a derogatory term for something that is a sham to undermine Islam, unauthentic or misleading true believers from heavenly aspiration or fraudulent. This characterization of Western education became a long-held perception that virtually, everything that has to do with Western culture and system was popularly seen as *Boko*⁸⁴ and those who value *Boko* were seen and shamed as deceitful collaborators with Western regimes.

The Colonial Administration, knowing that the effective implementation of the Indirect rule policy depended on the cooperation and goodwill of the Northern Oligarchy had to mitigate these

⁸¹ Udoidem, S. Religion in the Political Life in Nigeria: "A Survey of Religion-Related Crises Since Independence". In F. U. Okafor (Ed.), *New Strategies for Curbing Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Nigeria*, (1997), p. 152–182.

⁸² Witness History, "Maitatsine", *BBC World service* <https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/p0127jsh>, Accessed August 1, 2020

⁸³ Walker, A. 'Eat the Heart of the Infidel': *The Harrowing of Nigeria and the Rise of the Boko Haram*. London: G. Hurst and Co. (Pub 2016)

⁸⁴ Edlyne Eze Anugwom, *The Boko Haram Insurgence In Nigeria Perspectives from Within*, *New Directions in Islam*. (Dec 6, 2018), p.83-85

fears by promising to keep the missionaries and their schools out of the North.⁸⁵ While in the Colonial Southern Nigeria protectorate, Western schools were established and well funded, unlike the Northern counterparts that had dominance of Quranic and Islamic schools, although some schools were built in the North, they operated in conjunction with the Islamic schools as the colonial administration did not want to disrupt the status quo.⁸⁶

Today, there is a huge disparity gap in education between the Northern part of Nigeria and the Southern part. The literacy rate in the Southern part of Nigeria is 96 percent whilst the literacy rates in Northern Nigeria are as low as 7 percent in some states, with only Taraba and Adamawa States crossing the 50 percent mark in the North-East and North-West region.⁸⁷ It is unfortunate that the non-acceptance of education in northern Nigeria is still high due to the perception that Western education is created by Christians. However, it is no coincidence that it is still the Northern states that have called for the implementation of Sharia in which, today religious

⁸⁵ Edlyne Eze Anugwom, *The Boko Haram Insurgency In Nigeria Perspectives from Within*.p.84

⁸⁶ Madiha Afzal, *From Western Education is forbidden, To the worlds deadliest terrorist group: Education and Boko Haram in Nigeria*.https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200507_nigeria_boko_haram_afzal.pdf.p.7. Accessed on 2 August 2020

⁸⁷ Azuka Onwuka, *North-South educational imbalance: Threat, North-South educational imbalance: Threat to Nigerian development*, The Punch Newspaper(July 9, 2019), <https://punchng.com/north-south-educational-imbalance-threat-to-nigerian-development/>. Accessed on 2 August 2020

xtremism thrives as a result of these issues and Boko rhetorics have operationalized those sentiments and weaponizes this vulnerability to serve its recruitment strategy.

POLITICS DRIVEN BY ETHNO-RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS

2.1 NIGERIAN POLITICO-RELIGIOUS CULTURE

In Nigeria, there is a dominant influence of religion in politics in a fashion that ethnic politics is almost being supplanted by religious politics. The influence of religion in Nigerian polity is power itself that extends beyond politics. It influences economic prosperity, social relations, educational advancement, and the societal psyche.⁸⁸

The ethno religious pluralism plays a significant role that has generated tensions in the Nigerian polity. While there are three main religions in Nigeria: Christianity, Islam, and the Indigenous religion. However, politico-religious conflicts have revolved mostly around the interrelationships between, Islam and Christianity which is the result of decades of the scramble for political power that led to a charged up ethnoreligious sentiments, identification, and polarizing loyalty at both individual and societal levels in regional-national politics that keep reinforcing inter-religious and ethnic antagonism since Nigerian post-independence. The growing culture of religious nationalism in Nigeria thus religious violence and riots particularly in the Northern Nigeria is a product of years of uncompromising dominance of religious activism, exacerbated by the atmosphere of mutual distrust, lack of tolerance, and overbearing suspicion that virtually most national issues are approached through a religious lens that has led to repeated mayhem⁸⁹

Nigerians are very religious people to the extent that religious faith affects almost every aspect of their personal lives and indirectly plays a role in the determinism of political affairs. Therefore,

⁸⁸ Oluwaseun Olawale Afolabi, *The role of religion in Nigerian politics and its sustainability for political development*, (27 April, 2015) p.43, <http://www.netjournals.org/pdf/NJSS/2015/2/15-018.pdf>
Accessed on October 6, 2020

⁸⁹ Afe Adogame, *Fighting for God or Fighting in God's Name! The Politics of Religious Violence in Contemporary Nigeria*. "Religions: A Scholarly Journal", Volume 2009, Issue 1, (August 2015), p.182-183, <https://doi.org/10.5339/rels.2009.commonground.13> . Accessed on October 6, 2020.

the dominant religions in Nigeria and their ideologies permit the interaction between religion and politics, and the socio-cultural orientation, history, and legacies of Nigeria, are a systemic reflection of their traditional religion and belief system. The traditional politics of the local people has a linkage to belief in theocracy. For instance, To the Yorubas in the South Western region in Nigeria, the *Oba* (king), who is the traditional/political ruler in the Yoruba monarchy is selected only on the spiritual approval of the consultation of the *Ifa* oracle (divination), and only holding his(*Oba*), office in trust for *Olodumare* (the Supreme Being). Therefore, politics and religion in conservative societies like Nigeria are closely connected and have a direct influence on each other.⁹⁰ On the other hand, Muslims perceive State power as a tool for the advancement and propagation of Islamic faith. Akintola observes that, Islam as a way of life dictates the totality of life of a faithful Muslim, in which his political interest, economic, social values, and interactions are often given Islamic interpretations and Islamic principles are encouraged to follow as their guide based on the Holy Quran and Sunnah regardless of the society they found themselves, however, this phenomenon gives way for the spiritual relationship between religion and politics. This is evidential in the life of Prophet Mohammed who was the spiritual as well as the political leader of his people during his lifetime. After his death, the Caliphs emerged and still held on to those same principles,⁹¹ Nevertheless, the same entire societal structure was patterned and run in a theocratic system as seen in the Sokoto Caliphate of Uthman dan Fodio where the Sultan of Sokoto was an embodiment of a religious and a political leader, while Christians in Nigeria consider this phenomenon as a threat of power domination, often than not, the parties have been locked in a fierce battle for control of national resources. Kukah opined that no one can aspire to, or hold any form of political office in Nigeria without pretending to be religious⁹². Invariably, it is almost impossible to hold on to public office or any political power without a hold on to religion. Politicians wield their power often through appeal to religious sentiments, not only to achieve their political aims but also to counter and subjugate their opposing rivals as well as to legitimize their religion. For this reason, the major religious groups;

⁹⁰ Laguda, D. O. *Religion and Politics in a Pluralistic Society: The Nigerian Experience. Politics and Religion*, (2008) 2:123-133.

<http://www.netjournals.org/pdf/NJSS/2015/2/15-018.pdf>. Accessed on October 6, 2020

⁹¹ Akintola, I. L. "Introduction to Islam." *Aderibigbe and Aiyegboyin, Religion: Study and Practice* (Ijebu-Ode, Alamsek Press, 1997) . p. 138.

⁹² Kukah, M. H. *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. (1993). p. 228.

Islam and Christianity have been in a fierce tussle for the political control of the country.⁹³ This mutual mistrust engendered by ethnic-religious polarity drains the overall well-being of Nigeria.

Election season has always been a period that provides the public the opportunity for political discussion to identify socio-political and economic issues facing them, how best to approach these inherent problems, and various political programs of candidates vying for elective positions. One of the challenges that portends to the electoral discussion in Nigeria is the unusual attachments of religious sentiments into the choice of candidates, in such a way that supporters of most of the electoral candidates are aligned into religious identity voting blocs, for instance, "Muslim vote", "Catholic vote", "Anglican vote", "Pentecostal vote". However, such practices are spearheaded by religious leaders and faith organizations such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), and the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA). In most matters, the choice of a candidate for public office is voted in reference to the religious affiliation of the candidates.⁹⁴

In an interview with British Broadcasting Corporation(BBC), the Anglican archbishop of Jos, Benjamin Kwashi said:

Religion appeals not so much to reason. It is a heart matter. When religions like Christianity and Islam have a huge following of hungry not very educated people on both sides, then politicians will explore the areas of religion to get them on their sides. That's a very dangerous and bad thing to do. It's not fair and it's not right.⁹⁵

The Archbishop of Jos commented further that:

Money and religion in politics, they go together. When you find unscrupulous politicians who are just desperate for an office - not for what they will do for people they just want the office for what they can get for themselves - to retain the office at all costs they will use anything. They will use money and the religious sentiments to do that⁹⁶.

⁹³ Bujra, Janet, and Leo Igwe. "Leo Igwe: Interview with a Nigerian Humanist." *Review of African Political Economy* 33, no. 110 (2006): 740-43. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007139>. Accessed October 9, 2020.

⁹⁴ Jacob Kehinde Ayantayo, Religious Space in the Nigerian Public Sphere: Its Burdens and Prospects, p10, https://codesria.org/IMG/pdf/Jacob_Kehinde_Ayantayo.pdf. Accessed on October 10 2020.

⁹⁵ Will Ross, Nigeria elections: Mixing religion and politics, BBC News (29 January 2015) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31026554>. Accessed on October 10, 2020

⁹⁶ Ibid

Nigeria is one of the secular countries in the world yet, it has informally embraced the idea of mixing the state with religion. The idea of elected officials using state resources to fund religious complexes and events as a means of buying popular support has often led to a fierce battle for political control, some of the government direct involvement in religious matters are; (a)creation of Pilgrim Welfare Boards, (b)Government financing of Muslims and Christians for pilgrimage in Mecca and Jerusalem, (c)Building of religious structures in public places, (d)State declaration of religious days as official public holidays, (e) informal application of religious quotas for elective seats and politically appointed positions⁹⁷. Government establishment of the Pilgrim Welfare Board is an inverse erosion of secularity in Nigeria, the implication of bureaucratization of religion is that the government will spend public funds on annual budgets to run the frivolous board. The government influence on pilgrimage to Jerusalem and Mecca has made the religious exercise an extension of political activity. According to Onwubiko :

The two dominant religious organizations viz: Christian religion and Moslem religion have held both the federal and state governments on the jugular veins to be committing unimaginable amounts of scarce public funds to sponsoring their adherents to the yearly pilgrimages abroad. Since the blackmail to sabotage the government if it fails to sponsor pilgrimages gained ascendancy, federal and state governments have been contending with the needs of these religious organizations and their leaders⁹⁸.

This calls into question as to how state sponsorship of pilgrimage is relevant to National development. However, The Government-sponsored both the building of the Central Mosque and Christian Center in the capital city, Abuja, while various State Government houses have either a Mosque or a Chapel or both, which are maintained by public funds, as such giving space for clerics and imams to compete against each other in government houses, institutions, and functions. what is interesting is, at national/public gatherings, or political rallies, opening prayers are either offered by the Christian groups or vice versa while the closing prayers to officially end

⁹⁷ U.Tar and A.G Shettima, *Endangered Democracy? the struggle over secularism and its implications for politics and democracy in Nigeria*, p.14, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2010, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/115684/49.pdf> . Accessed on October 10 2020.

⁹⁸ Onwubiko.P, *50 years of independence: Road map to optimum growth and development in Nigeria*. Nsukka: Chuka Educational Publishers.(2010), p. 137-138

the event is offered by the Muslim group, this is the way as to prevent conflicts that trigger violence⁹⁹.

The impact of religious politics has characterized the national interest of Nigeria's foreign policy that often generates domestic conflicts and outcry between Muslims and Christians. The Northern region realigns for closer external relations with Islamic countries while the Christians prefer a closer relations with Israel and the West¹⁰⁰. Religious hostility has gotten to a point of mutual suspicion where when a Muslim presides the Nation or heads a government parastatal, then a sense of threat is felt by the Christians with rumors that pre-assumes he is using his office position to Islamise Nigeria, same in reverse when a Christian assumes an office.

2.2 RELIGION AND IDENTITY POLITICS IN NIGERIA

Identity politics are political issues that are often interpreted or debated within the boundaries of people's identities of either sex, class, ethnicity or religious affiliation. According to Olawale, it connotes political mobilization of identity consciousness in demanding greater socio-economic political rights¹⁰¹. It advocates the advancement of interests of a particular group relative to the wider society which they form. Political identity is often defined by its opposition to a dominant identity, but what it's vital about the "identity" of identity politics is that, it is the experience of the subjects within their social structure that generates injustice¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Ikenna L. Umeanolue, Religious influences on politics in Nigeria: Implications for national development, p.7

<https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/og.v15i1.9s> . Accessed on October 10, 2020

¹⁰⁰ Afe Adogame, The politics of religious violence in contemporary Nigeria, (11 August 2015),

<https://doi.org/10.5339/rels.2009.commonground.13> Accessed on October 10 2020

¹⁰¹ Yemisi Isaac Olawale, Religion and Identity Politics in Nigeria. p.5,

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342199715_Religion_and_Identity_Politics_in_Nigeria Accessed on October 10, 2020

¹⁰² Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Identity Politics, Jul 11, 2020, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-politics/> .

Accessed on July 11 2020

The identity of Nigerian politics is found through religion, its influence is very recurring in the center stage and dominant in most spheres of life of a Nigerian. It politicizes people's passion to freely worship, express, and self-identify in a way that has polarized the country as a battleground, this rivalry has become a political issue that shuns peaceful co-existence and tolerance in a way that weakens its sense of spiritual authority. The point of identity politics is not just to win political offices but to use political positions to champion the course of religious interest. Identity politics has overloaded the voting pattern along ethno religious lines endangering the conduct of elections to be free from violence and fair in vote-count. Politicization of religious identities polarizes voters against national cohesion and hinders the election of credible and competent leaders for the sake of religious affiliations. It sacrifices national unity for the appeasement of religious motives.¹⁰³

Fox and Sandler gave reasons why religion holds strong sway in political mobilization as follows:

- (i) religious organizations have strong international links and enjoy global solidarity
- (ii) religious organizations have the capability to easily unite differential social groupings in the society
- (iii) religious organizations are often strong in weak states
- (iv) the restriction of religious activities is often difficult for state regimes;
- (v) religious organizations often enjoy good patronage in the media and
- (vi) religious organizations have the 'ready-made' platform for political meetings¹⁰⁴.

Identity politics played by religious civil societies in Nigeria emerged out of circumstance to propagate their religious interest in fear of marginalization. Religious bodies are meant to foster inter-faith cohesion and trust, while serving as a basis for integration and brotherhood among its adherents, despite this, religious organizations have become the opposite of its intention. Their frequent need to denounce and criticize government policies that are contrary to the interest of their religious community irrespective of national interest has turned them into tools in Nigerian politics. The identity consciousness played by religious civil societies creates a grassroots base of

¹⁰³ Yemisi Isaac Olawale, Religion and Identity Politics in Nigeria. p.13

¹⁰⁴ Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, "Quantifying Religion: Toward Building More Effective Ways of Measuring Religious Influence on State-Level Behavior", Journal of Church and State 45 (3), Summer 2003, pp.559-588.

support but it reinforces ethno religious differences rather than stabilize national unity, these influences Nigerians to demonstrate allegiance and trust to their religious organization than to the government thereby weakening Nigerian sovereignty. According to Miles:

Religious belonging influences political attitudes and behaviors through two mechanisms:

First, religious groups develop the religious beliefs that are associated with political beliefs (that is, attitudes about abortion); second, religious groups help individuals make the connection between their religious views and the appropriate political views.

Religious leaders and religious social networks are the primary means through which belonging translates into political attitudes and behaviors. Considerable research substantiates the power of religious social networks and clergy to influence the political views and political activity of congregants. However, religious belonging does more than transmit beliefs and create social relationships¹⁰⁵.

Religious associations have played a greater role in politicking through open preference and endorsement of a political candidate over another. Through their religious organizations, religious leaders have weaponized their influence to climb the social-political ladder and direct their large followers to vote for whom they want. Their open political stance encourages the mobilization of their large members into active participation in politics by stimulating a sense of civic responsibility, rights, and religious identification. Nonetheless, the North-South dichotomy in Nigeria is not just along ethnic lines but it has widened further along religious lines. While these religious bodies have united various ethnicities under their umbrella, it has also created another national dilemma more sensitive than ethnicity which is religious divisions.

In 1964, the Northern Christian Association had to strengthen its influence by changing its name to Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) to include Christians from the Southern geopolitical zones, this inclusion helped the Christian association to unify its common interest to exercise a

¹⁰⁵ Matt Miles, Function of Religious Identity in Politics, Department of History, Geography and Political Science p.15, file:///C:/Users/mpero/Downloads/Matt%20Miles_Functions%20of%20Religious%20Identity%20in%20Politics.pdf. Accessed October 12, 2020

stronger bargaining power in shaping national policies, politics and power structures. They attempt to gain and retain political control by the Oligarchs from both the Christian and Muslim axis have played out negatively as they mix religion with politics in order to influence policy decisions and sway national discuss¹⁰⁶.

However, religious identity has also impacted the Federal character principle which was conceived to ensure equal representation of Nigerians from all states of the federation in political and administrative offices. It alleviated the Northern Nigerian fear of more educated Southerners controlling the civil service and the Southern Christian's fear of Northern domination based on the fact since independence, most governments have been led by Northern Muslims. having said that¹⁰⁷. The quota system devised by the federal character enabled allocation of holding public office along religious line by pairing a Muslim and a Christian in political positions at both Federal and State level. The point of policies that fosters national integration is to create an atmosphere of understanding to which both the weakness and strengths of each ethnic groups are harnessed to tolerant and compensate one another for mutual benefits thereby guaranteeing equal opportunities and expression of the identities of the various groups that is committed to ideals of national unity as against splitting one group against the other.

Religious bodies should endeavor to openly condemn religious violence, fish out perpetrators of violence and restrain from inciting speeches that gives rise to them

2.3 EVOLUTION OF POLITICS AND RELIGION IN NIGERIA

The politicization of religious-ethnicity in Nigeria took a dimensional turn when Nigeria gained independence in October 1st 1960, two distinct types of leadership had emerged: on the one hand, the leadership from the North, which was a conservative Islamic oriented, saw the independence of Nigeria only ruled and controlled by the Hausa-Fulani Islamic ruling class and

¹⁰⁶ Yemisi Isaac Olawale, Religion and Identity Politics in Nigeria. p.12

¹⁰⁷ Yemisi Isaac Olawale, Religion and Identity Politics in Nigeria. p.12

was supported by the British administration, and on the other hand, from the South was a more western-educated new breed of leaders whose leadership credibility stems from the hope given to the people that they are being liberated from the shackles of colonialism into a future independence of guaranteed freedom, prosperity and progress in new Nigerian ruled by equal Nigerians. This latter leadership did not enjoy the patronage of the British government.¹⁰⁸ Thanks to the colonial legacy of uneven demarcation of regional boundaries which ensured a perpetual political strong hold of power at the center by the Muslim Northern elites while the more literate Christian Southern part of Nigeria are dominate in the economic and civil service sector in Nigeria, however, the western-educated Southern elites were not happy at the neo-colonial oriented political control of the Muslim North and the North felt unfair at the dominance of the civil service by the South, this scenario led to a constant struggle for power, suspicion, and enmity.¹⁰⁹

The first dominant political parties in the North: The Northern People's Congress (NPC), the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) were characterized both in their membership profile and central ideology to be religiously oriented. The Northern People's Congress (NPC) had the most far-reaching popularity in the Northern region, it won a majority of the parliamentary seats. However, the party was very Islamically influenced, it was politically perceived as symbolising a consensus of the Muslim community (Ijma), which was a tremendous and winning mass appeal in the North as well as the fact that the party had religious leaders under its leadership wing which amongst them is Ahmadu Bello (the Sardauna/crown prince of the Sokoto Caliphate and Premier of the Northern region), and the Sultan of Sokoto.¹¹⁰

In the non-Muslims areas of the North known as the Middle Belt region, an opposing party known as the United Middle Best Congress (UMBC), emerged whose membership was largely driven by Christians in protest against the Hausa-Fulani Islamic hegemony. This religio-political

¹⁰⁸ Adigwe, Hypolite A. and Ingeborg Grau. "When God says yes - who can say no? Religion as a factor in political discourse in Nigeria since the 1960s." *Journal of African Studies* 7 (2007): p.86

¹⁰⁹ Enwerem, Iheanyi M. *The Centrality of Religion in Modern Nigerian Politics. A Dangerous Awakening: The Politicization of Religion in Nigeria*. Ibadan: IFRA-Nigeria, (1995). p. 45-73, <https://books.openedition.org/ifra/414?lang=en> . Accessed on October 10 2020

¹¹⁰ Hakeem Onapajo, *Politics and the pulpit :The Rise and Decline of Religion in Nigeria's 2015 Presidential Elections*, p.116, <https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE15.2Onapajo.pdf>, Accessed on October 10 2020.

positioning gave the party some electoral advantage in the Christian populated parts of the Northern region¹¹¹.

The sphere of Religious influence in political party formation and voting pattern was also instrumental in the electoral process in South -Western Nigeria. The National Muslim Party, was formed in Lagos in 1953 to oppose the Action Group (AG), party which was the dominate political party in the South-Western region of Nigeria, however the National Muslim Party failed to win any electoral seats. The National Muslim League (NML), was formed in 1957, it gained huge popularity among the Muslims in the South-Western region that it posed a formidable opposition and strong threat to the Action Group's electoral dominance, subsequently the National Muslim Party was heavily criticized of using religion for its political mobilization and the party had to change its name to National Emancipation League (NEL), furthermore the Party entered into an alliance with Northern People's Congress (NPC)¹¹². Meanwhile, the Action Group (AG) party, led by the premier of the South-Western region, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, was highly critical of the Islamic inclination of Northern People's Congress led by Ahmadu Bello. Chief Awolowo alleged further, that the leadership of Northern People's Congress (NPC) is attempting to set up a theocratic state and to join the Arab bloc by establishing links with the Islamic Congress of Egypt and Saudi Arabia¹¹³.

In the Eastern region of Nigeria, there was no inter-religious strife because Christianity was the dominant religion, though some Christians still retained their loyalties to the declining African traditional religion¹¹⁴, the Christian leaders from both the Eastern and Western region of Nigeria distanced their political orientations from their religious base but rather replaced it with their ethnic affiliation¹¹⁵.

After the independence of Nigerian in 1960, The grandson of Uthman Dan Fodio, Ahmadu Bello who was the leader of Northern People's Congress and the premier of the Northern region, began

¹¹¹ Hakeem Onapajo, *Politics and the Pulpit* p.6

¹¹² Ibid

¹¹³ John Olushola Magbadelo, *The Politics Of Religion In Nigeria* .*World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* , Vol. 7, No. 2 (April-June 2003), p.70-71. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48504808> . Accessed on October 22, 2020

¹¹⁴ Magbadelo, John Olushola. *The Politics Of Religion In Nigeria*. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 7, no. 2 (2003): p.70. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48504808> . Accessed October 22, 2020.

