Defining Populism through Turkey's Erdoğan

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Abstract

Le elezioni generali del 2002 in Turchia hanno cambiato radicalmente lo scenario politico del paese. I partiti storici non hanno raggiunto il punteggio per poter accedere al parlamento, mentre Il Partito della Giustizia e dello Sviluppo (AKP) ha ottenuto la maggioranza necessaria a formare un governo. L'opposizione ha potuto contare sulla presenza del solo Partito Democratico dei Popoli (CHP). Fondato da un gruppo di politici guidati da Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, l'AKP si presenta come un partito conservatore e democratico con l'obiettivo di una migliore democrazia, la fiducia di essere a capo della leadership all'interno dell'Unione Europea e di promuovere politiche di stabilità economica. L'esercito e la Corte Giudiziaria hanno dichiarato il proprio sdegno contro le iniziative dell'AKP, soprattutto riguardo a quelle di matrice religiosa che il partito perseguirebbe. Tuttavia l'AKP è riuscito a sopravvivere in diverse occasioni anche a situazioni di crisi aumentando il proprio potere. Con la promessa di ampliare la crescita economica e abbattere l'inflazione, l'AKP ha cominciato a cercare supporto all'interno di un bacino variegato di gruppi politici. A partire dal 2013, Erdoğan e l' AKP hanno affrontato tutta una serie di sfide provenienti da diversi oppositori. Da una parte, la pubblica opposizione è cresciuta anche attraverso le cosiddette proteste di Gezi, alimentate inoltre dalla brutalità degli scontri con la polizia. Dall'altra, il processo di pace con il PKK è stato accantonato, e il conflitto armato è stato spostato alle aree urbane nella Turchia sud-orientale. Infine, vecchii alleati del presidente, i Gülenisti, si sono schierati contro il governo di Erdoğan facendo trapelare, in un primo momento, delle registrazioni che avrebbero visti implicati alcuni membri del governo, sbloccando un'inchiesta per presunta corruzione e, in seguito, avrebbero architettato il colpo di stato del 2016 per rovesciare la leadership di Erdoğan. Tale tentativo viene considerato ad oggi come un drammatico cambiamento nella storia della Turchia. I cittadini hanno successivamente iniziato a riversarsi nelle strade a seguito della diretta di Erdoğan su FaceTime. Alla fine il colpo di stato non ha avuto il benché minimo successo.

Erdoğan è salito come leader (o si è presentato come tale) portando la nazione ad una situazione drammatica minacciando la stabilità del paese. Egli ha usato la sua immagine per trasformare il paese in un sistema presidenziale nel 2017, per poi essere eletto primo presidente nel 2018. Per raggiungere questo traguardo ha cambiato il suo programma cercando di ottenere, in questo modo, il supporto degli ultra nazionalisti del Partito del Movimento Nazionalista (MHP). Alcuni politici, tra cui alcuni parlamentari dell'HDP, giornalisti, accademici, e leader di

movimenti sociali, sono stati arrestati, mentre diversi dipendenti pubblici licenziati. La recente trasformazione della Turchia sotto Erdoğan viene generalmente descritta come una deriva autoritaria e la situazione politica come un autoritarismo competitivo. Erdoğan viene citato tra i maggiori leader populisti del ventunesimo secolo.

In questo studio spiegherò perché, e fino a che punto, il presidente turco possa essere considerate populista. Il populismo è diventato un termine in voga a partire dai primi decenni del ventunesimo secolo. Ma che cos'è il populismo? Il problema è , in primis, il fatto che non vi sia una definizione fornita da populisti o da teorici populisti. Il populismo appare in diverse forme e in diversi contesti -come ad esempio in Europa e in America Latina- e riappare con caratteristiche diverse anche nello stesso contesto geografico. Ci sono diversi approcci per definire il populismo e ognuno è altamente influenzato dalla regione studiata. Le due grandi definizioni si ritrovano in due approcci differenti: quello ideativo e quello strategico. Gli aderenti all'approccio ideativo asseriscono che questi partiti siano chiamati populisti per via della propria ideologia distinta, l'ideologia populista. D'altra parte, l'approccio strategico ritiene che i leader siano chiamati populisti in quanto perseguono una strategia atta a ottenere e mantenere il potere: la strategia populista.

In questo lavoro proverò a spiegare il populismo di Erdoğan attraverso approcci dominanti e già esistenti. Le definizioni ideativa e strategica del populismo presentano chiare peculiarità e accettano Erdoğan come un populista. Utilizzerò la metodologia proposta da illustri esperti per poter spiegare ed applicare al meglio le proprie definizioni. Nel terzo capitolo spiegherò perché, e in che modo, Erdoğan sia stato etichettato come populista attraverso l'approccio ideativo. Come menzionato sopra, questa variante configura il populismo come un gruppo di idee. Le idee e i concetti, in questo caso, si rifanno al "popolo", all' "élite" e alla "volontà delle persone".

Il metodo quantitativo che userò appartiene a Hawkins (2009, 2010). Egli quantifica in livelli di populismo attraverso i discorsi dei politici. Afferma, ad esempio, che un politico possa essere più populista di un altro. Categorizza i politici come non populisti, piuttosto che populisti, attraverso una scala di valutazione. Per applicare questo metodo quantitativo userò 139 discorsi che Erdoğan ha tenuto tra agosto 2014 a giugno 2019. Ho valutato questi discorsi secondo il metodo creato da Hawkins con una lieve modifica. In seguito all'analisi del suo metodo, ritengo che la variante proposta da Hawkins (2009,2010) sia limitata quando applicata al caso del

presidente turco. La rubrica necessita, infatti, di essere estesa maggiormente, o il risultato sarà completamente diverso. Quando il metodo di Hawkins veniva applicato a Erdoğan il risultato ottenuto era quello di un grafico variabile, poiché veniva preso in considerazione un ampio bacino di punteggi nel tempo. Questa variazione presenta un inevitabile dilemma per Hawkins, il quale afferma che il populismo sia una visione del mondo o un insieme di idee e che questo metodo sia sufficiente a misurare il populismo come tale. Se Hawkins avesse ragione a considerare il populismo come tale, allora il suo metodo fallirebbe nel misurarlo, perché i discorsi di Erdoğan possono essere valutati con qualsiasi punteggio nell'arco di cinque anni. Il populismo, misurato con il metodo di Hawkins, non è costante nei discorsi del presidente turco. D'altra parte, però, se la rubrica e il metodo di Hawkins si rivelassero esatti abbastanza da misurare il populismo e la variazione del grafico riflettesse effettivamente la verità riguardo i discorsi di Erdoğan, allora il populismo non potrebbe essere definito come una visione del mondo: questa dovrebbe, infatti, rimanere costante e non raggiungere il suo picco esclusivamente prima delle elezioni.

In secondo luogo, userò principalmente le definizioni di populismo proposte da Mudde per esprimere perché, e in che misura, Erdoğan sia considerato populista attraverso un metodo qualitativo. La sua definizione verrà divisa in quattro parti: l'ideologia, il popolo, l'élite, la volontà delle persone. Queste nozioni saranno applicate individualmente al discorso di Erdoğan. Dal momento che Mudde crede che il populismo sia un fenomeno nel mondo delle idee o, precisamente, ideologia dal nucleo sottile, l'analisi del discorso di un politico potrebbe essere considerato del tutto sufficiente. Mudde afferma che la distinzione tra idee e discorso sia irrilevante, in quanto i populisti di rado raggiungono il potere per implementare ciò che dicono (2017). Tuttavia, Erdoğan, essendo al potere da più di un decennio, pone una grande sfida alla definizione di Mudde. I dati ottenuti dai 139 discorsi saranno analizzati grazie anche all'applicazione dei concetti chiave dell'ideologia populista fino a qui studiata. Il mio argomento principale sostiene che l'approccio ideativo manchi di spiegare il motivo per cui Erdoğan sia considerato un populista. Per la definizione di Mudde, applicata qualitativamente, alcune nozioni sono molto simili a quelle proposte dall'approccio ideativo. Come ad esempio l'uso di "popolo" e "volontà del popolo". Il termine "élite" , invece, sembra essere quasi assente nel discorso di Erdoğan, soprattutto quando vengono citate le organizzazioni terroristiche. Si potrebbe, quindi, replicare che la definizione di Mudde manchi di spiegare interamente il populismo di Erdoğan.

In sintesi, l'approccio ideativo può spiegare solamente una parte del discorso di Erdoğan e non crea una rete comprensiva per spiegarne il caso. Nel quarto capitolo illustrerò cause ed effetti dell' "erdogan populista" attraverso l'approccio strategico per definire il populismo. Tale inclinazione guarda a questo fenomeno come ad una modalità di ottenimento e mantenimento del potere, con alcune caratteristiche distinte. Gli esperti falliscono nel raggiungere un consenso riguardo a tali peculiarità. Le componenti che loro propongono e discutono sono, ad esempio: lo scopo strategico del populismo, l'uso della tesi anti establishment, i collegamenti di natura plebiscitaria o leadership personalistica e la mobilizzazione.

Le conclusioni del capitolo mostrano come l'approccio strategico sia capace di spiegare perché Erdoğan sia considerato populista. Anzitutto, egli ha affrontato grandi sfide che potrebbero averlo potenzialmente spinto a usare una strategia populista per preservare il suo potere. Infine, Erdoğan è estraneo all'establishment, dal momento che è salito al potere da partiti che sono al di fuori dal sistema politico tradizionale. Il capitolo suggerisce, invece, che la tesi anti establishment non sia parte della strategia populista di Erdoğan. Al contrario, egli avrebbe sviluppato altre modalità per mantenere il proprio supporto pubblico. Inoltre, i collegamenti plebiscitari e la leadership personalista sono confermate dal caso preso in considerazione.

Il punto di forza di questo studio deriva dalla mole di dati che ho raccolto. Vi sono all'interno ben 139 discorsi pubblici tenuti da Erdoğan, analizzati tra agosto 2014 e giugno 2019. Questo ha fornito una certa consistenza cronologica al mio lavoro e mi ha permesso di elaborare numerose definizioni del populismo. Combinando fonti primarie e secondarie, così come diverse metodologie, ho cercato di fornire un'analisi approfondita sulla figura di questo presidente e sul fenomeno detto populismo.

1. Introduction

2002 general elections in Turkey radically changed the political scene of the country: it left all the parties previously in the parliament out and made AKP the governing party and CHP the main and the only opposition. AKP was a brand new party founded by a group of politicians led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç. This group had been labeled as 'reformists' in the ultra-conservative (or Islamist) FP. Leaving FP and its relatively radical ideology behind, AKP presented itself as conservative democrats with the objectives of a better democracy, EU membership, and a stable economy. Still, the military and the high judiciary

represented a challenge to the rise of AKP. Although it is hard to argue that the policies implemented and the laws enacted violated the principle of secularism, the military and the high judiciary were vocal about their annoyance about the AKP government, especially on the religious lifestyle that the AKP represents. The election of Abdullah Gül as the president by the parliament created great controversy mainly because Gül's wife wore a headscarf. Subsequently, AKP faced the danger of getting closed down in 2008; nevertheless, it survived it with the tie-breaking vote of the president of the Constitutional Court.

AKP survived political crises by increasing its power. With the addition of improving economic figures, such as a growing economy and a falling inflation, AKP started to draw support from a diverse range of social groups. The election results of 2007, 2009, and 2011 are the best evidence for it. Being backed by almost every other person in 2011, AKP was strong enough to initiate the Kurdish Peace Process, after thirty years of armed conflict against PKK. More, the process of harmonization of law on the path to the EU membership has been started. AKP's bringing together of a Muslim-majority society with a relatively well-working democracy put Erdoğan on the cover of the *TIME* Magazine.[1] Through this period, Gül had already become the president that had relatively symbolic power and no ties with the AKP. Bülent Arınç was elected as the chairman of the parliament and later appointed to important posts in the government. Erdoğan, on the other hand, with his charisma, was singled out as the leader of the AKP.

The year 2013 brought great challenges to Erdoğan's and his party. The last days of May witnessed Gezi protests that spread quickly from Taksim, Istanbul to the rest of Turkey. The protest was originated from Gezi Park and was originally environmental, it transformed into a nationwide protest against AKP government. Secondly, after falling out with the Gülenists, certain tapes were leaked that exposed government corruption in December 2013. Gülenists, a sect led by ex-imam Fethullah Gülen, used to be regarded as a philanthropic religious group also by AKP. After the leak that was organized by the members of the police and the judiciary who are strongly loyal to Gülen, it was understood that this group secretly attempted to seize the state power. Still, Erdoğan and AKP survived the 2014 local elections as well as the 2014 presidential

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[1] TIME Magazine, *Erdoğan's Way,* 28.11.2011. Found at:
http://content.time.com/time/covers/europe/0,16641,20111128,00.html

elections with great success, but the 2015 general elections changed the political game in Turkey. It was the first time that HDP (the party belonged to the Kurdish political movement) passed the threshold of 10%, and consequently, the first time AKP was unable to gain enough seats to govern as a single party. The peace process with the PKK was shelved, and the armed conflict was moved to urban areas in Southeastern Turkey. PKK and/or affiliated groups organized bomb attacks in various cities, which coincided with the ISIS attacks that resulted in the death of hundreds of people during the years 2015 and 2016. Yet, the greatest danger to that stability came on 15 July 2016, when a section of the military who is loyal to Gülen attempted to topple the government. Civilians went out to the streets after the call of Erdoğan through FaceTime, many of them died, and eventually, the coup failed. Erdoğan rose as a leader or was presented so, who carried the nation through a dramatic event that threatened the whole country. While ruling Turkey in a state of emergency, Erdoğan used his image to transform the country into a presidential system in 2017 and then got elected as the first president in the new system in 2018. To achieve this, he changed his discourse to be suitable to sustain the support of the ultra-nationalist MHP. Since 2015, many politicians including parliamentarians from HDP, journalists, academicians and civil society leaders were arrested, while civil servants sacked.

In the meantime on the foreign policy, Erdoğan had been having a conflictual relationship with the EU, Germany, the Netherlands, France, the USA, Russia, Israel, Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria, and Gulf countries (except for Qatar) occasionally. The influx of millions of Syrian refugees altered the social composition of certain cities. The conflict with the USA on the release of arrested Pastor Brunson, an American citizen, caused a sudden fall of Turkish Lira. Consequently, inflation rates rose above 15%. The worsening economic situation raised complaints about the Syrian refugees. In this context, Erdoğan carried his party to the 2019 local elections. Although losing the greatest cities, including Istanbul and Ankara, AKP still got 42.55% of votes.

The recent transformation of Turkey under Erdoğan's rule is generally described as an authoritarian slide and the political situation as competitive authoritarianism. However, there is one term to describe Erdoğan: populist.[2] This term is neither recent nor unique in its usage for Erdoğan. This term is used for Erdoğan in the context in which many political leaders and

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[2] The Guardian: *From Reformer to 'New Sultan': Erdoğan's Populist Evolution*. Found at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/11/from-reformer-to-new-sultan-erdogans-populist-evolution

movements are called as populist. More, although labeling Erdoğan as a populist is not recent, but still, it is only recently that there seems to be a consensus on labeling Erdoğan as populist (Weyland & Madrid, 2019). In this study, I want to explain why and to what extent Erdoğan is classified as a populist. For this, there is also the necessity to explore what is meant by the term populism.

Populism has become the political buzzword of the first decades of the twenty-first century. It is used across regions and continents, and for parties or politicians in power and in also opposition. It cannot be fit in the traditional right and left axis. There are political actors both from Left and Right that are labeled as populist. For example, both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders of the United States are categorized as populist. Next to them, Jeremy Corbyn, Nigel Farage, and Boris Johnson of the United Kingdom, Marine Le Pen of France, *Alternative für Deutschland* of Germany, Silvio Berlusconi, Matteo Salvini and the Five Star Movement of Italy, Pomedos of Spain, Alexis Tsipras and his party Syriza of Greece, Viktor Orbán of Hungary, Narendra Modi of India, Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, Joko Widodo of Indonesia, Nicolás Maduro and Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa of Ecuador, Andrés Manuel López Obrador of Mexico, Binyamin Netanyahu of Israel, and finally Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey are all considered as populists. For sure, this list is not exhaustive. Indeed, the label populist is generously used to describe political movements leaders.

But then, what is populism? The initial problem is that there is no definition provided by the 'populists' or populist theoreticians. So scholars need to first observe, and then propose definitions. There is no consensus in academia for a definition for populism, and this disagreement has been an integral part of the scholarship on populism since the beginning. The hardship arises because scholars find the perfect definition for a specific instance of populism, however, it should also be universal, across time and space. Populism appears in different shapes in different contexts such as Europe and Latin America. More, it reoccurs with radically changed characteristics even in the same geography. Therefore, a definition derived from one or a few instances of populism is subject to great challenges. It is assumed that everybody knows what is meant by populism, at least by intuition, but actually, everyone has its interpretation of the word.

There are many approaches to defining populism, and each is highly influenced by the region studied in its making. Some of the early definitions are already lost their grounds by the recurring populism instances with different characteristics. The contemporary definitions are the

economic (i.e., Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991; Acemoglu, Egorov, & Sonin, 2013), ideational (i.e., Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008; Hawkins, 2018), strategic (i.e., Weyland, 2001; Barr 2009), Laclauan (i.e., Laclau, 1997), and the list is not exhaustive. The two main definitions are the ideational and strategic approaches. Observation of the European radical right parties led some scholars (i.e., Mudde, 2007) to gather around the ideational approach. These parties are generally in opposition and they heavily use anti-establishment appeal. In other words, they blame it on the traditional center-right and center-left parties for the occurring socio-economic problems. The adherents of the ideational approach argue that these parties are called populist because of their distinct ideology, the populist ideology. On the other hand, the strategic definition is generally built on examples from democracies in Latin America, in which political leaders acquired political power contrary to the European counterparts. The strategic approach argues that the leaders are called populist because of their distinct strategy to obtain and maintain power, the populist strategy.

In this work, I will try to explain the populism of Erdoğan through already existing and dominant approaches to populism: the ideational and strategic definitions for populism. It is important to state explicitly that this work does not argue that Erdoğan is populism, nor it assumes that Erdoğan is populist. Without establishing a clear definition it is impossible to do so. Both the ideational and strategic approaches present clear definitions and they accept Erdoğan as a populist.[3] I will use the methodology proposed by scholars to use their own definitions. In this regard, the ideational approach provides both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The quantitative approach used in this study belongs to Prof. Kirk Hawkins. Through his method, one can quantify the politicians' level of populism assessing their speeches (Hawkins, 2009). He also provided the speeches and the analysis that his study group used to grade populism level of Erdoğan. To use this quantitative method, one hundred thirty-nine speeches of Erdoğan are analyzed in this study. In this analysis of speeches, some additional data is also collected that is useful for the qualitative method of ideational approach. Secondary resources will be mainly used for the strategic approach, which mainly based on observation of the political system and the political mobilization.

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[3] This will be shown in detail in the following section.

Trying to explain why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as a populist through existing definitions will also tell us something about the universality of these definitions. Turkey and Erdoğan represent also a very good universality challenge for the definitions of populism, especially for the two dominant approaches, namely the ideational and the strategic approach. Turkey resembles Western European party system. Having a parliamentary system tradition of governing, there have been persistent established parties or political movements in Turkey. The political leaders have been important, yet the parties are themselves important enough to persist. They are meticulously organized in almost every part of the country. For the parties in power, the province chairman of the governing party is as prestigious as the governor. On the other hand, resembling some Latin American democracies that have undergone an authoritarian slide, Turkey's democratic institutions have been traditionally weak. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded Turkey in a top-down and modernist fashion. The bureaucracy, especially the military has been the strongest institution in domestic politics. There have been several coup d'états that happened throughout the century. Elected parties could not govern, and had to quit under the pressure from the military. Although Turkey witnessed a decline in the power of bureaucracy as opposed to the democratically elected parties in the first decade of the twenty-first century during Erdoğan's AK Party rule, Erdoğan gradually transformed into an authoritarian leader. More, Erdoğan became a cult leader and transformed the country into to a presidential system with his great personal appeal in Turkish society. The point Erdoğan brought Turkey today has similarities with the Latin American populist presidents. In sum, while the organized party system resembles some European democracies, Erdoğan's personalistic leadership and his recent authoritarian slide resemble very much Latin American strong presidents. On top of that, Turkey also offers so many unique characteristics, evident from the recent political history at the beginning of the twenty-first century summarized in the beginning.

To restate the approaches, the ideational approach argues that populism is a specific set of ideas if not a distinct ideology, while the strategic approach argues that populism is a distinct strategy to obtain and maintain power. Based on this, I argue that the ideational approach falls short of explaining why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as a populist, because Erdoğan put forward many contradicting ideas, claims, and statements in his 17 years in power. The political systems of Turkey and Erdoğan's position in it are completely different from the Western European 'populist' parties on whom the ideational approach mainly built (Mudde, 2007). On

the other hand, the strategic approach proposes a more plausible explanation for Erdoğan's labeling as populist. He wanted to maintain his power after more than a decade of governing, and so he utilized a certain 'populist' strategy to achieve it. However, it still needs to be explained how this populist strategy is distinct from other strategies.

This study is organized as the following: First, the state of art will be presented in detail. In this chapter, first, the instances where the term populism is applied will be elaborated, for the use of the term goes back more than a century ago. After showing the diversity of the instances, the early definitions will be examined. The early definitions have no longer direct impact on defining populism at the moment; however, they are essential since they form the basis for the contemporary definitions. Later, four of the contemporary definitions will be elaborated. Apart from the two main approaches, namely the ideational and the strategic approach, which will be the focus in this study, the economic and the Laclauan approach will also be explained. In the last part of the first chapter, the pieces from academia and the media on the relation between populism and Erdoğan will be presented. In the second chapter, in which the ideational approach will be applied to Erdoğan, the quantitative method and the qualitative method will be used respectively. For the qualitative method, the data drawn from the speeches of Erdoğan will be elaborated, also with direct parts from his speeches. While collecting data for the quantitative method, there are also other additional elements measured that are used in the qualitative method of the ideational approach. Alongside this data, the secondary resources are used to decompose the Turkish political system from a historical perspective. In the third chapter, the strategic approach will be applied to Erdoğan only through a qualitative method. The secondary resources will be fundamental for the chapter. Lastly, a conclusion will be drawn based on the results of each chapter/method.

2. State of Art

2.1 The Use of the Term

Before examining the definitions of the term populism, it is important to start with demonstrating for which political groups, actors or movements this term has been employed throughout history. Houwen founded that the very first use of the term populism dates back to the 1890s (as cited in Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo & Ostiguy, 2017). The journey of the term has

been longer than a century, and during this time, it has traveled across the continents, starting from the United States.

The People's Party and the North American Agrarian Movement

The United States of America experienced a short-lived farmer's movement in the late nineteenth century. The reaction of the farmers was directed at the creditors and monopolies of the East, who, they claimed, are powerful enough to influence the economic policies of the state (Hofstadter, 1969). The initial argument of the farmers was that they did all the labor, yet the non-producers make all the profit (Canovan, 1981). Since they thought the existing political parties are corrupt and under the influence of the economic elite, they started a new independent party. This new party was called the People's Party, also known as the Populist Party. They aimed to restore agrarian profits and push for government intervention to the monopoly of railroad corporations (Hofstadter, 1969). Facing a ballot box and two established parties, the Populists had to further develop their political discourse.

In their discourse, the society was constructed in dual character. While innocent folk, victimized by economic catastrophes, constituted a homogenous mass labeled as 'the people,' on the other hand, there were the vested interests (Hofstadter, 1969). Although their political opposition was the financiers of the East, they were not anti-capitalist at all, rather they opposed to the trusts and the monopolies. The traditional landowning and its consequent inequalities were welcomed, whereas the institutions of modern capitalism were strongly opposed (Worsley, 1969). Nevertheless, the movement was not based on a peasant class, but rather a network of large farmers with political connections (Hofstadter, 1969). The People's Party participated in the presidential elections of 1892. Their candidate, James Weaver, made a significant impact receiving more than 8% of the votes, but he came third after the Democratic and the Republican candidates.

The emphasis on the coinage of silver became central when the Populists realized that this issue had the strongest support among the public. William Hope Harvey, a member of the People's Party, wrote a book in 1893 called Coin's Financial School, in which he blamed all the existing social problems of the country on the international conspiracy which resulted in demonetization of silver in the United States in 1873. He proposed that the reconstitution of free silver coinage would be a sufficient remedy for the existing problems (Hofstadter, 1969). Eventually, the silver issue became crucial for the 1896 presidential elections. The Democratic

Party nominated William Jennings Bryan who was a fierce supporter of the silver coinage and shared very similar rhetoric with the People's Party. Although the People's Party opposed the established parties initially, after Bryan's nomination they allied with the Democratic Party (Canovan, 1981). Still, the Republican candidate McKinley was elected as the president.

When the economic conditions got better after 1896, the populist movement in the US disappeared very quickly. This, according to Minogue (1969), is a good prove that North American populists did not have any ideology but only rhetoric. Looking at the movement from a racial perspective, Wileys (1969) states that it was racially homogenous, included German descendent and Protestant farmers. They were opposed to urban politicians and bankers who share the same ethnoreligious roots with them. Generally, the People's Party was characterized by its claim for democracy, egalitarianism, and criticism for monopolies (Hofstadter, 1969). Retrospectively, one can conclude that the North American populism was an attempt to alter the balance of power in favor, against the Industrial East (Worsley, 1969).

The People's Party was the first instance that the term populism was used to refer to. According to Canovan (1981), the members of the party created it as a self-description. Yet, there are scholars in the literature who do not classify this phenomenon as a populist (e.g., Barr 2009). To stay neutral and also avoid confusion, the People's Party and the preceding agrarian movement will be hereafter referred to as the North American agrarian movement when talked in general, and as the People's Party when the party itself directly implied.

The Russian Agrarian Movement or *Narodnichestvo*

The second phenomenon categorized as populist corresponds to the late nineteenth-century Russian agrarian movement. *Narodnichestvo* has been translated as populism in the literature; however, Worsley (1969) thinks that it is not a direct translation. Most probably, basing on the agrarian character and the historical context, it was translated as populism referring to the North American agrarian movement. According to Allcock (1971), the fact that the very same term applied for both of these referents is accidental.

Just like the term populism, the term *narodnichestvo,* too, created confusion in the literature. Aiming at resolving this confusion over the term*,* Pipes (1964) studies the contexts that this term had been used for. He states that the term has been dominantly used to mean Russian agrarian socialism. This ideology defends the idea that a development model based on peasantry can by-pass the capitalist stage. However, after the research on the historical usage of the term,

he concludes that the term *narodnichestvo* used to originally mean the belief in the superiority of the masses over the elite. In time, this meaning was replaced by the agrarian developmental model (Pipes, 1964). Walicki (1969) thinks that Lenin puts this developmental model into words in the most precise way: a non-capitalist economic development theory of Russia from the perspective of small producers. Despite the similarity with the North American agrarian movement, at first sight, they have fundamental differences.

