



Università  
Ca' Foscari  
Venezia

Master's Degree  
in Comparative  
International Relations  
(Cross-Cultural Path)

Final Thesis

**“Flying in  
Middle East Oil”**

The Role of Middle Eastern  
Oil in Eisenhower's  
'Containment' Policy, 1953-60

**Supervisor**

Ch. Prof. Duccio Basosi

**Assistant supervisor**

Ch. Prof. Giovanni Favero

**Graduand**

Darya Paramonava  
Matriculation number  
873038

**Academic Year**

2019 / 2020

# “Flying in Middle East Oil”

The Role of Middle Eastern Oil in Eisenhower’s ‘Containment’ Policy, 1953-60

*“Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.”*

Dwight Eisenhower

(quoting a statement from the war)

## Abstract

Tema largamente inesplorato anche a livello accademico, la presente tesi si incentra sul ruolo del petrolio del Medio Oriente nella politica del *containment* di Eisenhower. In effetti, la carenza di studi specifici su questo argomento è particolarmente notevole se si considera l’importanza del coinvolgimento americano nella regione durante gli anni ’50 ed il fatto che le motivazioni che hanno portato a tale coinvolgimento rimangono in gran parte da chiarire. Il presente lavoro di ricerca si basa quindi sulla tesi secondo cui sarebbe impossibile comprendere la politica americana del *containment* durante la presidenza di Eisenhower senza la dovuta considerazione per gli interessi petroliferi in Medio Oriente.

Per quanto riguarda la metodologia utilizzata, la tesi è basata su fonti sia primarie che secondarie. Le fonti primarie provengono principalmente, ma non interamente, dai documenti declassificati pubblicati sulle seguenti piattaforme: the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series; The American Presidency Project; The Cold War International History Project; the CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room. Le fonti secondarie includono una vasta gamma di volumi, articoli e documenti di lavoro, che discutono ogni aspetto specifico delineato nella tesi. L’analisi e la sintesi delle fonti secondarie supportate con le testimonianze disponibili nei materiali primari rappresentano il fondamento metodologico della tesi.

La tesi è suddivisa in tre capitoli: 1) “Eisenhower e la Politica del *Containment*: le Origini e la Revisione della Ricerca Contemporanea”; 2) “Ruolo del Medio Oriente nella Politica Estera Americana nella Metà del 20° Secolo”; 3) “L’importanza del Petrolio Mediorientale durante la Presidenza di Eisenhower e il suo Impatto sulla Definizione della Politica Estera Americana”. Il primo capitolo tratta la presidenza di Eisenhower, il suo posto nella storia dell’evoluzione della politica americana, nonché il concetto di *containment* e la sua interpretazione secondo Eisenhower una volta assunta la carica di presidente. Il capitolo è infatti suddiviso nelle seguenti sezioni: 1) “Eisenhower nella Storiografia: Valutazione Critica delle Questioni Più Controverse”; 2) “La politica del *Containment*: Valutazione Critica e Diverse Interpretazioni”; 3) “La politica del *Containment* durante la Presidenza di Eisenhower, le sue Origini ed i Principali Obiettivi Strategici”.

Nonostante la ricerca sulla presidenza di Eisenhower non sia affatto carente, non può in alcun modo essere paragonata nella sua esaustività con altre presidenze sia precedenti sia successive. In effetti, fu considerato un presidente “di transizione”, colpevole di non essere riuscito a portare a termine nulla di significativo, lasciando molti problemi irrisolti e continuando semplicemente le politiche ereditate dal suo predecessore. Tuttavia, la rivalutazione del suo ruolo a partire dagli anni ‘70, sia positivamente ma anche e soprattutto criticamente, ha rivelato come Eisenhower fosse un importantissimo pensatore strategico in politica estera e come la sua presidenza abbia stabilito importanti precedenti in questo senso e le cui ripercussioni arrivano fino ad oggi. Si potrebbe inoltre sostenere che la politica estera di Eisenhower fosse fondamentalmente incentrata sulla Guerra Fredda.

In questo senso, è necessario spendere qualche parola sulla politica del *containment*, teorizzata da George Kennan ed incarnata nella dottrina Truman. Nonostante la popolarità del termine, il concetto di *containment* non è affatto chiaro, e potrebbe essere pensato sia come una politica retrospettiva, reazionaria degli Stati Uniti nei confronti dell’aggressione Sovietica, sia come una politica espansionistica progettata per diffondere la cosiddetta *Pax Americana*. Il concetto potrebbe anche essere inteso come aggressivo e militarista (il *rollback*), o come preventivo e regressivo (contenimento vero e proprio, come previsto da Kennan). Ai fini della presente tesi, la politica del *containment* è intesa come qualsiasi violazione dello stato di sicurezza, reale o percepita, da parte dell’Unione Sovietica che ha spinto l’amministrazione di Eisenhower ad agire in modo preventivo, aggressivo o retrospettivo al fine di ripristinare questa percezione di sicurezza.

In effetti, la politica del *containment* di Eisenhower, elaborata con la teoria del *New Look*, appare preventiva nel suo carattere poiché si basa sull’effetto deterrente delle armi

nucleari e su operazioni della CIA che mirano alla destabilizzazione dei regimi antagonisti. Il carattere preventivo di questa politica è ulteriormente illustrato attraverso l'analisi del coinvolgimento di Eisenhower in Medio Oriente, nonché degli interessi petroliferi in questa regione e della possibilità di un intervento sovietico. Pertanto, il secondo capitolo discute l'evoluzione del petrolio prima che Eisenhower salisse al potere e il coinvolgimento generale degli Stati Uniti in Medio Oriente a metà del secolo, introducendo così il contesto in cui la sua presidenza si è svolta. Il capitolo prosegue con l'analisi della situazione in Medio Oriente e della presenza Occidentale attraverso gigantesche compagnie petrolifere — le cosiddette “Sette Sorelle” — che spesso sono state la causa di sconvolgimenti politici nella regione. Inoltre, il capitolo delinea le crisi regionali più significative verificatesi durante la presidenza di Eisenhower. Il capitolo comprende le seguenti sezioni: 1) “La Crescente Importanza del Petrolio come Motivo di Coinvolgimento Occidentale in Medio Oriente prima della Presidenza di Eisenhower”; 2) “Coinvolgimento Occidentale in Medio Oriente nella Metà del 20° Secolo e L'elaborazione della Politica del *Containment* (in Arabia Saudita, Iran, Iraq)”; 3) “Grandi Crisi in Medio Oriente negli anni '50 e la Risposta Americana del *Containment*”.

Il capitolo ha lo scopo di dimostrare che, sebbene l'importanza del petrolio in generale ed in particolare in Medio Oriente sia stata rilevante già molto prima di Eisenhower, fu lui ad essere il primo presidente ad adottare attivamente specifiche misure per garantire l'accesso americano, il che rende l'assenza di specifica ricerca su questo argomento una grave mancanza per la storia del petrolio e della Guerra Fredda. Questo coinvolgimento attivo è stato spinto dalla crescente importanza del petrolio già nel periodo precedente la sua ascesa al potere, in particolare per la ricostruzione nel dopoguerra dell'Europa occidentale e per le capacità militari della NATO. In questo contesto, il capitolo discute anche la presenza americana e le attività dei giganti del petrolio in Medio Oriente. Per ragioni dello spazio, la presente analisi si limita al coinvolgimento economico e politico americano in Arabia Saudita, Iran e Iraq in quanto si tratta dei paesi con maggiori risorse petrolifere. In aggiunta, il capitolo tratta le altre tre principali crisi mediorientali in cui l'amministrazione di Eisenhower venne direttamente coinvolta: le crisi di Suez, di Siria e di Libano.

L'ultimo capitolo discute il significato del petrolio durante la Presidenza Eisenhower vera e propria e le misure adottate dall'amministrazione per garantire l'accesso occidentale al petrolio mediorientale, nonché illustra i risultati del coinvolgimento americano in questa regione così instabile. Il capitolo è suddiviso nelle seguenti sezioni: 1) “Panoramica della Ricerca su Eisenhower e L'importanza della sua Politica Petrolifera”; 2) “L'importanza

Nazionale e Internazionale del Petrolio durante L'amministrazione di Eisenhower"; 3) "L'importanza del Petrolio Mediorientale ai Fini del 'Containment' Dell'amministrazione di Eisenhower."

Il petrolio presente in Medio Oriente è rapidamente diventato una risorsa indispensabile per la ricostruzione del dopoguerra e per il potenziale militare dell'Europa occidentale e giapponese. Anche gli Stati Uniti hanno sperimentato un allarmante afflusso di petrolio a basso costo o in quantità tali che la produzione interna divenne superflua e sottosviluppata. Considerando le implicazioni di tale sottosviluppo domestico nel caso in cui il petrolio mediorientale non fosse più disponibile, come in effetti successe durante la crisi di Suez per l'Europa, Eisenhower introdusse le quote petrolifere obbligatorie nel 1959 nel tentativo di isolare l'economia dalla crescente dipendenza da una risorsa proveniente da una regione così instabile.

La crisi di Suez del 1956 è forse l'argomentazione più significativa a sostegno della tesi secondo cui il petrolio mediorientale costituisce uno dei fattori più importanti nella politica del *containment* di Eisenhower in quanto le conseguenze della sua improvvisa carenza in Europa occidentale sulla sicurezza internazionale vennero considerate inaccettabili dall'amministrazione di Eisenhower. Fu perfino deciso di schierarsi con l'antagonista Nasser in contrapposizione ai tradizionali alleati Gran Bretagna e Francia nello sforzo di impedire all'onda del malcontento arabo di abbattersi contro l'Occidente. Dal momento che sia per Eisenhower sia per Dulles non poteva esistere una vera posizione di neutralità nella Guerra Fredda, dichiararsi contro l'Occidente comportava con grande probabilità essere dalla parte dell'Unione Sovietica, e di conseguenza antagonizzare gli arabi diventava praticamente sinonimo di consegnare il petrolio mediorientale ai sovietici.

Ciò è stato ulteriormente dimostrato dall'elaborazione della dottrina di Eisenhower e dalle tre volte in cui è stata applicata, seppur indirettamente o liberamente, ossia durante le crisi in Giordania, Siria e Libano. Sebbene nessuna delle crisi fosse pienamente riconducibile all'applicazione di questa dottrina, lo stretto coinvolgimento americano e l'invio delle truppe americane nel 1958 dimostrano chiaramente l'interesse di Eisenhower a preservare qualsiasi sentimento filo-occidentale rimasto nella regione, oltre a cercare di prevenire l'emergere di qualsiasi governo comunista o di sinistra, pur mantenendo saldamente la questione del petrolio in prima linea nelle sue politiche. In questo senso, le sue azioni hanno portato al fallimento in Siria ma al successo in Libano.

In conclusione, la tesi mira principalmente ad aprire nuove strade nella ricerca tradizionale sulla politica estera di Eisenhower. Sebbene i limiti di spazio non consentano

un'analisi approfondita di tutte le sue sfumature, la tesi fornisce basi preziose per futuri studi in questo settore.

## Table of Content

<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>Chapter 1. Eisenhower and the Policy of Containment: Origins and the Revision of Contemporary Research</b> .....	<b>11</b>
Eisenhower in Historiography .....	11
Policy of Containment: Critical Appraisal and Different Interpretations .....	16
Policy of Containment during the Eisenhower Presidency, its Origins and Main Strategic Objectives .....	26
<b>Chapter 2. Role of the Middle East in the American Foreign Policy in the Middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century</b> .....	<b>53</b>
Growing Importance of Oil as a Reason for Western Involvement in the Middle East before the Eisenhower Presidency .....	53
Western Involvement in the Middle East in the Middle of the 20th Century and the Elaboration of the Policy of Containment (in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq) .....	61
Major Crises in the Middle East in the 1950s and the American ‘Containment’ Response	79
<b>Chapter 3. The Importance of Middle Eastern Oil during the Eisenhower Presidency and its Impact on American Foreign Policy Formation</b> .....	<b>95</b>
Research Overview on Eisenhower and the Significance of his Oil Policy .....	95
Domestic and International Importance of Oil during the Eisenhower Administration .....	100
The Significance of Middle Eastern Oil for ‘Containment’ Purposes of the Eisenhower Administration .....	112
<b>Conclusion</b> .....	<b>126</b>
<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	<b>131</b>
<b>Bibliography and References</b> .....	<b>132</b>

## Introduction

In 1965, only four years after Dwight Eisenhower concluded his second term in office, he would write in the memoirs: “Beginning in the latter months of my first term and for several years thereafter, no other region of the world received so much of [our] close attention [...] as did the Middle East.”<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the presidency of Eisenhower does not demonstrate much involvement in any region of the world – not even Latin America, the traditional primary focus of the United States – to the degree it was engaged in the Middle East. Even the hallmark of his administration, the doctrine bearing the President’s own name, pertained to the Middle East and the protection of the American strategic security interests there.

The number of books and articles dedicated to the American political history of the post-war period is enough to provide one with the information on virtually any aspect of the domestic and foreign policy that could be of interest to a researcher. It is therefore curious why to this day the academic research on the region and Eisenhower’s policy towards it as a whole has remained rather sketchy: the Middle East is either mentioned as part of the overall analysis of the Eisenhower foreign policy, or researched only insofar as certain individual countries or crises are concerned. There is practically no available literature which would cover the totality of the Eisenhower policy in the Middle East, and certainly there is only perfunctory analysis as to why the Middle East was perhaps the most significant region for Eisenhower’s foreign policy.

While the analysis of the American foreign policy in the Middle East could be reconstructed by referring to different authors and their studies, the research on Eisenhower and oil appears to be even scarcer. To be true, the existing literature on the position of oil in the American political history is quite abundant but its primary focus seems to be drawn to more recent administrations and offers only a cursory analysis of the origins of the importance attributable to it. This appears to be even a bigger omission because Eisenhower was quite positively the first president to take active tenacious steps in order to ensure the uninterrupted access of the United States and its allies to the abundant oil resources in the Middle East – a policy that the United States is honoring to this day. None of the regions on the globe received quite as much attention from the two Eisenhower administrations as did

---

<sup>1</sup> D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, 1956-1961; The White House years*, Doubleday & Company, 1965, p. 104



the Middle East, and it was precisely in connection to the availability of the valuable resources to the United States and their protection from the Soviet Union.

In this respect, the present paper seeks to “fill the vacuum” and to introduce a new way of assessing Eisenhower’s foreign policy as the one greatly influenced by oil and security concerns associated with its availability in the Middle East in the context of Eisenhower’s policy of ‘containment’. The policy of ‘containment’ is understood as any breach of security, real or perceived, on part of the Soviet Union that inspired the Eisenhower administration to act preventively, aggressively or retrospectively in order to restore the lost sense of security. The policy of containment shaped and characterized Eisenhower’s foreign policy, seeing that the decade from 1950 to 1960 was arguably the most volatile period of the Cold War, particularly so due to the increasingly dangerous possession of the nuclear weapons both by the Soviet Union and the United States and the continuous arms race.

The importance of oil for the necessities of warfare was appreciated during the First World War and further confirmed by the Second World War, which introduced the idea that having enough oil at one’s disposal was one of the decisive factors of the modern warfare. Already after the conclusion of the Second World War it was common knowledge that the Middle East region possessed enormous quantities of oil, which the Western countries strove to control. As the famous military quote has it, “amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics”, and the American politicians starting with Roosevelt increasingly considered the access to these resources to be the key for the successful warfare against the Soviet Union or any other adversary.

Dwight Eisenhower, a student of war, who inherited the country, which had fairly recently declared its intention to counteract any Communist move with the move of its own, must have understood quickly the role that oil would play in the power balance. Indeed, the first significant move his government made was the approval of a covert operation in Iran, a country with vast resources of oil but with an alarmingly leftist government, which defied the British authority and nationalized its oil company. There would be many other moves, both inside and outside the United States, which were aimed at the protection of the national security interests, more and more associated with the availability of oil for the purposes of warfare with the Soviet Union. The Eisenhower administration started with oil concerns in Iran and finished with oil concerns embodied in the Eisenhower Doctrine, as well as presided over major Middle Eastern crises, such as the Suez Crisis in 1956, the Syrian Crisis in 1957, the Iraqi Revolution in 1958 and the Lebanon Crisis in 1958. All these events were in one way or another influenced by the Western involvement in each individual country’s internal

affairs because Western Europe depended on the Middle Eastern oil supplies for its post-war recovery and the military development of NATO, while the United States strove to deny the resources to the Soviet Union.

In order to discuss all the aspects of the Eisenhower oil policy in the Middle East in as much detail as the space constraints permit, the paper is divided into three chapters: 1) “Eisenhower and the Policy of Containment: Origins and the Revision of Contemporary Research”; 2) “Role of the Middle East in the American Foreign Policy in the Middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century”; 3) “The Importance of Middle Eastern Oil during the Eisenhower Presidency and its Impact on American Foreign Policy Formation”. The first chapter seeks to discuss and evaluate the presidency of Eisenhower, his place in the history of American policy making, as well as the concept of ‘containment’ and Eisenhower’s interpretation of this concept after assuming office. To this end, the chapter is subdivided into the following sections: 1) “Eisenhower in Historiography: Critical Appraisal of the Most Contentious Issues”; 2) “Policy of Containment: Critical Appraisal and Different Interpretations”; 3) “Policy of Containment during the Eisenhower Presidency, its Origins and Main Strategic Objectives”.

The second chapter discusses the evolution of oil before Eisenhower came to power and the general involvement of the United States in the Middle East in the mid-century, thus introducing the context for his presidency. In particular, the chapter analyzes the concessionary system for the oil majors in the key Middle Eastern states, elaborates on the contingent policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in connection to the policy of containment in the Middle East and outlines the most significant regional crises that took place during the Eisenhower presidency. The chapter, therefore, includes the following sections: 1) “Growing Importance of Oil as a Reason for Western Involvement in the Middle East before the Eisenhower Presidency”; 2) “Western Involvement in the Middle East in the Middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and the Elaboration of the Policy of Containment (in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq)”; 3) “Major Crises in the Middle East in the 1950s and the American ‘Containment’ Response”.

The last chapter is concentrated on the factor of Middle Eastern oil in the evolution of the policy of containment of the Eisenhower administration. It therefore discusses Middle Eastern oil in the academic research on Eisenhower’s foreign policy, the significance of oil during the Eisenhower presidency proper and the steps the administration took to secure Middle Eastern oil within the Western sphere of interest and away from the Soviet Union, as well as illustrates in what ways Middle Eastern oil influenced the development of American foreign policy. The chapter is subdivided into the following sections: 1) “Research Overview

on Eisenhower and the Significance of his Oil Policy”; 2) “Domestic and International Importance of Oil during the Eisenhower Administration”; 3) “The Significance of Middle Eastern Oil for ‘Containment’ Purposes of the Eisenhower Administration”.

In terms of methodology, the paper is built on both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources mostly but not entirely originate from the available declassified documents published on the following platforms: the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series; The American Presidency Project; The Cold War International History Project (the Wilson Center Digital Archive); the CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room. The secondary sources include a wide range of volumes, articles and working papers, which discuss any particular aspect outlined in the present paper. Analysis and synthesis of the secondary sources supported with the available evidence from the primary materials represent the methodological foundation of the present paper.

# Chapter 1. Eisenhower and the Policy of Containment: Origins and the Revision of Contemporary Research

## 1. Eisenhower in Historiography

Before the Eisenhower papers became accessible to historians in the 1970s, the contemporaries considered Eisenhower to be one of the more inadequate presidents the United States had had during the period that was uninteresting at best, and dull at worst - as William Shannon remarked, the years of the “great postponement.” In fact, although Shannon stated his position in November 1958 (i.e. two years before Eisenhower left the office), he summarized all the criticism levied against the incumbent president in years to come. He argued that while Eisenhower was extremely popular with the general public (“a symbol of the nation’s triumphant and united national purpose in a time when the national consensus was fracturing and the national mood becoming querulous and ugly”), as a president he was nothing more than a “transitional figure”. Such an assessment is based on a number of critical factors, associated with his presidency: 1) he never conceived a policy of his own and simply continued the policies implemented and devised before him by Roosevelt and Truman; 2) he did not solve any pressing domestic or foreign policy problems; 3) he failed to become the leader the United States needed at the times of lack of a national idea - that is, he did not become the symbol of unity in the country where people felt increasingly disunited; 4) instead of tackling the issues, his tactics served to augment fears and to protract the status quo; 5) even though the truces in Korea and Indo-China were achieved, the countries remained divided and there was no certainty about their future; 6) he was intellectually and physically incapable<sup>2</sup> of achieving the ambitious goal of balancing the budgets and preserving the leading role of the United States on the political arena, as well as lacked the political experience to pursue international resolutions.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Eisenhower did not have a formal political or judicial education or any experience in political life and was believed to avoid it. According to certain biographers he never voted and did not overtly express preferences for political parties (for further information, the reader could refer to J. Smith, *Eisenhower in War and Peace*, Random House Trade, 2012, p. 124; and I. Gellman, *The President and the Apprentice*, Yale University Press, 2015, p. 33)

<sup>3</sup> W. Shannon, “Eisenhower as President: A Critical Appraisal of the Record”, *Commentary*, 1958, Mode of Access: <https://bit.ly/39ZqUB1>, Date of Access: 17.03.2020. Similar ideas are to be found in other articles and books on the subject during the same period. For example, Marquis Childs argues in his book *Eisenhower*:

A whole other layer of critique against Eisenhower had to do with him handing over his foreign policy responsibilities and decision-making powers to his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The overwhelming majority of articles and papers on foreign policy credited Dulles with being the mastermind behind the most significant foreign policy decisions.<sup>4</sup> This, as Richard Immerman observed, had to do with the general perception of the President by contemporary researchers - he was considered inexperienced and unversed in the matters of politics and therefore was naturally dominated by Dulles, a Wall-Street lawyer, born into the family, where close relatives served as Secretaries of State and important presidential advisors.<sup>5</sup> However, the view that Dwight Eisenhower, “with a gold club in his hand and a broad but vapid grin on his face”, was “aloof” from politics and “reluctant”<sup>6</sup> to assume active leadership, leaving it to his Secretary of State, has long been largely abandoned as caricature and based entirely on non-exhaustive evidence, explained by the lack of primary resources and the public image of both Eisenhower and Dulles.

The declassified Eisenhower papers, also known as the Ann Whitman Files (by the name of Eisenhower’s personal assistant), contained a large series of phone conversations, minutes of meetings and other communications and therefore opened a new source of study of the Eisenhower presidency, as well as triggered the transformation of his unfavorable

---

*Captive Hero; a Critical Study of the General and the President* (Harcourt, Brace, 1958), that Eisenhower could be deemed “a weak president”, since he accentuated the differences instead of uniting the Americans, as well as was intellectually incapable of assuming such elevated responsibilities. In this regard, he is compared unfavorably to Nixon, who was planning to run for presidency in the upcoming elections. Nixon was described as the person capable of positive change, as well as a proactive statesman, believed to be the main impetus of those policies of the Eisenhower administration, which eventually got implemented. By the same token, the famous Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. poll of 75 well-known historians and scholars in 1962 ranked Eisenhower twenty-second out of 31 presidents.

<sup>4</sup> Even though the academic research does not often credit Dulles with ruling the country instead of Eisenhower, the majority of articles and biographies do indicate that he was more in charge than the President over the major decisions. For example, in his book *John Foster Dulles: 1888-1959* (Greenwood Pub Group, 1959), John R. Beal attributed to him a variety of accomplishments, including the elaboration of the Eisenhower Doctrine and his crucial participation in every major international event, ranging from Iran, to Egypt, to Vietnam. Other articles of the period, such as “Dulles, Suez, and Democratic Diplomacy” (*The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1959, pp. 784-798), written in the same year by Benjamin Nimer, hardly mention Eisenhower at all, making him a passive player in the climatic event, which is widely recognized as the most acute episode of the international disputes during the Eisenhower presidency. Moreover, the tribute the leading newspapers gave to Dulles when he fell ill and announced his resignation in 1959, provides an insight into his overall popularity. For instance, *The New Yorker* wrote the following: “For the former Secretary and for the President, these awful moments may be made slightly more endurable by the knowledge, which both must surely have, that there is today a far wider appreciation of Mr. Dulles’ services than there has been at any other time, and that this appreciation is in no sense the product of sympathy or pity or piety” (cross-referenced from J. Beal, *John Foster Dulles: 1888-1959*, cit., p. 348) It was also translated into reality, such as the opening of Dulles International Airport with his statue at the front (later removed). For the lack of space, it is impossible to provide a detailed account of the significance the contemporaries ascribed to Dulles.

<sup>5</sup> R. Immerman, “Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?”, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1979, pp. 21-38

<sup>6</sup> P. Holbo, R. Sellen (eds.), *The Eisenhower Era: the Age of Consensus*, The Dryden Press, 1974, pp.1-11

image into the increasingly positive evaluation. The first one to reconsider the presidency of Eisenhower in a major work was Herbert Parmet, who published a book in 1972, titled *Eisenhower and the American crusades* (no doubt, an allusion to Eisenhower's autobiography *Crusade in Europe*). The book provides a positive assessment of Eisenhower, basing on the following arguments: 1) Eisenhower avoided the plunge into isolationism after the American public was disillusioned with the Korean War; 2) his presidency is associated with a period of "unprecedented prosperity", when the ordinary American could afford to buy expensive goods and even make private investments, which in turn resulted in high approval ratings even after eight years of being in office; 3) his "hands-on", active approach to foreign and domestic matters was confirmed through primary sources; 4) his careful managerial style and astute understanding of the political climate, as well as his personal reputation and the war hero status secured the armistice in Korea, stripped McCarthy of political viability, and saved the United States from plunging into meaningless "crusades" all over the world, based entirely on ideological presumptions; 5) Dulles received guidance from the President, not the other way around.<sup>7</sup>

Perhaps, the most well-known study on the character of the Eisenhower presidency during the revisionist period<sup>8</sup> was conducted by Stephen Ambrose. This is the earliest exhaustive research on the presidency and does not necessarily provide a strictly positive assessment of it, despite it still vacillating towards eulogy, sometimes academically difficult to disengage from Ambrose's own interpretation of the President's character: "No wonder that millions of Americans felt the country was damned lucky to have him". Even though Ambrose recognized him as "one of the outstanding leaders of the Western world of this century", credited him with striving for peace at all times as well as applauded Eisenhower's efforts to curtail the adverse nuclear proliferation with his Atoms for Peace speech, the author likewise emphasized that Eisenhower's excessive hostility to the Soviet Union had landed the United States in a bitter arms race (in spite of the President's own extensive discourse about preventing it); also, his inability to differentiate between the Third World nationalism and the Soviet influence had culminated in dangerous confrontations, such as the Suez crisis. In

---

<sup>7</sup> H. Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American crusades*, Macmillan, 1972, 660 p.

<sup>8</sup> For more information on Eisenhower revisionism, the reader could refer to the following articles: M. McAuliffe "Eisenhower, the President" (*The Journal of American History*, Vol. 68, No. 3, 1981, pp. 625-632); V. de Santis "Eisenhower Revisionism" (*The Review of Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1976, pp. 190-207); S. Rabe "Eisenhower Revisionism: A Decade of Scholarship" (*Diplomatic History*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1993, pp. 97-115); P. Crowl "John Foster Dulles: The Policy Behind the Myth" (*Naval War College Review*, Vol. 27, No. 5, 1975, pp. 8-17). Curiously, after the outburst of the revisionist literature, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. while replicating his father's poll in 1997, found out that Eisenhower was ranked tenth among all the American presidents.

addition, Ambrose criticized the “nonapproach” Eisenhower took towards McCarthy, allowing the latter to do a lot of damage to civil liberties,<sup>9</sup> as well as the fact that after Eisenhower left the Oval office, the Cold War tensions were at their highest.<sup>10</sup>

The majority of more recent studies on Eisenhower and his eight years in office follow a more objective path, recognizing his strengths and weaknesses and rejecting generic notions of the President’s supposed inactivity, lack of intellect and dullness.<sup>11</sup> But even though it could be argued in line with certain historians, such as John Lewis Gaddis, that Eisenhower was a “good president” since he finished the Korean War and did not start any others,<sup>12</sup> it is hardly possible to conclude in the light of the available evidence that he did not escalate the American-Soviet relations and did not intensify the nuclear arms race.

Although the controversy over the excessive role of John Foster Dulles in the elaboration of foreign policy has already been largely dismissed by the revisionists in the 1970s, a number of famous historians ascribe certain significance to the Dulles brothers for attributing a certain tone to the presidency. Stephen Kinzer, for example, argues that there was a considerable degree of danger in the appointment of John Foster Dulles as the Secretary of State, and Allen Dulles as the Director of Central Intelligence, because that put the two of them in charge of both overt and covert sides of American foreign policy. As such, they contributed to the exploitation of the perceived Soviet threat and successfully fostered paranoia towards anything that seemed to be connected with Communism. They were able to

---

<sup>9</sup> Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy persistently assaulted the leading government officials and public servants in the Senate, accusing them of links with Communism. As such, McCarthy drew attention to himself for the first time in February 1950, when he attacked Secretary of State Acheson for harboring 205 communists in the Department of State, and demanded his resignation, as well as the cleansing of the Far East division of the Department of State since he believed that the majority of the Soviet spies were to be found there and that they facilitated the success of the Chinese Revolution. Moreover, one of the main postulates of McCarthyism, also sometimes referred to as the ‘witch-hunt’, was the so-called ‘Lavender Scare’, or the large-scale persecution of homosexuals because it was believed that a “sexual perversion” of this kind could potentially signify a security risk and sympathy for Communism (referenced from M. Leffler *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, Stanford University Press, 1992, pp. 341-345; and A. Friedman “The Smearing of Joe McCarthy: The Lavender Scare, Gossip, and Cold War Politics”, *American Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No. 4, 2005, pp. 1105-1129)

<sup>10</sup> S. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier and president*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1990, pp. 530-577

<sup>11</sup> The reader could refer to the following books for further clarification: C. Pach (ed.), *A Companion to Dwight D. Eisenhower*, Wiley-Blackwell, 2017; I. Gellman, *The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952-1961*, cit.; J. Smith, *Eisenhower in War and Peace*, cit.; J. Newton, *Eisenhower: The White House Years*, Anchor, 2011; W. Hitchcock, *The Age of Eisenhower: America, and the World in the 1950s*, Simon & Schuster, 2018.

<sup>12</sup> J. L. Gaddis, “He Made It Look Easy”, 20 April 2012, *The New York Times*, Mode of Access: <https://nyti.ms/39cahAA>, Date of Access: 20.03.2020

do that and to appeal to the general public without having to address the issue due to the fundamental traits of the American philosophy of exceptionalism.<sup>13</sup>

There is a range of articles and studies that deal specifically with Eisenhower's failure in key episodes of foreign policy: the exacerbation of nuclear arms race; his active role in the destruction of democratic aspirations in Iran and Guatemala on the basis of his unfounded concerns over them being influenced by the Soviet Union; his support for dictatorial regimes in Latin America and Southeast Asia; the creation of the conditions for bringing the United States to the war in Vietnam;<sup>14</sup> and ultimately for bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war (during the Korean War, the two Taiwan Strait crises, the Berlin Crisis).<sup>15</sup> This criticism, however, serves to underline the importance of Eisenhower's presidency in shaping the onset of the Cold War and in influencing the upcoming presidencies in terms of the pursued foreign policy. Eisenhower was by no means a "transitional" president, and although his political choices might seem controversial, there is no doubt as to the importance they played in furthering the Cold War and securing the American interests in different parts of the globe.

---

<sup>13</sup> St. Kinzer, *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War*, Times Books, 2013, pp. 120-130, 350-370. According to the author, both of them were devoted Christians, and John Foster Dulles remained dedicated to his faith his entire life. Catholic Christianity has always been a constitutional part of the American exceptionness, embodied in the belief that the American nation has a God-given global mission to fight the evil. As partners in Sullivan & Cromwell, who worked with plutocrats and international corporations, including the Big Oil, both received hefty profit from liberal capitalism, and believed that free market was a universal value everyone in the world wanted to have - the exceptionalist idea that the global order can and should be dictated by the United States.

<sup>14</sup> The lack of space precludes the in-depth discussion of the topic of Eisenhower's alleged role in the Vietnam War, since such discussion potentially necessitates the outline of the different approaches towards the war itself and the American role in it (whether it was "unavoidable", a "quagmire", a "stalemate", etc.). However, the evidence that Eisenhower indeed played a crucial role in the unfolding of the conflict appears to be sound. Perhaps, the most educational study is the one conducted by David Anderson for his book *Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961* (Columbia University Press, 1991), in which he argues that Eisenhower "trapped" his own administration and the successive ones into a commitment to the survival of Vietnam, the republic his presidency largely established, but the one lacking public support inside the country and any semblance of solid state structure. The author points out that American involvement in Vietnam during the Eisenhower presidency became so strong (military aid, economic and political support, etc.) that the eventual intervention and the war itself became just a matter of time.

<sup>15</sup> When the Communist China launched an attack against the territories held by the Republic of China in Taiwan in September 1954, Dulles and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Radford advocated for the preemptive nuclear strikes against Communist strategic positions in the conflict, along with an explicit warning to Moscow and Beijing that the United States was prepared to use nuclear weapons, but the escalation of the crisis towards the nuclear war over two insignificant islands of Quemoy and Matsu seemed to overstretch the American commitment (for more information, refer to B. Rushkoff "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955", *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1993, pp. 343-367). Similarly, the unfolding of the Berlin crisis from 1958 to 1961 threatened to become one of the most acute and dangerous nuclear conflicts, which started due to the United States equipping the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons and continued to present a grave danger of the nuclear war until its culmination with the construction of the Berlin Wall (for further information, refer to W. Burr "Avoiding the Slippery Slope: The Eisenhower Administration and the Berlin Crisis, November 1958 - January 1959", *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1994, pp. 177-205)



## **2. Policy of Containment: Critical Appraisal and Different Interpretations**

Containment is an ambiguous concept: it could be analyzed from economic, political and ideological points of view, it could be understood as both the premise and the logical outcome of the unfolding Cold War, and it could be viewed both as a policy of defense and a strategy of aggression. At the time of its announcement, political scientists and historians were almost unanimous in applauding it, while today they are almost unanimous in the assessment that the theoretic premises of containment do not stand up for scrutiny. What is conceptually clear about containment is its overall general philosophy - the Soviet Union is expansionist and there cannot be cooperation with it since its leaders have an unquenchable appetite for power.<sup>16</sup>

The struggle against the global Communism did not commence until after the end of the 1940s. At the end of the Second World War, the European part of the Soviet Union was in ruins, the resources were exhausted and the demographic potential was verging on the point of critical.<sup>17</sup> A long period of economic, political and social reconstruction awaited the Soviet Union, but it did possess military capacities, recognized by the high-ranking officials of the United States even before 1945, although it was no match for the technological advances of the United States. The situation would drastically change over a matter of a few years under the Truman administration, which would elaborate the Policy of Containment, recognizing the Soviet Union as the major security threat of the free world and, in particular, the United States.

At the early stages of the Truman presidency, who succeeded Roosevelt as at first the vice president upon his death and then the president in his own right, the possibility of a major war with the Soviet Union was not a priority concern. The Russians did not possess

---

<sup>16</sup> Kennan emphasizes the point in "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" by stating that Stalin and other leaders of the Soviet Union engaged in "the quest for absolute power, pursued now for nearly three decades with a ruthlessness unparalleled (in scope at least) in modern times", as opposed to the rest of Russians, "an amorphous mass of human beings among whom no independent organizational structure is tolerated". The Soviet expansionist motivations are best illustrated in the following: "Now it lies in the nature of the mental world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the character of their ideology, that no opposition to them can be officially recognized as having any merit or justification whatsoever. Such opposition can flow, in theory, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces of dying capitalism". The same expansionist design could be traced in the Long Telegram: "Soviet efforts, and those of Russia's friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an "imperialist" war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries."

<sup>17</sup> One of the iconic photographs taken in 1947 by the renowned war photographer Robert Capa in Moscow depicts women dancing with each other, revealing the demographic losses of the country. The same year General Eisenhower awarded the Medal of Freedom to Capa for his efforts to demonstrate the true face of war.

either atomic bomb or long-range air power, thus at the beginning the military threat was not the predominant one. But the economic and social devastation the war brought on Europe required strong governmental participation through land distribution, nationalization and welfare, without making people partake in new competitions necessary to prosper in the capitalist world. As Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson noted in the spring of 1945, the European peoples had suffered too much, “and they believe so deeply that governments can take some action which will alleviate their sufferings, that they will demand that the whole business of state control and state interference shall be pushed further and further”.<sup>18</sup> Communism with its fair redistribution and strong government hand, with its heroes of war and its sacrifices for the liberation of Europe, started to gain popularity in many countries, including the strategic frontiers, such as Greece. Furthermore, it was obvious that the communist parties attracted supporters, with the membership steadily growing throughout the war and taking up as much as 20 percent of the electoral vote in certain countries, such as France, Italy and Finland.<sup>19</sup>

The fears of the major transformation of the world order started to arise when Europe was plunged into the economic crisis, while Britain, the previously leading empire, was barely able to meet its wartime debt obligations.<sup>20</sup> To prevent unrest and encourage the market economy, the United States elaborated the Marshall Plan and established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, all aimed at the unification of the Western world in its struggle against communism. “We must face the fact”, Truman told to Congress in the early stages of his presidency, “that peace must be built upon power, as well as upon good will and good deeds.”<sup>21</sup> Truman also took an active stance on the question of rehabilitation of the economies of Germany and Japan, Russia’s traditional enemies, shattered after the defeat in the Second World War, including by reviving their military capabilities, as well as encouraged the French project for a European coal and steel community, the predecessor of the present-day European Union.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> “The Place of Bretton Woods in Economic Collective Security”, address by D. Acheson on 23 March 1945 before the Commonwealth Club of California, the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 12, p. 470

<sup>19</sup> M. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, cit., p. 7

<sup>20</sup> According to the estimations, Britain owed more than £3,000 million to its war creditors, predominantly the Sterling Zone and the United States, also facing a prospective cumulative balance of payments of £1,250 million between 1945 and 1950 (for more information, refer to C. C. S. Newton “The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan”, *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1984, pp. 391-408)

<sup>21</sup> “Recommendations of Universal Military Training”, Message of President Truman to Congress, 28 October 1945, the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 659

<sup>22</sup> M. Leffler, D. Painter, *The Origins of the Cold War: An International History* (2ed), Routledge, 2005, p. 37

The ideological guidance behind the economic and political measures to prevent the communist encroachment was provided by George Kennan, first with the Long Telegram he sent from Moscow in 1946 and later with his article, titled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” (also known as the “X” article), which was published in 1947 with the help of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. Even though the narrative did not call for military involvement per se, nor did it assume that the Soviet Union was going to launch an immediate attack on the United States,<sup>23</sup> the article would have a decisive influence on Washington and would become the foundation of the Truman Doctrine. After Secretary of Defense James Forrestal requested a special study on the allocation of resources against the Soviet threat, the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, then directed by its founder George Kennan, produced the Report to the President by the National Security Council, also known as NSC 20/4, in November 1948. Although the report reiterated the doubtfulness of the military engagement and was overall vague in its assessment,<sup>24</sup> the authors stated:

War might arise through miscalculation, through failure of either side to estimate accurately how far the other can be pushed. There is the possibility that the USSR will be tempted to take armed action under a miscalculation of the determination and willingness of the United States to resort to force in order to prevent the development of a threat intolerable to U.S. security [...] The risk of war with the USSR is sufficient to warrant, in common prudence, timely and adequate preparation by the United States.<sup>25</sup>

Despite the lack of clarity, the report did inspire the contemplation of the budgetary increase for the military buildup in the eventuality of a major war, but the military budget itself did not see substantial augmentation immediately, perhaps due to the upcoming presidential elections in 1948 and the tight budget necessary to keep financing the big

---

<sup>23</sup> Kennan continuously reiterated that “the most serious deficiency” of the X-Article “was the failure to make clear that what I was talking about when I mentioned the containment of Soviet power was not the containment by military means of a military threat, but the political containment of a political threat”, i.e. his policy of containment was a political strategy of limited geographical application, which did not presuppose a violent rollback, but instead an application of pressure to counter the ideological, rather than military, advances of the Soviet Union (for further information, refer to G. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950*, Little, Brown, 1967, pp. 354-368).

<sup>24</sup> The modern research is almost unanimous in treating NSC 20/4 as “practically useless”. It reiterated the same ideas Kennan brought up previously and did not provide a comprehensive evaluation of the various threats the country faced and the merits of strategies and systems, proposed alternatively by the Navy, the Army and the Air Defense. If Forrestal hoped to get a clear understanding of which propositions he should favor, in this respect NSC 20/4 was a pointless exercise (referenced from S. Rearden, “Paul H. Nitze and NSC 68: “Militarizing” the Cold War” in A. Nelson (ed.), *The Policy Makers: Shaping American Foreign Policy from 1947 to the Present*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008, pp. 5-29).

<sup>25</sup> National Security Council Report on U.S. Objectives With Respect to the USSR To Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security (NSC 20/4), 23 November 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; The United Nations, Volume I, Part 2, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v01p2/d60>, Date of Access: 17.01.2020

projects abroad.<sup>26</sup> Besides, Truman's Council of Economic Advisors warned that the growing expenditures might compel the President "to set aside free market practices - and substitute a rather comprehensive set of controls."<sup>27</sup> Other advisors, including Clark Clifford,<sup>28</sup> Secretary of State Marshall and Eisenhower, agreed that there was no need to puff up the military budget at that juncture, since the Soviet Union was unlikely to engage in the military aggression after the devastating results of the Second World War.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, the preponderance of the United States in possession of the unique nuclear weaponry, however short-lived it may prove to be, still constituted the decisive advantage that would effectively nullify the Soviet chances in a military campaign.

Despite the calls to keep the low budget, a number of events, including the Berlin Blockade, which resulted from the introduction of the new currency in the Western part of Germany, in April 1948 and before that the communist coup-d'état in Czechoslovakia in February of the same year, triggered the review of a limit of \$14.4 billion for the FY 1950 defense budget, originally set by Truman.<sup>30</sup> Regardless of Truman's determination to keep the budget low,<sup>31</sup> the following international events did not allow for fiscal conservatism: 1) the irreversible character of the Chinese Communist Revolution, as concluded by the study "United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949", also known as the China White Paper in August 1941, later confirmed by the actual fact of the Communist takeover in October of the same year; 2) the successful testing of the nuclear bomb by the Soviets on 29 August 1949.<sup>32</sup> The combination of these factors ultimately culminated in the elaboration of NSC 68 in April 1950, the document that Acheson described

---

<sup>26</sup> M. Leffler, D. Painter, *The Origins of the Cold War: An International History* (2 ed.), cit., p. 37

<sup>27</sup> Cross-referenced from M. Leffler "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 89, No. 2, 1984, pp. 346-381

<sup>28</sup> Clifford was a contributor of "American Relations with the Soviet Union", an extremely secretive report commenced upon the receipt of Kennan's Long Telegram and aimed at uncovering the violations of the agreements on part of the Soviet Union in a number of countries, such as Germany, Austria, the Balkan countries, Iran and Korea (Clifford-Elsey report: American Relations with the Soviet Union. 24 September 1946, Truman Library, Mode of Access: <https://bit.ly/3bLOqBO>, Date of Access: 10.01.2020)

<sup>29</sup> M. Leffler, D. Painter, *The Origins of the Cold War: An International History* (2 ed.), cit., p. 35

<sup>30</sup> K. Young, "Revisiting NSC 68", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2013, pp. 3-33

<sup>31</sup> Among other efforts, Truman appointed Louis A. Johnson as his Secretary of Defense after the resignation of Forrestal. Johnson was a well-known fiscal conservative, willing to pressure the Joint Chiefs of Staff to keep military expenditures from rising.

<sup>32</sup> In October 1949, the following conclusion was reached: [W]hen the USSR attains a stockpile of atomic weapons, overwhelming superiority of our own stockpile and production rate will be necessary if our atomic weapon posture is to continue to act as a deterrent to war. Moreover, and from a military standpoint, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the recent atomic explosion in the USSR underlines the military necessity of increased weapon production [...] (Report to the President by the Special Committee of the National Security Council on the Proposed Acceleration of the Atomic Energy Program, 10 October 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v01/d207>, Date of Access: 01.03.2020)

as “one of the most significant documents in our history. I don’t believe there is going to be one [...] equal to the analysis of this paper in terms of American survival in the world”.<sup>33</sup>

Regardless of the wording<sup>34</sup> of NSC 68 and of the fact that it spoke about the impossibility of the preventive war, the document was neither defensive-minded, nor status quo-oriented. It was not the policy of containment, elaborated by Kennan, but rather a strategy of achieving the rollback of the Kremlin drive for power, the idea further taken on by John Foster Dulles. Moreover, the language of the report evoked the overbearing fear of Communism and the irreconcilable differences between the United States and the Soviet Union:

Our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully and powerfully evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power.<sup>35</sup>

In this regard, the rapid military and economic buildup was deemed necessary at home and abroad, only to be executed through the increase in the military budget, which was advised by the authors of the report (since the report itself did not stipulate any budget per se) to be tripled reaching \$40 or \$50 billion per year, which was not immediately approved.<sup>36</sup> However, due to the outbreak of the Korean War and the intervention of China into the Korean peninsula, the defense budget for FY 1952 was increased by 458 percent over 1951 levels.<sup>37</sup>

The assessment of containment in the 1950s and early 1960s is based on the assumption that the Soviet conduct was indeed expansive, as opposed to conservative or contractive. The majority of the scholars of that period view the actions of the country as part of the carefully constructed design to wield power over the entire world, comparing it with the Nazi expansionism in the late 1930s.<sup>38</sup> It was therefore to be expected that the policy of

---

<sup>33</sup> Cross-referenced from R. Burns, J. Siracusa, *A Global History of the Nuclear Arms Race: Weapons, Strategy, and Politics*, Vol. 1, Praeger, 2013, p. 94

<sup>34</sup> Ken Young in his article “Revisiting NSC 68” (cit.) described the wording of the document as an exercise in “purple prose”, aimed at black-and-white assessments and fear mongering.