¹¹⁵ Hypolite A. Adigwe, Ingeborg Grau, *When God Says Yes - Who Can Say No? Religion as a Factor in Political Discourse in Nigeria Since the 1960s* p.87, https://stichproben.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_stichproben/Artikel/Nummer13/Nr13_Adigwe_Grau.pdf Accessed October 22, 2020.

to give official support for the spread of Islam in Nigeria, this ambition led to the creation of an Islamic organization called the *Jama'tu Nasril Islam* (JNI) in 1961 to coordinate the missionary task¹¹⁶ of (i) To propagate the religion of Islam and improve Muslims welfare, (ii) To give Islam a uniform voice internally and externally, (iii) To coordinate Islamic activities within Nigeria, (iv) To educate people as well as responsible for the spread of Islam, (v) Uniting Islamic scholars together¹¹⁷

Jama'tu Nasril Islam had prominent Muslim politicians, Muslim civil servants and Muslim leaders as its members, The Muslim organization was criticized to be the religious wing of Northern People's Congress due to how closely associated the Organization was to the party¹¹⁸. and was alleged to continue Uthman dan Fodio Jihad in Nigeria with its stated objectives, notwithstanding this claims, Ahmadu Bello led government funded *Jama'tu Nasril Islam* with one million pounds for its programs¹¹⁹ and the organization's staff were paid staff of the government, in addition the association got support from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Pakistan and other world Muslim Organization¹²⁰. In response to the Islamic policies of the Sardauna of Sokoto, the Northern Christian Association (NCA), was founded in 1964, to protect the interest of Christians in the North.¹²¹

In 1966, Sir Ahmadu Bello was assassinated in a coup led by mostly Igbo military officers. This coup triggered rampant attacks on Igbos residents and their properties in the Northern region. The 1966 uprising in Northern Nigeria cost the lives of many Igbos resident in the Northern region, they were political attempts to give it a religious coloration in the Eastern region, hence, expressions like "Muslim North" and "Christian South" became a popular term used in the printing press and radio stations. A civil war between the Nigerian government and the Eastern region finally broke out in July 1967, religious rhetoric's became one of the most widely and

¹¹⁶ Akintunde E. Akinade, *The Precarious Agenda: Christian-Muslim Relations in Contemporary Nigeria*.

P.5, The following lecture was given in Professor Jane Smiths' "Essentials of Christian-Muslim Relations class in the summer of 2002. <https://www.hartsem.edu/wp-content/uploads/Akinade.pdf> Accessed October 22, 2020.

¹¹⁷ Sulaiman Sheu Adua, *An Appraisal of Contributions of Jama'at Nasril Islam to the Spread of Islam in Northern Nigeria*, International Journal of Humanities Social Sciences and Education (IJHSSE) Volume 2, Issue 12, December 2015, p.70 <https://www.arcjournals.org/pdfs/ijhsse/v2-i12/10.pdf> .Accessed October 22, 2020.

¹¹⁸ F.U Okafor, *New Strategies for Curbing and Religious Conflicts in Nigeria* (Enugu: fourth Dimensions Publishers, 1997),p.158

¹¹⁹ F.U Okafor, *New Strategies for Curbing and Religious Conflicts in Nigeria*..p.106

¹²⁰ Ismaila A. *Where i stand :Tsiga Sheikh Abubakar Gumi with Ismaila A.Tsiga* (Spectrum Books limited 2001) p.106-107 Accessed October 22, 2020.

¹²¹ Mbachirin, Abraham T, The responses of the church in Nigeria to socio-economic, political, and religious problems in Nigeria: a case study of the Christian Association of Nigeria, p.163

effectively used propaganda tool in the civil war, thus, the crisis turned civil war, was falsely regarded by the easterners in Nigeria as a conflict between Islam and Christians, this belief was heightened by the pre-1966 proselytization campaign of Ahmed Bello whose political policies in the North were guided by religious undertone¹²².

On the Nigeria - Biafra civil war issue, the Biafran leader, General Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu on June 24, 1991 commented in an interview

Seen in the light of the conflicts that led to the civil war, it was certainly a political war. We did not go to war because the Sardauna came down to Tiv land and converted fifty thousand. We went to war because Ndi Igbo (the Igbo race) was slaughtered so much in the North that Ndi Igbo [the Igbo race) became fearful about their own survival in a polity headed by the North¹²³.

Ojukwu went further to analyze why religious propaganda was used as part of the civil war machinery :

Let us see it this way: Within Biafra, it was used to inculcate a feeling of identity as a people, separate and distinct from the Nigerian side. But outside, in making others hear of and understand our case, the religious aspect played a major part in restoring the survival of our people. This was because it was easy for the various Christian Churches to rally round the people with whom they have the same belief. That I used religion, yes... I needed to use it to make every Biafran clearly understand the dangers and reasons why he is fighting and I also went out to seek solidarity of like thinkers all over the world ¹²⁴.

The root cause of the Biafran war that ended in January 15th 1970, was political and more dictated by ethnic animosity than religious indignation though religious differences may have overlapped, nevertheless, the war was never a religious one, but religious sentiments were used in mobilizing supports from the global Christians and unifying the strength of the Igbos to a

¹²² Nicholas Omenka, Blaming the gods, Christian religious propaganda in the Nigeria-Biafra war *The Journal of African History* 51(2):367-389, (May 2019)

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333508456_BLAMING_THE_GODS_JAH, Accessed on October 22 2020

¹²³ Iheanyi M. Enwerem, The Centrality of Religion in Modern Nigerian Politics, French Institute for Research in Africa, Nigeria Institut français de recherche en Afrique, Nigeria. (paragraph 53-55, <https://books.openedition.org/ifra/414?lang=en>. Accessed on October 22 2020

¹²⁴ *ibid*

self-conscious Christian identity. Nevertheless, the Biafran religious propaganda was very effective abroad and amongst the Igbos, because it got its appeal from its ability to explain the fear for Igbo security as a result of the repetitive Northern massacres of igbos in the country.

The divisiveness of the politicization of religion continued to be the driving factor behind socio-political interpretation. General Murtala Mohammed who became the fourth military head of state from 1975, was gunned down in 1976 by a Christian Northern ethnic minority officer. The head of state's death sparked off a violent reprisal against Christians in the northern region, the coup led to the agitation for the re-establishment of Dan Fodio's caliphate. Muslims' clamor for a caliphate culminated into the demand for Sharia law in Nigeria which was a prominent movement in the 1970s¹²⁵

In the second republic between 1979 and 1983 of Shehu Shagari administration, religion was still dominate in Nigerian polity, majority of the political parties in Nigeria were either Christian or Muslim associated¹²⁶. The main political parties were National People's Party (NPN), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), People's Redemption Party (PRP), and the Nigeria's People's Party (NPP), for instance, National People's Party (NPN) was a re-emergence of the old Northern People's Congress(NPC), which was viewed as a product of elitist Muslim Hausa/Fulani caucus, while the People's Redemption Party (PRP), was ran with *Tijjaniyyah* brotherhood ideology. Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), and Nigeria's People's Party (NPP) were considered as Christian political parties¹²⁷. In the Eastern region, the church actively campaigned for Nigeria's People's Party(NPP), which to a large extent, contributed to the party's electoral success in the region¹²⁸. However,

The most heated national debate was concerning the creation of the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal, the inclusion of a provision for a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal in the draft constitution

¹²⁵ Usman Tar and Abba Gana Shettima, *Endangered Democracy? The Struggle over Secularism and its Implications for Politics and Democracy in Nigeria*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, (2010), p.9, <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:311793/FULLTEXT04.pdf> . Accessed on October 22 2020

¹²⁶ Adamo, David Tuesday. *Religion and elections in Nigeria: a historical perspective*. *Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae*, 44(3), <https://dx.doi.org/10.25159/24124265/3580> . Accessed on 25 October 2020.

¹²⁷ Hakeem Onapajo, *Politics and the pulpit :The Rise and Decline of Religion in Nigeria's 2015 Presidential Elections*, p.118, <https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE15.2Onapajo.pdf> , Accessed on October 25 2020.

¹²⁸ Eze, J 2009, *The church and presidential democracy: Political party elections in Igboland, 1979-2003*, *International Journal of Research in Arts and Social Sciences*, vol.1, pp.160-169. Accessed on October 25 2020.

at Constitutional Assembly in 1977/78¹²⁹. The Muslim's attempt to include the Sharia law into Nigerian constitution became a contentious issue. The sharia question provoked religious and tribal tension in the entire Nation, hateful and inflammatory utterances were made from both the Christian and Muslims. During the heated national debate over the Sharia issue, various regions in Nigeria threatened to secede if Sharia law was passed, and Muslim members of the assembly boycotted the assembly proceedings on several occasions, especially when the deliberations were not going to their favor as they were pushing for the establishment of Sharia law in all the states of the federation¹³⁰.

The provision of Sharia law to be made constitutional was problematic because of the religious plurality of Nigeria. it undermines the religious right of other faiths as Christians see sharia law very threatening, oppressive and as an attempt to turn Nigeria into an Islamic state. On the other hand, the Muslim leaders argue that, since half of the Nigerian population are practicing Muslims, it is rather unfair to be denied of their right to practice their faith fully without the sharia, it is very necessary for true islamic worship and guidance, they maintained that, absence of sharia was responsible for the moral decay in and backwardness of Muslims in Nigeria¹³¹.

The section ten (10), of the Nigerian Constitution stipulates that,

The Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion.¹³²

However, this constitutional provision makes Nigeria a secular state. Following the course of the national debate, a compromise was later reached in the constitutional assembly, which agreed that, a Sharia court of appeal shall be established in any State that desires it as well as a Customary court for adherents of traditional religion for any States that desires it¹³³.

¹²⁹ J.Isawa Elaigwu, Habu Galadima, *The Shadow of Sharia Over Nigerian Federalism*, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Volume 33, Issue 3, Summer 2003, .p.131, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a004995> .

¹³⁰ Muhib O.Opelye. *Religious Factors in Nigerian politics:Implications for Christain-Muslim Relations in Nigeria*, Journal of institute of Muslim minority affairs (july 1989) .p.356

¹³¹ Mbachirin, Abraham T, *The responses of the church in Nigeria to socio-economic, political, and religious problems in Nigeria: a case study of the Christian Association of Nigeria*, Baylor University. Institute of Church-State Studies. (2007-01-22), p.141, <http://hdl.handle.net/2104/4874> . Accessed on October 26, 2020

¹³² *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999*, p.7, <https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ng/ng014en.pdf> Accessed on 25 October 2020

¹³³ F.U Okafor, *New strategies for curbing ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria*, (Enugu: fourth Dimension Publishers, 1997), p.158

A Northern politician, Mahmud Tukur commented that,

Certain groups with political ambition from the North and South decided to use the Sharia debate as a means of mobilizing support, the advantage being that either way, these individuals would still use the support they had in presenting themselves as the defenders of their people from the cloak of Islamic domination¹³⁴.

On this Sharia debacle, Okafor observed that,

Unlike in the civil war, where religion was hiding under politics, with Sharia, politics was now hiding under religion. Also, with the Sharia, religious conflict now moved from the level of cold war and war of words to a level of confrontation¹³⁵.

The civilian government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari was toppled by General Buhari in 1984, the coup resulted to a religious claim from the non-Muslim blocs, that the Buhari's new regime was dominated by a "Muslim Militarist". General Buhari's dictatorial policies were criticized for being influenced by Islamic totalitarian principles. However, General Babangida overthrew Buhari's government in the 1985 counter-coup¹³⁶, Babangida's administration was highly criticized by Christians for its Islamic inclinations particularly in 1986 when his regime secretly registered Nigeria into full membership of Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), an international association of Islamic countries in which Nigeria had long held observer status¹³⁷.

Most Nigerians were unaware of Nigerian new membership to Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), until the national French news agency broke the news to Nigerians that Nigeria had been admitted as a member of the Organization. Churches as well as journalists made moves to inquire from the junta government if and why Nigeria had become a member of the Islamic Conference Organization. Muslims all over the globe rejoiced at Nigerian admittance to the organization, meanwhile the Christian population, became even more anxious when the media reviewed that top government officials like the Chief of General Staff, the Foreign Minister,

¹³⁴ F.U Okafor, *New strategies for curbing ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria*, p.161

¹³⁵ Ibid, p.162

¹³⁶ Usman Tar and Abba Gana Shettima, *Endangered Democracy? The Struggle over Secularism and its Implications for Politics and Democracy in Nigeria*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2010 p.9, <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:311793/FULLTEXT04.pdf> . Accessed on October 2020

¹³⁷ Ibid, p.6

Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister of Information, who were Christians, were equally not aware of the secret registration and membership acceptance of Nigeria to Islamic Conference Organization. Ebitu Ukiwe who was the deputy to General Babangida, publicly decries that he had been unaware of such covert policy. Many Nigerians, especially the Christians believed Ukiwe's sudden removal from office by General Babangida was due to the public denouncement of the controversial membership of Nigeria to Islamic Conference Organization¹³⁸.

Nigerian government's enrollment to the organization generated great fear among Christians that Nigeria is slowly moving into an Islamic state. Non-Muslims demanded the government to withdraw from the organization, as its membership was unconstitutional and against the spirit of secularism. Christian demonstrations against this move in turn, set off a retaliatory Muslim mayhem in the Northern states and riots across some cities¹³⁹.

However, the Muslims accused the Christians of only protesting when they felt their privileges were being threatened, they argued that the Nigerian socio-political system is inherently Christian oriented due to the influence of British colonialism which was never rectified in postcolonial Nigeria. Some Muslim leaders contended the adoption of Saturday and Sunday as days of rest rather than Thursday or Friday and the adoption of the Euro-Christian calendar days rather than the Muslim Hijra days are Christian rooted traditions¹⁴⁰. The Muslims threatened that, if the Nigerian government succumbs to Christian pressure and exits from the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), then Nigeria must close its diplomatic relations with the Vatican, change its Gregorian calendar, change the red cross signs as the signs of hospitals, its use of academic robes for judges and lawyers¹⁴¹.

However, the military-led government of Babangida justified its reasons for joining the religious organization:

¹³⁸ Babajimi Oladipo Faseke, *Nigeria and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation: A Discourse in Identity, Faith and Development*, 1969–2016, p.4-5, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10030156> Accessed on 25 October

¹³⁹ *ibid*

¹⁴⁰ Usman Tar and Abba Gana Shettima, *Endangered Democracy? The Struggle over Secularism and its Implications for Politics and Democracy in Nigeria*, p.9

¹⁴¹ Joseph Kenny, *Sharia and Christianity in Nigeria*, p.354-355

The Organization of Islamic Conference is only incidentally religious, and primarily for the purpose of economic, cultural, technical and diplomatic cooperation along with the pursuit of peace and justice¹⁴².

Some Christian leaders refuted the claim above, and alleged that the Babangida's government joined the organization in order to gain political favor from the Muslim population since he was not regarded as a good Muslim by the Muslim leadership in Nigeria¹⁴³.

Christian Pentecostalism revivalism is closely associated with the scramble for dominance in national politics between Muslims and Christians especially in the wake of growing Islamic fundamentalism and religious violence targeted at Christians in the northern region. Nigerian Christians have to an extent been politically unassertive and docile until the 1990s. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), which was established in 1976, consistently called for genuine Christians to contest elections under the military's transition to a democratic system. The Christian Association's push for Christian's active participation in politics laid the groundwork that renewed a determined Christian activism which was seen as the vehicle for reaching the position of power in Nigeria¹⁴⁴.

In the 1980s, The Evangelical churches became active members of the Christian Association of Nigeria which was initially made up of Only Catholics and Protestants but Evangelical political activism started with the founding of the Christian Student Movement of Nigeria in 1977. Its early activism emphasized the spiritual forces that govern Nigerian politics and bring about well meaningful reforms through prayers¹⁴⁵.

The membership of other Christian denominations gave the Christian Association a united front that enabled its increasingly political awareness and unofficial opposition to the military government. In 1987, The former grand Khadi of Northern Nigeria, a leading Muslim scholar, Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, issued a controversial statement where he publicly stated that Muslims will never allow non-Muslims to gain political leadership in Nigeria. In response to the Sheikh's

¹⁴² *ibid*, p.353

¹⁴³ Mbachirin, Abraham T, The responses of the church in Nigeria to socio-economic, political, and religious problems in Nigeria: a case study of the Christian Association of Nigeria, p.147

¹⁴⁴ U.Tar and A.G Shettima, Endangered Democracy? the struggle over secularism and its implications for politics and democracy in Nigeria, p.14.

¹⁴⁵ Pew Research Center, Historical Overview of Pentecostalism in Nigeria Origins and Growth, (October 5, 2006) <https://www.pewforum.org/2006/10/05/historical-overview-of-pentecostalism-in-nigeria/>. Accessed on November 3 2020

declaration, Pentecostal leaders allied with other Christians in Kaduna state (a Northern Muslim state) to launch a campaign to field candidates in the 1988 local government elections. The 1993 elections were an overwhelming turnout and participation of the Christian population in Nigeria as various evangelical church leaders competed at various levels of electoral positions¹⁴⁶.

The 1993 presidential election was an outcome of a transitional process to civilian governance initiated by the military regime of Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (IBB). The election was between Moshood Abiola contesting under the platform of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and his opponent Bashir Tofa, running on the platform of the National Republican Convention (NRC), both candidates were Muslims but the Social democratic party was more of a Christian leaning and Christians wholeheartedly voted for the party, however when it became certain that Abiola will win, Babangida's led government canceled calling the election result¹⁴⁷ citing electoral fraud, this resulted in a political crisis and widespread riots in the country. However, if MKO Abiola had been declared the winner of the 1993 presidential election, he would have been at that time, the first southerner to be elected as president of Nigeria, breaking through ethno religious divides and barriers having received support from all the regions in Nigeria.

The civilian rule was restored in 1999 that ushered in the fourth republic, but the resentment over Nigerian admittance to Organization of Islamic Conference(OIC), continued to be on political discourse, even so, for the first time in the political history of Nigeria, a Southern Christian won the presidency, Olusegun Obasanjo¹⁴⁸. Obasanjo's presidential candidacy in 1999 was largely supported by the Christian communities in Nigeria who viewed his election victory as a symbol of divine restoration of political power back to the Christian control to adjust decades of imbalance of power¹⁴⁹. Obasanjo's tenure was encircled by increasingly influential pentecostal churches who defined his presidency as a divine response to their prayers and prophecies for the country¹⁵⁰. Ebenezer Obadare classified these Evangelicals as the 'Theocratic Class'¹⁵¹.

¹⁴⁶ ibid

¹⁴⁷ Pew Research Center, Historical Overview of Pentecostalism in Nigeria Origins and Growth

¹⁴⁸ J.A.B Tsogo, P.I Johnson Jr, *How Vulnerable Is Nigeria To Islam Extremism*

¹⁴⁹ Usman Tar and Abba Shettima, Endangered Democracy?, The Struggle over Secularism and its Implications for Politics and Democracy in Nigeria, p.17, <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:311793/FULLTEXT04.pdf> . Accessed November 12, 2020

¹⁵⁰ Hakeem Onapajo, Politics and the pulpit:The Rise and Decline of Religion in Nigeria's 2015 Presidential Elections. <https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE15.2Onapajo.pdf> .Accessed November 12, 2020

¹⁵¹ Obadare, Ebenezer. "Pentecostal Presidency? The Lagos-Ibadan 'Theocratic Class' & the Muslim 'Other'." Review of African Political Economy 33, no. 110 (2006): p.670. <http://www.istor.org/stable/4007133> .Accessed November 13, 2020

After Obasanjo's inauguration, he rewarded the endorsement and support from the Christians by building and commissioning a chapel in the presidential villa as against the constructions of mosques from the past administrations that were Muslims. Obasanjo's political messianic status was enhanced by his personal ordeals in the hands of the previous military administration of General Abacha who jailed him on charges of coup conspiracy. However, upon the death of Abacha, Obasanjo was released and he relaunched his political career, reinventing himself as a born-again Christian, attracting massive Christian support which helped to serve his political purpose¹⁵².

On the other hand, it was an opportunity for the Christians to reverse decades of Muslim political dominance. The strife between Christians and Muslims kept worsening¹⁵³ as the Muslim population led by the Council of Ulama of Nigeria started to complain and petition against the imbalance allegedly effectuated by the new administration's "systematic relegation of Muslims within the ranks of the armed forces and federal establishment"¹⁵⁴ and pursuing a Christian agenda. Northern politicians who wanted Obasanjo's administration to pursue a Northern Oligarchical interest felt betrayed by his broad-based policies of national development as opposed to theirs¹⁵⁵.

The year 2000, was a turning point in Nigeria, it was the year the legislation of sharia law was implemented in twelve Northern states in Nigeria. Zamfara state government was the first to enforce the sharia criminal law applicable to all Muslims in the state but sharia issues that concern such as alcohol and prostitution were applicable to all citizens in those states that implemented the Sharia law¹⁵⁶.

Olomjobi noted that the hypocrisy of the Sharia promoted by the former governor of Zamfara state Ahmed Sani Yerima was exposed when the ex-governor suspended the implementation of Sharia law for a day in his state in order for the marriage of one of his children to successfully

¹⁵² Obadare, Ebenezer. "Pentecostal Presidency? The Lagos-Ibadan 'Theocratic Class' & the Muslim 'Other'." *Review of African Political Economy* 33, no. 110 (2006): 669-70. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007133>. Accessed November 12, 2020

¹⁵³ J.A.B Tsogo, P.I Johnson Jr, *How Vulnerable Is Nigeria To Islam Extremism*, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, (June 2011), p.49, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/5646>

¹⁵⁴ International Crisis Group, *Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict*, (December 20 2010) <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/northern-nigeria-background-conflict>

¹⁵⁵ John O.Magbadelo, *The Politics Of Religion In Nigeria*. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 7, no. 2 (2003), p.83, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48504808>. Accessed November 14, 2020.

¹⁵⁶ J.A.B Tsogo, P.I Johnson Jr, *How Vulnerable Is Nigeria To Islam Extremism*. p.50

take place. It was alleged that Yerima made an offer of over \$800 million as a gift to any state adopting the Sharia criminal code.¹⁵⁷

According to the 2010 International Crisis Group Report in respect to the Sharia crisis of 2000:

In the first decades of independence, which were marked by frequent violent conflict between the regions for control of state resources, the north saw the military as a route to power and influence. But following the disastrous rule of northern General Sani Abacha (1993-1998), the return to democracy in 1999 was viewed as a chance for the north to seek political and moral renewal. This led to the reintroduction of Sharia in twelve states between 1999 and 2002, although only two have applied it seriously. Sharia caused controversy over its compatibility with international human rights standards and the constitution and regarding the position of Christians in those states. It also exacerbated recurrent conflicts between Muslims and Christians¹⁵⁸.

The introduction of Sharia law was applauded by Northern Muslim elites but opposed by the non-Muslims who protested that the legislation of Sharia as a violation of the constitutional prohibition of state religion, thus, Christians decried that such imposition relegated them as second-class citizen. The protest against sharia was most violent in Kaduna state in which lives were lost and properties destroyed as riots plagued the cities over the issue between February and May 2000¹⁵⁹. The sharia movement did not initially start from people's demands for it, it was a geared effort of Northern Muslim governors and politicians who were members of the opposing political party (All People's Party), thus outside the patronage network of the incumbent power of Obasanjo's presidency and his party (People's democratic party), as a way to provide religious legitimacy to their political interest¹⁶⁰. Nonetheless, the sharia movement was popular among the masses not for sake of establishing an Islamic state governed by sharia but as a means of instituting political accountability and a redistributive economic reforms in governance.

¹⁵⁷ Olomojobi, Y. (2013), *Islam and Conflict in Northern Nigeria*. (Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited. 2013), p.127

¹⁵⁸ International Crisis Group, *Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict*

¹⁵⁹ J.A.B Tsogo, P.I Johnson Jr, *How Vulnerable Is Nigeria To Islam Extremism*, p.50-51

¹⁶⁰ Brandon Kendhammer, *The Sharia Controversy in Northern Nigeria and the Politics of Islamic Law in New and Uncertain Democracies*. (April 2013),

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272138064_The_Sharia_Controversy_in_Northern_Nigeria_and_the_Politics_of_Islamic_Law_in_New_and_Uncertain_Democracies . Accessed November 25 2020

Obasanjo's tenure was mired by a dramatic resurgence of political Islam particularly after the implementation of Sharia law by the twelve Northern states in Nigeria, on the other hand, was the peak ascendance of Christian revivalism and pentecostalism which started in the 1980s and the prevalent adoption of occult practices, rituals, and mysticism which has been a shadow of mainstream religions for power struggle and protection¹⁶¹. Kaduna State known for its religious diversity and its record as the most peaceful state in the north soon became a battleground where inter-religious violence thrived¹⁶². In respect to this situation, Dickson wrote that:

Islamic fundamentalism acquired a more pronounced political edge as the national fortunes of the governing Muslim national elite declined dramatically with the election of President Obasanjo, a born-again Christian from the South. After playing a major, often dominant role in the government and military for almost forty years, northern Muslims felt sidelined. Among the reasons for these sentiments was Obasanjo's removal of politicized military officers, who were disproportionately Muslim¹⁶³.