Firstly, *narodnichestvo* was formulated not by peasants themselves but rather a democratic intelligentsia (Walicki, 1969). The tsarist regime as well as the people marginalized by this group of intellectuals (Canovan, 1981). They idealized the peasantry as the most moral way of life (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). Although they moved to the country to encourage peasants to revolt (Anselmi, 2018), they did not find real support from the peasantry. Some peasants were suspicious about them and they complained about them to the Tsarist authorities (Kaltwasser et al., 2017). On the other hand, North American populism was a popular movement; they received support from the countryside (Worsley, 1969). Secondly, the ideology was not only a reaction against Russian capitalism but also against Western capitalism and Western socialism (Walicki, 1969). They suggested another way that is specific to Russia. On the other hand, the North American agrarian movement was essentially capitalist (Minogue, 1969). Thirdly, while *narodnichestvo* was in a way anarchist, the North American agrarian movement needed the state machinery to reform the system (Worsley, 1969). Finally, there is no definition of *narodnichestvo* as a movement; it can only present some aspects of an ideology of the movement (Walicki, 1969). By contrast, as stated above, the North American agrarian movement lacked a coherent ideology, yet it was an impactful movement.

After his detailed analysis of *narodnichestvo*, Walicki (1969) concludes that Russian 'populism' should rather be called *narodnichestvo* since it has unrepeatable and distinctive features. Considering that there is not much place for agrarianism in contemporary populism, this conclusion still seems to be justified. The Russian agrarian movement will be hereafter called *narodnichestvo*.

Latin American 'Classical' Populists

During the 1930s and 1940s, some Latin American countries experienced a new wave of politicians: Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina, José María Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador, Getulio Vargas in Brazil, and Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre in Perú. The contexts they had come to

power, their political discourse, and economic policies resembled each other to a certain degree. These personalistic politicians were labeled as populists.

By contrast with the North American agrarian movement and *narodnichestvo,* Latin American populism had an urban social base. When the pace of job creation could not catch up with the immense immigration from the countryside, a disposable mass formed, available to be 'manipulated' by politicians (Hennessy, 1969). The oligarchy was able to stay hegemonic during and after the creation of the nation-states (Laclau, 1977). These politicians were successful enough to unite the masses to break both the economic and political hegemony of the oligarchy.

Similar to the antagonism created by the North American agrarian movement, the populist discourse in Latin America articulated an antagonism between a united people without any class tensions and imperialist outsiders (Hennessy, 1969). Instead of employing a Marxist ideology and using class-based notions, Latin American populists preferred the notion of 'the people' (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). These personalistic leaders presented themselves with having a peculiar bond with the masses and placed themselves in fierce opposition to the establishment (Worsley, 1969). For the backwardness of Latin America, the blame was put on an alliance between foreign interests and the domestic oligarchy (Hennessy, 1969).

They also resembled each other in their economic policies. They pursued the import substitution industrialization (ISI) model, prioritizing the domestic production (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). The growth rates were high, and the increase in the real wages was immense, especially in Perón's Argentina (de la Torre, 2017). This brought positive results only in the short term, according to Henessy (1969), which was a reflection of the opportunism of the populist leaders.

The ambiguous relationship between democracy and this wave of populists was also evident. In particular, Perón incorporated the previously excluded masses to political life and fought against electoral fraud. While these moves were democratizing, he became gradually more authoritarian during his rule refusing the constraint and checks of liberal democratic institutions (de la Torre, 2017).

This wave of politicians is usually referred to as classical populists in the literature (e.g., de la Torre 2017, Weyland 1996, Mayorga 2006). They substantially differ from the phenomena labeled as populist previous to them. However, there is a visible (but not obvious) link between these populists and what we refer to as populists today. More, scholars from every approach

agree on labeling these politicians as populists. Therefore, this first wave of politicians of Latin America will be hereafter referred to as the classical populists.

Latin American 'Neopopulists'

The 1990s witnessed another populist wave of politicians in Latin America. Carlos Menem in Argentina, Alberto Fujimori in Perú and Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil rose to power in some way similar to the classical populists. However, they had profound differences that shook the established definitions of populism and sparked a debate that is still going on. While the political context and the personalism of these leaders resembled the classical populists, they differed on the economic policies that they implemented.

Failure of the ISI model and the expansionary policies caused high inflation rates and economic catastrophe (de la Torre, 2017). After the sovereign default in Mexico in 1982, the debt crisis spread across the continent. Austerity measures and neoliberal reforms dominated the region (Roberts, 2007). Both the economic crises of the 1980s and the following neoliberal adjustments created an environment where personalistic leaders can thrive in the weakened context of labor unions and political establishment (Roberts, 1995). The construction of antagonism, or in other words 'us versus them' rhetoric was important for the success of populism. This new wave of populists blamed the political establishment rather than the economic elite unlike classical populists (Weyland, 1996). Political parties and politicians were depicted as the enemy of the people (de la Torre, 2017). Some went even further, for example, Fujimori targeted the Congress and the judiciary too when he was on power (Roberts, 1995).

The main difference between these politicians from the classical populists is the economic policies they implemented. Rather than offering their economic policies, they implemented neoliberal reforms under the agreement they did with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). These included austerity programs and privatization. This was a blow against the scholars who associated populism with a certain set of economic policies. Some scholars showed that neoliberal policies and populism actually could work very well together (Roberts, 1995; Weyland, 1996). Economic stability secured the political power of the populist leaders, while popular support allowed the implementation of austerity policies. They were both opposed to organized civil society and both applied a top-down approach (Weyland, 1996). Instead of implementing expansive and redistributive economic policies, for example, Fujimori exploited popular resentment against the political elite coupled with giving

material benefits to certain segments of society through clientelistic linkages (Roberts, 1995). In that sense, privatization provided state funds that they needed for patronage and clientelism (de la Torre, 2017). However, both Menem and Fujimori had problems with their economy ministers who were charged to implement neoliberal reforms. Neither of them was fully committed to neoliberalism, evident in their highly increased spending before the elections (Weyland, 2001).

There is consensus in the literature that these politicians are also populists, however, the reasons differ. Both because they are a new wave of populists and that they implemented neoliberal policies they are called neopopulists by Weyland (1996). This term used also by other scholars (de la Torre, 2000; Mayorga, 2006; Barr, 2009). Since it is distinguishing them from not only classical populists but also contemporary populists, this wave of politicians will be hereafter called neopopulists.

European Radical Right Parties

The term populism is used also in Western Europe for some decades. Unlike in Latin America, the term did not refer to political leaders with mass support, but rather smaller opposition parties. These parties differed from traditional center-right and center-left parties of Western European liberal democracies, especially in their discourse.

According to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), these parties combine authoritarianism, nativism, and populism. They emphasize on law and order, express xenophobic ideas, and use anti-establishment appeals (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). The prominent example of these parties is France's *Front National*, and now known as *Rassemblement National.* Jean-Marie Le Pen and his successor Marine Le Pen kept an anti-immigration stance. They targeted not only the immigrants themselves but also the establishment who favor immigrants instead of the natives of the country. In the Netherlands, first Pim Fortuyn and now Geert Wilders expressed anti-Islamic sentiments. However, xenophobia and anti-immigration was not the only domain of European populists. Silvio Berlusconi's *Forza Italia* was neoliberal and represented mainstream politics (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). More, British UKIP mobilized around EU-scepticism, whereas Italian *Lega Nord* or now known as only *Lega* was originally founded on separatist ideas. Therefore, it is quite hard to find a consistent common denominator for these parties.

Nevertheless, these parties are the main study focus of prominent scholars of populism such as Cas Mudde. He refers to these parties as populist radical right parties (Mudde, 2007). On the other hand, other prominent scholars such as Kurt Weyland abstain from using the term

populism, because these parties are well organized (Weyland, 2017). Since there is no consensus, the best would be to prefer a neutral term for these parties. So, they will be hereafter called European radical right parties.

Contemporary Populist Leaders: Chávez, Trump, Orbán, Erdoğan, Sanders and more…

Finally, we arrive at the most disputed wave of populists. In the twenty-first century, populism became a buzzword and it is applied to a great variety of politicians and political parties. This included right-wing parties, left-wing parties, and authoritarian leaders. Thus, it is impossible to talk about contemporary populists as a coherent group.

Evo Morales in Bolivia, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Rafael Correa in Ecuador are the third wave of populists in Latin America. They built support by politicizing the social inequalities caused by neoliberal policies. Then, they all amended the constitutions to curb the power of "the elite," but these amendments also restricted the fair competition of the political actors (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Some scholars call this wave of populists radical populists (Kaltwasser et al., 2017).

In addition to that, authoritarian leaders such as Viktor Orbán of Hungary, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, and Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel are labeled as populists (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Some scholars drew attention to the contradictory usage of the term populist at the same time for Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders of the USA, and Jeremy Corbyn of the UK (Kazin, 2017). Surely, European radical right parties are still on the stage, including Matteo Salvini's *Lega* and Five Star Movement of Italy*, Rassemblement National, Alternative für Deutschland* of Germany, and Geert Wilder's *Partij voor de Vrijheid* of the Netherlands. Besides, there are some left-wing parties, such as *Podemos* of Spain, and SYRIZA of Greece that are labeled as populist.

In this chaotic environment where there is a broad range of political actors who are labeled as populist, it is very hard to establish an all-encompassing definition or even a term. Due to the great distinctions among them, they will be mostly mentioned individually. However, if referred to as a group, it will be hereafter called contemporary populists.

2.2 Early definitions

The early definitions of populism are mostly no longer central to the discussion over the meaning of populism. However, it is still important to shortly mention them, since they can shed some light on our understanding of the contemporary definitions.

The very first elaborations of the term populism came from American scholars, mostly from the field of sociology. Allcock (1971) claims that the first scholar attempted to recoin the term populist is Edward Shils by his article *Populism and the Rule of Law* published in 1954. Later, he studied the conspiracy theories in the United States and their relationship with the public opinion in his book *The Torment of Secrecy* published in 1956 (Anselmi, 2018). Shils used the term in the context of American politics trying to draw a connection between the People's Party and McCarthyism. He found it to be a threat to rule of law, mainly referring to the McCarthyism, while he described it as a belief that the ordinary people are better than their rulers, referring to the People's Party (as cited in Allcock, 1971). According to him, populism arises when there is popular indignation against the established ruling class. In this opposition, it takes a side in favor of the people, and it claims that the will of the people is superior to anything else (as cited in Taggart, 2000). Later, he examined the term in the context of both North American agrarian movement and *narodnichestvo*, concluding that populism is a phenomenon emerging from the tension between the urban and the country. Finally, he states that populism can be utilized to legitimize the rule of democratic regimes as well as oligarchic regimes (Shils, 1960).

Having influenced by Shils, Robert Dahl writes a chapter called *Populist Democracy* in his book *A Preface to Democratic Theory* published in 1956. He uses this term to describe the form of democracy where political sovereignty and political equality are maximized with a majoritarian decision-making mechanism (as cited in Kaltwasser et al., 2017).

Like Shils, Lipset too presented McCarthyism as an example of extreme populism, but instead of defining it he tried to identify its social base (Lipset, 1960). This conceptualization reinforced the negative connotation of the term (Kaltwasser et al. 2017).

In his book *The Politics of Mass Society,* Kornhauser claimed that the social uniformity is legitimized by populism. The normative set of values of the uniform society obtains power through populism to dictate. Kornhauser considers McCarthyism as an example of this phenomenon also. Comparing the liberal democracy with the populist democracy, Kornhauser

(1959) argues that while liberal democracy favors institutions and intermediation, the populist democracy promotes a direct and unrestrained mode of access.

Another scholar who defined populism looking at the agrarian movements was Garvin Kitching. In his work originally published in 1982, Kitching defines populism as an ideology that opposes large-scale production and industrialization in favor of small enterprises, namely peasants and artisans (2011). This definition excludes all the other phenomena labeled as populist. Thus, considering contemporary populism has no relation with the rural movements, what we call populism today is very distinct from what Kitching meant by it.

Gino Germani is another early scholar who studied populism but with a focus on the region of Latin America. He left fascist Italy for Argentina where he had experienced the rise of Perónism. Under this influence, he suggested that the authoritarian phase some countries had undergone (let it be fascist or populist) coincided with a modernization process. Secularization and social mobility that modernity brings incorporate masses into the political sphere. Contrary to fascism, populism demonstrates a more progressive and democratic multi-class alliance (as cited in Anselmi, 2018). Germani defined certain characteristics of populism as its multi-class composition, its advocacy for equality of political participation, and, contradictorily, the authoritarian tendency with charismatic leaders (as cited in Kaltwasser et al., 2017). His main focus on analyzing populism was Perónism in Argentina, and this was influential in his conceptualization.

Another scholar who linked with populism with modernization was Torcuato S. Di Tella. He claims in his earlier work *Populism and reform in Latin America* published in 1965, that populism is a way towards modernization of the underdeveloped societies (as cited in Taggart, 2000). However, in his more recent work, Di Tella (1997) becomes more descriptive in his definition. Populism is defined as a movement that mobilizes unorganized masses, and this mass is led and kept together by a charismatic leader. He goes on identifying four different set of conditions where populism emerges: (i) the coexistence of modernized and backward areas what he calls as *structural dualism,* (ii) when the economy fails to employ all the educated and urbanized individuals, (iii) rapid urbanization, (iv) concentration of wealth in the hands of foreign and national elites (Di Tella, 1997).

Vilas (1992) provides another good example of the structural approach that links populism with the modernization process. He argues that populism is a phenomenon in backward

capitalist societies, and it is an expression of a response to the threats brought by the process of passing from the non-industrial economy to industrial capitalism. Vilas develops his definition of populism by specifying its socioeconomic policies. According to him, populism is a 'strategy for capital accumulation, through import substitution and income distribution policies, promoting the small enterprises in the domestic market, and seeking full employment, expansion of consumption accompanied by social welfare policies. He goes on arguing that the inherent contradictions of populism shorten its lifetime, and eventually it transforms into a right-wing regime (Vilas, 1992).

In addition to these two different region-specific approaches, one on North America and the other on Latin America, there is Michael Kazin who analyzed presidential candidates of the United States in his book *The Populist Persuasion* originally published in 1995. Kazin (2017) defines populism as a language aims to mobilize ordinary people against the self-serving and undemocratic elite class. Kazin finds populism too elastic to be an ideology and rather categorizes it as an impulse. He sees populism as a 'mode of persuasion' to convince the masses and gain their support for particular issues. He argues that there are two types of populism in the US. The first type is directed against the corporate elite. Aiming at invoking economic awareness, and Bernie Sanders pursues this kind of populism. On the other hand, Trump is in line with the traditional American populism in which the definition of the people is ethnically restrictive (Kazin, 2017).

Later scholars worked on the term populism comparatively. The seminal work in this sense is *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characters* edited by Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner. This work was published in 1969, following a conference held in the London School of Economic in 1967, which brought numerous scholars from various fields with the main purpose of defining populism. Allcock quotes Professor Andreski's summary prepared before the conference mentioned where he lists the five meanings of populism: (i) a movement aims to redistribute the wealth, (ii) a movement favoring the lower classes, (iii) and in particular supported by rural classes, (iv) a type of cultural conservatism in terms of rural lifestyle, (v) a movement that idealizes the peasant (1971). Faced with very distinct phenomena, the scholars take their turn to clarify the term populism.

One of them was Alistair Hennessy. Looking at Latin American populism, Hennessy (1969) argues that populism in Latin America, in its widest sense, is an organizational tool to

unite different social interests applied to any movement without a specific social base. In the most sophisticated sense, it is "a political movement which enjoys the support of the mass of the urban working class and/or peasantry but which does not result from the autonomous organizational power of either of these two sectors. It is also supported by non-working-class sectors upholding an anti-status quo ideology" (Hennessy, 1969, p. 29). This definition enumerates the social groups that support this movement. Apart from that, the only substantial element we can take away from this definition could be that it is considered as a 'movement'. Paradoxically, the former definition, in the 'widest sense' is more descriptive than the sophisticated one, since there is a special emphasis on the agency and intention. Hennessy (1969) argues that the elements of this movement are a charismatic leader, a disposable mass, and a lack of any ideology other than nationalism and anti-US. The success of the populist leader depends on the ability to develop a kinship relationship with him and his followers either through media or close personal contact. To him, populism in sum is a manipulative mechanism.

MacRae (1969) lists the typical characteristics of populism are as follows: (i) a predominantly agrarian society under the threat of modernization, (ii) an egalitarian worldview targeting the elites, (iii) nostalgic in the face of modernization, (iv) refusing any kind of social, economic or political doctrine, (v) consequently seeking the remedy in the personality of a charismatic leader, (vi) a short-term association but not a sustained political party. He argues that populism is not about economics nor politics, but the society itself. It envisages a uniform society strictly rejecting alienation and represents a high degree of rural conservatism, in terms of lifestyle. Therefore it is conducive to intolerance and xenophobia (MacRae, 1969).

Stewart (1969) states that populism, in theory, aims to reconstruct the society around the traditional values of the people. Populist movements believe that a good blend of traditional values and modernizations is possible. This makes it evident that populism is, in a way, a response to modernization. This links the modernization process to the emergence of populism, thus, indirectly claims that it can exist only in certain historical time or developmental stage. Consequently, Stewart (1969) claims that although the populist movements can be supported by an urban mass, it will never be the only basis of the movement. It could only initiate a rural protest. This point of view associates populism with a rural movement. However, Stewart acknowledges that populism also appears in the anti-colonial movements where the national bourgeoisie wants to replace the foreign as the controller of the domestic economy. In this case,

the regimes use populistic nationalism to initiate movements in a manipulative way to achieve their aims. Considering these two different phenomena, he concludes that populism is a response to crises over the ways and means of industrialization and consequences of it. What populism ultimately aims is to avoid social conditions that appeared in Western Europe on the path of industrialization (Steward, 1969).

To Wiles (1969), populism is any movement that emphasizes the virtuous characteristics of the simple people, which composes the majority of society and their collective traditions. From this definition, he proceeds to give major characteristics of populism. Morality is at the center of populism. There is a mystical contact with the leaders. Its organization is loose, likely to emerge as a movement rather than a party. Its ideology is also loose and mostly defined from hostility. This hostility is conducive to violence, but this violence is short-winded. It is anti-intellectual, also opposing the establishment and the elites, particularly because they represent an alienation from the centers of power. It is prone to conspiracy theories. The unsophistication of its ideology brings facilitates its degeneration. It foresees a market-based economy, and it is keen on expansionary monetary policy. Populists are content with traditional economic inequalities; they never seek for complete equality in the society. While its roots from the country, it can also be based on urban classes. Populists are in favor of a strong and helpful state and nationalized banks. Financiers are seen as the enemy. They prefer an isolationist foreign policy, thus it strongly opposes the military establishment. It is religious and sectarian, and it tends to racialism. It despises science and technocracy. Evident from the listed characteristics, the focus of Wiles is mostly the North American agrarian movement. Finally, he compares populism and fascism. He argues that, there is populism in fascism, but fascism is distinct from populism for the following reasons: (i) fascism is elitist, (ii) it carries a cult of violence, (iii) it demands an absolute obedience to the leader, (iv) it rejects religion (Wiles, 1969).

Worsley (1969) sheds some light on the academic knowledge of populism in the 1960s. He lists the contexts that the term 'populist' or 'populism' is used for. There is Russian *narodnichestvo,* North American rural movement, certain kinds of states in the Third World, and lastly certain organized movements that express the notion of 'will of the people and projects a direct contact with the leader. Contrary to Canovan (1981), Worsley (1969) claims that populism is not formed by self-identification, and this term has never been used as self-description. This is the main distinction of populism, from (other) ideologies such as communism. Therefore, the

term populist is used for very distinct movements or ideologies, even though the shared attributes are not yet explained. He discusses the notion of 'the supremacy of the 'will of the people' which is claimed to be common to all populism. He thinks that supremacy of the will of the people is not unique to populism. Rather, it is the basis of democratic theory. Even the dictatorships and authoritarian regimes legitimize their rule by referring to the people, at least verbally. Worsley concludes that all the separate phenomena labeled as populist, they shared nothing more than a name (1969).

As seen, the prominent scholars of populism in 1969 were unable to produce an encompassing definition for populism. They contradicted not only with each other but also with themselves. As Peter Wiles puts it, 'to each his own definition of populism, according to the academic axe he grinds' (1969). Moreover, Allcock (1971) declares that there is no consensus in academia over the populism. Another attempt to approach the term with a comparative perspective came from Margaret Canovan with her seminal work *Populism* (1981).

Thinking that it is impossible to reduce all the phenomena labeled as populist into a single core, Canovan suggests that populism can only be conceptualized in line with Wittgensteinian family resemblances, or in other words, in terms of a range of populisms. Subsequently, she moves to categorize populism under two umbrellas: (i) agrarian populism, and (ii) political populism. Still, she admits that this distinction is not fundamental, reminding that US People's Party can be linked to both of these categories. While the agrarian populism has a particular social base and socioeconomic program, the political populism is related to forms of direct democracy, emphasis on the will of the people, and the tension between 'the elite' and grassroots (Canovan, 1981).

Later, she moves on to identify each category. However, Canovan struggles to establish an undisputed concept of agrarian populism because of the fundamental differences between *narodnichestvo*, the North American agrarian movement. Rather, she suggests a spectrum of agrarian populism that carries the common element of a link to the peasantry. She concludes that different phenomena categorized under the agrarian populism do not share a single set of ideas, political program or socioeconomic base (Canovan, 1981).

The political populism involves four different subtypes. First, there is a populist dictatorship where a charismatic leader leads a regime with rhetoric emphasizing a dichotomy between 'the elite' and the people. Secondly and contradictorily, there is a populist democracy

that is closer to a form of direct democracy. It argues for the involvement of the people to the political decision through plebiscitary mechanisms such as referenda. Third, there is reactionary populism which signifies mobilization of masses through conservatism, sparking hostility towards 'the elite' as well as ethnic minorities. Lastly, there is the politician's populism that is used to describe means of building support for elections without mentioning divisive issues. 'Catch-all' politics is another way of describing it. As seen, it is also hard to talk about the coherence of the subtypes of the political populism (Canovan, 1981).

After examining all the types of populism Canovan explicitly states that there is not enough evidence to unite all the populisms under a single ideology or a certain socioeconomic situation. Yet, she finds two common elements among all the populisms: (i) appeal to 'the people,' (ii) some sense of anti-elitism. Still, these two elements are too vague and ambiguous, argues Canovan (1981), and they are incapable of proving a certain unity among phenomena labeled as populist. For example, the people can be used to mean the peasants, workers, producers, the nation, the electorate, or everyone that is not considered as an opponent. Since it is too general, it loses its specificity as well as its usefulness for the work of defining populism. On the other hand, anti-elitism is comparably more precise, meaning distrust for the politicians and intellectuals. As Canovan argues, anti-elitism is a common element in all types of populism. However, positioning anti-elitism at the center of populism is not sufficient to create a distinct concept called populism. Finally, she admits that the phenomena examined throughout her work are too diverse to be categorized under the same label (Canovan, 1981).

Writing in 1985, Mouzelis cites that there were three main approaches to the concept of populism. The first approach regards it almost impossible to find a commonality among a great variety of phenomenon labeled as populism. The second approach prefers a narrow definition focusing on rural life and peasantry. The third approach is Ernesto Laclau's thesis that the populism is a way to unite popular demands against the power bloc. Laclau's work will be analyzed in detail as part of the contemporary definitions. Comparing existing literature at the time, Mouzelis (1985) states that both Canovan and Laclau agree on two main themes of populism as 'the people' and anti-elitism. However, he finds both of them quite problematic. Arguing that these elements are not unique to populism, he states that Communism involves both of the themes (Mouzelis, 1985).

After his study of clientelism and populism through the cases of Argentina and Greece, Mouzelis (1985) arrives to define of populism. Without clearly identifying its genus (i.e., ideology, movement, etc.), he argues that populism incorporates excluded or marginalized portions of society, through pro-people and anti-elite ideology and plebiscitary organizational structure. While it alters the political power balance against the establishment, unlike communism, it abstains to transform the established relations of production (Mouzelis, 1985).

Lastly, it is important to note that Mouzelis brought an impactful idea on studying populism. He suggested that restricting populism to the ideologies is not possible. Therefore, the organizational structures of populist movements should also be studied (Mouzelis, 1985). Some contemporary scholars, in particular, should take the adherents of the strategic approach this advice.

At the turn of the millennium, Paul Taggart also attempts to make a comparative analysis of populism. Taggart (2000) lists six themes of populism which are not necessarily linked to each other: (i) opposition to representative politics, (ii) idealization of 'heartland,' (iii) an ideology without core values, (iv) expression of a response to crisis, (v) ambiguity, (vi) like a 'chameleon' it changes according to the environment. Taggart moves on to explain each of these themes, and later he offers a definition for populism.

First of all, populists oppose to representative politics. Any intermediation like parties or the parliament is found unnecessary. Yet, representative politics itself enables populists to come to power (Taggart, 2000). Secondly, they often appeal to 'the people'. Taggart, instead, suggests the term heartland to avoid the ambiguity of the notion of 'the people'. Since populist in divergent meanings can use the people, the term heartland can create unity, signifying the place that 'the people' live in. Thirdly, Taggart (2000) states that populists are not enthusiastically political since they despise politics. However, at the time of crisis populists have to leave their reluctance aside and enter into politics. That is why the theme of crisis is usually present in their rhetoric. Fourthly, Taggart (2000) draws attention to the fact that politicians from a variety of political views employ populism. This makes populism to appear generally as the adjective of other ideas, such as populist left, populist right, etc. In a way, populism takes its secondary characteristics from the context. That is what Taggart calls as populism's chameleonic quality (Taggart, 2000). Lastly, lacking an ideology benefits them in using a language that is simple and direct. Thus, their discourse can be more comprehensible for ordinary people. However, he

rejects any conceptualization of populism as a 'catch-all' style politics. Upon elaboration of themes, Taggart suggests a definition of populism in some way repetition of the themes he listed. He defines populism as an episodic and chameleonic reaction to representative politics and crises, with a strong emphasis on 'heartland' but lacking any key values (2000).

We have seen that scholars have been unable to provide a comprehensive definition of populism. However, these definitions created a basis for contemporary definitions by providing the key ideas and keywords.

2.3   Contemporary Definitions

After the turn of the millennium, scholars started to group around certain definitions. Although they had differences within the approaches, they agreed on the basic denominator. Yet, the differences between the approaches are fundamental. In this section, these approaches and their prominent adherents will be presented.

First of all, the terminology should be established. There are different names used for different approaches in the literature. For example, the economic definition of populism is generally referred to as "the economic approach" but some scholars call it the "socioeconomic definition" by (e.g., Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). This study will use the former term. The line of academic thought following the prominent scholar Ernesto Laclau's work will be referred to as "the Laclauan approach". It should be noted that it is sometimes called the "discursive approach" (e.g., Mudde, 2017), and sometimes "Essex school" (e.g., Hawkins, 2018). To group definitions based on the ideas, the term "ideational approach" is invented and used by its prominent adherents (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Hawkins, 2018). Some scholars consider the ideational approach and the Laclauan approach under the umbrella of one group called "discursive approach" (e.g., Weyland, 2017). However, first, this would create confusion, and second, these two approaches have profound differences in identifying populist actors. Therefore, this study will elaborate on the ideational and the Laclauan approach separately. Also thus, the word "discourse" can be used free from any relation to the approaches. The last approach mentioned in this work will be referred to as the "strategic approach". In the literature, it is also named as "political-strategic approach" (e.g., Weyland, 2017), "political strategy approach" (e.g., Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017), "political approach" (e.g., Barr, 2017), "political-institutional approach" (e.g., Hawkins, 2009), and, finally, as "organizational approach" (e.g., Mudde, 2017).