<sup>35</sup> National Security Council Report on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC 68), 7 April 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d85>, Date of Access: 20.01.2020

<sup>36</sup> R. Bowie, R. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy*, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 3

<sup>37</sup> K. Young, “Revisiting NSC 68”, cit., pp.3-33

<sup>38</sup> A particularly compelling example of such literature must be the highly-celebrated at the time study by R. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Free Press, 1953). The research was undertaken by the RAND Corporation

containment of such an aggressive enemy was celebrated by the political scientists at the time and the United States was viewed to be a heroic nation, which took upon itself a courageous and unselfish task of protecting its European allies from the encroachment of global Communism.<sup>39</sup>

Even those in the minority - the researchers, who were rather critical of the policy of containment - did not necessarily question the overall threatening nature of the Soviet design. Walter Lippmann, a famous political commentator and one of the few contemporaries critical of Kennan, agreed that the Soviet Union menaced peace and security on the international level, but strongly criticized the doctrine of containment.<sup>40</sup> Another important critic of the X-Article was Hans Morgenthau, who objected to the United States “crusading” the world and called to “remember that no nation’s power is without limits, and hence that its policies must respect the power and interest of others”.<sup>41</sup>

Such assessment of containment is, of course, problematic due to a number of issues: 1) the exact meaning of the word “Soviet”, i.e. whether the satellites of the Soviet Union are Soviet and whether Communism is conceptually equal to being Soviet; 2) the exact meaning of “quest for power”, i.e. if influence could be potentially understood as “power” over a country, whether the nature of such power is militaristic, political or economic, and if influence could indeed be understood as power then how justifiable the military side of American containment is in ethical and budgetary terms; and 3) the positivistic assessment of containment - that is, only the instances of the Soviet Union exercising “power” are taken into account to prove the point, while the instances when the Soviet Union did not act are disregarded.<sup>42</sup>

---

on behalf of the U.S. Air Force and was applauded for its extensive use of primary resources, in particular Soviet documents. The book concludes that the nature of the Soviet conduct was intrinsically aggressive, that the true design behind the Communism doctrine was the world conquest and that the peaceful coexistence was impossible due to the existence of “two hostile camps” of communism and capitalism. The overall detailed review of the early literature on the Soviet conduct was carried out by W. Welch in his article “Soviet Expansionism and its Assessment” (*The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1971, pp. 317-327)

<sup>39</sup> This is not to imply that an exceedingly positive assessment of American policy of containment is abandoned completely today. One of the more fine examples of the continuous eulogy is *Harry S. Truman and the Cold War Revisionists* (University of Missouri, 2006) by R. Ferrell, in which the author refutes the revisionist arguments and identifies Truman, certainly on questionable grounds, to be one of the best American presidents exactly due to his foreign policy decisions.

<sup>40</sup> Lippmann believed it to be a major strategic mistake that would force the United States to partake in the establishment of undemocratic regimes and to support satellites in the remote parts of the world, instead of fostering “the natural alignment of the British, French, Belgians, Dutch, Swiss and Scandinavians”, who sought instead to “extricate” themselves “from the Russian-American conflict” (for more information, refer to W. Lippmann, *The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy*, Harper, New York, 1947, pp. 17-21)

<sup>41</sup> H. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1951, pp. 241-242

<sup>42</sup> W. Welch, “Soviet Expansionism and Its Assessment”, cit., pp. 317-327

The reappraisal of the policy of containment could be understood through various perspectives: 1) in terms of gradual reassessment of the Soviet intentions and/or the true American interests; 2) in accordance with the proper degree of the American involvement in the international affairs; 3) in terms of the ratio of American resources that were dedicated either to internal or external concerns. Kissinger in his memorandum to Nixon pointed out that “the mood of reappraisal has been precipitated by the costs and frustrations of the war in Vietnam, but it goes deeper than the reaction to the war and will outlast the war”.<sup>43</sup> In many instances, the reappraisal appeared somewhat reductionist in the sense that it attributed only one particular aspect of American public life to the policy of containment, such as economy<sup>44</sup> or cultural stereotypes,<sup>45</sup> for example.

An assessment of such kind, even though not in itself lacking merit for the change of perception of the American policies against the Soviet Union during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, did not provide an exhaustive reappraisal of the policy of containment due to the following reasons: the influence of the United States appears to have been overwhelming everywhere in the world, while other countries exercised no influence on the United States, which might not always be the case (that is, if the actions of the United States were always proactive, instead of mere reactionist); and arising from that, the

---

<sup>43</sup> Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, 20 October 1969, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundation of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d41>, Date of Access: 02.03.2020

<sup>44</sup> For example, William Appleman Williams identified the inconsistencies of the American aggressive policy towards Russia, coupled with the assurance of many officials that the Soviets would not start the war, as well as pointed out that Russia’s motives were primarily defensive and oriented at establishing the security perimeter in Eastern Europe. Williams attributed all the steps at ‘containing’ the Soviet Union taken by the United States to the Open Door policy, essentially arguing that it was “the fear that America’s economic system would suffer a serious depression if it did not continue to expand overseas” that pushed the Truman and Eisenhower administration to continuous overtures in the remote places (see W. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, (first published by World Pub. Co., Cleveland, 1959), W. W. Norton & Company; 50th Anniversary revised edition, 2009, pp. 202-276). Similar arguments that treated internal economic conditions of the United States as the main cause of the foreign policy decisions were later taken up by many researchers, but the book was extensively criticized in the 1970s. Robert Tucker, for example, pointed out in his book *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971) that Williams’ arguments were not fundamentally different from those by the “realists”, who claimed that the American foreign policy was based on mistaken calculations, and claimed the book was too radical to be considered a valid research.

<sup>45</sup> The study by Michael Hunt provides the reader with a somewhat unilateral view of the American foreign policy objectives, since it claims that the American decision-makers were influenced by the ingrained concepts of “racial hierarchy” and feeling of American exceptionalism, which somehow imparted the ideological dimension to the American foreign policy. That is, the policies against the Soviet Union and certain countries in the Third World were a manifestation of a form of racism, but in a more refined sense (see M. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1987, pp. 90-91)

overwhelming concentration on the experience of the United States alone as opposed to placing it in the broader context of international relations.<sup>46</sup>

More modern discussion on the policy of containment seems to introduce new dimensions to the previous revisionism. For instance, the philosophy of containment as proposed by Kennan was reappraised and criticized by historians and bibliographers, as well as by the author himself. As it has been mentioned, in his *Memoirs* Kennan lamented the fact that his entire philosophy was misunderstood and claimed that he never called for militaristic containment or for imperialist interventions in other countries.<sup>47</sup> In connection to these arguments, the studies on the philosophy of containment and Kennan were effectively divided into two major camps: those, who stated that the basis of the containment was primarily “political” (for example, John Lewis Gaddis); and those that believed its basis to be primarily “militaristic” regardless of Kennan’s disclaimer (such as Eduard Mark).<sup>48</sup> The gist of this debate lies to a great extent in the often contradictory statements of Kennan himself, which intermittently alluded to political and militaristic options.<sup>49</sup> However, the assessment provided by Gaddis and his commentary, in which he says that although the statements by Kennan might seem contradictory, one must conclude on the basis of representative (rather than atypical) evidence that Kennan’s vision of containment was much more “political” than it was “militaristic”. Thus Gaddis concludes that the effect of containment on an array of countries, including Guatemala, Iran, Germany, Korea, the Philippines, is derived from its “admittedly imperfect implementation, not its original formulation”.<sup>50</sup>

---

<sup>46</sup> For more information, refer to J. L. Gaddis, “New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1990, pp. 405-423

<sup>47</sup> In fact, as it has been mentioned by many biographers, Kennan was appalled that Lippmann considered Kennan’s containment to be a direct cause and the onset point of the clearly militaristic Truman Doctrine, and prepared a long letter in April 1948 to Lippmann in order to explain everything, but in the end never sent the letter (referenced from G. Kennan, *Memoirs*, cit., pp. 359-363).

<sup>48</sup> The debate between the two historians is certainly very important to clarify the issue (for more information, the reader could refer to the following articles: “Containment: A Reassessment” by J. L. Gaddis (*Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 55, 1977, pp. 873-887), “The Question of Containment: A Reply to John Lewis Gaddis” by E. Mark (*Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 2, 1978, pp. 430-441), as well as the reply by Gaddis that follows the article.

<sup>49</sup> As an example of Kennan’s militaristic evocations, Edward Mark recalls that on the eve of the Italian elections in 1948, which appeared to lead to the victory of a Communist party, Kennan proposed to Secretary of State Marshall to put a pressure on the Italian government to “outlaw” the party: “Communist would presumably reply with civil war, which would give us grounds for the reoccupation of the Foggia fields or any other facilities we might wish. This would admittedly result in much violence and probably a military division of Italy; but we are getting close to the deadline and I think it might well be preferable to a bloodless election victory, unopposed by ourselves, which would give the Communists the entire peninsula at one coup and send waves of panic to all surrounding areas” (cross-referenced from “The Question of Containment: A Reply to John Lewis Gaddis” by E. Mark (cit., pp. 430-441)

<sup>50</sup> See the commentary by Gaddis of the critical article by E. Mark (cit., pp. 440-441)



The view of Gaddis, who retained the positive assessment of containment insofar as the general philosophy went, but considered it to have been improperly implemented, is contrasted to that of other historians, who believe that the policy of containment was not formulated by Kennan. Rather, it was “conceived, enunciated, and directed” by President Truman, who distinctly emphasized the irreconcilable ideological differences and the imperialistic design of the Soviet Union,<sup>51</sup> while Kennan explained Russian policy through some sort of psychological pathology, which made them constantly insecure in the paradigm of their power. Against this background, the critical appraisal of containment could be understood within the spectrum of the critique of Truman’s foreign policy. As such, certain historians are critical of the results of the Truman presidency, but not of its overall benevolent intentions - that is, they express an apologetic point of view. For example, Kissinger in his reappraisal of containment prepared for President Nixon stated the following:

America’s assistance to South Vietnam against communist insurgency was initiated as a perfectly consistent application of the policy enunciated in the Truman Doctrine of helping independent governments resist communist incursions. The expansion of America’s involvement after 1965 did not lead to any different rationale. Nevertheless, the costs and frustrations that followed, and their domestic repercussions, have called that rationale into question.<sup>52</sup>

In the modern research, however, another subset of literature dismisses this analysis of the policy of containment as disingenuous. Perry Anderson provides a curious evaluation of the American containment by coming to the conclusion that “the ideology of national security, US-style, was inherently expansionist”.<sup>53</sup> In this respect, the ‘containment’ is not a doctrine or a policy as much as it is a slogan, “a bureaucratic euphemism”, in Anderson’s own words, used by the administrations to achieve their aims, all directed at the ultimate assurance of security of the American domination in the international relations, and should therefore be enclosed in the inverted commas.

---

<sup>51</sup> E. Spalding, *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism*, University Press of Kentucky, 2006. The book is curious in the sense of stripping Kennan from his role as the primary architect of containment, and credits Truman and his aid Clifford with the elaboration of the policy.

<sup>52</sup> Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, 20 October 1969, cit., Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d41>, Date of Access: 02.03.2020. A similar view is to be found in Leffler’s book *A Preponderance of Power* (cit.), a very important and thorough study, which was, however, criticized for a slightly one-sided view of the American politics, due to the research being based only on the American primary resources.

<sup>53</sup> According to Anderson, “containment was limited neither in its range nor in its means”; rather, the Truman administration, including Acheson, Truman and Kennan alike, worked to exaggerate the perception of the danger of the Soviet expansionist design to overrun the world. The issue of American security per se did not equate to the idea of global dominance, but it was the definitive security from all external threats that made the ultimate idea of the *Pax Americana* possible (see P. Anderson, *American Foreign Policy and its Thinkers*, Verso, London, 2015, pp. 30-50).

Bruce Kuklick carried out a conceptually similar analysis of the policy of ‘containment’ in the sense that it was a banner of the administrations to push forward the favorable policies:

To gain support for its expensive and unglamorous courses of action such as the Marshall Plan, the Truman administration exaggerated the propensity of the Soviet Union, and Communist ideology in general, for military adventure. Such an information policy may have been disingenuous, but in 1946-48 the Truman administration found it necessary, facing a public with little stomach for more international engagements and a hostile, almost isolationist Congress.<sup>54</sup>

Another interesting research on the topic of ‘containment’, foreign policy and the reasons behind the American global engagement was presented by Walter Hixson, who argued that it was the national identity, imbued with the sense of moral superiority and the American belief that the United States is destined by God to endeavor to save humanity, landed the country in an endless warfare with an array of enemies. In this regard, “the Cold War always was and still is a narrative discourse, not a reality”, it was a continuity of the national identity, rather than an externally imparted crisis.<sup>55</sup>

For the purposes of the present paper, the policy of ‘containment’ shall not be taken at face value, i.e. it is not the policy of containment of the Soviet Union within its borders, as advocated by Kennan in the X-Article, although the Soviet threat played its role in the elaboration of the Eisenhower foreign policy. The policy of ‘containment’ shall be understood in the meaning of any breach of security, real or perceived, that inspired the Eisenhower administration to act preventively, aggressively or retrospectively in order to restore the lost sense of security. It is, of course, possible that the administration embarked on certain endeavors aiming at the achievement of what could be described as imperialistic goals or indeed that American-style national security ideology was a priori expansionist, but for the purposes of this paper it is not quite as significant to focus on the few problematic episodes, which could have contradicting interpretations, as it is on the broader picture of ‘containment’ relevant for the Middle East. Although the policy of ‘containment’ would not be regarded in its original sense, for the remainder of the research the inverted commas shall be avoided in order not to confuse the reader with their constant presence. Besides, the original meaning of containment is not completely discarded from the analysis, since in the

---

<sup>54</sup> B. Kuklick, *Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger*, Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 38

<sup>55</sup> The war was necessary to locate an enemy from without in order to reaffirm the cultural hegemony within the United States and to discourage the gradual change towards peace-oriented internationalism, as opposed to military internationalism (see W. Hixson, *The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Yale University Press, 2008, pp. 163-167).

majority of episodes, the Eisenhower administration might indeed have been influenced by the 'red scare', despite the threat being misplaced or misjudges in its significance and scope. It is, however, important to underline that it was the overwhelming concern with the security of the American interests abroad in the face of the possibility of a major war with the Soviet Union or any other unforeseeable disaster, which inspired the actions of the administration, as illustrated above by certain historian. This insecurity constituted the bottom line of the actions undertaken by the administration, which can be identified as the policy of containment.

### **3. Policy of Containment during the Eisenhower Presidency, its Origins and Main Strategic Objectives**

Certain strategic objectives concerning Eisenhower's foreign policy were denominated during the election campaign and remained a priority for the first few years of his presidency. Eisenhower stated that one of his primary motivations to run for presidency was the prevention of the surrender to isolationism<sup>56</sup> that continued to be an option after the devastating Second World War. The General expressed his concerns that the provisions of NSC 68 with its demanding budget lines could plunge the nation back into isolationism because it required harsh sacrifices from Americans for a vague goal:

[I]t is not easy to convince an overwhelming majority of free people, everywhere, that they should pull in their belts, endure marked recessions in living standards, in order that we may at one and the same time develop backward countries and relieve starvation, while bearing the expenses and costs of battle in the more fortunate countries.<sup>57</sup>

Prolonged wars would create unrest at home, because they drained the vital resources and did not represent a noble aim for the American public, threatening the coherence of the

---

<sup>56</sup> Eisenhower publicly refused to run for presidency till February 1952 without, however, giving his Shermanesque statement, and it has been suggested that his final decision to run for presidency was due to his resolve to prevent "Mr. Republican" Robert A. Taft from implementing his isolationist ideas: "any thought of 'retiring within our own borders,'" Eisenhower wrote to Dulles in June 1952, "will certainly lead to disaster for the U.S.A." (cross-referenced from B. Duchin, "The 'Agonizing Reappraisal': Eisenhower, Dulles, and the European Defense Community", *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1992, pp. 201-221). In connection to this, Truman promised to become Eisenhower's running mate if he agreed to run for presidency. In his letter to Eisenhower in December 1952 he wrote: "As I told you in 1948 and at our luncheon in 1951 [November 5], do what you think is best for the country. My own position is in the balance. [...] If you decide to finish the European job (and I don't know who else can) I must keep the isolationists out of the White House. I wish you would let me know what you intend to do. It will be between us and no one else."

<sup>57</sup> D. Eisenhower, June 1953, cross-referenced from J. L. Gaddis *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 131

system of American values. Therefore, the overall attitude of Eisenhower towards such enterprises could be summarized in his own words in 1954: “[T]he United States cannot be strong enough to go to every spot in the world, where our enemies may use force or the threat of force, and defend those nations.”<sup>58</sup> This could also be attributed to the lack of assurance that the United States would manage to overcome the economic difficulties, which were believed to arise due to the liberal spending required by the Marshall Plan and NSC-68. As Secretary of State Dulles stated in his address to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee in May 1953: “[W]e and our allies alike must maintain an essential balance between our economic health and our military effort [...] If economic stability goes down the drain, everything goes down the drain.”<sup>59</sup> Keynesian approach proposed by certain senior officials did not persuade the president. Devoted to balanced budgets and sustained economic growth, Eisenhower found the plan at odds with his personal vision of the military spending.<sup>60</sup>

The overall dissatisfaction with the results of the economic policy pursued by the Democratic party in terms of the military budget as well as their continuous reliance on the New Deal practices with the strong participation of the government in the economic sphere contributed to the reason that Eisenhower turned down the Democratic ticket and Truman as his running mate in order to run for the presidency on the Republican platform. He reiterated the same dissatisfaction after Stalin’s death in his Chance for Peace speech in 1953:

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed [...] The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some fifty miles of concrete pavement. We

---

<sup>58</sup> Presidential remarks at the National Editorial Association Dinner, 22 June 1954, *Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1954: containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the president, January 1 to December 31, 1954*, p. 586

<sup>59</sup> Cross-referenced from R. Ripley, J. Lindsay (eds.), *U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997, p. 197

<sup>60</sup> The argument is not meant to introduce an idea that Eisenhower was a doctrinaire economic conservative, i.e. that he never resorted to Keynesian tactics to balance the budget. In terms of military spending his position was such that increasing spending on the military-industrial apparatus would upset upwards the tax system and stifle private enterprise, but in general Eisenhower was described by Iwan Morgan as “passive and half-hearted Keynesian”, since he did employ Keynesian counter-cyclical spending to combat economic downturns, particularly during the recessions, such as in 1959, when the United States saw the highest peacetime budget deficit (for more information, refer to M. Mayer, *The Eisenhower Years (Presidential Profiles)*, Facts on File, 2009, Introduction).

pay for a single fighter with a half-million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people [...] <sup>61</sup>

Another strategic objective Eisenhower underlined during his election campaign as well as throughout his two terms in office was the necessity to counteract global Communism and the Soviet spies that were believed to infiltrate the government. In this respect, the termination of the war in Korea and the domestic situation of McCarthyism came among the important topics of discussion in the run-up to the elections. Stephen Hess stressed the particular significance of foreign policy in the election campaign of the Republican Party, dubbing it the “Three C’s” campaign <sup>62</sup> - Korea, Communism, and Corruption <sup>63</sup> - since those three topics were considered the main failures of the Truman administration.

Eisenhower’s disagreement with the budgetary implications of NSC 68 and the general “wastefulness” of the Democratic administration stemming from Roosevelt’s policies of New Deal did not necessarily mean Eisenhower entirely dismissed the ideas communicated in NSC 68 - that it, of the American role in the global fight against Communism. Nonetheless, Eisenhower believed in fiscal prudence and aimed at shrinking the federal government, overblown in its expenditures and demanding excessive taxes, in order to reaffirm the free market and to overcome the consequences of the Democrats’ extravagant projects such as the Marshall Plan, <sup>64</sup> which were believed to have stifled the domestic entrepreneurship. Eisenhower was known to gravitate towards the big business and the corporate capitalism, which was evident not only because of the people he chose to associate with and the members of the administration he appointed, <sup>65</sup> but also in the importance he ascribed to the free market: “The minimum requirement,” he had written to

---

<sup>61</sup> D. Eisenhower, “Chance For Peace”, 16 April 1953, Miller Center, Mode of Access: <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-16-1953-chance-peace>, Date of Access: 12.01.2020

<sup>62</sup> S. Hess, “Foreign Policy and Presidential Campaigns”, *Foreign Policy*, No. 8, 1972, pp. 3-22

<sup>63</sup> Truman was known for giving considerable payoffs to his friends in the White House, who were labeled influence peddlers or “5 percenters” for the fee they charged, which sparked corruption scandals in the White House (referenced from I. Gellman, *The President and the Apprentice*, cit., p. 19)

<sup>64</sup> At the beginning of the first term Eisenhower was of the opinion that aid programs such as Marshall Plan had served their purpose and ought to be abandoned in favor of more trade. Thus, he attempted to lower tariffs under the slogan “Trade, not Aid” (referenced from E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower Volume II: The President*, Touchstone Book, 1984, Kindle ed., ch. “The Eisenhower Doctrine”).

<sup>65</sup> Many of Eisenhower’s top appointments were fiscal conservatives and the leaders of the big business: George Humphrey (the president of steel manufacturer M. A. Hanna Company, later to become the president of National Steel Corporation after concluding his duties in the administration in 1957) at the Treasury Department, Charles Wilson (the president of General Motors) at the Defense Department (to be succeeded by Neil H. McElroy, the president of Procter & Gamble in 1957), Sinclair Weeks (previously the president of the American Enterprise Association, the organization that advocates limited government and democratic capitalism) at the Commerce Department, Arthur Burns (economist, heavily influenced by the ideas of Milton Friedman) at the Council of Economic Advisers, Douglas McKay (the former president of the Oregon Automobile Dealer’s Association) at the Department of the Interior.

Dulles in 1952, “is that we are able to trade freely, in spite of anything Russia may do, with those areas from which we obtain the raw materials that are vital to our economy.”<sup>66</sup>

To be true, the world leadership in the struggle against Communism, recapitulated in NSC 68, found its illustration also in the Eisenhower administration, but in the form of the assured continual access to the world resources and the global commerce without the restrictions, imposed by a powerful antagonistic player. However, Truman’s way to attain this world leadership was irreconcilable with Eisenhower’s economic vision and could potentially jeopardize the goal itself, because the inflationary borrowing and endless taxation might turn the American public against the government that was protecting them from Communism - especially so, if the taxation and borrowing were not allocated towards welfare,<sup>67</sup> but instead to the military buildup. The policy of containment of the Eisenhower administration, as many researchers claim, was indeed a coherent logical development of the Truman administration, but it differed in the way the policy was applied and it contained a number of novel ideas and methods, enshrined primarily in the New Look.<sup>68</sup>

John Foster Dulles contributed greatly to the elaboration of the new policy, although he concentrated more on the threats than on domestic welfare and new economic possibilities. In his first televised address as Secretary of State he said that the “Soviet Communists” would seek to avoid all-out war but would work “to get control of the different areas around them and around us, so they will keep growing in strength and we will be more and more cut off and isolated. And they have been making a very great progress.”<sup>69</sup> The speeches such as this one worked well on the American public<sup>70</sup> in the light of the constant publicity afforded

---

<sup>66</sup> Cross-referenced from J. L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, cit., pp. 130

<sup>67</sup> Eisenhower tried to rectify the situation in 1954 with the expansion of Roosevelt’s Social Security, which he believed “will bolster the health and economic security of the American people. They represent one of the cornerstones of our program to build a better and stronger America.” (quoted from the Statement by the President Upon Signing the Social Security Amendments of 1954, 1 September 1954, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pp. 801-802)

<sup>68</sup> It was not identified that the modern research ascribed any particular uniqueness to the ‘policy of containment’ during the Eisenhower presidency in terms of its overall outline and goals, but instead described it to be consistent with the Truman policy of containment (refer to S. Dockrill, *Eisenhower’s New-look National Security Policy, 1953-61*, Palgrave Macmillan, 1996)

<sup>69</sup> R. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 59

<sup>70</sup> In that same speech Dulles referred to Stalin’s book *Problems of Leninism* as “the present-day Communist bible... [that] gives us the same preview that Hitler gave in *Mein Kampf*”. The references to *Mein Kampf*, Hitler and the Munich Appeasement were a recurrent method of appealing to the broader American public, used previously also by Truman. In particular, when the Czechoslovak Communist Party seized power in Prague, establishing a pro-communist government in February 1948, the West, outraged by the move, likened the Prague coup to the take-over of Czechoslovakia in 1938 by Hitler, equaling Stalin with the Nazi leader (referenced from T. Sayle, *Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*, Cornell University Press, 2019).

to people such as Joseph McCarthy and to the events such as the investigations of the Soviet spies,<sup>71</sup> as well as on the American government itself, where a few months prior to Eisenhower's inauguration, President Truman had approved NSC 135/3, which stated that the United States should "block further expansion of Soviet power even at [the] grave risk of general war".<sup>72</sup>

After assuming the office on 20 January 1953, Eisenhower started working out the possibilities, meant to "discover a reasonable and respectable posture of defense [...] without bankrupting the nation" with the expensive ventures like the Korean War.<sup>73</sup> It turned out to be difficult to translate this idea into policy, since during the discussions about the future of the United States military spending the participants divided into two groups depending on whether they put the military buildup (i.e. struggle against the global Communism) or the soundness of the internal economic policies first. For example, Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, a well-known fiscal conservative, advocated extraordinary 50 percent cuts and the stabilization of the economy,<sup>74</sup> while both the Pentagon and the State Department warned against excessive cuts, because it could endanger global security situation. Eisenhower occupied the middle position in the debate, favoring progressive reduction but being against immediate tax cuts.<sup>75</sup> In March 1953, the deliberations saw the defense budget lowered by \$7.5 billion dollars from \$41.3 billion for Fiscal Year 1954, originally requested by Truman.<sup>76</sup>

---

<sup>71</sup> Interestingly, Nixon, a Republican Representative from California at that time, was at the forefront of these investigations in 1948. He was the one to receive the testimony of a *Time* magazine editor, Whittaker Chambers, in front of the House Committee on Un-American Activities that Alger Hiss had been a communist spy. Nixon's persistence in the accusations as well as a careful treatment of the sensitive case where John Foster Dulles was concerned (in 1946, Dulles had become chairman of the board of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and worked hard to push through the nomination of Alger Hiss as its president, which might have endangered his work for Thomas Dewey's presidential campaign) allegedly contributed to the nomination of Nixon as Eisenhower's running mate (referenced from I. Gellman, *The President and The Apprentice*, cit., pp. 157-170).

<sup>72</sup> Brief of Approved U.S. National Security Objectives, Policies and Programs With Respect to the USSR (NSC 20/4, NSC 68/2 and NSC 135/3), 6 February 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d43>, Date of Access: 01.03.2020

<sup>73</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 131st Meeting of the National Security Council, 11 February 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d46>, Date of Access: 05.03.2020

<sup>74</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 138th Meeting of the National Security Council, 25 March 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d52>, Date of Access: 05.03.2020

<sup>75</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 140th Meeting of the National Security Council, 22 April 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d57>, Date of Access: 05.03.2020

<sup>76</sup> S. Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61*, cit., p. 31

Moreover, the militaristic approach the United States assumed towards the Soviet Union was at odds with the promises Eisenhower gave during the elections, as well as in the context of the sudden death of Stalin, which put this approach into a new perspective - something Eisenhower alluded to in his Chance for Peace speech:

The world knows that an era ended with the death of Joseph Stalin. The extraordinary 30-year span of his rule saw the Soviet Empire expand to reach from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan, finally to dominate 800 million souls. The Soviet system shaped by Stalin and his predecessors was born of one World War. It survived with stubborn and often amazing courage a second World War. It has lived to threaten a third. Now a new leadership has assumed power in the Soviet Union. Its links to the past, however strong, cannot bind it completely. Its future is, in great part, its own to make [...] So the new Soviet leadership now has a precious opportunity to awaken, with the rest of the world, to the point of peril reached and to help turn the tide of history.<sup>77</sup>

Notwithstanding, starting from May 1953, Eisenhower engaged in what would become known as a highly-secretive Solarium Project, an exercise in strategy and foreign policy design, where three separate Task Forces A, B, and C were required to consider three alternatives of the possible evolution of the security policy. The Task Forces were assembled at the Doolittle Panel, which included, among others, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert Cutler and some people, formally or presently associated with the CIA, such as Walter Smith and Allen Dulles.<sup>78</sup> The idea behind it was to find the compromising solution for various, often conflicting, foreign policy agendas, which, according to the Republicans, could not be tackled only by the military approach.<sup>79</sup> Task Force A had to deal with the containment policy and how it used to work under Truman and to decide upon the changes in the light of the reduced spending.<sup>80</sup> Task Force B occupied itself primarily with the question

---

<sup>77</sup> D. Eisenhower, "Chance For Peace", 16 April 1953, Mode of Access: <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-16-1953-chance-peace>, Date of Access: 12.01.2020

<sup>78</sup> M. Gallagher, "Intelligence and National Security Strategy: Reexamining Project Solarium", *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2015, pp. 461-485

<sup>79</sup> S. Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61*, cit., p. 33-35

<sup>80</sup> Task Force A, headed by George Kennan, who was requested to return from Moscow after briefly serving there as the Ambassador of the United States, proposed the familiar ideas of containment pursued during the Truman administration. Kennan habitually emphasized that ideology was but a method the Soviet Union used to propel its imperial designs, and pointed out the impossibility of a major confrontation in future due to the lack of Soviet military potential comparable to that of the United States. While Kennan did recognize the implications of the development of the atomic bomb by the Soviet Union and the possible elaboration of the hydrogen bomb, the recommendations remained the same as at the times of Truman - the United States should proceed with the high defense spending and the military buildup not in connection to any fear of the invasion, but to restrain the Soviet Union from resorting to violent acts at the territory of the free world. The main problem with that proposal was the budgetary implications, since it clearly required the return to the same 'wasteful' spending on the military. Some researchers claim that the final presentation in this project by Kennan had little to do with the original policy of containment he proclaimed in his X-Article and the Long Telegram, and a lot more to do with NSC 68, as envisioned by Nitze. As such, he spoke of global containment as opposed to the limited application of force to counteract the enemy - very much unlike his authentic idea. There continues to be a lot of speculation



of nuclear weapons and the possibility of its use as a deterrent of the Soviet aggression and/or a weapon of war.<sup>81</sup> Task Force C looked into the viability of the rollback in Europe.<sup>82</sup>

The existence of mutually exclusive and contentious elements in all of the three propositions precluded the possibility of using only one of the alternatives as the primary basis for the American security strategy, but certain observations of the three studies were included in the draft of the new National Security Report (NSC 162/2). The draft was edited multiple times by an ad-hoc committee, which was set up specifically for the purposes of finalizing the report and included representatives not only of the Task Forces but the State Department, the CIA and the Department of Defense. Eventually, the draft was presented to the National Security Council on 30 September 1953.<sup>83</sup> These deliberations clearly show that there was no possibility to reach the compromise on particularly difficult matters, such as the

---

about why he discarded his original idea and why Eisenhower and Dulles wanted specifically him to head the Task Force, when Nitze was also an available option, all of which does not seem to be proper to discuss with the space limitations of the present paper (refer to R. Melanson, D. Mayers (eds.), *Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s*, University of Illinois Press, 1987, Kindle ed.).

<sup>81</sup> Task Force B, directed by Major General J. McCormack (an expert on nuclear weapons), came to the conclusion that the world should be divided into two blocks of influence between the United States and the Soviet Union, and on its territory the United States should make sure that any Soviet move of aggression or the Communist allure would be regarded as the virtual declaration of war. The United States would need to take an uncompromising aggressive position and employ whatever means necessary, including nuclear weapons, to defeat the Soviet Union. The decision to strike with the weapons could be taken in accordance with the policy objectives of other players, but in the end the United States was entitled to make such decisions with no further consultation with the European partners. It contradicted what Eisenhower stated during the discussion of the possibilities of the nuclear option in the Korean War, referring to Europe and the allies in Asia, that the government “could not blind [itself] to the effects of such a move on our allies, which would be very serious since they feel that they will be the battleground in an atomic war between the United States and the Soviet Union”. However, the President eventually endorsed the blueprint by agreeing with Dulles that “somehow or other the taboo which surrounds the use of atomic weapons would have to be destroyed”. (Memorandum of Discussion at a Special Meeting of the National Security Council on Tuesday, 31 March 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p1/d427>, Date of Access: 15.01.2020). The threat of a major war contrary to conducting local wars, as proposed by Task Force A, was deemed the primary punitive and coercive measure against further aggression of the Soviet Union (Paper Prepared by the Directing Panel of Project Solarium, 1 June 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d69>, Date of Access: 05.03.2020).

<sup>82</sup> Task Force C, headed by Admiral R. L. Conolly, also proposed the threat of the general war to dominate the American-Soviet relations, but in that case it was based on the assumption that the Soviet Union was steadily losing the Cold War. Thus, the strategy consisted in adopting “a forward and aggressive political strategy in all fields and by all means” to accelerate the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union, the existence of which could be no longer tolerated by the free world (Eisenhower and the Nuclear Arms Race in the 1950s “Project Solarium”, Eisenhower National Historic Site, Mode of Access: <https://www.nps.gov/articles/projectsolarium.htm>, Date of Access: 15.10.2019). To achieve that goal, the United States should engage in continuous propaganda and covert operations, as well as foster its technological development and military potential - the provisions taken almost verbatim from NSC 68, which in turn demanded consistently high military budgets, larger than what the Truman administration requested for 1954, until the collapse of the Soviet Union was achieved (S. Dockrill, *Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61*, cit., p. 33-35).

<sup>83</sup> Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Policy Planning Staff (Watts), 12 August 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d83>, Date of Access: 05.03.2020

military budget. The same debate resumed as to whether the economy should prevail over the necessities of defense or vice versa.<sup>84</sup> Since the president remained in favor of the balanced economy, the final version of the report included the need for maintaining a “sound, strong and growing economy, capable of providing through the operation of free institutions, the strength [of the military posture] over the long pull and of rapidly and effectively changing to full mobilization”.<sup>85</sup> However, the final draft also sustained that the United States should always meet the costs of those policies that were deemed to be crucial for the security of the country.<sup>86</sup> Hence, the report contained two mutually exclusive positions, which made it unclear and open to interpretation. Such allowances illustrated that the report did not, in its essence, tackle the complicated challenges of the security situation, but instead presented an exercise of rhetoric meant to conceal the unaddressed problems.

A similar method was used to deal with another contentious issue, in which Eisenhower faced considerable opposition from some members of his administration. As the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Eisenhower valued the commitment and cooperation of the Western European partners, and favored the provision of military aid to them since this would allow the allies to build up their own military security and contribute to the protection of the free world from Communism by exercising their own containment - the view also shared by Dulles.<sup>87</sup> However, the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget mounted an opposition, claiming that the United States should curtail its excessive aid for the sake of the balanced economy. The compromise was reached, consisting in the provision that the United State should continue with the military aid to its key allies, but to strive to reduce it “as rapidly as United States interests permit”,<sup>88</sup> a most vague wording. The question about the

---

<sup>84</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to the cuts and “argued that we must take measures to defeat the external Soviet threat even if in the process we changed our way of life”, while Dulles pointed out that whenever the issue of spending cuts was raised, it always appeared to be the defense segment of the total budget that came under attack: “Why do we continue spending \$2 billion annually for price supports of agriculture?” (Memorandum of Discussion at the 165th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, October 7, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d94>, Date of Access: 19.01.2020)

<sup>85</sup> Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), 30 October 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d101>, Date of Access: 07.03.2020

<sup>86</sup> Ibidem: “In the face of these threats, the United States must develop and maintain, at the lowest feasible cost, requisite military and nonmilitary strength to deter and, if necessary, to counter Soviet military aggression against the United States or other areas vital to its security.”

<sup>87</sup> Dulles expressed his reservations that deep cuts in the military aid to allies might send the wrong message to other countries that the crisis was over and that the defense spending could be neglected. This, Dulles said, might “take heart out of NATO” (cross-referenced from B. Duchin “The “Agonizing Reappraisal”: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the European Defense Community”, cit., pp. 201-221)

<sup>88</sup> Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), cit., Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d101>, Date of Access: 07.03.2020

extension of military aid raised additional issues, which had to do with the redeployment of the American troops, already stationed in different parts of the globe.<sup>89</sup> The final report stated that under the present conditions the redeployment of troops was not viable.<sup>90</sup>

Another issue was the possibility to use the nuclear weapons in the Korean War and in any other conflict likely to arise. It should be understood that at the beginning of his presidency Eisenhower was not clear about his attitude to the idea of using nuclear weapons, since he had misgivings about the reaction of the NATO allies and was a proclaimed strong opponent of limited wars<sup>91</sup> or wars in general.<sup>92</sup> However, NSC 162/2 did provide for “a strong military posture to include the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power”,<sup>93</sup> - a remark, which is reminiscent of Dulles, rather than of Eisenhower, who made an effort to underline his preference for peaceful means, at least in 1952 and the early months of 1953 as opposed to the ideas of Dulles and the entire Republican platform during the elections.<sup>94</sup> During the discussions on the report, the idea of

---

<sup>89</sup> Even though the president himself recognized that “the cost of maintaining an American soldier in the field is fantastically higher than the cost of maintaining a foreign soldier”, in the debate he took the position of his Secretary of State, who disfavored a precipitous redeployment. While the United States deployment of troops and military presence might have been overextended, the issue was extremely delicate, and the hasty return of the American soldiers might trigger the demoralization of the Allies (Memorandum of Discussion at the 138th Meeting of the National Security Council, 25 March 1953, cit., Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d52>, Date of Access: 05.03.2020)

<sup>90</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 168th Meeting of the National Security Council, 29 October 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d100>, Date of Access: 05.03.2020

<sup>91</sup> Eisenhower had spoken on a number of occasions about the economic disadvantage of local wars: “[B]y their military threat they have hoped to force upon America and the free world an unbearable security burden leading to economic disaster. They have plainly said that free people cannot preserve their way of life and at the same time provide enormous military establishments.” (1953) (cross-referenced from J. L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, cit., p. 137). In 1955, NSC 5501 stated: “The United States cannot afford to preclude itself from using nuclear weapons even in a local situation, if such use will bring the aggression to a swift and positive cessation, and if, on a balance of political and military consideration, such use will best advance U.S. security interests.” (National Security Council Report (NSC 5501), 7 January 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d6>, Date of Access: 15.03.2020)

<sup>92</sup> During the Second World War, Eisenhower served as the Supreme Allied Commander and gave the decisive order to carry out the Normandy landings on 6 July 1944 (the so-called ‘D-Day’). Even though he never killed anyone or was injured in a battle, people close to Eisenhower commented that the emotional strain left him in the condition of physical withering and exhaustion; he experienced constant cramps, suffered from insomnia and chronic throat diseases. He once said: “I hate war, as only a soldier who has lived it can, as one who has seen its brutality, its futility, its stupidity” (cross-referenced from E. Thomas, *Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World*, Back Bay Books, 2012, Kindle ed.)

<sup>93</sup> Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), 27 October 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d98>, Date of Access: 19.01.2020

<sup>94</sup> The policy of containment for Dulles was the way the Democratic party tried to appease the enemy not unlike what the European leaders tried to do with Hitler in the 1930s, which was one of the reasons he undertook the elaboration of the “roll-back” doctrine. The same strategy was taken by Nixon and the entire Republican platform, supported but the majority of the party members, but not by Eisenhower, who claimed: “I’ll be

nuclear weapons was brought up, with Secretary of Defense Wilson informing the president that the Pentagon's strategists "must know whether or not to plan for the use of these weapons" and whether "we intend to use weapons on which we are spending such great sums". The Secretary of Defense was seconded by Dulles, while the President replied that "if the use of them was dictated by the interests of U.S. security, he would certainly decide to use them."<sup>95</sup>

The approval of NSC 162/2 in October 1953 was certainly a major achievement for the newly-formed Eisenhower administration, but due to the vague, open to almost any interpretation and all-inclusive nature of this report, it could present only the rough guidelines for setting up the immediate foreign policy agenda. Nor did it tackle the issue of maintaining high level of military capacity and preserving the economic stability at the same time - something Eisenhower promised to achieve during the elections. However, it was necessary to come to an agreement concerning the defense budget for the fiscal year of 1955. Even though the Pentagon asked for an enlargement of the budget to increase the number of military personnel,<sup>96</sup> Eisenhower agreed with Dulles that the Navy and the Army should be withdrawn from Korea and the overall reliance on the air force should be expanded, which allowed the administration to bring down the defense budget by about 3.5 billion from the level set for the fiscal year of 1954.<sup>97</sup>

In terms of the development of the foreign policy agenda, Secretary of State Dulles was concerned with the Soviet ideology, which came to be considered the essence of the Soviet quest to subjugate the free world, unlike it had been for the policy of containment and Kennan, who believed the ideology to be only a method to achieve global dominance.<sup>98</sup>

---

damned if I run on that" (cross-referenced from J. L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, cit., p. 126).

<sup>95</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 165th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, October 7, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d94>, Date of Access: 19.01.2020

<sup>96</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 166th Meeting of the National Security Council, 13 October 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d95>, Date of Access: 06.03.2020

<sup>97</sup> S. Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61*, cit., p. 53-54

<sup>98</sup> Dulles ascribed Moscow the extraordinarily clear understanding of their foreign policy objectives, which in turn signaled their readiness to switch to new regions, as well as a tactical finesse, unreachable in the West due to the absence of such an ideology (see J. L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, cit., p. 135-136). In the course of the year Eisenhower appeared to become increasingly interested in the topic of ideology, professed by Dulles. Even though, according to his own writings about the period, he was invited to Moscow at the very end of the war and was extended the honor of standing atop Lenin's Tomb (a courtesy unheard of for the representatives of the United States) with Stalin himself, as well as found a personal friend in Marshal Zhukov, Eisenhower used to consider the Soviet leaders to be nothing more than "fanatics" or "dictators" (see D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, The John Hopkins University Press, 1997, pp. 457-480). But in 1953, having done extensive readings on the

Against this background, some researchers, such as J. L. Gaddis, recognized that the preoccupation with ideology went so far that a lot of different, seemingly unrelated incidents around the globe were attributed to the grand design of the Kremlin. The assumptions of flexibility of their actions and the profound, infallible reasoning of the Soviet foreign policy objectives, however far from reality those assumptions might have been, allowed the Eisenhower administration to believe that the Communist or leftists states could not operate on their own, but rather they were all at least partly coordinated from Moscow.<sup>99</sup> These assumptions proved to be unsound, and the majority of researchers today treat the revolutions, uprisings or drastic reorientations, such as the one in Iran in 1953 or in Guatemala in 1954, to be a manifestation of nationalism struggling against years of oppression, rather than a conscious effort on the part of the Soviet Union to implant a Communist regime in the area. As such, a very prolific body of literature treats these interventions as a problem of major misjudgment and oversimplification due to the lack of proper information, not as a design to propel American interests around the globe.<sup>100</sup> Misjudgment in the modern research is portrayed in a more ‘sophisticated’ manner, i.e. it does not rest on the assumption that Eisenhower was not aware of the real Soviet influence in the countries before the intervention. According to Salim Yaqub, it is precisely the availability of the information on the growing nationalism that inspired the administration to

---

ideology of Communism, the works by Lenin and Marx, Eisenhower concluded that “anyone who doesn’t recognize that the great struggle of our time is an ideological one... [is] not looking this question squarely in the face” (see The President’s News Conference, 11 November 1953, *Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1953: containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the president, January 20 to December 31, 1953*, p. 243).

<sup>99</sup> Eisenhower remarked in 1957: “The Korean invasion, the Huk activities in the Philippines, the determined effort to overrun all Viet Nam, the attempted subversion of Laos, Cambodia and Burma, the well-nigh successful attempt to take over Iran, the exploitation of the trouble spot of Trieste, and the penetration attempted in Guatemala” were all examples “of Soviet pressure designed to accelerate Communist conquest of every country where the Soviet government could make its influence felt.” (cross-referenced from J. L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, cit., p. 138)

<sup>100</sup> Perhaps, the earliest analysis of this issue was carried out by Robert J. McMahon in his article “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists” (*Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 101, No. 3, 1986, pp. 453-473). The author criticized the revisionists, who, although recognizing consistent failures of Eisenhower’s policies in the Third World, still evaluated his presidency as predominantly positive. According to McMahon, this mistake was committed due to the insignificance of the Third World in all revisionist analysis, while, in fact, it must be evaluated as a vital part of Eisenhower’s foreign policy. As such, the author argued: “The Eisenhower administration grievously misunderstood and underestimated the most significant historical development of the mid-twentieth century - the force of Third World nationalism. This failure of perception, furthermore, constituted a major setback for American diplomacy.” Similar arguments are expressed by Richard Immerman in his numerous works on the different aspects of the Eisenhower presidency (e.g. refer to *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, 1982)

interfere in the Third World countries in order to fill the “vacuum of power” the unchecked nationalism produced and to prevent the Soviet Union from doing the same.<sup>101</sup>

It is obvious, however, that the Soviet Union had no means to partake in the large international projects as well as to continuously intervene in other countries, seeing that in the aftermath of the Second World War its economy, infrastructure and demographics lay in ruins, so the emphasis on its imperialistic military capabilities might have been misplaced. This is not to say that Dulles or Eisenhower were not aware of the Soviet Union economic and demographic problems in the 1950s.<sup>102</sup> In his private correspondence, Eisenhower wrote in 1956: “I cannot see them starting a war merely for the opportunity that such a conflict might offer their successors to spread their doctrine.”<sup>103</sup> The administration felt that the Kremlin would rather engage in the psychological warfare, as Eisenhower put it, by “poisoning men’s minds” through “lying propaganda”, “false promises” and other means of manipulation that could help to sway the hesitant population towards Communism - a claim difficult to support with waterproof facts.<sup>104</sup> The combination of these observations introduced many researchers to the idea best summarized by John Lewis Gaddis: “World order, and with it American security, had come to depend as much on perceptions of the balance of power as on what that balance actually was.”<sup>105</sup>

In this regard, Yugoslavia appeared to be a good example of the doubts the officials in Washington harbored towards any manifestation of Communism. During the Truman administration, Yugoslavia received the military and economic aid from the United States regularly, starting from 1949 - the trend, which continued well into the Eisenhower presidency.<sup>106</sup> In 1949, Eisenhower, the Army Chief of Staff at that time, expressed a

---

<sup>101</sup> The argument is well elaborated in Salim Yaqub’s *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (University of North Carolina Press, 2004). A similar view is suggested in R. Melanson and D. Mayers’ book *Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s* (cit.)