In the 2011 presidential election, Muhammadu Buhari who had been labeled in the press as a Muslim extremist by his political foes came to clinch the presidential party ticket of Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). Buhari's religious devotion and his remark on the support of Sharia law won him a large Muslim following, and ensuring the success of his political campaigns among Muslims was considered a religious duty, therefore, any attempt of opposition by a Muslim was thought of as heretical by some Muslim leaders. On the other hand, Buhari's opponent Goodluck Jonathan created a self-image of an oppressed Christian minority and regularly attended church services in order to identify himself more with the Christian population to rally his support base. Christian clerics heavily campaigned on his behalf in their churches. However, the 2011 presidential election seemed more like a contest between a Christian and a Muslim candidate which was heightened more by the already existing religious divide. While

¹⁶¹ U.Tar and A.G Shettima, *Endangered Democracy? the struggle over secularism and its implications for politics and democracy in Nigeria*, p.14, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2010, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/115684/49.pdf>. Accessed October 27 2020

¹⁶² John O.Magbadelo, "The Politics Of Religion In Nigeria." *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 7, no. 2 (2003),p.84,<https://www.jstor.org/stable/48504808> . Accessed November 14, 2020.

¹⁶³ Dickson, D, *Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research and Diplomatic Agenda*.(2008), <https://www.usip.org/publications/2005/05/political-islam-sub-saharan-africa-need-new-research-and-diplomatic-agenda> (November 14, 2020).

Jonathan won the election with a landslide dominating the leadings votes in the South and Middle Belt, Buhari was also overwhelmingly voted for in the Muslim-dominated states in the country but his loss of the election resulted in violent protests in the North.¹⁶⁴

One of the most controversial issues that raised national broil under Jonathan's administration was the introduction of Islamic Banking in Nigeria which operates on interest-free loans on the principles of Sharia law. The news of the governor of Central Bank Nigeria, Lamido Sanusi who happens to be a devout Muslim, approving the issuance of an Islamic banking license generated a heated reaction from Christians who viewed it as a crooked means of Islamizing Nigeria. It is worth mentioning that the approval of the Islamic banking system also enjoyed the support of Sanusi's predecessor Charles Soludo, who is a Christian¹⁶⁵. The Christian Association of Nigeria and some prominent Christian leaders were vocal against Sanusi's Islamic banking plan.

Cardinal Anthony Okogie, the Catholic Archbishop of Lagos in a press release stated:

We are against the operation of Islamic Banking because we see it as another deliberate move to subjugate Christians in Nigeria. Nigeria is a secular state; introducing Islamic Banking in Nigeria will further aggravate the culpable religious tension in the country already being hoisted by the radical sect Boko Haram¹⁶⁶.

Other Christian leaders raised concerns, for instance, Kaduna State chapter of the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN), Bishop David Bakare commented against the Central Bank move:

Honestly, if Governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi had done this advocacy for Islamic banking as a religious leader, it would have made a better sense than as a government official. Therefore, Sanusi should come out and tell the nation whose errand he is running and for who he speaks; is it for himself, Islam, or the government of Nigeria?¹⁶⁷.

¹⁶⁴ Hakeem Onapajo, Politics and the pulpit: The Rise and Decline of Religion in Nigeria's 2015 Presidential Elections, p.120, <https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE15.2Onapajo.pdf> . Accessed on October 17 2020.

¹⁶⁵ C. E. Clementina, O Okafor, I.E. Onyike, Press Coverage of Islamic Banking Controversy in Nigeria: A Job Not Well Done, Vol.19, 2013, <https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/NMMC/article/download/8751/9541> . Accessed on November 15 2020

¹⁶⁶ Sam Eyoboka, Okogie says no to Islamic banking, July 4th 2011, <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/07/okogie-says-no-to-islamic-banking/> . Accessed on November 15 2020

¹⁶⁷ Alex Thurston, Islamic banking stirs up controversy in religiously-divided Nigeria, The Christain Science Monitor, <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/0627/Islamic-banking-stirs-up-controversy-in-religiously-divided-Nigeria> . Accessed on November 15 2020

Nigerian Central Bank specification on the “Islamic” model of non-interest banks in its Guidelines deepened the worst fears of non-Muslims who thought it is a violation of the religious neutrality clause of Nigerian constitution, also there were concerns that Islamic banking in Nigeria may discriminate against non-Muslims. Whereas, Muslims contended that the banking system in Nigeria compels them to act against Islamic financial principles or deny them access to the banking economy because the financial system does not accommodate interest-free loans¹⁶⁸.

The 2015 electoral politics was no different from the 2011 elections. The election victory of Goodluck Jonathan in 2011, reinforced the determination of the Muslim North elite to strategize an electoral victory in 2015. This plan ensured selecting someone from the Muslim North to run for presidency as Jonathan's government was seen to be favorable to the Christian population and his policy bias against the Muslims.

In order for Goodluck Jonathan to continue to show his Christian commitment to garner strong Christian support, he embarked upon a regular pilgrimage with a large entourage of notable Christian leaders. Christian leaders benefited generously from Jonathan's administration in terms of licenses, waivers, and huge cash donations for church projects, these were ways his administration used to court the Christian votes, however, these deliberate efforts were thwarted by the opposition candidate, Muhammed Buhari, who picked a pastor, Yemi Osinbajo from one of the largest and most influential denominational megachurches in Nigeria, (Redeemed Christian Church of God), as his vice-presidential running mate¹⁶⁹. Osinbajo who appears more devout than Jonathan is known to be close to the General Overseer of Redeemed church, Pastor Enoch Adeboye whose church has more than an estimate of five million members, which means Jonathan's votes will be divided among the Christians¹⁷⁰.

Osinbajo is from the South West, a family of strong political ties in the South West, his wife is the granddaughter of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, an idolized political statesman who played a key role in Nigerian independence movement and the first premier of the Western region¹⁷¹.

¹⁶⁸ Olajide. B, Non-interest banking :Imperative in the global financial system. Guardian, (2011,June 29), p.23.

¹⁶⁹ Hakeem Onapajo, Politics and the pulpit:The Rise and Decline of Religion in Nigeria's 2015 Presidential Elections, p.121, <https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE15.2Onapajo.pdf> . Accessed on November 15 2020

¹⁷⁰ Stephen M. Cherry, Helen Rose Ebaugh, Global Religious Movements Across Borders: Sacred Service, Routledge, USA, 2016, p. 35

¹⁷¹ Tofe Ayeni, Nigeria's VP Osinbajo: Does he have friends in the political elite? 4 September 2020 <https://www.theafricareport.com/31338/nigerias-vp-osinbajo-does-he-have-friends-in-the-political-elite/>. Accessed on October 18 2020

Nevertheless, Osinbajo's selection was necessary to win votes in the South, as well as to appeal to the Christian votes.

Another notable issue that contributed to the religionization of politics in the 2015 electoral process was the high rise of the Boko Haram scourge in the country. Due to the deteriorated relationship between Christians and Muslims, the Christian communities view the Boko Haram violence as sort of a conspiracy perpetrated by the Northern Muslim elites aimed to actualize a long-term Muslim agenda to Islamize Nigeria, this paranoid was further alleged by some Christian leaders that the entire Boko Haram operation was politically orchestrated by the Muslim North as a way to remove the Christian president out of office.¹⁷²

However, Among the Muslim communities was a popular view that Boko Haram was a hidden plot by the Christian politicians to tarnish the image of Islam and silence the Muslim elites who were in strong opposition to Jonathan's re-election bid. Some Muslim leaders alleged that several incidences of Boko Haram raids had been masterminded Jonathan's presidency aimed at preventing voting in the Muslim dominated North East and ruining the electoral chance of a Muslim candidate. The accusations and threats from the two political camps almost brought the country to the brink of a religious war as it created a heated political climate that widen more the distrust between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria¹⁷³.

General Buhari went on to replace Goodluck Jonathan in a historic victory leading to the first peaceful transfer of power since Nigerian independence and the first time an opponent defeated an incumbent with the election result showing Buhari with 56.3 percent of votes against Jonathan's 43.6 percent. As was foreseeable, the voting patterns reveal¹⁷⁴. Jonathan won mostly in the Southern region while Buhari dominated the votes in the Northern states while also doing reasonably well in some Southern states.

¹⁷² Hakeem Onapajo, Politics and the pulpit: The Rise and Decline of Religion in Nigeria's 2015 Presidential Elections.

¹⁷³ Ibid

¹⁷⁴ Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Nigeria 2015 presidential election: Significance and challenges ahead, (March 31, 2015)

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/03/31/nigeria-2015-presidential-election-significance-and-challenges-ahead>
. Accessed on October 18 2020

2.4 CASES OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

Nigeria is no stranger to religious conflicts in the past, but its disturbance became a greater concern due to its frequency from the late 1970s into the '80s and '90s. Nevertheless, the religious violence is of most occurrence in Northern Nigeria, commonly perpetrated by Muslims who constitute the religious majority in that region. The religious violence is either inter-religious or intra-religious. inter-religious violence is often clashing between Christians and Muslims which usually snowballs into inter-ethnic crises. Some socio-ethnic issues are masked into inter-religious dimensions¹⁷⁵

From 1980 to 1985 has, had widespread riots stirred up in different cities in the Northern region by a radical Islamist group called Maitatsine. The most destructive of Maitatsine inspired riots occurred in Yan-Awaki Ward in Kano in December 1980. The group was known to carry arms to their preaching ground and evict people from their homes in Kano in order to accommodate their growing number of members. The State security forces had to be called in to quell the riots resulting in a death toll of 4,177 and much larger casualties, Muhammed Murwa the founder of the sect was killed in the riot and 1,673 of his followers were arrested. The rest of the sect's followers went underground but in October 1982, the regrouped sect inspired other riots in the Bulunkutu Ward of Maiduguri State, and the Rigassa/Tudun Wada ward of Kaduna State both in the Northern region. The Maitatsine uprising repeated itself again in 1984 and 1985 costing a total loss of lives close to 600 people. The riots are mostly in cities where government attention and security surveillance is minimal, these marginalized areas are mostly occupied by the poor

¹⁷⁵ Emefie Ikenga-Metuh, *Two Decades Of Religious Conflicts In Nigeria: A Recipe For Peace*, (6:1:1994), p.70
dsc.duq.edu › cgi › Accessed on November 21 2020

rural migrants, unemployed, low skilled workers, and Islamic scholars struggling for recognition and patronage¹⁷⁶. Bala Takaya analyses the phenomena behind Maitatsine uprising as:

(1). A powerful but still a faceless political elite group with a design to topple the political system and shift the locus of power for its own benefit through a major revolutionary social upheaval in a form that will appear as an Islamic Jihad or holy war.

(2). And/Or, a group of 'opportunistic mallams (Islamic teachers), who because they are not patronized by the leadership of the traditional orthodox Islam in Nigeria, feel marginalized and are therefore critical of the system and the modern values which sustain it. These types of Mallams adopt puritanical fundamentalism and radicalism as tools and use their students and adherents as readily mobilizable human materials to foment trouble. These Mallams could also easily be patronized and/or recruited by the first group for the planned social upheaval under the guise of religion¹⁷⁷.

The Maitatsine uprising is an example of intra-religious conflicts. The existence of a marginalized and obscure Islamic scholars with their strong influence over a growing and large follower drawn from impoverished illiterate background, often gives rise to a landmine of us-versus-them religious radicals inspired by Islamic traditions of revivalism. Though Maitatsine sect's uncanny exhibition of sadistic violence and syncretic rituals are non-recognized in orthodox Islam which is the mainstream Islam commonly practiced in Nigeria.

Another religious riot was triggered in 1987. During a highly publicized outdoor Christian crusade (with mounted loudspeakers), organized by the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA), at the College of Education in Kafanchan, Kaduna State. While the church event was going on, a female Muslim student overheard a testimony from a convert from Islam to Christianity, Abubakar Bello who made a comparison between the Qur'an and the Bible. It is alleged that, a Muslim woman, Aishatu Garba went to challenge Bello's claim which in turn developed into a fight between Christians and Muslims as more Muslim students joined in the heated contention. The brawl left a Muslim student dead, the news spread into town thereby

¹⁷⁶ Emefie Ikenga-Metuh, *Two Decades Of Religious Conflicts In Nigeria: A Recipe For Peace*, p.78-80

¹⁷⁷ Takaya, Bala, *The Foundations of Religious Intolerance In Nigeria, Backgrounds for Understanding the Maitatsine Phenomenon*, *Bulletin of Ecumenical Theology*, p.37, 2/2:1989-3/1: 1990. Accessed November 21 2020

starting a riot. Nine people were killed and two mosques were set ablaze. The next day, the riots spread to other cities and Northern states, in those cities, the Muslim youths attacked Christians, set fire to residents, businesses belonging to Christians and burnt hundreds of churches. It took the intervention of the army to restore peace and order in those cities affected by the fracas. The issue with the Christian rally was that it was organized in a religious provocative environment at a time when the tension arising from the polarizing the Sharia debate of the 80's was high and the trailing controversy of Nigeria joining the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), was at its peak.

German evangelist Reinhard Bonnke was invited by a Christian organization, Christ For All Nation Ministry for a week crusade planned to be held in Kano on 14 October 1991 under the theme: Kano for Jesus. The crusade was widely publicized in the city and various Media channels were deployed to advertise the coming Christian event. Thousands of posters were printed in the local languages carrying the message “Jesus for all by the year 2000” and The Christian Crusade’. Some Muslims felt Bonnke's coming crusade was crossing the red line, the crusade publicity messages were interpreted as an attempt to convert Muslim residents in Kano into Christianity. However, Muslims were offended and mounted pressure on the government to cancel Bonnke's permission to hold the crusade. When it was obvious that the crusade will commence as planned, Thousands of some Muslim groups marched through the city, violently protesting against the coming crusade, tearing up the posters, billboards, handbills of the crusade, and burning homes of non-indigenes and Christians. The destructions caused by the Muslim mob led to reprisal attacks the following day by some Christians against Muslim shops, homes, and mosques. Non-indigenes fled from their homes to seek refuge in the police stations and army barracks. By the time the police had restored order in the city, properties worth millions have already been destroyed and deaths of over 500. The crusade was later canceled¹⁷⁸.

The Christians blamed the government for failure in stopping the Muslim's destructive protests which were announced by the town criers a day before it started. On the other hand, the Muslims accused the government of double standards. They maintained that their earlier application to

¹⁷⁸ Pmnews Nigeria, The day 500 people died for Bonnke in Kano, (December 7, 2019)
<https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2019/12/07/flashback-the-day-500-people-died-for-bonnke-in-kano/>
Accessed November 21 2020.

invite a South African Muslim preacher to Nigeria was rejected by the government and questioned why the same government will grant permission for a Christian event in a predominately Muslim city like Kano. The government responded that it turned down the Muslim request on political grounds because Nigeria then cut off diplomatic relations with South Africa due to its Apartheid policy¹⁷⁹

On December 26, 1994, A group of Muslim fanatics severed the head of Gideon Akaluka, A Christian trader of Igbo ethnicity, who was arrested and jailed on charges of blasphemy after some Muslims told the police his wife had used pages of the Holy Qur'an for toilet paper for her baby. While Gideon was held in prison, a group of Muslim fundamentalists invaded the Dogon Dutse Prison in the northern city of Kano, the mob broke the keys to Gideon's prison cell where he was brutally beaten and beheaded. The group paraded around with the victim's lifeless head on the streets of Kano, screaming: *Allahu Akbar*, infuriating the Christians and Igbos nationwide but people in the area were extremely scared of the tension which may arise. The residents fled in fear of a city riot. Akaluka's wife fled Kano for safety reasons after his arrest. To date, no one has been persecuted for the murder of Akaluka¹⁸⁰.

The continuous widening gap of religious division became the front banner of Nigerian polity until when the Military rule ended in 1999. The democratic transition to civilian governance gave way to a platform for corrupt and power desperate politicians to play on Nigerian religious fears and distrust to garner more votes. In a system where religious sentiments cannot be distinguished from the place of politicking then violence is inevitable. The major floodgate that opened up old wounds of ethno religious antagonism was the re-introduction of full Sharia in Northern Nigeria, which was the first launch in Zamfara State in 1999, Prior to that, Sharia law in northern Nigeria covered only civil matters and excluded criminal matters. By the end of 2001, eleven other Northern states followed in the resolve in enacting wide-ranging Sharia laws incorporating both civil and criminal matters. The adoption of sharia by the Northern states added another spark of religious dissension that marked the epoch of waves of inter-religious violence in the country. The implementation of Sharia law raised fears of the Islamization

¹⁷⁹ Emefie Ikenga-Metuh, *Two Decades Of Religious Conflicts In Nigeria: A Recipe For Peace*. p.87

¹⁸⁰ News24, Christian beheaded by Muslims, (May 3 2001)

<https://www.news24.com/News24/Christian-beheaded-by-Muslims-20010503>. Accessed November 21 2020

agenda. It also attracted a national heated debate as to its constitutional legality and human right implications.¹⁸¹ A case in point is the organized protest by the Christians against the planned legislation of Sharia in Kaduna State legislature. Along the line, the protest was hijacked by hooligans and it turned violent, the crisis spilled over to other parts of the city. The state government set up a commission of inquiry to look into the crisis. The commission reported a death of over 1,295 persons and an unspecified number of people missing, 1,944 houses including business buildings razed to the ground, 746 vehicles set on fire, about 123 churches and 55 Mosques burnt down¹⁸²

Jos, the capital of Plateau state in North Central Nigeria, is a multi-ethnic and religious city which its diverse communities had prided itself on peacefully coexisting for decades. On September 7, 2001, the city became a scene of religious mass mayhem as violence suddenly erupted between Muslim communities and the Christian community that lasted for six days leaving more than 1000 people dead¹. The riots got poor coverage because it was overshadowed by the September 11 attacks on New York, however, the media coverage portrayed the riot as a religious conflict but in reality, the violence stemmed from a grievance built over time from the longstanding struggle for political control, economic resources and landownership rivalry amongst the ethnic groups which is often expressed not just in ethnicity but in terms of religion. The crisis was inflamed due to the manipulation of religious sentiment by both Christians and Muslims of whom are both perpetrators and victims¹⁸³. The impending point is the question of indigene which has pitted the indigenes against the settlers as the indigenes are predominantly Christians while the settlers are almost entirely Muslims. The imploding dispute is aggravated by the fact that the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group which is the settler group lay proprietary claim to Jos¹⁸⁴.

¹⁸¹ Umar Abubakar B. Jega & Muhammed Isah, *Managing Religious Conflicts and Boko Haram Attacks in Northeast* P.119 <http://www.internationalpolicybrief.org/images/2018/AUGUST/IJSRETH/ARTICLE12.pdf> Accessed November 21 2020.

¹⁸² Hussaini Abdu, *Ethnic and Religious Crisis in Northern Nigeria; Issues in Informer Repression*, Department Of Political Science And Defence Studies Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna, p.20 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235892796_Ethno-religious_Crisis_in_Northern_Nigeria .Accessed on November 24 2020

¹⁸³ Adeleye Oluwafunke Adeola, *Jos Crises, Peacemaking and its Challenges during 2001-2010*, *Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Studies* Volume 05 – Issue 05, October 2017 p.335, <https://www.ajournalonline.com/index.php/AJHSS/article/view/4855> Accessed on November 24 2020

¹⁸⁴ International Crisis Group, *Curbing Violence in Nigeria : The jos Crisis*, Africa Report N°196 – 17 December 2012, page-ii <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156727/196-curbng-violence-in-nigeria-i-the-jos-crisis.pdf> . Accessed on November 24 2020

The immediate trigger to the 2001 Jos conflict was the altercation flared up when a female Christian pedestrian tried to pass through the congregation of Muslim male worshippers at Friday prayers. It was alleged that a guard at the mosque rough handled her. This gave vent to the tensions that have been brewing over the years due to the occasional street blockages during Muslim Friday prayers. The non-Muslim residents and the Muslim worshippers clashed, the violent confrontation spread to other cities and within days, many houses were set on fire including churches and mosques, many lives were lost and people displaced¹⁸⁵. The military were later deployed to quell the riots and restore order. A commission of inquiry was set up but no one was prosecuted.

The 52nd edition of Miss World pageantry was scheduled to be hosted in Abuja Nigeria 2002, a total number of 110 contestants from all over the world were invited to compete for the crown. The beauty event was considered unchaste by many conservative Muslims and some Christians. Muslims peaceful protests were held in several cities in the Northern region. Already some contestants had threatened to boycott the beauty contest in protest against the Nigerian Sharia court's sentence of a woman Amina Lawal, who was sentenced to death by stoning on the offense of adultery in March 26, 2002, she was to be executed after she gave birth. However, trouble started when a journalist by the name of Isioma Daniel wrote an article on ThisDay Newspaper in defense of the beauty pageant event against Muslim protests suggesting that Prophet Muhammad would probably have approved of the pageantry which Nigeria was to host and may have wished to choose one of the contestants as his wife. The publication offended the Muslims who claimed the article was blasphemous and riots ensued in the North. The newspaper's office in Kaduna was burnt down, churches and shops were set on fire by the fanatics and over 100 lives were lost in the city of Kaduna due to the incident and about 3000 people were rendered homeless by the arson. The mayhem lasted for several days. Out of safety concerns, the pageant organizers moved the event to London. The Deputy Governor of Zamfara State in Northern Nigeria issued a Fatwa, a decree urging Muslims to kill Ms. Daniels as a religious duty¹⁸⁶.

¹⁸⁵ reliefweb, Nigeria: Jos: A city torn apart,(18 Dec 2001),
<https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-jos-city-torn-apart> Accessed on November 24 2020

¹⁸⁶ Alan Cowell, Religious Violence in Nigeria Drives Out Miss World Event, (November 23 2002)
<https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/23/world/religious-violence-in-nigeria-drives-out-miss-world-event.html>

Nigeria was the hardest hit in the 2006 Danish cartoon of the Prophet Muhammed crisis. The cartoon controversy spilled over in the Northern states of Nigeria. It served as a pretext to settle old religious grievances between the Muslim and Christian communities that prompted a tit for tat violence that resulted in over 100 loss of lives. The riot over the depiction of a caricature of Prophet Muhammed in Denmark started in Nigeria when Muslims attacked Christian minorities in the Northern part of the country, the rioters burned down eleven churches, homes, and businesses of Christians which triggered reprisal attacks on Muslims in the South East (Onitsha) when a busload of the bodies of Igbo victims from the violence were returned home 1, the sight of wounded and dead Igbo returnees opened up an age-old wounds massacred Igbos in the of Nigerian civil war¹⁸⁷.

On March 21 of 2007, Christiana Oluwasesin who was a Christian Nigerian secondary school teacher in Government Secondary School of Gandu was lynched when one of her students falsely accused her of desecrating the Qur'an, Christiana who was invigilating the exam that day, confiscated a paper of a student who was cheating in the exam. The paper had an Arabic inscription which the student had hidden in a book. She threw the book away. The students were incensed by this action. She was dragged, clubbed to death by the angry mob, her body was burnt and their classrooms, the library was set on fire. To date the murder remains unresolved, this incidence raises the question of freedom of religion and the respect for the sanctity of human life in Nigeria ¹⁸⁸.