According to the data they collected from various academic journals, Kaltwasser et al. (2017) show that most of the works on populism (57%) avoid or ignore to present a definition. The ones who adopt a definition mostly (28%) prefer the ideational approach, and secondly (13%) the strategic approach. The shares of other approaches are less than 2%. Still, the economic approach and the Laclauan approaches need to be mentioned, both being influential on other definitions and the mainstream conceptualization of the term populism.

The Economic Approach

Although scholars tried to explain the economic policies of the classical populists by linking them with redistributive and expansionary policies, this never took a form of definition. Recognizing that there is an ongoing discussion on how to define populism, the economists Dornbusch and Edwards (1991) suggest a definition in the domain of economics. They think that the central populist objective is redistribution. Thus, populist economic policies are designed to redistribute wealth. It is important to note that they do not suggest a definition for *populism*, but rather for what they call *economic populism*. According to them, economic populism is a set of policies that aims for fast growth and income redistribution. Expansive monetary policies are pursued while the risks of inflation are ignored (Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991).

They define economic populism but they also criticize it. According to them, although populist policies might lead to a temporary period of growth, they will eventually damage the economy by causing high inflation and a decrease in real wages. In short, populist policies are not sustainable. More, when such policies led to high inflation and crisis, the groups who were favored by populist policies will be the most damaged (Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991). Thus, the definition suggested inherently carries a normative judgment.

The economic approach was challenged by the emergence of neopopulists around the same time with the publication of the article of Dornbusch and Edwards. Scholars, in particular, Kenneth M. Roberts (1995) and Kurt Weyland (1996) showed that populism is not linked to any type of economic policy. For example, instead of implementing expansive and redistributive economic policies, Fujimori exploited popular resentment against the political elite coupled with giving material benefits to certain segments of society through clientelistic linkages (Roberts, 1995).

It was further criticized because of the unrestricted extension of this definition: any type of government who would implement these policies would be categorized as a populist (Barr,

2017). After all, both governmental choice and some political or economic constraints could lead to irresponsible economic policies (Weyland, 2001). With this definition, even the Keynesianism can be classified as populism. The problem is more visible when applied to real-world cases. Roberts (1995) states that based on their economic policies, the economic approach would classify the candidates Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as populist, while Fernando Collor de Mello as anti-populist ahead of the 1989 presidential elections of Brazil. However, both the public opinion and the academic classification point the opposite.

Hawkins (2018) interprets the economic approach as it is claiming that the politicians and voters behave in violation of the rational choice theory. He suggests that this is also contrary to the assumptions of liberal democratic theory. However, a group of scholars recently tried to explain the electoral preference for populist parties or leaders in the limits of the rational choice theory. One of the leading economists, Daron Acemoglu, and his colleagues published an article on populism in line with the definition of Dornbusch and Edwards. Their article aims to understand why and how the electorate prefers populist policies. They suggest that certain politicians (i.e., Menem in Argentina, Fujimori in Perú) who used redistributive rhetoric but eventually favored the elite. This created a sense of deception among the public. Consequently, the electorate prefers to vote for more left-leaning politicians to avoid ending up with right-wing policies (Acemoglu, Egorov, & Sonin, 2013).

They define populism is a set of policies supported by the majority of the society, yet ultimately hurts this majority in economic terms (Acemoglu et al., 2013). Put another way, populist policies eventually prove to be counterproductive. Facing the rise of so-called right-wing populism, they also admit that this definition should be regarded with the focus on the left-wing populism. In a way, they admit that the scope of the applicability of this definition is limited.

Unlike Dornbusch & Edwards (1991), they do not classify their definition of populism 'economic,' but still; they follow their line of thought. The distinction of defining *economic populism* and only *populism* is significant. When defined as *economic populism,* it does not necessarily oppose the arguments that populism can involve any kind of economic policy. For example, neopopulists were populists but they implemented *neoliberal* economic policies. On the other hand, redistributive and expansionary monetary policies implemented in a certain way or context can be called *populist* economic policies. In this comparison, the definition of

Dornbusch & Edwards (1991) seems stronger than the one suggested in the paper of Acemoglu et al. (2013).

All three main approaches, namely the Laclauan, ideational and strategic approach, criticize the economic approach for limiting populism to a certain set of economic policies (Hawkins, 2018). The main argument is that it cannot hold against the diversity of economic policies that are employed by populist parties or leaders (Kaltwasser et al., 2017) Nevertheless the economic approach still survives. The media and policymakers commonly use populism defined by this approach in a pejorative way (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017). Hence, it immensely contributes to our understanding of the term.

The Ideational Approach

As stated before, the ideational approach to populism is the most preferred definition in the literature. Most of the scholars who study European populism use ideational definitions (Mudde, 2017). The ideational approach has taken its roots from the works of Canovan (1981, 1999) and other normative political theorists (Hawkins, 2018). The ideational approach encompasses all the scholars who assume that populism is 'first and foremost a set of ideas' (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). Cas Mudde (2017), a leading scholar of the ideational approach, explains this set of specific ideas to be related to the struggle of 'the good people' and 'the corrupt elite'. Drawing from the discourse of the populist politicians, the ideational approach argues that populists see politics as a dualistic struggle between the good forces and the evil elite (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017). Next, the conceptualizations of several scholars will be presented individually with the addition of two scholars who employ quantitative methods under the ideational approach.

CAS MUDDE AND CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER

Cas Mudde's *The Populist Zeitgeist* published in 2004 is one of the most cited papers on populism. With this work, he laid the foundations of the ideational approach. Mudde (2004) starts its work by giving examples of parties of Western Europe, such as the Austrian Freedom Party, French National Front, and Dutch List Pim Fortuyn. This could be a hint that he primarily focuses on European radical right parties in theorizing his definition. He criticizes the normative interpretations of populism and attempts to give an empirical definition.

Starting from the two common elements of populism generally agreed in the literature (i.e., Canovan, 1981), namely 'the people' and 'the elite,' Mudde (2004) defines the populism as follows:

> *an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people"* (p. 543).

This definition is distinct in its identification of the genus of populism as an ideology. Borrowing from Freeden's (1998) explanation of nationalism as a thin-centered ideology, populism is considered to be a thin-centered since its inability to respond to a broad range of social issues. Thus, it is combined with other ideologies to provide such answers (Mudde, 2004). A few years later, he modifies his definition by embedding the notion of "thin-centered" to the definition directly (Mudde, 2007).

The other elements of the definition also need to be explained. Populism draws a moralistic division between the two antagonistic groups. This Manichean view while exalts the one part it delegitimizes the other. The notion of 'the people' does not necessarily mean all the members of society. It rather signifies a constructed subject. What populists oppose is the political establishment. According to his definition, he also categorizes the early Greens as populist because of their anti-establishment appeal. Contrary to socialism, populism avoids re-educating people. Rather, populism defends already established norms and customs within a society (Mudde, 2004). Finally, the notion of the general will is almost sacred for populists. The general will of the people is deemed superior even than constitutional norms and human rights (Mudde, 2007).

This definition refrains to give any organizational characteristic to populism as opposed to, for example, the strategic definition. Mudde (2004) argues that while personalistic leadership and direct relationship between the leader and the masses facilitate populism, they do not constitute the essence of populism. Thus, a possible definition should not go beyond stating the ideology, which is regarded as the only common element within the instances of populism.

Mudde (2004) argues that populist parties are generally associated with the radical right, but he also recognizes some left-wing populist parties. All the examples to justify these statements are drawn from Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and Northern America.

After this initial work (Mudde, 2004), followed by an analysis of the European radical right parties basing on his definition (Mudde, 20017), Cas Mudde generally collaborated with Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. They established Mudde's (2004) definition on strong theoretical ground. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012) aim to avoid Sartori's (1970) problems of conceptual traveling and conceptual stretching. They face two methods of categorization: radial categorization and classical categorization. Radial categorization assumes that a phenomenon can reflect in different ways while having common definitional elements in each case. In contrast, classical categorization suggests that all reflections of the phenomenon should carry all the defining elements. They prefer classical categorization based on the minimal common denominator since it would foster clarity to the term populism, which is already quite vague (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012).

Looking for the minimal definition for populism, they reach Margaret Canovan's (1981) establishing of the two common elements in all forms of populism: appeal to 'the people' and anti-elitism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). They follow Sartori's (1970) approach, which is defining only the core elements of the concept, and thus give a minimal definition (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). Founding on the 'core concepts' of Ball (1999), Mudde defines the core concepts of his definition as the genus as ideology, the notions of 'the people' and 'the elite,' and the will of the people (2017). These elements are regarded as 'central and constitutive' for the ideology of populism. All of these core concepts should be expressed in the discourse of a political actor to categorize him or her as a populist (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013).

Next to these core concepts, populism has two opposites, as elitism and pluralism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). Elitism implies that while 'the people' are 'dishonest and vulgar, 'the elite' is 'superior' in terms of morality and intellectuality (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). Pluralism is another direct opposite of populism (and also of elitism) because it acknowledges the variety of interests of different groups and aims to give a voice to all of them (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

One of the most controversial elements of the definition of Mudde and Kaltwasser is that they identify populism as an ideology. They admit that populism is not 'as conscious and

programmatic as an ideology' (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017), and it is unable to produce solutions for a wide range of social problems (Mudde, 2004). As already stated above, they borrow the term 'thin-centered ideology' from Freeden (1998). Drawing similarities between nationalism, which Freeden categorizes as a thin-centered ideology, they claim that both nationalism and populism should be considered as thin-centered ideologies, and thus, they can appear in combination with other ideologies (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). Populism fills its conceptual gap by being attached to the so-called 'host ideologies' (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017). The choice of host ideology depends on the context where the populist actor emerges (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Thus, the 'chameleonic nature' of populism introduced by Taggart (2000) is explained. Populism adopts certain aspects from the environment it emerges by combining with the most convenient host ideologies (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). This also explains why populism rarely exists in isolation, or pure form (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). An advantage of conceptualizing populism as an ideology is that it enables to analyze the 'demand-side' of populism by measuring the support for populist ideas among the people (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

Another element put forward is also essential to this definition of populism: the difference between 'the people' and 'the elite' is moral, and not determined by the position of power, ethnicity, religion nor social class (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). 'The people' are authentic and 'the elite' is corrupt (Mudde, 2017). According to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013), both of these groups are homogenous.

Laclau's describing of 'the people' as an empty signifier is regarded as the strength of populists since it can easily be used to appeal to diverse and complex groups. They are constructed by the populists and thus, the meanings they carry are subject to change (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). According to the context, 'the people' can mean the sovereign, the common people, or the nation (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). On the other side of the struggle, there is 'the elite'. 'The elite' can be depicted as corrupt, evil, conspiring or a traitor. Even in the anti-immigration sentiments, the one who is blamed is 'the elite' for favoring the interests of immigrants over the native people (Mudde, 2017). Finally, in this dualist struggle what should prevail is the will of the people, or in other words the general will. This notion takes its roots from Rousseau (Mudde, 2017). It is a reflection of seeing 'popular sovereignty as the only legitimate source of political power' (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). Consequently, the populists

generally support referenda and plebiscites, since they are seen as the explicit expression of the will of the people (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

KOEN ABTS AND STEFAN RUMMENS

Abts and Rummens (2007) try to analyze democracy and populism from a comparative perspective. According to them, populist ideology implies that there is an antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, and the power should be given back to the person who is the rightful sovereign and a homogenous group (Abts & Rummens, 2007). They also confirm that 'the people' are not defined precisely by the populist ideology (Abts & Rummens, 2007). They share the view that populism is only a thin-centered ideology because of its incapability 'to provide a comprehensive vision of society' (Abts & Rummens, 2007). They generally agree with Mudde's (2004) definition of populism, however, they think that the antagonism between 'the people' and 'the elite' is already inherent to the idea of popular sovereignty. Thus, they suggest that populism is "a thin-centered ideology which advocates the sovereign rule of the people as a homogenous body" (Abts & Rummens, 2007, p. 409). Political mobilization, charismatic leadership, and simplistic language are seen as important but not definitional characteristics of populism (Abts & Rummens, 2007).

DANIELE ALBERTAZZI AND DUNCAN MCDONNELL

Albertazzi and McDonnell edited a volume called *Twenty-First Century Populism* published in 2008 intending to examine populism in a region-specific way. Later in 2015, they edited another volume called *Populists in Power* in which they make regional analysis but this time for countries where the populist obtained political power.

According to them there are four basic principles of populism: (i) 'the people', as a homogenous group, is inherently good, (ii) 'the people' are the sovereign, (iii) the way of life (culture) of 'the people' is of great importance and must be preserved, (iv) the populist party/leader is united with 'the people' (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). They define populism based on these principles: "an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous 'others' who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice" (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 3). By ideology, they mean an 'interpretative framework through which the individuals make sense of their own experiences' (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). However

in their later work, just like Cas Mudde did, they embedded the notion of "thin-centered" to their ideology (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015).

The definition suggested by Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008) agrees with Mudde's (2004) definition of categorizing populism as an ideology between two opposing groups. The main difference is that instead of 'the elite' as a group opposing 'the people' they also add 'dangerous others' to capture the xenophobic element in contemporary Western European populism. More, they also draw attention to the relationship between the populists in power and 'the elite'. Since they work together with 'the elite' on certain issues, they will have to gradually differentiate between 'the good elite' and 'the bad elite' (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015).

Different from other ideational approach adherents, Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008) answer the question of what should be done to solve problems that populists politicize. The solution populism brings is that the power of the people should be given back to them 'through the populist leader/party' (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). They make this even more explicit in their later work (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015), stating that the solution populists propose is to put them in power. Another diverging element they bring is about the notion of 'the elite'. Albertazzi and McDonnell (2015) think that 'the elite' is not a homogenous group, but rather a complex group consisting of members from political, financial, bureaucratic and intellectual realms.

This definition also avoids specifying any social base or economic program of populism (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). They are hesitant to call certain populist parties as 'radical right' or 'extreme right,' since they regard populism being compatible with various ideologies and economic policies (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). Finally, they admit that their definition works perfectly with the 'right-wing populism' but not with 'left-wing populism' (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015).

BEN STANLEY

Like Mudde (2004), also Stanley (2008) picks up from Canovan's finding of 'the people' and 'the elite' as the common elements of populism. His approach conceptualizes populism as the product of a struggle between these two elements. Stanley (2008) argues that the use of the suffix -ism signifies that populism is a certain framework of thinking.

Basing his definition on ideas, Stanley (2008) defines populism as "an ideology articulated by political agents in the attempt to mobilize the people" (p. 98). Founding on

Freeden's (1998) concept of thin-centered ideology, Stanley (2008) defines populism as a thin ideology rather than a full ideology. This means that the ideology of populism is restricted to core concepts and these do not build up to constitute a set of solutions for greater social questions (Stanley 2008). Populism's thin nature implies that it cannot constitute a workable political ideology alone, and rather needs other ideologies to provide solutions to social issues. The vagueness of populism is seen as a direct consequence of its thin nature (Stanley, 2008).

Identifying the core concepts of populism, which justifies it being a thin ideology, requires empirical observation on what political actors have expressed. Stanley, too, admitted the fact that this method creates a circular argument (2008). The core concepts of populist ideology can be listed as follows: (i) existence of two social entities as 'the people' and 'the elite,' (ii) the antagonistic struggle between these two entities, (iii) emphasis on the popular sovereignty, (iv) favoring 'the people' and demonizing 'the elite' (Stanley, 2008). Populists take advantage of the conceptual vagueness of 'the people' in their discourse (Stanley, 2008).

KIRK A. HAWKINS (QUANTITATIVE METHOD)

Kirk A. Hawkins had very important contributions to the ideational approach. He took the ideational approach out of Europe and applied it to the Latin American context. More importantly, he introduced a new measurement method for the ideational definition. In his article *Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective* published in 2009, he applied a holistic grading method to analyze and measure populism in the discourses of political actors in a quantitative way. Weyland (2017), for example, claims that this innovation that Hawkins brought revived the ideational approach. This method strengthened the idea that populism can be studied empirically and not only qualitatively. Hawkins (2009) criticizes other approaches for their incapability to offer reliable methods for measurement, and that they apply the term without any empirical foundation.

Although the details of his works (Hawkins, 2009, 2010; Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017) will be elaborated in the following chapter, it requires a short explanation here. The technique of holistic grading is based on textual analysis. It is generally used to grade exams, developed by the teachers (Hawkins, 2009). The reader reads the whole text and interprets it in an integrated way. Based on a rubric, the reader assigns a grade (Hawkins, 2010). In the case of populism, Hawkins designs a rubric based on his understanding of populism. He defines populism, as "a Manichaean discourse that identifies the good with a unified will of the people and the evil with

a conspiring elite" (Hawkins, 2009, p. 1042). This definition is not special in any way when compared to other ideational definitions. He avoids controversial elements and rather focuses on what has already been agreed on in the ideational approach.

The rubric he designs involves six different criteria, all explained in detail. Next, he trains the readers, specifically chosen among who can read the speeches in their native tongue. Thus, cultural or linguistic differences are also eliminated. For each political actor, he assigns three or four readers to interpret four texts. The choice of texts is also important. They select one speech from each category of ribbon-cutting, campaign, famous and international. The interpreters read each speech and assign a grade of 0 (non-populist), 1 (mixed) and 2 (populist). Finally, the averages grades coming from different texts and interpreters are calculated to assign a general grade between 0 and 2 (Hawkins, 2009, 2010).

TEUN PAUWELS (QUANTITATIVE METHOD)

Pauwels finds the method applied in Hawkins (2009) is problematic because of its 'rough measurement' due to the three-point scale, and false positives such as George Bush (2011). More, the analysis highly depends on the subjectivity of the human coders. Pauwels develops his method. Pauwels (2011) agrees that populism is about "the antagonistic relationship between 'the people' and 'the elite'" (p. 97). He agrees with others that populism is a thin-centered ideology (Pauwels, 2011). The ideology of populism is reflected in their discourse as well, which enables us to measure it by textual analysis (Pauwels, 2011). He uses quantitative text analysis to measure populism, which is an alternative form of content analysis but expressed quantitatively. The difference is that humans do not interpret the text, but the words are processed as data by the computer (Pauwels, 2011). He picks certain words for populism such as 'the people,' 'establishment,' 'elite,' 'corruption,' 'patriarchy,' 'arrogant,' 'promise,' 'betray,' 'disc-grace,' 'truth,' 'direct,' 'referendum' (Pauwels, 2011). He measures the frequency of the usage of these particular terms to measure the populism of the politicians.

GENERAL FEATURES

The adherents of the ideational approach praise the ideational approach for being 'bold' and 'minimal' and for its capacity to work across regions and time (Hawkins, 2018). Its ability to capture and explain the populist essence of political actors who are labeled as populist, and to differentiate between the populist and non-populist actors are emphasized. And maybe most importantly, this conceptualization strips the normative elements away from the concept (Mudde

& Kaltwasser, 2017). Ideational approach is positivist, empiricist and it involves a variety of methods for studying populism. Textual analysis is the dominant method in studying populism from the ideational perspective because ideas are expressed most explicitly through speeches (Hawkins, 2018). However, there are a variety of other methods applied (e.g., Hawkins, 2009, 2010).

The ideational approach does not limit the definition of populism by specific organizational features unlike, for example, the strategic approach. This way, both unorganized political movements (mainly in Latin America) and well-organized political parties (common in Western Europe) are captured by the definition (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). The scholars of the ideational approach do not regard charismatic leadership as a definitional element, relying on examples such as the Occupy Wall Street movement (Hawkins, 2018). While acknowledging the importance of the leadership in populism, the ideational approach does not regard it as the sole factor explaining the development of populism. Rather, the 'demand-side' of populism is also deemed as important (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). Hawkins (2018), too, admits that politicians play an important role in populist mobilization. More, the lack of strong leadership may probably result in the failure of the populist movement. Additionally, clientelism can be a strategy employed by the populists, but populism as being an ideology is distinct from clientelism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

Although adherents of the ideational approach agree that populism is based on these ideas, some differentiations appear when it comes to defining populism precisely. The word 'ideational' is designed to overcome these small differences within the same approach (Hawkins, 2018). The main discussion is on the genus of populism. For example, when Hawkins (2018) summarizes the agreement within the ideational approach on the definition of populism he writes; "a thin-centered ideology or a discursive frame in which individuals see politics as the struggle between a reified will of the common people and an evil, conspiring elite" (p. 60). The hesitation in this definition is over the genus of populism, whether it is an ideology or a discursive frame. Hawkins (2018) acknowledges that populism is particular with its insufficiency to present answers and solutions to a broad range of social issues if considered as an ideology. To fulfill this gap populism is generally combined with other ideologies (Hawkins, 2018).

In addition to ideology and discourse, political style and language are other genera used within the ideational approach (Mudde, 2017). Mudde (2017) suggests overcoming the

disagreements on the genus of populism within the ideational approach by focusing on the similarities of various definitions. The differences within the ideational approach to determining the genus of populism whether as an ideology or a discourse are considered minor (i.e., Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017). According to Mudde, since the populist usually do not obtain enough power to implement their ideologies practically, the distinction between the discourse and the ideology is irrelevant (2017). This statement makes it even more evident that Mudde mainly considers European radical right parties when he theorizes populism because most of the populists in Latin America seized and exercised political power. Maybe because of a bit of overlooking populism in Latin America, the ideational approach considers populism both as a democratizing force and a path to authoritarianism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

CRITICISM

The ideational approached is mainly criticized by the adherents of the strategic approach. The main divergence between them is that the former argues that there are ideas at the center of populism, while the latter suggests that there is an opportunistic leader (Barr, 2018). Therefore, by contrast to the ideational approach that focuses on the ideas expressed, the strategic approach pays attention to the actions taken (Barr, 2018). By placing populism in the realm of ideas, the ideational approach denies the possibility that there is an individual at the center of populism who might manipulate the society through a certain discourse for his own political ambition (Barr, 2017). The ideational approach is criticized by making a priori assumption that politicians are sincere in their beliefs and ideas (Barr, 2017). The strategic approach argues that ideas are used strategically, on the way to the ultimate goal of reaching or maintaining power (Barr, 2018). Furthermore, conceptualizing populism as an ideology or a discourse would fall short on explaining the connection of populism with authoritarian tendencies, erosion of democratic institutions, or pragmatism of populist actors. A Manichean worldview cannot be directly linked to the erosion of democratic institutions and needs help from outside of the concept (Barr, 2018).

Another point is that scholars like Mudde (2004), Stanley (2008) and Albertazzi & McDonnell (2008, 2015) identify populism as a thin-centered ideology basing on Freeden's (1998) work. However, Freeden (2017), who coined the term two decades ago, argues that populism lacks enough articulation and capacity to be considered as a thin-centered ideology. According to him, 'thin-centered' ideologies like ecologism, feminism or nationalism emerged out of immense political thinking, contrary to populism. Weyland (2017) explains the notion of

'chameleonic nature' or 'thin-centered nature' of populism by the opportunism of populists. They seem to differ from one another since they had to employ winning strategies specific to the countries they aim to rise to power. This opportunism is also evident in their political career that includes sudden switches in their policies (Weyland, 2017).

Thirdly, critics draw attention to the contradiction between the populist discourse and real-life reflections. Weyland reminds that some intellectuals such as Noam Chomsky because of his left-wing oriented discourse endorsed Chávez. However, in reality, Venezuela suffered a high crime rate, high rates of inflation, and frequent scarcities during Chávez's populist regime (Weyland, 2017). Also, while the discourse of the populist leader describes a bottom-up movement, in reality, the leader designs her strategy in a top-down manner and seeks support and legitimacy based on plebiscites or elections. Populists talk about bringing the people back in power, but the one who is ultimately empowered is the populist leader (Weyland, 2017). As Albertazzi and McDonnell states, the solution populists propose is to put them in power (2015). Therefore, according to the strategic approach, the Manichean rhetoric should not be interpreted genuinely, but rather as a strategy for a top-down mobilization of the personalistic leader (Weyland, 2017).

Furthermore, the two main approaches are contrasted on their analytical utility in terms of exclusion and inclusion. While the strategic approach includes a higher degree of criteria in its definition, the ideational approach prefers a minimal definition. Consequently, Barr (2018) explains that the strategic approach excludes some cases such as European radical right parties (Weyland, 2017) or the North American agrarian movement (Barr, 2009). On the other hand, the choice of a minimal definition of the ideational approach makes the extension great. Based on the Manichean discourse many political actors can be categorized as populists (Barr, 2017) including phenomena that are usually considered non-populist, such as green movements (Mudde, 2004), George W. Bush (Hawkins, 2009) or Occupy Wall Street movement (Hawkins, 2018). This is the most evident in the quantitative method of Hawkins (2009, 2010). Hawkins's measurement results in 'false positives' (Weyland, 2017), such as George W. Bush. Hawkins introduces a few more criteria to exclude Bush. According to Barr (2017), the very fact that Hawkins (2009) needs to add limitations to limit the extension of the concept is evidence for the imprecision of this definition.

Finally, the strategic approach includes the defining elements to the definition itself, which create a direct connection with the empirical instances of populism (Barr, 2018). On the other hand, the ideational approach adherents mention the importance of leadership (e.g., Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, Hawkins, 2018), yet they do not include leadership in their definitions (Barr, 2018). Weyland (2017) points out to the contradiction that while the data collection is drawn from political actors (since there are no theorists of populism), there is no role of agency in the ideational definition. The real-word features of populism do not find their place in the definitions of populism.

The Laclauan Approach

Ernesto Laclau's work on populism is not new, yet it is still very influential. He takes a post-structuralist perspective in his analysis of populism. His theory influenced many scholars, in particular, the adherents of the ideational approach. However, it is not only scholars, but also many political movements are influenced by the Laclauan approach. The Podemos movement in Spain is founded on the Laclauan way of thinking.

Laclau puts forward the addressed issue in his book *On Populist Reason* (2005) in the first sentence of the preface as "the nature and logics of the formation of collective identities" (p. ix). He adds that populism has no precise referent, rather it is "a way of constructing the political" (Laclau, 2005, p. xi), and to give a general definition of populism will be inevitably too narrow (Laclau, 2005). Hence, Laclau (2005) gives up on the question "what is populism" and replaces it with the question "to what social and ideological reality does populism apply."

As Laclau says, we have the intuition in referring to the certain phenomenon as populism, yet it is difficult to translate this intuition into words (1977). Laclau starts criticizing earlier conceptualization. In particular, he criticizes Canovan (1981) and Peter Wiley (1969) because they avoid stating the specificity of populism (2005). He also claims that populism is not an ideology in the same sense as liberalism, conservatism or socialism (Laclau, 1977). Populism is not a type of movement, but rather a political logic of constructing a uniformity of social demands as opposed to an identified 'other' (Laclau, 2005). He refers to it as 'simplification of the political space' (Laclau, 2005).

Step by step, Laclau explains how certain societies are directed into populism. He thinks that the starting point is the ideological crisis of the hegemonic class of society. The hegemonic class is the one that could articulate a variety of worldviews in order to take potential opposition

under control (Laclau, 1977). An example of this is given by Laclau (1977) as the English bourgeoisie of the 19th-century which preserving its hegemonic position; it gradually subordinated the aristocracy, and partially absorbed the working-class demands. However, in time, the hegemonic class loses its capacity to articulate a certain worldview in the face of emerging contradictions. The example he gives at the time is the monopoly of capital and the liberal institutions in contemporary Western Europe (Laclau, 1977). When the dominant ideologies are lost ground, social identities created by those ideologies are also weakened (Laclau, 1977). This is the perfect moment for a fraction of society that aims to impose its hegemony.