<sup>102</sup> R. Bowie and R. Immerman in *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (cit., p. 46) pointed out that after Eisenhower traveled to the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War and saw the desperation and destruction, with “[not] a house standing between the western borders of the country and the area around Moscow”, it was enough to convince him that the Russians would not want to repeat the tragedy so early after the war.

<sup>103</sup> Cross-referenced from R. Bowie, R. Immerman (eds.), *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy*, cit., p. 47

<sup>104</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>105</sup> J. L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, cit., p. 90. Similar ideas are expressed by F. Ninkovich in his book *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (University of Chicago Press, 1994).

<sup>106</sup> Having defected from the Soviet Union, Josip Broz ‘Tito’ made Yugoslavia the first example of the countries, which followed the policy of non-alignment with either of the camps during the Cold War. While staying essentially Communist and more belligerent than the Soviet Union (the fact which could have become a problem for American Congress at times of passing the aid budget for the country), Yugoslavia improved the relationships with Greece and Turkey, sought to normalize the relations with Italy and Austria, stopped

minority opinion by suggesting to the NSC that the whole Soviet-Yugoslav dispute might be a sham, “an extremely subtle trick” to make the United States finance the recovery of Eastern Europe controlled by the Soviets.<sup>107</sup> Even though this opinion did not find much support among the top officials, it indicated the level of suspicion that Americans had towards Communism of any type and the apprehension they had that everything marginally related to the Soviet Union was part of the one elaborate plan to ruin the free world. However, in 1952 Eisenhower promised the liberation of Eastern Europe when he ran for presidency, but only by peaceful means as opposed to the roll-back approach, which was not viable under those circumstances. The liberation, therefore, could be achieved through the extension of support to the countries ready to defect from the Soviet camp.<sup>108</sup>

The vacillation of Tito’s Yugoslavia between the free world and Communism and Tito’s refusal to abandon the ideology as a clue for the future challenges the non-alignment offered did not inspire much trust in the administration, which led to Dulles declaring on 9 June 1955 that “neutrality has increasingly become an obsolete conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and shortsighted conception.”<sup>109</sup> This view was also inspired by the lack of assurance regarding the actions of Nasser in Egypt, since it was believed that he, like Tito, was trying to get the most of the two worlds by perpetually ‘flirting’ both with America and the Soviet Union.<sup>110</sup> Therefore, the concern over ideology and the adherence to one of the two opposing camps in the bipolar world was afforded a critical significance in Eisenhower’s foreign policy and played an important role in the elaboration of the New Look, which had at its core the premise of the ideological

---

collectivization and started a gradual reorientation of the country towards a more market-oriented economy. Even though a lot of these actions were more for the appearances sake in order to appease Congress and qualify for the American aid, the rupture with the Soviet Union made Yugoslavia seem to be the first country to abandon the Soviet camp and its ideology. (see H. Brands Jr., “Redefining the Cold War: American Policy toward Yugoslavia, 1948–60”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1987, pp. 41-53)

<sup>107</sup> Ibidem

<sup>108</sup> In this respect, as far as the aid to Yugoslavia was concerned, Dulles concluded: “[Yugoslavia] was qualified for economic and military aid as being the only country which, once being subject to Soviet Communism, had broken free, and done so peacefully. That peaceful break-away showed a possibility that other countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and China, might in due course peacefully resume effective control of their affairs. I said while Yugoslavia was not symbolic of what Americans like as a form of government, and while we should wish it different, it was symbolic of the possibility of the breakup of the Soviet empire without war.” (cross-referenced from R. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, cit., p. 237)

<sup>109</sup> Cross-referenced from J. Gabriel, *The American Conception of Neutrality After 1941* (Updated and Revised), Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 186

<sup>110</sup> On the eve of the Suez Crisis, after Nasser threatened that the Aswan Dam would be built with the help of the Soviets, if Americans refuse to show their support, Dulles referred to this threat as “immoral blackmail” and told his aids that it was “surely a bluff - the Soviets just don’t have that kind of surplus to sell or give away” (cross-referenced from S. Kinzer, *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War*, cit., p. 212).

aggressiveness of the Soviet Union and the necessity to counteract such aggression by an array of tactics, varying from propaganda and to the “brinkmanship”.<sup>111</sup>

The words “New Look” or “a new concept” started to appear in the public address of the senior governmental officials around 1953-1954. The idea promised the manageable military development, which was not oriented towards “fixed dates of maximum danger”, as Eisenhower stated in his annual budget message to Congress on 21 January 1954, but rather would prioritize the establishment of long-lasting sustainable military posture, which would secure the position of the United States in the environment of lack of certainty as to the motives of the opponent.<sup>112</sup> But the clarity was not there - Raymond Platig illustrated this idea in the introduction to his article, published just one year after the proclamation of the New Look policy:

The “new look” has been characterized as a policy of “instant retaliation,” of “massive retaliation,” of relying on the ability to “retaliate with great force by mobile means.” It has been described as a “strategy of detachment,” as an attempt to “hedge our strategic bets,” as preparing for the “long pull,” as “a reassessment of our strategic and logistic capabilities,” as preparing to take “whatever steps our national interest requires,” and as “an attempt by intelligent people to keep abreast of the times.” It has been called “less a policy than an idea,” “a misnomer,” “no ‘new look’ at all,” “merely an acceptance of the Old Look,” “a bluff to a certain extent,” a “gradual shift in emphasis,” and “revolutionary”.<sup>113</sup>

Regardless of everything the modern research has achieved to clarify the subject, the passage from the article of 1955 is emblematic for providing an idea of the attitude the public had towards the policy - it appeared to be a vague vision rather than a true policy. In the light of the above-mentioned challenges of the Eisenhower administration, the New Look could be arbitrarily summarized in the following strategic objectives: 1) the necessity to preserve the vitality of the American economy while providing enough financial means to guarantee the upper hand of the United States in the Cold War; 2) heavy reliance on nuclear weapons to provide the deterrent of Communist aggression or, depending on the circumstances of the hostilities, to engage into the nuclear warfare by delivering the strike and preventing the retaliation; 3) the wide-scale employment of the services of the CIA to conduct clandestine or

---

<sup>111</sup> Also known as “atomic diplomacy, the term itself is taken from a famous article from *Life* magazine by James Shepley, titled “How Dulles Averted War” (16 January 1956, pp. 70-72), which the author claimed had been based on the secret interview he had had with Dulles. In the same article Dulles stated: “You have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war [...] The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art. If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost.”

<sup>112</sup> D. Eisenhower, Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1955, 21 January 1954, Mode of Access: <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/annual-budget-message-the-congress-fiscal-year-1955>, Date of Access: 01.02.2020

<sup>113</sup> R. Platig, “The ‘New Look’ Raises Old Problems”, *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 1, The Gurian Memorial Issue, 1955, pp. 111-135



covert operations against other governments or leaders “directly or indirectly responsive to Soviet control”; 4) investing into the security and military buildup of the allies and reinforcing cooperation with European and Asian partners as well as winning the friendship of nonaligned governments;<sup>114</sup> and 5) “psychological warfare”, which included a wide range of tactics from printed and broadcast propaganda to maintaining unyielding positions in the relations with the Soviet Union.

Except for the ultimate approval of NSC 68 and the successful testing of the H-bomb in 1951 (followed by the corresponding testing carried out in the Soviet Union only nine months later), there was little time for Truman to do anything about nuclear weapons, let alone work out a comprehensive policy. However, Eisenhower, as the future president, was confronted with the issue during his election campaign, mostly due to the active participation of John Foster Dulles in the Republican ticket. Eisenhower expressed certain doubts<sup>115</sup> about the merit of the asymmetrical strategic deterrence, soon to be commonly known as ‘the Doctrine of Retaliation’ elaborated by Dulles, who argued that the best form to counteract and prevent the military aggression of the Soviet Union was the assurance of the retaliation of such proportions as to render the response impossible, no matter how minor the military aggression was and regardless of the location:

We keep locks on our doors, but we do not have an armed guard in every home. We rely principally on a community security system so well equipped to punish any who break in and steal that, in fact, would-be aggressors are generally deterred. That is the modern way of getting maximum protection at a bearable cost.<sup>116</sup>

During the Eisenhower presidency, the issue of nuclear weapons was a recurrent one, and the president at times gave ambiguous statements about his attitude towards their applicability in the Cold War. The question of atomic bombs first emerged during the discussion on the ways to conclude the Korean War, and the administration considered the workability of those scenarios, in which the strategic bombing could be conducted in certain

---

<sup>114</sup> C. Pach Jr., “Dwight Eisenhower: Foreign Affairs”, Miller Center, University of Virginia, Mode of Access: <https://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/foreign-affairs>, Date of Access: 20.01.2020

<sup>115</sup> Eisenhower did not seem to appreciate the simplicity of the nuclear response to the complex issues arising in the Cold War, which Dulles had already formulated in his book *War or Peace* in 1950, and criticized this point after reading the draft of Dulles’s famous article, titled “A Policy of Boldness”, for *Life* magazine in 1952: “What should we do if Soviet political aggression, as in Czechoslovakia, successfully chips away exposed positions of the free world? So far as our resulting economic situation is concerned, such an eventuality would be just as bad for us as if the area had been captured by force. To my mind, this is the case where the theory of “retaliation” falls down.” (cross-referenced from J. L. Gaddis *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, cit., p. 126)

<sup>116</sup> Address by Secretary of State Dulles, made before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, on 12 January 1954, section “The Need for Long-Range Policies”, The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 30, No. 758, p. 108

parts of China (for example, the air bases in Manchuria) and on the Korean peninsula.<sup>117</sup> The prevailing scholarly opinion on the subject is that Eisenhower never intended to actually use the nuclear weapons, even though he urged the members of the National Security Council to consider it as a viable alternative.<sup>118</sup> As Roger Dingman puts it, “NSC deliberations proved more discursive than decisive” and were nothing more than “rambling conversations” about the war in the context of an “accommodating enemy”,<sup>119</sup> while John Lewis Gaddis believes the primary motivation for Eisenhower to “make nuclear weapons the only military option” for the United States was the avoidance of the large-scale all-out war, since the availability of nuclear weapons and the threat to employ them would deter the Soviet Union from engaging in conflicts.<sup>120</sup> At the same time, the forceful nature of the President’s remarks during the meetings of the National Security Council both in winter and spring of 1953, the reports of which were not disclosed at that time to the general public and certainly not to the adversaries, challenges the above-mentioned research, which largely exonerated the president. For example, when the question arose whether or not the United States would proceed into the mainland China in case of the Chinese aggression, the report stated:

[T]he President expressed with great emphasis the opinion that if the Chinese Communists attacked us again we should certainly respond by hitting them hard and wherever it would hurt most, including Peiping itself. This, said the President, would mean all-out war against Communist China.<sup>121</sup>

It put him at odds with Secretary of State Dulles, who proposed “a full atomic strike on Korea itself”, the bombing of troop concentrations in Korea, the blockade of China’s coast, and the seizure of Hainan Island, with the expressed intention to achieve the victory in the Korean War and to avoid getting involved in other wars.<sup>122</sup>

---

<sup>117</sup> C. Malkasian, *The Korean War*, Rosen Publishing, 2009, p. 82.

<sup>118</sup> Among the more curious, if perhaps, extreme ideas, Campbell Craig in his work *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War* (Columbia University Press, 1998) credits Eisenhower with the elaboration of a “masterly chief executive” strategy to persuade the whole world and the President’s own advisors that the United States nuclear policy was indeed aimed at eliminating the Soviet Union in case of any minor confrontation. However, the author claims it was Eisenhower’s ploy to make sure “that his advisers would find it impossible to push Eisenhower toward war and away from compromise” (p. 53). This view, however, imparts the president with a substantial degree of Machiavellian thinking, which is unlikely in the light of everything history knows about Eisenhower to the present date.

<sup>119</sup> R. Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War”, *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1988-1989, p. 50-91

<sup>120</sup> J. L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, cit., p. 173

<sup>121</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 173rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 3, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p2/d811>, Date of Access: 17.01.2020

<sup>122</sup> Ibidem

Certain authors suggest that the actual steps that Eisenhower took to make the employment of nuclear weapons possible both in China and Korea, such as the meetings with the leaders of the European countries (particularly, Winston Churchill)<sup>123</sup>, aimed at convincing the allies of the desirability of the use of the weapons and the transfer of nuclear weapons in the realm of conventional arms,<sup>124</sup> are convincing enough to question the prevailing identification of the Eisenhower nuclear policy as largely benevolent and striving for peace.

The notion of nuclear weapons in modern research on the Eisenhower administration makes him seem almost schizophrenic: he appears to encourage it at every step and put it in the center of his foreign policy strategy, but also tries to abolish it and expresses his ever present disgust with the very idea of the nuclear war. By all means, the estimations such as these remain contingent on the records of Eisenhower's own words in different settings, but the reliability of these records is still questionable: the motivation behind any statement might be in direct contradiction with what the President actually said due to the complex nature of his job and the scope of his responsibilities. However, the nuclear policy of the United State was not the product of Eisenhower's own mind, but was substantially influenced by the entire administration, on advice of which Eisenhower was known to rely.<sup>125</sup>

It is customary to consider that John Foster Dulles' doctrine of 'massive retaliation' entered the United States dictum with his famous speech to the Council of Foreign Relations in New York on 12 January 1954, entitled "The Need for Long Range Policies":

A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him [...] He might be tempted to attack in places where his superiority was decisive [...] The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.<sup>126</sup>

---

<sup>123</sup> There is evidence that this was the case during the Big Three Bermuda Conference on 3 December 1953 (cross-referenced from S. Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61*, cit., p. 54)

<sup>124</sup> Incidentally, soon after the meeting with Churchill and the representatives from France, in his famous address "Atoms for Peace" to the United Nations, Eisenhower claimed: "In size and variety the development of atomic weapons has been no less remarkable. The development has been such that atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services. In the United States, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use." (D. Eisenhower, "Atoms For Peace Speech", 8 December 1953, United Nations, Mode of Access: <https://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/eisenhower-atoms-for-peace-speech-text/>, Date of Access: 14.11.2019)

<sup>125</sup> To cite just one example, Eisenhower (unlike Truman) presided over the majority of meetings of the National Security Council because he intended it to become "the principal forum for vigorously debating foreign policy issues and developing consensus behind presidential decisions" (the information is quoted from R. Damms, *The Eisenhower Presidency, 1953-1961*, Routledge, 2002, p. 28.).

<sup>126</sup> Dulles mentioned the phrase "massive retaliation" only in the section where he spoke about nuclear weapons: "We need allies and collective security. Our purpose is to make these relations more effective, less costly. This can be done by placing more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive power [...]"

However, as important as this part may seem, Dulles also tackled other critical issues of the United States foreign policy, such as the need to carefully balance the military budget, the economic stability and the provision of the American aid to the allies, but the speech nevertheless entered the history as the announcement of the doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’.

The doctrine of massive retaliation received a hefty amount of criticism by historians and policy advisors, some of them - contemporaries of the New Look.<sup>127</sup> The primary weakness of this doctrine for some researchers consisted in the fact that it required the United States to risk national suicide for the objectives, which were not intrinsically important for the American security or American national interests other than that of defeating the Soviet Union.<sup>128</sup> The proliferation of nuclear weapons on both sides of the Iron Curtain revealed the stark vulnerability of the defense systems - NSC 141 estimated the capabilities of the American shield to intercept no more than 10 to 15 percent of the bombs, which translated into around 65 to 85 percent ratio for Soviet bombs-on-target.<sup>129</sup> Furthermore, the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union were revised sharply upwards in summer 1954,<sup>130</sup> which undermined the trust of the general public in the doctrine of massive retaliation, since it did not seem to deter the enemy from advancing their weapons. The other problem consisted in the degree of the acceptable reliance upon the foreign military bases, which could execute a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. The concern had to do with the concept of “atomic blackmail”, i.e. the lack of certainty that the allies might be tempted to employ the American nuclear weapons against America as a way to exert political pressure.<sup>131</sup> The administration

---

Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him.” (Address by Secretary of State Dulles, section “The Need for Long-Range Policies”, cit.)

<sup>127</sup> The reader could familiarize themselves with the works of the RAND Corporation authors, such as Bernard Brodie (*Strategy in the Missile Age*, RAND Corporation, 1959) and Albert Wohlstetter (*Protecting the U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 1960s*, RAND Corporation, 1956; *The Delicate Balance of Terror*, RAND Corporation, 1958)

<sup>128</sup> For more, the reader could refer to H. W. Brands “The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State (*The American Historical Review*, Vol. 94, No. 4, October, 1989, pp. 963-989)

<sup>129</sup> Report to the National Security Council by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security (NSC 141), 19 January 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d42>, Date of Access: 21.01.2020. The estimations continued to grow, particularly after the Killian paper on the dangers of a Soviet nuclear attack, which stated: “for the first time in history, a striking force could have such power that the first battle could be the final battle, the first punch a knockout.” (The Killian Report, “Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack”, 3 April 1956, cross-referenced from *History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense*, Volume 2, 1956-1972, Center of Military History of the United States, 2009, p. 86)

<sup>130</sup> H. W. Brands, “The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State”, cit., pp. 963-989

<sup>131</sup> Ibidem: Even though the policy of encouraging nuclear bases on the territory of allies and key strategic partners was considered a sound one, in the mid-1950s it came under scrutiny during the negotiation of NSC 5422 “Tentative Guidelines under NSC 162/2 for Fiscal Year 1956”. Commandant of the Marine Corps Lemuel

was therefore divided between those, who supported the idea of strong alliances and the dislocation of nuclear bases, and those, who advocated self-sufficiency.

Even the overall tone of the Eisenhower administration concerning nuclear weapons appeared to be contradictory in nature. The President was the one to start the large-scale development of intercontinental ballistic missiles,<sup>132</sup> but at the same time was the one to advocate the peaceful employment of the atomic energy in his Atoms for Peace speech for the United Nations in 1953: “[...] the United States pledges [...] its determination [...] to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.”<sup>133</sup> He also fastidiously worked towards nuclear disarmament,<sup>134</sup> and understandably so, since the nuclear arms race threatened the very existence of the Western civilization, without providing the deterrent for local conflicts, in which the United States would still be forced to participate if it kept withholding the resort to nuclear arms. However, the efforts did not pay off, and the disarmament did not achieve any significant results.<sup>135</sup> As such, Eisenhower’s farewell

---

Shepherd wrote to the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “It may be that there is a point at which U.S. forces and bases on foreign soil will come to be regarded less as a deterrent to war than a threat to peace.”

<sup>132</sup> The change was largely introduced due to the elaboration of the Killian paper of 1955, which recommended accelerating procurement of intercontinental ballistic missiles (Atlas, and later Titan and Minuteman ICBMs), constructing land- and sea-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles (later Thor, Jupiter and Polaris IRBMs), and speeding construction of the Distant Early Warning Line (declared operational in August 1957) (cross-referenced from R. C. Hall “The Origins of US Space Policy: Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of Space”, 1992, BMD Technical Information Center, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization)

<sup>133</sup> D. Eisenhower, “Atoms For Peace Speech”, cit., Mode of Access:

<https://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/eisenhower-atoms-for-peace-speech-text/>, Date of Access: 14.11.2019

<sup>134</sup> During the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government on 18-23 July 1955, Eisenhower proposed the treaty on “Open Skies”, which would essentially allow the countries to conduct unopposed permanent reconnaissance on the opponent’s territory. As it was argued by Eisenhower, in this age of “new and terrible weapons,” the biggest fear of the nations was the surprise attack by the enemy. Nikita Khrushchev refused to allow the permanent reconnaissance, which the Russians interpreted as an act of espionage, effectively dismissing the disarmament (referenced from E. Thomas, *Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World*, cit., pp. 149-153). It is, however, argued by a lot of researchers that the proposal was a priori unacceptable for the Soviets, which Eisenhower was aware of (for example, refer to J. Frappier “Above the Law: Violations of International Law by the U.S. Government from Truman to Reagan”, *Crime and Social Justice*, No. 21/22, International Lawness and the Search for Justice, 1984, pp. 1-36)

<sup>135</sup> This is not to say that the Soviets found the idea of disarmament contrary to their foreign policy vision. The tentative rapprochement was the mutual policy of the United States and the Soviet Union between 1955 and 1960. In particular, after the summit in Geneva, where the subject was brought up, the arms limitation negotiations started in 1958, and Khrushchev had an official visit to the United States in 1959. However, the setback in the form of the U-2 crisis, which took place due to the intersection of an American U-2 spy plane in 1960 in the Soviet airspace, effectively nullified the efforts on both sides. There is no doubt that Eisenhower was aware of the surveillance mission, but since he had been assured by Allen Dulles that it was not possible for the pilot to survive the direct hit of SAM, the Administration released a report through NASA, indicating that a “weather research” aircraft had been lost over Turkey, resulting in an international embarrassment after the Soviets revealed that the pilot was in fact alive and under arrest (referenced from E. Geelhoed “Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Spy Plane, and the Summit: A Quarter-Century Retrospective”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly* Vol. 17, No. 1, 1987, pp. 95-106).

address from the Oval Office was rather pessimistic in its tone, especially so in the part about nuclear weapons:

Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose difference, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war - as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years - I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.<sup>136</sup>

Another distinctive feature of the New Look was the active reliance on the covert operations and clandestine activities planned and executed by the CIA during the Eisenhower presidency. It was not a diversion in the sense that the administrations had never used covert operations before, because Truman relied on them to stabilize the situation in strategically important locations without going to war (as it was the case of the Philippines as well as the attempted operations in Ukraine, the Baltic states, and the other Eastern European satellites of the USSR),<sup>137</sup> and in this respect the New Look exhibited continuity with the Truman administration.<sup>138</sup> However, it was a major break in terms of the frequency of the covert operations and the attitude of the President towards them.<sup>139</sup> For Eisenhower, the covert operations, just as the reliance on nuclear weapons, allegedly represented a way to provide for the security and to cut the budget at the same time - the mission of his entire presidency.

---

<sup>136</sup> President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Farewell Address, 17 January 1961, Mode of Access: <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=90&page=transcript>, Date of Access: 10.02.2020. In his own copy of the script, Eisenhower underlined "wish" and "is in sight".

<sup>137</sup> S. Corke, *US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare and the CIA, 1945-53*, Routledge, 2007, pp. 180-240

<sup>138</sup> Truman is credited with the establishment of the CIA, since the institution was considered both "necessary for the proper functioning of our military machinery" and "of primary importance for the proper conduct of our foreign relations", as described by Republican Congressman Ralph E. Church. Congress, however, had strong reservations about the intentions of the draftsmen, among whom the most important one was Hoyt Vandenberg, the first Director of Central Intelligence before the introduction of the bill and the former Assistant Chief of Air Staff at the U.S. Army Air Forces, to appoint a military man as the Director of the CIA. The Congressmen feared that the CIA, run by the military, would eventually turn into the American brand of Gestapo. The changes, introduced into the draft in regard to such misgivings, made the post of the Director of Central Intelligence principally a civilian one. The other change, introduced during the deliberations, was essentially collateral in nature: Congress made the president the chairman of the NSC, and since the CIA was accountable to the NSC, the Director of the Central Intelligence had to report directly to the President. Thuswise, the National Security Act passed in Congress and took effect on 18 September 1947 (for more detailed information, the reader could refer to T. Troy "Truman on CIA: Examining President Truman's Role in the Establishment of the Agency", The CIA Historical Review Program, Mode of Access: <https://bit.ly/3aVJt9w>, Date of Access: 13.03.2020).

<sup>139</sup> Even though it was Truman who set up the CIA, it is suggested by some biographers that he never trusted the organization with the potential to turn into a secret government of its own kind. For example, in 1963 he described the CIA as "a mistake," and said: "If I'd known what was going to happen, I never would have done it" (for more information, refer to M. Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman*, Berkley, New York, 1973, p. 419-420). However, it is open to discussion, since there is an extensive body of literature, which suggests that Truman was fully aware of the capabilities of the CIA and utilized it liberally.

The particularly conspicuous activity of the CIA in the 1950s and early 1960s is also often attributed to the rising number of independent states due to decolonization.

The perception in Washington that the Soviet Union expressed interest in swaying the non-aligned governments and new Third World countries towards Communism compelled the United States to act preventively. This could be further corroborated by the announcement of “the domino theory”<sup>140</sup> by Eisenhower during a press conference on 7 April 1954, in which he warned the world against the dangers of a pro-Communist government in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indochina, due to its tremendous potential of swaying other countries, which were dangerously close to American allies, such as Japan and South Korea.<sup>141</sup> But since the avoidance of the local wars inspired by the Korean conflict was one of Eisenhower’s election bids, the covert operations became a politically acceptable, reliable and relatively cheap alternative. It was also a way for Eisenhower to stay out of unsavory business of conducting an actual warfare, while the CIA operations were secretive, and the President did not have to acknowledge them even to the cleared personnel.<sup>142</sup> Moreover, certain researchers attribute unprecedented engagement in clandestine activities by the CIA to the persona of Allen Dulles, who had singular direct access to President Eisenhower and participated in the policy formation of the New Look, as described above.<sup>143</sup>

As it was discussed previously, one of the explanations for Eisenhower’s concern over the Third World and the non-aligned states had to do with the fact that, according to the information the President received, the majority of the new movements had left orientation, which could potentially render them clients of the Soviet Union. This was one of the possible

---

<sup>140</sup> Eisenhower did not introduce it as a novel idea, since Acheson had already given a similar metaphor in February 1947: “Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the East. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest domestic Communist parties in Western Europe. The Soviet Union was playing one of the greatest gambles in history at minimal cost” (cross-referenced from D. Reveron, N. Gvosdev, M. Owens, *US Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy: The Evolution of an Incidental Superpower*, Georgetown University Press, 2014, Kindle ed.).

<sup>141</sup> The President’s News Conference, 7 April 1954, *Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1954: containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the president, January 1 to December 31, 1954*, pp. 381-390

<sup>142</sup> One CIA veteran remarked decades later about Eisenhower: “He was a great admirer of covert operations. He’s the reason we got caught up in so many of them. [...] If somebody said, ‘Mr. President, I don’t understand why you authorized that operation against Arbenz,’ he would look you in the face and say, ‘I don’t know what you’re talking about.’ That’s the way things were done in those days.” (see S. Kinzer, *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War*, cit., p. 115)

<sup>143</sup> Even though it is not debatable that Allen Dulles enjoyed the possibility of the direct communication to the president, the opinions as to the reason for such access differ. Some researchers attribute it to the fact that his brother was the Secretary of State. However, another interesting suggestion was given by David Talbot in his book *The Devil’s Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America’s Secret Government* (Harper Perennial, 2015, pp. 180-190), who claimed that Eisenhower might have felt affinity to Allen Dulles for the clandestine assistance he had provided during the election campaign: in violation of the protocols of the CIA, he had supposedly leaked unseemly intelligence reports about the Korean War and the failures of the Truman administration to the media, as well as had channeled funds to the Republican ticket.

reasons for the elaborated preventive operations conducted in the Middle East and Latin America - the most strategically important regions for the United States (the latter - historically in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary).<sup>144</sup> The very beginning of Eisenhower's presidency is marked by the authorization of Operation 'Ajax' (discussed at length in later chapters), which aimed at toppling the democratically elected, potentially non-aligned leader Mohammed Mossadegh, due to the perception that he might turn to the Soviet Union at any moment. The success of this operation proved instrumental for further trust on the part of Eisenhower to Allen Dulles and the CIA.

The other well-known and extensively researched CIA operation bore the code name 'PBSUCCESS' and took place in Guatemala in 1954, kindling speculations as to role the United Fruit Company played in the overthrow of the democratically elected government.<sup>145</sup> Even though Guatemala was just a small country in Latin America, where the United States was a key power – a country surrounded by American-backed dictatorships (Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, François "Papa Doc" Duvalier in Haiti, and Marcos Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela),<sup>146</sup> the presence of Jacobo Arbenz still merited the close attention of the Dulles brothers even before Eisenhower became a president.<sup>147</sup> With Eisenhower in power, the new Operation 'PBSUCCESS' was drafted, listing such transgressions of Arbenz as turning Guatemala into

---

<sup>144</sup> For more information, the reader might refer to S. Ambrose, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (Reprint ed.), Anchor, 2012. The author also suggests that there is a sense of continuity in Eisenhower's employment of covert operations, since he had resorted to them during the Second World War and believed them to be a workable solution at peacetime.

<sup>145</sup> The United Fruit Company had operated freely in Guatemala for more than a century before the October Revolution in 1944 transformed the country into a liberal democracy. The company was known to wage so much power over the country that it was described as a "state within a state" - it owned the majority of lands, controlled the transportation system and had a monopoly over banana trade of the country, being the largest exporter of bananas in the world. After the revolution and the installation of the liberal democracy, Juan José Arévalo was elected and stayed in power until 1950, when he was succeeded by Jacobo Arbenz, who drafted the land reform bill under the title 'Decree 900'. This reform stripped the large landowners and estates of the uncultivated land in their possession and redistributed it among the population, effectively divesting the United Fruit of its large landholdings (for further information, the reader could refer to S. Streeter "Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Postrevisionist Perspectives", *The History Teacher*, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2000, pp. 61-74).

<sup>146</sup> S. Kinzer, *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War*, cit., p. 157

<sup>147</sup> There is substantial evidence that Allen Dulles tried to persuade the United States government to intervene in Guatemala during the Truman administration in 1952. Together with a group of CIA officers, he drafted a plan (Operation 'PBFORTUNE') and addressed it to the State Department, at that time responsible for the CIA financing, for it "to provide certain hardware to a group planning violence against a certain government." However, the State Department refused to grant the funds due to the fact that "the State Department officials made clear their feeling that if anything occurred there must be no question of any part of the American Government having had a hand in it, and they were not convinced that the plan for supplying the arms, insofar as they know the details, could be carried out without a breach of security" (Memorandum for the Record, 8 October 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Guatemala, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d23>, Date of Access: 21.03.2020).



“the leading base of operations for Moscow-influenced Communism in Central America,” installing a “Communist dominated bureaucracy,” and pursuing “an aggressively hardening anti-US policy targeted directly against American interests.”<sup>148</sup>

The anti-communist revisionist version of the events, which took place in Guatemala, puts the blame on the United Fruit Company and the vested interests some members of the government had in its domination of Latin America’s banana business. As such, Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer wrote a controversial book *Bitter Fruit*, which explores the overwhelming influence the United Fruit Company exercised over the decision-making in Washington regarding Guatemala, effectively citing the American imperialist interests as the reason for invasion.<sup>149</sup> The credibility of this version was undermined by the newly-available evidence and is no longer taken seriously: the “Red Scare” is understood to have been the main reason for the invasion, regardless of the presence of the banana giant.<sup>150</sup>

The other interventions of the CIA during the Eisenhower presidency are often attributed to the achievements of the operations in Guatemala and Iran, although those endeavors did not prove to be as successful.<sup>151</sup> The CIA also conducted a number of

---

<sup>148</sup> Memorandum for the Record, 11 September 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d51>, Date of Access: 21.03.2020

<sup>149</sup> The United Fruit is given no small credit for making Guatemala seem a Communist satellite by commissioning a lengthy 235-page study by John Clements Associates in 1952, which is regarded as an exercise in “unsubstantiated “facts,” exaggerations, scurrilous descriptions and bizarre historical theories” (quoted from D. Koepfel, *Banana: The Fate of the Fruit That Changed the World*, Plume, 2009). Moreover, the authors cite the personal interests of the Dulles brothers in the matter due to the fact that the United Fruit Company was a longtime client of Sullivan & Cromwell. As part of the CIA operation approved by Eisenhower, Carlos Castillo Armas invaded Guatemala and occupied the key infrastructure, rendering the counterattack impossible. Even though Arbenz tried to take the matter to the UN Security Council, only the Soviet Union supported the country and vetoed the proposal to let the United States handle the crisis. Arbenz was forced to resign, and Armas became the new president, rolling back the land reform instituted previously (S. Schlesinger, S. Kinzer, *Bitter fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, Doubleday, 1982).

<sup>150</sup> One of the most prominent works on the issue is *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton University Press, 1992) by Piero Gleijeses. In particular, the study looks at the intervention and the events that led to it from Guatemalan perspective as opposed to taking only the American evidence. It reveals that the administration of ‘Decree 900’ through the local communities by the Communist Party had a significant potential to leading to the radicalization of the peasantry. The author concludes that the influence of the United Fruit Company, even though present to some degree, was secondary to the concern of the Eisenhower administration over the Communist takeover of the country.

<sup>151</sup> For the matters of space it is impossible to explore the operations in great detail. Firstly, Operation ‘HAIK’ was allegedly orchestrated by John Foster Dulles and was meant to remove nonaligned Indonesian premier Achmed Sukarno in 1958 by means very similar to those used in Guatemala, but Sukarno proved to have more control over the country’s public opinion, being the leader of the opposition to the Dutch colonial powers. The other one aimed at eliminating the ‘threat’ of Fidel Castro - Operation ‘MONGOOSE’, or the Cuban Project of 1960. In spite of being conducted during the presidency of Kennedy, the operation was commissioned and partly organized during the final year of the Eisenhower administration. Due to these reasons, Eisenhower’s actions are considered to have led directly to the Bay of Pigs fiasco and, ultimately, to the Cuban Crisis (referenced from J. Callanan, “Eisenhower, the CIA, and Covert Action” in C. Pach (ed.), *A Companion to Dwight D. Eisenhower*, cit., pp 350-370).

operations, short of actual interventions, in Eastern Europe<sup>152</sup> and China<sup>153</sup> in order to weaken the Communist ideology there. In this respect the operations had more to do with propaganda and psychological warfare, which was aimed at sustaining the descent in the ‘Soviet orbit’.

A roughly one-third of the total content of the two autobiographies by Eisenhower *Mandate for change, 1953-1956; The White House Years* and *Waging peace, 1956-1961; The White House Years* is dedicated to the Middle East and the countries located there. Nonetheless, the majority of research on Eisenhower’s policy of containment, particularly during the revisionist era in the 1980s, either ignored the Middle East or treated it as the Third World containment problem. The works that concentrate solely on the Middle East and attribute to it a different degree of importance are few and far between. As such, the majority of research, which is currently available, deals primarily with Iran and the American policy in this country in 1953. For example, Mark Lytle and Kuross Samii released their studies in the same year, and the two books cover essentially the same topic of the American involvement in Iran, the former suggesting that the United States chose the wrong policy in the sense that supporting the neutrality of Iran would have preserved peace in a volatile region and kept the country securely outside the Soviet influence, while the latter criticizing the policymakers of the United States for not understanding that the American interests in the region were just as susceptible to harmful internal volatility as they were to the Communist influence.<sup>154</sup>

The Middle East starts featuring more often in the research in the 1990s and 2000s. In terms of a more modern follow-up on Iran and the Greater Middle East in general, the study

---

<sup>152</sup> There is also evidence regarding the CIA participation in the Berlin bread riots of 1953 and the Hungarian uprising of 1956, despite Allen Dulles’s assurance that the CIA had “nothing whatsoever” to do with the former, and that Radio Free Europe broadcast was restricted to “straight news reporting” during the latter. The research conducted by Scott Lucas demonstrates that the three years of psychological warfare and relentless propaganda, orchestrated by the CIA in Berlin, resulted in the riots, while the fermented descent in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania by means of recruiting and training the paramilitary forces, combined with relentless radio broadcast and the redistribution of leaflets, brought about reforms in these countries and the Hungarian uprising. These measures did not bring decisive changes to the ideological and political life of the Communist states, since Eisenhower did not extend overt assistance to them to avoid the escalation of the situation (see S. Lucas, *Freedom’s War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union*, Manchester University Press, 1999)

<sup>153</sup> In China, the most notable overture of the CIA was titled the ‘STCIRCUS’ program, initiated in 1956 and meant to exploit the animosity of Tibet towards the Communist China. The program was quite extensive and included the provision of ammunition and weapons to the Tibetan population and the training of Tibetan activists in the United States and friendly countries to conduct raids and spying missions in China. The operation had little success since during the Eisenhower administration the measures of this kind were too unobtrusive to shake the vigorous control of the Communist government over the country. Others suggest that the meager success could be attributed to the lack of agreement between the CIA Near East and Far East Divisions. Regardless of these conclusions, the program lasted throughout the Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson administrations, until Nixon turned to the American-Chinese rapprochement (referenced from J. Callanan, “Eisenhower, the CIA, and Covert Action” in C. Pach (ed.), *A Companion to Dwight D. Eisenhower*, cit., pp 350-370).

<sup>154</sup> For more information, the reader might refer to the following studies: M. Lytle, *The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 1941-1953*, Holmes & Meier Pub, 1987; K. Samii, *Involvement by Invitation: American Strategies of Containment in Iran*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987

by Roby Barrett provides an insight into the continuation of the evolution of the American-Iranian relations during the Eisenhower administration. The author argues that even though both Eisenhower and Dulles provided the economic aid to the country with the hopes of sustaining its peaceful development and, by such means, the security, the Shah used the aid to acquire military equipment and augment the country's war capabilities instead of investing in the civil infrastructure.<sup>155</sup> David Lesch produced an innovative research in 1992 concerning the Syrian crisis of 1957, which represents a revision of the American role in Syria and identifies the main mistake of the Eisenhower administration - that is, misjudging nation-building aspirations of the leftist government for a Communist take-over.<sup>156</sup> Another original research was conducted by Nathan Citino on Saudi Arabia in 2002, who recognized the importance of the country in the context on the American oil diplomacy in terms of the American relationship with Britain (not characterized by rivalry so much as by proper cooperation with the declining hegemon in the region) and other Arab states, especially so against the background of the CIA operation in Iran.<sup>157</sup> A more recent work by Chris Parker investigates the influence Israel exercised on the evolution of the Middle Eastern policy during the Eisenhower administration, showing that Israel played a significant role in the ultimate proclamation of the Eisenhower doctrine.<sup>158</sup>

Salim Yaqub discusses the issue of Eisenhower's participation in the broader Middle East by providing a different interpretation of the overall policy. As opposed to the revisionist perception, Yaqub argues that the administration understood the distinction between nationalism, neutralism and Communism, but the radical form of the Pan-Arabian neutralism of Nasser appeared to be just as serious a threat to the American interests in the region, since Eisenhower considered it possible that Nasser might become an unwitting pawn for the Soviet Union.<sup>159</sup> Randall Fowler also discusses the region but in the context of containment of Communism: in particular, the author claims that Eisenhower understood that the Cold War was essentially an exercise in rhetoric - that is, the ideas and words mattered more than weapons. In this respect, Fowler analyzes Eisenhower's rhetorical techniques, which were

---

<sup>155</sup> R. Barrett, *The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy Under Eisenhower and Kennedy*, I.B. Tauris, 2007

<sup>156</sup> D. Lesch, *Syria And The United States: Eisenhower's Cold War In The Middle East*, Westview Press, 1992

<sup>157</sup> N. Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa'ud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations*, Indiana University Press, 2002

<sup>158</sup> C. Parker, "Paying for Zion: Eisenhower's Middle East Policy", 1953-56, *Middle East Policy*, Volume 25, No. 2, 2018, pp. 100-120

<sup>159</sup> S. Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East*, cit.

used to justify the American involvement in the region, as part of the broader strategy of containment.<sup>160</sup>

The Suez crisis is another recurrent topic of the modern research on Eisenhower's policy agenda in the Middle East. For example, one of the latest studies was conducted by Michael Doran, who believes that the main reason for the crisis was Eisenhower's own mistake of trying to appease Nasser and thus pushing him towards taking advantage of the United States.<sup>161</sup> Likewise, Alex von Tunzelmann revisits the context of the Suez crisis and retells the events of the twin crises involving Suez and Hungary with an emphasis on the personal contributions of the European leaders, Nasser, Ben-Gurion and ultimately, Eisenhower himself.<sup>162</sup>

As it has been illustrated, Eisenhower's policy of containment originates in the militarized version of the Kennan idea of the containment proper - that is, in the Truman Doctrine. Although it did originate as a militarized design to roll back the Soviet Union, the political reality proved it to be impossible, so containment morphed into the policy aimed at keeping the Soviet Union within its existing borders. However, it is now quite clear that the expansionist behavior, attributed to the Soviet Union, was not based on factual evidence, and as some historians claim, Eisenhower and Dulles were aware of that. As such, the military development in the form of the nuclear proliferation and the elaboration of the New Look, had more to do with the hypothetically possible security breaches in the regions the United States considered vital to its interests in the face of a major crisis or in case of any future deficiencies. If one follows this logic, it seems difficult to locate the strategic importance in the continuous American involvement in the Middle East (perhaps, this is why the research conducted on the topic is not extensive). However, it appears that one particular aspect was amiss from the scholarship on Eisenhower - that is, the significance of Middle Eastern oil. It must be clarified that oil as such, the oil proper, was not the reason for Eisenhower's preoccupation with the region throughout his two terms in office, since America still held the world leadership in the production of oil. But, as it will be demonstrated in the following chapters, Middle Eastern oil becomes difficult to dismiss in the context of Eisenhower's policy of containment. The availability of Middle Eastern oil, even if not utilized precisely by the United States and not to the degree, which would have made it indispensable, was one of

---

<sup>160</sup> R. Fowler, *More Than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East*, Potomac Books, 2018

<sup>161</sup> M. Doran, *Ike's Gamble: America's Rise to Dominance in the Middle East*, Free Press, 2016

<sup>162</sup> A. von Tunzelmann, *Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace*, Harper, 2016. As such, the persona of Anthony Eden, the British Prime-Minister, with his dislike of Nasser and special interest in the Middle East, comes to the foreground of the evolvement of the crisis in Suez, while the resolution of it was influenced by Eisenhower and the fact that the new presidential elections took place in the same year.

main reasons for the involvement in the region. This cheap oil became particularly significant for the broader strategic interests of the United States because of the real or perceived security threat from the Soviet Union, and as such, required the implementation of certain precautionary measures to secure the immediate access to it, should the need arise, as well as to prevent such access from opening to the hostile state. Therefore, it is necessary to rectify the unfortunate omission of oil from the proper research on Eisenhower and his personal brand of containment.

## **Chapter 2. Role of the Middle East in the American Foreign Policy in the Middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century**

### **1. Growing Importance of Oil as a Reason for Western Involvement in the Middle East before the Eisenhower Presidency**

Nowadays, it seems almost an apriorism that Western interest in the Middle East had to do with oil even at the times when global energy production was largely dominated by coal.<sup>163</sup> Indeed, the dictum of the success of warfare being dependent on the oil supply gradually prevailed among the politicians since the conclusion of the First World War, when oil was recognized to be a strategically important resource, because the unprecedented large-scale military action required the expeditious supply of ammunition and troops to the ground, which in turn increased the reliance upon vehicles, aircraft and warships. It is widely regarded today by the researchers on the topic of war and oil during the First World War that it was the destruction of the rich Romanian oilfield by the British and the Romanian governments and the denial of German access to the oilfields of Baku<sup>164</sup> at the critical juncture that greatly contributed to the successful conclusion of the war for the Allies, who, as British Lord Curzon put it, “floated to victory on a flood of oil”.<sup>165</sup> In addition, the triumph in the first global war inspired the belief that the access to the resource was instrumental for the successful conduct of future wars as well as for the imperial aspirations.<sup>166</sup>

The Second World War confirmed the critical significance of oil for the purposes of warfare. Researchers, such as Mary Kaldor, recognize that the Japanese attack on Pearl

---

<sup>163</sup> S. Manahan, *Fundamentals of Environmental Chemistry*, CRC Press, 3rd ed., 2008, p. 1093

<sup>164</sup> T. Winegard, *The First World Oil War*, University of Toronto Press, 2016, pp. 72-103 (the same episodes are also described in a different manner and with a different degree of emphasis by Daniel Yergin, Timothy Mitchell, Mary Kaldor, Terry Lynn Karl, Yahia Said, Matthieu Auzanneau, et al., but for the lack of space the discussion could not be taken further.)

<sup>165</sup> T. Priest, “The Dilemmas of Oil Empire”, *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 99, No. 1, 2012, pp. 236-251

<sup>166</sup> Britain, the dominant colonial power at the time, established the foundation for the sustained supremacy over the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East region and, most importantly, the Persian Gulf. Paul C. Helmreich in his major work pointed out that Britain had a conspicuous interest in the partition of the Ottoman Empire also because it opened for it the access to the oil-rich territory of Mosul to secure fuel for the Royal Navy, which proved crucial during the First World War. The partition landed Britain in a bitter conflict with France based on the access to the oil exploration in the Middle East, culminating in the San Remo Oil Agreement on 8 April 1920, which gave France a considerable stake (25 percent) in the Iraqi oil production (for further information, refer to P. Helmreich, *From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920*, Ohio State University Press, 1974, pp. 230-314).