74-year old street vendor, Bridget Patience Abahime, a wife of a pastor was violently beaten to death on June 2, 2016, by a fanatic Muslim mob in the Northern city of Kano on a claim that, Mrs. Abhime had insulted Prophet Muhammed. Mrs. Abahime was said to have asked a young man who was doing his ablution in front her shop to move away. The man began to raise his voice against her accusing Abahime of blaspheming the prophet, this incident drew an angry

Accessed November 21 2020

¹⁸⁷ Lydia Polgreen, Nigeria Counts 100 Deaths Over Danish Caricatures, (Feb. 24, 2006), <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/24/international/africa/24nigeria.html> Accessed November 21 2020

¹⁸⁸ Mildred Europa Taylor, The brutal murder of Christiana O. Oluwasesin, the Nigerian teacher accused of tearing up the Quran, (April 23, 2020) <https://face2faceafrica.com/article/the-gruesome-murder-of-christiana-o-oluwasesin-the-nigerian-teacher-accused-of-tearing-up-the-quran12>. Accessed November 21 2020.

mob that clubbed her to death. However, Kano State Police command told the media that the deceased woman was in contention with some traders about religion and the woman was said to have blasphemed Prophet Muhammad which infuriated the traders to descend on her and beat her to death. The five suspects that were arrested in connection with her murder were cleared of the charges on Nov. 3, 2016, which sparked a nationwide condemnation ¹⁸⁹.

Muslims and Christians are also divided in another key issue, for instance, is the violence between nomadic cattle herders and farmers because of the decreasing availability of greener pastures for animal grazing¹⁹⁰. Some states like Benue State, that are within the geopolitical zones of central Nigeria known as Middle Belt, are home to a diversity of ethnicities, religion and languages, have become a sectarian broiling center of occasional clashes of largely Muslim Fulani pastoralists and predominantly Christian farming communities. Loss of grazing reserves due to drought and desertification in the North forced most of the Fulani herders to migrate southward Nigeria, in search of grassland and water for their cattles, thereby pushing the cattle rearers to encroach upon farms, and damaging crops of the agrarian communities in the central and southern region, which has aggrieved farmers, who in turn steal the Fulanis livestock. This scenario has propelled a violent clash between the two groups, stoking up dangerous religious conspiracy theories that have increased religious tensions¹⁹¹.

The Fulani herder's attacks are perceived by many Christian communities as a subtle form of Jihad. The religionization of the conflicts are further inflamed by some Christian religious leaders who give inciteful statements, for instance, in March 2016, the prelate of the Methodist Church of Nigeria, Dr. Samuel Uche, said:

We are aware there is a game plan to Islamize Nigeria, and they are using the Fulani herdsmen to initiate it¹⁹².

¹⁸⁹ The Cable News, Justice for Bridget Patience Agbahime, (November 7, 2016), <https://www.thecable.ng/justice-bridget-patience-agbahime>. Accessed November 21 2020

¹⁹⁰ RJ Reinhart, Nigerians Deeply Divided by Religion on Key Issues, February 14, 2019, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/246689/nigerians-deeply-divided-religion-key-issues.aspx>. Accessed on November 30 2020.

¹⁹¹ .Linus Unah, Can the church in Nigeria stop the violence between herders and farmers?, June 25, 2018 Issue <https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2018/05/29/can-church-nigeria-stop-violence-between-herders-and-farmers>. Accessed on November 30 2020

¹⁹² International Crisis Group, Herders against Farmers: Nigeria's Expanding Deadly Conflict, 19 September 2017

Some southerners widely believe the Buhari led government is deliberately failing to stop Fulani herder aggression, because of President Buhari's Fulani ethnic roots and his position as life patron of the cattle breeders' association. While the Biafra separatist groups and sympathisers in the South East allegedly claim the attacks are a part of Northern agenda to overwhelm and forcefully convert the Igbos to Islam¹⁹³. According to the International Crisis group, in 2016 over 2,000 people were killed as a result of the crisis and From January 2015 to February 2017, at least 62,000 people were displaced in Kaduna, Benue and Plateau states¹⁹⁴.

Most of the riots and religious violence in Northern Nigeria may not have taken place if the police had acted fast enough, in some of the areas affected by the conflicts, it took the security agents two days to respond to the mayhem. The police are often accused of bias and protecting one group against the other. There is a frequent occurrence of religious violence in the Northern parts yet instigators and perpetrators are hardly identified, charged, often those involved in these crimes go free because of the powerful interest involved in the case. Another issue is the human rights abuses of the state security forces in their activity to bring order. Shot at sight orders are sometimes given by the government to the police to quell the riots. At times, under ages children are arrested without charges and detained alongside adults and criminals. The police while managing the crisis exacerbate the conflicts more by increasing the casualty figures. Sometimes, the government sets up commissions of inquiry but the recommendations of the reports are never implemented by the government nor their findings made public, these lapses signal the lack of political will by the government to put an end to ethno-religious violence in Nigeria.

For instance, the Commission of inquiry on the 1987 Kafanchan crisis, Justice A.G Karibi-White Tribunal was never implemented to date while the Commission of inquiry on the 1987 Kafanchan crisis, Justice A.G Karibi-White Tribunal were never made known to the public¹⁹⁵.

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/252-herders-against-farmers-nigerias-expanding-deadly-conflict> Accessed on November 30 20202

193 Ibid

194 Ibid

¹⁹⁵ Hussaini Abdu, Ethnic and Religious Crisis in Northern Nigeria, p.36

2.5 CAUSES OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE

2.5.1 Inter-Religious Suspicion And Competition

There is a fear among conservative Muslims over the growing influence of Western-Christian culture and ideals as a result of political secularization in Nigeria. However, the only politics these puritan Muslims understand is Islamic politics guided by Quran and Sunnah in an Islamic State. While the Christians and activists express deep concern of Islamic domination and loss of their freedom under an Islamic state, the fear of Islamization agenda and the threat of imposition of Sharia on Christians creates mutual distrust and suspicion among these religious groups¹⁹⁶. These inter-religious polarizations seem to center on the perception of the imposition of religious identity on the other forcing both religions to compete for influence in various spheres, politically assert dominance, and aggressively engage to supersede more converts¹⁹⁷. Lincoln contends that religious clash is inevitable when the religion of the status quo or majority becomes an instrument of domination over religion of resistance or religious minority. hence, while Islam is the dominate majority, Christianity is the religion of resistance¹⁹⁸.

2.5.2 Disruptive Modes Of Worship

Obstructive and disruptive religious events in a heated inter-religious environment are a provocative landmine that could potentially set off violence. Large crusades and revivals occasionally organized by churches often disrupt public highways. Disorganized crowds pulled by these church programs lead to high traffic congestion on public roads, thereby obstructing

¹⁹⁶ A.Idike, E.O Innocent p.77, Ethno- religious Identities in Nigeria: Implications for government in Nigeria, Journal of Policy and Development Studies Vol. 9, No. 5, https://www.arabianibmr.com/pdfs/JPDS_VOL_9_5/6.pdf .November 2015

¹⁹⁷ Ali, Mohammed I. S, The Use, Misuse of religion and Implications In Nigeria Politics, p.7, (November 2019) https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337224731_THE_USE_MISUSE_OF_RELIGION_AND_IMPLICATIONS_IN_NIGERIAN_POLITICS . Accessed Dec 02 2020.

¹⁹⁸ Lincoln.B, Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11. Chicago, III: University of Chicago Press. (2003)

vehicles and forcing road users going about their business to wait for a long period of time in an unapologetic and insensitive disregard of their rights to use public roads. Also, intending road users are forced to wait or abate their movement during Friday *Juma'at* prayers due to lack of road access. This situation is very common in Muslim dominated areas where public roads are blocked till the completion of prayers. Public disturbance like this are potential trigger points that easily sparks religious violence. For instance, the 2001 Jos riots erupted after a Christian woman insisted on her rights to pass through a public road barricaded by Muslim worshipers on Friday *Juma'at*¹⁹⁹.

In addition, the indiscriminate location of worship centers in residential areas with their magnifying loud-speakers within and outside their premises generates noise pollution to the detriment of neighbors' comfort. The night vigils hosted by churches constitute a public nuisance, throughout the night in the neighborhoods, and the loud early morning (4 am - 5 am) prayers of Muslim worshipers also contribute to public complaints.

2.5.3 Religious Identities And Intolerance

In Nigeria, what separates an individual from another is his/her identity. The identity is based on ethnicity and religion. This factor has led to personalization among Nigerians of different ethno-religious groups. When religious identity is personalized, religious groups tend to see their faith as superior to another which forms a fanatic dogma in their mind that makes them intolerable to other people's beliefs, it also gives them a religious justification to be hostile to others whom they consider unbelievers. The display of animosity and intolerance towards people outside their religious circle is the source of religious conflict confronting an intolerant multi-religious society like Nigeria.

¹⁹⁹ Isaac Terwase Sampson, Religious violence in Nigeria, AJCR 2012/1
<https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/religious-violence-in-nigeria/#:~:text=The%20literature%20on%20religious%20violence,major%20causes%20of%20such%20violence> .

2.5.4 Religious Attacks And Ridicule On Other Religions

In an inter-religious society where both religious groups claim a monopoly of truth, salvation of one's soul, and unequivocal way to eternity in heaven. This religious claim is contemptuously riddled in the public sermons of both religious groups, as these uncomplimentary preachings are delivered with rhetoric signifying the monopoly of salvation thereby openly showing disdain and discredit other religion's teachings, rituals, and symbols. The use of audio and videotapes by both Christians and Muslims to publicly broadcast provocative religious messages even in conflict-prone cities has sustained and intensified the cycle of inter-religious violence in Nigeria²⁰⁰.

Both Christianity and Islam do not recognize each other nor believe the opposing others right to exist. This hatred is expressed through campaigns of deliberate distortion of facts against each other and inciteful statements²⁰¹. According to Bashir Isyaku, the 1978 Kafanchan riots in Kaduna state were allegedly sparked by a Christian preacher, Reverend Abubakar Bako who purportedly misinterpreted verses from the Holy Qur'an to falsely discredit Islam to the hearing of Muslims while defending the exclusive essence of salvation through Christianity²⁰². There have been numerous literatures written by Christians against Islam, for instance, in Reverend Father, J. O. Odetayo chapter five of his book, 'Battle for Nigeria: The Cross or the Crescent', he made inciteful claims such as:

Allah is the name of the chief of the pagan Arabian deities, being worshipped before Mohammed was born. The spirit called by the name would make its worshippers violent and bloodthirsty: Muslims put no value onto human lives and they are intolerant. Hence, they can kill even when hired to do so²⁰³.

²⁰⁰ Isaac Terwase Sampson, *Religious violence in Nigeria*
<https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/religious-violence-in-nigeria/#:~:text=The%20literature%20on%20religious%20violence,major%20causes%20of%20such%20violence>. Accessed on December 6 2020

²⁰¹ A. O. Omotosho, *Religious Violence in Nigeria – the Causes and Solutions: an Islamic Perspective*, 2003, P.3
<https://nairametrics.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Religious-Violence-in-Nigeria.pdf> Accessed on December 6 2020

²⁰² Bashir Isyaku. *The Kafanchan Carnage*, B. Isyaku (January 1, 1991), p.25

²⁰³ Osman Bari, *Islam or Christianity "The Up Right view*, Bureau for Islamic Research, Kano, 1993, pp. Ii-iv.
<https://kdsg.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Kafanchan-1987-White-Paper-on-the-Report-of-the-Committee-to-Investigate-Causes-of-Riots-and-Disturbances-in-Kaduna-State-March-1987.pdf> Accessed on December 6 2020

Another provoking book is from a Christian writer by the name G.J.O Moshay whose book is called 'Anatomy of the Quran', the author made several condemnations and attacks on Prophet Muhammad and Islam in most of the Chapters of his book ²⁰⁴

However, the difference between Muslim criticism of Christianity and Christian criticism of Islam is that, Christians attack the Islamic concept of God and Prophet Muhammed as a false Prophet while Muslims feel constrained to criticize the validity of Jesus except only Christ divinity, this is because of the Islamic belief that Jesus is one of the prophets of Allah but Prophet Muhammed was the last messenger sent to replace Christianity ²⁰⁵.

The lack of genuine effort to understand and tolerant each other belief brings poor knowledge that breeds perceived threat and enmity, but by accepting and recognizing all necessary rights to which other religions are entitled and restraining against Unguarded religious utterances by religious fellows x is very important as a matter of national security²⁰⁶.

²⁰⁴ G. J. O. Moshay, *Anatomy of the Qur'an*, Fireliner International, Ibadan, 1994, p. 46.

²⁰⁵ See Quran 61:6

²⁰⁶ Kaduna State Government, White paper on the Reports of the committee to investigate causes of riots and disturbances in Kaduna State, 6th-12th March 1987 p.35, Kaduna state Nigeria
<https://kds.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Kafanchan-1987-White-Paper-on-the-Report-of-the-Committee-to-Investigate-Causes-of-Riots-and-Disturbances-in-Kaduna-State-March-1987.pdf> Accessed on December 6 2020

THE CASE OF BOKO HARAM

3.1 THE EMERGENCE OF BOKO HARAM

There are different accounts as to the historical emergence of Boko Haram but some scholars focusing on Islamic revivalism and origin in Northern Nigeria contends that the Boko Haram story begins with the origin of the Maitatsine uprisings that terrorized Kano state in the early 1980s,²⁰⁷ given that the Maitatsine movement shared similar ideological resistance against Western culture. According to Salihu Mohammad Niworu:

it was an ideology inherited by Muhammed Yusuf from his biological father Mallam Yusuf who was an active member of Maitatsine.²⁰⁸

The second account of Boko Haram origin is on the view that Boko Haram started in 1995 when Abubakar Lawan founded the *Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra* also known as *Shabaab* group or Muslim youth organization, in Maiduguri, Bornu State, subsequently, it changed its name several times from *Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra* to Nigerian Taliban to *Yusufiyya* sect and ultimately to its popularly known name Boko Haram. Onuoha stated that the sect's operations were not non-violent until its leader Abubakar Lawan left to further his studies at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia. Shortly afterward Mohammed Yusuf assumed the leadership position of the group position and indoctrinated the members with his teaching which he claimed were based on purity and Sharia law.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ John Ford, *The Origins of Boko Haram, how a fanatical militant group grew to terrorize Africa's most-populated country*. National Interest June 6, 2014. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-origins-boko-haram-10609> . Accessed on August 4,2020

²⁰⁸ Salihu Niworu, *Boko Haram Sect: Terrorists or a Manifestation of the Failed Nigerian State*, *Journal of Politics and Law Archives* Vol. 6, No. 2 (2013),<http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/view/27875>. Accessed on 3 August 2020

²⁰⁹ Freedom C Onuoha, "Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram", lecture delivered the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), *George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies*, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. (14 March 2014). p.3

The third narrative of Boko Haram origin is often contented to have emerged in Kannamma in Yobe State. According to Anugwom “the group that emerged in Kanamma was a splinter faction of Boko Haram which broke away from the Maiduguri headquarters. This faction was led by a zealous former lieutenant of Yusuf known as Muhammad Alih, who felt Yusuf was too slow in ushering in the righteous era of Islam. The Kannamma faction, which broke off in 2003, raided police stations, intimidated the local population, and invaded government buildings in a clear bid to attract attention as a revolutionary group. The group also dubbed itself as the Nigerian Taliban, even though it had no link whatsoever with the Taliban and could not last long enough to even aspire to such linkage. The group was soon enough wiped out by the military.²¹⁰

During the crackdown of the Kannamma faction by the Nigerian security force, Muhammed Yusuf fled to Saudi Arabia after he was declared a fugitive. It is arguably believed that during Yusuf's hajj in Saudi Arabia that the renowned Islamic scholar Ja'afar Adam whom Yusuf was once a student of, brokered peace between the then governor of Borno State, Ali Modu Sharif, and Muhammed Yusuf, the outcome of the truce was Yusuf's assurance of peace in the city and the state government's support of Boko Haram movement which was demonstrated in the appointment of Boko Haram key financier Alhaji Buji Foi as State commissioner of Ministry of religious affairs,²¹¹ However, Foi was extrajudicially killed by the Nigerian Police on the 31st of July, 2009, after he had been arrested and driven to the Police Headquarters in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State.²¹²

According to Premium Times Newspapers,

The Report traced the origin of private militias in Borno State in particular, of which Boko Haram is an offshoot, to politicians who set them up in the run-up to the 2003 general elections. The militias were allegedly armed and used extensively as political thugs. After the elections and having achieved their primary purpose, the politicians left the militias to their fate since they could not continue funding and keeping them

²¹⁰ Edlyne Eze Anugwom, *The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria: Perspectives from Within*, New Directions in Islam, December 6, 2018, p.45-46

²¹¹ Edlyne Eze Anugwom, *The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria* p.46

²¹² Muhammad A. Kumo, *Buji Foi brutal killed by the Nigerian police*, YouTube videos July 17th 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N_m4PBSzU7Y

employed. With no visible means of sustenance, some of the militias gravitated towards religious extremism, the type offered by Mohammed Yusuf.²¹³

Yusuf's increasingly vocal and violent critiques of western education and had brought him an undue attention from some Muslim scholars and Imams who disagreed strongly with his views and some of these scholars had warned the government about Boko Haram extremists underling, Mohammed Yusuf was arrested and interrogated on several occasions due to Boko Haram violent clashes with the Local Authorities but it only escalated as Boko Haram grievance grew increasingly bold as well as Yusuf's popularity. The group was dissatisfied with the way sharia law was implemented in Borno State. Boko Haram nefarious activities went so far as to engage in several assassinations of local religious leaders who criticized Yusuf's radical Quranic interpretations, of which one of such leaders was Yusuf's former teacher, Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmoud Adam, a prominent Islamic scholar and preacher who was assassinated as he was praying at the mosque on the orders of Mohammed Yusuf.²¹⁴

In December 2008, the Borno state government charged Yusuf with terrorism, it is alleged that some politicians intervened on behalf of Yusuf and had him released on bail.²¹⁵ Boko Haram maintained its irregular hit-and-run assaults on security posts in some cities of Borno and Yobe states, until July 2009 when the group provoked a major anti-government revolt that escalated into full-scale armed unrest between the Boko Haram and the Military, the tensions between Boko Haram and Borno State government came to a tipping point over a seemingly minor incident when traffic officers intercepted a convoy of motor-bike of the group members who were en route to a funeral of a fellow late member, over a motorcycle helmet violation. The new nationwide helmet and safety regulations enforced by the state had prior, been a source of dispute between the government and Yusuf's followers, It was a regulation necessitated by the need to improve road safety measures and drastically reduce casualties from accidents involving motorbikes, however, it was opposed by the sect, who claimed that wearing of helmets interfered with their proper religious headdresses and prevented the pure practice of Islam. The sect

²¹³ Premium Times Newspaper, *How Ex-Gov Modu Sheriff sponsored Boko Haram- Falana*, September 4, 2014, <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/167724-how-ex-gov-modu-sheriff-sponsored-boko-haram-falana.html>. Accessed on August 6 2020

²¹⁴ Matfess, "Hilary. Boko Haram: History and Context." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History*. 26 Oct. 2017; Accessed 7 Aug. 2020.

<https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-119>.

²¹⁵ Edlyne Eze Anugwom, *The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria* p.46

member's resistance from the routine traffic check ended abruptly in the crossfire between the latter and police officers, in response to this incident, the sect members unleashed a rampage of vandalism and arson on police stations in Bauchi and Yobe states. Yusuf himself continued inciting violence, he went further to record and distribute several video sermons in which he explicitly threatened the state and the police with violence, the videos were circulated on DVD cassettes and it went viral like wildfire²¹⁶

The intensification of the bloody unrest attracted the Federal Government attention which authorized a five days swift military action code name Operation Flush which lasted from 26th to 30th July across the five Northern State cities: Bauchi, Bornu, Kano, Katsina, and Yobe state. The Nigeria military in joint force with the police conducted an operation of the door-to-door raid at the homes of suspected members of Boko Haram, which an estimate of 700 to 1000 members of the sect were rounded up without trial and killed in the raid including 72-year-old father-in-law of Yusuf, Baba Fugu Mohammed, who went to honor the police invitation and never returned home.²¹⁷ A few days after Nigerian military scourge, Muhammed Yusuf was finally captured by the Nigerian army, handed over to the police but hours later, Yusuf was extra-judicially killed at the police headquarters. The government claims he was killed following an escape attempt, but witnesses report contradicts that he was executed.²¹⁸ Yusuf alleged State-sanctioned murder drew sympathizers which inversely conferred martyrdom status on him and solidified Boko Haram's sympathy. However, members of the sect who were not killed or arrested fled to neighboring countries, little is known about where exactly they fled to, though the sect insurrection that period brought its members the attention of global Jihadists and rebel groups across the Sahel.

Adam Higazi observes that during this campaign

In Maiduguri, the army and especially the police rounded up and executed suspects, without any due process, and at times inflicted what looked like collective punishment on the local population . . . The mopping-up operation also claimed many lives and generated particular resentment. This was mainly performed by the police, who relied on

²¹⁶ A. Walker, *What Is Boko Haram?* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2012)

²¹⁷ Matfess, Hilary. *Boko Haram: History and Context*

²¹⁸ M. Smith, *Explaining Nigeria's Boko Haram and Its Violent Insurgency* (Africa Check, 2014).

informants—usually, the ward head *maiangwa* within each neighborhood—whom the Borno State governor and security forces ordered to point out the houses where Yusufiyya members were residing.²¹⁹

The heavy-handed brutality of the security force's counter-campaign during the raid drew resentments from the surrounding communities. It was the same blunt tactics used against the Maitatsine movement in the 1980s, which is generally believed to be the precursor to Boko Haram. However, as the success of the counter-insurgency campaign was thought to be the end of the sect, the group re-emerged under a new leadership of Yusuf's second in command named Abubakar Shekau.²²⁰

Aftermaths of the Nigerian State security purge of Boko Haram members, the traditional rulers and local Imams in Maiduguri were tasked by the law enforcement to give names of associates and sympathizers of Boko Haram and suspected members who may have fled, an unknown number of people were listed and later disappeared mysteriously, presumed summarily executed by the police, though the police deny any of these accusations till today.²²¹

3.2 FRACTURING OF BOKO HARAM LEADERSHIP

It is relevant to note that, the terror group Boko Haram is not monolithic or a unified movement, it is a fragmented entity with different factions who disagree on tactical operations and strategic directions and in some cases, they compete against each other for attention and followers, while the splinter groups are ideologically inclined to Jihad-Salafism, they are focused on different issues on either domestic or international extremism, however, Boko Haram's origin started as a single entity, this research shall explain how Boko Haram came to become disintegrated into three main splinter groups.


²¹⁹ Higazi, "The Origins and Transformation of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria." *Politique africaine*, vol. no 130, no. 2, 2013, p.137-164. https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_POLAF_130_0137--the-origins-and-transformation-of-the.htm

²²⁰ Nigeria Social Violence Project, *Summary of Data*, 2015. (J.H.U. SAIS, Producer).