In a society, accumulated unfulfilled demands could result in a widening gap between the system and the people, named as 'internal antagonistic frontier' (2005). This is the first precondition of populism. Secondly, the isolated demand begins to be articulated all together, named as equivalential articulation of demands. Finally, the unification of this variety of demands transforms into a single 'system of signification' (Laclau, 2005). Laclau (2005) argues that the vagueness and imprecision attributed to populism are rooted in its unification of heterogeneous demands.

According to Laclau (1977), populism starts exactly at this moment when what he calls popular-democratic elements are articulated by a fraction of society in opposition to the hegemonic ideology. Nazism was a form of such antagonism created by the German capitalist class to impose its hegemony (Laclau, 1977). Laclau finds it possible to call Hitler, Mao and Perón all as populist, not because of their expressed ideologies or social bases, but because each of them presented an antagonism to the power bloc based on popular-democratic interpellations. Interpellation is the process of transforming individuals into subjects through an ideology (Laclau, 1977). Thus, the emergence of populism is not tied to any stage of development but rather to an ideological crisis (Laclau, 1977).

That is why populism divides society into two antagonistic camps: on the one hand, there is a collection of unfilled demands, and on the other an unresponsive power (Laclau, 2005). The 'other' or 'the enemy' is essential for the totalization. In other words, society needs an antipode to differentiate and identify itself as, in this case, 'the people' (Laclau, 2005). The notion 'the people' is only a way of constructing a collective identity (Laclau, 2005). Popular identities are created as a result of this kind of equivalential articulation (Laclau, 2005).

Interestingly, Laclau mentions the *halkçılık* principle of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey. He translates *halkçılık* as populism; however, he states that it is opposite to populism he has been trying to explain. Atatürk's *halkçılık* viewed society based on solidarity and without and division, whereas populism involves a dichotomic division of the society. Secondly, this uniformity of the people was not based on actual popular demands of the society; rather it was imposed from the top (Laclau, 2005).

Laclau criticizes the emphasis on the leadership in the literature (2005) for it's ignoring the demand side of populism since the reason for the success of such manipulation remains unexplained. Still, the role of the leader is significant, because equivalential articulation leads to the singularity that can easily be embodied in the leader (Laclau, 2005). Thus, vagueness and imprecision are overcome by the personification of the set of heterogeneous demands. Plus, the leader keeps the singularity coherent in the changing circumstances with his total autonomy. Both the notions of 'attempt to impose hegemony by a fraction in a society' and the use of 'internal frontier' signal that Laclau considers only a domestic antagonism for populism (Laclau, 2005).

Laclau's theory becomes a normative one. He does not focus on the undemocratic consequences of populism, but rather presents it as a democratizing force. More, he places populism on the Left. For example, He claims that socialism can only be the highest form of populism (Laclau, 1977). He even advises the anti-globalization movement on the articulation and the language it uses (Laclau, 2005).

CRITICISM

Both the Laclauan approach and the ideational approach see populism as a specific set of ideas (Hawkins, 2018). However, it is argued that the ideational approach 'moves beyond' Laclau's work (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017). The Laclauan approach is interested in the consequences of populism, while the ideational approach directly focuses on the content of the ideas (Hawkins, 2018).

The adherents of both the strategic and the ideational approach criticize the Laclauan approach. The critics agree that the conceptualization of Laclau is normative and anti-positivist (Mudde, 2017, Barr, 2018; Hawkins, 2018). As Barr (2018) states, Laclau does not really define populism, rather he explains the construction of social identities. That is why Laclau's approach

does not help to differentiate between the cases (Barr, 2018). Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012) find Laclau's theory of populism extremely abstract and vague.

More, it is tended to limit populism to left-wing movements (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017). Since it generally reflects Laclau's post-Marxist theory, the Laclauan approach denies any right-wing association with populism (Hawkins, 2018).

The Strategic Approach

The adherents of the strategic approach are mostly scholars who study Latin America. The influence of the region in their definitions is also obvious. Since Latin American populists—both classical and neopopulists—seized power and demonstrated a high degree of opportunism, the scholars are skeptical about the ideas and discourses populists present. Rather, they conceptualize populism as a specific way of building and maintaining political power and assuring its popular legitimacy (Weyland, 2017). Initially, the definitions presented by Latin American scholars have associated populism with a certain stage of economic and social development, or specific social groups. However, with new instances of populism, scholars emancipated the definition from its incidental elements (e.g., Roberts 1995; Weyland, 1996). Nevertheless, those early definitions carried meaning related to building power. In order to keep this consistency, the strategic approach locates populism only in the political domain, that it is related to the 'search for and use of power' (Barr, 2018).

KURT WEYLAND

Kurt Weyland is one of the leading scholars of the strategic approach. With Kenneth Roberts (1995), he demonstrated that populism can work together with neoliberalism (Weyland, 1996). After the delinking of redistributive policies from populism, the definitions had to be reviewed. In his article *Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics* published in 2001, Weyland started with his criticism of earlier definitions as well as the economic definition and then laid the groundwork for a new definition of populism.

He starts with the modernization and dependency theories. Modernization theory, already demonstrated above, suggests that rapid urbanization and industrialization stimulated mass participation that eventually resulted in producing unstable rules such as populism (Weyland, 2001). On the other hand, the dependency theory suggests that the inclusion of Latin America economies to the global capitalist system prevented the creation of a hegemonic social class.

Rather, a personalistic leader holding multi-class masses together filled this political power vacuum creating a particular regime that is called populism (Weyland, 2001). The economic-structuralist approaches by both dependency and modernization theorists had an empirical basis because the classical populists in Latin America displayed similar definitional attributes. The definitions of populism reflected the features of the era (Weyland, 2001).

However, the comeback of populism in the 1980s and 1990s in fundamentally different socio-economic conditions proved that populism couldn't be linked to any stage of economic development nor social mobilization (Weyland, 2001). With the new wave of populism in Latin America, previously assumed common characteristics of examples of populism dramatically decreased (Weyland, 2001). While some Leftist scholars did not label Menem and Fujimori as populist because of the economic policies they enacted, others pointed out the mass support they obtain as personalistic leaders and argued that their governing strategy is characterized by populism. Weyland disagrees with authors who reject to label the new wave populists because of their economic policies (2001). The new wave of populists used similar strategies to obtain power but the economic policies they enacted under neoliberal restructuring were fundamentally different (Weyland, 2001). He rather focuses on these common strategies to give a precise definition of populism.

First, he sets his theoretical approach to conceptualization. He presents three different strategies for conceptualization: (i) cumulation, (ii) addition, and (iii) redefinition. Cumulation is quite exclusive and thus offers little empirical use. Addition, on the other hand, produces radial concepts that are more inclusive but they are so broad that they can create 'a pseudo-consensus'. In contrast, redefinition creates classical concepts and sets a few definitional characteristics. He aims to redefine populism as a classical concept, restricting it to a single domain, and let it free from any socioeconomic conditions and policies (Weyland, 2001). Since it focuses on a single domain this definition would allow for a reasonable extension. Plus, he suggests that the flexibility and the opportunism of both classical populists and neopopulists cannot be explained by multi-domain conceptualization (Weyland, 2001).

He lists certain characteristics of populism existing in the literature as expansionary and redistributive economic policies, personalistic leadership, use of plebiscitarian mechanisms, a direct and unmediated relationship of the leader with an unorganized mass, multi-class alliances, offering material incentives (Weyland, 2001). The economic policies had already been refuted

(Weyland, 1995). Thus, the first step of Weyland in constructing his definition is to remove the class-specific element. Since different populist leaders relied on different classes for their rise to power, populism should not be defined based on socioeconomic classes (Weyland, 2001). Next, he elaborates on the material incentives. He argues that clientelism is fundamentally different from populism since it is based on a pragmatic exchange. Clientelism can be one of the strategies a populist leader adopts but it does not carry a populist character (Weyland, 2001).

With the characteristics left, he suggests that populism is "a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers" (Weyland, 2001, p. 14). First, he starts justifying his definition with the genus that is determined as 'political strategy'. He argues that Knight's (1998) definition of populism as a style, focuses on the performative aspects of the populist leaders. Politicians can employ such aspects, especially during their campaigns. Political strategy excludes this occasional use of populist methods and rather embraces leaders who base their power on certain means and instruments categorized as a populist (Weyland, 2001).

Secondly, he explains the fundamental importance of the 'personalistic leader' for populism. Populist leaders depict themselves as they are fighting against the threats posed by enemies of the people or country (Weyland, 2017). He promises to challenge the status quo and special interests as the true representative of the people (Weyland, 2001). By pursuing this strategy his ultimate aim is to circumvent the political establishment and reach power (Weyland, 2017). The anti-establishment appeal, then, should be seen in strategic terms as well.

Populist leaders sometimes create political parties to compete for the elections and to mobilize support. The personalism is also present in the way of building organizations such as political parties. The leader keeps the utmost power and autonomy in shaping politics. If the political party starts to constrain the leader, then the rule loses its populist character (Weyland, 2001). However, this authoritarian personalism should not be confused with fascist leaders. The personalism of populism is distinct from fascist leaders as Mussolini or Hitler, because the former is fully personalistic, whereas in the latter there is a superior ideology (Weyland, 2017). Personalistic leaders are characterized by opportunism and pragmatism since their ultimate goal is to seize and maintain power. Therefore, this distinction implies that a personalistic leader who follows a clear ideology is non-populist, while the one who is a pragmatist and/or opportunist is

populist (Weyland, 2017). The notion of charisma is also very much used for populist leaders, however, for Weyland charisma is not essential to populism, but a facilitating factor (2017).

The third component of Weyland's definitions is about the support of populism and its consequent organizational features. To explain this, Weyland compares populism with other types of rule. While military dictatorships base their power on the military power, and oligarchy, on their wealth, the populists base their power on the large support that they draw from the masses (Weyland, 2001). As stated above, under populism, the ruler is not an organized political party, but an individual. Hence, instead of institutionalized links between the party and the people, a populist leader establishes an unorganized and direct relationship with the masses. To sustain this unorganized fragile mass support, populist leaders aim to create a direct relationship with the masses through face-to-face contact and television. Television is a good instrument to bypass the organized support to reach the masses, while it also enables to project charisma if present (Weyland, 2001). This popular support is the legitimizing force of the populist leaders. Therefore, elections, referenda, and mass rallies are utilized to demonstrate popular support (Weyland, 2001). Populism holds this support indicated by electoral victories or mass rallies above anything (Weyland, 2017). Seen from this perspective, undermining of constitutional and democratic norms by populist leaders is also justified. More, strong popular support gives populists the chance to delegitimize the opposition (Weyland, 2017).

Conceptualizing populism as a political strategy ultimately aims to seize and maintain political power implies that populism is considered only in the political domain. The anti-elite rhetoric and the discourse of challenging the establishment are also considered as indicators for placing populism in the political domain (Weyland, 2001). By limiting populism only to the political domain, the socioeconomic policies are regarded as only instrumental (Weyland, 2001). This definition also explains the opportunism and lack of commitment to certain policies and ideologies of populist leaders (Weyland, 2001).

Since most of the political entrepreneurs aim to seize political power, Weyland regards the main distinction of populism as its organizational features. Accordingly, comparing the classical populists and the new wave populists, Weyland (2001) argues that the latter is more populist than the former because of its lower levels of organization. More interestingly, well-organized and institutionalized European radical right parties, i.e., Front National, are not categorized as populist movements according to this definition (Weyland, 2017). The political

parties who stick with their ideologies and do not act to maximize the possibility of obtaining power in a pragmatist way are also not considered populist (Weyland, 2017). On the contrary, Silvio Berlusconi's *Forza Italia,* Alexis Tsipras's SYRIZA*,* and Victor Orbán's FIDESZ are qualified as populist since they prioritize capturing the governmental power rather than sticking with the ideologies (Weyland, 2017).

KENNETH M. ROBERTS

Similar to Kurt Weyland, Kenneth M. Roberts analyzes mainly Latin American populism. He showed that neopopulists implemented distinct economic policies compared to the classical populists focusing on Perú's Fujimori (Roberts, 1995). He also focused on mobilization (Roberts, 2007) because the distinct feature of populism from other personalistic leaderships, such as clientelism, is that it is based on mass mobilization (Roberts, 2006). However, opposing to the definition of Weyland (2001), he argues that the diversity in the organizational forms of populism rules out placing 'unorganized masses' as a definitional element of populism (Roberts, 2006). Roberts (2006) suggests four subtypes of populism in organizational terms: (i) organic populism, (ii) labor populism, (iii) partisan populism, and (iv) electoral populism.

In the countries where both partisan organization and the organization of labor unions are high and strong, populist leaders preferred organic populism by creating labor confederations and founding a mass party around them. Thus, they based their power on a very strong and organized popular support (Roberts, 2006). Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico and his party PNR is a good example of organic populism.

If organized labor is more developed than the partisan organization, then it is more likely that labor populism will emerge. Perón, for example, organized workers by using his position as a Minister of Labor. This confederation of labor played a crucial role both for his release from prison and his electoral victories (Roberts, 2006). He despised the political party organization that could potentially limit his autonomy.

In a society where organized labor is less developed and partisan organizations, partisan populism emerges. Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre of Perú avoided building labor organizations. Instead, he created a political party, APRA, around his charismatic leadership. His party was very well organized and disciplined (Roberts, 2006).

Finally, where both labor unions and partisan organization are weak, electoral populism is the organizational subtype that is likely to emerge. In this subtype, the relationship between

the leader and his/her followers is direct and unmediated. Velasco Ibarra of Ecuador relied on his oratory skills and mass rallies. His party organization was loose and only aimed to mobilize voters before elections (Roberts, 2006).

Apart from the institutional conditions of the systems, the relationship between the establishment and the populist leader can be influential in the organizational preferences of the populist leader. If the populist leader does not challenge the establishment radically a strong organization might not be necessary, like in Fujimori's case. However, when the threat posed by the populist leader to the establishment is strong, then the populist leader might need to rely on strong and organized popular support in order to counterweight the power of 'the elite' (Roberts, 2006).

Based on his convincing arguments about the organizational features and after getting rid of 'multi-class social base' and 'clientelist or redistributive economic policies' components of his original definition of populism (Roberts, 1995), Roberts redefines populism as "a top-down political mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge elite groups on behalf of an ill-defined pueblo, or 'the people'" (2007, p.5). This definition deliberately avoids any economic, sociological or historical conditions, because Roberts believes that populism can emerge in very different contexts (Roberts, 2007). The notion of personalism is emphasized in line with Weyland's (2001) definition. In addition to that, Roberts also specifies the populist appeal. This anti-elite appeal is similar to what the ideational approach suggests, however, for Roberts the personalistic leader and his mobilization are central to populism. He believes that populism lacks ideology, and the flexibility in policy-making and mobilizing support is evidence for that (Roberts, 2007). He argues that some types of populist mobilization utilize certain economic policies generally in a redistributive way, while others rely on non-material frames such as nationalism and anti-establishment appeal (Roberts, 2007). It implies that Roberts perceives appeals as instrumental.

Another characteristic of this definition is its avoidance to specify the organizational characteristics of populism contrary to Weyland (2001). However, the top-down manner in the mobilization stays as an exception. According to this definition, Morales should not be regarded as populist because he rose to power through a bottom-up mobilization. Except for Morales, Roberts (2007) claims that his definition is able to capture the instances populism emerged in different geographical and historical contexts.

ROBERT R. BARR

Another important scholar from the strategic approach is Robert R. Barr who also mainly studies on Latin America. When compared to Weyland and Roberts, Barr brings new terminology with his definition that he presented in his article *Populists, Outsiders, and Anti-Establishment Politics* published in 2009. In this article, Barr takes the notions of anti-establishment politics, political outsiders, and plebiscitarian linkages as his focus of study.

Barr regards anti-establishment discourse as a tool to achieve political success by taking advantage of high public discontent (2009). At the times when the establishment can no longer represent the ordinary citizens, an 'us versus them' discourse is employed by political actors opposing the whole class of elites. Still, Barr (2009, 2017) uses 'anti-establishment' instead of using 'the elite' to extend its reach, since establishment can be political or economic, domestic or foreign. Barr (2009) states that it can only be one aspect of populism next to other aspects. After all, anti-establishment appeals are not always direct reflections of the reality, but rather constructed realities by the politicians. In order to find support and acceptance, this specifically constructed reality needs to conform to society's perception of reality (Barr, 2009). More, political actors who are not labeled as populists can employ an anti-establishment appeal, too.

Next, Barr moves on to analyze the concepts of political outsider and maverick. An outsider is a political actor who rises to power not through the established party system, but with a new party or independently. Being an outsider enables politicians to employ anti-establishment appeal in a more credible way (Barr, 2009). On the other hand, a maverick is a political actor who becomes a known political figure through the established political system, but then leaves his party and establishes a new party to achieve political power (Barr, 2009).

Thirdly, Barr (2009) discusses the types of political linkages. Arguing that the programmatic appeal (where citizens show loyalty to political actors based on the ideologies) is not a linkage since it lacks interaction between the people and the party, he lists four types of political linkages: (i) clientelistic linkages where the basis of support is the exchange of material benefits, (ii) directive linkages where the constituency is coerced, (iii) participatory linkages where the citizens are involved in politics through internal party democracy or citizens' initiatives, (iv) electoral linkages where citizens are consulted for their judgment for the political leadership without enabling them to participate. Plebiscitarian linkages are considered as an extreme form of electoral linkages where citizens are presented by two choices, of which the

political leadership supports one. Such plebiscites are served to indirectly demonstrate the popular support for the leader (Barr, 2009). Mass rallies are another tool to show popular support for the leader. Plebiscitarianism can be considered to be democratic since it allows citizens to make decisions by voting, but it is a majoritarian one (Barr, 2009).

Based on the concepts of outsider, maverick, anti-establishment appeal and plebiscitarian linkages, he defines populism as "a mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages" (Barr, 2009, p. 38). This type of conceptualization has straightforward implications. First, it shows that Barr (2009) agrees with Weyland (2001) on defining populism as a strategy to achieve and maintain political power. Second, the use of any appeal other than anti-establishment or any insider political actor would fall out of populism (Barr, 2009). Barr does not include any specific organization type in his definition. Agreeing with Roberts (2006), he argues against Weyland's (2001) organizational attributions of populism. Pointing out different instances of populism with different organizational features, such as Fujimori's loose electoral coalitions and Perón's tight political party, Barr is supporting not to condition populism with any type of organization (2009). Populists do not use the plebiscitarian linkages and the anti-establishment appeal uniquely, yet the use of both combined is typical to populism (Barr, 2017). Agreeing with Weyland (2001), Barr considers the social constituency of populism of secondary importance (2009). He convincingly explains that the social constituency of populism is "a function of where the construction of the 'us versus them' conflict will most likely to take hold" (Barr, 2009, p. 39).

Although Barr does not include personalistic leadership in his definition, the other elements inevitably lead to it. When a maverick or an outsider creates a plebiscitarian linkage with the masses, this reinforces the leader and turns him into personalistic. However, Barr considers charisma only as a facilitating factor. Charisma is utilized to garner support and to solidify the bonding between the leader and the people. Yet, it is not a definitional element (2009). An example of a non-charismatic populist leader is given as Fujimori of Perú.

Personalism also implies that the mobilization is naturally top-down. This detail is essential for the definition of Barr (2009). By this definition, he excludes the North American agrarian movement from populist movements, because it was a grass-roots organization that even promoted participatory linkages (Barr, 2009). Thus, top-down mobilization and

personalistic leadership limit the extension of the concept (Barr, 2017). More, the clientelistic linkages are also excluded from the definition. Otherwise, the construction of social identity that is specific to populism and distinct from clientelism would be overlooked (Barr, 2009). Additionally, including clientelism to the definition of populism would limit the concept to the politicians who are in power, since clientelism involves distributing state resources (Barr, 2017).

OTHER SCHOLARS

Carlos de la Torre made an important contribution to the study of populism with this book *Populist Seduction in Latin America* published in 2000. In this book, he generally focuses on Ecuador and its populist leaders Velasco and Bucaram. He defines populism as "a style of political mobilization based on strong rhetorical appeals to the people and crowd action on behalf of a leader" (de la Torre, 2000, p. 4). This rhetorical appeal depicts a moral struggle between el pueblo and the oligarchy (de la Torre, 2000). Since the distinction is based on moral values, any dialogue with or any compromise to the opposition is not possible (de la Torre, 2000). Different from Mudde's (2004) conceptualization, this struggle is only rhetoric and not an ideology. In fact, he thinks populism lacks ideology (de la Torre, 2000). Plus, the 'crowd action' should not be regarded as something participatory, because political participation in populism occurs only in the form of participation to mass rallies (de la Torre, 2000). Crowd action is something essential to populism, and it is occasionally used to threaten the opposition (de la Torre, 2000). In addition to the definition he proposes, he claims that populism has no specific social base. Contrary to Weyland (2001) and Barr (2009, 2017) he suggests that clientelism is usually a mode of mobilization used by populism. According to de la Torre, populism is not something that disappears and reemerges. The populist appeal is always there; the rise of populism, then, depends on the circumstances where other arguments are used up or weakened (de la Torre, 2000).

René Antonio Mayorga contributed to the book *The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes* published in 2006, with his chapter called *Outsiders and Neopopulism: The Road to Plebiscitary Democracy*. He explains how the neopopulists of Latin America degenerated the systems into plebiscitarian democracies. Mayorga (2006) defines populism as a pattern of politics where a "charismatic leader exploits an ideological discourse of defending the poor and excluded, through which he garners electoral support and democratically legitimizes the quest for and exercise of power" (p. 135). He adds that populism is personalistic, anti-institutionalist

and rooted in the mobilization of the masses (Mayorga, (2006). Although it looks similar in the first instance, Mayorga (2006) criticizes Weyland's (2001) definition for its inability to capture the early instances of populism, particularly the populist leaders who rose to power based on organized and institutionalized support. Secondly, he finds the definition of Weyland (2001) incomplete in explaining the 'neopopulists'. Mayorga (2006) argues that the strategy of neopopulists included weakening the liberal democratic institutions once they reach and consolidate power.

In their influential article *Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in the Andes*, Steven Levitsky and James Loxton argue that populism is the main reason behind the competitive authoritarian tendencies in Latin America (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). They define populism as the mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic outsiders using anti-establishment appeals (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). While non-personalistic populism can be categorized as movement populists, non-outsiders can be categorized as maverick populists. Thus, Levitsky and Loxton (2013) suggest a semi-radial concept type.

Analyzing from a sociological perspective, Robert S. Jansen (2011) defines populism as "any sustained, large-scale political project that mobilizes ordinarily marginalized social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action, while articulating an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people" (p.82).

GENERAL FEATURES

The strategic approach is praised to prevent conceptual stretching and to be in line with the historical meaning of the term (Barr, 2017). By leaving out economic policies and social constituencies, a strategic approach enables the definition to encompass the empirical varieties. Although this approach became prominent after the neopopulists, it is able to capture also the left-wing contemporary populists as Chávez, Morales, and Correa (Barr, 2018).

What is central to the strategic approach is that it interprets the behavior of populist actors in their quest for power with a set of distinct features that makes it populist. In this view, both rhetorical and organizational features are regarded as tactics in a broader strategy (Barr, 2018). It is also praised because the characteristics of populism are included in the definition at the conceptual level (Barr, 2018). Another advantage of adopting a strategic approach to populism can be seen in explaining the causes of populism. For example, the strategic use of

anti-establishment appeal can be immediately linked with distrust of the establishment, while top-down mobilization is a sign of weakened democratic representation in a system (Barr, 2018).

The main difference in the strategic approach from the ideational approach is that it presents a coherent strategy to obtain and maintain political power (Weyland, 2017). The ideational approach uses notions such as 'chameleonic nature' or 'thin-centered' to describe the vagueness of the concept they present. Compared to the ideational approach the definition strategic approach presents is more exclusive. This results in excluding the extreme-right movements because of their lack of opportunism and flexibility that are perceived as essential to populism (Weyland, 2017).

The adherents of the strategic approach have not reached a consensus on the organizational features of populism. While Weyland (2001) makes a great emphasis on the lack of institutionalism of populism, others such as Roberts (2006) and Barr (2009) argue that organizational features are incidental. Besides, Jansen argues that populism can be mobilized both top-down and bottom-up manner (as cited in Barr 2018). However, Barr (2009) excludes bottom-up movements such as the US agrarian movement from populism.

Another disagreement is on the discourses populists use. The appeals are excluded from Weyland's (2001) definition. Others, such as de la Torre (2000) and Barr (2009) include anti-establishment appeals to their definitions. Barr (2018) argues that the inclusion of certain appeals helps to limit the extension of the definition, particularly creating differentiation from fascism.

CRITICISM

The scholars of the ideational approach agree with the strategic approach that populism should not be defined based on certain economic or social policies (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). However, they criticize it mainly on two aspects. First, it is argued that the sincerity of the populist messages cannot be measured conclusively 'without getting into the populist's head' (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p.9). It is found unscientific to claim that populists do not believe in what they say and that they act strategically, since this an assumption and not an empirical argument (Mudde, 2017).

Second, the critics do not consider the organizational aspects as definitional elements of populism that are essential to the strategic definition. (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012). Rather, populism with its chameleonic character can be expressed in any organizational features (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). Hence, Weyland's (2001) definition while being successful in capturing

Latin American populism, fails to embrace Western European populist parties with structured political parties (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015).

Contrary to the strategic approach, the ideational approach does not regard maximizing power in the executive branch as a 'power grab' but just as an expression of the populist ideas (Hawkins, 2018). While the strategic approach tries to reveal the ultimate goal of populist actors, the ideational approach argues that the main reason behind the actions of populists is the set of ideas they hold (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017).

2.4 Populism and Erdoğan

Is the current president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a populist? It is impossible to answer this question without determining the definition of populism. A short Google search with the terms 'populist' and 'Erdoğan' can show that writers in the prominent news outlets such as The Guardian[4], Bloomberg[5], The New York Times[6] and in Foreign Policy[7] label Erdoğan as populist. Yet, to use the definitions created by the scholars, we also need those scholars to categorize Erdoğan as populist.

Fortunately, scholars agree that Erdoğan is a populist. From the ideational approach, the prominent scholars Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) mention that Erdoğan is a populist (p. 40). However, they avoid any kind of articulation or analysis of the ideology, discourse or policies of Erdoğan. They only mention his name and categorize him as a populist. There is also Hawkins from the ideational approach that categorizes Erdoğan as a populist, and luckily in a much more detailed way. A group called Team Populism,[8] whose director is Prof. Hawkins himself, prepared a report[9] for The Guardian using the quantitative method Hawkins created (which will also be used in this study). The study included 40 leaders and Erdoğan was one of them. The

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[4] The Guardian: *From Reformer to 'New Sultan': Erdoğan's Populist Evolution*. Found at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/11/from-reformer-to-new-sultan-erdogans-populist-evolution

[5] Bloomberg: P*opulism Gets a Setback and Erdogan a Rival.* Found at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-24/populism-gets-a-setback-and-erdogan-a-rival

[6] The New York Times: *Has Erdoğan's Populism Reached Its Limits?* Found at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/02/opinion/turkey-erdogan-election-defeat.html

[7] Foreign Policy: *Love Will Set You Free From Populism.* Found at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/01/love-will-set-you-free-from-populism/

[8] Team Populism, 2019, Brigham Young University. Found at: https://populism.byu.edu/
[9] The Guardian: *Revealed: the rise and rise of populist rhetoric.* Found at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2019/mar/06/revealed-the-rise-and-rise-of-populist-rhetoric

leaders were compared with grades, ranged between 0 and 2, assigned given by the method of Hawkins. According to that Erdoğan has been categorized as populist, with a 1.5 grade out of 2. He had the highest grades with politicians like Chávez and Maduro of Ecuador, Rafael Correa of Ecuador and Morales of Bolivia. Interestingly he was the only non-Latin American leader with a 'very populist' that corresponds to the grade range of 1.5 to 2. Erdoğan's case was so interesting; The Guardian published an individual report[10] for him to show the timeline of the development of his populism. According to the data provided by Team Populism, when Erdoğan came in power (for the period 2003-2007) his populism grade was as low as 0.1, which puts him on the same ranking with Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac. Moving to the next period, the years between 2007 and 2014, Erdoğan received a grade of 0.9, being categorized as somewhat populist, next to Silvio Berlusconi. Only in the latest period between 2014 and 2018, Erdoğan's populism grade reaches as high as 1.5. In conclusion, the adherents from the ideational approach agree that Erdoğan is populist, and Hawkins's method finds that Erdoğan has been very populist between the years 2014 and 2018.