Harbor was considerably motivated by the oil embargo of the Roosevelt administration and the decision of the United States to freeze the funds, which Japan used to purchase the fuel. The attack was meant to cripple the United States' fleet (thus opening the access from Sumatra and Borneo for the Japanese oil tankers) and to ultimately facilitate the passage towards the East Indies oilfields.<sup>167</sup> Peter Darman arrives to the same conclusion in his book *Attack on Pearl Harbor: America Enters World War II* that the oil embargo proved to become one of the major factors behind the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, since according to the Japanese estimations the amount of oil accessible to them would have run out by the end of 1942, unless they managed to access the overseas oil fields.<sup>168</sup>

Likewise, it has been argued that one of the main motivations of the Nazi Germany to invade the Soviet Union arose out of the necessity to reach as soon as feasible the oilfields in the Caucasus region to make up for the depleting petroleum reserves of the Axis powers.<sup>169</sup> Furthermore, the report of the British Technical Sub-Committee on Axis Oil provided the details that Hitler equipped Hermann Göring with the three strategic motives for the invasion of the Soviet Union, one of which was to “break through to the Caucasus in order to get possession of the Caucasian oil fields, since without them large-scale aerial warfare against England and America is impossible.”<sup>170</sup> Matthieu Auzanneau also describes the situation in the Middle East, and argues that the joint efforts of the Allies ensured that the Middle East oil remained inaccessible to the German soldiers there.<sup>171</sup>

During the war, the United States produced at much as 90 percent of oil for the Allies and the Land-Lease purposes, as well as many oil-related products, the manufacturing of

---

<sup>167</sup> M. Kaldor, T. L. Karl, Y. Said (eds.), *Oil Wars*, Pluto Press. 2007, pp. 1-41

<sup>168</sup> P. Darman, *Attack on Pearl Harbor: America Enters World War II*, Rosen Publishing, New York, 2012, pp. 10-20

<sup>169</sup> Before such aim could be translated into action, Nazi Germany partook in the endeavor of producing the synthetic oil, but it turned out that the German factories were inadequate to fulfill the growing needs of the belligerent nation. Alex J. Kay in his study of the planning on German occupation policy in the Soviet Union stresses that oil occupied a key place in the pre-war efforts of Germany, while the Army General Staff and Hitler himself continuously underlined the necessity to reach the oil fields both in Caucasus and Baku (for more information, refer to A. Kay, *Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder: Political and Economic Planning for German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1940-1941 (War and Genocide)*, Berghahn Books, 2011, pp. 56-59)

<sup>170</sup> Technical Sub-Committee on Axis Oil of the UK Ministry of Defense, *Oil as a Factor in the German War Effort, 1933-1945*, published in 1946, declassified, p. 33

<sup>171</sup> Matthieu Auzanneau contends that even though the nationalist forces active at that time in the governments of Iran, Iraq and Syria courted the Nazi, of which there is ample evidence, the Allies took measures to prevent the Axis powers from gaining full reign over the resources. To this end, the Royal Navy imposed a blockade along the coasts of Lebanon, while the Soviet Union and Britain jointly invaded and took possession of Iran, and the Australian soldiers occupied Damascus (for more information, see M. Auzanneau, *Oil, Power and War: A Dark History*, cit., p. 110)

which started only because of the war, such as synthetic rubber.<sup>172</sup> As much as 60 percent of the total tonnage the United States moved overseas consisted of petroleum and petroleum products.<sup>173</sup> Regardless of such production scale at home, Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed his concern about the means employed to protect the ‘enclave’ of the United States oil interests in the Middle East surrounded by the British dominion, - Saudi Arabia. On 18 February 1943 the American president wrote to the Lend-Lease Administrator Stettinius: “I hereby find that the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States.”<sup>174</sup> - thuswise making possible the extension of the Lend-Lease program to the kingdom. It could also be understood in the context of strategic planning, since it is one of the first instances when a country from the Middle East came to play a considerable role in the national security interests of the United States due to its vast oil reserves.<sup>175</sup>

Although this is just one episode in the bigger picture of the ever-growing importance of oil during the Second World War, it is, however, illustrative of the increasing reliance on oil in the Roosevelt administration. Domestically, however, the situation with oil was different - the reorientation of the economy towards the necessities of war resulted in the depletion of oil reserves for civilian purposes, which pushed the prices upwards. In this regard, Roosevelt’s government introduced the Office of Price Administration (OPA) to prevent the prices from rising any further. At the same time, the active participation of the population in the war-industrial complex increased the per-capita income, which, coupled with the lack of available resources for civilians, created the situation of excessive demand and inadequate supply, forcing the administration to elaborate the two-price rationing system for the essential goods, including gasoline, in 1942.<sup>176</sup> This contributed to the immediate post-war public scare that the United States was running out of domestically available oil.

---

<sup>172</sup> D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, cit., p. 393

<sup>173</sup> Report to the National Security Council by the Departments of State, Defense, the Interior, and Justice, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Vol. I, Part 2, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v01p2/d159>, Date of Access: 10.06.2019

<sup>174</sup> President Roosevelt to the Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius), Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The Near East and Africa, Vol. IV., Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943v04/d888>, Date of Access: 13.08.2019

<sup>175</sup> It was in 1943 when Everette Lee DeGolyer, who is considered to be the most influential geologist among his contemporaries, was dispatched to the Middle East to assess the oil potential in the Persian Gulf and particularly so in Saudi Arabia. At the end of his expedition in 1944 it was established by his team that “the oil in this region is the greatest single prize in all history”, while DeGolyer himself concluded: “The center of gravity of world oil production is shifting from the Gulf-Caribbean area to the Middle East - to the Persian Gulf area and is likely to continue to shift until it is firmly established in that area” (for more information, refer to D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, cit., p. 393).

<sup>176</sup> R. Higgs, “The Two-Price System: U.S. Rationing During World War II”, Foundation for Economic Education, 24.04.2009, Mode of Access: <https://fee.org/articles/the-two-price-system-us-rationing-during-world-war-ii/>, Date of Access: 15.03.2020



After the war, America emerged as the only major country in the world with the substantial capital and without the troubles the European countries faced in terms of the demolished infrastructure and colossal demographic losses. Americans used around 20 million automobiles in 1945, by 1950 the number practically doubled. Gasoline sales increased by 42 percent in the same period of time. The increase in demand inspired the domestic oil companies to investigate new oilfields in the United States and, through affiliates, in Canada, increasing domestic oil production by 21 percent.<sup>177</sup> In fact, according to the available data, the United States alone accounted for around 66 percent of world production in 1945, 52 percent in 1950, and 44 percent in 1955.<sup>178</sup>

However, what was indeed experienced by the American public was the shortage of the available oil. In the second half of the 1940s the United States was going through a period of adjustment to the postwar order: the factories and plants used for the purposes of war needed to be restructured, the oil refineries required the reorientation towards the production of gasoline instead of aircraft fuel. The economy was in turmoil, experiencing sharp inflation, followed by rapid deflation.<sup>179</sup> This adjustment together with the continuous export of oil to the former Allies caused the crude oil prices to rise sharply, and in 1948, for the first time since the launch of the Lend-Lease, the United States imported more oil than it exported, even though the imports surpassed the exports only by a small margin.<sup>180</sup> The nationwide fears that the United States would be left dry of oil in the near future did not resurrect after the rationing was lifted, but the strategic significance of the access to abundant foreign and domestic oil was confirmed as much in peacetime as in wartime.

In Europe, the energy situation was incomparably worse. The countries of Western Europe experienced the staggering shortage of the main source of energy, extracted on their territories - coal. Coupled with the uncommonly low winter temperatures in 1946, the lack of coal resulted in the devastatingly high unemployment and the halt of the postwar industrialization of European countries, and especially so, Britain.<sup>181</sup> After the war Britain became the world's leading debtor. The overall balance of payments was in deficit not only towards the Sterling Zone, but to the major wartime creditor - the United States. Moreover,

---

<sup>177</sup> D. Painter, "Oil and the American Century", cit., pp. 24-39

<sup>178</sup> D. Painter, "The Marshall Plan and Oil", *Cold War History*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2009, pp. 159-175

<sup>179</sup> U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "One hundred years of price change: the Consumer Price Index and the American inflation experience", *Monthly Labor Review*, April 2014, Mode of Access: <https://bit.ly/2ITmr6V>, Date of Access: 15.03.2020

<sup>180</sup> D. Painter, "The Marshall Plan and Oil", cit., pp. 159-175

<sup>181</sup> W. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950*, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 3

the majority of contemporary economists dealing with the matter expected Britain to enlarge its debts many times by the end of 1950. It was quickly becoming obvious that the reconstruction of the war-torn Europe, as John Maynard Keynes observed, was only possible if the United States was willing to extend generous credits, maintain high levels of internal demand and keep the tariffs low.<sup>182</sup>

In this regard the pressing concerns of the United States about the economic collapse of Britain, and later the rest of Europe, were justifiable, because an economic crisis of such magnitude might mean that the weakened states would not be able to defend themselves against the Soviet expansion. Moreover, in the first months of 1947 there was still no joint initiative, no definite international policy of the “free world” against the Soviet expansion, and the void needed to be filled.<sup>183</sup> The decision to take upon such a role was of a tremendous magnitude for Harry Truman, who referred to this as “the most terrible responsibility that any nation ever faced. From Darius I’s Persia, Alexander’s Greece, Hadrian’s Rome, Victoria’s Britain, no nation or group of nations has had our responsibilities.”<sup>184</sup>

The economic grievances were expected to produce political turmoil in the nearest future and render the region susceptible to the influence of the Soviet Union, which would ultimately isolate the United States on its continent. To prevent such an outcome, the United States extended as much as \$13 billion in aid to Europe between 1948 and 1952, a significant amount, which, however, was somewhat modest in comparison to the economic assistance made available to the Allies immediately after the war, but it played a decisive role in alleviating resource shortages, particularly oil.<sup>185</sup>

---

<sup>182</sup> C. Newton, “The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan”, *The Economic History Review New Series*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Aug., 1984), pp. 391-408

<sup>183</sup> M. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, cit., p. 25-141

<sup>184</sup> The exigency of such decision was further highlighted by the official message on the part of the British administration to the government of the United States that the British Empire was halting its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean (particularly, Greece and Turkey) due to the severe balance of payments deficit and economic crisis. In the same year the British House of Commons passed the Indian Independence Act, granting liberty to Britain’s most valued colony, soon to be followed by the announced departure from Burma and Palestine. (for more information, see S. Sestanovich, *Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama*, Knopf, New York, 2014, p. 21)

<sup>185</sup> J. Bradford de Long, B. Eichengreen, “The Marshall Plan: History’s Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program”, *NBER Working Paper Series*, Working Paper No. 3899, 1991, pp. 2-5. The authors argued that Wartime relief, post-World War II UNRRA aid, and pre-Marshall Plan “interim aid” were crucial for the reconstruction of the devastated infrastructure, while the Marshall Plan aid “was simply not large enough to significantly stimulate Western European growth by accelerating the replacement and expansion of its capital stock”, but it worked to speed up economic growth in Europe via “altering the environment in which economic policy was made” (that is, preventing capital controls over product and factor markets in Western Europe, as well as encouraging the restoration of price and exchange rate stability).

As such, one of the pinnacles of the Marshall Plan was the solution to the energy crisis in Europe. Since the coal capacity was insignificant in the immediate postwar years, oil was to gradually replace it. Even though the usage of oil for the production of energy was relatively modest (around 10 percent in 1947), only oil was used to keep vehicles and industrial equipment running.<sup>186</sup> According to the estimations, about 50 percent of oil was imported from the United States and had to be paid for in dollars, received from America as part of the Marshall Plan. For certain countries, oil constituted the primary commodity acquired under the European Recovery Program. Nowadays it is estimated that as much as 20 percent of the 13 billion dollars extended to Europe was spent on the purchase of oil and oil-related equipment.<sup>187</sup>

Oil prices played their own role in the rapid deterioration of the European balances of payments - the rapid rise in prices for American oil from \$1.05 a barrel for crude oil in 1945 to \$2.22 a barrel in 1948<sup>188</sup> was one of the essential reasons for the dwindling current dollar accounts. Even the part of oil that did not come directly from the United States and American oil companies required the majority of its payments in dollars, since the state-of-the-art oil equipment, services and technical innovations arrived from the United States, as well as the substantial part of the oil tanker fleet was directly or indirectly controlled by the States and required dollars for payments.<sup>189</sup>

David Painter in his innovative article points out that the introduction of the Marshall Plan and the elevated oil prices worked towards the reorientation of oil consumption of Europe. In order to offset costs associated with oil and oil-related products, many Western European countries partook in the construction of new refineries or engaged in the process of

---

<sup>186</sup> M. Leffler, O. Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I*, Cambridge University Press; reprint ed., 2012, p. 497

<sup>187</sup> Yergin D., *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, cit., pp. 420-425.

<sup>188</sup> "The International Petroleum Cartel" (Reprint), Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, 22 April 1975, p. 361. The Middle Eastern majors priced oil according to the formula known as "gulf plus": the price of crude oil from the Gulf of Mexico plus the cost of shipping it from Houston, Texas to the port of destination. The sole purpose of this formula was to allow the major oil companies to minimize the production costs (outstandingly low in the Middle East) and maximize the benefits. Thus, even though oil did not come from the United States, but rather from the "offshore sources", Britain and other Western European countries still had to cover the shipping, which in reality did not take place. The artificial premium became known as "phantom freight". Following the surge of prices in the United States, the Middle Eastern oil reached the all-time high of \$2.22 a barrel, which caused American and British parliaments to question the profits the companies were receiving. Under pressure, the majors revisited the pricing system, in the end equalizing the final price of crude oil from the Gulf of Mexico and Ras Tanura in New York, which pushed the price of crude oil to \$1.88 per barrel in April 1949 and to \$1.75 in July 1949, making the Middle Eastern oil the cheapest in the world (referenced from G. Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*, cit., pp. 60-65).

<sup>189</sup> H. Mendershausen, "Dollar Shortage and Oil Surplus in 1949-1950", *Essays in International Finance*, No. 11, Princeton University Press, 1950, p. 119

the reorientation of the existing ones (for example, in Germany many plants that previously dealt with the production of synthetic fuel from coal turned to refining oil). Although, as the author argues, the United States tried to impede such developments by extending a very limited amount of the overall Marshall Plan funds to the improvement of the refinery capacity in European countries, such strategy did help to redefine the import profile of oil for Europe: in 1938, around 41 percent of oil imports constituted crude oil; by the end of the Marshall Plan crude oil increased to 77 percent of oil imports in Western Europe, and in 1953, Western Europe was a net exporter of petroleum products. This was a critical moment of change for the European continent that shifted from its complete dependence on coal towards acquiring profit from exporting of the oil-related products.<sup>190</sup>

Giuliano Garavini brings up another essential feature of the Marshall Plan influence on the international petroleum dealings. In 1948 total petroleum output in the Middle East increased from 4.8 percent to 12.2 percent of global production. While in 1938 only 23 percent of European imports came from the Middle East and 47 percent from Venezuela, by 1950 the Middle East provided 85 percent of European imports, while Venezuela and the Caribbean only 13 percent. The decision to prevent the drainage of finite national resources to the reconstruction of other countries, coupled with the all-time high demand for crude oil, resulted in the crucial structural shift of the market - the United States became a net importer of oil in 1948.<sup>191</sup>

The growing significance of the Middle Eastern oil for the United States strategic security was illustrated yet again in 1949, when President Harry Truman approved NSC 26/2 “Removal and Demolition of Oil Facilities, Equipment and Supplies in the Middle East”, a top-secret security document, which claimed that it was imperative for the security and strategic interests of the United States to destroy the Middle Eastern oil industry if the Soviet Union were to invade the region. As such, the aim was to disable as much as possible the oil wells and corresponding infrastructure in order to prevent the usage of those by the enemy, which led to the CIA dubbing it the “denial policy”.<sup>192</sup>

---

<sup>190</sup> D. Painter, “The Marshall Plan and Oil”, cit., pp. 159-175

<sup>191</sup> G. Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*, cit., pp. 60-65

<sup>192</sup> S. Everly, “The Top-Secret Cold War Plan to Keep Soviet Hands Off Middle Eastern Oil”, *Politico Magazine*, 23 June 2016, Mode of Access: <https://politi.co/3bXGo9r>, Date of Access: 07.10.2019. The reference to this policy would be made again by Henry Kissinger in the 1970s after the oil shocks, who spoke about the military option in case the oil prices were not put under control.

Another significant issue to resolve during the Truman administration was domestic opposition to the cartel-like operation of the Big Oil companies in the Middle East.<sup>193</sup> Already in 1942, the Department of Justice started the investigation of the supposed crimes against the antitrust laws committed by Standard Oil of New Jersey. Allegedly, Jersey entered into an agreement with a German chemical trust about the division of interests that stipulated that the German trust did not deal with the development of oil, while Standard Oil of New Jersey did not interfere into the production of chemicals. In the preparation to the investigation, it was found out that Jersey and Royal Dutch Shell maintained the provisions of the previously uncovered “As Is” agreement dealing with the non-interference into the respective market interests. Since it had been determined that such an affiliation would hinder free commerce, Jersey signed a consent decree that prohibited its involvement with “As Is” agreement. However, during the investigation of the company’s activity it was uncovered that the two companies continued to partake in the joint meetings where the preservation of the provisions of this agreement was discussed. In 1947, it was recommended that the Justice Department should launch an official investigation of the activities not only of the two companies but also Socal, Socony, Texaco, Gulf, and Anglo-Iranian Oil, but the evidence appeared to be too scarce.<sup>194</sup>

The long period of hesitation whether to proceed with the charges on the part of the Truman administration resulted in another documentary illustration of the importance of oil for the American security on 6 January 1953, just two weeks before Truman would vacate the White House and Eisenhower would become the next president, in the form of NSC 138/1 “National Security Problems Concerning Free World Petroleum Demands and Potential Supplies”. The report reiterated the worries that since the United States’ demand for crude oil rose faster than the domestic production (Americans consumed seven million barrels per day,

---

<sup>193</sup> Since the publication of *History of Standard Oil* in 1904, which turned “America’s most private man [John D. Rockefeller, the owner of Standard Oil] into its most public and hated figure,” as historian Ron Chernow later wrote, the American public had an intense dislike for the Big Oil. Rockefeller’s methods of erecting an oil empire by suppressing the competition and resorting to bribery to achieve privileges were beyond doubt, even though one might argue that the positive impact of the trust he created is equally undisputable, with the prices of oil products being significantly lower for the consumer in comparison to the years before the creation of the cartel. Years of attacks, investigation and litigations would pass, before the Supreme Court ruled in 1911 the dismantling of Standard Oil Trust and the foundation of about thirty independent oil companies. That decision would become a defining moment for the American antitrust legislation and would cement the idea that the Big Oil was evil and unscrupulous in the minds of ordinary Americans. Among the companies, established on the ruins of Standard Oil Trust, one would find Exxon (Standard Oil of New Jersey), Mobil (Standard Oil of New York), and Chevron (Standard Oil of California), the enterprises that would play a key role in the creation of a virtual American cartel in the Middle East (cross-referenced from L. Maugeri, *The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World’s Most Controversial Resource*, cit., pp. 16-18).

<sup>194</sup> B. Kaufman, “Oil and Antitrust: The Oil Cartel Case and the Cold War”, *The Business History Review*, Vol. 51, No. 1, 1977, pp. 35-56

which constituted over 60 percent of world demand in the late 1940s and early 1950s), the country might confront the necessity of ensuring the continuous access to the foreign oil. The report went as far as to conclude that “major sources of foreign oil are now indispensable to the economy of Europe and in the future may become indispensable even to the peacetime economy of the United States.” Against this background the report recommended the termination of the criminal proceedings against the companies operating in the Middle East and the substitution of such proceedings with a civil suit, which always “entails less publicity, and brings corrective action more promptly”, as well as brought about the awareness that the continuous access to the foreign oil should prevail over the antitrust legislation.<sup>195</sup>

## **2. Western Involvement in the Middle East in the Middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and the Elaboration of the Policy of Containment (in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq)**

Middle Eastern concessions for the Western companies represented a type of contract between the international and/or foreign company or a group of such companies and the country in possession of oil deposits, and presupposed the following provisions, common to all the concessions in the Middle East and beyond:<sup>196</sup>

- 1) the government of the country in question grants the international and/or foreign company an exclusive right to conduct exploration, development and hydrocarbon production operations in a defined area for a limited period of time;
- 2) the company receives the title to the hydrocarbons and enjoys an almost complete freedom in choosing the ways to utilize the acquired resources;
- 3) the company assumes the totality of financial and commercial responsibilities and risks, associated with the exploration, development and production of the oil-related products;

---

<sup>195</sup> Report to the National Security Council by the Departments of State, Defense, the Interior, and Justice (NSC 138/1), 6 January 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic And Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v01p2/d159>, Date of Access: 16.12.2019

<sup>196</sup> F. Parra, *Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum*, cit., pp. 8-20. The definition provided by Francisco Parra appears to be the most detailed, while it is in principle similar to all the definitions of the concessionary system. For example, Valérie Marcel defines it as follows: “A “concession agreement” is a legal instrument through which companies can conduct their oil extraction activities on a defined area of foreign territory. In the early days of the oil industry, the concessionaire was at liberty to manage exploration programs, production levels and prices.” (for more information, refer to V. Marcel, *Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East*, Brookings Inst. Press/Chatham House, 2006, p. 16)

- 4) the country receives certain payments from the company operating in the region in return for the concession (for example, in the form of royalties, surface taxes, signature bonus, etc.);
- 5) the concessions represent a contract with the state, and the contractual element prevails over the legislative or regulatory elements, effectively removing the concession from the sphere of influence of the local jurisdiction, which, however, does not necessarily imply that the government of the host country cannot have any control over the concession.<sup>197</sup>

The primary strategic significance was afforded to the concessions gained by the American oil companies in Saudi Arabia. Although the first American contractors landed in Saudi Arabia in 1933, only a year after the kingdom was established,<sup>198</sup> the British position in the Middle East was “impregnable,” as E. Mackay Edgar remarked in *Sperling’s Journal* in 1919, because “all the known oil fields, all the likely or probable oil fields outside of the United States itself, are in British hands or under British management or control, or financed by British capital.”<sup>199</sup> Therefore, American companies had only two ways to enter the Middle East oil field: through the partnership and shareholding in Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) or by pursuing their independent concessions in places not controlled by the British, which was risky and entailed lack of access to the already established fields.

---

<sup>197</sup> Ibidem: for the reason that the oil countries were perceived to be politically unstable and unfriendly towards the companies from the West, the concession agreements normally included two features that are not generally found in licenses for production and development in the industrialized countries: a choice-of-law clause and an arbitration clause. The choice-of-law clause stipulated that the parties to the contract could choose whether their contract would be regulated by a law other than the national law of the host country, or by a combination of the national and international law. This helped to insulate the country from the adverse or favorable influences of the changes in the domestic law. The arbitration clause became the logical continuation of the choice-of-law clause since it was only to be expected that the disputes between the country and the company should be settled outside the host country and the court must remain completely impartial. Such devices effectively removed the concessions and the operation of the company from the jurisdiction of the national law and accorded a great deal of legal security to the companies, ensuring their continuous access to the resources and oilfields even in the face of the unforeseen alterations in the country’s legal system. In particular, the provisions of the concession could not be modified, unless the company agreed to do so, meaning that nothing short of nationalization of the company could bring the production of the area back under the country’s control. Moreover, the fiscal stability clause was included into the concession agreements, which stipulated that the host countries could not increase existing tax rates or levy new taxes for the duration of the said agreement. However, such agreements displayed phenomenal endurance and the terms of the contracts could last for at least seventy years in Kuwait (as of 1950) and around thirty to fifty years in other countries of the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. Moreover, they covered extraordinary areas, with just a single concession covering the majority of Saudi Arabia, just three concessions - the whole of Iraq, one concession - the whole of Kuwait, one - the southern half of Iran. All of those concessions were owned by the varying composition of the same oil majors.

<sup>198</sup> M. Auzanneau, *Oil, Power and War: A Dark History*, cit., p. 182

<sup>199</sup> Cross-referenced from “The International Petroleum Cartel” (Reprint), Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, 22 April 1975, p. 41. The majority of concessions in the entire Middle East were held by Britain’s exclusive Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) at that time. King Ibn Saud did not sell the concessions right away to IPC because the British offered sterling and rupee, while the king preferred gold.

In the first case, as Rachel Bronson argued, the United States government, citing the alliance during the First World War and the principles of the open-door policy, negotiated with IPC to allow the American companies an access to an area circumscribed on a map by a red line encompassing most of the old Ottoman Empire – an accord that was commonly referred to as the Red Line Agreement of 1929, which, though providing the much-desired access to the Middle East, imposed considerable restrictions on the signatories.<sup>200</sup> Principally, the restriction had to do with the understanding that none of the parties to the agreement would cut deals with the countries within the red line or commence any exploration or drilling works without the due explicit consent of the other signatories. At the time of drawing the agreement, nobody was against the provision, since the actors had no money to drill alone, but this resulted in no new explorations, because any additional oil had a potential of saturating the market and bringing the prices down.<sup>201</sup>

Alternatively, the American companies could enter the Middle East outside of the influence of IPC. Taking advantage of the hesitation and unwillingness of the other major players, Standard Oil of California (SoCal) that had no shares in IPC and thus was not bound by the provisions of the Red Line Agreement, offered a comparatively small loan of 50,000 pounds and an annual rent of 5,000 pounds (all paid in gold) to Ibn Saud, which he accepted in August 1933.<sup>202</sup> In 1936, Socal was joined by Texaco, an American company with a big market in Asia but not enough oil to service it, which acquired 50 percent of the shares of the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company (the predecessor of Aramco).<sup>203</sup> In 1947, Jersey and Socony joined Texaco and Socal in their joint ownership of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), which caused uproar in the American Senate demanding the investigation of the monopolistic activities of the companies, but which did not result in considerable repercussions for the company.<sup>204</sup> Thus, Aramco came to possess the only

---

<sup>200</sup> R. Bronson, *Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia*, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 16-18

<sup>201</sup> A. Toprani, "The French Connection: A New Perspective on the End of the Red Line Agreement, 1945-1948", *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2012, pp. 261-299

<sup>202</sup> *Energy to the World: The Story of Saudi Aramco*, Vol. 1, Aramco Services Company, 2011, p. 26

<sup>203</sup> M. Auzanneau, *Oil, Power and War: A Dark History*, cit., p. 183

<sup>204</sup> The purchase of the company's shares by the two major companies in the region from the other two giants due to the giants being short of capital and new markets signified the creation of a virtual cartel that would dominate the production of Middle Eastern oil. Furthermore, the Senate underlined the fact that Aramco sold oil to the American Navy and the general public at an excessive rate. In this regard, President Truman ordered to commence the grand jury investigation on 23 June 1952 in order to indict the criminal actions of the Big Oil companies. Yet, a few months later the investigation was dropped, and Truman extended a recommendation for the Department of Justice to consider a civil suit against the companies, even though that would mean lower penalties and a more complex procedure. The decision of the president to change the course of actions was also significantly influenced by the events in Iran and the nationalization of oil that took place in 1951. The development of this nature highlighted the changing priorities the United States was experiencing as Middle



concession in the Arab world, which was controlled exclusively by an American company, but this one concession gave the United States power over the largest oil reserves in the world.

The administrations of Roosevelt and Truman expressed a determination to keep an alliance with Saudi Arabia due to the apparent security concern.<sup>205</sup> Besides, the production of crude oil in Saudi Arabia was rising in quantum leaps: in 1947, the oil production increased by 50 percent over 1946, and then by 59 percent in 1948 and once more by 22 percent in 1949, which constituted 174 thousand barrels per day - one-third of the Middle East total production a year. Such large scales of production naturally brought down the unit costs (to just \$0.20 per barrel). The large-scale production was partly neutralized by the decreased price, but it also meant lower royalty checks for the King of Saudi Arabia, since the concession agreement entailed the royalties to be fixed at 12 percent of the price.<sup>206</sup>

The deterioration of the oil income ultimately led Saudi Arabia to follow the example of Venezuela and assume the fifty/fifty model of oil profit sharing.<sup>207</sup> The American State Department and the Treasury participated keenly in the agreement between the company and Saudi Arabia in terms of the increase of Arabian taxes to reach the target profit sharing. Similarly to the situations in Venezuela, the first tax decree imposed an income tax of 20 percent in 1950, followed in the same year by an additional decree, which stipulated that the

---

Eastern oil started to play a more important role (referenced from B. Kaufman “Oil and Antitrust: The Oil Cartel Case and the Cold War”, cit., pp. 35-56)

<sup>205</sup> The events in the Middle East were indicative of the Soviet interest and/or of communist activity. In violation of the provisions of 1943 Tehran Declaration to respect the territorial borders and sovereignty of Iran, the Soviet Union stationed the troops on its northern territory. It required a considerable amount of American assistance to reclaim the region (refer to M. Leffler, D. Painter, *The Origins of the Cold War: An International History* (2 ed.), cit., p. 25). Then Moscow started challenging Turkish authority over the strategic Black Sea Straits, and in 1947 the United States intervened into Greece to quench Communist-led peasant and worker-based nationalist movement and supported the establishment of any other regime, even if it presupposed the rise to power of the Nazi sympathizers and collaborators in the country (refer to N. Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians*, Pluto Press, London, 1999, pp. 62-63). These events inspired the idea that the international Communism was trying “to deny to Western Powers the strategic facilities available in the Near East, such as bases, Suez Canal and oil.” (Paper Drafted by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler), 24 October, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume 5, Mode of Access:

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v05/d93>, Date of Access: 10.03.2020)

<sup>206</sup> F. Parra, *Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum*, cit., p. 17

<sup>207</sup> Venezuela passed a new decree in 1948 allowing the government to increase taxes up to 26 percent to ensure the revenues from the oil production were divided on the fifty/fifty basis between Venezuela and the oil-producing company. After it was discovered that the changes in the price again put the country's revenues below 50 percent, Venezuela passed legislation on the additional tax the following year, allowing the country to set whatever taxes necessary to achieve the equal share of the profits. That was not a problem for the oil companies per se, because of the existence of the United States Internal Revenue Act of 1918, which stipulated that the tax portion of these payments was deductible from corporate taxes due to the American government. Hence nothing would change for the companies except for the country where the money flowed (referenced from G. Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*, cit., pp. 54-62).

payments to Saudi Arabia would equal, but not exceed, 50 percent of Aramco's net profits.<sup>208</sup> But unlike in Venezuela, this was not an exercise of the sovereign government's right to levy taxes (Article 21 of the original concession essentially violated this right).<sup>209</sup> The sole purpose of this process was to make Aramco's payments eligible for the deductions under the Internal Revenue Act, a practice today known as 'the golden gimmick'. Aramco was virtually subsidized by the American taxpayer, and since the subsidies went to the foreign regime, it essentially meant that American taxpayers paid to keep Saudi Arabia loyal and acquiescent. The golden gimmick was soon adopted by many companies, including outside the oil industry, and continues to operate today in the form of the multinationals paying money only to the country where they make profits and not to those where the headquarters are located.<sup>210</sup>

The critical significance of Saudi Arabia in an unstable region, whether due to the Soviet threat or rising nationalism, generated the necessity to provide for the security of the existing regime, which could be traced through both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Hence, the arrangements for its defense were made both through the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA) of 18 June 1951, which authorized the deployment of the U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) and the supply of American weapons to Saudi Arabia, as well as the Eisenhower Doctrine of 5 January 1957, which provided a significant boost to the defense of the country, including the assistance to the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), a paramilitary group meant to protect the regime.<sup>211</sup>

---

<sup>208</sup> F. Parra, *Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum*, cit., p. 17-20: After the introduction of the model in Venezuela, it was understood that other countries would quickly follow suit. The nationalization of the oil company in Iran inspired the idea that the refusal to comply with the fifty/fifty requirement might result in the creation of hostile nationalistic regimes that would deny American access to the resources, so the Truman administration was inclined to agree. Moreover, in 1950 when this became an issue, the Korean War broke off, which created the necessity to make sure the access to Middle Eastern oil was not interrupted and there was no other country for the Soviet Union to sway to Communism in a strategically important location.

<sup>209</sup> Article 21 of Aramco original concession of May 1933 stipulated: "the Company and enterprise shall be exempt from all direct and indirect taxes, imposts, charges, fees and duties (including, of course, import and export duties), it being understood that this privilege shall not extend to the sale of products with the country, nor shall it extend to the personal requirements of the individual employees of the Company" (cross-referenced from "International Corporations and United States Foreign Policy", Hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 93rd Congress, Second Session on Multinational Petroleum Companies and Foreign Policy, 1974, Part 7, p. 363).

<sup>210</sup> M. Auzanneau, *Oil, Power and War: A Dark History*, cit., pp. 196-197

<sup>211</sup> M. Klare, *Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Petroleum Dependency*, cit., p. 30-45. The interest of Saudi Arabia in the mutual defense program with the United States consisted in the necessity to protect the country and the regime from potential as well as factual danger. Saudi Arabia was virtually encircled by the hostile Yemen in the south and the Hashemites in Iraq and Transjordan to the north. Therefore, even the recognition of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948 by President Truman did not terminate the concession of Aramco, although Ibn Saud had threatened the United States with such an eventuality. It could be argued that the Saudi government exploited American fears of Communism to bargain for the military aid necessary to defend itself from Arab nationalists at home and abroad.

It is argued by a number of scholars that Saudi Arabia, and particularly its involvement in the dispute over the Buraimi oasis,<sup>212</sup> was the pivotal point of the broader Middle Eastern policy of the Eisenhower administration. For example, Tore Tingvold Petersen contended: “Great Britain’s failure both to maintain the security of the area and to come to terms with Arab nationalism forced a larger role on the United States, lest the Middle East be lost to the Soviet Union”.<sup>213</sup> This political engagement allowed for mercantile ambition, and therefore the United States decided to supplant the British companies with the American ones.

Although Nathan Citino challenges the view that the American involvement was motivated by the competition and believes instead that the resulting conflict was caused by the failed cooperation in the context of the “postwar petroleum order”, he nevertheless points out the same idea that the difference of the policies in the Middle East ultimately led to the greater American involvement: “While the British sought to preserve their formal colonial presence in the Gulf, the U.S. worked through private oil companies to forge a relationship American officials believed could accommodate Arab nationalism.”<sup>214</sup>

The Eisenhower administration would explore the political benefits of the private/public cooperation in Saudi Arabia in a number of other episodes, including the Suez Crisis and the practical implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, discussed in later chapters. The overall importance of the country and of the activity of Aramco remains undeniable, and it is established that the Eisenhower administration viewed Saudi Arabia as the leader of conservative Arab states, and King Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia as the best candidate to counterbalance Gamal Abdel Nasser and his idea of Pan Arabism. This was to be achieved including by the efforts to provide stable oil markets for Aramco in

---

<sup>212</sup> The conflict had to do with the invasion of Saudi Arabia onto the territory, which belonged to the British clients of Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman: on 31 August 1952, Hamasa, one of three Omani villages in the oasis, was invaded and seized by the Saudi Emir of Ras Tanura, Turki bin Abdullah Al Otaishan, backed by Aramco – a move, which apparently had to do with the prospective abundant oil fields in the area. Immediately after that, Britain engaged in the efforts of reaching a diplomatic resolution of the conflict, which resulted in the so-called “Standstill Agreement” of October 1952: the Saudis were to remain in control of Hamasa, while neither party would endeavor pushing any further into the territory until the proper decision was reached. However, disregard for the provisions of the agreement on the part of Saudi Arabia in the form of bribery and sway of public opinion pushed Great Britain unilaterally to abrogate the agreement and reclaim its freedom of action in Buraimi. The conflict would last throughout the entire Eisenhower administration and would terminate with the agreement on the part of Saudi Arabia to cede control over Buraimi in 1974 to the Trucial states, in return for minor territorial concessions elsewhere (referenced from T. Petersen “Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East: The Struggle for the Buraimi Oasis, 1952-1957”, *The International History Review*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1992, pp. 71-91)

<sup>213</sup> T. Petersen “Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East: The Struggle for the Buraimi Oasis, 1952-1957”, cit., p. 74

<sup>214</sup> N. Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa'ud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations*, cit., p.20

Western Europe, as well as through attempts to distance Saudi Arabia from the influence of Nasser.<sup>215</sup>

This was, however, not successful. The deplorable conditions and meager wages in the oil industry for the local population produced large scale strikes as early as 1953 and continued for years, and it was steadily becoming obvious that Nasser was immeasurably more popular with the population than the United States and the Western powers. The following beatings and arrests resulted in the demands to eliminate Aramco's influence over the country's domestic policy and the closure of the American military base in Dharhan. Besides, the country strove to ascertain its independence at least to some extent, while being a virtual client of the United States. This contradiction, according to Robert Vitalis, was illustrated in the discrepancies in the Saudi policies, which intermittently supported and opposed the United States: King Saud's refusal to participate in the Baghdad Pact of 1955, which Nasser considered an illustration of Western imperialism, but siding with the United States in the Suez Crisis; Saud's approval of the Eisenhower Doctrine, but Faisal's rapprochement with Egypt in the spring of 1958.<sup>216</sup>

Britain's conquest of the Persian<sup>217</sup> oil started in 1901, when William Knox D'Arcy received a 60-year exclusive oil concession that covered the majority of the Persian Empire except for a small part in the north. Thus Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC, the predecessor of British Petroleum) was established, but since it experienced serious financial troubles and did not produce a lot of oil, in 1914 Churchill was compelled to propose the acquisition of 51 percent of the shares, which transformed the company from a privately owned into a governmental enterprise.<sup>218</sup> The original Agreement, renewed in 1933, stipulated that Iran was due a royalty payment adjustable to fluctuations of the sterling vis-à-vis gold as well as certain dividend distributions and no other taxes.<sup>219</sup> The exemption from the taxes to the local authority would be the model for all the subsequent concessions and the basis for consternation for all the major oil producers after the Second World War.

---

<sup>215</sup> G. Brew, "Our Most Dependable Allies": Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, 1956–1958", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2015, pp. 89-109

<sup>216</sup> Allegedly, Saud's family forced him to surrender the government to his brother, Crown Prince Faisal, in March 1958 due to the country's excessive reliance on the United States, especially after American lack of support in the Buraimi dispute with the British and the US involvement in the Syrian Crisis (for more information, the reader might refer to R. Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*, Stanford University Press, 2006, pp. 163-185).

<sup>217</sup> Persia changed its name to Iran in 1935.

<sup>218</sup> L. Maugeri, *The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World's Most Controversial Resource*, cit., pp. 23-24

<sup>219</sup> W. Bishop, Jr., "The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1951, pp. 749-754

The involvement of the Allies during the Second World War became pronounced particularly in Iran. In order to protect the rich oilfields and key rail routes from Germany, which was experiencing considerable petroleum shortages, Great Britain and the Soviet Union jointly occupied the territory and forced Reza Shah to abdicate and move into exile using the pretext that the shah refused to expel thousands of Germans, who, according to Britain, were partaking in the spy activities and exercising undue propaganda influence on the country.<sup>220</sup> For the entirety of the war, Iran remained occupied by the Allies, but even after the surrender of the Axis powers the Soviet Union remained present in northern Iran and did not withdraw the troops until 1946, following the considerable pressure applied to it by the United States and Great Britain. As Daniel Yergin explains in his study, the interest of the Soviet Union to remain stationed in Iran and to seek its concessions was primarily motivated by oil.<sup>221</sup>

The original Concession Agreement of 1933 was considered to be dissatisfying for the Majlis (Iranian Parliament) because of the following contentious points: the Agreement was said to have no legal force since Finance Minister Hassan Taqizadeh was pressured to sign it; AIOC was believed to have committed fraud and paid less than it should; Britain froze the adjustments of the sterling leading to lesser payments, and the total amount of payments was unsatisfying. The situation was worsened after the Second World War, since the international oil prices went up, but instead of benefiting from the favorable economic conditions, Iran paid more in taxes to Britain for the drilling of its own oil than received in royalties and dividends.<sup>222</sup>

Nonetheless, Britain proposed to remedy the situation in 1949 by negotiating the new Supplemental Agreement, which, among other things, included the increase in payments to the Iranian government and the promise to preferentially hire the local population. The agreement was nothing close to the fifty/fifty formula already at work in Venezuela and

---

<sup>220</sup> Iran proclaimed itself neutral in the war, while Germany had played a significant role in the economic reconstruction of the country, particularly in the Trans-Iranian Railway, so Germany had an important influence over Reza Shah (for more information, refer to J. Straw, *The English Job: Understanding Iran and Why It Distrusts Britain*, Biteback Publishing, 2019, pp. 98-99).

<sup>221</sup> After the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union was experiencing significant shortage of oil, and its production was at the level of about 60 percent of that in 1941. But besides the immediate oil interests, Stalin pursued the geopolitical strategy that was formed in 1940 with the Nazi about the division of the spheres of influence, which included Iran and its strategic location with its access to the Persian Gulf, not to mention its rich oil fields, into the realm of interests of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union tried to receive a concession from Iran to create a joint oil venture in the north, where it had stationed its troops till 1946, but the Majlis passed a law refusing such proposals from the Soviets as well as reclaiming the “national rights” in the south in 1947 (for more information, refer to D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, cit., pp. 420-423).

<sup>222</sup> F. Parra, *Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum*, cit., pp. 22-23

negotiated between Saudi Arabia and Aramco in 1950 and could not have satisfied the population even if the government agreed to sign it. But the political conditions would not allow Britain to execute its plans, since the Supplemental Agreement required further ratification in the Majlis, now controlled by the nationalist movements and a pro-Communist Tudeh party.<sup>223</sup> The nationalization bill was passed by both chambers of the Majlis in March 1951, forcing the young Reza Pahlavi to sign the nationalization on 1 May 1951.<sup>224</sup>

In this regard, in August 1951 Prime Minister Attlee imposed dire economic sanctions on Iran,<sup>225</sup> promising prosecution to any cargo ship owner who would load the “stolen” oil, while other Western oil companies established a virtual blockade of the Iranian oil, effectively cutting off the markets for the nationalized company, which led to the colossal drop in the oil revenues from \$400 million in 1950 to less than 2 million in the period from July 1951 to August 1953.<sup>226</sup> However, the United States advocated a political settlement of the issue through the provision of a new agreement on the part of AIOC.<sup>227</sup>

Steve Marsh provides an interesting argument for the actions of the Truman administration. The author argues that Truman was trying to force the oil settlement on Britain in 1952 and to encourage the involvement of the American companies in an Iranian consortium, but the lack of trust of the oil majors, at that time prosecuted for the violation of

---

<sup>223</sup> R. Alvandi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 14-15

<sup>224</sup> Mohammed Mossadegh became the leader of the National Front parties and chaired the Oil Committee of the Majlis, which put forward a decision not to ratify the Supplement Agreement and instead proposed the nationalization of the company. Prime Minister of Iran Razmara, an adherent of the Shah, reported that the government did not consider such a decision to be possible or legal under the provisions of the existing agreement. On 7 March 1951 the Prime Minister was assassinated by a member of an extremist religious nationalist party, after which the Oil Committee passed the nationalization proposal. Mossadegh, the first to be chosen by Parliament and not imposed by the sovereign, became the Prime Minister (for more information, refer to D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, cit., pp. 450-456).

<sup>225</sup> The reaction of Britain is often explained by economic and political reasons. AIOC’s Iranian operations and its refinery at Abadan annually provided 22,000,000 tons of oil products and 7,000,000 tons of crude oil. In addition, they generated £100 million per year in foreign exchange, while the company was Britain’s largest overseas investment, which represented a crucial significance in the context of the profound post-war balance of payments deficit in Britain. Politically, the loss of Iran would have resulted in the international embarrassment and would have meant the definitive breakdown of the former British supremacy (for more information, refer to M. Heiss, “The United States, Great Britain, and the Creation of the Iranian Oil Consortium, 1953-1954”, *The International History Review*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1994, pp. 511-535)

<sup>226</sup> “International Corporations and United States Foreign Policy”, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 93rd Congress, Second Session of Multinational Petroleum Companies and Foreign Policy, 1974, Part 9, p. 214

<sup>227</sup> Both Truman and Acheson were in favor of the diplomatic approach to the problem. Acheson stated that the United States recognized “the right of sovereign states to nationalize provided there is just competition” and in case the oil remained available for the “free world” (cross-referenced from D. McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years*, Dodd, Mead & Co, 1976, p. 387). In fact, in 1951, Mossadegh was declared “Man of the Year” and the “Iranian George Washington” by *Time* magazine, which illustrated the favor of the general public in the West. When Mossadegh arrived to New York in order to give a speech in the United Nations, he was received by Truman and invited to place his hand on the Liberty Bell, the American symbol of the struggle against the British oppression (D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, cit., pp. 467-468)

the antitrust laws, subverted the plans of the peaceful settlement. This pushed the Truman administration to extend antitrust immunity to the oil majors under the Defense Production Act on 7 November 1952 and left almost no other chance for incoming President Eisenhower but to extend it, once he assumed the office. This, however, did not help the situation, since the oil majors refused to participate in those plans, unless the British approval was secured, as well as refused to lift the oil embargo when the Truman administration tried to use it as a political weapon. This, in the opinion of Steve Marsh, showed the true political potential of the oil majors in the region already in the early 1950s, which without a doubt found its illustration also in the Eisenhower administration and its antitrust policies for the Big Oil.<sup>228</sup>

The oil revenues being a significant budget line for Iran, the blockade propelled the country into an economic disaster, while Churchill, back in office, advocated the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh.<sup>229</sup> British Parliament entertained the idea of the military intervention, but it was understood that Britain, without the American support, was not able to finance a military involvement with its balance-of-payments deficit and the dollar and gold reserves moving precariously close to the bare minimum to finance its own imports. But leaving things the way they were was not an option either: “If Persia were allowed to get away with it, Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries would be encouraged to think they could try things on,” declared Defense Minister Emmanuel Shinwell. “The next thing might be an attempt to nationalize the Suez Canal.”<sup>230</sup>

With Eisenhower coming to office, the issue of the Communist inclinations of the Mossadegh government came to the foreground of the American concerns. The incoming president wrote to Churchill on 8 May 1953: “I still regard that area as one of potential disasters for the Western world”.<sup>231</sup> However, this is not to imply that Eisenhower was determined to eliminate Mossadegh from the very onset, which would potentially contrast him with Truman and Acheson, who sought to alleviate the crisis through mediating and negotiation.<sup>232</sup> The existing evidence from Eisenhower’s diaries, convincingly presented by

---

<sup>228</sup> S. Marsh, “Anglo-American Crude Diplomacy: Multinational Oil and the Iranian Oil Crisis, 1951–53”, *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2007, pp. 25-53

<sup>229</sup> As it is underlined by the overwhelming majority of the researchers, Churchill was the most aggressive adherent of the idea of coup d’état in Iran and the overthrow of Mossadegh, whom he considered a lunatic (for example, see C. de Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia: Muhammad Mossadegh and a Tragic Anglo-American Coup*, Harper Perennial, 2013).