²²¹ Andrew Walker, What Is Boko Haram? Special report of United States Institute of Peace.p.4. <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR308.pdf> Accessed on August 9,2020

Before Muhammed Yusuf died in 2009 uprising, he was the commander in chief or *Amir ul-Aam* and spiritual leader of Boko Haram, He had two deputies, and each state where Boko Haram operated in, had its commander or *Amir* including every Local government where the group ran its operations. Following the death of Yusuf, one of the hardline deputies, Abubakar Shekau took over the leadership of the organization, he modified the group's organization to a loose command-and-control-structure, in some sort of interlinked cells and units which permits autonomous operation but generally take directives from the apex commander.²²²

Figure1: Hypothetical Organisational Structure and hierarchy of the Boko Haram leadership under Abubakar Shekau²²³



²²² F. C Onuoha, "(Un)Willing to Die: Boko Haram and Suicide Terrorism in Nigeria", *Report, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, (24 December 2012) <https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/12/2012122491416595337.html> . p.1, Accessed on August 10,2020

²²³ F. C Onuoha, *(Un)Willing to Die: Boko Haram and Suicide Terrorism in Nigeria*

Figure 1, as shown above, illustrates that Abubakar Shekau as the spiritual leader leads an 18-member Shura Consultative Council that authorizes the growing sophisticated attacks by various cells of the sect since the July 2009 uprising. The precise number of Boko Haram soldiers is unknown, In 2015 Amnesty International estimated around a rough number of Boko Haram troops to be 15,000,²²⁴ while United States intelligence officials in that same year estimated a more conservative number of around 4,000-6000 hardcore fighters.²²⁵

To the surprise of most people, Boko Haram re-emerged after more than a year hiatus with a shock attack of a prison break out on September 20 in Bauchi. Under Shekau's leadership of Boko Haram re-emergence in 2010, the mode of operation of Boko Haram realigned. Anugwom explained :

Boko Haram in 2010 moved from an active *dawah* or proselytization phase of the Mohammed Yusuf's era to the armed conflict phase of the Shekau (jihad phase) era in which there was a need to match fiery speech with action.²²⁶

Abubakar Shekau revolutionized Boko Haram operation using extreme measures of violent tactics such as the placement of improvised explosives devices (IEDs), targeted assassinations, drive-shooting, and strategic use of female suicide bombers,²²⁷ the group was refashioned as a Jihad tool for retribution and vengeance against the State. Boko Haram became territorial, some major towns in the North-East States that were captured were declared caliphate with Jihadist flags hoisted in those territories and them towns renamed, for instance, Maiduguri Municipal Council (MMC), Bama, Mubi, Michika, Damaturu, and Bauchi town were captured and held under Boko Haram controls while many other towns and villages became a battleground between the sect and Nigeria military.²²⁸

Abubakar Shekau reiterated his claim on Islamic caliphate in August 2014 in a released video:

²²⁴ Amnesty International interviews with human rights defenders, *Our job is to shoot, slaughter and kill: Boko Haram's reign of terror in North-East Northern*, (2015).p.17. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4413602015ENGLISH.PDF>. Accessed on August 11 2020

²²⁵ VOA News, *US Estimates Boko Haram Has Up to 6,000 Fighters*, (February 06, 2015 08:18 AM), <https://www.voanews.com/africa/us-estimates-boko-haram-has-6000-fighters> . Accessed on August 11,2020

²²⁶ Edlyne Eze Anugwom, *The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria: Perspectives from Within*, *New Directions in Islam*, December 6, 2018, p.112-113.

²²⁷ F. C Onuoha, (Un)Willing to Die: Boko Haram and Suicide Terrorism in Nigeria.

²²⁸ Tochukwu Omenma, J., Abada, I.M. & Onyinyechi Omenma, Z. *Boko Haram insurgency: a decade of dynamic evolution and struggle for a caliphate*. *Secur J* (17 February,2020). <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00233-7> . Accessed on August 11,2020

We have indeed established an Islamic caliphate. To everyone living in Islamic Caliphate, we convey our greetings, he said, specifically mentioning “brethren” in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Shishan (an Islamist term for Chechnya), Yemen, Somalia and the caliphate in Iraq and Syria.²²⁹

Subsequently, the Nigerian troops began to gain ground that in march 2015, Boko Haram lost its self-proclaimed capital, Gwoza and gradually other occupied towns by Boko Haram began to fall back into the government control, thereby forcing the Boko Haram to retreat into safe havens on the periphery of Lake Chad, in the Sambisa Forest and the hills and mountains east of Gwoza²³⁰

In 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Islamic State (IS), this development rebranded the group as Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) under the command of Shekau. However, in 2016, Boko Haram split into two factions-Islamic State Africa Province (ISWAP) led by Al-Barnawi who was reported to be the eldest son of Muhammed Yusuf and *Jama’atu Ahl al-Sunnah Lil-Dawa wal-Jihad* (JAS) headed by Shekau. Al-Barnawi was recognized by the Islamic State as the new governor of Islamic State-West Africa (ISWAP) by Islamic State (IS) while Shekau was demoted, Shekau rejected the replacement and broke away with his loyal militants under the group’s previous name, *Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad* also known as Boko Haram in the media. The split was as a result of irreconcilable operational differences in leadership style, as Al-Barnawi was allegedly in favor of engagement with the Muslim civilians which is central in their struggle while it focused its offenses on security forces and its infrastructures, as opposed to Shekau led faction.²³¹

According to Shekau worldview:

I am against the principle where someone will dwell in the society with the infidels without making public his opposition or anger against the infidels publicly as it is stated

²²⁹ Vanguard Nigeria newspaper. Shekau denies ceasefire deal with FG in new video (ON November 10, 2014 12:44 AM) Read more at: <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/11/shekau-denies-ceasefire-deal-fg-new-video/#sthash.Edhm4fpu.dpuf> . Accessed on August 11 2020

²³⁰ Tochukwu Omenma, J., Abada, I.M. & Onyinyechi Omenma, Z. Boko Haram insurgency: a decade of dynamic evolution and struggle for a caliphate.

²³¹ Rachel Bryson, Audu Bulama Bukarti, “Boko Haram’s Split on Women in Combat”, *Tony Blair Institute of Global Change* (17th September 2018), <https://institute.global/policy/boko-harams-split-women-combat>. Accessed August 13 2020

in the Quran. Anyone doing that can't be a Muslim, thick and thin. This is what our ideology proved and that is where I stand.²³²

Shekau's faction which views the local populace as enemy combatants on the premises that, they don't support the Jihadist movement, the sect's indiscriminate and punitive violence against civilians and its extensive use of female suicide bombers fragmented the internal leadership of Boko Haram which Al-Barnawi counters, that such tactics alienate Muslim's sentiment from Boko Haram goals.²³³

Mahmood explained:

Thus, while ISWAP [Islamic State West Africa Province] attempts to maintain an ideological link to Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf's preaching, it is distancing itself from Shekau's wayward application. This is central to its appeal to those who may disagree with Shekau but are vulnerable to extremist rhetoric or harbors anti-government sentiments. Yet its treatment of civilians compared to that of JAS [*Jama'atu Ahl al-Sunnah Lil-Dawa Wal-Jihad* led by Shekau] militants differ greatly, ... As one respondent from Ngala, where both groups have reportedly been active, commented: 'The Shekau faction just kills people ... if you meet the Barnawi people [on a] farm, they will let you go. Another from Damboa remarked: 'With Shekau, there are no negotiations – just killings. [the Barnawi faction] on the other hand will kill the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and collect food, but they may even apologize about it.²³⁴

The split of Boko Haram carries a wider implication, Al-Barnawi faction-Islamic State Africa Province (ISWAP) which has the strongest Islamic State (IS) affiliate in Africa, appears to be strategically positioning itself as a long-term threat in a way that may be compelling to the younger generation for recruit, the group operates in the tri-border area of the Lake Chad region, they control of the territories within that axis allows it to conduct small and large scale attacks,

²³² Hamza Idris, Shekau Vs Barnawi: *The Battle for Boko Haram's Soul*, Daily Trust Newspaper, (September 11, 2016), <https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/news/shekau-vs-barnawi-the-battle-for-boko-haram-s-soul/162159.html#UgUeegToUOgohsBE.99> .Accessed on August 13 2020

²³³ Omar S. Mahmood, *The potentially more sinister threat in Boko Haram's split* (July 2018), <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-potentially-more-sinister-threat-in-boko-harams-split> Accessed on August 13,2020


²³⁴ Omar S. Mahmood, *The potentially more sinister threat in Boko Haram's split*.

effectively deploying the use of hit and run tactics against the Nigerian troops, these territories also serve as its recruitment centers using various incentives and intimidation to recruit soldiers.

According to the 2019 United Nation Security Council Committee Report on Islamic State Africa Province (ISWAP), the group have an estimated 1500–3000 fighters,²³⁵ amongst them are African foreign Islamic State (IS) fighters, who had fought in Iraq and Syria, but returned and joined different terrorist groups in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions. Al-Barnawi's faction of Boko Haram is reported to have access to huge funding that enables the group to acquire sophisticated military equipment, reconnaissance drone hardwired, and vehicles that have led its numerous successful attacks on military bases and towns and has killed more than 700 Nigerian troops.²³⁶

²³⁵ United Nations Security Council 2019. S/2019/50. Letter dated 15 January 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Daesh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council. 15 January. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1663461?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header>. Accessed on August 13 2020

²³⁶ United Nations Security Council 2019. S/2019/50



The Economist

Source: Thorpe (2019, p. 1)

Figure 2 above illustrates the two factions of Boko Haram and their areas of control²³⁷

As at 2018, *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad* faction of Boko Haram led by Shekau controls South, Central Borno, Sambisa forest and the Nigerian border with Northern Cameroon which enables easy supplies and reinforcement from its regional allies, collect taxes as well as provide services, however, the Sambisa forest is used as its haven, training camp and operational headquarters from which most of their attacks are launch and retreat.²³⁸

²³⁷ Thorpe, J. "Measures to suppress and eradicate Boko Haram". *ODUMUNC 2019 Issue Brief for the African Union*. Old Dominion University, *Model United Nations Society*.(2019).p.3
<https://www.odu.edu/content/dam/odu/offices/mun/issue-brief-2019/ib-au-boko-haram.pdf>
 Accessed on 13 2020

²³⁸ Tochukwu Omenma, J., Abada, I.M. & Onyinyechi Omenma, Z. *Boko Haram insurgency: a decade of dynamic evolution and struggle for a caliphate*. Secur J (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00233-7>

The third splinter group from Boko Haram though relatively known is a sect called *Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan* which translates as Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa, or generally known to the public as Ansaru, the group first came to public knowledge in January 2012, when flyers were distributed in the cities of Kano State signed by the name Abu Usamatul Al'Ansari who claims to be the leader of the breakaway group, the message of the fliers was about the faction's dislike for Boko Haram's operational behaviors especially Skekau's attacks on Muslims and innocent non-muslims, the group condemned it as

Inhuman and damaging to fellow Muslims, It pledged to restore the dignity of Muslims in black Africa and called upon the heritage of Usman dan Fodio, founder of the Sokoto Caliphate in West Africa.²³⁹ In June 2014, a video emerged of Abu Usamata Al'Ansari, where he reaffirmed his condemnation of Boko Haram's indiscriminate killing of innocent Muslims and innocent security operatives and also stated that its focus is to defend Islam and Muslims across Africa and its duties are not confined to northern Nigeria but Africa.²⁴⁰ It is worthy to note that, the name of the acclaimed leader of the splinter group Abu Usamatul Al' Ansari' is probably an assumed name for Khalid al-Barnawi, a one time leader of Boko Haram who is believed to have trained with Al-Qaeda in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria in the mid-2000s.²⁴¹

According to former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria John Campbell :

Little is known about Ansaru's command structure or the number of fighters at its disposal. Conventional wisdom is that Ansaru's operatives are better educated, better trained, and much more international in outlook than those of Boko Haram.²⁴²

²³⁹ Sahara Reporters, *Rift in Boko Haram, 'Ansaru' Splinter Group Emerges, Calls BH 'Inhuman' To Muslims*, (31 January 2012).
<http://saharareporters.com/2012/01/31/rift-boko-haram-%E2%80%98ansaru%E2%80%99-splinter-group-emerges-calls-bh-%E2%80%98inhuman%E2%80%99-muslims> . Accessed on 15 2020

²⁴⁰ LWJ Staff, "New Islamist group emerges in Nigeria, vows to defend all Muslims in Africa", *Long Wall Journal* (June 4th, 2012), <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/06/new-islamist-group-emerges-in.php> Accessed on 16 August 2020

²⁴¹ Freedom C. Onuoha, *Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan: Nigeria's Evolving Militant Group*.(04/04/2013), <https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/node/1295> .Accessed on August 16 2020

²⁴² John Campbell, "Major Nigerian Terrorist Arrested", *Council of Foreign Relations* (April 4,2016).
<https://www.cfr.org/blog/major-nigerian-terrorist-arrested> .Accessed on August 16 2020

Ansaru has been responsible for several attacks after it gained media attention in 2012, one of the highest profiled operations of the group includes raiding the detention center of Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), in the capital of Nigeria Abuja and freeing its members and other detainees in November 2012,²⁴³ the group is also responsible for the kidnap of a French engineer by name Francis Collomp, working for a power company Vergnet, in Katsina in December 2012, In a released video, the group claimed to be holding Collomp as retaliation for the French government's planned intervention of Northern Mali and its public ban of the burqa, however, Collomp escaped after one year of capture.²⁴⁴ Ansaru reaffirmed its anger against the military intervention in Mali when it claimed responsibility for an attack on a convoy of Nigerian troops en route to deployment with West African forces in Mali to participate in combat operations.²⁴⁵ However, a month later, Ansaru kidnaps a group of seven foreign workers employed by Lebanese road construction company Setraco, claiming the men were being held for transgressions by European nations in Mali and Afghanistan, sadly, On 9 March 2013, Ansaru released a video showing it had killed the seven hostages. The group stated that the attempts by the British and Nigerian governments to rescue the hostages forced them to carry out the execution.²⁴⁶

In April 2016, the Nigerian government announced the capture of the leader of Ansaru, Abu Usamatul Al'Ansari whose real name is Khalid al-Barnawi after years of relatively low violence from the group. Since the group's leader was arrested, the sect has been inactive and operationally dormant, it is believed that the group's operations have ended.²⁴⁷ and some of its members have rejoined Boko Haram, however, Islamic State of Western African Province

²⁴³ James Forest, *Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria*, (May 2012). JSOU Report 12-5 http://www.jamesforest.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Boko_Haram_JSOU-Report-2012.pdf Accessed on August 16 2020

²⁴⁴ Ruth Bender, *French Hostage Francis Collomp Released in Nigeria*, (November 17, 2013) . <https://www.wsj.com/articles/france-says-french-hostage-francis-collomp-released-in-nigeria-1384688301> Accessed on August 16 2020.

²⁴⁵ Reuter, *Islamists Ansaru claim attack on Mali-bound Nigeria troops*. (January 20, 2013) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violence/islamists-ansaru-claim-attack-on-mali-bound-nigeria-troops-paper-idUSBRE90J0B520130120> .Accessed on August 16 2020

²⁴⁶ Farouk Chothia, *Profile: Who are Nigeria's Ansaru Islamists?*, (March 11 2013) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21510767> .Accessed on August 16 2020

²⁴⁷ Hilary Matfess, *Boko Haram's internal rift probably isn't good news. Here's why*. (August 24, 2016) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/08/24/boko-harams-internal-rift-probably-isnt-good-news-heres-why/> . Accessed on August 16 2020

(SWAP) and Boko Haram are still actively operational and sometimes clash in overlapping territories.

3.3 THE IDEOLOGY BEHIND BOKO HARAM

Since the death of the founder of Boko Haram Mohammed Yusuf, there has been an overlapping shift of Boko Haram ideology, the first strand of this ideology is the enact desire to launch a revenge mission against those who directly and indirectly supported the crackdown and extra-judicial killing of Yusuf and some Boko Haram members in July 2009, this vindictive mission targets the Nigerian government, its security apparatus and some traditional religious leaders in Northern Nigeria. However, this course has been adopted by every Boko Haram faction²⁴⁸ while the second ideological strand is channeled towards a regional and international Jihadism, Shekau's faction seems to be grassroots and regionally focused, Islamic State's Western African Province (ISWAP), is internationally inclined with affiliation from Islamic State (IS), while Ansaru whose leadership are trained by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has translated it's international and pan-West African message into an insurgency with a focus on the kidnapping of foreigners.²⁴⁹ The Boko Haram's Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Ansaru are more of a threat to western Interest than Shekau's led Boko Haram faction.

The emergence of Boko Haram Ideology and why it resonates well with an increasing number of young men in Northern Nigeria can be understood from socio-economic and religious dimensions of the group's ideology, the silent underlying grievance of decades of socio-economic neglect, weak infrastructure, constrained opportunities, unhindered porous borders that have facilitated the movement of arms and unchecked groups from neighboring countries, rampant corruption among the political-religious elites and politicization of ethnic-religious identities,

²⁴⁸ Jacob Zenn, Atta Barkindo & Nicholas A Heras, *The Ideological Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria*, The RUSI Journal, (14 Aug 2013) 158:4, 46-53, p.2, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2013.826506 . Accessed on August 18 2020.

²⁴⁹ Ibid,p.2

provide the space in which activist religious voices that radically express and identifies with this internal resentment easily enables the opportunity for the groundwork and convenience to chisel fundamentalism particularly in North-East Nigeria.

Research by Zacharias P. Pieri & Jacob Zenn on Boko Haram wrote that:

Yusuf was deeply concerned with the level of corruption and poor governance in Nigeria and set about to create a society organized according to the sharia. Through establishing microfinancing programs, he would loan small amounts of money to individuals and attracted a large following of youths who were loyal to him. These young men would establish small ventures—shoe-shining businesses, market stalls, rickshaws—and would give a certain amount of the profits back to Yusuf. Women were also instrumental in the early workings of the movement benefitting from Yusuf's largess, while he called for all women to be educated in a basic Islamic education.²⁵⁰

Yusuf's micro financing schemes were so popular in the North-East because it provided a kind of social welfare that filled the Government's void. It was easy to market Yusuf's ideology as a viable solution to the failed corrupt system of governance to the people who were marginalized by the State, that when Boko Haram started advocating for a violent change, the movement still enjoyed huge support and sympathy from the people, many of whom have become disenfranchised from the government's decades of failure and did not have an affinity for the State, so the acceptance of the Boko Haram method of change became easy.

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), reported in 2019 that:

The northeast region of Nigeria has the worst development indicators for children in the areas of health and education, with the population being among the poorest in the country. Even before the current insurgency, poor development indicators, poverty and high rates of out of school children reflected inequity within the country and contributed to the recruitment of young people into armed groups.²⁵¹

²⁵⁰ Zacharias P. Pieri & Jacob Zenn, *The Boko Haram Paradox: Ethnicity, Religion, and Historical Memory in Pursuit of a Caliphate*, *African Security*, 9:1, (March 1, 2016), p.66-88, DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2016.1132906 . Accessed on August 14 2020

²⁵¹ United Nations Children's Fund(UNICEF), *Every child learns:UNICEF education strategy 2019-2030*, (December 2019),p.2




Figure 3 above illustrates the literacy rate in Nigeria 2018 by zone and gender.²⁵²

The illiteracy rate in North-East Nigeria is the highest in Nigeria, it is also in the same region where Boko Haram originated and its activities thrive most. This is a perturbing issue since the word Boko is derived from the English word book which means Western education or modern education, as opposed to the distinct Islamic education that existed and flourished in Northern Nigeria before being dislodged by the British colonial system.²⁵³

As Muhammad Isa observes:

The term Boko implies a sense of rejection and resistance to the imposition of Western education and its system of colonial social organization, which replaced and degraded the earlier Islamic order of the jihadist state. Islamic scholars and clerics who once held sway

<https://www.unicef.org/sites/default/files/2019-12/EdStrategy-2019-2030-CountrySolutions-Nigeria.pdf>. Accessed August 19 2020

²⁵² Simona Varrella, *Literacy rate in Nigeria 2018 by zone and gender*, Statista, (August 14, 2020)

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1124745/literacy-rate-in-nigeria-by-zone-and-gender/>. Accessed August 19 2020

²⁵³ Muhammad Kabir Isa, *Militant Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria*, in *Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa*, edited by Wafulu Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, (2010), p. 332.

in the caliphate state and courts assigned the name Boko to northern elites who spoke, acted, ruled, and operated the state like their Western colonial masters. It is not uncommon to hear in discussions among Islamist scholars and average northerners that poverty and collapsed governance—the bane of the region—can be blamed on the failures and corrupt attitudes of Yan Boko (modern elites trained at secular schools) who have acquired a Western education and are currently in positions of power. As such, the system represented by the Yan Boko is unjust, secular and has no divine origin. It is therefore un-Islamic, which in turn accounts for its ineptitude and corruptness.²⁵⁴

Boko Haram ideology came to capitalize on the alleged lapses of western education that has failed to provide better opportunities and galvanized decades of deep-seated resentments against westernization that seems to be a threat to the pre-existing Islamic order in Northern Nigeria.

Muhammed Yusuf, in one of his public sermons, remarked:

It is those who have obtained Western education that are seen as educated, civilized, and polished ... true! The rest are illiterates. It is the same thing that the white man wrote in his book, stating clearly that all those who cannot read and write are illiterates. Therefore, in the contemporary world, if you cannot speak English, anything you say is fundamentally stupid and unintelligent. This in essence is what the beneficiaries of western education believe and they use such thinking to treat us disdainfully This is the area by which education is a source of destruction for our children, our friends, our daughters, and our brothers. This source of destruction is inscribed in the white man's philosophy of writing and the faith of its implementation. Followers of Western education have usurped our hearts with a philosophy and method of thinking that is contrary to the demands of Allah. They have destroyed our style of life with a system that has not been instructed to us by the Prophet of Allah. They have imposed upon us laws that are not of Allah. Have you understood the trap they have set for us?.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁴ Muhammad Kabir Isa, *Militant Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria*, .p.332

²⁵⁵ MOHD Nur & Yusuf.3gp, the original sermon as posted on YouTube, (October 28, 2011) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQY4GLtzLdU>, Accessed on August 21,2020.

Madiha Afzal threw light on the scenario that:

First, there is a lack of northern buy-in for the Nigerian state's post-colonial, federally-imposed Westernized system of education. Many northern Muslims see this system as ideologically incompatible with their beliefs and as insufficiently representative. Second, Western education is also seen as responsible for poor educational outcomes in the north because it was imposed on a population not familiar with that system during colonization, in contrast to the south. Third, by the poor educational outcomes in the north, the system of Western education is then seen as responsible for the lack of job opportunities that even the educated in the north face — as a symbol of “dashed expectations,” leading to the youth “tearing up their certificates,” or degrees. Fourth, Western education is considered a symbol of the Nigerian state's corruption because it is Western-educated politicians and elites who are seen as presiding over that corruption.²⁵⁶

However, these socioeconomic factors have left a vacuum of vulnerability among the Northern Muslims has culminated into a mass appealing sentiment which the Boko movement has morphed into an Islamist ideology of shared righteous indignation.

The religious dimension of Boko Haram ideology is framed within the radical Islamic discourse which is born out of the deep sense of insecurity about the spiritual decay and moral future of Islam with which Mohammed Yusuf had become conversant. The Sokoto Caliphate founded by Uthman Dan Fodio famous for its well-structured socio-political and administrative system modeled in Sharia laws became dismantled by the Western Christian power with contrasting ideas about the relationship between governance and religion. Thus, the basic philosophy behind Boko Haram's ideological resonance is the fact that since the beginning of the 20th century, the historic *Dar-al-Islam* (house of Islam) built by dan Fodio has been ruled by infidels.²⁵⁷

Muhammed Yusuf summarized Boko Haram's ideology in an audio sermon:

²⁵⁶ Madiha Afzal, From, *Western Education is Forbidden" to the World's Deadliest Terrorist Group: Education and Boko Haram in Nigeria*, (April 17 2020).
<https://www.africaportal.org/publications/western-education-forbidden-worlds-deadliest-terrorist-group-education-and-boko-haram-nigeria/> . Accessed on August 21, 2020

²⁵⁷ Alexander Thurston, Boko Haram the History of African Jihadist movement, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics, p.98, (November 14, 2017)

Our religion is Islam, our creed is the creed of the *Al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ Ahlul Sunnah Wal Jama'ah*, and our *manhaj* is *jihad*. We believe that sharia is the only truth. The constitution is a lie, it is *Kufr*. Democracy is a lie; it is *Kufr*. Working with the government that does not rule by the Sharia is a lie; it is *Kufr*. Working with the security agencies is a lie; it is *Kufr*. For those who are ignorant, let them be aware that a Muslim needs to make *hijrah* from the institutions established by the *ta'waghit*.²⁵⁸

Muhammed Yusuf believed in a set of doctrines that formed the religious basis for Boko Haram political stances. These doctrines were *Al-wala' wa-l-bara*, *Al-hukm bima anzala Allah*, and *Izhar al-din*. *Al-wala' wa-l-bara*, means exclusive loyalty (al-wala), to those whom they consider true Muslims and complete disavowal of all others.