There are also scholars from the strategic approach who categorize Erdoğan as a populist. In his general explanation of the strategic approach Barr (2018) asks how Perón and Erdoğan 'gained power to transform their countries' (p. 44). Although, he does not directly state that Erdoğan is a populist, from the context we understand that Erdoğan is implicitly considered as populist. Luckily, there is clearer evidence. Weyland and Madrid (eds. 2019) provide a list of politicians with a time period, in which the contributors of the book agree to categorize them as populist. The scholars contributed include Weyland, Roberts, and Madrid from the strategic approach and Kaltwasser from the ideational approach. They all agree that Erdoğan should be categorized as populist, even if for different reasons (Weyland & Madrid, 2019). In sum, scholars from both the ideational and strategic approaches agree that Erdoğan is populist. Only Hawkins provides a detailed analysis and his method shows that Erdoğan is populist only after 2014. Therefore, although some scholars might argue that Erdoğan has been populist before, the post-2014 period is a time range that there is a certain agreement in the academia that Erdoğan is populist. The scope of this study will be post-2014, as well.

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[10] The Guardian: *From Reformer to 'New Sultan': Erdoğan's Populist Evolution*. Found at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/11/from-reformer-to-new-sultan-erdogans-populist-evolution

Since this study will try to test the existing definitions on Erdoğan, it is essential to see the previous works that analyzed the populism of Erdoğan, and the definitions adopted. One of the very first studies categorizes Erdoğan, or his party *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* or Justice and Development Party (referred to as AKP), as populist is Dağı's *Turkey's AKP in Power* published in 2008. Dağı describes the very early years of AKP in power, mainly on the party's moving away from Islamism. At the very end of the article, he states that AKP is a populist party, however, he does not provide any background or justification, let alone a specific definition (Dağı, 2008). Later, Dinçşahin (2012) focuses on the years between 2007 and 2010 and describes the 'populist strategy' employed by Erdoğan during these years. According to him, the obstruction attempt of the military and the high judiciary of electing a president (Abdullah Gül) whose wife wears an Islamic headscarf created a crisis in Turkey in 2007. Erdoğan was successful to use this crisis to call for an early election in 2007, and two referenda for constitutional amendments in 2007 and 2010. He polarized the society into two camps with a heavy anti-establishment discourse. Eventually, Erdoğan won the elections and the two referenda. Dinçşahin (2012) is not clear which definition of populism he adopted. He writes 'populist strategy' and mentions the 'anti-establishment discourse' as well as 'the people-the elite' antagonism. From the context, one can conclude that the 'populist strategy' is used by Erdoğan to obtain or at least maintain political power. Therefore, Dinçşahin (2012), whether intentionally or not, adopted the strategic approach for explaining why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as a populist**.**

One of the most influential works written about Erdoğan and populism was produced by Aytaç and Öniş (2014), in which they compare 'different strands' of populism by two cases from Argentina and Turkey. They refer to the presidents of Argentina, both Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, and Erdoğan for Turkey. Based on the economic policies implemented, they categorize Kirchners as left-wing populist, while Erdoğan as right-wing populist. They make it clear that they adopt the strategic definition of Barr (2009) in their work (Aytaç & Öniş, 2014). Founding their theoretical framework on Aytaç and Öniş (2014), Aytaç and Ezgi (2019) adopted Barr's definition too, and therefore prefer the strategic approach to explain the populism of Erdoğan.

Yabancı (2016) mentions definitions from both the ideational approach and the strategic approach in her brilliant analysis of AKP's construction of dependent civil society. The point of

her work is to show that the emphasis on the anti-establishment appeal in populism is overestimated, by showing that AKP employed other strategies when anti-establishment appeal lost its credibility after years of being in power. Eventually, she reminds that the essential nature of AKP populism "as a specific way of gaining and exercising power" (Yabancı, 2016, p. 609). This description is, although not explicitly, shows that Yabancı preferred to adopt a strategic definition for Erdoğan or AKP (2016).

Castaldo (2018) analyzes populism and the rise of competitive authoritarianism in Turkey basing on the Levitsky and Loxton's (2013) work. Since Levitsky and Loxton (2013) establish their theoretical basis of populism on Barr's definition, Castaldo (2018) as well adopted Barr's definition, which belongs to the strategic approach. Lastly, Selçuk (2016) creates a comparative analysis of democratic erosion in Turkey, Ecuador, and Venezuela by analyzing the weak democratic institutions and strong presidents. He is straightforward about his conceptualizing of populism as defining it as "a political phenomenon in which an anti-establishment figure cultivates direct linkages with the people in an antagonistic way" (Selçuk, 2016, p. 571). He explains three dimensions of populism that are a variant of Barr's (2009) definition, focusing on outsider status, plebiscitary linkage and the Manichean vision (Selçuk, 2016).

However, not all scholars adopted the strategic approach. Kirdiş and Drhmieur (2016) compare the 'pro-Islamic' governing parties in Turkey and Morocco. They analyze the rise of populism in these parties, adopting Mudde's thin-centered ideology definition. Yet, they also emphasize the strategic aspect of utilizing populism in pursuing their own ideological agenda as well as in appealing to a more diverse electoral base. Although it is ambiguous, they ultimately adopted an ideational definition, while also mentioning the strategic aspect of populism (Kirdiş & Drhmieur, 2016). Türk (2018) described how Erdoğan used populism in the moments of crisis as a medium for mass mobilization. Although it seems like he adopted a strategic approach, he explicitly defines the populism himself, emphasizing on the notions of 'the people,' 'the elite,' and the will of the people. Therefore, he adopted an ideational approach, while explaining that Erdoğan used populism for mass mobilization (Türk, 2018).

As seen, the scholars who studied Erdoğan and populism are not always clear on which definition or approach they are adopting in their categorization of Erdoğan as a populist. Yet, the majority of scholars either implicitly or explicitly give definitions closer to the strategic approach. The emphasis of anti-establishment appeal is also very common in the scholarship on

Erdoğan and populism. In line with the dominance of the global scholarship, this study will use the ideational and strategic approach in the next sections for explaining why Erdoğan is labeled as populist. It is important to remind that this study does not presume that Erdoğan is a populist: it is empirically impossible to claim so without presenting a clear definition for populism. As explained above, both the ideational and the strategic approach for populism categorize Erdoğan as a populist. This study will use these approaches to try to explain why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as a populist by using the methods these approaches use themselves. Eventually, it will be possible to assess the capacity of each approach in explaining why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as a populist.

The reader should be reminded that these definitions are based on observations. Scholars come up with a definition by observing certain cases, and then propose a universal definition that would work across time and region. They can easily conclude that a certain case should not be categorized as populist since it is excluded by their definition: as also mentioned above they produce circular arguments. Yet, as Canovan (1981) says, pure empiricism is not possible in the social sciences and that concepts should be constructed. This study will test these definitions in one case that is of Erdoğan. The findings here do not or cannot directly prove or disprove the definitions. The purpose of this study is to propose the strongest arguments, with their empirical basis, for and against these definitions.

3.   The Ideational Approach Applied to Erdoğan

In this chapter, I want to explain why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as a populist through the ideational approach for populism. The ideational approach, as described in detail above, argues that populism is a specific set of ideas. Some scholars think that it is a 'thin-centered' ideology, and some argue that it is a type of discourse. The ideas and concepts unique to the proposed popülist ideology are 'the people,' 'the elite,' and 'the will of the people'. It will enable us to see if the ideational approach is capable of explaining why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as a populist. To do that, first I will use a quantitative method. The quantitative method I will use belongs to Hawkins (2009, 2010). He quantifies the populist levels for politicians through their speeches. Furthermore, he can, for instance, claim that one politician is more populist than another. More, he can categorize politicians as non-populist, somewhat populist, and very populist through a scale he proposes. For this quantitative method I will use, I used one hundred thirty-nine speeches Erdoğan gave between August 2014 and June 2019. I

have graded these speeches according to the method created by Hawkins, only with a slight modification that will be explained in detail below. Second, I will use mainly Mudde's definition of populism to explain why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as a populist through a qualitative method. Mudde's and some other scholars' definitions are created qualitatively based on concepts and notions mentioned above. Hence, I will apply these concepts through two sources. During my analysis of Erdoğan's speeches, I have also collected data for the qualitative method. Therefore, I will still be able to use the speeches I have analyzed for the quantitative approach. In addition to that, I will use secondary sources. My main argument is that the ideational approach falls short of explaining why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as a populist. First, due to the unique characteristics of the Turkish political scene, and second due to Erdoğan's ruling for more than a decade, the concepts and notions emphasized in the discourses of Erdoğan are distinct. After the analysis of why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as a populist through the ideational approach, this chapter provides clear conclusions. First, the method created by Hawkins (2009, 2010) seems limited when applied to Erdoğan's case. The rubric needs to be widely extended, or the results will be radically different. Certain notions are very similar to what the ideational approach proposes, such as the use of 'the people' and 'the will of the people'. However, 'the elite' seems to be almost non-existent in the discourse of Erdoğan, especially in comparison with the mention of terrorist organizations. In sum, the ideational approach can explain only a part of Erdoğan's discourse and it falls short creating a comprehensive framework for explaining the case of Erdoğan. The strength of the conclusion derived from this chapter comes from the great data it has processed. The one hundred thirty-nine speeches chosen for this analysis also provide chronological continuity to track consistency and change in Erdoğan's discourse.

3.1   Quantitative Method

In this section, the ideational approach will be utilized to explain why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as populist through one hundred thirty-nine speeches analyzed by a quantitative method crated by Hawkins (2009). Hawkins is an adherent of the ideational approach, and he provides a minimal definition, focusing on the agreements already reached in the ideational approach. First, the choice of the method will be justified, and then the rubric created by Hawkins will be explained. Next, the grading system and its modification for this

study will be described in detail, followed by the data, descriptive results and the conclusion for the method and the findings from this study.

The Choice of Method

As mentioned in the literature review, there are two prominent quantitative methods of measuring populism. One belongs to Hawkins (2009, 2010) which utilizes the holistic grading technique based on qualitative analysis of texts, and the other to Pauwels (2011) which prefers to use a quantitative text analysis based on specific words such as 'the people,' 'establishment,' 'elite,' 'corruption,' 'patriarchy,' etc. The method implemented by Pauwels is impractical for the purposes of our study since the language and political discourse in Turkey are profoundly different from Western Europe. The choice of words would be inevitably biased. The rest of the study will show that there is a necessity to interpret certain words and concepts to make the best adaptation of quantitative measurement of populism in Turkey.

Hence, the application of Hawkins's quantitative method is a better choice, since it gives the researcher the chance to examine the words in their contexts qualitatively. For example, the notion of 'the people' can be translated into Turkish as *insanlar* (humans)*, kişiler* (persons) or *halk* (collection of individuals in a society). Yet, Erdoğan uses the notion of *millet* (nation) in his discourse in a similar way of the use of 'the people' by the Western European populists. The notion *millet* has a unique meaning that can be linked to the concept of 'the people' of the ideational definition of populism, only if examined qualitatively. The method of Hawkins is, therefore, more suitable to make a cross-country research since it is able to avoid linguistic and cultural setbacks. After this qualitative interpretation, the method still enables one to assign a quantitative value, or in other words a grade, through a rubric.

The quantitative method used by Hawkins (2009, 2010) based on the holistic grading method will be hereafter referred to as 'the Hawkins Method.' In the next section, the Hawkins Method will be explained in detail including its rubric, grading system and its adaptation for Erdoğan.

The Hawkins Method and Its Adaptation
THE 6-SECTIONED RUBRIC

Hawkins starts his article that introduces his new method of measuring populism with a quote from Hugo Chávez (2009). He claims that many scholars and media members would

depict those words of Chávez as populist and he aims to find its reasons. It is important to note that Hawkins presupposes that populism is something that can be found in words, and only in words. This explains why the definition and measuring method of Hawkins belong to the ideational approach in defining populism. He categorizes his definition as a 'discursive definition' rather than 'ideational' in this work (2009), but later, to escape the discussion on the genus, scholars of the same approach agreed on the term 'ideational' explained by Hawkins himself in his more recent work (2018).

According to Hawkins, populism is best defined, as "a Manichean discourse that identifies the good with a unified will of the people and evil with a conspiring elite" (2009, p. 1042). His explanation of this definition in detail lays the grounds for the rubric he proposes for the method. His rubric is composed of six criteria, each proposed in one 'populist' and one 'pluralist' option. Next, each element of Hawkins' rubric will be described in detail:

Populist element 1: The first element of the rubric focuses on how the discourse is framed. If the speaker creates a Manichean view of the issues with a moral dimension, it is considered as populist. The issues are presented in a dualistic way that is clear what is wrong or right, good or bad. The gray areas are not possible. On the contrary, the 'pluralist' way should require focusing on narrow issues. The differences of opinion are justified. To explain this criterion, Hawkins gives the example of Chávez framing the upcoming elections. According to Chávez, the elections are not for extending Chávez's term, but rather a matter of independence of the country. Hence, the elections are presented as a "contest between the forces of good and evil" (2009, p. 1043). This criterion of the rubric can easily be applied to the discourse of Erdoğan. The speeches that draw a dualistic understanding of the issues are considered as populist. However, there are some speeches, where Erdoğan first talks about narrow issues, ongoing investments or finished projects; but later on, concludes the speech with a Manichean view of the political agenda. In such speeches where the Manichean world view is not present in the entire speech but only at some part, still, it is considered as 'populist' for this populist element in this study.

Populist Element 2: What the second element measures is twofold. First, whether the speech presents 'cosmic proportions' for the issues being discussed, in the sense that the subject matter has great influence across time and space. Second, whether national or religious leaders are mentioned to justify and strengthen this 'cosmic struggle' argument. The pluralist option of

this criterion would be fulfilled if the speaker sticks with the material reality, and avoids making references to historical figures. Erdoğan seems to embrace all the Muslims around the world in his discourse, and not only the Turkish people. More, there are many references to the early Turkish rulers from Ottoman and Seljuk dynasties. It is not clear whether Hawkins requires both of the clauses existing or only one, but in this study at least one of them is considered enough to fulfill this criterion as 'populist'.

Populist Element 3: The third element of Hawkins's rubric is about the 'good' side of the Manichean vision depicted by the populist. According to the populist speaker, the good is embodied in the will of the people. Hawkins describes it as "a crude version of Rousseau's General Will" (2009, p. 1043). Essentialism is ascribed to this will of the majority, which should be taken reference by the government in its making of policies. Especially in its description as something straightforward and unified, the speaker romanticizes the notion of the will of the people. Chávez talks about this homogenous group that holds 'the will' as *el pueblo* in a singular way (Hawkins, 2009). The opposite of this 'populist' criterion is acknowledging that there is no known will of the people for each specific issue. The views might change from issue to issue, as well as from individual to another. There is a similar concept with Chávez's *el pueblo* in Erdoğan's discourse as well, which is *millet*. It has a slightly different meaning, yet it is used similarly with Chávez's *el pueblo*. The will of the people is usually referred to as *milli irade* in Turkish. In this study, each time Erdoğan refers to *milli irade* or *millet* as a homogenous group that acts, thinks, fights and holds a single and sharp opinion, this populist element is considered fulfilled.

Populist Element 4: The fourth element is about the 'bad' side of the Manichean struggle, which is the evil minority. The evil minority can change according to the context. It could be the oligarchy, the economic elite, the international elite, the United States, etc. Hawkins (2009) quotes Hofstadter to describe the evil minority as malice, omnipresent and powerful. Chávez, for example, usually describes his opponents in being cooperation with international forces for secret and malicious plan against the people. The opposition leaders are depicted as controlled by bigger forces. The pluralist way of this criterion would be avoiding mentioning conspiracy theories and 'an evil ruling minority'. It should also avoid depicting opponents as evil. Thus this element is designed as twofold: an evil, powerful minority and, the demonized opposition.

However, the inclusion of the 'demonized opposition' notion is problematic. The sixth (and the last) criterion also involves hostility against the opposition. One empirical fact, thus, could be used to fulfill two elements in the rubric. To avoid the problem of repetitive grading, the explanation of the criteria should be re-examined in Hawkins's original work (2009). We understand from the example of Chávez presented by Hawkins that the opposition should not only be depicted as evil but also in cooperation with the other evil forces against the people to fulfill the fourth element. The main issue focused by this criterion is that *the existence of certain forces powerful enough to at least attempt to work against the people*. Erdoğan usually utilizes hostile language against the opposition. Yet, in this study, this 'evil minority' criterion is considered fulfilled only when Erdoğan claims that the opposition is working together with other forces in a sinister plan. Sometimes he avoids targeting the opposition but prefers to mention some other forces working against Turkey. Since, 'the enemy' or 'other' change a lot in the discourse of Erdoğan, the extension of this criterion is limited by the 'ruling' capacity and 'powerful' feature of the enemy. Therefore, if there is an 'enemy' that is depicted as powerful enough to pose a serious threat to the country, that Erdoğan has to ask help or support of the people to fight against them, then this element is considered fulfilled. The terrorist organizations, for example, are out of this element, mainly because Erdoğan usually talks about how successful he is to fight against them. He depicts them as already defeated and that they will never be powerful enough to pose a serious threat against Turkey. Just like the opposition parties, terrorist organizations are sometimes depicted as in cooperation with greater forces, too, like in an 'evil coalition'. Then again, an 'evil coalition' is articulated by Erdoğan considered powerful enough as much as an 'evil minority' that Hawkins tries to depict, and thus it is enough to fulfill this element.

Populist Element 5: The fifth element of Hawkins measures whether the discourse leads to an advocating of a systemic change or not. This could be expressed as a 'revolution' or 'liberation' even though such change can happen practically through elections. For example, Chávez used to depict the election cycles as revolutionary eras (Hawkins, 2009). This systemic change is a move against the evil minority that manipulated the system for its own interests. The 'pluralist' part of the criteria requires a focus on particular issues and avoids demanding a systematic change. Erdoğan usually advocates for change, too. In this study, when Erdoğan depicts elections and constitutional amendment referendums as liberation from the evil forces

this criterion has been considered to be fulfilled. Apart from elections, he frequently talks about *yeniden diriliş* or *yeniden inşa* that mean 'rebirth' and 'rebuilding' respectively. This should be considered a Turkish version of the discourse of revolution that might be rooted in the leftist discourse of Latin America. Also, when he advocates for change about the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council as the minority that rules the world this criterion has been considered as fulfilled.

Populist Element 6: The sixth and the last element is about what Hawkins calls as 'anything goes attitude' (2009). The democratic customs are overlooked or openly violated for allegedly 'better expression of the will of the people'. In this regard, a hostile language is used against the opposition. Chávez used to accuse the opposition with treason and question their patriotism, competence, and sense of responsibility (Hawkins, 2009). The pluralist way would be respecting the democratic procedures, and approaching the opposition within such custom. The opposition leaders or parties are considered as legitimate. One can observe a striking similarity between Chávez and Erdoğan in their depiction of the opposition. When Erdoğan directly accuses the opposition by treason or being in cooperation with 'terrorist organizations' this criterion is fulfilled. Here, it should be noted that in cooperation with 'terrorist organizations' are profoundly different from being in cooperation with evil conspiring forces in their power capacity. As described above, while terrorist organizations are only a threat with power no way greater than Turkey, the evil forces are strong enough to alter or at least try to alter the economic and political situation in Turkey. Thus, the former case, where the opposition is depicted in cooperation with the terrorist organizations, justifies the sixth criterion, while the latter one, where the opposition is depicted in cooperation with the evil forces, justifies the fourth criterion.

To sum up, the six populist elements are as follows: (1) Manichean vision, (2) cosmic proportions and historical references, (3) essentiality of the will of the people, (4) the evil minority (5) legitimization of non-democratic means and hostility against opposition, (6) the rhetoric of revolution and liberation.

HOLISTIC GRADING VS ANALYTIC GRADING

The rubric introduced above forms the qualitative part of the method. In this section, assigning a quantitative grade in the Hawkins Method will be explained. In order to create a quantitative value, he utilizes a technique called holistic grading. This technique demands the reader to read the whole text and interpret it in its entirety. Thus, it provides certain advantages

compared to counting words (i.e., Pauwels, 2011). Nevertheless, it is hard to argue that there is one single word and sentence that all the populists employ around the world. More, human coders are capable enough to analyze the meaning behind sentences.

In Hawkins's method, the graders give one single grade to the text based on the rubric designed, after examining the speech. Hawkins gives a 3-grade scale for measuring populism:

- Grade 0 should be assigned if the speaker uses a *few of the populist elements*.
- Grade 1 should be assigned if the speech includes *clear populist elements blended with non-populist elements*.
- Grade 2 should be assigned if *all or almost all of the populist elements* are expressed (Hawkins, 2009).

In sum, by the degree of using the populist elements, the speakers receive a grade on a scale from 0 to 2. Obviously, the populist elements are the ones listed in the 6-sectioned rubric that is explained in the previous part.

By introducing a rubric, that is 6-sectioned populist elements, which goes beyond 0-2 scale dependent on the *number* of the populist elements fulfilled, Hawkins extends the holistic grading technique from its original form and, in fact, somehow applies the analytical grading. This is how he explains the holistic grading compared to analytical grading:

> *"Unlike analytical grading, which tries to break a text down into its parts and then combine the scores of each of those parts (as a content analysis does), a holistic approach works by assessing the overall qualities of a text and then assigning a single grade without any intervening calculations"* (Hawkins, 2009, p. 1049).

In theory, in the holistic grading, the grader should have only one rubric with assigned grades. If the holistic grading would have been applied to measuring populism, for instance, a grade of 0 would correspond to 'a little or not at all populist,' while 1 would correspond to 'somewhat populist,' and 2 would correspond to 'very populist'. Obviously, such a technique would have absolutely no analytical use in the study of populism, because the main question lingering in the field, which is also the focus of this study, is *what populism is*. Therefore, it is impossible to detect what is 'a little' or 'somewhat populist' before defining populism.

Otherwise, measuring populism would only be based on intuitions. The main purpose of this and Hawkins's empirical study is to go beyond that intuition.

Although not admitted by Hawkins himself, the Hawkins Method somehow blends holistic and analytical grading techniques, by linking the 0-2 rubric with the number of populist elements in the 6-sectioned rubric. First, the reader examines each element in the rubric, and then according to the number of criteria fulfilled, it assigns a grade on a 0-2 scale. No doubt that this blending comes with potential miscalculations. For example, let us assume that there is a political actor that uses profoundly different discourse from Chávez who created the basis of the 6-sectioned rubric. The reader, a native speaker of the language of the politician, finds the speech of this political actor highly populist. Yet, the differences between the discourses between the Chávez and the analyzed leader are distinct, thus only a few elements presented by Hawkins are fulfilled. Thus, the grader is in a dilemma: either she applies pure holistic grading and gives the grade of 2 based on her *intuition*, or she assigns a grade of 1 in order to stick with the blended rubric. If the former preferred, then the study loses its purpose since the actual rubric that breaks down populism is not being applied. The adherents of the ideational approach praise it to be the most positivist one, and that it aims to employ a quantitative method to increase the empirical utility. Then the intuitions should not be involved in measuring populism.

In this study, the Hawkins Method is applied in a slightly changed way in order to avoid the mentioned potential problems. The speech is still read and interpreted in its entirety, but each element in the six-sectioned rubric designed by Hawkins is graded individually as 1 or 0. The grade of 1 means 'populist,' 0 means 'pluralist,' in line with the rubric. Thus, each speech can get a total score on the scale from 0 to 6. Still, to remain faithful to the original method, and to compare results with the researches conducted in the 0-2 scale, the 0-6 scale will be converted. In line with Hawkins's 0-2 rubric, the total score of 0 and 1 would correspond to Hawkins's holistic grade of 0, the total score of 2, 3, and 4 would correspond to Hawkins's holistic grade of 1, and the total score of 5 and 6 would correspond to Hawkins's holistic grade of 2. To avoid confusion, the 0-6 scale will be hereafter called as the 'populist score,' and the 0-2 scale used by Hawkins (2009, 2010) will be hereafter referred to as 'the Hawkins Grade' corresponding to the name assigned to his method as the Hawkins Method. The corresponding grades can be seen clearly in Table 1. Hawkins (2009), names the grade 0 as 'non-populist,' 1 as 'mixed,' and 2 as 'populist'. Such distribution is justified directly from the 0-2 scale of the Hawkins Method.

Table 1

Populist Score	The Hawkins Grade
0	0
1	0
2	1
3	1
4	1
5	2
6	2

The 0-6 scale preferred in this study is one of the two cautions taken to compensate for the setbacks of working individually and not as a group of scholars. In the Hawkins Method, there are groups of scholars who are reading and grading four types of texts that belong to a particular politician. The four categories of texts are campaign speeches, ribbon-cutting speeches, international speeches, and "famous" speeches. Each text is read and graded by two or three graders, and then the average grade is calculated from the grades assigned by different graders for different types of speech types. In this study, speech types are increased to eight. In the Hawkins Method, the total amount of speeches analyzed for each politician is either three of four. The average score inevitably comes with decimal points between 0-2, and these scores enable to compare of politicians with each other; otherwise, the grades of 0, 1, and 2 would be too limited for comparison. In this research, the grading is done individually, thus using a 0-6 scale would produce a quantitative measure with more insight. The subjectivity of an individual reader can be diminished to a certain extent. The second caution taken is the number of speeches analyzed. Instead of three or four, in this study, one hundred thirty-nine speeches are graded between August 2014 and June 2019. The data will be explained in detail in the next section.

Data

The fact that the adherents of both approaches, the ideational and the strategic approaches, agree that Erdoğan has been populist (at least) since 2013 or 2014 is fortunate because the speeches he had been giving since he was elected as the president are recorded in the

website of the presidency of Turkish Republic. The speeches he made during his term as prime minister, until August 2014, cannot be found from an official source, because the website of the prime minister is abolished with the title itself after the elections of June 2018 which put all the constitutional amendments accepted in the 2017 referendum in force. Therefore, this study will mainly use speeches that can be accessed on the web site of the presidency of the Turkish Republic.[11] The data is public, can be accessed by everyone through the official website. All the speeches are exclusively in Turkish. There are also English, French, and Arabic language versions of the web sites that present certain speeches of Erdoğan, however, those speeches are only in the scope of foreign relations, and completely different from the ones accessed from the Turkish version.