<sup>230</sup> D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, cit., p. 458

<sup>231</sup> *The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953-1955*, ed. by P. Boyle, The University of North Carolina Press, 1990, p. 53

<sup>232</sup> Many authors do claim that the policy of Eisenhower represented a rupture or a radical change from the policy of Truman in the country. This idea is elaborated, for instance, in the following studies: S. Kinzer, *All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*, Wiley, 2008; A. Scott Cooper, *The Fall of*

David Collier, shows that Eisenhower came to the White House with the attitude to the problem very similar to that of Truman, and lamented Churchill's old-fashioned style of politics, which presupposed that Britain was allowed to dictate the rules from the position of a great First-World power.<sup>233</sup> However, the looming threat of Communism, regardless of whether it was in fact dangerous or whether the American government had sufficient information on the Communist activity in Iran, and the availability of important oil resources in the country played its role in inspiring the planned coup-d'état in the fall of 1953.<sup>234</sup>

In 1954, after the deposition of Mossadegh and the return of Shah Reza Pahlavi, Herbert Hoover Jr., the son of the former American president and one of the key figures for the development of the American oil industry among his contemporaries, went to arbitrate the discussions of the negotiation, to which he would refer as "perhaps the largest commercial deal ever put together, with assets which might be worth over a billion dollars".<sup>235</sup> The United States advocated the creation of an 'International Consortium' to produce, refine and sell the Iranian oil on the market in 1954. AIOC (renamed to become British Petroleum) received only 40 percent of the shares, even though it used to control the majority of the country. The remaining 60 percent of the shares were divided among five major American companies (Mobil, Texaco, Exxon, Gulf and Chevron), which together held another 40 percent, the Royal Dutch Shell settled with 14 percent and Compagnie Française des Pétroles (today's Total) with 6 percent. As Mary Ann Heiss convincingly demonstrated, the British government appeared to agree with the reasoning of the American side "to seek a rapid, if not

---

*Heaven: The Pahlavis and the Final Days of Imperial Iran*, Henry Holt and Co., 2016; M. Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup D'état in Iran", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1987, pp. 261-286; G. Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*, cit.; M Auzanneau, *Oil, Power and War: A Dark History*, cit. However, this argument does not stand up for scrutiny.

<sup>233</sup> D. Collier, *Democracy and the Nature of American Influence in Iran, 1941-1979*, Syracuse University Press, 2017, pp. 119-120

<sup>234</sup> Operation Ajax (or Operation Boot, as it was known in the United Kingdom) was devised jointly by the American and British intelligence officers and included, among other things, the manipulation of the public opinion to turn as many people as possible against Mossadegh; the launching of the staged attacks on religious leaders; the bribing of the military officers as well as the voting members of Parliament to trigger the coup; and the organization of a massive anti-government demonstration by paying to thousands of people. Mossadegh would be effectively removed from power and subsequently arrested. As it is understood from the declassified information, the main CIA officer in Iran that made Operation Ajax possible was Kim Roosevelt, grandson of Theodore Roosevelt and cousin of Franklin Roosevelt, who together with General Norman Schwarzkopf prepared Shah Reza Pahlavi to regain the throne after the coup. It was Kim Roosevelt who bribed, organized and prepared the rally to remove Mossadegh. On 19 August 1953, crowds of people filled the streets of Tehran, including the armed forces and members of the police, who attacked the governmental buildings. The fighting was ruthless, 300 people were killed, and on the same day Mossadegh's residence was taken by force. The Prime Minister managed to escape but soon surrendered, thus ending the brief democratic interlude that Iran enjoyed in the 1950s (referenced from A. Etges, "All that Glitters is Not Gold: The 1953 Coup against Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran", *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2011, pp. 495-508)

<sup>235</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 199th Meeting of the National Security Council, 27 May 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954, Volume X, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d465>, Date of Access: 25.03.2020



very satisfactory, settlement rather than prolong negotiations in the hope of eventually getting something better”.<sup>236</sup>

On 29 October 1954 the Shah put his signature on the agreement that permitted the existence of the International Consortium, which would work in the country up to the Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. Even though the national company instituted by Mossadegh kept the formal provisions of his policy and retained the national rights on the oil reserves, only the Western companies belonging to the Consortium were able to purchase and distribute the Iranian oil, thus ensuring the exclusive Western access to Iran.<sup>237</sup> After the notable improvement of the American presence in Iran, the country’s strategic significance in the American foreign policy would increase particularly during the Eisenhower administration. In 1958, the critical position of Iran was reiterated in NSC 5821/1 “Statement of U.S. Policy Towards Iran”:

Iran’s strategic location between the USSR and the Persian Gulf and its great oil reserves make it critically important to the United States that Iran’s friendship, independence and territorial integrity be maintained. Since 1953, Iran has been regarded in the area as a symbol of U.S. influence, and its reversion to neutralism or its subjection to Soviet control would represent major psychological setbacks, with repercussions for U.S. prestige throughout the Middle East and Asia.<sup>238</sup>

In 1955, Iran joined the Northern Tier initiative, which joined Great Britain, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan under the pact. The Shah had hoped to receive the substantial military aid due to this development, and Secretary of State Dulles backed the Iranian membership as well as requested a package for Iran of \$50 million of additional military aid, effectively overruled by Secretary of Defense Wilson, who referred to the political and economic instability of the country, which made it premature to extend large military assistance. Nonetheless, the episode showed the support of the Department of State for the Shah of Iran.<sup>239</sup>

The Shah’s regime was, however, politically volatile and economically unstable. The rampant corruption and lack of necessary economic reforms landed the country in profound economic stagnation, regardless of the fact that from 1954 to 1960, Iranian oil revenues had surged from \$36.7 million to \$262.7 million. The precariousness of the situation convinced

---

<sup>236</sup> M. Heiss, “The United States, Great Britain, and the Creation of the Iranian Oil Consortium, 1953-1954”, cit., pp. 511-535

<sup>237</sup> M. Auzanneau, *Oil, Power and War: A Dark History*, cit., p. 207

<sup>238</sup> Statement of U.S. Policy Towards Iran (NSC 5821/1), 15 November 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d257>, Date of Access: 20.04.2020

<sup>239</sup> S. McGlinchey, *US Arms Policies Towards the Shah's Iran*, Routledge, 2014, pp. 11-12

the Eisenhower administration in 1960 of the necessity to introduce a package of reforms in the country, ranging from agrarian reforms to the military assistance, but the lack of time prevented the possibility of action, and the problem was eventually passed to the Kennedy administration.<sup>240</sup>

Iraq was one of the countries that Britain occupied during the First World War and maintained its control following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>241</sup> As various historians point out, the occupation was the direct result of the prognosis of rich oil deposits, available in Mesopotamia, coveted by all the actors of a major war. In this regard, Sir Maurice Hankey, the Secretary to the War Cabinet at the time, after carefully reviewing the strategic location of the two regions and their rich oil fields, observed:

[O]il in the next war will occupy the place of coal in the present war, or at least a parallel place to coal. The only big potential supply that we can get under British control is the Persian and Mesopotamian supply. The point where you come in is that the control over these oil supplies becomes a first class British War Aim.<sup>242</sup>

Matthieu Auzanneau also underlines the significance of oil in the British occupation of the territory by discussing that the Armistice of Mudros, concluded on 30 October 1918, prevented the British from seizing all the important territory in the north, including the strategic city of Mosul, the territories around which contained “the largest undeveloped resources [of oil] at present known to the world”, but in violation of the armistice, the British invaded the city and occupied it without encountering any significant opposition.<sup>243</sup>

In 1925, the original concession to produce, refine and sell oil from the young government of Iraq was acquired by the British-controlled Turkish Petroleum Company (to be renamed Iraq Petroleum Company in 1929). Britain controlled 75 percent of the enterprise, while France received the remaining quarter, previously held by Deutsche Bank, as part of the war contributions after the First World War.<sup>244</sup> The original Agreement of 14 March 1925 left the company susceptible to the non-discriminatory taxation system and

---

<sup>240</sup> For more information, the reader could refer to V. Nemchenok, “In Search of Stability Amid Chaos: US Policy Toward Iran, 1961–63”, *Cold War History*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2010, pp. 341-369

<sup>241</sup> Even though the formal, but largely fictitious independence would be granted after the First World War in 1921 (with the ascend of King Faisal of the Hejaz, whom the British anointed from outside through bribing of the local tribes), Britain would receive a mandate from the League of Nations over Mesopotamia as well as Palestine to ensure the smooth transit of the formerly dependent territories to sovereignty. The mandate ended in 1932, but not the British presence, since the British remained stationed firmly in the form of the military bases in Iraq under bilateral agreements for another twenty years (for more information, refer to G. Muttitt, *Fuel on the Fire: Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq*, The Bodley Head, London, 2011, pp. 20-30)

<sup>242</sup> Cross-referenced from H. Mejcher “Oil and British Policy towards Mesopotamia, 1914-1918”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1972, pp. 377-391

<sup>243</sup> M. Auzanneau, *Oil, Power and War: A Dark History*, cit., p. 110

<sup>244</sup> P. Helmreich, *From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920*, cit., pp. 230-314

potentially indefinite tax increases in Article 27, as well as provided for the parcel system, so that the company was to choose several plots for drilling and either retain or relinquish the rights to this land within 32 months.<sup>245</sup>

These lenient provisions had to do with the lack of exhaustive knowledge about the presence and the size of the Iraqi oil reserves, yet to be discovered. However, on 14 October 1927, the company struck oil near Kirkuk, and a fountain gushed out so forcefully that it killed two prospectors and could not be contained for several days resulting in tons of oil being wasted. This astounding oil discovery led to the progressive lack of control the Iraqi government had over the company.<sup>246</sup> This prompted the revision of the original agreement on 24 March 1931 in terms of taxation (effectively eliminated by the side letter to IPC, prepared by the government on that same day and signed by Prime Minister Nuri Said, which promised the exemption from taxation). Furthermore, the company received the concession to operate over 32,000 square miles instead of mere 192 square miles of the original Agreement, the parcel system was terminated and the provision to sell oil to Iraq at the lowest cost sold to others was discontinued. The revision was soon submitted to the Iraqi Parliament and promptly ratified.<sup>247</sup>

Once the virtual British control was established, the government of the United States interceded on behalf of the American oil companies in the negotiations in respect to the Iraqi oil, advocating the traditional “open-door” policy, meaning the assurance of the free access to all countries of the world for every company.<sup>248</sup> The negotiations with the major companies continued until 31 July 1928, when it was settled that Turkish Petroleum Company would be owned jointly by the following major actors of the oil industry: Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (23.75%), Royal Dutch Shell (23.75%), Compagnie Française des Pétroles (23.75%), and the Near East Development Corporation (NEDC), a consortium of five American companies (Standard Oil Company of New York (Socony), Gulf Oil, the Pan-American Petroleum and Transport Company, Atlantic Richfield Co., and Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso) equally sharing the same 23.75%).<sup>249</sup> The five American companies would operate jointly for several years, until Gulf Oil, the Pan-American Petroleum and Transport Company, and Atlantic

---

<sup>245</sup> F. Parra, *Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum*, cit., pp. 12-14

<sup>246</sup> D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, cit., p. 204

<sup>247</sup> F. Parra, *Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum*, cit., pp. 12-14

<sup>248</sup> A. Samuel, “The Open Door and U.S. Policy in Iraq between the World Wars”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 38, No. 5, 2014, pp. 926-952

<sup>249</sup> S. Saul, “Masterly Inactivity as Brinkmanship: The Iraq Petroleum Company’s Route to Nationalization, 1958-1972”, *The International History Review*, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2007, pp. 746-792. The remaining 5 percent were owned by Calouste Gulbenkian, who was credited to be the first person to use the Iraqi oil and the author of the Red Line Agreement.

Richfield Co. surrendered their shares to the other two companies in the early 1930s, the last being Gulf Oil, which held to its 16.67 percent until 1934.<sup>250</sup> This British, French and American cooperation resulted in the conclusion of the infamous Red Line Agreement of 1929, discussed previously.

It is unanimously underlined by the researchers on the topic that the imposition of an unfavorable concession system combined with the establishment of a complete monopoly over the entire country<sup>251</sup> fermented unrest in the country. Iraq was treated as a virtual colony, its oil fields were grossly underdeveloped and the vast territories remained idle under the control of IPC, since it would not allow any other company or country to commence the drilling. Leonardo Maugeri shows that the underinvestment in Iraq was connected to the rationing of the Middle Eastern oil production, called “Aggregate Programmed Quantity” (APQ), a system devised by the major oil producers to control the overproduction of oil in the region.<sup>252</sup> Moreover, it was not a system based on mutual and equal limitations. On the contrary, as Matthieu Auzanneau mentions, the APQ was needed to exert a political leverage and to win over the attractive countries, such Saudi Arabia or Iran, and to penalize those that were considered to be less important, such as Iraq.<sup>253</sup>

While the Truman administration did not concern itself too much with Iraq and its concessionary system, dedicating more attention to Saudi Arabia, Iraq came to play a more substantial strategic role in the formulation of foreign policy under Eisenhower. Iraq caught the attention of John Foster Dulles, when he visited eleven Middle Eastern capitals and South Asia in the spring of 1953 with the purpose to determine the degree of Communist inclinations in those strategically significant regions, because the Iraqi leaders expressed particular concern with the Soviet threat, more so than any other Arab country.<sup>254</sup>

---

<sup>250</sup> E. Fitzgerald, “The Iraq Petroleum Company, Standard Oil of California, and the Contest for Eastern Arabia, 1930-1933”, *The International History Review*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1991, pp. 441-465

<sup>251</sup> The other two non-government companies, which received concessions in Iraq were Basrah Petroleum Company on 20 April 1932 and Mosul Petroleum Company on 29 September 1938, which had the same shareholders and management as IPC, and thus were its de facto subsidiaries (cross-referenced from S. Saul, “Masterly Inactivity as Brinkmanship: The Iraq Petroleum Company’s Route to Nationalization, 1958-1972”, cit., pp. 746-792).

<sup>252</sup> L. Maugeri, *The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World’s Most Controversial Resource*, cit., pp. 80-81

<sup>253</sup> M. Auzanneau, *Oil, Power and War: A Dark History*, cit., pp. 220-221

<sup>254</sup> Rich oil fields of Iraq featured among the possible reasons the Soviet Union might be lured to Iraq. Besides, the influence was likely to occur through the members of the banned Communist Party or by means of manipulating public opinion of the Kurdish nationalists in Northern Iraq. Moreover, the Iraqi establishment had a reason to fear that propaganda from Moscow had a potential of swaying the opinion of the impoverished Iraqi society, creating a widespread discontent, particularly after “the confrontation in Iran in the summer of 1953 between the conservative forces loyal to the Shah and their radical-nationalist and left-wing opponents” (cross-referenced from A. Sanjian, “The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 226-266).

Moreover, the previous attempts of the United States to create a viable anti-communist alliance in the Middle East to protect it from the Soviet invasion were not brought to fruition: the Allied Middle East Command (AMEC) to consolidate an alliance of Turkey, Britain, Egypt, the United States, and France was rejected by Egypt in 1951; the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) was also rejected, since Nasser saw it as a tool of American imperialism.<sup>255</sup> After his visit, Secretary of State Dulles came up with an idea of a Northern Tier alliance of the states to the south of the Soviet Union, dismissing the necessity to invite Egypt. The alliance would be centered on Iraq, and potentially include Pakistan, Turkey and Iran.<sup>256</sup> Alternatively, Gregory Brew claims that the idea ultimately belonged to the British, while the American administration preferred to build the regional defense of the Middle East around Saudi Arabia and King Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud.<sup>257</sup>

In April 1955, the Baghdad Pact came into existence and was founded by Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Great Britain. Ara Sanjian contends that the participation of Great Britain was viewed as necessary by the Iraqi establishment (particularly Nuri al-Said, the most powerful politician in Iraq) because of the expiration of the 1930 Treaty of Preferential Alliance in 1957. The author argues that the invitation of Great Britain was supposed to render the unpopular treaty obsolete, but would still allow Iraq to maintain the military alliance and receive the military assistance from the former mandatory country.<sup>258</sup> But the invitation of the British into the alliance, as Daniel Williamson points out in his research, was exactly the reason the United States decided not to join the pact: the participation of a former colonial power was conducive to the idea of the renewed Western imperialism in the region among the Arab nationalists, the most vocal of who were Nasser and King Saud of Saudi Arabia,<sup>259</sup> which could lead to the renewed sense of hostility.<sup>260</sup> The United States would

---

<sup>255</sup> D. Williamson, "Understandable Failure: The Eisenhower Administration's Strategic Goals in Iraq, 1953-1958", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol.17, No. 3, 2006, pp. 597-615

<sup>256</sup> The encouragement for Iraq to participate in the alliance came also in the form of the a military assistance program from the United States and the maintenance of a military assistance advisory group in Iraq by an exchange of notes dated 21 April 1954 (referenced from Operations Coordinating Board Report, 7 August 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d462>, Date of Access: 14.05.2020).

<sup>257</sup> G. Brew, "Our Most Dependable Allies": Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, 1956-1958", cit., pp. 89-109

<sup>258</sup> A. Sanjian, "The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact", cit., pp. 226-266

<sup>259</sup> King Saud was reportedly a vocal opponent of the Baghdad Pact due to the involvement of Great Britain into the alliance. Saudi Arabia had a long-standing dispute with Great Britain concerning Buraimi, and this in term allegedly pushed King Saud to closer ties with Nasser, extremely critical of Iraq, which he considered to be a client of Britain, and of the Pact itself (for more information, refer to G. Brew, "Our Most Dependable Allies": Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, 1956-1958", cit., pp. 89-109).

<sup>260</sup> D. Williamson, "Understandable Failure: The Eisenhower Administration's Strategic Goals in Iraq, 1953-1958", cit., pp. 597-615

eventually commit to the support of the alliance in the form of joining the military committee of the Baghdad Pact, but never becoming a full member.

The Iraqi coup d'état on 14 July 1958<sup>261</sup> terminated the Iraq participation in the Baghdad Pact and led to important concession revisions for the production of the Iraqi oil. In addition to all the other transgressions of Britain and IPC, it was found out after the independent auditing that IPC withheld the totality of the payments to the Iraqi government even in the form of the due royalties. The new Abd al-Karim Qasim's government responded by revoking the concession on the lands IPC did not develop (which happened to be 99.5 percent of the original concessionary territory) with Public Law 80 on the grounds that IPC failed to meet its commitments.<sup>262</sup> Thus, without formally nationalizing the company, as it was done elsewhere, Iraq precluded the foreign access to the oil fields. Furthermore, Iraq turned to the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance, while Qasim trusted the Iraq Communist Party with the task of preventing the Nasserists from coming to power.<sup>263</sup>

Although Iraq did play a role in Eisenhower's general policy of containment,<sup>264</sup> the administration's lackluster response to the Iraqi coup d'état might seem problematic in terms of determining the scope of American interest in the Middle East. Many researchers, such as Gregory Brew, argue that in the particular case of Iraq the fear of aggressive Arab nationalism might have outweighed the Cold War concerns or oil considerations, since the antagonism of Nasser was reaching a dangerous juncture of turning the Arab world entirely against the West. As Gregory Brew points out, the negative involvement of the United States in Syria, the closest ally of Nasser's Egypt, as well as the plans to overthrow the government

---

<sup>261</sup> For several years Nasser had been trying to stir unrest in Iraq, publicly denouncing the Royal Family and the Hashemites, who had been put in power by the British and therefore were not legitimate. In July 1958, the military coup-d'état suddenly broke off. The soldiers marched through the streets, joined by many more people hailing Nasser and disparaging the Royal Family, until the country plundered into violence. Soon the palace was occupied, and King Faisal II was decapitated. The Crown Prince Abdullah, hated by the public and the de facto leader of the country, was shot dead, and his body was dragged through the streets of Baghdad and then hung from a balcony of the Ministry of Defense. A similar fate awaited the pro-Western Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri es-Said, who tried to escape the city by wearing female clothes, but was recognized and lynched on the spot by the mob. His body was dragged along the streets, and then run over by a car several times (cross-referenced from C. Tripp, *A History of Iraq* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 86)

<sup>262</sup> L. Maugeri, *The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World's Most Controversial Resource*, cit., p. 87

<sup>263</sup> B. Kaufman, *The Arab Middle East and the United States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and Superpower Diplomacy*, Twayne Pub, 1996, pp. 27

<sup>264</sup> For example, Iraq was one of the key actors in the American scheme to overthrow the government in Syria, which, like Egypt, had turned to the Soviet Union for military assistance in 1957. As Eisenhower himself remarked, "the suspicion was strong [within the administration] that the Communists had taken control of the government". Even though the plan was not executed due to Jordan and Iraq bailing out of it, the fact of the initial participation of Iraq was indicative of a growing alliance (cross-referenced from B. Kaufman, *The Arab Middle East and the United States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and Superpower Diplomacy*, cit., pp. 26-27).

there antagonized the Arab nationalists to such extent that Saudi Arabia and Iraq backtracked from their pledge to support the American anti-Communist efforts in Syria.<sup>265</sup>

Moreover, as it is stated in NSC 5722 “Construction of a New Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System”, the Metline pipeline project to avoid the dependence on the Suez Canal and the Syrian pipeline was too risky for the United States due to the following reason:

The possibility that Arab states may actively oppose a pipeline route through non-Arab lands creates a degree of political risk for Western interests in the area. Arab pressures in and upon Iraq to oppose the project may result in political instability within that country with unfavorable political developments for the West including further isolation of Iraq in the Arab world. Except for Iran, at present all oil to be moved originates in Arab countries and passes through Arab countries.<sup>266</sup>

Although the document was composed almost a year before the Iraqi coup d'état, it is illustrative of the overall line of decision-making in terms of Iraq in the Eisenhower administration. This is not to say that the military response post-factum was completely off the agenda, since the Western forces were readily available near the shores of Lebanon.<sup>267</sup> However, during the meeting of President Eisenhower with the principle security advisors immediately after the revolution on the same day, Secretary of State Dulles stated that Iraq was “primarily a UK responsibility” and did not support the idea of a military intervention in the country.<sup>268</sup>

In conclusion, Iraq appears to diverge from the general policy of the United States in the sense that the revolution with the visible Communist elements as well as the request for the Soviet aid did not inspire the immediate ‘containment’ response from the Eisenhower administration, as it did it in other places of the world, such as Guatemala and Iran. Although this is beyond the scope of the present paper, it could be potentially argues that the United States undertook all the necessary steps to ensure the continuous Western access to Middle Eastern oil, important in the framework of containment, by striving not to antagonize the Arab nationalism, especially after the Syrian Crisis, as discussed in the following chapter. It appears that when approaching the end of his second term, Eisenhower was more ready to

---

<sup>265</sup> G. Brew, “Our Most Dependable Allies”: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, 1956–1958”, cit., pp. 89-109

<sup>266</sup> National Security Council Report 5722 “Construction of a New Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System”, 30 September 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d265>, Date of Access: 14.05.2020

<sup>267</sup> B. Kaufman, *The Arab Middle East and the United States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and Superpower Diplomacy*, cit., p. 29

<sup>268</sup> Editorial Note, 14 July 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d109>, Date of Access: 14.05.2020

accept the possibility of growing Arab nationalism, but considered it to be just as dangerous as the Communist direct involvement. Whether the United States tried to accommodate Arab nationalism during the Iraq Revolution or not, the Eisenhower administration definitely strove to prevent the Arab discontent from rising so much as to prevent the American access to Middle Eastern oil.

### **3. Major Crises in the Middle East in the 1950s and the American ‘Containment’ Response**

Although President Eisenhower had to deal with Gamal Abdel Nasser more than any other president, Nasser was one of the issues in the Middle East that Eisenhower inherited from the Truman administration. The humiliating defeat of Egypt in the war against Israel in 1948-1949 as well as the extreme impoverishment of the population together with unscrupulous corruption of the pro-British monarch and the high-ranking officials led to the outbreak of the revolution in 1952, which saw the gradual ascent of Nasser as the leader of Egypt and the most influential figure in the Arab world throughout the 1950s. Salim Yaqub also argues that the eventual revolution took place in no small degree due to the efforts of President Truman to establish the Middle East Command, an organization of the Middle Eastern States to withstand a possible Soviet attack, inspired by the outbreak of the Korean War, with Britain in charge and Egypt being the nucleus of this organization. The efforts were interpreted as yet another manifestation of the Western imperialism, and the Egyptians rebelled.<sup>269</sup>

---

<sup>269</sup> S. Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East*, cit., pp. 23-30. Among other factors that held the British interests in Egypt, there was the Suez military base, which was deemed important for NATO and the purposes of the Cold War. The dissatisfaction of the Egyptian people with the West also had to do with Israel, particularly so with the recognition of the State of Israel on the territory of Palestine on 11 May 1949 by President Truman, regardless of the strong opposition of his own Secretary of State Marshall (for more information on the topic, the reader could refer to D. Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel*, Oxford University Press, 1993). The combination of the variety of factors, but mainly the imperialism of the Western powers, contributed to the emergence of the radical and nationalist organizations in the Egyptian society, the most powerful of which were the Muslim Brotherhood (the Ikhwan, a radical Islamic organization), and the Free Officers (sometimes referred to as the Young Officers Movement) under the undisputed leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser (for more information, refer to F. Gerges, *Making the Arab World: Nasser, Qutb, and the Clash That Shaped the Middle East*, Princeton University Press, 2018). The trigger to the revolution came in January 1952, when the anti-British riots erupted in Cairo, following the massacre of the Egyptian police forces by the British due to their refusal to surrender members of the Egyptian resistance. The riots resulted in deaths of more than 70 people. The revolution itself took place on 22 July 1952, a couple of weeks earlier than planned, because Nasser was wary of the possibility of arrest. Backed by the support of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian communist movement, the Free Officers conducted the



Although the revolution was successful and the government was controlled by the anti-British nationalistic forces, the United States did not abandon its intention to integrate Egypt into some sort of defense organization, mostly because Egypt exercised significant political and cultural influence on the Arab world and was a very populous country with the access to the crucial Suez Canal Base.<sup>270</sup> Barry Rubin contended that Paul Nitze's project of the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) was the fallback option for the United States, aimed at keeping Egypt and its military base from falling under the Soviet bloc influence, which failed due to the lack of military aid the United States was willing to extend to the new government.<sup>271</sup>

After Nasser came to power in 1954, John Foster Dulles tied the reception of the military and economic aid first to the successful settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Suez base (which Nasser actively contributed to achieving) and later to Egyptian-Israeli peace. However, the question of aid held an ideological aspect to it – the project of a High Dam at Aswan was the most ambitious and politically promising undertaking of the revolutionary government.<sup>272</sup> The lack of economic assistance from the West compelled Nasser to consider the development of his non-alliance with the Soviet tilt – in September of 1955 it was announced that Egypt was getting \$200 million worth of military aid from Czechoslovakia in exchange for the Egyptian cotton, including about 200 jet fighters and 35 twin-engine bombers, as an attempt to balance the escalating tensions with Israel in the Gaza Strip.<sup>273</sup>

William Cleveland, in consonance with many other researchers, believes that in light of those developments, the Eisenhower administration decided to offer its assistance in the

---

military coup-d'état against the monarchical regime of King Farouk, who fled to Italy (for more information on the passage of the revolution and the persona of Nasser in the early years of his influence, refer to S. Aburish, *Nasser: the Last Arab*, St. Martin Press, New York, 2004).

<sup>270</sup> National Intelligence Special Estimate "Prospects For An Inclusive Middle East Defense Organization", 17 March 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p1/d65>, Date of Access: 27.03.2020

<sup>271</sup> B. Rubin, "America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 97, No. 1, 1982, pp. 73-90. The lack of enthusiasm to extend the military assistance on the part of the United States was partly explained by Truman's lame-duck status. Besides, the talks with the British counterparts were not achieving any significant results in Egypt on the questions of the Suez military base, which the Egyptian government wanted the British to vacate with all urgency, and Sudan, which Nasser wanted to incorporate into Egypt under the state of Greater Egypt. Not being able to wait so long for military assistance, Egypt withdrew its support from the idea of MEDO in 1953. "America will not please us to infuriate Britain," Nasser complained in one of his speeches. Indeed, John Foster Dulles is believed to intentionally have stalled the negotiations on the aid in order to prevent it being used against the main American ally in Europe - Britain.

<sup>272</sup> J. Alterman, *Egypt and American Foreign Assistance, 1952-1956*, Palgrave, 2002, pp. 97-131

<sup>273</sup> B. Rubin, "America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957", cit., pp. 73-90.

undertaking of the Aswan Dam via supporting the loan to Egypt from the World Bank, but abruptly withdrew the offer before Nasser made a decision, which pushed him to nationalize the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956 and resulted in an acute international crisis.<sup>274</sup> Silvia Borzutzky and David Berger in their article charge Secretary of State Dulles with the escalation of the situation due to his lack of sound judgment about the political climate in Egypt and impossible concessionary demands he made in exchange for the American financial assistance with the project.<sup>275</sup> Daniel Yergin, on the other hand, contends that the sudden change of heart on the American part had to do with the inimical attitude of the American Congress, which was unwilling to grant Egypt any aid, seeing that Nasser was decidedly hostile to Israel and recognized “Red China”. Congress therefore informed Dulles that the aid would be extended either to Yugoslavia or Egypt, and the administration apparently chose Tito of Yugoslavia as the recipient.<sup>276</sup>

On 26 July 1956, the fourth anniversary of the overthrow of King Farouk, President Nasser made his famous address to the people of Egypt, mentioning the code-word “de Lesseps”<sup>277</sup> in the process, which was the signal for the Egyptian troops to occupy the Canal Company offices and by so doing to nationalize the company.<sup>278</sup> Besides more complicated geo-political motives for the extreme reaction of the leaders of France and Britain, the Suez Canal was a vital route that simplified the communication between the colonies and the British Empire and was the principle juncture for the passage of goods between Asia and Europe. Also, before the existence of supertankers, 70 percent of Western Europe’s oil passed

---

<sup>274</sup> W. Cleveland, *A History Of The Modern Middle East*, Westview Press, 2nd ed., 1999, p. 302. Certain authors point out that the move was meant to humiliate Nasser for accepting the Soviet aid and for implying he might turn to the Soviets again for the same project (for example, see M. Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War*, University of California Press, 2005, p. 94).

<sup>275</sup> S. Borzutzky, D. Berger, “Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don’t: The Eisenhower Administration and the Aswan Dam”, *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 1, 2010, pp. 84-102. Indeed, the political climate in Egypt did not allow for overt and eager manifestations of support for the “soft imperialism”, which the Western countries, such as Britain and the United States, embodied. Nasser had to deal with strong political movements inside Egypt: the Wafd (an old nationalist party), the Ikhwan, and the Communists. After the Ikhwan attempted to assassinate Nasser in October 1954, which was followed by a brutal retaliation, the political situation was too precarious for Nasser to attempt enthusiastic rapprochement with the West, although he was still willing to contemplate making some concessions because the Aswan Dam was a vital project (for more information, see R. H. Dekmejian, *Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics*, State University of New York Press, 1971, pp. 30-36).

<sup>276</sup> D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, cit., p. 482

<sup>277</sup> Ferdinand de Lesseps, the developer of the Suez Canal.

<sup>278</sup> B. Turner, *Suez 1956: The Inside Story of the First Oil War*, Hodder & Stoughton, 2007, Kindle ed., Ch. 12

through the Suez Canal from the Middle East, which meant that the access to petroleum was contingent upon the Canal's availability.<sup>279</sup>

William Hitchcock expresses the opinion of the majority that, apart from the loss of its stake in the Canal Company, France partook in the endeavor of the military intervention because of Nasser's active support for the Algerian independence against the French.<sup>280</sup> For Britain, the nationalization of the Canal was rather damaging economically in addition to the political humiliation the country endured. Barry Eichengreen provides a convincing economic rationale for the involvement of Great Britain in the Suez affair: in 1956, Britain was still unable to pay off all of its debts stemming from the Second World War. The domestic wages were set too high, the productivity remained too low, which prevented the country from establishing a strong export system to offset its inadequate finances. A military intervention in a foreign country was considered impossible, and the dollar reserves of Britain were at the minimal acceptable level of \$2 billion dollars, barely enough to prevent the country from becoming insolvent. But in this particular case, the persona of Prime Minister Eden is believed to have tilted the country towards the eventual participation due to his strong assurance that the United States would assist with an emergency loan from the International Monetary Fund.<sup>281</sup>

---

<sup>279</sup> This is not to imply that factually anything changed with the nationalization. Egypt physically controlled the Canal since the end of the Second World War and the Israeli ships were basically banned from the Canal all along. Neither did Nasser prevent the ships from Britain or France or any other country except for Israel to transit peacefully through the Canal after the nationalization. The Suez crisis was not the product of the sudden shift in objective factors of the Canal usage. It was more the possibility of such disruptions and the general climate of hostility, which culminated in the invasion. Unfortunately, it is impossible to discuss in great detail the variety of delicate factors in the relations, which led to the confrontation among Egypt, Israel and Great Britain in the present paper. However, for a very detailed analysis of these issues the reader might refer to K. Love, *Suez: The Twice-Fought War*, McGraw-Hill, 1969.

<sup>280</sup> W. Hitchcock, "The Ghost of Crises Past: The Troubled Alliance in Historical Perspective" in J. Anderson, J. Ikenberry, T. Risse (eds.), *The End of the West?: Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order*, Cornell University Press, 2008, pp. 59-60. France entered in a secret accord at Sèvres with Israel, soon to be joined by Britain to attack Egypt and seize the Canal. On 29 October 1956 Israeli troops invaded the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Desert, moving closer to the Canal itself. According to the existing pact with Israel, Britain and France were supposed to demand the withdrawal of Israel and Egypt forces from the Canal zone in order to avoid a major military confrontation, while occupying the area with allegedly peacekeeping intentions. Nasser had little other choice but to refuse the demand for withdrawal and followed his decision with sinking all forty-seven ships transiting the Canal, closing it to shipping. On October 31, the United Kingdom and France started bombing Egypt's airfields in order to destroy the jet fighters purchased from the Soviet Union. On November 5, French paratroopers appeared not far from the Canal, soon to be followed by the Royal Navy commandos, who quickly seized the control of the Canal at the minimum military and economic cost (for any other general information on the events, the reader might refer to D. Varble, *The Suez Crisis 1956* (Essential Histories), Osprey Publishing, 2003).

<sup>281</sup> B. Eichengreen, *Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar*, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 154-160

Moreover, in this situation one might have to entertain the possibility of personal feelings making a difference for the eventuality of the crisis. As Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Anthony Nutting recalled in his memoirs, Prime Minister Eden was livid to find out about the nationalization and stated in his conversation with Nutting that he required the elimination of Nasser:

What's all this poppycock you've sent me? [...] What's all this nonsense about isolating Nasser, or 'neutralizing' him, as you call it? I want him destroyed, can't you understand? I want him removed [...] And I don't give a damn if there's anarchy and chaos in Egypt.<sup>282</sup>

There are different explanations as to why Prime Minister Eden was expecting American support after the invasion, although the majority of historians today contend that there was no intentional deceit on part of the Eisenhower administration, which is corroborated by the available evidence of the primary resources. Some researchers explain Eden's actions by the possibility of a miscommunication, which stemmed from the fact that Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles were both experiencing grave health problems at that time and might have lost some degree of control over the signals the European allies were getting from the United States.<sup>283</sup> Others consider such opinion disingenuous, since the letters from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden leave little room for misinterpretation regarding the possibility of a military intervention.<sup>284</sup> As such, Richard Filipink Jr. does a convincing analysis of the primary resources and concludes that the British were deceiving

---

<sup>282</sup> A. Nutting, *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez*, C. N. Potter, 1967, pp. 34-35

<sup>283</sup> At least partly, the argument is outlined in D. Nichols, *Eisenhower 1956: The President's Year of Crisis - Suez and the Brink of War*, Simon & Schuster, 2012, Introduction. Besides, Harold Macmillan, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, who personally knew President Eisenhower during the war due to being the wartime liaison between Eisenhower, at that time the Supreme Allied Commander of the North African theater, and Prime Minister Churchill, persuaded Prime Minister Eden that Eisenhower was not in favor of Nasser's regime. "Ike," Macmillan wrote, "is really determined, somehow or other, to bring Nasser down". The influence of Macmillan is believed to have played a role in persuading Eden, although it is now widely considered to be a "failure in communication" (for more information, the reader might refer to J. Pearson, *Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp. 105-108)

<sup>284</sup> In the first letter that Eisenhower sent to Prime Minister Eden after the fact of the Canal Company nationalization on 31 July 1956, the president stated: "I have given you my personal conviction, as well as that of my associates, as to the unwisdom even of contemplating the use of military force at this moment." (Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, 31 July 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26 - December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d35>, Date of Access: 01.04.2020). The same opinion was rather forcefully given in the letter to Prime Minister Eden, dated 2 September 1956: "As to the use of force or the threat of force at this juncture, I continue to feel as I expressed myself in the letter Foster carried to you some weeks ago." (Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, 2 September 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26 - December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d163>, Date of Access: 01.04.2020)

themselves when they expected the “special friendship” with the United States to compel the Eisenhower administration to support the intervention.<sup>285</sup>

Whatever the reasons for such firm belief may have been, Eden was not correct in his assessment of Eisenhower’s attitude to the crisis and to Nasser. Although the Eisenhower administration viewed Nasser as a possible danger and worked to replace him through different means,<sup>286</sup> Eisenhower could not possibly support the military response to the Suez issue. Perhaps, it is best described in Eisenhower’s own words in his letter to Eden on 2 September 1956:

Even now military preparations and civilian evacuation exposed to public view seem to be solidifying support for Nasser which has been shaky in many important quarters. I regard it as indispensable that if we are to proceed solidly together to the solution of this problem, public opinion in our several countries must be overwhelming in its support. I must tell you frankly that American public opinion flatly rejects the thought of using force, particularly when it does not seem that every possible peaceful means of protecting our vital interests has been exhausted without result. Moreover, I gravely doubt we could here secure Congressional authority even for the lesser support measures for which you might have to look to us.<sup>287</sup>

Moreover, different researchers, including Barry Eichengreen and Daniel Yergin, cite Eisenhower’s re-election in the same year as the reason for his reluctance to get involved in controversial endeavors, especially so when they required American military presence abroad.<sup>288</sup> At that juncture, the crisis was unacceptable for the United States, because

---

<sup>285</sup> R. Filipink Jr., “‘Force is the Last Method’: Eisenhower, Dulles and American Intervention in the Suez Crisis”, *Critique*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2007, pp. 173-188

<sup>286</sup> According to Nathan Citino, at the beginning of 1956 Eisenhower worked to isolate Nasser by promoting King Saud as the leader of the Arab world, since Saudi Arabia is the keeper of the holy places of Islam. If King Saud were to take up the leading role, he would be able to pass the Western influence to other countries, or so Eisenhower reportedly expected (see N. Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa'ud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations*, cit., pp. 87-88). In fact, Nathan Citino also observes that Saudi Arabia’s active support of OPEC was in no small degree connected to the provision of oil for Western Europe, since the organization of such kind was believed to make the flow of oil steadier and less prone to country-specific crises. The evidence for the importance of Saudi Arabia before the crisis is also provided by David Nichols in his book *Eisenhower 1956: The President’s Year of Crisis - Suez and the Brink of War* (cit.), which shows that Eisenhower emphasized the need to promote King Saud “as the figure with sufficient prestige to offset Nasser”. Incidentally, the author also observes that the choice of King Saud had to do with the oil resources, which Eisenhower expected to be secure for the European use once the pro-American leader was at the forefront of the Arab world (pp. 90-93)

<sup>287</sup> Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, 2 September 1956, cit., Date of Access: 01.04.2020

<sup>288</sup> The analysis of Eisenhower’s 1956 elections campaign reveals that one of the important election bids for him was his image of the man that brings peace. After he agreed to an armistice that ended the Korean War in July 1953, the United States experienced strong economic growth, dubbed the “Eisenhower prosperity”, which increased his approval ratings from 68 and 79 percent in 1955, according to the Gallup poll (for more information on Eisenhower’s campaigns, refer to C. Pach, Jr., “Dwight D. Eisenhower: Campaigns and Elections”, Miller Center, Mode of Access: <https://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/campaigns-and->

supporting Britain and France in the Suez intervention would mean siding with the occupying power against the background of the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution by the Soviet Union in the same year, which could be interpreted as a manifestation of neo-colonialism in the Arab world.<sup>289</sup>

The crisis was threatening to turn into a major confrontation between the Communist powers and the Western world in the Middle East, when the Soviet Union signaled that the troops would be sent to protect Egypt unless the withdrawal is effectuated immediately. This is not to imply that the following actions of the United States stemmed from Eisenhower's anger over the invasion of an independent country. There is a consensus today among the researchers that Eisenhower and Eden had agreed on the necessity to remove Nasser from power, the evidence for which is perhaps best provided by Ray Takeyh, who discusses the secretive Operation Omega, a joint undertaking of American and British governments to eliminate Nasser from the political arena, which was already underway in March 1956. As such, the author argues that Nasser's Egypt was bound to become the target of the American interest because of an "inherent conflict between a super-power focused on curbing Soviet moves and a local regime preoccupied with regional challenges".<sup>290</sup> However, the means of the removal were conflicting.

Notwithstanding, the lack of expressed support from the United States resulted in the uncertainty of the market in Britain's solvency and triggered the run on the pound. The exchange rate vis-à-vis dollar started to rise, threatening to undermine the cohesion of the sterling zone.<sup>291</sup> Meanwhile, on November 2, Dulles introduced a cease-fire resolution to the

---

[elections](#), Date of Access: 01.04.2020). This election bid would have been difficult to reconcile with the American participation in the First World intervention into an independent Arab country.

<sup>289</sup> The Hungarian Uprising from 23 October until 10 November 1956 is considered to be one of the key events of the Cold War since it demonstrated the preparedness of the Soviet Union to defend its interests with a military intervention. After the violent collapse of the Communist government, the new government of Imre Nagy sought to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and to unilaterally declare the country's neutrality by partly following the example of Yugoslavia and its non-alignment foreign policy. The Soviet Union made a decision to crack down on the revolution and on November 4, the army moved to Budapest and suppressed the uprising in a matter of days, which led to the establishment of a new pro-Communist government already in January 1957. Csaba Békés argues that the initial policy of the Eisenhower administration to support the liberalization of the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe gave hope to many countries, including Hungary, which even appealed to the United Nations for the protection of the country's neutrality (for more information on the revolution, the reader might refer to C. Békés, "The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality", *Cold War History*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2006, pp. 477-500) One of the reasons for Eisenhower not to participate in the Suez Crisis on the side of the occupying power, therefore, was the need to preserve the image of the liberator, which might help foment anti-Communist feelings in the Soviet bloc.

<sup>290</sup> R. Takeyh, *The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953-57*, St. Martin's Press, 2000, Introduction

<sup>291</sup> B. Eichengreen, *Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar*, cit., pp. 154-160

United Nations, demanding the immediate withdrawal of the British and French troops from the Egyptian territory. The speculators intensified their attacks on the pound since the rupture between Britain and the United States was made public, while Britain's gold and dollar reserves were precariously close to the threshold of \$2 billion, which was considered the lowest safety line for the country's solvency. With the reserves falling below \$2 billion at the beginning of December, one of the few solutions Britain had was to refer to the IMF for the largest available loan, but the United States made it conditional on the British immediate withdrawal from the Suez region.<sup>292</sup> Once the British agreed to withdraw, the crisis was effectively over, with Nasser emerging more powerful than he was before the events in the Suez and Britain definitively losing its status of the major international power.<sup>293</sup>

Many researchers, including Peter Hahn, believe that the Suez Crisis set the stage for the Eisenhower Doctrine insofar as the United States strove to fill the power balance in the Middle East once Britain was definitively removed from the region. The author contends that the Soviet Union exhibited the intention to win the favor of the Arab leaders, which inspired the Eisenhower administration to act accordingly for the purposes of containment and the Cold War.<sup>294</sup> Randal Fowler also argues that the Suez Crisis was the breaking moment for the American rhetorical discourse in relation to the Middle East and created the conditions for the Eisenhower Doctrine: it was the first time a president declared the United States to be responsible for the security of the countries in the region, i.e. Eisenhower made the American interest in the region emphatically public and underlined that the United States would protect

---

<sup>292</sup> Specifically, the conditionality of the loan became definitively known on December 2, when the United States Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey called British Chancellor of the Exchequer Richard "Rab" Butler to inform him that the United States would be willing to support Britain's application for the loan on the condition that the British announced the definitive date for the withdrawal of the troops from the Suez zone. Macmillan had to make a statement about the British economic situation on December 4, and if it was revealed that the reserves fell beyond the mark of \$2 billion, this could have led to the final run on the pound. Although the date was not announced due to logistical considerations, Eden's government pledged that "we have decided to go without delay and we intend to go without delay". Eisenhower and Dulles considered the pledge good enough, partly because the definitive British insolvency was detrimental to the American interests in Western Europe and the work of NATO, and the United States expressed its support for the IMF loan, which was announced on December 4, when Britain was able to declare the receipt of the \$1.3 billion loan from the fund, the largest it could get. For a more detailed review on the economic sanctions the United States successfully employed against Britain, the reader might refer to D. Kunz, *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis*, University of North Carolina Press, 1991.

<sup>293</sup> Certain officials in the United States complained that Eisenhower courted "the Middle East tin-pot dictators" like Nasser, as George Kennan once put it to the journalist C.L. Sulzberger, and believed the situation would have been better served if Eisenhower had prioritized the relations with the long-standing alliances as opposed to protecting questionable dictatorships (J. L. Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life*, The Penguin Press, New York, 2011, Kindle ed.)