Yusuf told his followers that:

What will make you a soldier of Allah first and foremost, you make a complete disavowal of every form of unbelief: The Constitution, the legislature ... worshipping tombs, idols, whatever. You come to reject it in your speech and your body and your heart. Moreover, Allah and His Messenger and the believers, you love them in your speech and your body and your heart.²⁵⁹

Yusuf upheld the firm notion of *Al Hukm bi-Ghayr ma anzala Allah*, meaning ruling by other than what God revealed was equivalent to polytheism. In other words, he posited that man-made legislation and democratic systems such as constitutions were idols that humans established to position themselves as an authority in contention and rivalry with God. True Muslims must have to choose between Allah commands and the laws of Man, for Islam demands obedience to the Qur'an and the Sunnah, therefore, Muslims must commit themselves completely to Islam.²⁶⁰ This stance meant that the Nigerian secular socio-political system is culpable to unbelief. Additionally, Yusuf espoused the principles of *Izhar al-din* which means manifesting religion through public action. Yusuf objected to the view that Islam exists only within the walls of the

²⁵⁸ Littafin Haazihi Aqeedatuna, Recording of commentary by Muhammad Yusuf on Hadhihi 'Aqidatuna, undated (likely 2008 or 2009), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JWfWa2rfsKw&index=2&list=UUdXgmSgdKq3HlwFnZcYuweA> Accessed August 27 2020

²⁵⁹ Littafin Haazihi Aqeedatuna

²⁶⁰ Abdulbasit Kassim, "Defining and Understanding the Religious Philosophy of Jihadi Salafism and the Ideology of Boko Haram", *Journal of Politics, Religion and Ideology* 16:2-3 (2015), p.173-200.

mosque, Boko Haram advocated for an activist faith, focused on confronting the idolatrous, anti-Islamic oppression (taghut), that opposes the practices of pure Islam and true Muslims.²⁶¹ Yusuf iterated that a life of Personal piety alone was insufficient, therefore Muslims needed to confront the depraved society surrounding them, completely oppose it through *Izhar al-din*, or risk their faith. In Yusuf's last sermons before his demise, he commended his followers to foster an unshakeable piety through practices such as *Asqiyam al-layl* (night prayer), implying that such practices would reinforce them for a coming period of armed struggle against the unbelieving State.²⁶²

The Boko Haram movement is deeply influenced by takfir and the theological doctrine of jihadi-Salafism which constitutes a major part of the group's ideological justification for violent attacks against other Muslims who oppose their dogma. Boko Haram's strong beliefs on intra-Muslim solidarity, the dismissal of democracy, the rejection of Western-style education, and strict adherence to the philosophy of Salafi-Jihadism came to become the fundamentals of its operational ideology.

3.4 RECRUITMENT METHOD OF BOKO HARAM

The ability of Boko Haram to keep recruiting soldiers is part of its thriving reasons in Northeast Nigeria. According to United States Intelligence, Boko Haram have an estimation of 6000 hardcore soldiers,²⁶³ while Amnesty International puts a rough estimate of its fighters at 15,000²⁶⁴, the group's target recruits, are often rural young men from poor backgrounds in Northeastern Nigeria. However, the average age of Boko Haram recruits appears to be about 30

²⁶¹ Yusuf, Hadhihi 'Aqidatuna

²⁶² Muhammad Yusuf, *Guzurin Mujaahidai*, sunnahization Youtube channel,(October 28, 2011), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VWCNdqWGU-M>

²⁶³ VOA News, *US Estimates Boko Haram Has Up to 6,000 Fighters*, (February 06, 2015) <https://www.voanews.com/africa/us-estimates-boko-haram-has-6000-fighters>, Accessed on August 29 2020

²⁶⁴ Amnesty International, *Boko Haram at a glance*, (29 January 2015), <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/01/boko-haram-glance/> Accessed on August 28 2020

years or younger, more often, the group recruit's child soldiers.²⁶⁵ The United Nations on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), reported that since 2009, Boko Haram and the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP), have recruited more than 8000 children.²⁶⁶ However, between 2013 and 2017, more than 3,500 children, most of whom were aged 13-17, were recruited by the sects. The transnational reach of the sect to recruit foreign fighters Cameroun, Chad, Niger, Mali, and Libya etcetera is noteworthy and its ability to maximize to its advantage the weak check and control in Nigeria border and abuse the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) policy on the free movement of persons across sub-regions further aggravates the lapses that facilitate the movement of criminals, mercenaries quickly across the States boundaries²⁶⁷. These neighboring countries are used as rear bases for attacking Nigeria and trafficking weapons.

Below are several strategies Boko Haram uses for its recruitment.

3.4.1 Forceful Conscription

Over the years, there has been an increasingly kidnap of teenage boys in Northeast Nigeria and indoctrination of these kids in Qur'anic schools that are often located in Cameroon, there have been alleged reports that signposts erected by Boko Haram at the Cameroon border towns have ISIL's *rayat al-uqab* insignia written in the Arabic language that says "It is a crime and treason not to join jihad".²⁶⁸ Daily Post newspaper revealed that young men were forcefully taken away to join Boko Haram after recruitment efforts through preaching failed to attract volunteers to the group²⁶⁹.

²⁶⁵ Jules Suzdaltsev, *on How Does Boko Haram Recruit Its Soldiers?*, (August 1st 2016),

<https://www.seeker.com/how-does-boko-haram-recruit-its-soldiers-1954346409.html> . Accessed on August 28 2020

²⁶⁶ United Nations on Drugs and Crime(UNODC), UNODC holds consultation in Abuja on the treatment of children affected by Terrorist Groups,

<https://www.unodc.org/nigeria/en/unodc-holds-consultation-in-abuja-on-the-treatment-of-children-affected-by-terrorist-groups.html>, Accessed on August 29 2020

²⁶⁷ Kangdim Dingji Maza, Umut Koldas and Sait Aksit, *Challenges of Countering Terrorist Recruitment in the Lake Chad Region: The Case of Boko Haram* p.5, <https://www.mdpi.com/646018>

²⁶⁸ Jacob Zenn, *Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region*, (October 2014, Volume 7, Issue 10), <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/boko-haram-recruitment-financing-and-arms-trafficking-in-the-lake-chad-region/> Accessed on August 30 2020

²⁶⁹ Ali Adoyi, *Boko Haram: Over 50 women abducted in Gulak town*, (September 15, 2014), <https://dailypost.ng/2014/09/15/boko-haram-50-women-abducted-gulak-town/> . Accessed on August 30 2020

Further, According to Daily Post News, a resident of Husra village in Michika LGA, Musa Uba disclosed to the media that:

They conducted preaching sessions to attract converts to their sect but people only listened out of fear. The next day they asked if anybody wanted to join them but there was no response, so they selected many healthy-looking young men and ordered them to follow them. One of the victims is my relative who did bodybuilding exercises regularly²⁷⁰

Boko Haram often kidnapped boys who are first indoctrinated into Jihad ideology, then deployed into sensitive missions such as intelligence gathering, transporting sabotage equipment, soon after some experience in these operations, the boy soldiers are moved into special units, drafted to overwhelm the security forces, weakens their positions and morale. Additionally, these child soldiers may also be given a quota of how many security personnel or “high-value targets” they must attack, and risk punishment at the hands of their commanders if they fail or show cowardice²⁷¹.

One of the defining characteristics of Boko Haram has been the kidnap of girls and women who are forced into carrying out suicide attacks, while others serve as cooks sex slaves, or wives of Boko Haram fighters.²⁷² The most notorious kidnapping was the abduction of 267 Schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno State in 2014 that triggered an international social media campaign of #BRINGBACKOURGIRLS²⁷³ and the kidnapping of 110 schoolgirls in Dapchi though 101 girls were later released while five died and three remained unaccounted for²⁷⁴. Between June 8, 2014, when Boko Haram reportedly deployed its first female suicide bomber, and February 2018, about 469 women have been deployed in more than 240 suicide attacks, the most by any terrorist organization, thereby involving young girls as both the victims and vanguards of terror, killing

²⁷⁰ Ibid

²⁷¹ Yossef Bodansky, *The Boko Haram and Nigerian Jihadism* ,No. 318 (February 2015),p.39, <https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/390636118.pdf>, Accessed on August 30 2020

²⁷² Yossef Bodansky, *The Boko Haram and Nigerian Jihadism*

²⁷³ BBC news, *Nigeria Chibok abductions: What we know*, (8 May 2017), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-322999438>. Accessed on August 31,2020

²⁷⁴ Sahara Reporter, *Boko Haram Has Enslaved Only Christian Among Kidnapped Girls Of Dapchi*, (March 21, 2018) <http://saharareporters.com/2018/03/21/boko-haram-has-enslaved-only-christian-among-kidnapped-girls-dapchi> . Accessed on August 31 2020

roughly 1,259 people and injuring some 2,967 people, while 29 percent of the attackers are teenagers, 6 percent are younger girl children and only 12 percent were reportedly adults²⁷⁵. Boko Haram use of forceful conscription of recruits may have been the sect's strategy of reducing its financial burden to pay mercenaries,²⁷⁶ however, the feminization of suicide bombing by the group helps them to evade detection which easily enables the female bombers to gain access to places without raising attention or attracting suspicion. Nevertheless, because the female bombers wear the hijab which makes it easy to hide explosives, it becomes more challenging for the male-dominated security officers as Islamic religion forbids a man to frisk a woman. Moreover, news of female bombers draws more media sensation and has an effect of surprise and shock in people than male counterparts which helps to perpetuate their propaganda of fear.²⁷⁷

The puzzling question then arises as to how Boko Haram is able to effectively control and indoctrinate these coerced, or hostages into willingly carrying out Jihad activities for instance suicide bombing, the plausible answer may be the Stockholm syndrome which can be analyzed through four factors throughout the captive phase. The first factor is when the captor threatens to kill the captive and has the capability to do so, this tactic instills fear that teaches compliance than resistance to the victim.²⁷⁸ This is evident in Boko Haram tactics towards their prisoners.

In Deutsche Welle (DW) exclusive interview with one of Boko Haram rescued victims-Christina Ijabla, has explained :

²⁷⁵ Elizabeth Pearson, "Wilayat Shahidat: Boko Haram, the Islamic State, and the Question of the Female Suicide Bomber", *Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines*, (May 2018), p.34-35, https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines_Chapter-2.pdf . Accessed on August 31 2020

²⁷⁶ Kangdim Dingji Maza, Umut Koldas and Sait Aksit, *Challenges of Countering Terrorist Recruitment in the Lake Chad Region*, p.6 <https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/11/2/96>, Accessed on August 31 2020.

²⁷⁷ Freedom C. Onuoha Temilola A. George, *Boko Haram's use of Female Suicide Bombing in Nigeria*, (17/03/2015), <https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/node/1398> , Accessed on August 31 2020

²⁷⁸ Anne Jones, *Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Rape Trauma Syndrome, and Battering*; retrieved from <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/new/victempow/student/postram.htm>. Accessed on September 3 2020

They said that they would kill us and our families and that they had complete control over us. Then they blindfolded one of the girls - one of us - and shot her before our very eyes. Then we did what they asked.²⁷⁹

The second factor, is that the victim is dependent upon the kidnapper for his/her life and completely relies on them for basic needs of survival as a result, becomes easier to manipulate and control the prisoner. The third factor is that the detainee is isolated, and only the perspective of the abductor is available to him/her which could potentially wear down the victim's belief. The fourth factor is the vital element that instills the Stockholm syndrome when the perpetrator begins to show a selective degree of kindness and tenderness to the prisoners, the effect causes the detainees to subside their resentment and set their mind on their captor's good side to protect themselves.²⁸⁰ Through these factors, Boko Haram victims become in a compromising and vulnerable position that enables Stockholm syndrome.

3.4.2 Boko Haram Loan Schemes

One of the most effective strategies, Boko haram has used to gain followers, sympathizers, and recruit members has been its social welfare schemes and community building based on Islamic principles, disbursement of financial assistance to unemployed youths to start petty commercial activity, soft loans to traders, artisans and business owners struggling to sustain their business²⁸¹ while some people join the group for opportunistic reasons in expectation of receiving some money afterwards, either way, Boko Haram used loan trap that made it difficult to repay²⁸². Recipients of these zero interest loans were both members and non-members of the Boko Haram sect however membership was not always a requirement for receiving the group's financial

²⁷⁹ Christina Ijabla, Exclusive: Boko Haram victim tells DW of captivity near Chibok girls, Interviewed by Muntaqa Ahiwa and Jan-Philipp Scholz for Deutsche Welle (DW) News, (May 30, 2016) <https://www.dw.com/en/exclusive-boko-haram-victim-tells-dw-of-captivity-near-chibok-girls/a-19294093#:~:text=Africa-Exclusive%3A%20Boko%20Haram%20victim%20tells%20DW%20of%20captivity%20near%20Chibok,whose%20seizure%20sparked%20international%20outrage> .

²⁸⁰ Jones, *Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Rape Trauma Syndrome, and Battering*

²⁸¹ Idayat Hassan, *The danger of a better-behaved Boko Haram*, (21 August 2018), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2018/08/21/opinion-nigeria-militancy-peace-boko-haram> . Accessed on August 3, 2020

²⁸² Radina Gigova, Boko Haram luring young people with loans, Nigerian military says, (April 21, 2016) <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/21/africa/nigeria-boko-haram-loans-entrepreneurs/> , Accessed on September 2 2020

support. Some business owners or those who want to start a micro business are unaware of the lure of business support is a trap though while some who are aware of the unspoken conditions but are willing to take the risk to benefit from those loans offered by Boko Haram, the stories of Boko Haram recruitment through soft loans often different variations but the tactics are always the same, for instance: a struggling business owner, perhaps is approached by a generous benefactor, or he shares a mutual friend with him, maybe he is familiar with him or has seen the person around several times in the community. The benefactor makes a benevolent offer. Later, the benefactor comes back, demanding repayment and if the business owner at that time could not repay the loan, he is forced to join Boko Haram or be killed.²⁸³ Those who were unable to meet up with the loan repayment were forced into joining the group or spy on their communities and provide sensitive information on military movements.²⁸⁴

3.4.3 False Religious Teachings

In the early beginning of Boko Haram, Yusuf's sermons was attracting massive crowds and followers to the movement, many people in the Northern Nigeria, the three countries that border Borno state where Boko Haram was founded-Southern Niger, Northern Cameroon and Republic of Chad were familiar with Boko Haram teachings as a result of listening to Yusuf's sermon on compact disc record (CD's) and digital versatile disc record (DVDs).²⁸⁵ However, the false teachings of this movement is the leading factor that influences the adoption of Jihadists views especially among the youths, the ignorance of the deep knowledge of true Islamic teachings and the dependence on roaming preachers who claim to be Islamic scholars on the interpretation of the Quran rather than the holy book enables opportunity for religious ideologues who often distort religious injunctions to target recruits.²⁸⁶ Often these radical preachers take advantage of the socio-economic and cultural challenges facing the Northeast region of Nigeria to indoctrinate people into believing that their problems resulted from the influence of Western civilization and

²⁸³ Mercy Corps, *Motivations and empty promises*, (April 2016), https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf Accessed on September 2 2020

²⁸⁴ Kangdim Dingji Maza, Umut Koldas and Sait Aksit, *Challenges of Countering Terrorist Recruitment in the Lake Chad Region: The Case of Boko Haram*, (20 February 2020) p.6, <https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/11/2/96/htm>

²⁸⁵ Jacob Zenn, Atta Barkindo & Nicholas A Heras, *The Ideological Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria*, (14 Aug 2013), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2013.826506> . Accessed on September 13 2020

²⁸⁶ Freedom C. Onuoha, *Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram ?*, p.5, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348-Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf . Accessed on September 16 2020

British colonialism, this false narrative easily appeals to the hearts and minds of some people especially areas where literacy rate is extremely low , poverty and frustration is high . This is inline as to why Boko Haram was able to attract huge followers and recruits because of its anti-western sentiment teachings, its this same strategy the sect has continued to use to recruit and expand its base across the Lake chad region.²⁸⁷

3.5 HOW BOKO HARAM IS FUNDED

Funding plays a key role in Boko Haram's sustenance and operations, according to the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium report, from 2006-2011, Boko Haram made an estimation of \$70 million, with annual income slightly more than \$10 million per year.²⁸⁸ However the groups finances started to decline from 2016 due to increased military incursions as the sect began to lose most of its territories and was unable to pay its combatants.²⁸⁹ Notwithstanding, the group has a highly diversified financing strategy and their ability to stay off financial regulation can be attributed by their hard to track ability to move funds through human cash couriers across Nigerian weak borders. Boko Haram reportedly regularly uses women as cash couriers, given that under religious restrictions in northern Nigeria, the predominately male security officers at checkpoints would not make physical contact with them. Cash couriers are often tasked with transporting other important items, such as messages or letters between the sect leaders and commanders. For Instance, in June 2012 a Boko Haram cash courier was arrested on the border between Nigeria and Niger Republic with a correspondence letter from the leader of the terror group, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb(AQIM) whose name is Abdelmalek Droukdel to

²⁸⁷ Kangdim Dingji Maza, Umut Koldas, Dr. Sait Aksit, Challenges of Countering Terrorist Recruitment in the Lake Chad Region: The Case of Boko Haram, p.7 <https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/11/2/96/htm> , Accessed on September 16 2020.

²⁸⁸ Boko Haram: Coffers and Coffins; A Pandora's Box - the Vast Financing Options for Boko Haram, Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium. <http://www.trackinterrorism.org/article/new-financing-options-bokoharam/bank-robberies-and-general-theft-nigerian-military> . Accessed on September 16 2020

²⁸⁹ Yaya J. Fanusie, Alex Entz, *Boko Haram Financial Assessment*, Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance, (May 2017), p.7 https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/defenddemocracy/uploads/documents/CSIF_Boko_Haram.pdf ..Accessed on September 17 2020.

Abubakar Shekau, suggesting the importance of these couriers to Boko Haram's communications and external infrastructure.²⁹⁰

This research shall explore various methods in which Boko Haram is financed .

3.5.1 Funding from Foreign Terrorist Organizations

It is widely speculated that Boko Haram had received funding from numerous Islamist terrorist organizations, though how much, when, and from which groups is in dispute, For example, The Daily Beast's Eli Lake reported in 2017, that Boko Haram received some early seed funding from the late Osama bin Laden in 2002, through an acolyte named Mohammed Ali who Osama Bin Laden sent to Africa with \$3 million to incubate radical groups that shared al-Qa'ida's mission to impose Islamic rule.²⁹¹

The connection between Boko Haram and al-Qa'ida – and its money – perhaps allegedly deepened, when Yusuf sought refuge in Saudi Arabia to escape one of Nigeria's first crackdowns on the terrorist group. It remains unclear what happened while he was in Saudi Arabia, or who he met, but Boko Haram leaders have later disclosed that much of their financial backing comes from al-Qaeda.²⁹²

A Boko Haram spokesman said in 2011:

Al-Qaeda are our elder brothers. We enjoy financial and technical support from them. Anything we want from them we ask them.²⁹³

²⁹⁰ AOAV, *Sources of funding (including self-funding) for the major groupings that perpetrate IED incidents – Boko Haram*, (25 May 2017) <https://aoav.org.uk/2017/sources-funding-including-self-funding-major-groupings-perpetrate-ied-incidents-boko-haram/> . Accessed on September 17 2020 .

²⁹¹ Eli Lake, Boko Haram's Bin Laden Connection, (July 12, 2017), <https://www.thedailybeast.com/boko-harams-bin-laden-connection> . Accessed on September 18 2020

²⁹² Terrence McCoy, Paying for terrorism: Where does Boko Haram gets its money from?,(June 6 2014), <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/paying-terrorism-where-does-boko-haram-gets-its-money-9503948.html> . Accessed on 18September 2020

²⁹³ Ibid

Boko Haram reportedly received \$250,000 from Algerian offshoot of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2012 and Somali group al-Shabab.²⁹⁴

3.5.2 Commercial Enterprises

During the formative years of Boko Haram, the group was able to generate streams of revenue through its microfinancing system for small and medium-sized businesses throughout Northern Nigeria²⁹⁵. The revenue derived from the microfinance schemes was used to run Boko Haram operations, through this financial structure, Boko Haram was able to create an investment network with recruited experts who acted as legitimate front men as well as remit agreed upon sums. Aside from revenues from its microfinancing business, it also served as its source of recruits.²⁹⁶ Nevertheless, loans were given to business owners in return for pledged financial support and if financial support could not be met when demanded at a later time, then personnel support to Boko Haram was mandated.

However, Boko Haram engaged in local businesses through its supporters who remit profits to the group, some of the businesses are either small and medium scale which includes cross border hawking, pedicure and manicure services, bureau de change services, haulage and transportation businesses, Kola nut and Fish sales et ce tra.²⁹⁷ In the capital of the Local Government Area of Borno State called Monguno, the Nigerian military banned the fish trade because Boko Haram was profiting from it.²⁹⁸ In April 2016, eleven Boko Haram members were apprehended at a market in Northwest Nigeria with 463 bags of fish, upon interrogation, they confessed they were engaged in the business of selling fish in order to raise funds and support the activities of Boko Haram.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁴ Tom Keatinge, Finances of jihad: How extremist groups raise money, (12 December 2014) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30393832> . Accessed on September 18 2020

²⁹⁵ Virginia Comolli, Boko Haram Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 63-78

²⁹⁶ FATF-GIABA-GABAC, Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa, FATF, Paris, (October 2016)p.19 www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/terrorist-financing-west-central-africa.html Accessed on September 19 2020

²⁹⁷ Rock, Jason L, *The funding of Boko Haram and Nigeria's actions to stop it*, Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, December 2016 <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/81223377.pdf> Accessed on September 2020

²⁹⁸ Dionne Searcey and Ashley Gilbertson, Nigeria's Battles With Boko Haram Scar the Land and Its People, (March 10, 2017), <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram.html> . Accessed on September 20, 2020

²⁹⁹ FATF-GIABA-GABAC, *Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa*, p.19

3.5.3 Smuggling and Trafficking

The lapses in the West African porous borders has been severely exploited by Boko Haram as its smuggling routes for human trafficking. According to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), Boko Haram has actively been involved in abducting more than 1000 children since 2013 including 276 girls taken from their secondary school in the town of Chibok in 2014³⁰⁰, some of the girls are believed to have been sold into marriage to militants for \$12.³⁰¹

According to CNN's translation from the local Hausa language in one of the Boko Haram released videos, Shekau said

I abducted your girls. I will sell them in the market, by Allah, there is a market for selling humans. Allah says I should sell. He commands me to sell. I will sell women.³⁰²

Boko Haram has also been involved in smuggling stolen vehicles across the Nigerian-Cameroon border, in 2014 Cameroonians reportedly discovered travel records to Libya and receipts from car exports to Qatar in a Boko Haram camp³⁰³, which may have been affiliated to a Cameroonian businessman, Alhaji Abdalla who was found to have helped sponsor Boko Haram through his smuggling network, which extended through Chad and Libya, and to Qatar.³⁰⁴

Arms trafficking is another major source of Boko Haram's revenue. Traffickers bring weapons in through the open border crossings³⁰⁵, and keep stockpiles in other neighboring countries³⁰⁶. In 2015, a Boko Haram member was arrested while trying to traffic weapons from Sudan to West Africa in supply trucks³⁰⁷.

³⁰⁰ Stephanie Busari, UNICEF: Boko Haram has kidnapped more than 1000 children in Nigeria, (April 13, 2018), <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/13/africa/boko-haram-children-abduction-intl/index.html>. Accessed on September 19 2020

³⁰¹ Jessica Prois, *Nigerian Girls Kidnapping Is A Serious Human Trafficking Issue. Here's What's Being Done*, (May 12, 2014) https://www.huffpost.com/entry/nigerian-girls-kidnapping_n_5270034?euccounter=1. Accessed on September 20 2020

³⁰² Aminu Abubakar and Josh Levs, *I will sell them, 'Boko Haram leader says of kidnapped Nigerian girls*, (May 6, 2014) <https://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/05/world/africa/nigeria-abducted-girls/>. Accessed on September 20 2020

³⁰³ Jacob Zenn, *Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, (October 31, 2014) <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-haram-recruitment-financing-and-armstrafficking-in-the-lake-chad-region>. Accessed on September 20, 2020

³⁰⁴ Jacob Zenn, *Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region*.