The selection of the speeches is random, however, there are two criteria in this randomness: First, the distribution of the speech types was important to achieve a reasonable final average score. Second, the chronological consistency was minded. For this, there have been at least two speeches selected for each month between August 2014 and June 2019. Within the months, the priority has been to select one speech from the first half of the month, and one from the second half of the month. On the official website, there are more than five hundred speeches published. Choosing a great number of speeches, almost a quarter of all speeches, is also one caution taken in the selection of the speeches.

Some speeches are not included in the website of the presidency for different possible reasons. To avoid the chronological inconsistency and not to miss very important speeches, videos of specific speeches from YouTube were watched and analyzed in the same manner with the written speeches. There are ten speeches accessed from YouTube, among one hundred thirty-nine. Seven of the ten are campaign speeches. Most of the speeches made in campaign periods were not included in the presidency website, most probably because Erdoğan is not giving those speeches with the title of 'the president' but as the chairman of the AKP. One of the ten was a weekly party group meeting, one is a speech in a program for the anniversary of 15 July, and the last one is a speech given in a dinner in Ramadan. The rest of the speeches can be accessed from the official website.

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[11] TCBB, *Konuşmalar:* https://www.tccb.gov.tr/receptayyiperdogan/konusmalar/

The speeches analyzed are categorized in line with the Hawkins Method. Yet, the categories are not only four but eight:

Speech Type 1: Speech type 1 stands for speeches given in an international context, either by the audience or the content of the speeches. For instance, the speeches given in the United Nations General Assembly, NATO or G-20 meetings are considered as type 1, international speeches. The location of the speeches has no impact on the 'international' characteristic of the speeches. There are thirteen international speeches, while six of them are given abroad; the rest is given in Turkey but in an international context.

Speech Type 2: Speech type 2 stands for famous speeches. In this study, the famous speeches are considered to be the ones that are given in unique circumstances and then become unforgettable. There are six speeches categorized by type 2. Half of them are made after the failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016. One of the six is made when Erdoğan joins back to AKP after the April 2017 referendum, which enables the president to be a member of a political party. He had resigned from his party in 2014 when he was elected as president. The other two type 2 speeches are made in mass rallies for Jerusalem and the anniversary of the conquest of Istanbul.

Speech Type 3: Type 3 stands for ribbon-cutting speeches and there are fourteen of them. Ribbon-cutting speeches are the ones given at the opening ceremonies. In this study, the groundbreaking ceremonies, ceremonies given in the beginning of constructions, are also considered to be a ribbon-cutting speech. The contexts of such speeches are unique since it is expected to be different from casual politics.

Speech Type 4: Type 4 speeches are campaign speeches. Campaign speeches are speeches given in campaign periods to attract support from the public. It should be noted that since Erdoğan had to be a non-partisan and neutral president before the 2017 constitutional amendment, it was unconstitutional for him to campaign for AKP. Yet, he still held mass rallies under the name of ribbon-cutting meetings. In these meetings, many projects and investments are opened in a specific city. Erdoğan avoided using any party name, but his intentions were clear. Thus, such speeches named "ribbon-cutting" but actually utilized as campaign speeches are regarded as type 4, or in other words as campaign speeches. In total, there are nineteen campaign speeches graded in this study.

Speech Type 5: Until here the speech type categories are the same as the Hawkins Method. There are four other categories in this study. Speech type 5 stands for post-election

speeches. Erdoğan has been giving speeches to the crowd gathered in front of the AKP headquarters in Ankara, at the night of elections based on the informal results. They have been always victory speeches until he left AKP in 2014. Since he was giving these speeches on the balcony of the AKP headquarters building, the speeches are called 'balcony speeches,' and they have been traditionally famous. It has been considered that he lowers his tone and makes embracing statements in his balcony speeches. Surely, this observation belongs to the period before 2014, or in other words, before the scope of this study. There were parliamentary elections in June 2015 that renewed in November 2015. There was a referendum for constitutional amendments in April 2017, there were parliamentary and presidential elections on June 2018, and finally local elections in March 2019. Erdoğan made two 'balcony speeches,' one in June 2018 and the other in March 2019 since he held the title of chairmanship of the AKP. Previously, Ahmet Davutoğlu made the 'balcony speeches' of the 2015 elections, the prime minister at the time as well as the chairman of the AKP. Still, one speech he made in an international graduation ceremony is considered as type 5, since it seemed like he used this opportunity to give his reactions to the results of the elections in June 2015. More, he gave a short press conference after the referendum in April 2017 where he shared his response to the result. In total, there are four type 5 speeches analyzed in this study.

Speech Type 6: One of the most modifications brought in this study is the introduction of speech type 6, which stands for casual speeches. Casual speeches are the noes given by Erdoğan almost every day, in which he expresses his opinion about day-to-day politics. Erdoğan is a politician who gives speeches very often. These speeches are influential enough to set the political agenda in Turkey constantly. Especially in recent years, numerous TV channels broadcast almost all of the speeches given by Erdoğan. Thus, these speeches carry the potential to reach the public almost every day. They constitute the backbone of the discourse of Erdoğan. That is why the inclusion of this category seemed essential for the purpose of the study. There are forty-six speeches categorized as type 6. These speeches involve mostly the reeves meetings. The reeves, in Turkey, or *muhtarlar*, are presidents elected in a village with very limited executive competence. Since the president, as in most of the parliamentary systems, endowed by only symbolic powers even though he is considered to be the head of the executive. In an attempt to stay in the limits of the constitution, Erdoğan should have compensated the weekly party group meetings with the reeves meetings. There were more than fifty reeves meetings from

January 2015 to the beginning of 2019. Twenty-four of them are included in this study. The other type 6 speeches are conferences, meetings, openings where Erdoğan is invited to give a speech. They do not carry common content.

Speech Type 7: Type 7 stands for formal speeches that are given by Erdoğan with the title of the president of the republic. The speeches given for the opening of the legislation years of the parliament, for the national holidays, for the conferences with ambassadors or governments are examples of type 7 speeches.

Speech Type 8: The last speech category is type 8 that stands for party speeches. After his rejoining to the AKP and election as the chairman of the party, he started to give weekly party group meeting speeches in the parliament held mostly on Tuesdays, on the same day with other political party leaders. Out of fourteen type 8 speeches, ten are the party group meeting speeches. The rest of them are given in the party congresses either national or provincial level.

The number of each speech type has great implications in this study. Since there are no 3-4 graders present, the average score will be calculated by the grades assigned for each speech in the 0-6 scale. Thus, for instance, if there are overwhelming numbers of campaign speeches included in this research, the final populism score might be greater (Hawkins assumes that campaign speeches will have higher populist scores). Hence, it is important to distribute speech types reasonably.

Graph 1: Distribution of Speech Types in the Analyzed Speeches

(1) International (2) Famous (3) Ribbon-Cutting (4) Campaign (5) Post-election (6) Casual (7) Formal (8) Political Party

Graph 1 shows the percentages of each speech type. Type 2 and Type 5, which are famous and post-election speeches respectively, are inevitably little in number compared to others. Their involvement in the research is not aimed to influence the final average score, but rather to investigate their own score individually. Type 6 constitutes around 33% of all the speeches, which is a reasonable ratio for the casual speeches that are supposed to reflect the actual and consistent discourse of Erdoğan. This is in line with Hawkins's definition that sees populism as an ideology. If it is an ideology, then populist discourse cannot be unique to campaign speeches but it should consistently exist in the casual speeches of Erdoğan. Apart from type 2, type 5 and type 6, the other speech types constitute 9% to 17%. The weights of other types of speeches are close to each other, therefore it is expected that the biased results will be avoided.

When analyzing such a great number of speeches for a period of almost five years, it is important how to distribute the speeches across time. As already mentioned, from August 2014, when Erdoğan received the duty of presidency, until (including) June 2019, there are speeches

for every single month of the indicated time period. Only the months of August 2014 and April 2019, each has one speech, for the other forty-seven months there are at least two speeches per month. This means that there is a very strong consistency in the data in providing the populist score. This way we will be able to see how populist scores change through time.

Descriptive Results

Including all one hundred thirty-nine speeches with eight speech types for the period August 2014-June 2019, the populist score of Erdoğan is 3.39 out of 6. The Hawkins Grade equivalent of this populist score would undoubtedly be a 1. Contrary to the findings presented in the Guardian,[12] Erdoğan should be categorized as 'somewhat populist' based on the rubric designed by Hawkins himself. As shown in Table 2, 13% of the speeches received the Hawkins Grade of 0 (or populist scores of 0 and 1), 61% of the speeches received the Hawkins Grade of 1 (or populist scores of 2, 3, and 4), and around 26% of the speeches received the Hawkins Grade of 2 (or populist scores of 5 and 6). In conclusion, the majority of the speeches are made by Erdoğan can be considered as mixed or 'somewhat populist', and only a quarter of them as 'very populist'.

One explanation of this contrary result could be the bias in the selection of the speeches by their types. Hawkins (2009) does argue that different speech types have different Hawkins Grades. Hypothetically, high number of speeches selected from one certain speech type can alter the result in either way. To avoid such bias, as shown in Graph 1, the weights of speech types are distributed in a reasonable ratio: Type 2 and 5 with symbolic weight, Type 6 with a heavy weight since it is the casual speeches, and the other types similar weights. Still, it is important to examine the speech types individually to see if the weighted average is biased.

Table 2 is very descriptive in this aspect, giving in-depth information about the speech types. According to Table 2, none of the type 1 speeches (international speeches) of Erdoğan received the Hawkins Grade of 2. Type 2 (famous speeches) of Erdoğan never received the Hawkins grade of 0. None of the type 4 speeches (campaign speeches) received the Grade of 0. Lastly, type 8 speeches (political party speeches) never received the Grade of 0. For the rest, all types of speeches received all three possible grades. The three of the exceptions, the types of 2,

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[12] The Guardian: *From Reformer to 'New Sultan': Erdoğan's Populist Evolution*. Found at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/11/from-reformer-to-new-sultan-erdogans-populist-evolution

Table 2: The Hawkins Grade distribution according to the Speech Type

Speech Type	The Hawkins Grade / (Populist Scores)			Total Number	Percentage (%)	Average Score
	0 / (0 and 1)	1 / (2, 3, and 4)	2 / (5 and 6)			
1	6	7	0	13	9.35	2.00
2	0	2	4	6	4.32	4.33
3	3	8	3	14	10.07	2.86
4	0	7	12	19	13.67	4.74
5	2	1	1	4	2.88	2.50
6	5	33	8	46	33.09	3.28
7	2	17	4	23	16.55	3.08
8	0	10	4	14	10.07	3.93
Total number of speeches for each grade	18	85	36	139	100.00	3.39
% of the grade in all the speeches	12.95	61.15	25.90	100.00		

4, and 8 did not get grade 0. It means that that if there is a bias in the selection of the speeches, it is not towards the lower grade.

In any case, Graph 2 shows the average score of each speech type that is even clearer to see whether the speech types are biased towards the lower grade. According to Graph 2, all of the speech types received populist scores between 2-5. This interval entirely corresponds to the Hawkins grade of 1, or in other words, mixed or 'somewhat populist'. This clearly sweeps all the doubts away about the possible bias rooted in the excessive selection of a particular speech type. Even the most populist speech type, which is type 4 (campaign speeches), has an average score of 4.74. This score would still translate as the Hawkins Grade of 1. The least populist of the speech types is type 1 (international speeches) with the populist score of precisely 2.00.

Graph 2: Average Populist Score for Each Speech Type

If the lower Hawkins Grade found in this study for the speeches of Erdoğan is not rooted from the bias of selection of the speech types, then it should be the implementing of the Hawkins method, in particular in the application of the populist elements and the qualitative analysis of the speeches. As shown in Graph 3, the fifth populist element is fulfilled less than 20% of the speeches of Erdoğan. While the first, second, third and fourth populist elements are fulfilled

more than 50% of the speeches; the sixth element is fulfilled 47% of the speeches. In the next sections, each populist element will be evaluated with the examples of sentences or phrases that Erdoğan uses.

POPULIST ELEMENT #1: MANICHEAN VISION

Among the twenty-five speeches that did not fulfill the first criteria, or in other words did not draw a Manichean worldview, there are only two speeches that received the populist score of 3. The rest received less than 3, and mostly 0. One can argue, then, that Manichean vision is one of the most essential parts of a populist discourse defined by Hawkins. With the use in 82% speeches of Erdoğan, one can also argue that a dualistic way of framing politics is fundamental for the discourse of Erdoğan. There are few examples where he avoided creating a Manichean vision. An example was in the opening of the legislative year of the parliament, in October 2014,

Graph 3: Percentage of Fulfillment for Each Populist Element

Populist Elements

when Erdoğan was addressing the parliament members for the first time as a president. In this speech, Erdoğan had embracing rhetoric, saying that Turkey did not have time to waste with polarization, and depicting the differences of the different parties as richness. Later in September 2017, when he was addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations, he was focusing on different issues across the world, asking each member to equally join forces to establish a new

world system. Or as in October 2018, when he was giving a speech for the ribbon-cutting ceremony of the new Istanbul Airport, he was only mentioning the past projects and investments as well as the features of the new airport. However, such speeches that lack a dualistic framing were the minority.

A very clear example of a Manichean vision was expressed by Erdoğan in the first mass rally after the failed coup attempt: "*The ones who are trying to create a grey area between the nation and the putschists are categorically terrorists since there is no such grey area.*"[13] The political parties in the parliament agree that the Gülen Movement (or FETÖ) designed the coup attempt of 15 July 2016. This rare agreement between the parties is not only on the detection of the culprit but also on the determination of keeping the democratic means of change of power. Erdoğan's Manichean rhetoric in this context might not be very divisive, apart from the members of the sect.

Of course, this Manichean rhetoric takes another shape before a referendum with two possible answers of 'yes' and 'no'. Such context was present before the 2017 referendum for constitutional amendments that would transform the country from a parliamentary system to a presidential system. Erdoğan was on the 'yes' side and he was addressing his audience with a very strong Manichean discourse: *"Look, who is advocating for 'no'? PKK is advocating for 'no'. Who is advocating for 'no'? Kandil is advocating for 'no'. Who is advocating for 'no'? The ones who want to divide our country are advocating for 'no'. Who is advocating for 'no'? The ones who deny our flag are advocating for 'no'. Who is advocating for 'no'? Unfortunately, the ones who are denying the native and the national values in this country are advocating for 'no'. Then, my brothers and sisters, now, is the main opposition also in the same line with these?"*[14] PKK is a group of Kurdish militants who is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey and many other states. Kandil is a place on the mountains on the border of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. The administrative team of PKK is located at Kandil. Basically, Erdoğan means that the terrorists are advocating for 'no'. With this speech, Erdoğan makes it obvious that he would create his

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[13] TCBB: *Millete Hitap*, 19.07.2016. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/47677/millete-hitap (all the citations from the speeches of Erdoğan is translated to English by myself).

[14] TCBB: *Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sistemi Sempozyumunda Yaptıları Konuşma,* 11.02.2017. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/71056/cumhurbaskanligi-sistemi-sempozyumunda-yaptiklari-konusma

campaign on this dualistic discourse, that on the one side there are patriots and on the other terrorists. Voting for 'no' that is one of the legitimate answers becomes almost criminalized.

The dualistic view has not been expressed only in the political arena. For example, in a dinner program with artists and athletes, Erdoğan makes a distinction within the artists and athletes: "*We are sad to see that there are some people who call themselves as artists and athletes who are in conflict with their own country and own nation. Yet, they still try to [orally] lynch our artists and athletes who carry 'native and national' position. This group of people is very courage in supporting terrorists, but when it comes to national unity and fraternity, they immediately start to lie.*"[15] It is hard to objectively determine what is considered 'native and national' by Erdoğan, but it can be interpreted as supporting Erdoğan's policies.

POPULIST ELEMENT #2: COSMIC PROPORTIONS - HISTORICAL REFERENCES

In 59% of the speeches analyzed, Erdoğan presented cosmic proportions or made historical references in order to strengthen his arguments. There are mainly two ways Erdoğan satisfies this populist criterion. First, he frames issues as they are related to a group of people beyond the citizens of Turkey. It is not like 'everyone in the world' as Chávez does, rather a more limited and specific group of people. According to him, to be a Turkish means "*bringing together all our brothers who are looking up to us with their hopes, bringing together hundreds of millions of oppressed and aggrieved people into one single heart.*"[16] He depicts a special relationship with the people of certain countries: "*When Syria cries, we shed tears. When Iraq cries, we sadden, too. For this, when innocent Palestinians are aggrieved, our heart burns, too.*"[17] He makes it clearer in a later speech about the basis of this relationship: "*We are honored to lead Muslims. We are inviting all the Muslims to a shake-off, to a rebirth, to stand up for another time.*"[18] Erdoğan depicts the Turkish nation, or indirectly himself, as the leader of the Muslim countries, but mostly through advocating for the oppressed Muslim nations. In part linked to the fourth criteria, the evil minority, Erdoğan usually claims that the evil scenario is at

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[15] TCBB: *Sanatçı ve Sporcularla İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 19.06.2016. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/45464/sanatci-ve-sporcularla-iftar-programinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[16] TCBB: *41. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 09.11.2017. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87288/41-muhtarlar-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[17] TCBB: *42. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıları Konuşma,* 20.12.2017. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87814/42-muhtarlar-toplantisi

[18] TCBB: *Kudüs'e Destek Mitinginde Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 18.05.2018. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/94021/kudus-e-destek-mitinginde-yaptiklari-konusma

work not only in Turkey but all in the geography around Turkey encompassing other Muslim nations: *"Especially, this region is chosen on purpose. There is an arch here, starting from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, it comes to Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Libya, and it goes on. And what is the issue in all these regions? Division of the people living in those lands."*[19] Mentioning the incidents around Turkey gives him the basis to argue that the 'evil' is at work, not only for Turkey but for the people living in countries around Turkey, too.

Secondly, he makes historical references going back to almost a thousand years. For example, he draws a comparison between the Battle of Manzikert (1071), which enabled Turks to move the inlands of Anatolia, and the reaction of civilians on the night of July 15 the coup attempt.[20] For him there is a political continuity within the Turkish nation: *"The ones who do not understand the secret of the conquest of Istanbul, cannot understand the actual meaning that the Republic of Turkey expresses."*[21] In the ceremony of him starting his new duty as a president first time within the presidential system, he was referencing the Seljuks of thousand years ago, to the Ottoman Empire and the conquest of Istanbul, and the creation of modern Turkish republic. For him, transforming the country into a presidential system is another important historical juncture for the Turkish nation.[22]

There are also references to specific historical leaders as well, with which Erdoğan aligns himself, though not using the subject *I* but rather *we*: *"We would be proud to go through the path of Selahaddin Eyyubi, Kılıç Arslan, Alparslan, Osman Gazi, Fatih, Yavuz Sultan Selim"*[23] These are political figures who have been active around Anatolia. Interestingly, except for Selehaddin Eyyubi, all are Turkish Muslim leaders, and Eyyubi is known to have a Kurdish ethnicity. One of the most frequent references is made to Fatih Sultan Mehmet who conquered Istanbul as an Ottoman Sultan in 1453. During the siege, he had to carry the ships through the land to bypass a

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[19] TCBB: *Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 12.08.2015. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/35906/8-muhtarlar-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[20] TCBB: *15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimi ile İlgili Meydanlara Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 23.07.2016. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/49742/15-temmuz-darbe-girisimi-ile-ilgili-meydanlara-yaptiklari-konusma

[21] TCBB: *23 Nisan Ulusal Egemenlik ve Çocuk Bayramı Dolayısıyla Çocukları Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 23.04.2015.
Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/31972/23-nisan-ulusal-egemenlik-ve-cocuk-bayrami-dolayisiyla-cocuklari-kabulunde-yaptiklari-konusma

[22] TCBB: *Cumhurbaşkanlığı Göreve Başlama Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 09.07.2018. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/94767/cumhurbaskanligi-goreve-baslama-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma

[23] TCBB: *Sakarya Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 11.04.2015. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/30145/sakarya-toplu-acilis-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma

Byzantine blockage. Erdoğan usually compares this event with the *Marmaray* project which involves a tunnel through Bosphorus making it possible to drive or take a subway from one side of Istanbul to another: *"Our ancestor Fatih moved the ships over the land, and we are moving the rail system under the Bosphorus"*[24] He creates a shorter version of this comparison, and usually mentions it as *"Fatih moved the ships over the land, we are moving it under the sea"*[25] as if it is the ships being moved through the tunnel.

POPULIST ELEMENT #3: ESSENTIALITY OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE

Erdoğan fulfills the third populist element 68% of all the speeches analyzed in this study. After the first populist element, the Manichean vision, this is the second most fulfilled criterion. Enjoying coming first in every election and referendum since 2002, Erdoğan finds in himself the right to talk on behalf of the people living in Turkey. The word he uses for 'the people' is something closer to 'the nation'. For example, in response to the opposition leader and the chairman of CHP Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu who told a presidential system is not possible, Erdoğan was putting forward the will of the people: *"Someone is saying, very interestingly, that 'as long as I am here a presidential system cannot happen in this country'. This is disrespectful towards the nation, it is such a shame, who are you to say this? No one can stand against the will of the nation, when the nation wants, what it wants happens, who are you?"*[26] Here, 'the nation' or *millet* is presented as a subject capable of making decisions as a whole. The fact that the opposition leader also represents a good portion of the people is disregarded. He responds to this issue in one of his speeches after the referendum: *"Now, some write in their columns that what we are going to do about this much votes of no. Forget about that; is it enough if there is one more 'yes' vote? It is enough. Isn't democracy this? Democracy is this. Whichever receives more votes, this issue is over in favor of it."*[27] One more than the 50% directly characterizes the will of the people, and the notion of democracy is diminished into a simple plebiscite.

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[24] TCBB: *İstanbul'un Fethi'nin 562. Yıl Dönümü Kutlamalarında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 30.05.2015. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32584/istanbulun-fethinin-562-yil-donumu-kutlamalarinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[25] TCBB: *Bahçelievler Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 20.06.2019. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/105758/bahcelievler-toplu-acilis-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma

[26] TCBB: *İkinci Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 17.02.2015. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2991/ikinci-muhtarlar-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[27] TCBB: *39. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 22.08.2017. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/99545/39-muhtarlar-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma

Before the constitutional amendments, the president of the parliamentary system had a symbolic position with the requirement of being impartial towards political parties. Erdoğan was criticized for not staying impartial during the first phases of his presidency, as the constitution requires. Indeed, it was stated that Erdoğan violated the norm of impartiality as a president in favor of AKP (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2016). He was responding to the critics as he was sided with 'the nation': *"Whom am I sided with? I am sided with the nation; I am next to the nation. I have to protect whatever the interests of my nation require; I have to be with it. We have the understanding of seeking the solutions of our problems in our nation and in the will of the nation"*[28] In this regard, the nation is considered as one single unit with one single set of interests. The fact that the political parties are numerous, and they represent various and diverse opinions coming from different portions of the people are not taken into account.

Erdoğan also uses the elections to establish a communication between 'the nation' and him. When he was talking about the leaks published by the Gülen movement (or FETÖ) in 2013, he pointed the election results of 2014: *"Our nation showed that it received our message on the local and presidential elections."*[29] This was a message by 'the nation' interpreted as backing Erdoğan or his party against the Gülen movement. The parliamentary elections held on November 1, 2015, carried an even more important message according to Erdoğan: *"Of course, one of the most important messages of the 1st of November is that Turkey has to solve its new constitution problem. The nation is waiting for this, right? It is."*[30] Erdoğan was seeking to bring the presidential system to Turkey at that time. He interpreted the fact that AKP received around 49% of the votes that the people agree with him on changing the constitution and transforming the country into a presidential system. Later, certain articles of the constitution were amended by a referendum in 2017, instead of drawing up a whole new constitution.

POPULIST ELEMENT #4: EVIL MINORITY

The fourth populist element is the third most fulfilled criterion in the discourse of Erdoğan with 63% frequency. Indeed, there is almost always 'the other' or 'the enemy' present

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[28] TCBB: *14. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 4.11.2015. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/35912/14-muhtarlar-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[29] TCBB: *81 İlin Valisini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 08.09.2016. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/51281/81-ilin-valisini-kabulunde-yaptiklari-konusma

[30] TCBB: *14. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 04.11.2015. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/35912/14-muhtarlar-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma

in the discourse of Erdoğan, apparent from the use of Manichean vision in 82% of the speeches. However, the specificity of this populist element is that 'the other' is capable to influence or damage the people. Hawkins describes it as the 'ruling minority'. This description cannot be taken directly to apply to Turkey's case since the ruling power has been Erdoğan for more than a decade. Instead, as stated above, this 'ruling' capacity is interpreted as the power to damage the country. In this sense, terrorist organizations such as *FETÖ* (the Gülen movement) or PKK are not considered as the 'evil minority' since they lack enough power. The 'evil minority' of Erdoğan is not 'the elite' and it is not directly the US, too. Erdoğan usually does not name it. The Turkish language allows him to hide the subject in his sentences. When he does name it, it is either 'someone' or concepts such as 'foci'[31] and 'the upper mind.'[32]

One of the early events that have been interpreted as the 'scenario' of the forces working against Turkey is the Gezi protests of 2013. According to Erdoğan, these protests were not rooted in the society: *"But someone has been insistently trying to eradicate us for the last hundred and fifty years. Each time Turkey made a leap forward, each time Turkey attempted to get rid of its chains, some dirty plots, some dirty scenarios have been put in play. Don't you still get it, they say, it's not an issue of a few trees, they say. Then what is the issue? The issue is to breed bad blood among the youth. The issue is to do such move against our government at the time, to eradicate our nation, since they knew that it would be easier that way, but unfortunately, they failed."*[33] One of the protestors told that the issue is not about a few trees to draw attention to the police brutality against the protestors. However, Erdoğan interpreted this sentence as a hint to something sinister and vicious.

Another conspiracy theory put forward by Erdoğan was related to the Turkish lira crash in August 2018. An American pastor working in Turkey called Andrew Brunson was arrested concerning the coup attempt of 15 July. Erdoğan had asked the US to swap the priests, meaning the Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen who is accused of organizing the coup attempt of July 15. In

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[31] TCBB: *'28 Şubat'lar Bin Yıl Sürmez' Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 28.02.2015. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/29592/28-subatlar-bin-yil-surmez-programinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[32] TCBB: *23. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 06.04.2016. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/43824/23-muhtarlar-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[33] TCBB: *19 Mayıs Atatürk'ü Anma Gençik Ve Spor Bayramı Münasebetiyle Gençleri Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 19.05.2015. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32661/19-mayis-ataturku-anma-gencik-ve-spor-bayrami-munasebetiyle-gencleri-kabulunde-yaptiklari-konusma

August 2018, the non-moderate speeches of Erdoğan and Trump, as well as tariffs brought by Trump for export of certain goods caused a severe decline of the Turkish lira against the US dollar. Erdoğan interpreted the situation differently: *"By manipulation of the currency, they try to create doubt clouds over the strong economy of Turkey (...) The target of such attacks, which have no economic foundations, which have no link with the parameters of the Turkish economy, is very clear. The aim, here, is to make Turkey surrender economically. Here, the aim is to succeed the plan by the economic hitmen, which had failed in the hands of the members of FETÖ who sold their souls for a dollar on the night of July 15."*[34] If you read between the lines, according to Erdoğan, the coup was designed by the US, and the decline of currency is the second part of the plan. Yet, Erdoğan avoids accusing the US directly for the coup.