<sup>294</sup> P. Hahn, "Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2006, pp. 38-47

this interest even if this would require the revision of its relationship with the Western allies and a military intervention into sovereign states.<sup>295</sup>

The Eisenhower Doctrine was enunciated on 5 January 1957, within a Special Message to the Congress, in which President Eisenhower declared the commitment of the United States to provide economic assistance and military aid to the Middle East, as well as to use armed forces in order to prevent “overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism”.<sup>296</sup> The foundations for the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine were laid during the Suez Crisis, in which the United States managed to position itself as the defender of the Arab world as opposed to the neutral power or a hostile aggressor, thereby establishing the legitimacy of the doctrine. The Eisenhower Doctrine pledged \$200 million to counteract the Soviet expansion in the Middle East,<sup>297</sup> since as Secretary of State Dulles argued, despite the fact that “to try to keep Russia out has been British policy for the last hundred years, and they have succeeded pretty well up to the present time”, “now they are finished”.<sup>298</sup>

Although according to the administration the Eisenhower Doctrine was aimed at combating the International Communism in a strategically important location - that is, it was a particular case of the Truman Doctrine - Salim Yaqub, the first one to do a comprehensive analysis of the Eisenhower Doctrine, maintains that the proclamation of the doctrine and the events that followed were manifestations of “a political struggle between the United States and the Nasserist movement over the acceptable limits of Arabism”. These limits, according to the author, were drawn insofar as the governments in the Middle East were open to the influence of the Soviet Union: Egypt and Syria, for example, stood outside of those limits due to them having concluded the arms deals with the Communists. The Eisenhower Doctrine

---

<sup>295</sup> R. Fowler, *More Than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East*, cit., pp. 120-130

<sup>296</sup> Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East of President Eisenhower, 5 January 1957, Miller Center of Public Affairs, Mode of Access: <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-5-1957-eisenhower-doctrine>, Date of Access: 03.10.2019

<sup>297</sup> Cross-referenced from G. Wawro, *Quicksand: America's Pursuit of Power in the Middle East*, Penguin Books, 2010, Kindle ed., Ch. 7

<sup>298</sup> Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee, Vol. IX, 85th Congress, First Session, 1957, p. 21. The Congressional records show that the Senate did not express overwhelming support for the undertaking, and certain Senators, such as Richard Russell and Hubert Humphrey, believed that the doctrine was akin to the preliminary declaration of war and a military commitment, which did not have clear time limits and could not be properly assessed in logistical terms, similar to the Korean War. However, the approval was still granted.



was therefore a tool to strengthen the ties with the pro-Western governments, such as Saudi Arabia, which would “stand openly with the United States in the Cold War”.<sup>299</sup>

Moreover, Salim Yaqub underlines that the reaction of most of the Arab world to the proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine was predictably negative, to the point that whatever amiable feelings had been formed due to the seemingly pro-Arab handling of the Suez Crisis, they were dissolved in the face of the breach of sovereignty the Eisenhower Doctrine entailed. The most vocal on the subject was the Syrian government, which informed the Department of States that “theory of vacuum is artificial theory that imperialism uses as instrument to justify its interference and domination” and that the presence of any economic interests in the region did not “grant the right” to the United States to interfere in the region for the protection of such interests.<sup>300</sup>

Similarly, John Lewis Gaddis believes that the Eisenhower Doctrine originated in the lack of acceptance on part of the Eisenhower administration of Nasser’s idea of “positive neutrality”. Indeed, after Dulles pronounced neutrality to be “immoral” in 1955, Gaddis maintains, the administration seemed increasingly more concerned with the potential vulnerability of the newly independent states, in the Middle East and elsewhere, to the sways of communist propaganda.<sup>301</sup> In this regard, Dulles stated on 22 April 1957: “International communism is on the prowl to capture those nations whose leaders feel that newly acquired sovereign rights have to be displayed by flouting other independent nations. That kind of sovereignty is suicidal sovereignty”.<sup>302</sup>

The Lebanon crisis from 15 July to 25 October 1958 is regarded as the only practical implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine and what Nixon described in 1961 as “one of the most striking successes of any American political-military venture since World War II.”<sup>303</sup> After the brutal 14 July Revolution in Iraq, discussed above, Lebanon’s president Camille Chamoun immediately appealed to Washington invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine to invite

---

<sup>299</sup> S. Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East*, cit., pp. 3-5

<sup>300</sup> Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State, 11 January 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v13/d344>, Date of Access: 07.04.2020

<sup>301</sup> J. L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, cit., pp. 179-180. Curiously, the author

<sup>302</sup> “The Basic Concepts of United States Foreign Policy”, Address by Secretary of State Dulles Before the Annual Luncheon of the Associated Press, New York, 22 April 1957, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1957*, Department of State Publication 7101, p. 28

<sup>303</sup> Cross-referenced from I. Gellman, *The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952-1961*, cit., p. 434

American assistance in order to preserve the regime - following the example of Jordan's King Hussein, who had requested American military aid on the same grounds in 1957.<sup>304</sup>

As such, the American passive involvement in Lebanon was inherited by the Eisenhower administration from President Truman, with the main contentious matter being, as in other Arab states, the American support for Israel and the partition of Palestine.<sup>305</sup> However, the Chamoun government was a routine recipient of the American aid, both military and civil, in 1955 and 1956 because, as Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr. put it in his telegram to the Embassy in Lebanon, "from association with him [Chamoun] [...], US has come to have great confidence in his judgment, and believes that his conception of

---

<sup>304</sup> Any detailed discussion of the crisis in Jordan is not possible due to the space constraints. In brief, the conflict in Jordan started in 1956, when the newly appointed Prime Minister Suleiman al-Nabulsi tried to overthrow King Hussein and create a coalition with the governments of Syria and Egypt, but the plans never came to fruition due to the considerable economic support that the United States extended to the monarch in order to stabilize his position in spring 1957. Although the nationalist coup was averted, it was indicated by the mobilization of the troops and certain pronouncements that Syria might intervene into the country to help the nationalist movement, while Iraq and Saudi Arabia expressed their intention to protect the monarchy in case of the intervention. The Jordan crisis threatened to turn into a major conflict in the Middle East, especially when Israel started the mobilization in order to occupy the West Bank once Jordan was in the midst of a major war. The participation of Israel could result in another Arab-Israeli conflict, which represented a danger to the American interests in the Middle East. The administration, therefore, felt compelled to move the Sixth Fleet closer to the borders of the country, which ultimately prevented the outbreak of hostilities (summarized from P. Hahn, "Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957", cit., pp. 38-47). Although it could be argued that the actions of the administration prevented the conflict, a lot of researchers believe that the American involvement exacerbated political divisions in the country, especially insofar as the attitude to the West was concerned (for example, see R. Fowler, *More Than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East*, cit., pp. 136-137)

<sup>305</sup> The main source of political instability in Lebanon in the 1950s was the cohabitation of large Christian and Muslim communities in the country. The first president of Lebanon, Bechara El Khoury, was Christian and upheld the interests of the Christian community as well as prohibited the activities of a small Communist party since he considered that it was actively supported by the Muslim communities, which might lead to a religious coup as well as bring the country under the Soviet leadership. This in principle made him a friend of the United States, especially after the crack-down on the members of the Communist party intensified in connection to the Korean War. However, Khoury had low approval ratings among the Christians and Muslims alike due to the allegations of corruption and nepotism, staged elections and active employment of martial law. Consequently, he was forced to step down in a "bloodless coup" on 17 September 1952 and was replaced by Camille Chamoun, another Christian (although supporting the equality of all confessions) and a vehement opponent of Communism, who established a manifestly pro-Western state in Lebanon. The favorable attitude of the Lebanese leadership compelled Dulles to visit the country during his Middle East tour in May 1953, but the visit resulted in an uncomfortable discussion of the American support for Israel with the Muslim leaders of the country. During the two terms in office, the Eisenhower administration would repeatedly face the dilemma the American pro-Israel stance posed for the successful policy implementation in the Middle East. "Except for Israel," Eisenhower remarked in July 1958, "we could form a viable policy in the area." (for more information on American careful balancing in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the reader might refer to P. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961*, University of North Carolina Press, 2006)

best interests of Lebanon and Near East area coincide with ours.”<sup>306</sup> Partly due to those considerable benefits, President Chamoun declared that he supported “Eisenhower Plan one hundred percent”<sup>307</sup> once it was announced - the move which resulted in more vehement opposition during the parliamentary elections from the Muslim communities, which united under Nasserist ideas of preventing the Western countries from interfering in the matters of independent Arab states. The opposition, which was considered to be Communist in its origin, was brutally suppressed in Beirut in May 1957, when the troops loyal to Chamoun fired at pro-Nasser protesters. Moreover, the elections turned victorious for the president since the overwhelming majority of the elected politicians supported his government.<sup>308</sup>

The most controversial undertaking of the Chamoun government was his attempt to introduce the amendments in the Constitution which would allow the incumbent president to serve another term in office. The constitutional changes were expected to be made with the American assistance,<sup>309</sup> while Nasser addressed the anti-Chamoun Muslim militants in Lebanon over the radio, urging them to rebel against the president. The bloody protests erupted in Beirut in May 1958, involving assassinations, mob fighting and arson and rapidly extending to other areas of Lebanon, in connection to which the Chamoun administration requested the United States to send the troops to the country.<sup>310</sup> The issue was seriously

---

<sup>306</sup> Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon, 28 October 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v13/d118>, Date of Access: 07.04.2020

<sup>307</sup> Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 13 January 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v13/d132>, Date of Access: 07.04.2020

<sup>308</sup> The summary is provided based on D. Little, “His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1996, pp. 27-54. The author stated that the protests were triggered by the support for the Eisenhower Doctrine, extremely unpopular in the Arab world. Although that might be true, the opposition in Lebanon was strong prior to the Doctrine and in no small degree was religious in its nature. Besides, the author provides convincing evidence that the elections were financed by the CIA to ensure the most favorable results for the incumbent president.

<sup>309</sup> According to the available primary resources, the Chamoun government often cited the necessity to protect the country from the Communist takeover as the pretext for more American aid, dedicated to maintaining the existing regime and serving Chamoun’s own political ambition. For example, Foreign Minister Malik “lamented incapacity of west to deal with danger of Communist subversion” and “had positive proof Egyptian and Syrian Governments were determined to overthrow present regime in Lebanon” in January 1958 (Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 9 January 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v11/d1>, Date of Access: 07.04.2020). Similarly, Chamoun undoubtedly considered the United States to have no other choice but to extend the assistance since his actions were no longer the matter of only the Lebanese internal affairs: “[W]estern failure to support him will have repercussions among all most moderate and responsible friends and allies of west in ME area” (Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 4 May 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v11/d18>, Date of Access: 07.04.2020)

<sup>310</sup> D. Little, “His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis”, cit., pp. 27-54

entertained by the Eisenhower government, and during the discussions Secretary of State Dulles pointed out that it was impossible to invoke the “Middle East Doctrine”, because it would require the proof that Lebanon was attacked by the United Arab Republic and that the Republic was controlled by the communists. While the Lebanon Crisis was a religious clash, the repercussions of not assisting the country were deemed unacceptable for the United States, although American military presence was made strictly conditional.<sup>311</sup>

Ultimately, the revolution in Iraq coupled the civil war in Lebanon and dangerous political unrest in Jordan as well as lack of clarity over the Western position in Kuwait triggered the “Operation Blue Bat”, a product of Anglo-American military collaboration to prevent the disintegration of the Western influence in the Middle East. The Sixth Fleet and two destroyer squadrons were brought to the shores of Lebanon and the Marine Corps occupied the strategically important sites in Beirut, while the British air forces remained in reserve in Turkey in case of complications. Eisenhower justified the interference on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter in terms of collective self-defense, as well as stated the operation was meant to protect American citizens and assets that came under attack during the protests.<sup>312</sup> This concluded the intervention, which is now widely recognized to have been successful in the short term, but devastating for the American interests in the long run.<sup>313</sup>

---

<sup>311</sup> For the discussion on the matter, see Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, 13 May 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v11/d30>, Date of Access: 07.04.2020. The conditions set by Washington involved 1) filing a complaint with the United Nations Security Council due to the external violation of the country’s independence; 2) securing the support of some Arab states for the complaint and for the involvement of the United States; 3) and as far as President Chamoun was concerned, not pushing his candidacy during the elections (Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon, 13 May 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v11/d31>, Date of Access: 07.04.2020)

<sup>312</sup> Cross-referenced from S. Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East*, cit., pp. 220-230

<sup>313</sup> It is mostly the early research on the intervention that praises Eisenhower for the American involvement. Robert Divine, for example, stated that the intervention served the broader purpose of securing the American interests in the Middle East after the Suez debacle. The author argued that the actions of the President were not meant to destabilize the region as a response to the Iraqi revolution. On the contrary, Eisenhower successfully showed the strength of American determination to protect its allies, which resulted in the assurance on the part of General Abd al-Karim Qasim, the new leader of Iraq, that oil would continue to flow to the global market (for more information, see R. Divine, *Eisenhower And The Cold War*, Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 101-104). Indeed, the short-term advantages of the intervention are almost unanimously recognized today. But in the long-term perspective, Douglas Little believed, Eisenhower set a dangerous precedent, later utilized by his successors in Vietnam - the lack of reasons to invoke the Eisenhower Doctrine resulted in Eisenhower resorting to his powers as commander-in-chief, which allowed him to overcome any Congressional disapproval and to intervene into a civil war of a foreign country on the grounds of upholding the American international credibility (D. Little, “His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis”, cit., pp. 27-54). The same line of arguments is presented more recently by Salim Yaqub, who contends that the intervention in Lebanon was the definitive downfall of the Eisenhower Doctrine, because it showed the United States that “the flow of

The least successful undertaking<sup>314</sup> of the Eisenhower government, which could loosely be attributed to the shortcomings of the doctrine, is the American involvement in the Syrian Crisis in 1957. After the Suez Crisis, Egypt and Syria were considered the center of the Soviet influence in the region by the National Security Council and therefore represented considerable danger for the interests of the United States:

Egyptian and Syrian military and economic dependence on the bloc was increased. By support of the Arab nations and particularly Egypt and Syria throughout this period, the Soviet Union appeared as the defender of the sovereignty of small countries and of Arab nationalism against the threats of Western “imperialism.” The Soviet position as military purveyor and technical adviser gave it a military foothold of great future potential in the heart of the Near East.<sup>315</sup>

Moreover, as it was illustrated during the Suez Crisis, the countries of Western Europe and particularly Britain relied on the provision of the Middle Eastern oil, which in part was controlled by Syria, since the two major oil pipelines ran through its territory.<sup>316</sup> But Syria appeared to be increasingly anti-Western and pro-Soviet, particularly after the intervention in Suez and the aborted Operation Straggle (the CIA attempt of an anti-Communist coup in Syria in 1956). As such, the country even concluded an arms deal with the Soviet Union in November 1956<sup>317</sup> and, as it was already mentioned previously, declared the Eisenhower Doctrine to be a manifestation of “Western imperialism”. The increasingly leftist orientation of Syria coupled with the trade deal concluded with the Soviet Union in July 1957 due to the fact that the country was in dire need of financial assistance, were all

---

Arab nationalism was too strong” (for more information, see S. Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East*, cit., pp. 230-240)

<sup>314</sup> The concept “not successful” here means the Eisenhower Doctrine failed to prevent the spread of the International Communism in a Middle Eastern country, which is its main objective. Different researchers, such as Stephen Blackwell, show that the Syrian Crisis was a crucial cornerstone for rebuilding the “special relations” of Great Britain and the United States after the Suez Crisis, so it could be argued that the episode was a success in certain aspects (for more information, refer to S. Blackwell, “Britain, the United States and the Syrian crisis, 1957”, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2000, 139-158)

<sup>315</sup> Progress Report on United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East (NSC 5428), 22 December 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d178>, Date of Access: 11.04.2020

<sup>316</sup> The first pipeline (belonging to IPC) extended from the Kirkuk region of Iraq across Syria to the Lebanese coast at Tripoli. This pipeline was sabotaged as a sign of solidarity with Egypt during the Suez Crisis. The second one was the Trans-Arabian pipeline (Tapline), which ran from Saudi Arabia cross Jordan and Syria to the port of Sidon in the Lebanon (cross-referenced from O. Almog, *Britain, Israel and the United States, 1955-1958: Beyond Suez*, Routledge, 2002, p. 2)

<sup>317</sup> According to the CIA findings, Syria received “an estimated 130 T-34 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, and 20–25 MIG 15 fighters”, although the fighters were believed to have been destroyed during the UK-French attack in 1956 (Special National Intelligence Estimate, 29 November 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d151>, Date of Access: 11.04.2020)

contributing factors to another attempt at an anti-Communist coup in August 1957, conceived by the CIA and Allen Dulles, although the coup was exposed before it was translated into reality.<sup>318</sup> In response, Syria immediately expelled three American representatives from the country and surrounded the embassy with tanks, which was followed by the expulsion of the Syrian representatives from the United States.<sup>319</sup>

Although not formally invoked, the Eisenhower Doctrine influenced the development of the Syrian Crisis. There is sufficient evidence to believe that the administration tried to encourage the pro-Western states in the region to unite against Syria in order to topple the radical government. For example, Secretary of State Dulles sent the following telegram to Saudi Arabia on 21 August 1957:

We are in receipt of messages of concern from the neighboring Arab countries - Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. Turkey, too, feels that it is in danger of being caught within a Soviet vice. [...] The United States has no purpose or desire to intervene. [...] Of course, under the doctrine [...], we would sympathetically consider a request to assist any country that was attacked by a Syria which itself was dominated by International Communism. We believe, however, that it is highly preferable that Syria's neighbors should be able to deal with this problem without the necessity for any outside intervention.<sup>320</sup>

However, only Turkey started to act against Syria by concentrating 50,000 soldiers near the Syrian border by September 1957, which had invited the attention of the Soviet Union that threatened to interfere unless Turkey stopped gathering troops, as well as Egypt that sent pilots and soldiers to Syria in October in order to jointly defend the country against the Turkish aggression.<sup>321</sup> The situation was rapidly deteriorating into an international crisis, which Dulles referred to as “the greatest peril for us since the Korean War ended”.<sup>322</sup>

---

<sup>318</sup> Before the coup, the Syrian army officers that had the key roles in the operation, willingly surrendered to the Syrian intelligence, handed in the money they received from the CIA and uncovered the details of the plot (for more detail on the CIA operations in Syria, the reader might refer to W. Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II*, Common Courage Press, 2008, pp. 84-88)

<sup>319</sup> Summarized from S. Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East*, cit., pp. 147-181

<sup>320</sup> Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, 21 August 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v13/d364>, Date of Access: 15.04.2020

<sup>321</sup> Cross-referenced from P. Hahn, “Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957”, cit., pp. 38-47. Although the Egyptian contribution was small, the participation of Nasser effectively ruled out the possibility of the participation of any Arab state, since he was so popular in the Arab world. The danger of Turkey's attack was curtailed by the threat of the involvement of the Soviet Union, especially so after the country had just tested the intercontinental ballistic missiles and launched Sputnik (see S. Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East*, cit., p. 170).

<sup>322</sup> Memorandum of a Conversation With the President, White House, Washington, 7 September 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v13/d388>, Date of Access: 15.04.2020

As the international hostilities mounted, the Eisenhower administration appeared to carefully balance its commitment to the principles of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which compelled it to support Turkey, should it move against Syria, a nation controlled by the “International Communism”, with the necessity to prevent a major war with the Soviet Union. The tensions eventually dissipated due to a number of factors, such as Syrian complaint to the United Nations and Saudi proposal to mediate between Turkey and Syria, which allowed the superpowers to draw out of the conflict at the end of October.<sup>323</sup> Moreover, Peter Hahn argues that “the tension over Syria finally broke when Syria and Egypt merged into the United Arab Republic (UAR) on 1 February 1958”. According to the author, the amalgamation was one of the most significant cornerstones of the abandonment of the Eisenhower Doctrine, because the opposition to the merger only antagonized the United States in the Arab world, while the support for the new country helped to neutralize the negative aspects of both Egypt and Syria as Nasser limited the political power of Communists and Syria limited the dictatorial aspirations of Nasser.<sup>324</sup>

The conclusions of the academic research today on the success of the Eisenhower Doctrine are perhaps best summarized by Randall Fowler, who contends that “[t]hough “International Communism” had not exactly invaded the Middle East, at every turn the Eisenhower administration met nothing but foreign-policy failure in the region”.<sup>325</sup> Indeed, the possibility of an immediate Soviet attack was hardly entertained even in Washington during the evolution of the crises described above. However, it does not mean that the policy of containment was not actively at work in the Middle East during those events. As it is stated in the first chapter, Eisenhower’s containment had a preventive character and was directed primarily at securing the long-term strategic interests of the United States and its allies in the region. Therefore, the policy of containment was indeed at work, but mostly in connection to the one often neglected factor – Middle Eastern oil.

---

<sup>323</sup> I. Pearson, “The Syrian Crisis of 1957, the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, and the 1958 landings in Jordan and Lebanon”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2007, pp. 45-64

<sup>324</sup> P. Hahn, “Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957”, cit., pp. 38-47

<sup>325</sup> R. Fowler, *More Than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East*, cit., p. 136

## **Chapter 3. The Importance of Middle Eastern Oil during the Eisenhower Presidency and its Impact on American Foreign Policy Formation**

### **1. Research Overview on Eisenhower and the Significance of his Oil Policy**

The literature on the topic of the importance of oil for the Eisenhower administration still appears rather scarce in comparison to that of later administrations. David Painter, for example, acknowledges the significance of oil in the Suez crisis and underlines Eisenhower's concern about the issue.<sup>326</sup> Burton I. Kaufman in his article identified the importance of oil for both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in terms of its strategic security significance. Both presidents, according to Kaufman, understood the necessity to protect the Middle East from the possible advances of the Soviet Union, and therefore acted preventively, exhibiting discernible continuity in their policies. Furthermore, the author contended that the two presidents relied on the multinational oil companies to provide the security and stability of oil supplies in the region.<sup>327</sup> The article also makes an allowance that the actions of both Truman and Eisenhower administration in providing the protection from the antitrust regulations played a major role in the establishment of OPEC.<sup>328</sup>

---

<sup>326</sup> D. Painter, "Oil and the American Century", *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 99, No. 1, Oil in American History, 2012, pp. 24-39. Painter quotes Eisenhower, who said in his address to the Congress on 21 January 1957: "If the nations [of the Middle East] should lose their independence, if they were dominated by alien forces hostile to freedom [...] Western Europe would be endangered just as though there had been no Marshall Plan, no North Atlantic Treaty Organization".

<sup>327</sup> B. Kaufman, "Mideast Multinational Oil, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Antitrust: the 1950s", *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 63, No. 4, 1977, pp. 937-959. It is argued that unlike Truman, who principally counted on the oil companies to ensure the continuous supply of oil to Europe, Eisenhower sent his special representative Herbert Hoover, Jr. to resolve the Iranian oil dispute in 1953. Herbert Hoover, Jr. was instructed to work closely with the oil companies to create an Iranian oil consortium, which was exempt from the antitrust regulations, since in 1953 the National Security Council issued a famous directive "that the enforcement of the antitrust laws of the United States against the Western oil companies operating in the Near East may be deemed secondary to the national security interest." The fact that the Eisenhower administration took steps to secure the interest of the Big Oil, first by endorsing the content of NSC 138/1 and later by transferring the case under the Department of State (effectively under John Foster Dulles) is recognized by the prevailing number of researchers who write on the subject (for similar arguments, see L. Maugeri, *The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World's Most Controversial Resource*, Praeger, 2006, pp. 74-75).

<sup>328</sup> *Ibidem*: Kaufman remains arguably the most prolific author on the topic of the antitrust regulations under Truman and Eisenhower. He contended that the oil-producing countries, such as Venezuela and Iran, might have



Similarly, David Painter claims that OPEC countries assembled in this organization in 1960 due to the fact that the multinational companies manipulated the posted prices in order to withhold part of the revenue from the host countries in 1959, violating the concession terms and other agreements (as in Iran), aimed at controlling the Middle Eastern oil.<sup>329</sup> This is elaborated by Leonardo Maugeri, who provides additional cause-and-effect link between the imposition of the import caps on oil at 13 percent of domestic consumption (Mandatory Oil Import Program of 1959) and the creation of OPEC. Since the American market represented 40 percent of the global oil consumption, the world experienced the over-saturation of cheap oil that the Seven Sisters were not able to redistribute, which in turn pushed them to reduce the posted prices by 15 percent. Therefore, since the revenues of the host countries were contingent upon the posted price, the host countries saw millions of dollars “vaporize” from their expected earnings.<sup>330</sup>

On the other hand, while the creation of OPEC was initiated largely by Saudi Arabia and represented the virtual termination of the Western control over the production of oil in the region, Nathan Citino argues that the foundation of OPEC served the purpose of undermining the Arab nationalism as well as of securing the Western access to Middle Eastern oil. As such, the unity of the large producers of oil preempted Arab nationalists’ idea of a coordinated Arab oil policy that would redistribute oil throughout the entire Arab world. Moreover, the Western access to oil was not interrupted, and although it was the government of Saudi Arabia that controlled oil instead of Aramco, it still used the same markets for oil. In

---

followed the example of the multinational companies, which preserved a monopoly over the exploration, production, and refining of oil during most of the 1950s and 1960s, and therefore created a virtual cartel of their own. Even though the author acknowledged that the foundation of OPEC was mainly the result of the dissatisfaction connected to the constant exploitation of the Third World by the capitalist West, the decisions concerning the antitrust laws and the amplification of the powers of the multinational oil companies in the Middle East particularly during the Eisenhower administration must have played a significant role in pushing the countries towards the OPEC agreement. The idea of OPEC as a cartel is by far not incontestable, since it has been argued that the OPEC-like quotas would have existed even if OPEC itself had never been founded, as well as that the behavior of OPEC is reminiscent more of risk management than of cartel cooperation (for more information, the reader refer to J. Colgan “The Emperor Has No Clothes: The Limits of OPEC in the Global Oil Market”, *International Organization*, Vol. 68, No. 3, 2014, pp. 599-632). Giuliano Garavini states that although it came to be a tradition to refer to OPEC as “cartel”, it did not have the attributes of one: members did not control production or prices directly. Rather, OPEC was an anti-cartel organization to counterbalance the power of international oil companies (G. Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 123)

<sup>329</sup> D. Painter, “Oil and the American Century”, cit., pp. 24-39

<sup>330</sup> L. Maugeri, *The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World’s Most Controversial Resource*, cit., pp. 83-85

this respect, Saudi Arabia remained a crucially important American ally, and its oil continued to represent an undeniable asset for the defense of Western Europe.<sup>331</sup>

Michael T. Klare demonstrates in his book that both Truman and Eisenhower administration appreciated the existence of the link between the Middle Eastern oil reserves and the conduct of war. To be precise, Eisenhower, just as Roosevelt and Truman, understood the crucial significance of Saudi Arabia, which was “a vital national security interest that must be defended”.<sup>332</sup> Nathan Citino dedicates his study to the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia during the presidency of Eisenhower and concludes that whether for the Soviet threat or for the danger of Arab nationalism, Aramco, and by extension oil, did play the central role in the United States foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia.<sup>333</sup>

Leonardo Maugeri claims that the policy of Eisenhower towards Iran was “dramatically” altered from that of the Truman administration. While Truman worked towards pacifying the British and improving the contentious situation with the newly elected leader of Iran without resorting to ousting him, Eisenhower considered Iran to be intrinsic to American strategic objectives for three reasons: 1) the old Russian and new Soviet interest in the region, including the occupation of the northern part of the country in the aftermath of the Second World War; 2) Iran was a path to the rich oil reserves of the entire Persian Gulf, “which represented a key prize in the struggle for global power”; 3) the necessities of the Korean War, during which Iran supplied the lion share of fuel to the American troops under the United Nations flag. The author suggests that John Foster and Allen Dulles were instrumental in the organization of the coup and, allegedly, responsible for giving Eisenhower a misleading picture about the seriousness of the Communist influence in Iran, unwittingly supported by Mossadegh, who was in desperate need of financial aid in the light of the recent

---

<sup>331</sup> N. Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa'ud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations*, cit., pp. 145-167

<sup>332</sup> M. Klare, *Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Petroleum Dependency*, Penguin Books, 2005, p. 38. What appears to be particularly interesting is that the author identifies a direct link between the Suez crisis and the Eisenhower Doctrine; and as a precondition to it - the perceived close relationship between Nasser and Moscow, which provided the weapons and aircraft to Egypt via Czechoslovakia. Even though it might be argued that Eisenhower prevented the Western powers and Israel from intervening in Egypt, Klare maintains that one of the primary reasons Eisenhower condemned the invasion was his assurance that the downfall of Nasser might inflame Arab nationalism and threaten the existence of the Saudi regime. Thus, the link is drawn between the threat to the national oil interests in the Suez crisis, which generally is not considered to be prevalent for the United States, and the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine. It is therefore possible to make a deductive inference that Saudi Arabia played a significant role in the struggle against the Soviet Union, and hence Eisenhower's version of the policy of containment.

<sup>333</sup> N. Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa'ud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations*, cit., pp. 1-17

oil embargo by the British and therefore considered it necessary to pressure the American administration for the assistance citing the Communist expansionist designs.<sup>334</sup>

A different idea is presented by Francisco Parra, who maintains that Eisenhower did not approve of the covert operation, and that the entire affair was orchestrated by the CIA and the British, while John Foster Dulles worked to stall the intervention and gave the final go-ahead only in the late June of 1953. The author also contends that even though the financial compensation proposed by Mossadegh was “not far from the joint British-American position”, his political stance deteriorated in Iran, and he started to rely on the Communist Tudeh party, which persuaded the Dulles brothers that he was a client of the Soviet Union. In this interpretation, the Dulles brothers were genuinely concerned about the Communist situation in Iran and did not conscientiously exaggerate the fears of the administration.<sup>335</sup> Similarly, Roger Stern maintained that Secretary of State Dulles advocated for the immediate involvement in Iran because of his genuine concern that the Soviet Union would be willing to intervene in the region due to the dwindling oil resources it possessed.<sup>336</sup> Francisco Parra also provides his commentary on the nature of the import caps introduced by the Eisenhower administration in the 1959, which were meant to pacify the domestic oil producer, but in reality made little difference for the ultimate oil imports.<sup>337</sup>

The research also differs in the importance ascribed to the Dulles brothers in terms of shaping of the American foreign policy due to the invested interests they had in the oil business, either due to their personal acquaintances and investments or in connection to Sullivan & Cromwell. Stephen Kinzer, for example, echoing Daniel Yergin, mentions that

---

<sup>334</sup> L. Maugeri, *The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World's Most Controversial Resource*, cit., pp. 65-70

<sup>335</sup> F. Parra, *Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum*, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, London, 2004, pp. 25-28

<sup>336</sup> R. Stern, “Oil Scarcity Ideology in US National Security Policy, 1909-1980”, Working Paper of the Oil, Energy & the Middle East Program, Princeton University Press, 2012, p. 18

<sup>337</sup> F. Parra, *Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum*, cit., pp. 46-47. The author illustrates that even though the strong domestic-oil lobby was able to push through the import caps with the argument that the national security interests would suffer if at times of a crisis the United States was to be denied the access to the Middle Eastern oil, the domestic production would be so underdeveloped and such a small number of fields would be operational that it might endanger the successful resolution of the said crisis for the United States. Even though the administration accepted the premise, according to the author, in reality many states were able to secure the exceptions from the caps for the heavy oil imports, while Canada and Mexico were completely exempt from the quotas, since, it was argued, the availability of their oil could not possibly be endangered by an international crisis. Hence, these measures denied the essence of the reasoning for the introduction of the caps, seeing that its main premise consisted in allowing the domestic companies to invest in the development of new oil fields at home, so that the United States could benefit from the existing oil fields in case of the crisis, but the free availability of the imported oil from Canada and Mexico effectively nullified the argument, even though the prices did go up. As such, the multinationals quickly realized the benefits of keeping the American prices high, since this gave them an opportunity to lower the posted prices.

Allen Dulles used to be the chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department and often dealt with the leaders of the oil countries. Dulles also monitored closely the negotiations of the United States with Iraq and the Turkish Petroleum Company in 1924, which resulted in the renewed concessions.<sup>338</sup> Moreover, Kinzer claims that the achievements of Allen Dulles to secure the interests of Bunker Oil in Columbia against the challenge of Royal Dutch Shell in 1928, was part of the reason he was invited to join Sullivan & Cromwell, where oil companies, particularly Standard Oil, were valuable clients.<sup>339</sup>

Both Daniel Yergin and Matthieu Auzanneau stress the rapid development hydrocarbons imparted on the domestic economy between the 1950s and the 1970s. Daniel Yergin referred to the phenomenon as the creation of “Hydrocarbon Society”,<sup>340</sup> when cars became an integral part not only of economic and social life but also of culture (with the surge of popularity coming particularly from Elvis Presley and his fascination with Cadillacs). Matthieu Auzanneau underlines the connection between the demand for oil and the overall growth of consumerism (increasing number of motels, fast foods, commercial centers, etc.), as well as between the development of oil and the improvement of agriculture (through pesticides and high-yielding crops) and exponential world population growth.<sup>341</sup>

Discussing Eisenhower and his Middle East policy, Randall Fowler briefly observes that although the United States had enough domestic oil reserves to satisfy the growing consumption needs and although the American investment in the region was not significant, the Middle Eastern oil had “immense importance” in terms of “the alliance logic of containment”<sup>342</sup> - “[The Middle East] contains about two thirds of the presently known oil deposits of the world and it normally supplies the petroleum needs of many nations of Europe, Asia and Africa. The nations of Europe are peculiarly dependent upon this supply [...]”<sup>343</sup> Similarly, Timothy Sayle underlines that cheap oil was one of the primary interests in the Middle East precisely because it was in the center of the energy production and fragile economic recovery of the war-torn European allies.<sup>344</sup> Giuliano Garavini also maintains that

---

<sup>338</sup> D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, Simon & Schuster, 1991, p. 201

<sup>339</sup> S. Kinzer, *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War*, cit., p. 47-48

<sup>340</sup> D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, Simon & Schuster, 1991, p. 541. The author cites that “the number of motor vehicles in the United States increased from 45 million in 1949 to 119 million in 1972”.

<sup>341</sup> M. Auzanneau, *Oil, Power and War: A Dark History*, Chelsea Green Publishing, 2018, pp. 303-311

<sup>342</sup> R. Fowler, *More Than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East*, cit., p. 27

<sup>343</sup> Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East, 5 January 1957, *Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1957: containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the president, January 1 to December 31, 1957*, p. 6

<sup>344</sup> T. Sayle, *Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*, cit., p. 32

the interest of the United States and its oil giants in the Middle East, and particularly in Saudi Arabia, had to do with “the emergence of a promising new market for Middle-Eastern petroleum in Western Europe” due to the necessity to overcome economic problems and generate the economic growth in order to “resist the spread of international communism”.<sup>345</sup>

Although the overall research on oil and the presidency of Eisenhower is by no means extensive, it is, however, indicative of the important place the resource occupied in his foreign policy. It is, therefore, amiss that few, if any, studies concentrated on the role the Middle East oil played in formulation of Eisenhower’s foreign policy, particularly in connection to the policy of containment of the Soviet Union. Although Eisenhower was not the first president to understand the significance of the Middle Eastern oil in strategic security planning, it could be argued that he was the first president to take active steps to ensure America’s continual access to the resource in the region and to protect it from the external influence. The implications this could have for the study on his presidency and legacy are conspicuous enough to merit an in-depth analysis, which thus far has remained quite sketchy.

## **2. Domestic and International Importance of Oil during the Eisenhower Administration**

When Eisenhower assumed the office in 1953, the importance of oil in the domestic industrial complex had already become undeniable. In comparison to the Truman administration, however, the production of oil during the Eisenhower presidency experienced an unprecedented increase. Reportedly, in 1950 the total world output of crude oil exceeded 537 million metric tons (around 3.67 billion barrels) a year, and during the whole decade it showed impressive growth annually, which allowed the production of crude oil to exceed 1050 million metric tons (7.7 billion barrels) a year for the first time in history in 1960.<sup>346</sup> World production of oil per day increased from 13.15 million barrels in 1953 up to 21.03 million barrels in 1960, with the total daily production surging more than twofold in just one decade.<sup>347</sup> As such, the average annual growth of oil production globally equaled 10.2 percent from 1950 to 1960.<sup>348</sup>

---

<sup>345</sup> G. Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*, cit., p. 71

<sup>346</sup> P. Odell, *An Economic Geography of Oil* (Routledge Revivals), Routledge, 2013 (reprint of the 1963 ed.), p. 15

<sup>347</sup> This includes crude oil, shale oil, oil sands and natural gas liquid. The data were compiled by Worldwatch Institute from U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of Energy data (cross-referenced from the

Although annual production of crude oil in the United States grew from 1.97 billion barrels in 1950 to 2.57 billion barrels in 1960,<sup>349</sup> which allowed the country to remain by far the largest producer of oil in the world, the total share of North America in the world oil production declined significantly from more than a half of the global production (54.1 percent) in 1951 to 38.6 percent in 1960.<sup>350</sup> The production of petroleum in the Middle East region grew rapidly in the discussed period: the overall output increased more than three-fold from 612 million barrels in 1950 to 1.93 billion barrels in 1960. The striking growth of output is also attributed to the fact that six out of twenty world's largest oil discoveries took place in this decade, five of which - in the Middle East: Safaniya (Saudi Arabia, 1951), Rumaila North and South (Iraq, 1953), Manifa (Saudi Arabia, 1957), Khurais (Saudi Arabia, 1957), Ahwaz (Iran, 1958).<sup>351</sup> Thus, the share of Middle Eastern oil in global production increased from 17 percent in 1950 to 25 percent in 1960.<sup>352</sup>

The relatively modest rise in the share of the global output of oil for the Middle East and a remarkable slump in the share of the United States is explained by the exceptional surge of production in the Soviet Union (from 37.9 million tons in 1950 to 147.9 million tons in 1960)<sup>353</sup>. The oil industry was practically dormant in the immediate post-war years due to the large-scale destruction of infrastructure, but between 1955 and 1960, Soviet oil production doubled, and by the end of the 1950s, the country surpassed Venezuela and became the second largest oil producer in the world after the United States. In fact, according

---

supporting dataset for L. Brown, *World on the Edge: How to Prevent Environmental and Economic Collapse*, W. W. Norton & Company, 2011).

<sup>348</sup> C. van der Linde, *Dynamic International Oil Markets: Oil Market Developments and Structure, 1860-1990*, Springer Science+Business Media, 1991, p. 73

<sup>349</sup> In fact, during the Eisenhower administration proper the growth of crude oil production was significantly less pronounced, with 2.36 billion barrels in 1953 and 2.57 billion barrels in 1960, meaning that 65 percent of the decade-long growth took place before 1953 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis, U.S. Production of Crude Oil,

Mode of Access: <https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=p&s=mcrfpus1&f=a>, Date of Access: 20.05.2020)

<sup>350</sup> C. van der Linde, *Dynamic International Oil Markets: Oil Market Developments and Structure, 1860-1990*, cit., p. 106

<sup>351</sup> F. Robelius, "Giant Oil Fields - The Highway to Oil: Giant Oil Fields and Their Importance for Future Oil Production" in *Uppsala Dissertations from the Faculty of Science & Technology* (Book 69), Uppsala University Press, 2007, p. 79

<sup>352</sup> C. Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa*, Columbia University Press, 1982 (the reference is from Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, *Annual Statistical Bulletin*, 1978).

<sup>353</sup> A. Heinrich (ed.), *Export Pipelines from the CIS Region: Geopolitics, Securitization, and Political Decision-Making (Changing Europe)*, Ibidem Press, 2014

to the estimations of Daniel Yergin, “Soviet output was equal to about three-fifths of the total production in the Middle East”.<sup>354</sup>

The increasing production of oil is connected to the surge in international demand. Global oil consumption grew from 436 million tons in 1950 to 753 million tons in 1955 to 1020 million tons in 1960.<sup>355</sup> It was in the decade from the 1950s to the 1960s that oil supplanted coal as the dominant resource; it was increasingly used in transportation, in energy production and in the industrial complex, as well as represented the raw material for a range of additional products from synthetic rubber to artificial fibers. Oil came to play such an important role in every aspect of human life that the global consumption increased at an average rate of 7.5 percent a year, and especially fast in Western Europe and Japan.<sup>356</sup> During the presidency of Eisenhower, Western European consumption of oil increased by about 15 percent per year, and by 1961 oil accounted for roughly a third of Western European total energy consumption, 75 percent of which came from the Middle East (141 of 192 million metric tons of crude oil), while Japan experienced even more acute dependence on the Middle Eastern oil, importing 26 of 33 million metric tons.<sup>357</sup>

The consumption in the United States grew from 6.5 million barrels per day (around 2.3 billion barrels a year) in 1950 to 9.8 million barrels per day (3.5 billion barrels a year) in 1960, which represented the annual growth of about 4 to 5 percent, a modest increase in comparison to Japan and Western Europe. In the United States, the majority of oil consumption was attributable to transportation: in 1950 transportation consumed 51.6 percent of oil available for the United States, while in 1960 it increased to 52.4 percent.<sup>358</sup> While the increase might seem moderate in percentage terms, the total share of oil for transportation amounted to 1.18 billion barrels in 1950 and to 1.83 billion barrels in 1960.

A remarkable difference between the United States and the rest of the world in terms of oil consumption for transportation consisted in the number of automobiles and other vehicles available to the American consumer. In 1950, US citizens drove 40 million cars, about 75 per cent of the world total, while in Europe the first place was occupied by the United Kingdom, with only 2.25 million cars, followed closely by France, with 2 million

---

<sup>354</sup> D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, cit., p. 515

<sup>355</sup> K. Kondratyev, V. Krapivin, C. Varotsos, *Global Carbon Cycle and Climate Change*, Springer, 2003, p. 30

<sup>356</sup> J. Bamberg, *British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-1975: The Challenge of Nationalism* (History of British Petroleum, Vol. 3), Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 216

<sup>357</sup> B. Kaufman, “Mideast Multinational Oil, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Antitrust: the 1950s”, cit., pp. 937-959

<sup>358</sup> M. Ratner, C. Glover, *U.S. Energy: Overview and Key Statistics*, Congressional Research Service, 2014, p. 8

cars. By 1960, the number of cars used by the citizens of the United States had increased by 50 percent, amounting to 61.7 million cars (one for every 2.9 people).<sup>359</sup>

The increase in the number of the available vehicles was contingent on the increased number of the available roads. As Barack Obama acknowledged in 2009, “President Eisenhower made an investment that revolutionized the way we travel - an investment that made our lives easier and our economy grow”.<sup>360</sup> To be true, Eisenhower is widely credited with the initiative that secured the full funding for the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways in 1956. As Elisheva Bias points out, the reasons for the initiative were not limited only by the economic and demographic considerations (such as the previous roads being unreliable and unsafe), but the proposal was also highly influenced by the Cold War anxieties (in case of a nuclear attack, the population would have to be evacuated quickly, but the old road system did not allow speedy evacuation).<sup>361</sup>

David Jones in his study argues that Eisenhower could not be fully credited with the successful passage of the Interstate Highway Bill, since his initial proposal, which called for bond financing, was ignored by Congress, but his popularity and his support allowed the chairs of the House and Senate subcommittees on roads to produce a compromise legislation, meant to pacify all the actors involved, and which was signed by the president under the name of the Federal Aid Highway Act on 29 June 1956.<sup>362</sup> The Act provided for a 41,000-mile superhighway system (later raised to 42,500 miles) that was meant to cover the entire country. The Federal government was to pay 90 percent of the costs, and the majority of money would come from the highway trust fund accumulated out of gasoline taxes - the compromise solution, supported by a very powerful “highway lobby”, which included companies across industries from automobile makers to oil companies.<sup>363</sup>

The United States oil consumption was also marked by an important development - the country’s increasing reliance on the imported oil. The imports more than doubled during the discussed period, from 177.7 million barrels in 1950 to 371.6 million barrels in 1960,

---

<sup>359</sup> S. Pirani, *Burning Up: A Global History of Fossil Fuel Consumption*, Pluto Press, 2018, p. 83

<sup>360</sup> Remarks at the DeSoto Next Generation Solar Energy Center in Arcadia, Florida, 27 October 2009, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack Obama, 2009, Book II - July 1 to December 31, 2009*, p. 1593

<sup>361</sup> E. Blas, “The Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways: The Road to Success?”, *The History Teacher*, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2010, pp. 127-142

<sup>362</sup> D. Jones, *Mass Motorization and Mass Transit: An American History and Policy Analysis*, Indiana University Press, 2010, pp. 109-110

<sup>363</sup> D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, cit., p. 553



constituting 11.6 percent of domestic demand.<sup>364</sup> Although the imports were comparatively modest – especially taking into account the reliance on the imported oil the United States experienced during, for example, the Iraq War in 2003 – and although the country was more than self-sustainable in terms of oil production, the cheap oil from the Middle East was more attractive for the producer than the expensive American oil. Moreover, the accelerated production and exports of the Soviet oil were a cause of anxiety for the Eisenhower administration, which categorized the Soviet oil exports as part of the so-called “Soviet economic offensive”.<sup>365</sup> Due to the fact that the Soviet oil was purchased including by certain Western European states and allies (especially so Italy, Austria, Germany, France, and Sweden), the Eisenhower administration reportedly considered importers of the Soviet oil to be vulnerable to the economic and political pressure from the adversary.<sup>366</sup> The general attractiveness of the Soviet oil was explained by the fact that the Soviets sold oil at 20 or 30 percent discounts in respect to the prices of the Seven Sister, but this development, together with the influx of the cheap Middle Eastern oil, pushed the global prices downwards, which was felt particularly acutely by the American independent companies operating on the domestic market.<sup>367</sup>

However, the exports from the Soviet Union represented no more than 2.6 percent of global petroleum exports in 1958 and had increased to 5.2 percent by 1960, a modest overall amount, but with a discernible growth. During the discussed period, the global oil exports nearly quadrupled, from 2.4 million barrels per day to over 8.2 million barrels a day, with the exports constituting 39.3 percent of the total global production. Venezuela ceded its leading position as the world’s largest exporter of petroleum, which it still occupied in 1948, and was replaced by the Middle Eastern region, where the exports increased from 40.6 percent in 1948 to 56.9 percent of total global exports in 1960.<sup>368</sup>

---

<sup>364</sup> U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis, U.S. Imports of Crude Oil, Mode of Access: <https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=p&s=mcrimus1&f=a>, Date of Access: 20.05.2020

<sup>365</sup> D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, cit., p. 515

<sup>366</sup> The largest importer of Soviet oil was Finland (from the early 1950s, the Soviet Union delivered around 80-90 percent of Finish oil) up until 1959, when the first place was occupied by Italy (for more information, the reader could refer to N. Jensen-Eriksen, “The first wave of the Soviet oil offensive: The Anglo-American Alliance and the flow of ‘Red Oil’ to Finland during the 1950s”, *Business History*, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2007, pp. 348-366)

<sup>367</sup> L. Maugeri, *The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World’s Most Controversial Resource*, cit., pp. 82-83

<sup>368</sup> G. Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*, cit., p. 39. It should be noted that 80 percent of the production in the Middle East at that time was controlled by the Seven Sisters (AIOC, Royal

It might seem that the demand for oil worldwide matched its supply, but already in the 1950s the production of oil exceeded the global necessity and oversaturated the market. During the Eisenhower presidency, however, this development was not readily visible first due to the Iranian nationalization in 1951, which resulted in the imposition of the oil embargo until the CIA-orchestrated coup d'état in 1953. The oil embargo threatened to undermine the rearmament and economic reconstruction of the Western allies, since such reconstruction depended on the steady flow of oil.<sup>369</sup> The other development that influenced the category of oil supply was the Suez Crisis of 1956, which led to the limited delivery of oil due to the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the resulting suspension of oil transfer, as well as the sabotage of more than half of the Eastern Mediterranean pipeline capacity in Syria (from 40 million to 14 million tons annually).<sup>370</sup> As the direct consequence of the closure, oil supply was to be carried out around the Cape, covering the distance of about 11,200 miles, which led to the increase in the number of oil tanker fleet and the emergence of supertankers to reduce the nominal cost of oil delivered through a longer route. The share of tankers in the world's fleet had increased sharply by 1959 to constitute 30.3 percent (in comparison to only 19.5 percent in 1949).<sup>371</sup>

The increasing production and the leaps in global oil supply influenced the development of crude oil prices in the United States: a barrel of WTI crude oil cost \$2.57 in January 1953, but experienced a sudden surge in June 1953, hitting \$2.82. The price remained more or less stable until February 1957, when it experienced another sudden increase, hitting the maximum of \$3.07. Since then, WTI price was slowly going down to settle firmly at \$2.97 in March 1959 until July 1964.<sup>372</sup> After the revision of the pricing system in the Middle East following the international pressure connected to the cartel-like character of the operation of the multinational companies in the region (as discussed previously), the price of Middle Eastern oil remained stable at \$1.71 until 1953, when it experienced an upward adjustment to \$1.93. Then it remained fixed at this level and was

---

Dutch Shell, SoCal, Gulf Oil, Texaco, Esso, Socony), discussed in the previous chapter. The Seven Sisters experienced the apogee of their activity in the 1950s until the introduction of OPEC in 1960.