³⁰⁵ Jacob Zenn, *Boko Haram's International Connections*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, (January 14, 2013) <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-harams-internationalconnections>. Accessed on September 20 2020

³⁰⁶ Jacob Zenn, *Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region*.

³⁰⁷ Financial Action Task Force, *Terrorist Financing In West and Central Africa*, (October 2016).

The former Nigerian minister of interior under Goodluck Jonathan administration disclosed that Nigeria has over 1,499 irregular (illegal) and 84 regular (legal) officially identified entry routes into Nigeria, Adamawa State which is one of the strongholds of Boko Haram have about 25 illegal routes into Nigeria from neighboring countries³⁰⁸ while 250 unprotected footpaths link directly to Cameroon, Chad or Niger Republic from Damaturu/Maiduguri axis which are the capital cities of Yobe and Borno state.³⁰⁹ As a result of these weak border securities, more than 70 percent of about 8 million illegal arms in West Africa were reported to be in Nigeria.³¹⁰ Boko Haram has been able to take advantage of this leakage and commercialize on illicit transnational arms trafficking into and out of Nigeria using various methods such as the use of thatched bags with weapons concealed in them and attached to camels, donkeys, and cows and then moved across the borders with the aid of nomadic pastoralists or herders. Boko Haram members are known to collude with cross-border traders and drivers to help hide their ammunition in their goods that are transported via heavy trucks, trailers, and Lorries, however very little inspection is conducted on these lorries by the security and border officials due to the huge size of the goods loaded on them.³¹¹

3.5.4 Kidnapping For Ransom

Boko Haram has generated millions in revenue through high profile kidnapping, the group is responsible for the kidnapping of numerous western expatriates, former and current Government officials, and some wealthy Nigerians. Ransom payments appear to be an important source of funding for the group. In April 2013, the group received a ransom of 3million USD for the release of a French family.³¹² In 2014 the group was behind the kidnapping of the wife of

<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-WestCentral-Africa.pdf> Accessed on September 20 2020

³⁰⁸ Freedom C. Onuoha, *Porous Borders and Boko Haram's Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria*, (08/09/2013), <https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/node/132> . Accessed on September 20 2020

³⁰⁹ Sagir Musa, *Border Security, Arms Proliferation And Terrorism In Nigeria*, (April 20, 2013) <http://saharareporters.com/2013/04/20/border-security-arms-proliferation-and-terrorism-nigeria-lt-col-sagir-musa> . Accessed on September 20 2020

³¹⁰ Dr. Freedom C. Onuoha, *Porous Borders and Boko Haram's Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria*

³¹¹ Lt.Col Sagir Musa, *Border Security, Arms Proliferation And Terrorism In Nigeria*

³¹² BBC News, *Nigeria's Boko Haram 'got \$3m ransom' to free hostages*, (April 2013), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22320077> . Accessed on September 20 2020

Cameroon's vice prime minister who was released alongside with 10 Chinese workers after the Cameroon authorities paid a ransom of 400,000 USD³¹³.

In mid-2014, the-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Linda Thomas-Greenfield remarked: "Our suspicions are that they are surviving on very lucrative criminal activities that involve kidnappings,³¹⁴ nevertheless, United States officials believes that Boko Haram makes as much as \$1 million for the release of each abducted wealthy Nigerian³¹⁵.

3.5.5 Taxation and Extortion

When Boko Haram takes control of a territory, it begins through taxing the local population or threatens them with violence when they fail to comply. The group has been able to extort money from traders and business owners offering protection in exchange for cash.³¹⁶ The sect often threatens politicians, and some government officials with harm on family members if they fail to pay for protection.³¹⁷ These threats sometimes come through letters or text messages or phone calls demanding payment at a certain location on a certain date. There have been allegedly claims by the Nigerian media that some Northern Nigerian Government officials paid Boko Haram to not attack their jurisdictions. A high-level Boko Haram operative alleged that under Ibrahim Shekarau administration, the former Governor of Kano state reached an agreement as far back as 2004 to be paying a monthly protection dues of N5 million (13,036.45USD), to Boko Haram which was later increased to N10 million (26,072.90USD), in 2009 in order to avoid these states being attacked. Other Northern state governors like Bauchi state under Alhaji Isa Yuguda administration, started to pay in 2008, however, when the two states reneged on the monthly

³¹³ Sahara Reporters, *Cameroon Paid Boko Haram \$400K Ransom, Plus Arms And Ammunition, To Secure Release Of Deputy Prime Minister's Wife, Other Hostages*, (October 11, 2014) <http://saharareporters.com/2014/10/11/cameroon-paid-boko-haram-400k-ransom-plus-arms-and-ammunition-secure-release-deputy-prime> , Accessed on September 20 2020

³¹⁴ Phil Stewart, Lesley Wroughton, *How Boko Haram is beating U.S. efforts to choke its financing*, (July 1, 2014) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nigeria-bokoharam-insight-idUSKBN0F636920140701>

³¹⁵ Phil Stewart, Lesley Wroughton, *How Boko Haram is beating U.S. efforts to choke its financing*, (July 1, 2014), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nigeria-bokoharam-insight-idUSKBN0F636920140701> Accessed on September 20 2020

³¹⁶ Yaya J. Fanusie Alex Entz, *Boko Haram Financial Assessment*, (May 2017), https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/defenddemocracy/uploads/documents/CSIF_Boko_Haram.pdf . Accessed on September 20 2020

³¹⁷ Farouk Chothia, *Boko Haram crisis: How have Nigeria's militants become so strong?*, (26 January 2015), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30933860> Accessed on September 20 2020

payments, Boko Haram re-started its series of attacks on the two states, this protection money would have totaled over \$1.5 million dollars per year.³¹⁸

3.5.6 Cattle Rustling and Robbery

Looting is one of the funding models of Boko Haram. The group is reportedly known to invade villages, steal livestock and food,³¹⁹ Local authorities in the Northern region Nigeria have recorded an increase in cattle raiding activities mainly in the north and north-west of Nigeria that is directly linked to Boko Haram. Most attacks occur in the remote rural areas, close to forested regions in the north-west where there is almost an absence of security presence. These activities are highly lucrative for Boko Haram, such theft could pull in millions of dollars for Boko Haram, as cattle fetch an average market price of \$500, but the group actions adversely deprive the local communities of their food and means of livelihoods.³²⁰ However, On 9 September 2014, 7000 cows from the Republic of Chad en route to Maiduguri, Nigeria were ambushed and hijacked by Boko Haram around Dikwa in Nigeria.³²¹

In March 2016, four cattle markets in Borno State Nigeria (Gamboru, Dusuman, Shuwari, Ngom) were suspended by the authorities due to its suspected connections to Boko Haram.³²² Cameroonian government closed down one of its biggest cattle markets in the far North region of Mayo-Sava due to suspected transactions of stolen cattle by Boko Haram militants group has been able to profiteer in auctioning stolen cattle by creating its own markets in its controlled territories, most times in order to avoid detection by the state securities, the sect sells its stolen cattle at distant local small markets, at times the group hides its raided cattle in neighboring countries to sell them later.³²³

³¹⁸ Emmanuel Aziken, AbdulSalam Muhammad, Victoria Ojeme, and Ndahi Marama, We 're on Northern gov's payroll – Boko Haram, (January 24, 2012) <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/we-re-on-northern-govspavroll-boko-haram/> Accessed on September 20 2020

³¹⁹ Ife Olori, *Boko Haram ravage village, steal livestock and food*

<https://www.legit.ng/879941-boko-haram-invade-borno-village-seize-cattle-steal-food.html>, Accessed on September 26 2020

³²⁰ FATF-GIABA-GABAC, *Terrorist financing in West and Central Africa*, p.12, (October 2016)

<http://iffoadatabase.trustafira.org/iff/Terrorist-Financing-West-Central-Africa.pdf> Accessed on September 26 2020

³²¹ Ibid p.14

³²² BBC News, *Nigeria's Boko Haram 'cattle markets' shut down*, (4 March 2016),

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35727473> Accessed on September 26 2020

³²³ Divine Ntaryike Jr. and Pius Lukong, *Cameroon Closes Down Cattle Market as Militants Turn to Rustling*, (August 29, 2016) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-29/cameroon-closes-down-cattle-market-as-militants-turn-to-rustling>

Boko Haram has committed hundreds of bank robberies in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa state. a practice which they justify as permissible under Koranic law by calling the money ‘spoils of war’³²⁴. Some towns close to Boko Haram operational reach were not spared in their terrorizing heist, the group has raided more than 40 villages, one of the alleged masterminds of the Christmas day bombing in Madalla in 2015, Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar, confessed how the loot from Boko Haram robberies were shared :

Normally, the money is supposed to be shared to five groups: the less privileged, widows of those who died in the jihad, Zakat, those that brought in the money, and the last to the leadership to be used in prosecuting the jihad.³²⁵

3.5.7 Donations and Sponsorship

There have been numerous accounts of donations pouring in from Boko Haram sympathizers and supporters from both external and local level, amongst them, are notable and local politicians who either funded or aided Boko Haram in order to advance their own political interests, for instance In Borno state prior to the 2003 State Gubernatorial election in Borno State, Ali Modu Sheriff employed members of Boko Haram's group and promised financial support and political influence in exchange for their support for his campaign as state governor. After Ali Sheriff's electoral victory, Alhaji Buji Foi, an open supporter and financier of Boko Haram was appointed for the position of Borno's Minister for Religious Affairs.³²⁶

On October 5, 2015, the Nigerian Army reported the arrest of Mohammed Maina who allegedly gathers cash and other material contributions from Boko Haram local sympathizers and delivers

³²⁴ AOV, *On sources of funding (including self-funding) for the major groupings that perpetrate IED incidents – Boko Haram* <https://aov.org.uk/2017/sources-funding-including-self-funding-major-groupings-perpetrate-ied-incidents-boko-haram/> . Accessed 26 2020

³²⁵ Daily Post News, *Kabiru Sokoto names Boko Haram's leaders*, (February 14, 2012)

<https://dailypost.ng/2012/02/14/kabiru-sokoto-names-boko-harams-leaders/> Accessed on September 27 2020

³²⁶ Premium Times, *How Ali Modu Sheriff Aided and Abetted Boko Haram: 40 Unknown Facts*, By Kaka Shehu Lawan, (August 28, 2016)

<https://opinion.premiumtimesng.com/2016/08/28/40-unknown-facts-ex-gov-ali-modu-sheriff-aided-abetted-boko-haram-violence-borno-attorney-general/> Accessed on September 27 2020

them to the terrorist's camps.³²⁷ Another arrest by the Nigerian military was an alleged sponsor of Boko Haram named Aliyu Hussaini who impersonates as a brigadier general in the Nigerian army.³²⁸ One of the apprehended members of Boko Haram, who was identified as a treasurer for the sect, confessed that he was the handler of both the compulsory and voluntary contributions from the group's members. The treasurer revealed that sympathizers and supporters of Boko Haram often makes voluntary donations of less than \$1. In fact, during Muhammad Yusuf's time as leader of Boko Haram, members were committed to pay a daily due of 100 naira (\$0.30) to the organization, and this formed the basis of the group's finances in its early stages.³²⁹ On further investigations by Nigerian security agencies, it was uncovered that Boko Haram uses children, elderly, and physically and mentally challenged people to appeal for funds from the public, these beggars are also positioned in strategic locations where they also serve as spies for the organization.³³⁰

A British charity organization by the name Al Muntada Trust, which raises funds for disaster projects in Africa attracted controversy in 2012 for its alleged sponsorship links to Boko Haram, The British Charity Commission spokeswoman said:

The commission is aware there may be some concerns with regards to an organization entitled Al Muntada Trust Fund and, specifically, allegations that this organization has provided financial support to the Nigerian group, Boko Haram. There are a number of registered charities with a similar name to this organization, so the commission is not able to confirm at this stage whether or not this relates directly to a UK registered charity.³³¹

³²⁷ Morgan Winsor, *Nigerian Army Arrests 'Suspected Boko Haram Financier,' 'Stimulants Dealer' Mohammed Maina*, (October 06, 2015) <https://www.ibtimes.com/nigerian-army-arrests-suspected-boko-haram-financier-stimulants-dealer-mohammed-maina-2129305> , Accessed on September 27 2020

³²⁸ Cable news Nigeria, *Soldiers nab suspected Boko Haram sponsor*, (May 19 2015), <https://www.thecable.ng/soldiers-nab-suspected-boko-haram-sponsor> , Accessed on September 27 2020

³²⁹ AOAV, *Sources of funding (including self-funding) for the major groupings that perpetrate IED incidents – Boko Haram*, (25 May 2017) <https://aoav.org.uk/2017/sources-funding-including-self-funding-major-groupings-perpetrate-ied-incidents-boko-haram/> Accessed on September 27 2020

³³⁰ Ibid

³³¹ Jamie Doward, *Peer raises fears over UK charity's alleged links to Boko Haram*, (Sun 9 Sep 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/09/uk-charity-boko-haram> . Accessed on September 27 2020

COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST TERRORISM

4.1 CIVIL SOCIETY/ INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO BOKO HARAM

#BringBackOurGirls Movement is a female led social media driven protest that emerged in April 2014 following the abduction of 276 school girls by the Boko Haram group from a public secondary school Chibok, Borno State Nigeria. Through BringBackOurGirls hashtags on social media, and various protests in Nigerian big cities for months, the movement generated a huge public awareness, debate as well as an online rage against Boko Haram that trended round the world.

The global trend drew the attention of international celebrities who lent their voice to the protest, including world leaders, for instance, the United States President Barack Obama responded to the public awareness by sending a team of specialists to Nigeria to assess and advise the Nigerian government on rescue operations³³².

The campaign also brought media attention to the scourge of Islamic terrorism in Nigeria and the need to safeguard girl child education in those affected zones. The global buzz from the movement put pressure on the Nigeria government which had earlier denied the Chibok abduction to make frantic efforts to tighten the general security in the North east and pay more attention to the rescue efforts of the kidnapped school girls. Besides that, a Paris Summit for Peace and security in Africa was convened by French President François Hollande in quick

³³² Plan-International, Bring back our girls's right in nigeria, <https://plan-international.org/bring-back-our-girls-rights-nigeria> , Accessed on January 14, 2021

response to Militant Islamism in Nigeria and various counter-terrorism strategies were agreed by participant state actors in dealing with security issues in Sub-Sahara Africa upon ³³³.

One of the most vital community based Non-governmental organizations in the Northeast region is the Future Prowess Islamic Foundation founded by Zannah Mustapha in 2007 in Borno state which offers free education, free meals, School uniforms, and health care to displaced orphans and vulnerable children affected by the Boko haram violence³³⁴.

The foundation helps to deal with some challenges affected by the conflicts by offering psychological, spiritual, and developmental needs for children and women who lost their husbands to the insurgents, as well as trains the widows in vocational skills. Mustapha was also instrumental in negotiating the release of 82 of the abducted Chibok schoolgirls in May 2017³³⁵

Civil society organisations that operate in the North-eastern region in response to Boko Haram, function mostly in the capacity of community response networks. The response networks are grassroot oriented and are instrumental to strengthen inter-faith dialogue, peaceful co-existence. These engagements involves local religious leaders, traditional leaders , women, youths and elders³³⁶.

At the youth level counter-terrorism campaign, is a concerted effort led coalition of activists, students, lawyers, educators, medical professionals called Youth Coalition against Terrorism (YOCAT), The organization organizes mentorship programs for students, social security awareness campaigns, community dialogue across the religious and ethnic spectrum to ease tensions, and empowerment workshops for young people, as well as give voices to the victim of Islamic insurgency with the aim of weakening extremism appeal in north-eastern Nigeria³³⁷.

³³³ Leela Jacinto, Hollande welcomes Nigeria, regional powers for security talks, France24 News, (16/05/2014) <https://www.france24.com/en/20140516-france-nigeria-security-summit-hollande-boko-haram-africa> ,

Accessed on January 13, 2021

³³⁴ Jonathan Clayton, *Giving hope to children*, (September 18, 2017)

www.nrc.no/perspectives/2017/giving-hope-to-children/ Accessed on January 13, 2021

³³⁵ Roland Schönbauer, *The Nansen Award was one of the most inspiring things in my life*, United Nation Refugee Agency, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2020/12/5fe088ea4/nansen-award-inspiring-things-life.html> , Accessed on January 13, 2021

³³⁶ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *The Limits of Punishment*, (May, 2018) p.28-29,

<https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/3128/3-I.oP-Nigeria-final.pdf>, Accessed on January 13, 2021

³³⁷ United Nation, Youth Coalition against Terrorism, <https://www.un.org/victimsofterrorism/en/node/3431> Accessed on January 13, 2021

Youth Coalition against Terrorism has impacted more than 6000 youths through its skills/entrepreneurial training that boosts employment chances for youths, as well as pool capital to fund their business plans. They also offer counseling services for traumatized victims of Boko Haram insurgency³³⁸.

In addition, within the regional and international level, non-state and state actors continue to collaborate with the Nigerian government in counter-checking extremist narratives that give space for terror group recruitment. One of such broad-based international initiatives that delivers a multidimensional approach is the *Stabilization, Recovery, and Resilience* program in conjunction with the United Nations, African Union, Lake Chad Basin, and other civil society organizations. Through this program, key drivers that push public sympathy for violent extremism are identified, as well as understood. The proactively stem various methods extremist groups use to consolidate and expand recruitment³³⁹.

The joint military coalition between member states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission under the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has also been successful at pushing back Boko Haram's territorial expansion and weakens the group's attack capabilities

4.2 GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO BOKO HARAM

At the initial stage of Boko Haram civil unrest, the Nigerian government extensively made use of the police force to contain the activities of the group, these efforts were through numerous roadblocks and mass arrests, but the inability of the police to check the insurgency compelled the government to put together a Joint Task Force (JTF) in 2003 which subsequently launched a

³³⁸ One Young World, Youth Coalition Against Terrorism (YOCAT)

<https://www.oneyoungworld.com/ambassador-projects/youth-coalition-against-terrorism-vocat> Accessed on January 13, 2021

³³⁹ Kangdim Dingji Maza, Umut Koldas, Sait Aksit, Challenges of Countering Terrorist Recruitment in the Lake Chad Region: The Case of Boko Haram, (20 February 2020)

<https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/11/2/96/htm> Accessed on January 13, 2021

campaign called **Operation Flush**³⁴⁰. It was the operation of the Joint Task Force that succeeded in killing the founder of Boko Haram (Muhammed Yusuf). The death of Yusuf pushed the group to a more aggressive combative approach with the leadership ascension of Shekau.

In response to the anti-terrorism efforts of the Nigerian government, the Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC) was established in 2012 to coordinate strategic guidance to the intelligence and law enforcement agencies and also synchronizes the implementation of counter-terrorism policies. The center works under the office of the National Security Adviser and in collaboration with relevant multinational non-state actors that includes the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, Hedayah (based in Abu Dhabi), and the United Nations³⁴¹.

On May 14th, 2013, the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency in the North-eastern region in response to Boko Haram's territorial control and expansion. The government's counterterrorist operation began once the emergency was declared in an effort at ending the threat posed by Boko Haram and reducing its influence in the region it has operated in for years. The government formed the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) composed of vigilante groups, hunters, farmers, and concerned youths to complement the military's security surveillance and protection operations through its community efforts. The Civilian Joint Task Force members have been successful in preventing several Boko Haram attacks through quick identification of suspicious and unusual faces in their communities and through communal driven approach and immense knowledge of their local environment, they have been resourceful to the state security agencies in capturing Boko Haram members³⁴² as well repelling Boko Haram raids in communities. Civilian Joint Task Forces have helped the Nigerian military operations in intelligence gathering. The government has enrolled about 5000 locals into the civilian Joint Task Force after training them for counterterrorism activities.

³⁴⁰ Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri, *By the Numbers: The Nigerian State's Efforts to Counter Boko Haram*, in Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, ed., *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria* (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2014), p. 200.

³⁴¹ Counter Terrorism center, *About CTC*, <https://ctc.gov.ng/about-ctc/> Accessed on January 15, 2021

³⁴² Oluwaseun Bamidele, *Civilian Joint Task Force' (CJTF) – A Community Security Option: A Comprehensive and Proactive Approach to Counter-Terrorism*, *Journal of De-radicalization*, (Summer 2016, Nr. 7) ISSN: 2363-9849) <https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/40/55> p.127. Accessed on January 13 2021

In addition to these security undertakings, Nigeria enacted national legislation against terrorism called the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2013 which provides strong measures that strengthen the prevention, prohibition, and combating and financing of terrorism³⁴³. Through the Act, the Nigerian government can facilitate mutual assistance from foreign governments in information sharing and terrorism-related extradition, also the Act stipulates a penalty of 20-year prison term to death sentences³⁴⁴.

Other measures of Government response to counter Islamism in Nigeria are through economic development programs that help to alleviate poverty, address the education gap, and improve social reforms in the North-eastern region. These programs are formed to bridge the gap in the high rise of poverty through youth empowerment schemes, for instance: Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria (YouWin) is a government job creation initiative launched in 2011 that funds impressive business plans for aspiring young entrepreneurs in Nigeria³⁴⁵

The Government of Nigeria through the Ministry of Defense launched a counterinsurgency program called Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) in 2016 aimed at rehabilitating low-risk repentant Boko Haram ex-combatants and reintegrating them back into society. As the name of the program suggests it provides a safe corridor back to the society which would inclusively disarm, demobilize and equip them with the new skillset to re-integrate productively.

The initiative involves vocational training, amongst the compulsory skills are farming, fishery, while the barbing, cosmetology, cap making, laundry, carpentry, tailoring, and shoemaking are optional. The scheme also includes de-radicalization and reintegration programs. However, since 2019 about 893 ex-Boko haram members have being rehabilitated³⁴⁶ and about 1,800 women and

³⁴³ Tijjani Muhammad-Bande, *Measures to eliminate International Terrorism*, At the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly. New York 6, October 2020 https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/75/pdfs/statements/int_terrorism/03mtg_nigeria.pdf p.4. Accessed on January 13 2021

³⁴⁴ Sneha Bhura, *Can Nigeria's Anti-Terrorism Law Address the Boko Haram Threat?*, *Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)*, (December 2012) https://idsa.in/africatrends/nigeria-anti-terrorism-law-address-the-boko-haram-threat_sbhura_1212. Accessed on January 13 2021.

³⁴⁵ Oladeinde Olawoyin, *Buhari govt set to launch repackaged job creation initiative, YouWin*, (February 16, 2017), <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/223717-buhari-govt-set-launch-repackaged-job-creation-initiative-vouwin.html>. Accessed on January 13 2021

³⁴⁶ Nextier SPD (Security, Peace, and Development), *Accepting Ex-Boko Haram Fighters*, (1 Jul 2020), <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/accepting-ex-boko-haram-fighters>, Accessed on January 14, 2021

children have returned to their communities through this process³⁴⁷. The program was divided into three categories: Category A, also known as the low-risk members, is for innocents caught in the web of battle or victims of circumstances who were captured by Boko Haram, they are mostly women and children. Category B is for Boko Haram members referred to as medium risk, this group are members who are willing to surrender, give up arms and are open to rehabilitation. Category C, are for the captured Boko Haram hardliners beyond rehabilitation whom are referred to high risk members, this category will remain in prison to face court trial³⁴⁸.

The government deployment of military patrol vehicles that are equipped with explosives and device detections within a radius of 50 meters is a highly welcome response strategy that has amounted to tremendous success in densely populated cities that has affected bomb detections and arrests.³⁴⁹

On several occasions, The federal government of Nigeria has made efforts to negotiate peace deals with Boko Haram that includes some form of amnesty in order to incentivize defections and arms surrender of the top-level commandants and fighters. Nevertheless, these attempted negotiations have all collapsed due to Boko Haram's refusal to negotiate and gross refusal to any form of amnesty³⁵⁰.