Erdoğan is also eager to unite all the hardships he faces or Turkey faces in one single plan: *"Turkey, just like in other fields, is under siege economically. The attacks started with the Gezi protests, went on with the 17-25 December coup attempt, and promoted to a higher degree by the July 15 coup attempt, seem to be going on. We need to be prepared the different types of such attacks that target the independence, the economic interests, and the national pride of Turkey."*[35] Hence, the different political incidents seem to Erdoğan as different faces of one single plot against Turkey, and not consequences of distinct social, political and economic events. In this regard, he also claims that the attacks against himself or his party are, in fact, targeting Turkey itself.[36]

POPULIST ELEMENT #5: THE RHETORIC OF REVOLUTION AND LIBERATION

The fifth populist element of Hawkins is the least fulfilled one in the discourse of Erdoğan. Only 19% of the speeches involve rhetoric that creates a sense of revolution or liberation. More interestingly, it is observed that Erdoğan generally utilizes such rhetoric in the pre-election period. Out of twenty-seven instances, this element is fulfilled seven times before the 2015 election of June and November, five times before the constitutional amendment referendum of April 2017, twice before the parliamentary elections of June 2018, and three times

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[34] TCBB: *Türkiye-Kırgızistan İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 02.09.2018. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96516/turkiye-kirgizistan-is-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma

[35] TCBB: *10. Büyükelçiler Konferansı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 13.08.2018. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96166/10-buyukelciler-konferansi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma

[36] TCBB: *AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 09.01.2018. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/90386/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma

before the local elections of March 2019 and the renewed Istanbul election of June 2019. In short, seventeen out of twenty-seven times this element is used concerning the upcoming elections. Erdoğan has been calling for a change in the structure of 'permanent five' of the United Nations Security Council for four times, that is also considered as fulfilling this criterion. There are only six instances that the ideas of revolution or liberation are not linked either to elections or the United Nations Security Council.

There are broadly three ways that Erdoğan fulfills this populist element. Expectedly, his insistent call for the presidential system starting from his election as the president in 2014 became central in this criterion. He linked the constitutional change with "*renaissance*"[37] and "*building of the New Turkey.*"[38] In fact, the presidential system was a major systemic change brought to Turkey, at least since the coup and the creation of the new constitution in the early 1980s. The country transformed into a presidential system, officially after the 2018 elections when Erdoğan was elected as the first president with full executive power.

The fact that Erdoğan was successful in bringing the systemic change he wanted partly pushed Erdoğan to come up with a slightly changed rhetoric. Since the systemic change has already been done very recently, he had to invent a new discourse. The campaign for the local elections 2019 was built around the rhetoric of *beka*[39]*,* which means the matter of survival of the country and state. He explains this rhetoric in detail linked with the 'evil minority' element, a year before the 31 March 2019 elections: *"The ones who try to block our country, who try to stop the victory walk of our nation are waiting for the 2019 elections. God forbid, in case of any inconvenience, we should not forget that it is not going to be us who will lose, but Turkey itself. The issues went beyond a political competition and transformed into a survival issue for our*

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[37] TCBB: *İstanbul'un Fethi'nin 562. Yıl Dönümü Kutlamalarında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 30.05.2015. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32584/istanbulun-fethinin-562-yil-donumu-kutlamalarinda-yaptiklari-konusma; TCBB: *AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 20.03.2018. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92030/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[38] TCBB: *Sivas'ta Halka Hitapları,* 04.06.2015. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32659/sivasta-halka-hitaplari; TCBB: *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 26. Dönem 2. Yasama Yılı Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 01.10.2015. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/52461/turkiye-buyuk-millet-meclisi-26-donem-2-yasama-yili-acilisinda-yaptiklari-konusma; TCBB: *"Yeni Anayasa İçin Hep Birlikte" Temalı Programda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 28.01.2016. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/38673/yeni-anayasa-icin-hep-birlikte-temali-programda-yaptiklari-konusma; TCBB: *AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 24.04.2018. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92474/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[39] *AK Parti Trabzon Mitingi,* 02.03.2019. Found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7u7ab0upeNk; *AK Parti Gaziantep Mitingi,* 15.03.2019. Found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GM3nvOl16IM

nation and state.''[40] Although the rhetoric of *beka* is not directly the same with the "revolution" or "liberation," it is still used in a way to attain a higher degree to the elections than it practically has. Hence, with the flexibility that the Hawkins Method provides, one should interpret *beka* as an equivalent of "revolution" or "liberation" of Chávez.

The third rhetoric of revolution that Erdoğan uses was generally involved in the speeches he made in the Generally Assembly of the United Nations. The motto he used was 'the world is greater than five'[41] referencing the permanent five members of the UNSC. He was explaining the meaning of this motto in the 72nd General Assembly of the United Nations: *"It is also an expression of how late we are on reforming the Security Council of the United Nations. The world is not like the era of post-World War 2 anymore; it has changed a lot. Then, we believe that what is fair is not a world managed by five permanent members, rather a Security Council of the United Nations managed by every country of the world.''*[42] Indeed, this call for reform is not linked to any elections; however, it constitutes an essential part of Erdoğan's discourse in the domestic politics: he depicts himself as the leader of the oppressed, the leader rising against the established world powers. Still, one can argue that it is an extension for the populist element five, but it is consistent with the tendency of setting the bias on selecting the populist side, therefore, it is considered as fulfilling this criterion.

POPULIST ELEMENT #6: LEGITIMACY OF NON-DEMOCRATIC MEANS - HOSTILITIY AGAINST OPPOSITION

Erdoğan is a leader who frequently shows hostility against the opposition and justifies non-democratic means in his speeches. It is, indeed, almost impossible to find Erdoğan speaking kindly of the opposition, especially for the time period under scrutiny in this study. Yet, this populist element requires a little more than impoliteness: a hostile language against the opposition. For example, when talking about the Syrian refugees Erdoğan shows the difference

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[40] TCBB: *AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 20.03.2018. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92030/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[41] TCBB: *Birleşmiş Milletler 69'uncu Genel Kurulu Genel Görüşmelerinde Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 24.09.2014. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2936/birlesmis-milletler-69uncu-genel-kurulu-genel-gorusmelerinde-yaptiklari-konusma, TCBB: *Birleşmiş Milletler 71. Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 20.09.2016. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/52364/birlesmis-milletler-71-genel-kurulunda-yaptiklari-konusma; TCBB: *Birleşmiş Milletler 72. Genel Kurulunda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 19.09.2017. Found at: tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87252/birlesmis-milletler-72-genel-kurulunda-yaptiklari-konusma

[42] TCBB: *Birleşmiş Milletler 72. Genel Kurulunda Yaptıkları Konuşma.* 19.09.2017. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87252/birlesmis-milletler-72-genel-kurulunda-yaptiklari-konusma

between him and the opposition leader Kılıçdaroğlu as follows: *"In this regard, we perceive the Syrian refugees who came to our country as our guests. The opposition leader, on the other hand, describes them as 'trouble'. This is the difference between him and I."*[43] This is hardly hostile language; hence this would not fulfill this populist element.

Still, almost half of the speeches analyzed, precisely 47%, he satisfied the criterion of this populist element. One of the earliest instances analyzed in this study is only a few days before the 7 June 2015 elections: *"Pennsylvania, Kandil, Gezi, the Armenian diaspora, the homosexual associations are all united, and brought the main opposition party and the so-called nationalist party in front of them; they are continuing with the old Turkey coalition."*[44] The decomposition of this sentence would make it clearer. Pennsylvania is where Fethullah Gülen resides; Kandil, as stated above, where the PKK is being managed; Gezi refers to the Gezi protests; the Armenian diaspora is included in this group, probably because it is lobbying in Western parliaments for the recognition of Armenian Genocide; the homosexual associations are not a very frequent subject he refers to, yet he involves them too. The interesting thing to see today is that Erdoğan is targeting the nationalist party, the MHP, and depicting them in coalition with other evil forces. More, Kandil or the PKK is included in the evil coalition, but not the Kurdish party HDP. Today, MHP is a very close ally, and HDP is almost used synonymously with the PKK.

In fact, the main target of Erdoğan has been HDP, especially after July 2015. On the parliamentary elections of June 2015, HDP succeeded to pass the threshold of 10% and changed the composition of the parliament drastically. AKP lost the majority for the first time since the first election it participated. A month later, the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish State escalated, and the Peace Process was stalled. HDP became the focus of criticism by Erdoğan for not reacting enough to PKK on the side of the state. This criticism went even beyond and the party became almost criminalized. When he was describing the stalling of the peace process between the state and PKK, he called the HDP members as "the political

[43] TCBB: *23. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 06.04.2016. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/43824/23-muhtarlar-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[44] TCBB: *Sivas'ta Halka Hitapları,* 04.06.2015. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32659/sivasta-halka-hitaplari

organization in the position of representing the terrorist organization."[45] This description of HDP became almost usual since then.

Labeling HDP as representatives of PKK quickly paved the way to call them terrorists in short. This became practical to criminalize the main opposition, too. Aligning with the nationalist MHP, Erdoğan started to easily accuse the opposition as a whole to be linked with terrorism: *"Sometimes they walk with the terrorist organizations hand to hand, arm to arm; sometimes they speak as terrorist organizations do; they attack the national with language of terrorist organizations and defend them; sometimes, they visit one of the leaders of the terrorist organization in the prison. Why? They do not have such sensitivity. The main opposition party which uses all of its energy, its time, each opportunity it can have, to acquit violence, street terror and its separatist friends, is the greatest obstacle for our country and the development of our democracy."[46]* By 'walking with the terrorists' he refers to *Adalet Yürüyüşü* or 'the walk of justice' led by the opposition leader Kılıçdaroğlu, from Ankara to Istanbul in protest of arbitrary arrests made after the failed coup attempt. In this walk, in which all political symbols were banned, some parliament members from HDP joined next to Kılıçdaroğlu. The leader of the terrorist organization of which Erdoğan mentions is Selahattin Demirtaş, the ex-co-chairman of HDP. While he was still co-chairman, he was arrested and put in prison, since November 2016. In the campaign period of June 2018 presidential elections, the opposition candidate of CHP visited Demirtaş in prison. Hence, by the phrases 'walking with the terrorists' or 'visiting terrorist leaders' Erdoğan actually refers to HDP members. However, the main opposition CHP has not been linked only to PKK or HDP. Erdoğan usually accuses them to cooperate with FETÖ although CHP is historically known for being a critique of the movement: *"Instead of asking permission from the nation, they ask for it from Pennsylvania."[47]*

In addition to hostile language against the opposition, and criminalizing them, Erdoğan also used certain language that would be considered under 'anything goes' attitude as named by Hawkins (2009) or in other words, legitimizing of non-democratic means. Yet, Erdoğan has been careful in picking his words. Although practically he is violating a certain procedural rule, he

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[45] TCBB: *11. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 29.09.2015. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/35535/11-muhtarlar-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma
[46] TCBB: *AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 26.12.2018. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/100313/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma
[47] *AK Parti Adana Mitingi,* 19.06.2018. Found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-MftS3gsBts

immediately claims that he is not violating. One of the major examples of this came when he was criticizing a judgment of the Constitutional Court upon an individual application: *"But, in the meantime, the Constitutional Court gave a judgment that has no relation with the individual application right, by violating the constitution and putting itself before the actual court. This institution, especially a part of its members including its president, did not hesitate to give a judgment that is against its country and nation in one of the recent examples of the greatest attack against Turkey. This issue has no relation to the independence of the judiciary."*[48] In the referendum of 2010 for constitutional amendments, AKP introduced the right of individual application to the Constitutional Court in the issues of individual rights and freedoms. When the Court accepted the application of the journalists Can Dündar and Erdem Gül for the violation of their rights by being tried arrested, Erdoğan gave this above-mentioned reaction. According to Erdoğan, these journalists were spies[49] because of a certain story they published. He heavily criticized the Court members and singled out the president especially. Yet, he said he is not violating the independence of the judiciary.

Another example was found in the speech of Erdoğan only a day after the manifesto of Barış *İçin Akademisyenler* or 'the academicians for peace.' Academicians more than a thousand published a manifesto warning the state for the violations of rights and freedoms of civilians in its urban conflict with the PKK. Erdoğan accused the academicians of supporting the terrorist organizations against the state. He mocked their claim of the violation of rights and freedom. Still, he states that it is the PKK itself who is violating the rights and freedoms of the civilians of the region, and not the state.[50]

Criticism and Conclusion

In this section, a twofold criticism will be directed at the Hawkins Method. First, the method itself will be criticized in its creation and application in the earlier work of Hawkins (2009). It will be argued that the Hawkins Method is flawed in its creation and it is reflected in

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[48] TCBB: *Burdur Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 11.03.2016. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/40143/burdur-toplu-acilis-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma

[49] Yeni Şafak: *Erdoğan: Can Dündar bir ajan,* 28.09.2018. Found at: https://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/erdogandan-can-dundar-cevabi-3398599

[50] TCBB: *8. Büyükelçiler Konferansı Vesilesiyle Düzenlenen Yemekte Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 12.01.2016. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/37541/8-buyukelciler-konferansi-vesilesiyle-duzenlenen-yemekte-yaptiklari-konusma

the results Hawkins finds in his own study (2009). Next, the method will be elaborated in light of the conclusions drawn from this study on Erdoğan. Prof. Hawkins himself provided the rubrics used by the graders of Team Populism (Hawkins, Aguilar, Castanho Silva, Jenne, Kocijan & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019) in their making of Erdoğan's populist grade for The Guardian. Hence it will be possible to compare and contrast the original graders and this study on the application of the method and specifically the rubric.

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

Before scrutinizing the method, first, the evaluation of the method by Hawkins himself requires attention. Elaborating the reliability of the technique, Hawkins mentions the level of agreement of the graders on the speeches (2009). He has two different data in his analysis since he divides the political leaders into two groups as Latin American Chief Executives and Non-Latin American Chief Executives. In the first group, he finds that the level of agreement is 78%. Plus, 100% of the time the graders are within one grade. In the second part, the level of agreement falls to 70%, and only 86% of the time the graders are within one grade. These numbers should be evaluated considering that there are three grades: 0, 1 and 2. Not being 'within one grade' means that while one grader thinks that the speech is not populist at all, the other thinks that the speech is extremely populist. Looked this way, the fact that 14% of the times the graders completely disagree on the non-Latin America Chief executives cast great doubts on the reliability of the technique. Subsequently, having less than 80% agreement among graders might not be seen as a supporting data of the reliability of the technique if there are only three grades possible.

However, the main problem is with the creation of the method itself. It is clear from the work of Hawkins (2009) that the rubric for measuring populism is prepared under the heavy influence of Chávez and his discourse. From the start of the article, Hawkins works on the idea that everybody agrees on Chávez being populist and keeps on justifying each populist element he creates by some examples from Chávez. If, as Hawkins presupposes, populism is a concept that can be measured, then taking Chávez as a starting point comes with certain consequences. First, building the rubric on Chávez would inevitably lead to grading Chávez as the most populist leader. Indeed, Chávez turns out to be the political leader with the highest grade, which is precisely 1.9 out of 2 (Hawkins, 2009). Chávez might be a leader who is broadly recognized as populist, but it does not necessarily mean that he is the 'most' populist leader. Consequently, the

method does not directly measure how much populist the analyzed leaders are, but rather, how populist they are *compared to* Chávez.

This is crucial when analyzing the grades for the other political leaders. For example, Hawkins, having found Perón, Velasco Ibarra and Vargas to be strongly populist, concludes that there is continuity between classical and contemporary populists. In fact, it only means that there is continuity between the discourses of past Latin American leaders and of Chávez who is also a Latin American leader. That is why finding these classical populists strongly populist should not be interpreted as rubric tapping "into something deep and fundamental" as Hawkins does (2009, p. 1055). This becomes clearer when Hawkins ends up having false positives and false negatives.

George W. Bush is measured to be the second most populist leader among the non-Latin American Chief Executives, and the sixth most populist leader if both groups are combined. Both Weyland (2017) and Pauwels (2011) criticize Hawkins's method because of this false positive result. Indeed, Hawkins does not take this measurement as a basis to argue that Bush was populist, rather he tries to explain why Bush cannot be considered as a populist (2009). According to Hawkins, 'the elite' did not constitute an important part of Bush's speech. More, he did not call for a revolution or a systemic change in the United States. Hence, Bush might be 'antagonistic' but not a populist. Eventually, the reason why Bush received a relatively higher grade from the graders linked to the failure of training the graders carefully.

However, Bush is not the only leader who was graded an unexpected value. Hawkins finds false negatives, too. For example, Hawkins states that both Lula and Kirchner are generally considered as 'lukewarm' populist, yet in the study, they received the grades of 0.3 and 0.2, respectively. According to the analysis, Kirchner avoided the bellicosity and romanticized notion of the people in his speeches, while Lula emphasized consensus and avoided Manichean vision in his speeches. Although categorizing Lula, as populist might be controversial, Kirchner considered as a populist by the scholars (i.e., Aytaç & Öniş, 2014). Yet, Carlos Menem is a leader broadly accepted to be a neopopulist. Menem received as a grade of 0.8 in the study of Hawkins (2009). While Menem uses Manichean rhetoric, he avoids expressing a notion of the will of the people and a conspiring elite. Hence, Hawkins argues that Menem is not a populist but rather a charismatic leader (2009). Contrary to the false positive finding of Bush, Hawkins accepts the false negative findings and concludes that Kirchner, Lula, and Menem are not populist.

Either accepting or rejecting the grades assigned by the graders, the results inevitably raise serious questions on the reliability of Hawkins's technique. Disregarding the grade assigned to Bush can be understandable to a certain extent, but accepting low grades for the leaders known as being populists is hardly justified. What Hawkins does, actually, is to create a definition and a set of criteria on a certain populist leader, and end up claiming that other populists are not actually populists. What if, for example, the rubric has been designed based on the discourse of Menem? Then, Chávez would receive a lower grade and he would not be categorized as populist. In conclusion, what we find is that the discourse of Bush is similar to Chávez, while the discourses of Menem, Kirchner, and Lula are different from Chávez. The study of Hawkins actually has two great conclusions: (1) The discourse of Chávez is not unique to populists since also Bush utilizes it, and (2) the discourse of Chávez is not necessarily the single discourse used in populism since other politicians regarded as populist do not utilize it.

FINDINGS FROM THE ANALYSIS OF ERDOĞAN

As stated above the final average populist score of Erdoğan is 3.39, which corresponds to the Hawkins Grade of 1 or 'somewhat populist'. The score of 3.39 or the Hawkins Grade of 1 is fundamentally different from what is found by Team Populism and published in the Guardian.[51] The first possible explanation for this difference was the bias in the selection of the speech types. However, it is already shown that all the speech types received an average score between 2.00 and 4.74, which fall into the range of the Hawkins Grade of 1. The second possible explanation is the application of the rubric to the speeches of Erdoğan. This section will compare the application of the rubric in this study with the Team Populism led by Hawkins.

Fortunately, Prof. Hawkins shared the rubrics his group of graders used for the specific speeches of Erdoğan that they used to measure Erdoğan's grade. The rubrics of the speeches made only between August 2014 and June 2019 will be analyzed here since the scope of this study is this exact time interval. There are two speeches analyzed both by the Team Populism and this study. One of them is the speech given by Erdoğan in the 72nd United Nations General Assembly. The grades and the application of the rubric are almost the same. However, the main

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[51] The Guardian: *From Reformer to 'New Sultan': Erdoğan's Populist Evolution*. Found at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/11/from-reformer-to-new-sultan-erdogans-populist-evolution

divergence between Team Populism and this study in the application of the rubric is evident in the famous speech type.

As the famous category, the selected speech is the one Erdoğan gave in the *Yenikapı Meeting*. This speech is also graded in this study. This mass rally was organized with the participation of opposition leaders of CHP and MHP, but HDP was not invited. At the time, the alliance between MHP and AKP was not formed yet, thus the participation of these two parties was important. In fact, this meeting was presented as 'political unity' against the putschists. This speech received a populist score of 4 in this study, fulfilling the first populist element and not the fifth and sixth. In other words, in the speech given by Erdoğan, there was no mention of 'revolution' or 'liberation,' a systemic change demand, or rhetoric of *beka,* which would fall into the scope of the fifth element. There was also no hostility against the opposition in the speech or any justification of non-democratic means that would fall into the scope of the sixth element. It is not surprising considering that the opposition parties, if not all were present in the mass rally, and the rally itself was organized in protest of a coup attempt. It is absolutely arguable that the speech given by Erdoğan was highly 'populist' based on the intuitions. However, it is not possible to grade this speech with 2 and call it extremely populist with the definition of populism and the rubric provided by Hawkins. Yet all three graders from Hawkins's group gave a grade of 2 for this speech (Hawkins et. al., 2019). It is important to look closely at how the graders evaluated the fifth and the sixth element and eventually gave the Grade of 2.

For the fifth element, which measures if there is the rhetoric of revolution or liberation in the speech, one grader quoted Erdoğan's words saying that the same groups direct all the terrorist organizations. This claim absolutely falls into the fourth element, which is the 'evil minority'. This should not be regarded as fulfilling the fifth element as the grader did. The second grader comes closest to the essence of the fifth element yet it still seems like he pushed it slightly. He quotes Erdoğan saying that it is necessary to save everything from FETÖ and put it back to its natural course, and re-examine the cases against the military that designed by FETÖ. Although the grader is right at detecting the FETÖ is described as perverting the system, Erdoğan is not calling for systemic revolution or change. He only expresses the necessity for the *recovery* of the country. It is true that after a few months Erdoğan was going to call for a referendum for constitutional change, but in this speech, he does not do that yet. Therefore, even this quote

cannot fall into the fifth element. The third grader did not state anything for the fifth element at all, yet he graded the speech with a 2, like the other two graders. (Hawkins et. al., 2019)

For the sixth element, which measures if there is a justification of non-democratic means or a hostile language against the opposition, the first and second grader put forward Erdoğan's words about a possible reintroduction of the death penalty. In response to the chanting of the crowd asking for the death penalty for the putschists, Erdoğan says that if the people want it and the parliament legislates it, he would sign the law as the president. However, legislating a death penalty is clearly not a non-democratic act. It could be unconstitutional because of certain international agreements that Turkey is a party, but still, it can be overcome by amending the Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution that holds international agreements prevailing over the laws about the fundamental rights and freedoms. A death penalty itself, especially if enacted lawfully, cannot be necessarily categorized as 'non-democratic'. The third grader did not state any reason or quote for the sixth element at all (Hawkins et. al., 2019).

In conclusion, the graders from the Team Populism either extended the scope of the elements in order to include Erdoğan's speech or completely disregarded the elements themselves. It is likely that the graders individually believed that this speech given in *Yenikapı Meeting* is one of the most populist speeches given by Erdoğan. Yet, the rubric falls short of embracing the populism reflected or expressed by Erdoğan. A coup attempt is a very unique incident. Understandably, it is impossible to create a rubric thinking of such a case, but if the rubric is not embracing all the possible contexts and circumstances, then it is hard to argue that it is universal. If the graders feel the need to extend the criteria, since they think that the speech is populist, then the rubric faces the danger of losing its empirical utility. If there are still intuitions playing a role in determining the populist grade, then one can question what the rubric of Hawkins brings as new and practical.

In this study, the rubric has been applied to the speeches with full fidelity to its originality. The extensions are made only in a justifiable way. Most importantly, instead of a fusion between a holistic grading and analytical grading, an analytical grading is preferred in order to completely cross out the intuitions. Still, the comparability is preserved by the grade conversion as indicated in Table 1. With these modifications or even corrections, the application of the Hawkins Method to Erdoğan provides another important conclusion apart from the final average score. Graph 4 explicitly indicates the populist score of each speech

Graph 4: Populist Scores for All The Speeches Analyzed

analyzed between August 2014 and June 2019. Graph 4 shows us that the populist score of Erdoğan's speeches can take very different values with almost no pattern. However, if looked closely one can argue a correlation between important political events and the populist scores.

Each dashed line indicates a specific political event in Turkey:

Line (A): 7 June 2015 parliamentary elections.

Line (B): 1 November 2015 renewed parliamentary elections

Line (C): 15 July 2016 coup attempt

Line (D): 16 April 2017 referendum for the presidential system

Line (E): 24 June 2018 parliamentary and presidential elections (this was the first presidential election in the parliamentary system).

Line (F): 31 March 2019 local elections

Line (G): 23 June 2019 canceled and renewed local election for the greater municipality of Istanbul.

It can be observed that among all eight populist scores of 6, seven of them came before an election period. There is one score of 6 before the 7 June 2015 parliamentary elections, and there are three scores of 6 both before the 1 November 2015 renewed parliamentary elections and the 16 April 2017 referendum. Although not as clear as the scores of 6, there are groups of scores of 5 before other political events indicated in the graph. This gives an important hint: populist discourse, as defined and described by Hawkins, can be used before the elections to build support. This, however, goes completely against the ideational approach. Hawkins and other adherents of the ideational approach argue that populism is a set of ideas and they deny the strategic definition of populism. The graph stands for strong support for the strategic definition, where populism is a tool to build or maintain support. It is important to note that these interpretations are inevitably weak since they cannot be supported by an empirical causality.

If we do not go that far to interpret high scores before the elections as evidence for the strategic definitions, graph 4 still indicates something important for the definition and method of Hawkins. The most visible feature of the graph is that the populist score highly fluctuates. It can take any score at any time. There are scores of 1 or 0 right after 6. The scores of 6 or 0 are spread along the timeline. This fluctuation presents an inevitable dilemma for Hawkins who argues that populism is a worldview or set of ideas and that his method is sufficient to measure populism. If Hawkins is right about populism being a worldview, then his method fails to measure it, since

Erdoğan's speeches can be graded with any score for five years of period. The populism, measured by the rubric of Hawkins, is definitely not something constant in the speeches of Erdoğan as a worldview should be. On the other hand, if the rubric and method of Hawkins are good enough to measure populism and the fluctuating graph actually reflects the truth about the speeches of Erdoğan, then, populism can no longer be defined as a worldview. Obviously, a worldview should be constant and should not peak almost only before the elections. A worldview should be present also in the casual speeches that constitute the backbone of this study with 33% of 139 speeches analyzed. However, this study indicates the opposite. Graph 4 looks like the populist discourse is utilized according to the changing contexts in politics, more than a constant and consistent expression of certain ideas.

3.2   Qualitative Method

In this section, the ideational approach will be applied to Erdoğan through a qualitative method. The definition of Cas Mudde will be chosen to adopt since he is the main scholar in the ideational approach, owed to his seminal work *Populist Zeitgeist* (Mudde, 2004). His definition will be broken into four parts: ideology, 'the people', 'the elite' and the will of the people. These notions will be individually applied to Erdoğan's discourse. Since, Mudde thinks that populism is a phenomenon in the world of ideas, or precisely a 'thin-centered ideology', analyzing a politician's discourse is regarded to be sufficient. Mudde expressed that the distinction between the ideas and the discourse is irrelevant since populist rarely achieve the power to implement what they say (2017). Erdoğan, being in power for more than a decade, poses a great challenge for the definition of Mudde. In the application of the core concepts of the proposed populist ideology, the data collected from one hundred thirty-nine speeches will be used. In conclusion, the data leads us to claim that while certain notions such as 'the people' and 'the will of the people' are also present in the discourse of Erdoğan, 'the elite' is replaced with other groups. Therefore, having one core concept being rejected by Erdoğan's discourse, one can argue that Mudde's definition falls short of explaining the populism of Erdoğan entirely.