<sup>369</sup> S. Marsh, "The United States, Iran and operation 'Ajax': Inverting interpretative orthodoxy", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2003, pp. 1-38

<sup>370</sup> P. H. Frankel, "Oil Supplies During the Suez Crisis - On Meeting a Political Emergency", *The Journal of Industrial Economics*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1958, pp. 85-100

<sup>371</sup> D. Todd, *Industrial Dislocation: The Case of Global Shipbuilding* (Routledge Revivals), Routledge, 2019 (reprint of 1991 ed.)

<sup>372</sup> West Texas Intermediate (WTI or NYMEX) Crude Oil Prices per Barrel - 70 Year Historical Chart, *Macrotrends*, Mode of Access: <https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart>, Date of Access: 26.04.2020

increased one more time to reach \$2.08 in 1957 to subsequently fall to \$1.76 in 1960.<sup>373</sup> The typical cost of production (maintenance and expansion; tax and royalty payments not considered) in the 1950s was evaluated at \$0.51 in Venezuela, \$0.16 in the Middle East, and \$1.73 in the United States.<sup>374</sup>

The general attractiveness of the imported oil due to the relatively low prices in comparison to the WTI was rapidly becoming an issue for the Eisenhower administration. For example, the large imports depressed the development of domestic oil production and fossil fuels extraction. In the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration experienced considerable pressure from the Independent Petroleum Association of America (conventionally known as “the independents”), supported in turn by the National Coal Association, to reduce the amount of petroleum imported from abroad. As a result, on 29 July 1957, President Eisenhower addressed the oil importers operating east of the Rocky Mountains to voluntarily reduce their oil imports of crude oil, which did not prove successful, since the imports continued to grow.<sup>375</sup>

While the position of the independents exercised considerable leverage on the government of the United States, particularly because they controlled the exploration and extraction activities on the territory of the country, thus limiting America’s increasing dependence of the imported oil, this influence was hardly comparable with that of the giants in the Middle East, virtual super-states.<sup>376</sup> Nonetheless, domestic oil production was just as much the question of national security as the access to the Middle Eastern oil was. As such, already in July 1954 Eisenhower established an Advisory Committee on Energy Supplies and Resources Policy, which was directed to study the resources and supplies situation of the United States in order to “strengthen the national defense” as well as to evaluate the assurance of supplies both for the economic development and “for any future emergency”.<sup>377</sup> On 26 February 1955 the committee made the following statement:

---

<sup>373</sup> J. Blair, *The Control of Oil*, Vintage Books, 1978, p. 118

<sup>374</sup> C. van der Linde, *Dynamic International Oil Markets: Oil Market Developments and Structure, 1860-1990*, cit., p. 124

<sup>375</sup> W. Mead, “The System of Government Subsidies to the Oil Industry”, *Natural Resources Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1970, pp. 113-125

<sup>376</sup> L. Maugeri, *The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World’s Most Controversial Resource*, cit., p. 83

<sup>377</sup> “Mandatory Oil Import Control Program, Its Impact Upon the Domestic Minerals Industry and National Security”, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, Second Session, 13, 14 and 16 May 1968, Serial No. 90-25, p. 22

[...] if the imports of crude and residual oils should exceed significantly the respective proportions that these imports of oils bore to the production of domestic crude oil in 1954, the domestic fuels situation could be so impaired as to endanger the orderly industrial growth which assures the military and civilian supplies and reserves that are necessary to the national defense. There would be an inadequate incentive for exploration and the discovery of new sources of supply.<sup>378</sup>

On 21 June 1955, the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 authorized the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization to advise the President when it was determined that certain resources were imported to the United States in such amounts as to render the country susceptible to any national security breaches. Already in August 1955 the Director identified that such a threat existed in terms of Middle Eastern oil and issued several warnings to the importers both in 1955 and throughout 1956 to voluntarily limit their purchase. After the independents filed a petition to limit the imports of oil due to security considerations in December 1956, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization advised the President to take action in order to require the importers to reduce their purchase, but the action was temporarily suspended due to the Suez Crisis. The same advice was extended one more time to the President in April 1957 following the resolution of the Suez Crisis, which resulted in the subsequent investigation of oil imports and the requirement to voluntarily limit the imports in July 1957.<sup>379</sup>

The main problem with the voluntary restrictions consisted, however, in a number of loopholes that allowed the importers to follow the prescription only nominally. For example, the most common way to circumvent the provision to limit purchases consisted in the imports of oil derivatives as opposed to the import of crude oil. The derivatives did not fall under the limitations until the passage of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, which broadened the national security provision to authorize the President to limit the importation of such derivatives as well as crude oil.<sup>380</sup> The expanded provision allowed Eisenhower to carry out other actions in order to regulate any oil-related issues that threatened to impair

---

<sup>378</sup> Report No. 232, Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, 84th Congress, First Session, Senate, 28 April 1955, p. 4

<sup>379</sup> "Mandatory Oil Import Control Program, Its Impact Upon the Domestic Minerals Industry and National Security", Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, cit., pp. 22-23

<sup>380</sup> J. Bialos, "Oil Imports And National Security: The Legal And Policy Framework For Ensuring United States Access To Strategic Resources", *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1989, pp. 235-300. In particular, the concern had to do with the findings by the Commerce Department that although domestic demand grew by 216.8 percent from 1954 to 1958, domestic crude oil production rose only by 5.8 percent. This alone allowed to draw a conclusion that oil imports grew even after the establishment of voluntary restrictions.

national security, making it possible for him to establish Mandatory Oil Import Program (MOIP) on 10 March 1959.<sup>381</sup>

There is also evidence, convincingly cited by Daniel Yergin among other researchers, that the Eisenhower administration, and particularly so Eisenhower himself, John Foster Dulles and Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy Clarence Randall, resented the introduction of the import quotas on any grounds, and even more so on the grounds of national security. For example, Randall commented that the national security policy would be better served if the United States conserved its oil reserves instead of using them for domestic purposes: “Our policy should be to conserve that which we have rather than to take measures which would cause our supplies to be exhausted more rapidly”.<sup>382</sup>

Moreover, the telephone conversation between Secretary of State Dulles and Attorney General Herbert Brownell Jr. suggests that Brownell opined that “this business about the national security is a good deal of window dressing”, while Dulles considered that the independent companies were trying to improve their market position by appealing to the security concerns:

What they are doing is to try to put the price of oil up and put more of the Texas wells into production and accelerate new drilling which will only happen if the price goes up. They are beginning to run dry and it takes more drilling to get the same amount of oil as before and so the cost is higher.<sup>383</sup>

There is also evidence of the pressure put on the administration by the independent oil companies in connection to the violation of anti-trust laws in case the government decided to “break down the formula for imports into individual companies”, and the Secretary of State Dulles even remarked that he “does not want to go to jail in his later years instead of retiring to Duck”.<sup>384</sup> Likewise, President Eisenhower pointed out that “that unless the Executive takes

---

<sup>381</sup> Proclamation 3279 - Adjusting Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products Into the United States, 10 March 1959, President of the United States Dwight Eisenhower, The American Presidency Project, Mode of Access: <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-3279-adjusting-imports-petroleum-and-petroleum-products-into-the-united>, Date of Access: 29.04.2020. According to this Proclamation, “in Districts I-IV [consisting of the Lower 48 with the exception of the states, included in District V] the maximum level of imports of crude oil, unfinished oils, and finished products, except residual fuel oil to be used as fuel, shall be approximately 9% of total demand in these districts”, while the imports in District V (consisting of the following states: California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Nevada, and Arizona) were to be reduced to the difference between the estimated demand and domestic production in the district.

<sup>382</sup> Cross-referenced from D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, Simon & Schuster, 1991, p. 537-538

<sup>383</sup> Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Attorney General (Brownell), 2 July 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v10/d260>, Date of Access: 14.05.2020

<sup>384</sup> Ibidem: Duck meaning Dulles’ summer home on Duck Island on Lake Ontario.

some action, Congress will, and there is some doubt that if he were to veto new legislation, the veto would be upheld” when talking about the exigency of coming to some sort of conclusion on the mandatory nature of import quotas.<sup>385</sup>

Although it is hardly possible to discuss the true intentions and reasoning behind the introduction of mandatory import quotas by the Eisenhower administration, given the space limits of the present paper, it could be assumed that the administration was presented with a number of conflicting factors, all having to do with the national security of the United States and the ready availability of the Middle Eastern oil. While it remains to be dubious and open for further analysis, for the purposes of this paper it will be taken for granted that Eisenhower considered it necessary to introduce the oil caps because it was determined that the excessive dependence on the imported oil from the Middle East coupled with the underdevelopment of domestic production might land the United States in a dangerous situation if an international crisis occurred, especially if taking into account that the Soviet Union had at its disposal abundant and developed oil facilities. An inference of this nature appears in consonance with the evidence presented henceforth (and it will not negate the original argument if the inference is incorrect), although the future research on this topic would benefit from a more detailed analysis of the administration’s original intentions and their gradual evolution.

During the deliberations on the nature of the mandatory oil caps, it was deemed necessary to consider excluding oil coming from Canada and Mexico, since it was argued that oil arriving from the territories immediately adjacent to the United States overland could not be cut short by the actions of the adversary and therefore did not fall under the national security provision. Besides, it was determined that the United States should give a preferential treatment to Canadian oil because this would also stimulate the production of oil in Canada pursuant to the US-Canadian plan to share resources in time of war, as well as in Venezuela, where Canada imported oil from, and would reduce “Free World reliance on Middle East oil”.<sup>386</sup> However, according to the evaluations, the market of Venezuela suffered

---

<sup>385</sup> Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State, 10 November 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume IV, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v04/d285>, Date of Access: 20.03.2020

<sup>386</sup> Memorandum From the Secretary of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Cullen) to the Chairman of the Council (Randall), 18 December 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume IV, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v04/d290>, Date of Access: 25.03.2020

substantially from the import quotas, since the demand for its oil on the American market shrank so much that the loophole with Canada did not work.<sup>387</sup>

The oil import quotas lasted until 1973 when they were lifted by President Nixon and they might seem to represent a direct contradiction to the supposed importance of Middle Eastern oil for the Eisenhower administration, seeing that this oil was effectively prohibited to enter the United States - the largest oil market in the world at that time. However, it could be potentially explained by referring to the United States National Petroleum Policy. As it was demonstrated above, the importance of Middle Eastern oil on the global market was growing at a disproportionately high speed. Particularly, the Western European dependency on Middle Eastern oil (75 percent of total Western oil imports in the late 1950s) and, by extension, the NATO dependency must have caused the Eisenhower government to deliberate on the ways to exercise some sort of control on the situation. Such concerns were undoubtedly further aggravated by the Suez Crisis – as David Painter mentioned in his article, the possibility of losing Middle Eastern oil was comparable to losing Europe and NATO for President Eisenhower.<sup>388</sup>

Therefore, the Eisenhower government took steps to insulate the United States from the eventuality of losing the Middle East and its oil supplies to the enemy to the extent it was possible under the conditions of general oil availability for the United States and its Western European allies. For such purposes, back in November 1953 the National Security Council prepared the statement of policy NSC 97/6 “A National Petroleum Program”, which determined the following:

It should be the objective of the United States to develop and insure, in conjunction with its allies, resources which will provide an adequate supply of petroleum products to meet the combined requirements of the United States and its allies in a future major war.<sup>389</sup>

In order to achieve that objective, the United States had to recognize the importance of Middle Eastern oil, but likewise needed to gain access to the alternative sources of petroleum in order to ensure its availability at the times of a crisis. Special emphasis was given to the development of oil fields and the refinery capacity in the Western Hemisphere,

---

<sup>387</sup> Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, American Republics, Volume V, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d351>, Date of Access: 25.03.2020

<sup>388</sup> D. Painter, “Oil and the American Century”, cit., pp. 24-39

<sup>389</sup> Statement of Policy by the National Security Council “NSC 97/6 - A National Petroleum Program”, 16 November 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v01p2/d64>, Date of Access: 27.03.2020

i.e. in Canada, Venezuela and the United States proper. During the discussions on the provision of exemptions for the Canadian oil, it was argued that the increased reliance on the oil sources from the Western Hemisphere would “lessen the political leverage and economic impact on Free World security of the denial or interruption of Middle East oil”.<sup>390</sup> Therefore, the imposition of the mandatory oil import quotas could be viewed as in line with the general argument of the present paper: the importance of Middle Eastern oil became undeniable for the purposes of the Cold War during the Eisenhower administration and required certain preventive measures. Indeed, while the foreign policy objectives in their majority had to do with the assurance of the American access to the Middle Eastern resources, the domestic oil import caps served a different purpose - they were meant to protect the national security of the United States if such access was no longer granted due to whatever reasons - the Soviet occupation or the unpredictable outcomes of the Arabian nationalism.

This same purpose was continuously pursued in Western Europe simultaneously with the efforts to shield the United States economy from the dangerous dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Particularly, it was meant to be achieved through the development of the alternative sources of energy and better conservation practices, which would ensure that Western Europe had enough oil not to succumb to external danger before the United States was able to supply oil to its immediate allies. For example, the changes into NSC 5820/1 “Western European Dependence on Middle East Petroleum” agreed upon during the deliberations of the National Security Council on 13 May 1959 included the following provisions:

[...] in order to retard Western Europe’s increasing dependence on Middle East oil and to reduce the effects on Western Europe of an emergency created by any complete or partial denial of Middle East oil resources, the United States should continue to encourage such action as is economically and politically feasible to facilitate the orderly development of alternative Free World sources of oil and other forms of energy outside the Middle East, and the broad diversification of means of transporting fuel in the Free World. The United States should also urge Western European countries to increase their petroleum stockpiles and to have in readiness emergency plans for conservation, sharing and transportation of oil.<sup>391</sup>

---

<sup>390</sup> Memorandum From the Secretary of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Cullen) to the Council, 15 December 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume IV, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v04/d289>, Date of Access: 25.03.2020

<sup>391</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 406th Meeting of the National Security Council, 13 May 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume IV, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v04/d298>, Date of Access: 01.07.2020



The preoccupation with the availability of oil for Western European allies at the times of an emergency had to do with a number of factors pertaining to the Middle East, but especially so with the legacy of the Suez Crisis and the possibility of such significant shortages of the available oil as to render problematic the economic solvency and political security of such valuable allies as Great Britain, as discussed later. It therefore appears that the introduction of oil caps was in consonance with the overall ‘containment’ policy, pursued by the Eisenhower administration both domestically and abroad. The import quotas were meant to prevent the American ‘addiction’ to the foreign resources and induced the increase in production capacities of the United States.

### **3. The Significance of Middle Eastern Oil for ‘Containment’ Purposes of the Eisenhower Administration**

The Middle Eastern region was discussed in connection to the American foreign policy almost immediately after Eisenhower assumed the office in 1953. As such, NSC 26/2 was revisited just days after the Presidential inauguration in 1953 and replaced by NSC 176, later reworked into NSC 5401, which reinvigorated the efforts to enforce the “denial policy” with the Allies both in Europe and the Middle East, particularly through bringing Aramco back to supporting this policy after it abandoned it in 1952. The policy was transformed with the introduction of NSC 5714 “Protection and Conservation of Middle East Oil Resources and Facilities” on 29 May 1957, which is barely declassified to this day. However, it is known that the document presupposed the efforts to conserve and protect the Middle Eastern oil facilities, as well as the allowance of the last resort policy of destroying the wells through an unspecified “direct action”.<sup>392</sup>

In the early months of his presidency, Eisenhower had to deal also with another major document of the Truman administration – NSC 138/1 “National Security Problems Concerning Free World Petroleum Demands and Potential Supplies”. The meeting of the National Security Council in April 1953 determined that the civil suit was indeed preferential to the criminal proceedings, while John Foster Dulles considered even the civil suit to be a burden for the American security interests: “Secretary Dulles again made it plain that he

---

<sup>392</sup> S. Everly, “U.S., Britain Developed Plans to Disable or Destroy Middle Eastern Oil Facilities from Late 1940s to Early 1960s in Event of a Soviet Invasion”, *National Security Archive*, Mode of Access: <https://bit.ly/35qGB2q>, Date of Access: 07.10.2019

wished to go on record as to the dangerous effect on our national security of the decision to go forward with this civil suit.”<sup>393</sup> Moreover, as Kaufman argued in his article, Eisenhower considered it necessary to further alleviate the anti-trust pressure for the Big Oil due to the unraveling situation in Iran and the necessity to create the ‘International Consortium’, discussed in detail in the previous chapter. According to Kaufman, after the National Security Council came to the conclusion that the participation of the American oil companies in the consortium was dictated by the security interests of the United States, J. S. Leach, the chairman of the Board of Texaco, replied the following:

However, as we wish to be quite sure that the Attorney General is satisfied that all final agreements which are executed pursuant to the proposed plan will not separately or collectively constitute a violation of the antitrust laws, or create a violation of antitrust laws not already existing, we feel that we should not become finally obligated under any agreement or understandings in pursuance of such plan, until they have been first examined and approved by the Attorney General.<sup>394</sup>

It is therefore argued that the Eisenhower administration believed that the security deliberations outweighed the Department of Justice claim that the oil majors violated the anti-trust laws of the United States, which is particularly well illustrated in the Department of Justice decision to grant the anti-trust immunity to the oil companies that participated in the consortium. As it were, the immunity would be granted again on several occasions, when the strategic security interests came in conflict with the anti-trust laws.

Another issue inherited from the Truman administration in the Middle East was the lack of any viable agenda for the American actions in connection to the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by the government of Prime Minister Mossadegh. The Secretary of State Dulles was of a very strong opinion concerning the Communist danger in Iran and felt it required proper handling:

Not only would the free world be deprived of the enormous assets represented by Iranian oil production and reserves, but the Russians would secure these assets and thus henceforth be free of any anxiety about their petroleum situation. Worse still, [...] if Iran succumbed to the Communists there was little doubt that in short

---

<sup>393</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 139th Meeting of the National Security Council, 8 April 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v01p2/d163>, Date of Access: 09.04.2020

<sup>394</sup> Cross-referenced from B. Kaufman, “Oil and Antitrust: The Oil Cartel Case and the Cold War”, cit., pp. 35-56

order the other areas of the Middle East, with some 60% of the world's oil reserves, would fall into Communist control.<sup>395</sup>

It could be argued that the importance of the Iranian oil became more pronounced after the embargo Britain imposed on that oil, especially in the context of the Korean War, for which Iran had been the principal source of fuel, particularly for the American military equipment and armed forces operating under the United Nations flag in Korea.<sup>396</sup> The traditional interest of the Soviet Union in the region, especially after the Communists tried to receive oil concessions in the northern part of the country,<sup>397</sup> coupled with the signals the United States received from Mossadegh about the increasing Communist influence in the country might have played a significant role in the following covert operation, described in detail in the previous chapter.

However, the latest available evidence indicates that the United States was fully aware that the Communist Tudeh Party had no possibility to seize power in Iran or to invite the Soviet Union to receive the Iranian concession (something the Tudeh was known to strive for). As Mark Gasiorowski argues in his studies, all the estimations of the CIA in that period showed that Mossadegh, despite his occasional 'flirtation' with the party that loosely supported him, was firmly against the Communist takeover and did not allow the Communist Party members to occupy any substantial positions in the government. Moreover, the CIA at one point even considered Mossadegh to be the effective barrier, which prevented the Communist infiltrations in the government. It is therefore unclear how one should interpret the following overthrow of Mossadegh.<sup>398</sup> The United States officials claimed to believe that the disintegration of Mossadegh coalition,<sup>399</sup> which started in 1952, opened the possibility for the Communist takeover, which seems disingenuous in the face of the available evidence. Hence, although it is beyond the scope of the present paper, it could be surmised that the coup may have been triggered by Eisenhower's conviction that neutralism and Arab

---

<sup>395</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 135th Meeting of the National Security Council, 4 March 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954, Volume X, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d312>, Date of Access: 25.03.2020

<sup>396</sup> D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, cit., p. 464

<sup>397</sup> R. Cossa, *Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns*, McNair Papers, No. 11, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1990, pp. 9-26

<sup>398</sup> For more information on Communist activity in Iran prior to the coup, see M. Gasiorowski, "U.S. Perceptions of the Communist Threat in Iran during the Mossadegh Era", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2019, pp. 185-221

<sup>399</sup> This information came to Washington also from the American embassy in Iran. For example, see Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 20 February 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d155>, Date of Access: 02.03.2020

nationalism were conducive to eventual Communist infiltration in the Middle East, especially so in terms of the strategic availability of oil to the Free World. In this regard, it appears that Iran represented strategic, rather than immediate, security significance to the United States, and Eisenhower continued the policies of the Truman administration, which stipulated the following:

The primary objective of our policy toward Iran is to prevent its domination by Soviet Russia, and to strengthen its orientation toward the West. Our policy lays first emphasis on economic and social development to strengthen the country's resistance to communism. [...] Politically, Iran is extremely important to the security of the United States in the cold war. Its fall under Soviet control would have a tremendous moral effect on other friendly nations, and would render it quite probable that most of the other Near Eastern countries would soon fall under communist domination. The consequences of such an eventuality are obvious to anyone familiar with the strategic and political importance of the area and of its resources.<sup>400</sup>

As it was mentioned, while the answer as to why exactly Eisenhower authorized the American direct involvement in Iran and the overthrow of a democratically elected leader and Truman hesitated to do so, remains outside the scope of the present paper, it appears clear that oil played an important role in the developments in 1953, both as part of Truman's legacy and Eisenhower's personal convictions about the security objectives in the Middle East. Indeed, oil was one of the main concerns for Eisenhower as early as on 21 June 1951, when he wrote a letter to Everett Hazlett, in which he stated:

As to Iran, I think the whole thing is tragic [...] [Some sources] attach as much blame to Western stupidity as to Iranian fanaticism and Communist intrigue in bringing about all the trouble. Frankly, I have gotten to the point that I am concerned primarily, and almost solely, in some scheme or plan that will permit that oil to keep flowing to the westward [...] The situation there has not yet gotten into as bad a position as China, but sometimes I think it stands at the same place that China did only a very few years ago. Now we have completely lost the latter nation [...] I most certainly hope that this calamity is not repeated in the case of Iran.<sup>401</sup>

While the previous foreign policy decisions of Eisenhower might be understood in the context of him assimilating the legacy of the Truman administration, it has been demonstrated in the previous chapters that by the end of his first term, Eisenhower had worked out his own policy in the Middle East and elsewhere. Perhaps, the best illustration of

---

<sup>400</sup> Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs "Political and Economic Factors Involved in Military Assistance to Iran in FY 1951", undated, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v05/d210>, Date of Access: 10.03.2020

<sup>401</sup> Letter to Everett 'Swede' Hazlett, 21 June 1951, cross-referenced from M. de Moraes Ruchsen, "Operation 'Ajax' Revisited: Iran, 1953", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1993, pp. 467-486

his particular brand of containment, which among other provisions, included the strategic availability of Middle Eastern oil for the Western European allies and NATO and its denial to the Soviet Union, was the American involvement in the Suez Crisis and the subsequent declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine connected with it. It is quite obvious that Eisenhower worried about the possibility of disruptions in the flow of oil to Western Europe even before the nationalization of the Suez Canal – indeed, Eisenhower wrote in his diary on 13 March 1956:

There is, of course no easy answer. The oil of the Arab world has grown increasingly important to all of Europe. The economy of European countries would collapse if those oil supplies were cut off. If the economy of Europe would collapse, the United States would be in a situation of which the difficulty could scarcely be exaggerated.<sup>402</sup>

He reiterated the same worries when discussing the possibility of a military intervention in Egypt after the nationalization with Prime Minister Eden, who insisted on the military response:

I really do not see how a successful result could be achieved by forcible means. The use of force would, it seems to me, vastly increase the area of jeopardy. I do not see how the economy of Western Europe can long survive the burden of prolonged military operations, as well as the denial of Near East oil.<sup>403</sup>

Secretary of State Dulles expressed a similar position at the beginning of 1957 regarding the dangers the absence of oil presented for the cohesion of Western Europe in case oil supply were cut short, as it did during the Suez Crisis:

The North Atlantic Treaty forces in Europe and the Mediterranean fly in Middle East oil. Their trucks, their tanks, their vehicles move on Middle East oil, and the ships operate with Middle East oil. By land, sea, and air, motion is primarily dependent upon such oil.<sup>404</sup>

The meaning behind these words is indicative of the overall planning for the Eisenhower foreign policy in the Middle East – the strategic significance of Middle Eastern oil was such that the defense of Western Europe could not be conceived without due consideration for the availability of the resource. As far as the Eisenhower administration saw

---

<sup>402</sup> D. Eisenhower, *The Eisenhower Diaries*, ed. by R. Ferrell, W. W. Norton & Company, 1981, p. 319

<sup>403</sup> Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, 2 September 1956, cit., Date of Access: 01.04.2020. “Near East” and “Middle East” seemed to be used interchangeably by the Eisenhower administration as far as one can judge by the available primary resources. In the very least, “Near East” was incorporated in the term “Middle East” and denoted a smaller area.

<sup>404</sup> Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 85th Congress, 1st Session on Joint Resolutions to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence, January 14, 15, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30; February 1 and 4, 1957, p. 171

the issue, NATO would not be operational without the access to the Middle Eastern oil and this in turn would render the military response of the allies inadequate in the eventuality of the sudden Soviet attack, which would result in the subjugation of the allies' territory. This logical inference seemed to be confirmed during the Suez Crisis and the preparations for the American exports of oil when the Canal and the Mediterranean pipeline<sup>405</sup> were no longer available for the transfer. Since Western Europe experienced a dramatic shortage of oil, the decision was made to establish the Middle East Emergency Committee (MEEC) on August 10, which included thirteen major oil companies and was meant to prepare for massive oil-lift from the Western Hemisphere to Europe in case the Middle Eastern supplies were blocked. To this effect, the MEEC received the immunity from antitrust liabilities from the Justice Department several days later.<sup>406</sup> However, the supply of oil from Venezuela was considered virtually unworkable, to the point that a study on the alternatives to the usage of the Suez Canal, requested by the Executive Committee of Standard Oil of New Jersey, stated that it was recommended to build a large-diameter pipeline in the Middle East, which was supposed to be ready in four years.<sup>407</sup>

These efforts are not outlined in order to imply that the United States was willing to publicly extend the energy relief program to Britain or France in the immediate aftermath of the intervention. On the contrary, Eisenhower had already made clear that the American companies operating in the region would not be allowed to provide petroleum to the occupying countries until the troops were withdrawn, and invited Saudi Arabia to impose a joint embargo on the oil exports to Britain and France.<sup>408</sup> Eisenhower commented to Arthur Flemming, the director of defense mobilization, on October 30:

I'm inclined to think that those who began this operation should be left to work out their own oil problems - to boil in their own oil, so to speak. They will be needing oil from Venezuela and around the Cape and before long they will be short of dollars to finance these operations and will be calling for help. They may be planning to present us with a *fait accompli*, then expect us to foot the bill. I am extremely angry with them.<sup>409</sup>

The available research on the Suez Crisis does not always appreciate the role oil and the policy of containment played in its evolution. In the majority of studies oil is reduced to

---

<sup>405</sup> The Mediterranean pipeline that carried oil to Europe from Iraq was sabotaged in November 1956 by Syria in solidarity with Nasser's Egypt.

<sup>406</sup> K. Love, *Suez: The Twice-Fought War*, cit., pp. 406-408

<sup>407</sup> D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, Simon & Schuster, 1991, p. 201

<sup>408</sup> K. Love, *Suez: The Twice-Fought War*, cit., pp. 650-655

<sup>409</sup> Cross-referenced from M. Auzanneau, *Oil, Power and War: A Dark History*, cit., p. 208

one of the reasons the Western powers decided to invade Egypt, since the Suez Canal was one of the two crucial routes for the passage of the Middle Eastern oil to Europe (the other being the pipelines, one of which was sabotaged by Syria after the invasion, as discussed previously). However, more importantly, oil had a crucial influence on the elaboration of the American response to the nationalization and the subsequent invasion, as well as an instrument the United States used in order to force Britain to comply with the withdrawal demands.

As it was foreshadowed above, Eisenhower appreciated the importance of oil for Western Europe and for the American interests in the region, but his memoirs reveal that Eisenhower also believed that the Soviet Union's decision to assist Egypt during the crisis had to do with the disruption of oil supply, which would have a serious detrimental impact on the American position in the Cold War:

In this confusion one danger loomed above all others: the leaders of the Soviet Union, like the Czars before them, had their eyes on the Middle East. The Soviet goal was by no means the right to move ships through the Suez Canal, for less than 1 per cent of the Canal traffic was Russian. Neither was the goal Middle Eastern oil; the Soviet Union had no need for it and indeed, exported oil itself. The Soviet objective was, in plain fact, power politics: to seize the oil, to cut the Canal and pipelines of the Middle East, and thus seriously to weaken Western civilization.<sup>410</sup>

Indeed, the correlation between oil supplies and the Cold War power balance was seriously contemplated in the White House two months before the nationalization. The general feeling was such that the United States would have to consider any available means, including military response, to not only secure the continuous access to Middle Eastern oil, but also to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining any such access – all in connection to the growing power of Nasser in Egypt:

It was the consensus of the meeting that Near Eastern resources are so vital to the security interests of the United States and the West generally that we could not accept a situation in which access to those resources would be subject to hostile control. Measures, even drastic, would have to be seriously contemplated.<sup>411</sup>

The existence of the Soviet threat in the 1950s came under scrutiny in the subsequent years after the end of the Eisenhower presidency. An interesting analysis was prepared by Francis Fukuyama for the RAND Corporation in 1980, in which he observes that the Soviets

---

<sup>410</sup> D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, 1956-1961: The White House Years*, cit., pp. 177-178

<sup>411</sup> Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, March 28, 1956, 4:40–6:30 p.m.1, 28 March 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1 - July 26, 1956, Volume XV, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v15/d224>, Date of Access: 05.04.2020

threatened to interfere into the Middle East three times during Eisenhower's time in office – namely, during the Suez, Syrian and Lebanon crises, and argues that the threat was only made after the peak of the crisis was passed. This signaled the unwillingness of the Soviets to deliver on their threats to minimize the likelihood of the crisis escalating into a major superpowers confrontation. Fukuyama concludes that the threats were always bluffs, and the Soviets were unwilling to challenge the American position in the Middle East, particularly so in the 1950s, when the Soviet Union “possessed a minimum deterrent against Western Europe, a largely coastal navy, and ground forces whose possible deployment was limited to the European continent.”<sup>412</sup>

While the Soviet threat in itself is widely recognized as mild and virtually non-existent during the Suez Crisis in the modern research, the communications of the National Security Council and the documentary evidence of the reflections of both Eisenhower and Dulles, as presented above, seems to illustrate there was a considerable degree of apprehension that the Soviets might strike. As a matter of fact, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin sent letters to the governments of Israel, France and Britain, denouncing the attack and threatening the use of the nuclear weapons against Paris and London unless the forces were withdrawn. However, the National Security Agency (NSA) estimated that the Eisenhower administration considered those letters and threats to be a bluff.<sup>413</sup> At the same time, it appears that the administration was conscious of the Soviet efforts to exercise influence over countries in the Middle East, particularly due to the Soviet increasing presence in Syria:

[...] the intelligence community by and large was adhering to its earlier estimate that the Soviet Union was not likely to take actions in the Middle East which they believed likely to induce general war. The real problem here was the possibility of chain reactions which might ultimately lead to general war without being so intended. [...] Mr. Dulles returned to his worries about the situation in Syria, where, he said, it would be easy for a coup to occur under Soviet auspices. [...] The Soviets might well try to frighten the Shah of Iran and to upset the Nuri regime in Iraq. [...] [Admiral Radford] argued, the Soviets are perfectly well aware of the world oil situation and of the fact that sooner or later the United States will have to assist Europe, and that this will turn the Arabs against us.<sup>414</sup>

---

<sup>412</sup> F. Fukuyama, “Soviet Threats to Intervene in the Middle East 1956-1973”, A Series in International Security and Arms Control, Rand Corporation, 1980, p. 30

<sup>413</sup> “The Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History”, *Special Series: Crisis Collection*, Vol. 2, Office of Archives and History, National Security Agency / Central Security Service, 1988

<sup>414</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 303d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 8 November 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26 - December 31, 1956, Volume



It is impossible to discuss in great detail the true intentions of the Soviet Union and to what degree the Eisenhower administration considered the Soviet threat to be valid for the security of the American and European immediate interests in the Middle East. However, it seems that antagonizing the Arab world against the Western countries was believed to open possibilities for Soviet infiltration and increased Communist influence in the region – an eventuality that to an extent became a reality after the Suez Crisis, with Syria turning increasingly more to the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance. In this regard, the response of the Eisenhower administration was prompted by the threat to long-term strategic interests of the United States in the region as opposed to a possibility of the ‘hot war’ with the Soviets or a nuclear attack against the allies. This, however, could be open to further elaboration, especially insofar as Eisenhower’s personal, perhaps somewhat deluded convictions about the scope of the ‘red danger’ are concerned.

In regards to the European access to Middle Eastern oil, the conflicting agendas that Eisenhower had to take into account, as David Nichols argues, required very delicate handling. On the one hand, the dramatic shortage of oil in Western Europe, which rendered the operation of NATO unfeasible, was the constant topic of discussions during the meetings with the President in October and November 1956.<sup>415</sup> On the other hand, the President contended during one of the discussions that the increase of the American production capacity for the needs of the allies in Europe might result in the grave repercussions for the Western influence in the Middle East:

The President pointed out that if we really get the Arabs sore at all of us, they could embargo all oil, which would ruin our present Middle East Emergency Committee plan which still counts on some 800,000 barrels of oil daily from Middle East sources. Mr. Anderson [Robert B. Anderson, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, one of the closest confidants of Eisenhower] agreed, and said that furthermore, if the Arabs got sore enough, we could also lose what we are now getting from the Aramco tapline [Aramco Trans-Arabian Pipeline].<sup>416</sup>

In her detailed account of the economic aspect of the Suez Crisis, Diane Kunz makes an argument that oil was perhaps the most important element of the American sanctions towards Great Britain to force Eden to withdraw the British troops out of the Suez zone. The

---

XVI, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d554>, Date of Access: 06.04.2020

<sup>415</sup> D. Nichols, *Eisenhower 1956: The President's Year of Crisis - Suez and the Brink of War*, cit., pp. 258-270

<sup>416</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 303d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 8 November 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26 - December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d554>, Date of Access: 06.04.2020

author provides the evidence that the supplies of oil from the Western Hemisphere would cost Great Britain, at the lowest estimate, between \$500 million and \$700 million per year, which was difficult to contemplate when taking into account the eroding dollar reserves. The only way to finance such an endeavor, therefore, would be to request a loan from the IMF, which during the 1950s was entirely controlled by the United States. In this regard, Kunz contends that Prime Minister Eden overestimated the economic freedom of his country, which in reality was fully dependent on the favorable American attitude.<sup>417</sup>

As far as the present paper goes, the Suez Crisis appears to be the most illustrative in terms of the importance the Middle Eastern oil played in Eisenhower's policy of containment. Curiously, the factor of oil played increasingly against the interests of the Eisenhower administration to such an extent that the administration found itself in a Catch-22 situation: the drastic shortages of oil in Western Europe threatened the cohesion of the countries under the auspices of NATO as well as rendered it vulnerable to the Soviet attack. But the United States discovered its inability to provide oil to their European allies for fear of antagonizing the Arab states and turning them decidedly against any Western government, which would further reduce the availability of the Middle Eastern oil to the West and perhaps would also expose the Middle East to the propaganda of the Soviet Union.<sup>418</sup>

As it was mentioned, the awareness of the precarious position of Western Europe in case of the oil disturbances increasingly influenced the elaboration of American foreign policy in the region. Particularly, the Eisenhower administration appeared to be more conscious that the possibility of the Soviet infiltration might also arise if Arab nationalism rebelled against what they perceived as Western imperialism. In this regard, maintaining friendly, insofar as it was possible, relations with the Middle Eastern countries became one of the most important foreign policy objectives:

Certain Middle East governments have shown a willingness and capability to deny Western access to oil reserves (Iran 1951–53) and to disrupt Middle East oil transport facilities (Egypt and Syria 1956–57). It is essential that more effective measures be devised to protect the free world's, and particularly the NATO countries' long-term access to Middle East oil and to insure against temporary interruptions of its flow. This requirement confronts the West with the difficult problems of maintaining satisfactory political relations with

---

<sup>417</sup> D. Kunz, *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis*, cit., pp. 100-105

<sup>418</sup> "The Suez Crisis – A Test for the USSR's Middle Eastern Policy" (Reference title: CAESAR V-A-56), Soviet Staff Study, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 3 January 1957

the Middle East countries concerned with the production and transport of oil, and of securing oil supplies against external attack or internal disturbance.<sup>419</sup>

Similarly, David Painter maintains that the Suez crisis revealed the dangers of the Arab nationalism in terms of the Western access to the oil resources, which Eisenhower thought to counter with the active protection of the pro-Western regimes and through economic and military assistance, collectively known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.<sup>420</sup> Although the Suez Crisis was resolved in a way beneficial to the United States, the danger of such crisis and the underlying vulnerabilities of the United States compelled the Eisenhower administration to work out a special policy in the Middle East that would aim to fill the power balance after Great Britain was categorically discredited.<sup>421</sup> The Eisenhower Doctrine was therefore a manifestation of the changing reality of power dynamics, in which the traditional colonial powers ceded their place to the new dominating country - the United States.

There is little doubt even in the early research that the Eisenhower Doctrine as such together with its manifestations during the Syrian Crisis in 1957 and the intervention in Lebanon in 1958 were largely motivated by oil interests of the United States, especially insofar as the large oil resources remained available to Europe and out of reach of the Soviet Union. Vast oil reserves of the Middle East were the first factor of American interest that President Eisenhower mentioned during the speech that enunciated the Eisenhower Doctrine.<sup>422</sup> It was referred to during the discussions with the pro-Western states, such as Saudi Arabia, in the context that the Eisenhower Doctrine was in direct opposition to the “doctrine of Communism”, which basically meant that the access to the Middle East was Russia’s “traditional ambition, and if they succeeded in the Middle East, with its great resources of oil and its position as a strategic cross-roads, Russia would have gained a position of great power.”<sup>423</sup>

---

<sup>419</sup> Review of Middle East Problems Bearing upon the Supply of Oil to the Free World, 10 May 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v10/d255>, Date of Access: 19.04.2020

<sup>420</sup> D. Painter, “Oil and the American Century”, cit., pp. 24-39

<sup>421</sup> For example, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee, Vol. IX, 85th Congress, First Session, 1957, p. 21

<sup>422</sup> Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East of President Eisenhower, 5 January 1957, cit., Date of Access: 03.10.2019

<sup>423</sup> Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, 30 January 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v13/d259>, Date of Access: 10.04.2020

The question of oil remained inside the spectrum of the American concerns during the Syrian Crisis. In the course of the meeting with the National Security Council in September 1957, the Secretary of State pointed out the following:

[...] The earlier report by the Director of Central Intelligence on the situation in Syria indicated that there was a considerable hazard in the Middle East area which could involve another interruption of the flow of Middle Eastern oil to the Free World. The two pipelines that pass through Syria could be blown up, and Egypt might even make trouble again in the Suez Canal. The United Kingdom has indicated to us its concern about these possibilities, and the President had stated last Saturday that the State Department could advise the British that if new difficulties arose with respect to Middle Eastern oil, the United States could recreate the Middle East Emergency Committee.<sup>424</sup>

The events in Syria as well as the brewing conflict in Lebanon compelled the State Department to analyze the scope of the American and Western interests in the Near (Middle) East, which resulted in the conclusion that oil represented the first most important factor of American strategic objectives in the area:

The objectives of the U.S. with respect to the Near East are: a. Availability to the U.S. and its allies of the resources, the strategic positions, and the passage rights of the area, and the denial of such resources and strategic positions to the Soviet bloc.<sup>425</sup>

The same concerns regarding the Western access to the Middle Eastern resources were reiterated during the Lebanon Crisis in 1958. When the military operation in Lebanon, which did not possess any valuable oil resources, was contemplated in earnest and the possibility of consecutive political unrest in Kuwait, the country with vast oil resources particularly important for Britain in the face of the revolution in Iraq, became the subject on the discussion, Secretary of State Dulles observed:

If the whole oil area was under the control of the UAR their bargaining position would be too great with a resultant adverse effect on the economy of Western Europe and the rest of the world. [...] [I]t would be foolish for the U.S. and the U.K. to move into Lebanon and Jordan and not plan at the same time to hold other areas of greater intrinsic value. There was nothing in Lebanon and Jordan [...] of significant value to either the

---

<sup>424</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 336th Meeting of the National Security Council, 12 September 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v13/d398>, Date of Access: 15.04.2020

<sup>425</sup> Staff Study Prepared in the Department of State “United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East”, 30 October 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d270>, Date of Access: 09.04.2020

U.S. or the U.K. [...] [T]he U.S. and the U.K. should agree in principle on the holding of Kuwait and the Dhahran area.<sup>426</sup>

Notwithstanding its efforts, the Eisenhower Doctrine antagonized previously friendly regimes and failed to prevent the increasingly leftist orientation of Syria. However, according to Ivan Pearson, for example, the Eisenhower Doctrine served the short-term purpose of strengthening the declining British position, especially so in Lebanon, Jordan and Kuwait, and of ensuring continuous Anglo-American cooperation, reinstated after the Suez Crisis.<sup>427</sup> By extension, the Eisenhower Doctrine succeeded in achieving the short-term availability of oil for the Western allies, since the actions of the United States prevented the political unrest in Kuwait, the main source of oil controlled by Britain after the Revolution in Iraq, and even improved the petroleum situation by receiving Syrian authorization for the repairs of the sabotaged pipeline following the announcement of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza at the beginning of March 1957.<sup>428</sup>

Although the connection between oil and the Eisenhower Doctrine is not often appreciated in the academic research and only vaguely mentioned by Eisenhower himself, it is impossible to doubt the importance it had in both the elaboration of the Middle East policy and its implementation in Syria and Lebanon. In fact, the Eisenhower Doctrine was the culmination of all the Middle Eastern foreign policy objectives and achievements throughout the two terms of the Eisenhower administration, the legacy of which was even felt in Vietnam and other American interventions in countries around the world, explained by the real or perceived Communist activity there. The doctrine was influenced in no small degree by the oil factor, especially so in the context of the Cold War exigencies: although the United States did not require Middle Eastern oil per se and produced more than enough petroleum for its domestic and international needs, the provision of Middle Eastern oil for the Western allies and NATO and denial of the resources to the Soviet Union appeared to occupy one of the central positions in the American national security planning and one of the most important strategic security objectives of the Eisenhower administration.

In conclusion, the dependency on Middle Eastern oil during the Eisenhower administration is embodied in its significance for the conduct of the Cold War. In the 1950s,

---

<sup>426</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 17 July 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII, Mode of Access:

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d23>, Date of Access: 10.04.2020

<sup>427</sup> I. Pearson, “The Syrian Crisis of 1957, the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, and the 1958 landings in Jordan and Lebanon”, cit., pp. 45-64

<sup>428</sup> S. Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East*, cit., p. 152

the Soviet Union became the most pressing foreign policy concern for the United States, and by extension, the means of preventing the Soviet Union from winning the Cold War became the most important foreign policy objectives. It is emblematic of the Eisenhower administration in comparison to that of the Truman presidency that the Middle East came to play a decisive role in the containment strategies of the United States. This development is primarily connected to the significance of the available oil resources in the area – the factor, which is largely ignored in the modern research, but which has far-reaching implications for understanding of Eisenhower’s foreign policy.

This is not to argue that Middle Eastern oil was indispensable for the domestic economy of the United States but the Suez Crisis and other conflicts in the Middle East illustrated the degree of dependence Western Europe experienced on the imports of oil from the Middle East, both for the ongoing post-war reconstruction and defense exigencies of NATO. It was, therefore, a primary foreign policy objective to ensure that Western Europe and NATO had a continuous uninterrupted access to the resources in the Middle East, as well as to deny such access to the Soviet Union, especially taking into account the traditional interest Russia allegedly exhibited in the region. Whether or not the Soviet Union was indeed concerned with being involved in the Middle East and gaining the access to its oil resources, seeing that the Soviet Union produced large quantities of it and was the second largest exporter after the Middle East, is not discussed in the present paper, but could potentially improve the conclusions, outlined above. As far as the present paper is concerned, however, it was demonstrated that the Eisenhower administration believed in the possibility of the Soviet takeover, which in itself was enough for the United States to act preventively – that is, to ‘contain’ the Soviet Union from extending its influence over the Middle East and its valuable oil reserves.