³⁴⁷ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *In Nigeria, we don't want them back*, (May 2018),

<https://www.brookings.edu/research/in-nigeria-we-dont-want-them-back/>. Accessed on January 14, 2021

³⁴⁸ Bamas Victoria, 'Repentant Boko Haram': A look at Operation Safe Corridor deradicalisation and rehabilitation camp, (November 1, 2020),

<https://www.icirnigeria.org/repentant-boko-haram-a-look-at-operation-safe-corridor-deradicalisation-and-rehabilitation-camp/>. Accessed on January 14, 2021

³⁴⁹ Onuoha, F, *Boko Haram: Evolving tactical repertoire and state responses*. In O.Mbachu & U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study, in terrorism and counter-terrorism* (2013), p.423. Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited

³⁵⁰ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *In Nigeria, we don't want them back*

4.3 HUMAN RIGHT ABUSES IN THE COUNTER-TERRORISM APPROACH

The Nigerian military has a long record of human rights abuses. Whenever the Nigerian military retakes a community from Boko Haram's hold, the soldiers kickstarts a clearing operation which round's up the villagers en mass including children and women, and illegally detain them in degraded human conditions for an indefinite period of time thereby violating their human rights³⁵¹. Illegal detainment of the locals seems to create space for various kinds of interpretation as a collective punishment for falling under Boko haram's rule or harboring the insurgent, nonetheless these human right abuses further alienate the Boko Haram victims from the government whom they have come to distrust and resent. Losing the hearts and minds of the people in the affected areas is a counterproductive strategy that defeats the sole purpose of counter-terrorism.

There had been several cases of extrajudicial killings and torture claims against the Nigerian military. According to Amnesty International report from 2011-2015, The government's Special Military Task Force which was established in response to Boko Haram's threat in 2011 has resorted to arbitrary arrests, harassments, intimidations, extortion, and torture in their intelligence-driven operations. Many people have been reported missing, mostly men who are believed to have been shot by the Joint Military Task Force (JTF). There have been claims by the Amnesty International of women being sexually molested by the security forces³⁵².

In 2013, reports emerged in the press on how the army burnt down homes and opened fire on civilians in the village of Baga, killing about 200 villagers³⁵³. people have been forcibly evicted from their family homes and their entire villages being razed to the ground by the military. Several communities that have been liberated by the Nigerian army remain empty of residents because the towns have been completely destroyed and uninhabitable, sometimes displaced

³⁵¹ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *In Nigeria, we don't want them back*.

³⁵² Amnesty International, *Nigeria: Human Rights Agenda 2011–2015*, (14 October 2011) p.30, <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/24000/afr440142011en.pdf> , Accessed on January 14, 2021

³⁵³ Dionne Searcey, *They Told Us They Were Here to Help Us.' Then Came Slaughter* , New York Times (February. 28, 2017) <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/world/africa/nigeria-civilian-massacre.html> Accessed on January 14, 2021

persons or people accused of association with Boko Haram are prevented from returning to their ancestral homes and properties. Relatives of suspected members of Boko Haram, including their wives, brothers, parents, children, and anyone associated with the sect suspect, have been arrested and detained without trial for a very long time for offenses they did not commit. Also the demolition of properties of people suspected to be sympathetic to Boko Haram is unlawful. Security operatives have been accused of indiscriminate aggressive search and enter of resident's homes³⁵⁴. It goes without saying, the Nigerian army must ensure to protect the lives of civilians in war as part of the international humanitarian law and distinguish between civilians and combatants.

Nigerian security reliance on the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) for intelligence without proper investigations has led to arbitrariness, often CJTF unverified claims serve as the sole basis for raids and arrests. While some of CJTF's pieces of information have arguably led to tremendous success against Boko haram, sometimes their tip-off is motivated by a desire for financial gains or resentment, grudge against a local rival, or envy³⁵⁵.

On March 14th, 2014, The Nigerian Troops extrajudicially executed about 640 recaptured detainees, after their prisoners were released during a Boko Haram attack on Giwa Barracks in Maiduguri State. The evidence of some of these executions was published by Amnesty international which prompted the Nigerian government to an investigation into the matter, however, the outcome of the investigations have been kept in secrecy and no one has been held accountable yet³⁵⁶. Nigerian state securities have unlawfully arrested more than 20,000 people between 2009 and 2015 including children as young as nine years old. Many of the detainees were not informed of the reasons for their incarceration nor were they given access to attorneys or family visits. Between 2011 and 2015, Amnesty International have reported more than 7,000 suspects that have died in military detention without trial, at the same time, June 2013 alone had more than 1, 400 deaths in Giwa Barracks Maiduguri. Thus, their deaths were never

³⁵⁴ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *The limits of punishments : Transitional justice and violent extremism*.

³⁵⁵ Mantzikos, The Absence of the State in Northern Nigeria, *African Renaissance*, Volume 7, Issue 1, Jan 2010, p.58-61 https://journals.co.za/content/aa_afren/7/1/EJC10348 Accessed on January 14, 2021

³⁵⁶ Amnesty International, *Nigeria: Boko Haram and Nigerian military committing crimes under international law in north east Nigeria*, Index: AFR 44/1033/2015, (20 February 2015), p.3, <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/54eee0894.pdf> Accessed on January 14, 2021

officially recorded or investigated by the government³⁵⁷. Countless numbers of suspects have died in military prisons which are in extreme poor conditions, overcrowded without access to adequate sanitary or medical care. The high rate of death in custody are as a result of starvation, diseases, suffocations and excessive use of torture³⁵⁸. In July 2015, the United States, turned down Nigerian government request to purchase advance weapons due to Leahy Law which prohibits the transaction of United State's military weapons to states whose militaries are accused of human rights violations.³⁵⁹

4.4 CHALLENGES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS IN NIGERIA

Corruption Amongst Stakeholders : Nigeria has an annual defense budgetary allocation of around US\$1.9 billion ³⁶⁰, and in 2021, the security budget was increased to 11.3% ³⁶¹, which is one of the largest national security budgets in Africa, yet Nigeria ranks third as the most impacted in terrorism in 2020 global terrorism index, the rate of deaths attributed to Boko Haram has increased by 25 percent from 2018 to 2019³⁶². Significant investment has been made in Nigerian counter-terrorism efforts but corruptions within the leadership ranks of the state security departments, agencies continue to negatively impact the effective use of funds to fight terrorism. Sometimes arms procurements aren't even made or delivered, at times there are

³⁵⁷ Amnesty International, Stars on Their Shoulders, Blood on Their Hands: War Crimes Committed by the Nigerian Military, (3 June 2015, Index number: AFR 44/1657/2015)

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AFR44/1657/2015/en/> Accessed on January 15, 2021

³⁵⁸ Amnesty International, *Nigeria: Boko Haram and Nigerian military committing crimes under international law in north east*

³⁵⁹ Joe Picard, Nigeria Calls for a Re-Think of the Leahy Law, The Hill, 5 February 2015, <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/231778-nigeria-calls-for-a-re-think-of-the-leahy-law> . Accessed January 15, 2021

³⁶⁰ Temitope Francis Abiodun, *Why there's a mismatch between funding for Nigeria's military and its performance*, <https://theconversation.com/whv-theres-a-mismatch-between-funding-for-nigerias-military-and-its-performance-149554> Accessed on January 16, 2021

³⁶¹ Ifeanyi Dave Ibemere, *Nigeria's Security Sector: Where do the funds go?* (September 21, 2020)

[https://www.dataphyte.com/security/nigerias-security-sector-where-do-the-funds-go/#:~:text=The%20budget%20which%20was%20%E2%82%A6.%2C%20and%20Agencies%20\(MDAs\)](https://www.dataphyte.com/security/nigerias-security-sector-where-do-the-funds-go/#:~:text=The%20budget%20which%20was%20%E2%82%A6.%2C%20and%20Agencies%20(MDAs)) Accessed on January 16 2021

³⁶² Institute for Economics & Peace report ,Global Terrorism Index 2020 : measuring the impact of Terrorism, Institute for Economics & Peace, p.8-13, <https://kbb9z40cmb2apwafcho9v3i-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/gti-2020-report.pdf> Accessed on January 16, 2021

fictitious procurement contracts, however, military expenses are usually not audited for sensitive reasons which give the opportunity for funds meant for counter-terrorism operations to be easily diverted.

In 2015, there was an alleged launder of US\$2.1 billion meant for arms procurement³⁶³ and diversions of 3.9billion Naira by the office of the Chief of Defense Staff and the probe into allegations yielded no result³⁶⁴, but then again, in 2017, US\$43 million cash allocated for covert operations by the National Intelligence Agency was found hidden in a private building in Lagos State³⁶⁵ and in 2018 US\$1 billion budgeted for arms procurement from excess crude oil accounts mysteriously went missing³⁶⁶.

There have been media reports of Nigerian soldiers refusing deployment and some unit commanders complaining of weapon shortfalls, poor logistics supplies, and unpaid allowances including helicopters which they need to deploy and reinforce soldiers in remote areas and evacuate them swiftly³⁶⁷, poor remuneration amongst the combatants can lead to low morale in the counter-terrorism campaigns among soldiers. According to Emeka Njoku, there have been moments when the Nigerian ground troops, in face with Boko haram offensives are forced to ration bullets, and are not allowed to return fire because of insufficient weaponry³⁶⁸. Nigerian soldiers often decry insufficient and adequate weapons to match Boko Haram's sophisticated manpower.

³⁶³ BBC News, Nigeria's Dasuki 'arrested over \$2bn arms fraud, (1,December 2015)
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34973872> , Accessed on January 16, 2021

³⁶⁴ Premium Times, EFCC closes case in N3.9 billion charge against Nigeria's ex-Air Force chief, (October 24, 2018)
<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/292242-efcc-closes-case-in-n3-9-billion-charge-against-nigerias-ex-air-force-chief.html> , Accessed on January 16, 2021

³⁶⁵ Idris Ibrahim, \$43 million Ikoyi money: EFCC summons ex-NIA chief Oke, wife, (November 1, 2017)
<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/248041-43-million-ikoyi-money-efcc-summons-ex-nia-chief-oke-wife.html>
Accessed on January 16, 2021

³⁶⁶ Ibid

³⁶⁷ Daily Trust News, Boko Haram Crisis: Soldiers Revolt Over Inadequate Weapons, (August 20 2014)
<https://dailytrust.com/boko-haram-crisis-soldiers-revolt-over-inadequate-weapons> , Accessed on January 16, 2021

³⁶⁸ Emeka Njoku, Investigating the intersections between counterterrorism and NGOs in Nigeria: development practice in conflict-affected areas (february 13, 2020)
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09614524.2020.1714546> Accessed on January 16, 2021

If the financial impunities of conflict entrepreneurs and corruptions within the government agencies, politicians are not legally dealt with, and the institutionalization of accountability in budget expense not put in place to investigate and prosecute officials and contractors who take advantage of their positions in the counter-terrorism campaign to misappropriate funds, then terrorism will continue to be endless in Nigeria because continuous insecurity in Nigeria has become an avenue for cash flow and rent seeking amongst stakeholders responsible to stem it.

Poor Contextual Approach : There is no universal solution to terrorism. There is a need for a counter-terrorism approach that understands the local dynamics and complex contextual intricacies that thrive grassroot extremist violence. Individuals who join terror groups are motivated by various reasons, there is no single solution for all cases. The inability for counter-terrorism campaigns to understand and mitigate what drives Boko Haram recruitment as well as involve relevant local stakeholders impedes the broad counter-terror approach. Often, the current approach is a redundant state-centric, non-sustainable, and does not reflect the reality on the ground. A community-driven multidimensional strategy that reflects the current dynamic realities of the conflict has to be designed in tackling the insurgency.

Lack of Trust : The politicization of insecurity issues in Nigeria and the corruption that goes with it, is demoralizing local citizenry trust in the government's genuine commitment to ending terrorism. Also, the mutual suspicion between the civilian and the military in counter-terrorism engagement has become counter-productive. This distrust is driven by the fear of civilians being leaked as informants to the security forces which subsequently incurs reprisal attacks from Boko Haram, this fear makes the locals reluctant to inform the securities whom they think may serve as double agents of suspicious activity. Sometimes the locals clash with soldiers accusing them of collaborating with the insurgents³⁶⁹

The allegations of brutalities, extortions, extrajudicial killings, looting, and rape by the Nigerian army on communities they are supposed to protect never get investigated or yield any form of

³⁶⁹ Daniel E. Agbibo. Eyes on the street: Civilian Joint Task Force and the surveillance of Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria, Intelligence and National Security,(2018), 33:7, 1022-1039, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2018.1475892, Accessed on January 16, 2021

accountability³⁷⁰, has been alienating the locals from the securities and negatively affecting the image of the Nigerian military. These unaddressed local grievances negate community relationships with the Military/government in being proactive in counter-response to Boko haram.

Nigerian former President Goodluck Jonathan, admitted a few years ago in a public function, that Boko Haram has sympathizers in the executive arms of government, including the legislative houses and the security force³⁷¹. The Islamist group has a number of secret backers that have over the years infiltrated the strategic top level government agencies. If the government and intelligence community are compromised by unknown elements then any security operations will always be a step behind.

Lack Of Clear Reintegration Plan : There seems to be a high public resentment of the Government's *Operation Safe Corridor program*, and the government has done little or no effort to raise public awareness, especially against the general misconceptions surrounding the scheme. There is a poor government's effort to build mass support for the initiative, in part because of fear of being seen as too tolerant or weak towards extremist groups. The re-integration of former Boko Haram members back into society has faced backlashes from communities. However, the fear of public retributions and stigmatization have affected the broad purpose of the program. Nevertheless, recaptured women and children from Boko Haram who went through the rehabilitation program of Operation Safe Corridor have faced ostracism and rejection back in their communities.

The public misconception that Boko Haram combatants and their wives who surrender to the authorities for de-radicalization and rehabilitation are not genuinely repentant is very prevalent. Young women who were impregnated by the sect continue to face systemic rejection and public scorn from their communities, even relatives to the islamist group face stigma. In addition, the idea that the government provides various assistance and aid to former Boko harm members

³⁷⁰ Amnesty International, They betrayed us: Women who survived Boko Haram raped, starved and detained in Nigeria. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4484152018ENGLISH.PDF>. Accessed on January 16, 2021

³⁷¹ Monica Mark, Nigerian president admits Islamists have secret backers in government, (January,9th 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/09/nigeria-islamists-government-backers-admits-president> Accessed on January 17 2021

while neglecting the well-being of the victims of the conflict or rebuild the various communities that have been destroyed has continuously been a strong drawback in the counter-terrorism strategy³⁷²

Technological deficit In Police Intelligence : According to Amnesty International report, the Majority of Nigerian Police stations lack the database for fingerprinting, often do not document properly their investigations, have a small number of forensic laboratory facilities that are not well funded, and with a very few trained forensic technicians who have no regards to follow a systemic forensic investigative methodology, as such, hampers the police departments to gather enough intelligence or undertake a thorough forensic investigation. The Police often rely on confessions which most times are extracted through torture³⁷³. Alleged Boko haram members who are tortured excruciatingly in pain give forced confessions that are false of which in the process innocent suspects suffer. These factors undermine counter-terrorism campaigns.

State Regulation Of Civil Societies : According to Emeka Njoku, civil society bodies are often deliberately excluded from partaking in the domestic process of making counter-terrorism laws and policies, which impedes their ability to adequately advocate both the marginalized and vulnerable groups. Hence, the capacity of civil society organizations to function and advance the counter-terrorism efforts in Nigeria is shaped by politics³⁷⁴. Njoku further notes that civil societies are positioned in a way that only advances the core interest of the state while the government endorses them in return else they are censored and sanctioned. However, the key factors that attract State constraints against these civil societies are when they demand transparency in the utilization of security funds, push political advocacy, or report human right violations to international government organizations. Nevertheless, government preferable partnership with Non-Governmental Organizations in the counter-terrorism campaigns is limited only to social service provision which handicaps civil societies organizations from exerting

³⁷² An interview with a social community worker, Maiduguri, Borno State December 21 2020.

³⁷³ Amnesty International, 'Nigeria: Human Rights Agenda 2011–2015', p.8, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/014/2011/en/> Accessed on January 16, 2021

³⁷⁴ Emeka Njoku, Civil Society Organisations and Counter-terrorism in Northeastern Nigeria, <https://www.growkudos.com/projects/civil-society-organisations-and-counter-terrorism-in-northeastern-nigeria> Accessed on January 17, 2020

pressure on the government on issues of good governance , accountability, transparency, and social justice³⁷⁵.

4.5 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

It is difficult to evaluate the counter-offensive strategy adopted by the Nigerian army which claims success in its efforts to defeat Boko Haram, despite the fact that the sect has continued to maintain its operational capacity to carry out indiscriminate attacks in the North-eastern region. The government response to the insecurity issues seems to be reactionary rather than proactive measures. However this research recommends some proactive policies to counter Islamic militancy in Nigeria.

The government needs to collaborate more with community-based civil society members, village elders/leaders, youths, women and local religious bodies, victims, rehabilitated former Boko Haram members on open dialogue about how to accommodate the judicial and non-judicial form of accountability while also balancing justice, reconciliation, victims rights and the prevailing roots causes of extremism and probably sustainable solution policies.

Greater attention should be given to non-military counter-terrorism campaigns which should be emphasized on winning the heart and minds of the people in order to boost mutual trust in the conflict-affected areas. This strategy will create space for political progress that enables and fastens socio-economic development.

The federal government has to be committed to setting up Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, so as to resolve the grievances from the conflict and as well bring accountability

³⁷⁵ Emeka Njoku, Good NGOs, Bad NGOs: Nigerian Government Partnership with NGOs in Counter-terrorism Operations, (6 November 2019) <http://democracyninfrica.org/good-ngos-bad-ngos-nigerian-government-partnership-ngos-counter-terrorism-operations/> January 17, 2020

into Nigerian military human rights abuses. This will help to restore back the image of the Nigerian military that has been battered by its human rights violations.

Boko Haram attracts sympathizers, recruits, and followers on the appeal that the Nigerian current secular system that is western inclined has failed to deliver good governance, justice, and wealth distribution to Muslims. Boko haram infuses religion into people's grievances against the government failures and provides Sharia as an alternative model of governance against the corruption of political leaders. The North-eastern region which is the hot zone of militant Islamism is also the most socio-economic underdeveloped geopolitical zone in Nigeria. The government must be genuine in its effort to undertake grassroots infrastructural development that addresses the region's high illiteracy rate and enact sustainable socio-economic policies.

This research recommends the Nigerian government to mandate registration and licensing of religious schools, religious teachers, public preaching permit and ensure compliance and accountability of religious teachings to be strictly in accordance with a balanced doctrinal principle. Instituting such a policy will checkmate exposure of children and youths to extremist ideologies.

It is to Nigerian national security interest to adopt enhanced intelligence gathering infrastructure and embrace the latest intelligence best practices to keep pace with the dynamic environment of terrorism. One of such technological endeavors that the law enforcement authorities must initiate is an online criminal records database and identification systems with fingerprint scanning, establish more forensic laboratories in the Northeast and ensure the facilities are not underfunded. Installation of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras needs to be mounted at strategic corners with global Positioning System (GPS) tracking. Nevertheless, greater cooperation with Network service providers can help to monitor terrorist communication flow.

This research recommends the government strengthen its effort into investigating Boko Haram's acquisition of attack capabilities, how Boko haram acquires its weapons, its means of logistics, and routes of its supply chain as well as track and block the non-formal channels of Boko Haram funding.

There are over 1,499 illegal borders in Nigeria but only 84 formally recognized entry routes into Nigeria³⁷⁶. Boko Haram's supply chain network is built upon the lapses of these irregular borders along with underground tunnels for transnational trafficking. Weak border management will always undermine the counter-terrorism efforts of the security operatives. The government must undertake intensive transborder military operations in collaboration with its regional neighboring countries as well as mount intensive security checkpoints along with the irregular entry points to Nigeria.

Boko Haram's unconventional methods of warfare, hit and run strategies and the sect's maneuvering ability to hide in thick vast forest areas of Sambisa renders Nigerian military conventional engagement largely ineffective.

This research recommends that Nigerian government modify its conventional military response to terrorism by involving the private military contractors who are better trained, equipped and understands the best situational approach suited to confront the evolving security challenges. While the private soldiers are in operation, the government should provide guidelines and operating procedure to the mercenaries on the rules of engagement. Outsourcing the core offensive operations to mercenaries can enable the government to focus more on the non-military solutions of counter-terrorism.

³⁷⁶ Freedom C. Onuoha, Porous Borders and Boko Haram's Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria, (August 2013) <https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/node/1323> Accessed on January 20, 2021

CONCLUSION

This research provides a contextual understanding of Boko Haram with an aim to provide answers to the research question: *What are the root causes of violent extremism in Nigeria ?*. The research posits that poverty and religion are not the precursors of the resurgence of militant Islamism in Nigeria, though they are the necessary factors that gave Boko Haram space to breathe but not sufficient enough to explain the evolution of radical Islam particularly in Nigeria. Therefore this thesis has been able to demonstrate that, the primacy of historical legacy and systemic identity politics, embedded in Nigerian multi-ethnic and religious fragile political arrangement laid the structural paths that gave birth to militant Islamism, thus the political opportunity and timing played into the metamorphosis that gave birth to Boko Haram.

Terrorism does not happen spontaneously, there are mechanisms and processes which include grievances coupled with the radical ideological belief system, but the group's creation was only made possible by the political space that enabled, accommodated and normalized fundamentalist opinions in Nigerian political process.

The ideology of Islamism strives on the revival of perfect Islamic order in which Boko Haram presumes that the celestial noble cause of Jihad is bestowed upon its members to liberate and restore the 7th-century Islamic haven in Nigeria, therefore, the perfect will of Allah cannot be achieved through the governance of a secular state, Western culture or moderate Islam. Hence, Boko Haram rejects completely any form of system that is not totally based on the Holy Quran as practiced in the era of Prophet Muhammed, as such, it is a political conflict against the secular democratic ideology practiced in Nigeria. On this account, any form of objection to this divine call is conceived as the symbolic evil that threatens true Islam which the sect believes and they

are divinely mandated to declare war on. Boko Haram's attempt to legitimize its own ideology in Nigeria is the reason for the national insecurity ravaging Northeastern Nigeria.

Furthermore, Boko Haram attracts sympathizers, recruits, and followers on the appeal that the Nigerian current secular system that is western inclined has failed to deliver good governance, justice, and wealth distribution to Muslims. Boko Haram infuses religious perversion into people's grievances against the government and provides Sharia as an alternative model of governance against the corruption of the political elites. However, the issues of corruption and socio-economic marginalization drive Boko Haram recruitments. It is imperative that the government addresses issues of poverty, bring more transparency and accountability against corruption. Nevertheless, counter-terrorism efforts need to be more proactive in intelligence gathering including inputting mechanisms in place in monitoring unusual financial transactions both in the formal and informal settings, and address root causes. It is vital that the Nigerian government collaborate more with the international community in border control and in information sharing which will go a long way to disrupt networks of terror organizations.

While the government continues to make endeavors to seek negotiation with Boko Haram, it is important that they understand that Boko Haram groups are not freedom fighters but rather a terror organization that lacks a legitimate identity-based grievance, as such, their ideological based demands are incompatible with the Nigerian constitution.

Terrorism has impacted negatively on the image of Nigeria in the international community. The high insecurity level has invariably disrupted the flow of Foreign Direct Investment into the country. Socio-economic activities cannot thrive well in an environment maimed by instabilities. The existence of Boko haram is a threat to peace, unity and statehood of Nigeria.

The thesis contributes to the broader existing literature by offering explanations to a different perspective on militant Islamism in Nigeria. The research has highlighted the need for further research with regards to the role/part played by identity politics in the emergence of Boko Haram.

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