## Conclusion

The diversity of events, policy decisions and strategic arrangements discussed in this paper clearly demonstrate that the Eisenhower administration indeed “flew in Middle East oil” against the Soviet Union – that is, oil from the Middle East region represented a critical significance for the elaboration of ‘containment’ policy during Eisenhower’s terms in office from 1953 to 1960. Although the role of oil in global geopolitics is sometimes pegged as a conspiracy theory in the academic research and therefore remains criminally underappreciated, there is no doubt that oil was such an important factor in Eisenhower’s foreign policy that ‘containment’ in the 1950s could not be properly contemplated without due regard to Middle Eastern oil.

While there is a whole range of literature dedicated to Dwight Eisenhower, both as the celebrated General of War and the President of the United States, it is not as robust and exhaustive as that on Harry Truman, John Kennedy or Richard Nixon. For a long time Eisenhower was considered to be a “transitional” president, who did nothing of particular importance in the foreign policy but who had high approval ratings due to the steady years of the “Eisenhower prosperity”. However, once the primary resources of his diaries, conversations and political undertakings were made available for research, the academic world acquired new appreciation of Eisenhower as a strategic foreign policy thinker and a staunch Cold Warrior. Despite the fact that now opinions on his presidency differ from an overall positive assessment to criticism for exacerbating the tensions with the Soviet Union to such a degree that it made the Cuban Crisis and the intervention in Vietnam possible, Eisenhower remains one of the key presidents in the history of the United States, particularly in the context of the Cold War.

Many critics claim that the foreign policy of Eisenhower was the direct continuation of President Truman’s policy of ‘containment’ elaborated by George Kennan and embodied in the Truman Doctrine. Such view is problematic, in the very least because the concept of ‘containment’ is rather objectionable. Although Kennan himself identified ‘containment’ as political, almost ideological concept, the militaristic dimension to it remains just as conspicuous. Neither is it quite clear whether containment was ultimately meant to be a defensive or an aggressive policy - that is, whether it aimed at protecting the Free World from the ‘dictatorial vices’ of Communism or whether it furthered America’s neo-imperialist claims in the Third World countries endowed with natural resources. Moreover, while the

New Look, designed by Eisenhower and Dulles, did originate in the Truman Doctrine, it went beyond it in the acceptable tactics of warfare: Eisenhower heavily relied on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the CIA covert operations aimed at destabilizing Communist control in different regions, and propaganda. Therefore, as opposed to the military rollback of the Truman Doctrine, the New Look was the policy of preventive action to tackle any hypothetically possible security breaches in the regions the United States considered vital to its interests, especially in the preparation to a major crisis, such as the war with the Soviet Union.

This is where the Middle Eastern oil comes into play. Its importance was even recognized by President Roosevelt, who declared Saudi Arabia “vital to the defense of the United States” and extended the Lend-Lease to the young kingdom. Although Truman did not actively participate in the undertakings of the Big Oil in the Middle East, the growing importance of oil inside the United States and for the Marshall Plan, as well as for the economic and military recovery of Western Europe was becoming more evident. Moreover, the Middle East was believed to have such valuable possessions of oil that the Truman administration felt compelled to come up with the “denial policy” in 1949, aimed at the destruction of the oil facilities in the Middle East in case of the Communist invasion, which was later endorsed by the entrant Eisenhower administration.

The American citizens partook in the quest for oil in the Middle East already in the 1930s, long before its significance was fully appreciated by the American policy-makers. Arguably, there is no other country in the region that holds as much strategic and economic importance for the United States as Saudi Arabia. American oilmen introduced themselves to the kingdom just a couple of years after its establishment and acquired there the first and only truly American concession in the Middle East in 1933. The role of Saudi Arabia in the foreign policy of the United States and the policy of containment during the Eisenhower presidency can hardly be overrated, since Eisenhower pegged King Saud as the only viable ideological opposition to Nasser and relied on Saudi Arabia’s support whenever a dangerous crisis was brewing in the region.

While other Middle Eastern countries were either factually independent or under British control, Iran was one of the major achievements of the Eisenhower administration in terms of extending the American influence and ensuring the availability of oil for American needs. When Mossadegh nationalized Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the British introduced a harsh embargo on Iranian oil, it was Eisenhower who authorized the CIA-orchestrated coup d’état to overthrow the leftist government, when Truman hesitated to do so. As a result, the



monarchy was restored, and although the company remained nationalized and oil remained Iranian, the American oil giants received unprecedented share of rights to purchase and distribute this oil. Despite the remaining influence, Great Britain ceded its role as the regional leader and the United States reaffirmed its increasingly conspicuous super-power positions.

While the role of oil in this crisis appears indisputable, the underlying importance of it for the first manifestations of Eisenhower's policy of containment remains underappreciated. Already in 1953, the Eisenhower administration exhibited preoccupation with the availability of Iranian oil to Western Europe and the prevention of the Soviet access to it – the policy pursued throughout Eisenhower's entire presidency. Another major issue is the supposedly traditional interest the Soviet Union exhibited in Iran, which was cited on several occasions by the administration. Although there was no discernible Soviet activity in the country even in the reports of the CIA, the possibility of a Communist infiltration based on Russia's traditional interest is considered to be one of the reasons for the resulting coup.

The Iraqi Crisis and the subsequent 14 July Revolution in 1958 were indicative of the ability on the part of the United States to handle a delicate situation with rationality. While many researchers claim that Eisenhower was unable to tell apart Arab nationalism and the Communist influence, the Iraqi Crisis demonstrates that in the very least the Eisenhower administration was able to show restraint although the crisis was developing along the lines of the similar events in Iran and Guatemala, where the United States intervened to topple the democratically elected leaders. The awareness of the unstable political situation in the Arab world, especially after the Suez Crisis and the Syrian Crisis, and the determination to work with the problem illustrate Eisenhower's commitment to his policy of containment in the Middle East, which was influenced by the precariousness of oil availability if the Arab countries turned decisively against the West.

Indeed, Middle Eastern oil played all the more important role in the global economic and military environment in the 1950s. Both Western Europe and Japan were dependent on it for its post-war recovery; the economy of Britain was even more vulnerable to cheap oil shortages because its dollar and gold reserves were rapidly dwindling. Even the United States imported increasing amounts of cheap Middle Eastern oil to satisfy its unprecedented demand. The imports grew at such alarming rates that the Eisenhower administration felt compelled to introduce Mandatory Oil Quotas in 1959. Although the decision might seem counterintuitive in the context of this paper, it is, in fact, in perfect consonance with the main argument: Eisenhower's policy of containment was preventive in its character, and the limitations of the large imports of Middle Eastern oil exercised the preventive function – to

minimize the dependence of the American security on the availability of this oil. Due to the imports, the domestic oil production was critically slow, which inspired the decision to stimulate it in case of an international crisis.

It, however, remains outside the scope of the present paper to determine the particularities of Eisenhower's attitude to the possibility of introducing the caps. It is suggested that the President and the Secretary of State were firmly against the limitations, since they considered that antagonizing the relations with the Middle Eastern states due to the closure of the American market was a more serious threat for the American strategic security. In this respect, the research would benefit from further analysis but the argument that the importance of Middle Eastern oil for the strategic security in Western Europe was a crucial motivation behind the actions of the President, is still valid whether the decision to introduce mandatory caps was forced on Eisenhower or not.

The dangers of such dependency were demonstrated on the example of Western Europe and the Suez Crisis in 1956. Once Nasser closed the Suez Canal for oil transfer following the intervention of Great Britain, France and Israel, Western Europe experienced a deficiency which endangered even the existence of NATO and British economic solvency. The situation was aggravated further by the Syrian sabotage of an important pipeline in solidarity with Nasser. The United States therefore found itself in a precarious situation: on the one hand, it did not support its long-standing allies and instead sided with a "tin-pot dictator" Nasser; on the other hand, supporting the occupying powers at that juncture would ruin any possibility for nourishing pro-American sentiments in the Arab states. However, the United States made the necessary preparations for emergency oil-lift to Europe in case the shortage would make its allies vulnerable to a sudden Soviet attack.

In a direct response to the Suez Crisis, in January 1957 Eisenhower declared the commitment of the United States to extend economic and military assistance, even in the form of armed forces, to any Middle Eastern state, which found itself threatened by the aggression of the "International Communism". The provisions of the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine were loosely applied in the Jordan and Syrian crises in 1957 and invoked for the stabilization during the civil war in Lebanon in 1958. As far as Syria is concerned, the crisis threatened to be of the same magnitude as the Korean War. Once again, as during the Suez Crisis, the United States found itself unable to side with its NATO ally Turkey for fear of completely antagonizing the Arab world, especially after Nasser extended military assistance to Syria. Although the crisis was averted after the Soviet Union withdrew its pledge for

military aid to the leftist government of Syria and the matter was handed to the United Nations, the situation threatened to unfold in a major international confrontation.

Oil occupied an important position in the development of the crisis, since Syria was the transitional country for two major oil pipelines, which together with the Suez Canal, were the principal delivery routes for Middle Eastern oil to Europe. As such, the allegiance of Syria and Egypt in a war against the West, with the participation of the Soviet Union, had the danger of irrevocably changing the balance of power in the Middle East. Similarly, while Lebanon was not a country endowed with any significant oil resources, the Revolution in Iraq, which introduced unrest in the region, endangered the stability of Kuwait, the last oil-rich region controlled by the British. Besides, even the National Security Council and John Foster Dulles agreed that the civil war in Lebanon was in principle a religious conflict and did not fall under the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine, so it is hardly possible to cite the preoccupation with Communism as the major reason for American involvement. However, antagonizing the Arab states was believed to open a possibility for their eventual rapprochement with the Soviet Union, as was the case in Syria, which endangered the strategic interests of the United States and gave the Soviets a hypothetical access to Middle Eastern oil. This, allegedly, compelled the United States to send the troops to the Lebanese shores, but the research would by all means benefit from the in-depth analysis of the Soviet motives and intentions in the region, as well as to what degree they were known to the Eisenhower administration.

The space constraints of the present paper only allow for a cursory discussion of the magnitude of events that took place in the Middle East as part of Eisenhower's policy of 'containment', but the paper does introduce a significant but underrated topic - the role of oil in these events. Proper research on this topic might open new directions of enquiry of many international crises that can be traced back to the Eisenhower administration, both in the Middle East and in other parts of the globe, such as the Iranian Revolution of 1979 or the Cuban Crisis. In common law, students are expected to study precedents in order to understand how the law works. Eisenhower set a number of crucial and often perilous precedents in foreign policy which can be observed in the American relations with the Middle Eastern countries to this day. And in history, like in law, to understand how things work it is necessary to study precedents.

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to thank Professor Duccio Basosi for his constant assistance from the moment I first thought of writing something on Eisenhower and oil to the day of my defense. His astute insights greatly contributed to the development of a tentative idea into this thesis.

This work would not exist without the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series; the American Presidency Project; the Cold War International History Project; the CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, etc. The availability of such impartial and valuable sources of information is what makes history research possible nowadays.

This paper is dedicated to my parents for their unyielding support and love. I hope that one day I will be able to make you as proud of me as I am proud of you. Thank you for encouraging me at every step of this beautiful academic journey.

## Bibliography and References

### Primary Sources

#### Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)

- Brief of Approved U.S. National Security Objectives, Policies and Programs With Respect to the USSR (NSC 20/4, NSC 68/2 and NSC 135/3), 6 February 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d43>, Date of Access: 01.03.2020;
- Editorial Note, 14 July 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d109>, Date of Access: 14.05.2020;
- Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, American Republics, Volume V, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d351>, Date of Access: 25.03.2020;
- Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, 31 July 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26 - December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d35>, Date of Access: 01.04.2020;
- Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Policy Planning Staff (Watts), 12 August 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d83>, Date of Access: 05.03.2020;
- Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), 27 October 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d98>, Date of Access: 19.01.2020;
- Memorandum for the Record, 11 September 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala, Mode of Access:

- <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d51>, Date of Access: 21.03.2020;
- Memorandum for the Record, 8 October 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d23>, Date of Access: 21.03.2020;
  - Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, 20 October 1969, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundation of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d41>, Date of Access: 02.03.2020;
  - Memorandum From the Secretary of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Cullen) to the Chairman of the Council (Randall), 18 December 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume IV, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v04/d290>, Date of Access: 25.03.2020;
  - Memorandum From the Secretary of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Cullen) to the Council, 15 December 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume IV, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v04/d289>, Date of Access: 25.03.2020;
  - Memorandum of a Conversation With the President, White House, Washington, 7 September 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v13/d388>, Date of Access: 15.04.2020;
  - Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, 13 May 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v11/d30>, Date of Access: 07.04.2020;
  - Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, 28 March 1956, 4:40–6:30 p.m.1, 28 March 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1 - July 26, 1956, Volume XV, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v15/d224>, Date of Access: 05.04.2020;

- Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, 30 January 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v13/d259>, Date of Access: 10.04.2020;
- Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Attorney General (Brownell), 2 July 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v10/d260>, Date of Access: 14.05.2020;
- Memorandum of Conversation, 17 July 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d23>, Date of Access: 10.04.2020;
- Memorandum of Discussion at a Special Meeting of the National Security Council on Tuesday, 31 March 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p1/d427>, Date of Access: 15.01.2020;
- Memorandum of Discussion at the 131st Meeting of the National Security Council, 11 February 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d46>, Date of Access: 05.03.2020;
- Memorandum of Discussion at the 135th Meeting of the National Security Council, 4 March 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954, Volume X, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d312>, Date of Access: 25.03.2020;
- Memorandum of Discussion at the 138th Meeting of the National Security Council, 25 March 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d52>, Date of Access: 05.03.2020;
- Memorandum of Discussion at the 139th Meeting of the National Security Council, 8 April 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, General: Economic and

Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2, Mode of Access:

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v01p2/d163>, Date of Access: 09.04.2020;

- Memorandum of Discussion at the 140th Meeting of the National Security Council, 22 April 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d57>, Date of Access: 05.03.2020;
- Memorandum of Discussion at the 165th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, October 7, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d94>, Date of Access: 19.01.2020;
- Memorandum of Discussion at the 166th Meeting of the National Security Council, 13 October 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d95>, Date of Access: 06.03.2020;
- Memorandum of Discussion at the 168th Meeting of the National Security Council, 29 October 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d100>, Date of Access: 05.03.2020;
- Memorandum of Discussion at the 173rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 3, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p2/d811>, Date of Access: 17.01.2020;
- Memorandum of Discussion at the 199th Meeting of the National Security Council, 27 May 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954, Volume X, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d465>, Date of Access: 25.03.2020;
- Memorandum of Discussion at the 303d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 8 November 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26 - December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Mode of Access:



- <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d554>, Date of Access: 06.04.2020;
- Memorandum of Discussion at the 336th Meeting of the National Security Council, 12 September 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v13/d398>, Date of Access: 15.04.2020;
  - Memorandum of Discussion at the 406th Meeting of the National Security Council, 13 May 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume IV, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v04/d298>, Date of Access: 01.07.2020;
  - Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, 2 September 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26 - December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d163>, Date of Access: 01.04.2020;
  - National Intelligence Special Estimate “Prospects For An Inclusive Middle East Defense Organization”, 17 March 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p1/d65>, Date of Access: 27.03.2020;
  - National Security Council Report (NSC 5501), 7 January 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d6>, Date of Access: 15.03.2020;
  - National Security Council Report 5722 “Construction of a New Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System”, 30 September 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d265>, Date of Access: 14.05.2020;
  - National Security Council Report on U.S. Objectives With Respect to the USSR To Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security (NSC 20/4), 23 November 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; The United Nations, Volume I, Part 2, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v01p2/d60>, Date of Access: 17.01.2020;

- National Security Council Report on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC 68), 7 April 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d85>, Date of Access: 20.01.2020;
- Operations Coordinating Board Report, 7 August 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d462>, Date of Access: 14.05.2020;
- Paper Drafted by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler), 24 October, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume 5, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v05/d93>, Date of Access: 10.03.2020;
- Paper Prepared by the Directing Panel of Project Solarium, 1 June 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d69>, Date of Access: 05.03.2020;
- Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs “Political and Economic Factors Involved in Military Assistance to Iran in FY 1951”, undated, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v05/d210>, Date of Access: 10.03.2020;
- President Roosevelt to the Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius), Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The Near East and Africa, Vol. IV., Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943v04/d888>, Date of Access: 13.08.2019;
- Progress Report on United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East (NSC 5428), 22 December 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d178>, Date of Access: 11.04.2020;

- Report to the National Security Council by the Departments of State, Defense, the Interior, and Justice (NSC 138/1), 6 January 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic And Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v01p2/d159>, Date of Access: 16.12.2019;
- Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), 30 October 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d101>, Date of Access: 07.03.2020;
- Report to the National Security Council by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security (NSC 141), 19 January 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d42>, Date of Access: 21.01.2020;
- Report to the President by the Special Committee of the National Security Council on the Proposed Acceleration of the Atomic Energy Program, 10 October 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v01/d207>, Date of Access: 01.03.2020;
- Review of Middle East Problems Bearing upon the Supply of Oil to the Free World, 10 May 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v10/d255>, Date of Access: 19.04.2020;
- Special National Intelligence Estimate, 29 November 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d151>, Date of Access: 11.04.2020;
- Staff Study Prepared in the Department of State “United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East”, 30 October 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d270>, Date of Access: 09.04.2020;

- Statement of Policy by the National Security Council (NSC 5402), 2 January 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954, Volume X, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d403>, Date of Access: 26.03.2020;
- Statement of Policy by the National Security Council “NSC 97/6 - A National Petroleum Program”, 16 November 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v01p2/d64>, Date of Access: 27.03.2020;
- Statement of U.S. Policy Towards Iran (NSC 5821/1), 15 November 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d257>, Date of Access: 20.04.2020;
- Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State, 10 November 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume IV, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v04/d285>, Date of Access: 20.03.2020;
- Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon, 28 October 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v13/d118>, Date of Access: 07.04.2020;
- Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon, 13 May 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v11/d31>, Date of Access: 07.04.2020;
- Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, 21 August 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v13/d364>, Date of Access: 15.04.2020;
- Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 13 January 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v13/d132>, Date of Access: 07.04.2020;

- Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 4 May 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v11/d18>, Date of Access: 07.04.2020;
- Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 9 January 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v11/d1>, Date of Access: 07.04.2020;
- Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State, 11 January 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII, Mode of Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v13/d344>, Date of Access: 07.04.2020.

### **CIA Publications**

- “The Suez Crisis – A Test for the USSR’s Middle Eastern Policy” (Reference title: CAESAR V-A-56), Soviet Staff Study, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 3 January 1957;
- “The Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History”, *Special Series: Crisis Collection*, Vol. 2, Office of Archives and History, National Security Agency / Central Security Service, 1988;
- T. Troy, “Truman on CIA: Examining President Truman’s Role in the Establishment of the Agency”, The CIA Historical Review Program, Mode of Access: <https://bit.ly/3aVJt9w>, Date of Access: 13.03.2020.

### **Addresses, Speeches and Proclamations**

- “Recommendations of Universal Military Training”, Message of President Truman to Congress, 28 October 1945, the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 659;
- “The Basic Concepts of United States Foreign Policy”, Address by Secretary of State Dulles Before the Annual Luncheon of the Associated Press, New York, 22 April 1957, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1957*, Department of State Publication 7101;
- “The Place of Bretton Woods in Economic Collective Security”, address by D. Acheson on 23 March 1945 before the Commonwealth Club of California, the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 12, p. 470;

- Address by Secretary of State Dulles, made before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, on 12 January 1954, section “The Need for Long-Range Policies”, The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 30, No. 758, p. 108;
- D. Eisenhower, “Atoms For Peace Speech”, 8 December 1953, United Nations, Mode of Access: <https://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/eisenhower-atoms-for-peace-speech-text/>, Date of Access: 14.11.2019;
- D. Eisenhower, “Chance For Peace”, 16 April 1953, Miller Center, Mode of Access: <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-16-1953-chance-peace>, Date of Access: 12.01.2020;
- D. Eisenhower, Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1955, 21 January 1954, Mode of Access: <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/annual-budget-message-the-congress-fiscal-year-1955>, Date of Access: 01.02.2020;
- President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Farewell Address, 17 January 1961, Mode of Access: <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=90&page=transcript>, Date of Access: 10.02.2020;
- Presidential remarks at the National Editorial Association Dinner, 22 June 1954, *Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1954: containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the president, January 1 to December 31, 1954*, p. 586;
- Proclamation 3279 - Adjusting Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products Into the United States, 10 March 1959, President of the United States Dwight Eisenhower, The American Presidency Project, Mode of Access: <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-3279-adjusting-imports-petroleum-and-petroleum-products-into-the-united>, Date of Access: 29.04.2020;
- Remarks at the DeSoto Next Generation Solar Energy Center in Arcadia, Florida, 27 October 2009, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack Obama, 2009, Book II - July 1 to December 31, 2009*;
- Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East of President Eisenhower, 5 January 1957, *Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1957: containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the president, January 1 to December 31, 1957*;
- Statement by the President Upon Signing the Social Security Amendments of 1954, 1 September 1954, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pp. 801-802;

- The President's News Conference, 11 November 1953, *Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1953: containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the president, January 20 to December 31, 1953*;
- The President's News Conference, 7 April 1954, *Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1954: containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the president, January 1 to December 31, 1954*.

### **Articles and Publications by Political Intellectuals**

- "George Kennan's 'Long Telegram'," February 22, 1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives and Records Administration, Department of State Records (Record Group 59), Central Decimal File, 1945-1949; reprinted in US Department of State, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VI, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), 696-709;
- A. Nutting, *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez*, C. N. Potter, 1967;
- D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, The John Hopkins University Press, 1997;
- D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956: The White House Years*, Doubleday & Company, 1963;
- D. Eisenhower, *The Eisenhower Diaries*, ed. by R. Ferrell, W. W. Norton & Company, 1981;
- D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, 1956-1961: The White House Years*, Doubleday & Company, 1965;
- G. Kennan ("X"), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947, Mode of Access: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct>, Date of Access: 15.02.2020;
- G. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950*, Little, Brown, 1967.

### **Congressional Hearings and Records**

- "International Corporations and United States Foreign Policy", Hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 93rd Congress, Second Session on Multinational Petroleum Companies and Foreign Policy, 1974, Part 7;
- "International Corporations and United States Foreign Policy", Hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations,

93rd Congress, Second Session of Multinational Petroleum Companies and Foreign Policy, 1974, Part 9;

- “Mandatory Oil Import Control Program, Its Impact Upon the Domestic Minerals Industry and National Security”, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, Second Session, 13, 14 and 16 May 1968, Serial No. 90-25;
- D. Todd, *Industrial Dislocation: The Case of Global Shipbuilding* (Routledge Revivals), Routledge, 2019 (reprint of 1991 ed.);
- Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions with the Senate armed Services Committee, Vol. IX, 85th Congress, First Session, 1957;
- Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 85th Congress, 1st Session on Joint Resolutions to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence, January 14, 15, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30; February 1 and 4, 1957;
- M. Ratner, C. Glover, *U.S. Energy: Overview and Key Statistics, Congressional Research Service*, 2014;
- Report No. 232, Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, 84th Congress, First Session, Senate, 28 April 1955.

### **Correspondence**

- *The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953-1955*, ed. by P. Boyle, The University of North Carolina Press, 1990, p. 53;
- *The Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955-1957*, ed. by P. Boyle, The University of North Carolina Press, 2005.

### **Statistics**

- U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis, U.S. Production of Crude Oil, Mode of Access:  
<https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=p&s=mcrfpu1&f=a>, Date of Access: 20.05.2020;
- U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis, U.S. Imports of Crude Oil, Mode of Access:



<https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrimus1&f=a>, Date of Access: 20.05.2020;

- West Texas Intermediate (WTI or NYMEX) Crude Oil Prices per Barrel - 70 Year Historical Chart, *Macrotrends*, Mode of Access:

<https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart>, Date of Access: 26.04.2020.

## Other

- “The International Petroleum Cartel” (Reprint), Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, 22 April 1975;
- Clifford-Elsey report: American Relations with the Soviet Union. 24 September 1946, Truman Library, Mode of Access: <https://bit.ly/3bLQqBO>, Date of Access: 10.01.2020;
- *Energy to the World: The Story of Saudi Aramco*, Vol. 1, Aramco Services Company, 2011;
- *History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense*, Volume 2, 1956-1972, Center of Military History of the United States, 2009;
- R. C. Hall “The Origins of US Space Policy: Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of Space”, 1992, BMD Technical Information Center, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization;
- R. Cossa, *Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns*, McNair Papers, No. 11, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1990
- Technical Sub-Committee on Axis Oil of the UK Ministry of Defense, *Oil as a Factor in the German War Effort, 1933-1945*, published in 1946, declassified;
- U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “One hundred years of price change: the Consumer Price Index and the American inflation experience”, *Monthly Labor Review*, April 2014, Mode of Access: <https://bit.ly/2ITmr6V>, Date of Access: 15.03.2020.

## Secondary Sources

### Books

- A. Heinrich (ed.), *Export Pipelines from the CIS Region: Geopolitics, Securitization, and Political Decision-Making (Changing Europe)*, Ibidem Press, 2014;
- A. Kay, *Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder: Political and Economic Planning for German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1940-1941 (War and Genocide)*, Berghahn Books, 2011;
- A. Scott Cooper, *The Fall of Heaven: The Pahlavis and the Final Days of Imperial Iran*, Henry Holt and Co., 2016;
- A. von Tunzelmann, *Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace*, Harper, 2016;
- A. Wohlstetter, *Protecting the U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 1960s*, RAND Corporation, 1956;
- A. Wohlstetter, *The Delicate Balance of Terror*, RAND Corporation, 1958;
- B. Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, RAND Corporation, 1959;
- B. Eichengreen, *Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar*, Oxford University Press, 2011;
- B. Kaufman, *The Arab Middle East and the United States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and Superpower Diplomacy*, Twayne Pub, 1996;
- B. Kuklick, *Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger*, Princeton University Press, 2007;
- B. Turner, *Suez 1956: The Inside Story of the First Oil War*, Hodder & Stoughton, 2007;
- C. Craig, *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, Columbia University Press, 1998;
- C. de Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia: Muhammad Mossadegh and a Tragic Anglo-American Coup*, Harper Perennial, 2013;
- C. Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa*, Columbia University Press, 1982;
- C. Malkasian, *The Korean War*, Rosen Publishing, 2009;
- C. Pach (ed.), *A Companion to Dwight D. Eisenhower*, Wiley-Blackwell, 2017;
- C. Tripp, *A History of Iraq* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2007;
- C. van der Linde, *Dynamic International Oil Markets: Oil Market Developments and Structure, 1860-1990*, Springer Science+Business Media, 1991

- D. Anderson, *Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961*, Columbia University Press, 1991;
- D. Collier, *Democracy and the Nature of American Influence in Iran, 1941-1979*, Syracuse University Press, 2017;
- D. Koepfel, *Banana: The Fate of the Fruit That Changed the World*, Plume, 2009;
- D. Kunz, *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis*, University of North Carolina Press, 1991;
- D. Lesch, *Syria And The United States: Eisenhower's Cold War In The Middle East*, Westview Press, 1992;
- D. McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years*, Dodd, Mead & Co;
- D. Nichols, *Eisenhower 1956: The President's Year of Crisis - Suez and the Brink of War*, Simon & Schuster, 2012;
- D. Reveron, N. Gvosdev, M. Owens, *US Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy: The Evolution of an Incidental Superpower*, Georgetown University Press, 2014;
- D. Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel*, Oxford University Press, 1993;
- D. Talbot, *The Devil's Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America's Secret Government*, Harper Perennial, 2015;
- D. Varble, *The Suez Crisis 1956* (Essential Histories), Osprey Publishing, 2003;
- D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, Simon & Schuster, 1991;
- E. Spalding, *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism*, University Press of Kentucky, 2006;
- E. Thomas, *Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World*, Back Bay Books, 2012;
- F. Fukuyama, "Soviet Threats to Intervene in the Middle East 1956-1973", A Series in International Security and Arms Control, Rand Corporation, 1980;
- F. Gerges, *Making the Arab World: Nasser, Qutb, and the Clash That Shaped the Middle East*, Princeton University Press, 2018;
- F. Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century*, University of Chicago Press, 1994;
- F. Parra, *Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum*, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, London, 2004;
- G. Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press, 2019;

- G. Muttitt, *Fuel on the Fire: Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq*, The Bodley Head, London, 2011;
- G. Wawro, *Quicksand: America's Pursuit of Power in the Middle East*, Penguin Books, 2010;
- H. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1951;
- H. Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American crusades*, Macmillan, 1972;
- I. Gellman, *The President and the Apprentice*, Yale University Press, 2015;
- J. Bamberg, *British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-1975: The Challenge of Nationalism* (History of British Petroleum, Vol. 3), Cambridge University Press, 2000;
- J. Beal, *John Foster Dulles: 1888-1959*, Greenwood Pub Group, 1959;
- J. Blair, *The Control of Oil*, Vintage Books, 1978;
- J. Gabriel, *The American Conception of Neutrality After 1941* (Updated and Revised), Palgrave Macmillan, 2002;
- J. L. Gaddis *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, 2005;
- J. L. Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life*, The Penguin Press, New York, 2011;
- J. Newton, *Eisenhower: The White House Years*, Anchor, 2011;
- J. Pearson, *Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002;
- J. Smith, *Eisenhower in War and Peace*, Random House Trade, 2012;
- J. Straw, *The English Job: Understanding Iran and Why It Distrusts Britain*, Biteback Publishing, 2019;
- K. Kondratyev, V. Krapivin, C. Varotsos, *Global Carbon Cycle and Climate Change*, Springer, 2003;
- K. Love, *Suez: The Twice-Fought War*, McGraw-Hill, 1969
- K. Samii, *Involvement by Invitation: American Strategies of Containment in Iran*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987;
- L. Brown, *World on the Edge: How to Prevent Environmental and Economic Collapse*, W. W. Norton & Company, 2011;
- L. Maugeri, *The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World's Most Controversial Resource*, Praeger, 2006;
- M. Auzanneau, *Oil, Power and War: A Dark History*, Chelsea Green Publishing, 2018;

- M. Childs, *Eisenhower: Captive Hero; a Critical Study of the General and the President*, Harcourt, Brace, 1958;
- M. de Moraes Ruehsen, "Operation 'Ajax' Revisited: Iran, 1953", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1993, pp. 467-486;
- M. Doran, *Ike's Gamble: America's Rise to Dominance in the Middle East*, Free Press, 2016;
- M. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1987;
- M. Kaldor, T. L. Karl, Y. Said (eds.), *Oil Wars*, Pluto Press. 2007;
- M. Klare, *Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Petroleum Dependency*, Penguin Books, 2005;
- M. Leffler *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, Stanford University Press, 1992;
- M. Leffler, D. Painter, *The Origins of the Cold War: An International History* (2ed), Routledge, 2005;
- M. Leffler, O. Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I*, Cambridge University Press; reprint ed., 2012;
- M. Lytle, *The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 1941-1953*, Holmes & Meier Pub, 1987;
- M. Mayer, *The Eisenhower Years (Presidential Profiles)*, Facts on File, 2009;
- M. Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman*, Berkley, New York, 1973;
- N. Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians*, Pluto Press, London, 1999;
- N. Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa'ud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations*, Indiana University Press, 2002;
- O. Almog, *Britain, Israel and the United States, 1955-1958: Beyond Suez*, Routledge, 2002;
- P. Anderson, *American Foreign Policy and its Thinkers*, Verso, London, 2015;
- P. Darman, *Attack on Pearl Harbor: America Enters World War II*, Rosen Publishing, New York, 2012;
- P. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, Princeton University Press, 1992;
- P. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961*, University of North Carolina Press, 2006;

- P. Helmreich, *From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920*, Ohio State University Press, 1974;
- P. Holbo, R. Sellen (eds.), *The Eisenhower Era: the Age of Consensus*, The Dryden Press, 1974;
- P. Odell, *An Economic Geography of Oil* (Routledge Revivals), Routledge, 2013 (reprint of the 1963 ed.);
- R. Alvandi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, 2016
- R. Barrett, *The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy Under Eisenhower and Kennedy*, I.B. Tauris, 2007;
- R. Bowie, R. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy*, Oxford University Press, 2000;
- R. Bronson, *Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia*, Oxford University Press, 2006;
- R. Burns, J. Siracusa, *A Global History of the Nuclear Arms Race: Weapons, Strategy, and Politics*, Vol. 1, Praeger, 2013;
- R. Damms, *The Eisenhower Presidency, 1953-1961*, Routledge, 2002;
- R. Divine, *Eisenhower And The Cold War*, Oxford University Press, 1981;
- R. Ferrell, *Harry S. Truman and the Cold War Revisionists*, University of Missouri, 2006;
- R. Fowler, *More Than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East*, Potomac Books, 2018;
- R. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, Free Press, 1953;
- R. H. Dekmejian, *Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics*, State University of New York Press, 1971;
- R. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, Princeton University Press, 1992;
- R. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, 1982;
- R. Melanson, D. Mayers (eds.), *Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s*, University of Illinois Press, 1987;
- R. Ripley, J. Lindsay (eds.), *U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997;

- R. Takeyh, *The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953-57*, St. Martin's Press, 2000;
- R. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy*, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971;
- R. Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*, Stanford University Press, 2006;
- S. Aburish, *Nasser: the Last Arab*, St. Martin Press, New York, 2004;
- S. Ambrose, *Eisenhower Volume II: The President*, Touchstone Book, 1984;
- S. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier and president*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1990;
- S. Ambrose, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (Reprint ed.), Anchor, 2012;
- S. Corke, *US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare and the CIA, 1945-53*, Routledge, 2007;
- S. Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New-look National Security Policy, 1953-61*, Palgrave Macmillan, 1996;
- S. Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*, Wiley, 2008;
- S. Kinzer, *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War*, Times Books, 2013;
- S. Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union*, Manchester University Press, 1999;
- S. Manahan, *Fundamentals of Environmental Chemistry*, CRC Press, 3rd ed., 2008;
- S. McGlinchey, *US Arms Policies Towards the Shah's Iran*, Routledge, 2014;
- S. Pirani, *Burning Up: A Global History of Fossil Fuel Consumption*, Pluto Press, 2018;
- S. Schlesinger, S. Kinzer, *Bitter fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, Doubleday, 1982;
- S. Sestanovich, *Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama*, Knopf, New York, 2014;
- S. Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East*, University of North Carolina Press, 2004;
- T. Sayle, *Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*, Cornell University Press, 2019;
- T. Winegard, *The First World Oil War*, University of Toronto Press, 2016;

- V. Marcel, *Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East*, Brookings Inst. Press/Chatham House, 2006;
- W. Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II*, Common Courage Press, 2008;
- W. Hitchcock, *The Age of Eisenhower: America, and the World in the 1950s*, Simon & Schuster, 2018;
- W. Hixson, *The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Yale University Press, 2008;
- W. Lippmann, *The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy*, Harper, New York, 1947;
- W. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950*, Princeton University Press, 1992;
- W. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, (first published by World Pub. Co., Cleveland, 1959), W. W. Norton & Company; 50th Anniversary revised ed., 2009.

#### **Journal Articles and Working Papers**

- A. Etges, “All that Glitters is Not Gold: The 1953 Coup against Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran”, *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2011, pp. 495-508;
- A. Friedman “The Smearing of Joe McCarthy: The Lavender Scare, Gossip, and Cold War Politics”, *American Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No. 4, 2005, pp. 1105-1129;
- A. Samuel, “The Open Door and U.S. Policy in Iraq between the World Wars”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 38, No. 5, 2014, pp. 926-952;
- A. Sanjian, “The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 226-266;
- A. Toprani, “The French Connection: A New Perspective on the End of the Red Line Agreement, 1945-1948”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2012, pp. 261-299;
- B. Duchin, “The “Agonizing Reappraisal”: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the European Defense Community”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1992, pp. 201-221;
- B. Kaufman, “Mideast Multinational Oil, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Antitrust: the 1950s”, *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 63, No. 4, 1977, pp. 937-959;
- B. Kaufman, “Oil and Antitrust: The Oil Cartel Case and the Cold War”, *The Business History Review*, Vol. 51, No. 1, 1977, pp. 35-56;
- B. Nimer, “Dulles, Suez, and Democratic Diplomacy”, *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1959, pp. 784-798;



- B. Rubin, “America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 97, No. 1, 1982, pp. 73-90;
- B. Rushkoff “Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955”, *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1993, pp. 343-367;
- Brands Jr., “Redefining the Cold War: American Policy toward Yugoslavia, 1948–60”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1987;
- C. Békés, “The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality”, *Cold War History*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2006, pp. 477-500;
- C. C. S. Newton “The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan”, *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1984, pp. 391-408;
- C. Parker, “Paying for Zion: Eisenhower’s Middle East Policy”, 1953-56, *Middle East Policy*, Volume 25, No. 2, 2018, pp. 100-120;
- D. Little, “His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1996, pp. 27-54
- D. Nichols, *Eisenhower 1956: The President’s Year of Crisis - Suez and the Brink of War*, Simon & Schuster, 2012;
- D. Painter, “Oil and the American Century”, *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 99, No. 1, Oil in American History, 2012, pp. 24-39;
- D. Painter, “The Marshall Plan and Oil”, *Cold War History*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2009, pp. 159-175;
- D. Williamson, “Understandable Failure: The Eisenhower Administration's Strategic Goals in Iraq, 1953-1958”, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol.17, No. 3, 2006, pp. 597-615;
- E. Blas, “The Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways: The Road to Success?”, *The History Teacher*, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2010, pp. 127-142;
- E. Fitzgerald, “The Iraq Petroleum Company, Standard Oil of California, and the Contest for Eastern Arabia, 1930-1933”, *The International History Review*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1991, pp. 441-465;
- E. Geelhoed “Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Spy Plane, and the Summit: A Quarter-Century Retrospective”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly* Vol. 17, No. 1, 1987, pp. 95-106;
- E. Mark, “The Question of Containment: A Reply to John Lewis Gaddis”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 2, 1978, pp. 430-441;
- G. Brew, “Our Most Dependable Allies”: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, 1956–1958”, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2015, pp. 89-109;

- H. Mejcher “Oil and British Policy towards Mesopotamia, 1914-1918”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1972, pp. 377-391;
- H. Mendershausen, “Dollar Shortage and Oil Surplus in 1949-1950”, *Essays in International Finance*, No. 11, Princeton University Press, 1950;
- H. W. Brands “The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State (*The American Historical Review*, Vol. 94, No. 4, October, 1989, pp. 963-989;
- I. Pearson, “The Syrian Crisis of 1957, the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, and the 1958 landings in Jordan and Lebanon”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2007, pp. 45-64;
- J. Alterman, *Egypt and American Foreign Assistance, 1952–1956*, Palgrave, 2002;
- J. Bialos, “Oil Imports And National Security: The Legal And Policy Framework For Ensuring United States Access To Strategic Resources”, *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1989, pp. 235-300;
- J. Bradford de Long, B. Eichengreen, “The Marshall Plan: History’s Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program”, *NBER Working Paper Series*, Working Paper No. 3899, 1991;
- J. Colgan “The Emperor Has No Clothes: The Limits of OPEC in the Global Oil Market”, *International Organization*, Vol. 68, No. 3, 2014, pp. 599-632;
- J. Frappier “Above the Law: Violations of International Law by the U.S. Government from Truman to Reagan”, *Crime and Social Justice*, No. 21/22, International Lawness and the Search for Justice, 1984, pp. 1-36;
- J. L. Gaddis, “Containment: A Reassessment”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 55, 1977, pp. 873-887;
- J. L. Gaddis, “New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1990, pp. 405-423;
- K. Young, “Revisiting NSC 68”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2013, pp. 3-33;
- M. Gallagher, “Intelligence and National Security Strategy: Reexamining Project Solarium”, *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2015, pp. 461-485;
- M. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup D’état in Iran”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1987, pp. 261-286;
- M. Gasiorowski, “U.S. Perceptions of the Communist Threat in Iran during the Mossadegh Era”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2019, pp. 185-221;

- M. Heiss, “The United States, Great Britain, and the Creation of the Iranian Oil Consortium, 1953-1954”, *The International History Review*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1994, pp. 511-535;
- M. Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War*, University of California Press, 2005;
- M. Leffler “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48”, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 89, No. 2, 1984, pp. 346-381;
- M. McAuliffe “Eisenhower, the President”, *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 68, No. 3, 1981, pp. 625-632;
- N. Jensen-Eriksen, “The First Wave of the Soviet Oil Offensive: The Anglo-American Alliance and the Flow of ‘Red Oil’ to Finland during the 1950s”, *Business History*, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2007, pp. 348-366;
- P. Crowl “John Foster Dulles: The Policy Behind the Myth”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 27, No. 5, 1975, pp. 8-17;
- P. H. Frankel, “Oil Supplies During the Suez Crisis - On Meeting a Political Emergency”, *The Journal of Industrial Economics*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1958, pp. 85-100;
- P. Hahn, “Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2006, pp. 38-47;
- R. Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War”, *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1988-1989, p. 50-91;
- R. Filipink Jr., “‘Force is the Last Method’: Eisenhower, Dulles and American Intervention in the Suez Crisis”, *Critique*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2007, pp. 173-188;
- R. Higgs, “The Two-Price System: U.S. Rationing During World War II”, Foundation for Economic Education, 24.04.2009, Mode of Access: <https://fee.org/articles/the-two-price-system-us-rationing-during-world-war-ii/>, Date of Access: 15.03.2020;
- R. Immerman, “Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?”, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1979, pp. 21-38;
- R. McMahon, “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 101, No. 3, 1986, pp. 453-473;
- R. Platig, “The ‘New Look’ Raises Old Problems”, *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 1, The Gurian Memorial Issue, 1955, pp. 111-135;
- R. Stern, “Oil Scarcity Ideology in US National Security Policy, 1909--1980”, Working Paper of the Oil, Energy & the Middle East Program, Princeton University Press, 2012;

- S. Blackwell, “Britain, the United States and the Syrian crisis, 1957”, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2000, 139-158;
- S. Borzutzky, D. Berger, “Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don’t: The Eisenhower Administration and the Aswan Dam”, *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 1, 2010, pp. 84-102;
- S. Hess, “Foreign Policy and Presidential Campaigns”, *Foreign Policy*, No. 8, 1972, pp. 3-22;
- S. Marsh, “Anglo-American Crude Diplomacy: Multinational Oil and the Iranian Oil Crisis, 1951–53”, *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2007, pp. 25-53;
- S. Marsh, “The United States, Iran and operation ‘Ajax’: Inverting interpretative orthodoxy”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2003;
- S. Rabe “Eisenhower Revisionism: A Decade of Scholarship”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1993, pp. 97-115;
- S. Saul, “Masterly Inactivity as Brinkmanship: The Iraq Petroleum Company’s Route to Nationalization, 1958-1972”, *The International History Review*, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2007;
- S. Streeter “Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Postrevisionist Perspectives”, *The History Teacher*, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2000, pp. 61-74;
- T. Petersen “Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East: The Struggle for the Buraimi Oasis, 1952-1957”, *The International History Review*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1992, pp. 71-91;
- T. Priest, “The Dilemmas of Oil Empire”, *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 99, No. 1, 2012, pp. 236-251;
- V. de Santis “Eisenhower Revisionism”, *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1976, pp. 190-200);
- V. Nemchenok, “In Search of Stability Amid Chaos: US Policy Toward Iran, 1961–63”, *Cold War History*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2010, pp. 341-369;
- W. Bishop, Jr., “The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case”, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1951, pp. 749-754;
- W. Burr “Avoiding the Slippery Slope: The Eisenhower Administration and the Berlin Crisis, November 1958–January 1959”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1994, pp. 177-205;
- W. Cleveland, *A History Of The Modern Middle East*, Westview Press, 2nd ed., 1999;
- W. Mead, “The System of Government Subsidies to the Oil Industry”, *Natural Resources Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1970, pp. 113-125;

- W. Welch, “Soviet Expansionism and its Assessment”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1971, pp. 317-327.

### Chapters in Books

- F. Robelius, “Giant Oil Fields - The Highway to Oil: Giant Oil Fields and Their Importance for Future Oil Production” in *Uppsala Dissertations from the Faculty of Science & Technology* (Book 69), Uppsala University Press, 2007;
- S. Rearden, “Paul H. Nitze and NSC 68: “Militarizing” the Cold War” in A. Nelson (ed.), *The Policy Makers: Shaping American Foreign Policy from 1947 to the Present*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008;
- W. Hitchcock, “The Ghost of Crises Past: The Troubled Alliance in Historical Perspective” in J. Anderson, J. Ikenberry, T. Risse (eds.), *The End of the West?: Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order*, Cornell University Press, 2008.

### Newspaper and Magazine Articles

- W. Shannon, “Eisenhower as President: A Critical Appraisal of the Record”, *Commentary*, 1958, Mode of Access: <https://bit.ly/39ZqUB1>, Date of Access: 17.03.2020;
- S. Everly, “The Top-Secret Cold War Plan to Keep Soviet Hands Off Middle Eastern Oil”, *Politico Magazine*, 23 June 2016, Mode of Access: <https://politi.co/3bXGo9r>, Date of Access: 07.10.2019;
- Shepley, “How Dulles Averted War”, *Life*, 16 January 1956, pp. 70-72
- J. L. Gaddis, “He Made It Look Easy”, 20 April 2012, *The New York Times*, Mode of Access: <https://nyti.ms/39cahAA>, Date of Access: 20.03.2020.

### Websites

- C. Pach Jr., “Dwight Eisenhower: Foreign Affairs”, Miller Center, University of Virginia, Mode of Access: <https://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/foreign-affairs>, Date of Access: 20.01.2020;
- C. Pach, Jr., “Dwight D. Eisenhower: Campaigns and Elections”, Miller Center, Mode of Access: <https://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/campaigns-and-elections>, Date of Access: 01.04.2020;

- Eisenhower and the Nuclear Arms Race in the 1950s “Project Solarium”, [Eisenhower National Historic Site](#), Mode of Access: <https://www.nps.gov/articles/projectsolarium.htm>, Date of Access: 15.10.2019;
- S. Everly, “U.S., Britain Developed Plans to Disable or Destroy Middle Eastern Oil Facilities from Late 1940s to Early 1960s in Event of a Soviet Invasion”, *National Security Archive*, Mode of Access: <https://bit.ly/35qGB2q>, Date of Access: 07.10.2019.