The Choice of Definition

There are numerous scholars putting forward a qualitative analysis for defining populism. Many of them have been already mentioned above, in the literature review. The leading scholars in the ideational approach are Cas Mudde and his recent colleague Robert Kaltwasser. In this

study, in order to limit the scope, the works and the ideas of only these two scholars will be elaborated. Other scholars will be cited only if they agree with Mudde and Kaltwasser in the issue. For example, Ben Stanley will also be mentioned in the rest of the chapter, since he is in complete agreement with Mudde and Kaltwasser about populism being a thin-centered ideology (Stanley, 2008). Although discussed above, the definition of Mudde (2007) should be presented here again to shed a light for the rest of the section:

> *a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people* (p.23).

This definition is slightly different from what cited before, having the addition of 'thin-centered' feature for the ideology. The definition is very clear in presenting four essential components or core concepts: (1) ideology, (2) the pure people, (3) the corrupt elite, and (4) the will of the people. In the rest of the chapter, each of these elements will be elaborated respectively with a conclusion at the end.

Ideology

One of the main claims of the prominent adherents of the ideational approach is that populism is a thin centered ideology (i.e., Abts & Rummens, 2007; Mudde, 2007, Stanley, 2008; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015). The discussion on the 'thinness' has already been presented in the literature review. The introducer of the term thin-centered ideology, Michael Freeden, argued that populism is not fit for the term (2017). Obviously, this does not rule out all the scholarship based on the ideological definition of populism. However, there can be many other questions directed to the claim that populism is an ideology.

Defining populism starts from scrutinizing the use of the term in the media and academia. The very first observation of the use of the term populism is that it has negative connotations. The adherents of the ideational approach share this idea, too. Mudde and Kaltwasser state that the term populism is ascribed to others with a negative connotation (2017). Albertazzi and McDonnell claim that populism is usually used in the media and in the political field to denigrate politicians (2008). For Stanley, this negative connotation is an indication that populism is an

ideology that is being disliked (2008). However, politicians labeled as populists reject this label and they refrain from calling themselves populist (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). Only Stanley presents an example where a politician accepted to be called populist (2008). Stanley (2008) refers to Marine Le Pen who admitted to being populist if populism means taking into account people's ideas. She asks the question and answers herself: "Have the people right, in a democracy, to hold an opinion? If that is the case, yes I am a populist" (Stanley, 2008). Many scholars have studied and tried to define populism, and a part of this scholarship is presented in this study. Yet, populism has never been defined in this way. 'Holding an opinion in a democracy' could be better termed as freedom of thought, and 'taking people's ideas into account' would be better referred to as participatory democracy. In the contemporary world, and not only in Le Pen's France, freedom of thought and some type of democratic governing are very common. These features hardly make politicians or rulers populist. In this regard, the acceptance of Le Pen being a populist in this way gives us no insight about populism, nor it provides support for scholars who argue that populism is an ideology. The use of populism as criticism and lack of politicians calling themselves as a populist (at least in the contemporary world) still stands as one of the biggest obstacles for defining populism as an ideology, regardless of being thick or thin.

Although defining populism as an ideology, Mudde still talks about populism as something that can be utilized. For example, he explains the rise of populism Europe as follows: "…at least since the early 1990s populism has become a regular feature of politics in western democracies" (Mudde, 2004, p. 551). A 'regular feature' here, which he means the talk of 'the elite' and 'the people', can only be rhetoric and not a set of ideas. In his explanation of populist left parties, Mudde states that such parties combine socialist ideology "with a strong populist discourse*"* (2004, p. 549). This sentence gives away the possibility that any actor regardless of its ideology can utilize the 'populist discourse'. However, an ideology, contrary to a discourse, should be the distinctive feature of a certain politician. This is also evident when Mudde explains the relationship with populism and the two major parties of the US as follows: **"**While populism has traditionally been associated most strongly with the Democratic Party, Republicans have been known to use it as well" (2004, p. 550). He prefers the word "use" for populism. This is another hint that populism is something that can be *utilized,* even inconsistently, rather than a set of ideas that is held more consistently.

Furthermore, there are hints that populism is seen as something different from ideology by the adherents of the ideational approach. For instance, Mudde claims that charismatic leadership plays an important role in populism: it does not define populism but it facilitates populism (2004). How can charisma play a role in an ideology? If the charisma is not directly related to the populist ideology, then this feature is not unique to populism. Indeed, charisma can also play an important role for liberal or socialist leaders, as well. Hence, charismatic leadership would be completely irrelevant to any study that aims to define populism, if populism were just another ideology.

There are also indications made by the adherents of the ideational scholars that populism is not an ideology at all. For example, scholars agree that there is no international organization for populism that holds populist movements together or create a unity in the definition and application of populism (i.e., Worsley, 1969; Canovan, 1981; Stanley, 2008). Stanley notes that the audience of the populist movements can change even within the same country (2008). Consequently, categorizing populism as an ideology practically fails. For example, Hawkins suggests that populists use any possible means to spread their message in response to the studies about the performative elements of populism (2018). He puts it as if the main objective of populists is to spread their message, like a regular ideology. However, the populist 'ideas' are only expressed through politicians. Populist magazines, books, journals or any other communication element that is not related to political parties or actors are not common, if not non-existent. Most probably, the adherents of the ideational approach cannot provide any policy examples of the political parties that are called populist. As mentioned above, the only solution that populist parties propose for the problems they bring on the agenda is their election in the upcoming elections (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015). Thus, even scholars who define populism as an ideology often treat the concept something different from ideology. Clearly, populism departs from other ideologies for its practical features and consequences.

The recent populist case in Turkey, brought by Erdoğan does not provide strong evidence for the 'ideology' claim. As mentioned, Team Populism finds that Erdoğan became populist after 2014 using the Hawkins Method, precisely after eleven years of being in power. Can one argue that Erdoğan had undergone a profound ideological change? If that is the case, then there is no proof to it, since there are no ideological changes in AKP's party program since its foundation in 2002. A new publication was printed in 2015 with no change from the original program. Thus,

categorizing populism as an ideology might work very well for the marginal opposition parties in Western Europe. Yet, categorizing populism as an ideology falls short for the populists in power, or politicians who became populist when they are holding an office.

Let us assume for an instant that populism is an ideology. An important feature of ideology would be its coherency and consistency although it is termed as 'thin-centered'. However, populism seems like failing to sustain an ideological position. Mudde states that populism is associated with the radical right, non-radical right and also with the left. In short, populism is everywhere in the left-right spectrum (2004). He even goes further and categorizes the Green movement in the '70s as populist due to its opposition to the established political parties and 'the elite' (Mudde, 2004). The question here is that in which ideological sense could Erdoğan and Chávez be categorized in the same group with the Green Movement of the '70s?

If categorizing a green movement is regarded as an extension, still there is strong evidence about the lack of ideological unity and coherence about the political actors called populist. For example, Hawkins suggests that anti-immigrant sentiment is common among European radical right parties (2018). If populism is an ideology, anti-immigrant sentiment should be common to all populists even if not expressed with the same frequency and emphasis. However, we observe that Erdoğan is a very strong supporter of Syrian migrants in Turkey. In a talk in 2015, he was thanking the crowd listing to him for hosting Syrian refugees.[52] This could be explained by the fact that Erdoğan and his party were in the government who received and accepted the influx of Syrian refugees. Still, Erdoğan is not a reluctant supporter of Syrian migrants; rather he even went further and accused the ones who provoke the people against the Syrian to be in treason like PKK and FETÖ in 2017.[53] Such profound differences over the migration and refugees between populist actors inevitably raise doubts on conceptualizing populism as an ideology. As shown, populist actors might show diversity not only in greater political opinions such as the left-right spectrum but also in very minor policies such as anti-immigration.

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[52] TCBB: *Bursa, Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 06.02.2015. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2985/bursa-toplu-acilis-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma

[53] TCBB: *AK Parti Grup Toplantısı,* 25.07.2017. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/80037/birinci-ve-ikinci-dunya-savaslarinda-tarihin-en-acimasiz-katliamlarina-imza-atanlar-bize-insanlik-dersi-veremez.html

Like the anti-immigration sentiment, there are also other common perceptions on populism that Erdoğan disproves. For instance, Mudde (2004) links the rise of populism in recent years with the independence of media. According to him, after escaping the tight control of the establishment parties, the private and independent media gave the stage to 'populist' actors to attract more viewers. However, in the case of Turkey, the freedom of media is curbed in the same period as the rise of the populism of Erdoğan. Data from graph 5 shows from the Freedom House that Turkey started to be a 'not free' for the freedom of the press starting from 2014 (the data on freedom of press is available only until 2017).[54] This date precisely corresponds to the time that scholars agree that Erdoğan is populist.

Graph 5: Press Freedom (0=Most Free, 100=Least Free)

Source: Freedom House, 2018

This also reflected the frequency of Erdoğan targeting the media. The graph 6 shows how many times Erdoğan criticized the media and the intellectuals. The data is derived from the 139 speeches analyzed for the Hawkins Method. According to the graph 6, Erdoğan often criticized the media or the intellectuals in 2015. However, if graph 5 and graph 6 analyzed together, as the freedom of press decreases in Turkey, Erdoğan muted his criticism towards media as well. Among all twenty-eight speeches analyzed in 2018, Erdoğan never mentioned the media or the

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[54] Freedom House, 2018. Found at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/turkey

intellectuals. The numbers are also very low in 2016 and 2017. In the first half of 2019, Erdoğan criticized the media only once. Yet, this criticism was aimed at the Western media and not the domestic media. It can be concluded that Mudde was biased towards the parties in opposition when he was arguing that freedom of press helped populism to gain support. As clearly seen from a 'populist in power' case, the freedom of press definitely at odds with populism.

Another reason claimed to contribute to the rise of populism by Mudde is the increased education level compared to previous decades (2004). The idea suggests that as the level of education in the society increased, the electorate started to question impositions of the establishment parties or the political elites. It is not clear what exactly Mudde means by the 'increased education level'. It can take two different meanings: (1) the level of education of the individual voter, (2) the median education level of society. For the first claim, there should be empirical evidence to argue. In Turkey's case, according to the data provided by KONDA, the electorate of AKP is composed of voters predominantly with lower education levels compared to the average level.[55] Then, the first proposed meaning of 'increased education level' is not valid for Turkey.

If Mudde means the collective education level as a society, then still, it is hard to argue that increased education is a determinant when populism occurred in such big diversity. It is a phenomenon that occurred in Latin America of the 1930s, in Latin America of late the twentieth century, in Western European countries of the twenty-first century as well as Eastern European, Southern European and Latin American countries of the twenty-first century. Populism has existed and it keeps occurring in so many different periods and geographies, the education level seems to be irrelevant to it. Mudde must bring empirical evidence to support this claim.

After all the questionable claims about populism being an ideology, one of the standing arguments is that it has restricted core concepts. Stanley (2008) argues that populism is a distinct ideology because of its unique way of interaction with its core concepts. He goes on saying; "the core of an ideology is comprised of a cluster of decontested concepts which (…) form a relatively distinct and coherent ideational framework with a large degree of durability over time" (Stanley, 2008, p. 99). This core is explained by Mudde as the Manichean struggle between 'the

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[55] KONDA: *Seçmen Kümeleri - Ak Parti Seçmeni.* Found at: http://konda.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/KONDA_SecmenKumeleri_AkParti_Secmenleri_Mayis2018.pdf

pure people' and 'the corrupt elite' (2017). Hence, European radical right parties are labeled as 'populist' radical right parties because they frame the world or a specific country "as a struggle of the people against a conspiring elite" (Hawkins, 2018, p. 58-9). In addition to this dualistic setting, Mudde suggests that, according to populism, the will of the people should prevail. Taking this as a basis, the core concepts of the ideational definition will be analyzed with data from Turkey and Erdoğan in the next sections. If populism is an ideology, then we should see a clear reflection of these core concepts in Erdoğan's discourse.

'The people'

The very first and maybe the most consistent restricted core concept of the proposed populist ideology is the notion of 'the people' (Canovan, 1981; Taggart, 2000; Mudde, 2017). The term 'the people' is vague and mainly considered as a rhetorical tool rather than a well-defined notion (Mudde, 2004). In other words, the meaning of the term is not very much determined. Consequently, this makes it easier for populist politicians to often use it in their speeches. Still, there is something distinctive of 'the people': being morally pure (Mudde, 2017). Albertazzi and McDonnell describe 'the people' as a virtuous and homogenous community, which can take different meanings for different contexts (2015).

The direct Turkish counterpart of the term 'the people' should be *halk*. The term *halk* is as neutral as 'the people' and it literally means the group of people living in a country. In the discourse of Erdoğan, though, the word *halk* is generally used differently from the notion of 'the people' described in the proposed populist ideology. He refers to the people living in Istanbul as *Istanbul halkı*,[56] to the people of Syria as *Suriye halkı*,[57] to a group of people living in a specific region as *bölge halkı*,[58] or to himself as a president elected by the people as *halkın oylarıyla seçilmiş cumhurbaşkanı*.[59] The common meaning is that by *halk*, Erdoğan means a very neutral group of people. Yet, Erdoğan rarely ascribes a political meaning to the word *halk*.

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[56] TCBB: *Büyük Üsküdar İftarında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 31.05.2019. Found at: tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/105626/buyuk-uskudar-iftarinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[57] TCBB: *Dünya Enerji Düzenleme Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 25.05.2015. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32657/dunya-enerji-duzenleme-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma

[58] TCBB: *Milletvekilleri ile İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 13.06.2016. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/44412/milletvekilleri-ile-iftar-programinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[59] TCBB: *Yedinci Büyükelçiler Konferansı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 06.01.2015. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2970/yedinci-buyukelciler-konferansinda-yaptiklari-konusma

There is another term in Erdoğan's discourse, *millet,* which carries a lot of political baggage. Compared to the 65% of the use of the word *halk* among one hundred thirty-nine speeches analyzed, Erdoğan uses the word *millet* almost 90% of the time. However, *millet* does not directly translate to 'the people'. Although Turkish Language Institution, *TDK,* translates *millet* as nation,[60] the etymology of the word gives us more suggestions. Contrary to the word *ulus,* which is a direct translation of the English word nation, Nişanyan Sözlük states that *millet* stems from Arabic, carrying the meaning of a group of people adhering to a certain religion.[61] However, it is also indicated that this religious connotation has been partly lost after the 1920s. Then it is important to investigate how Erdoğan uses this word.

He usually ends his mass rallies with a certain motto: *tek millet, tek bayrak, tek vatan, tek devlet* (one 'nation,' one flag, one country, one state). Sometimes he inserts an explanation for each component. Luckily, Erdoğan clarifies what he means by *millet* numerous times: "*…with Turkish, Kurdish, Laz, Circassian, Kabardian, Abkhaz, Bosnian, Albanian, all the 80 million, we are one nation*"[62] Very interestingly, ethnic minorities are counted one by one by Erdoğan. Mudde argues that the ethnic minorities and immigrants are excluded from the composition of 'the people' in the nativist and nationalist populists (2017). Mudde would probably consider Erdoğan as nativist or nationalist, too. Erdoğan usually uses the phrase *yerli ve milli,* which means native and national, quite often to praise his supporters, and he denigrates his opposition by accusing them of not being *yerli ve milli.* An example of this has already given above in the quantitative analysis of Erdoğan's speeches. Then, Mudde's argument of exclusion of ethnic minorities does not hold for Turkey. It is mainly because ethnic minorities are not necessarily immigrants in Turkey.

According to the Joshua Project, which draws the ethnic map of countries for their missionary purposes, all the ethnicities counted by Erdoğan are natives to the lands of Turkey.[63] Still, it is not all the native ethnicities are counted to be composing the *tek millet.* There are no Armenians, no Greek, no Jewish mentioned even though they constitute important portions of

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[60] TDK, 2019. Found at: http://sozluk.gov.tr/

[61] Nişanyan Sözlük, 2019: Found at: https://www.nisanyansozluk.com/?k=millet

[62] TCBB: *39. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 22.08.2017. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/99545/39-muhtarlar-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[63] Joshua Project, 2019. Found at: https://joshuaproject.net/countries/TU

society, even if not numerically. Here, we can observe the religious connotation of the notion *millet.* The commonality of all the ethnicities being counted by Erdoğan is their choice of the Islamic religion. However, Alawites, Zazas or Yazidis are not mentioned in the *tek millet,* as well, most probably because they do not belong to Sunni Islam. So, 'the people' of Erdoğan, or *millet,* is not only religiously indicative but also sectarian. This explains that Erdoğan uses the word *millet* with a religious connotation, rather than a secular notion of nation.

A term with heavy religious and sectarian connotations does not translate as the neutral and embracing 'the people'. However, the word *millet* should be inclusionary enough for Erdoğan so that he uses it in a very similar way with 'the people' ideational scholars describe the notion. There is only a minor difference in the characteristics of *millet* compared to 'the people': there is no emphasis on ordinary man, common man, or weakness of *millet*. Rather, *millet* represents a group of people that is strong, wise, determined, clever and proud. On the second anniversary of the coup attempt, Erdoğan was praising *millet: "This nation is a noble nation. This nation is a brave nation. This nation is a heroic nation. This nation is a nation that defends its liberty at the expense of its life."*[64] In addition to these qualities, *millet* is also wise: *"The November 1 is approaching. We ask for a historical decision, a historical effort. I am sure that this nation will do the necessary."*[65] The November 1 signifies the renewed parliamentary elections of November 2015. Erdoğan knows what is good for the country, and he is sure that *millet* is on the same line with him. The use of *millet* Erdoğan inevitably takes another dimension after numerous elections he triumphed.

In conclusion, the ethnic or religious composition of *millet* is profoundly different from 'the people.' More, the characteristics of *millet* are also different from 'the people' for not being common or ordinary but rather brave and wise. However, when the rhetorical use of the notion 'the people' considered, *millet* substitutes the 'the people' perfectly. The case of Erdoğan confirmed that 'the people' could take different meanings accordant to the context. More, it can even mean something closer to nation than 'the neutral people.' Yet, most importantly, *millet* is as pure as 'the people'. Erdoğan expresses an immense closeness and empathy with *millet.* It seems like there can be no disagreement between *millet* and him. Rhetorically, it can be

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[64] TCBB: *15 Temmuz Şehitler Köprüsü Buluşmasında Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 15.07.2018. Found at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96173/15-temmuz-sehitler-koprusu-bulusmasinda-yaptiklari-konusma

[65] *Milyonlarca Nefes, Teröre Karşı Tek Ses Buluşması,* 20.09.2015. Found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vpy1YleVg4E

concluded that the equivalence of the populist 'people' is *millet* in the context of Turkey, and Erdoğan utilizes it with a very high frequency. The first component or core concept of the proposed populist ideology is, therefore, confirmed by Erdoğan's case, even though the connotations are slightly different.

'The elite'

'The elite' in the proposed ideology of populism is defined with its "adversarial relationship with the people" (Stanley, 2008, p. 103). 'The elite' is considered to be corrupt or evil as opposed to good or pure people (Mudde, 2017). "First and foremost, 'the elite' is defined on the basis of power, i.e., they include most people who hold leading positions within politics, the economy, the media, and the arts" (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 12). This clearly puts forward 'the elite' is not only 'them' or an enemy but also rather a group that is powerful or influential. By framing an adversarial relationship between the people and the "power holders," the identification of 'the people' is also simplified (Stanley, 2008, p. 104): it is basically everyone except the power holders. This can be true if the subject-matter populist actor is in the

Table 3: Notions Presented as 'The Other'

#	Notion	# of times in 139 speeches	Frequency (%)
1	*Vesayet*	19	13.7
2	*Elit*	1	0.7
3	*Bürokratik oligarşi*	2	1.4
4	*Batı, Amerika, AB*	44	31.7
5	*Üst akıl, karanlık güçler, küresel ittifak, birileri*	53	38.1
6	*Paralel yapı, 17-25 Aralık, FETÖ*	86	61.9
7	*PKK, PYD, bölücüler*	81	58.3
8	*Medya, uluslarası medya, aydınlar*	21	15.1

opposition. In Erdoğan's case, this definition of 'the elite' would fail. Erdoğan is the power holder himself. Erdoğan indeed constructs an adversarial relationship in his discourse, evident

from the data that shows that he drew a Manichean vision in 82% of the speeches analyzed. However, the adversary is seldom 'the elite'.

Table 3 shows the groups of notions and their frequency of expression in the one hundred thirty-nine speeches analyzed. The notions in the table do not precisely fit in the definition of 'the elite' by the adherents of the ideational scholars. However, they are mentioned as powers or actors which are against 'the people' or *millet.* Among them, *elit* or the notion (2) means 'the elite' in Turkish. As seen, Erdoğan used this word only once in the analyzed speeches. The notion (3) means the 'bureaucratic oligarchy', which can be considered as non-elected elites, and it is mentioned only twice. In sum, notions which would directly correspond to 'the elite' in the proposed ideology of populism are very rarely expressed in conflict with 'the people' or *millet.* In fact, after twelve years of ruling it should be hard to attack 'the elite'. First, the elected political elite is directly assigned by Erdoğan himself, as the absolute party leader with the competence to determine parliamentary candidates and the ministers. Second, after twelve years, Erdoğan should have easily transformed the bureaucracy under ministries or independent institutions.

However, the main challenge for Erdoğan was what he calls as the bureaucratic oligarchy that is composed of military and judiciary. The notion (1), *vesayet* means tutelage. Aytaç and Elçi (2019) explain the 'tutelage regime' basing on Şerif Mardin's (1973) center-periphery analysis of modern Turkey. Since the beginning of the modern Republic (1923), a 'quasi-autonomous' bureaucracy has been considered to be the center of power in Turkey, including the military and the high judiciary, which is also called as 'deep state' (Söyler, 2013). These institutions had been also successful in preserving themselves from the elected politicians through their own recruitment systems (Aytaç & Elçi, 2019). The military made two coups d'état in 1960 and 1980 as well as two unarmed military interventions in 1971 and 1997 and thus suspended the democracy (Söyler, 2013); and numerous political parties were shut down by court decisions especially from Kurdish and ultra-conservative political traditions. The tutelage regime saw itself as the guardian of secularism and nationalism, which it sees essential to the modern republic founded by Atatürk. Therefore, they were heavily opposed to political movements with Islamist and Kurdish lineage (Selçuk, 2016).

By calling this center of power as *vesayet* or tutelage, Erdoğan was criticizing the centers of power for undermining the democracy and the political choices of the people. As Aytaç and

Elçi (2019) convincingly argue, 'the elite' of the proposed populist ideology should be regarded as the military and the high judiciary, or what Erdoğan calls *vesayet,* in Turkish politics, because they traditionally control the power political power. Looked this way, one can conclude that all the notions (1), (2) and (3) in table 3 should be categorized as 'the elite' in Erdoğan's discourse. Even in this case, the total percentage of 'the elite' mention in all the speeches is 15.8%.

Furthermore, when *vesayet* is mentioned in the speeches of Erdoğan, it is no longer presented as a present danger or enemy. In the speeches analyzed starting from 2014 August, *vesayet* is described as a defeated power: *"We have neutralized all systems and institutions of tutelage above the politics in these last twelve years."*[66] Aytaç and Ezgi (2019) confirm this statement in their work, stating that Erdoğan was successful in countering the tutelage by invoking plebiscitary tools in the times of crises. Erdoğan is vocal about it: *"They wanted to push our country into the tutelage swamp, we have found the solution in going back to our nation."*[67] Then, *vesayet* or 'the elite' is an old and defeated enemy. It has no place in today's politics anymore. Therefore, it is hard to argue that *vesayet* represents a good example of 'the elite' in Turkey for the scope of this study between August 2014 and June 2019.

Aytaç and Ezgi (2019) draw attention to the fact that, even before 2014, the military and judiciary started to fade away in Erdoğan's discourse in the post-2011 era, as their power also fades away. In this context Aytaç and Ezgi (2019) states the new targets in the discourse of Erdoğan:

> *The targets of his populist strategy in this period have been the main opposition CHP, academics, intellectuals, and journalists who are not aligned with the government, the Western powers, and some vague actors that are imagined to plot against Turkey* (p.99).

The first 'target,' the main opposition party should not be considered as 'the elite' because CHP is a political party that failed to be in the government since 1979. It can be argued that Erdoğan

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[66] TCBB: *Yedinci Büyükelçiler Konferansı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 06.01.2015. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2970/yedinci-buyukelciler-konferansinda-yaptiklari-konusma
[67] TCBB: *8. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma,* 12.08.2015. Found at:
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/35906/8-muhtarlar-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma

usually accuses CHP of being in collaboration with *vesayet*, yet the fact that *vesayet* is defeated, it is also hard to argue that CHP is a part of the establishment or the elite.

The other 'target' Aytaç and Ezgi (2019) lists are confirmed in this study. The intellectuals, academics, and journalists are grouped in the notion (8), which is mentioned 15.1% of the time. Yet, as already discussed above and evident from graph 6, the mention of this notion drastically dropped after 2015, mainly because the press freedom is curbed, and their influence faded away in similarly with the tutelage regime. The second group of targets, 'the Western powers and some vague actors' are categorized in the notion (4) and (5). In the notion group (4), *Amerika* means the US, and *AB* stands for the European Union (EU), while *Batı* means the West. This group has mentioned in 31.7% of the speeches analyzed. The notion group (5) precisely stands for the vague actors, since each notion mentioned does not signify any specific actor. *Kirli odaklar* means 'dirty foci,' *üst akıl* is translated by Aytaç and Ezgi (2019) as 'the mastermind,' *karanlık güçler* stands for 'the dark forces,' *küresel ittifak* means 'the global coalition,' or 'global alliance' and lastly but with the highest frequency, *birileri* implies 'someone'.

The common feature among these notions that they are vague and what is implied is implicit although the speaker pretends as if the audience exactly knows what he is implying. These vague notions, which can be considered as conspiracy theories, are mentioned in 38.1% of the speeches. If one assumes that Erdoğan is implying Western powers by mentioned vague notions, or even some external forces, we can combine the groups (4) and (5) to get another figure. After subtracting the seventeen speeches both of these groups mentioned in the same speech, we reach the figure of 57.6%. Still, it comes the third in the most mentioned notions groups in the list.

Among all the notion groups, only two of them have not been mentioned yet, which represent the top two mentioned groups described in conflict with *millet*: the notions group (6) and (7). In the group (6), *paralel yapı* and *FETÖ* are used synonymously for the Gülen movement, and *17-25 Aralık* implies the investigations against the prominent members of the AKP and the government started by the police and judiciary working for the Gülen Movement. After the coup attempt of 15 July 2016, the group was named as *FETÖ*, and designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey. These notions are mentioned in 61.9% of the speeches analyzed. The group (7) is more straightforward; PKK and PYD are Kurdish armed insurgent groups in Turkey and Syria, respectively. Turkey designates them both as terrorist organizations.

Bölücüler means separatists, referring to PKK's initial purpose to create an independent Kurdish state on the lands separated from Turkey. These notions are mentioned in 58.3% in the speeches analyzed.

It is already discovered in the academia that the populists in power might modify their 'elite'. For example, as already stated, Albertazzi and McDonnell argue that some populists differentiate between the good and bad elite because of the necessity to collaborate with 'the elite' when in power. Also, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) admit that the populists in power, like Chávez, need to redefine their 'elite' in order to keep their well-working anti-establishment appeal. However, what is consistent in the populist rhetoric is the claim "the real power does not lie with the democratically elected leaders, i.e., the populists, but with some shadowy forces that continue to hold on to illegitimate powers to undermine the voice of the people" (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.12). As shown, the discourse of Erdoğan had extended beyond 'the elite' or *vesayet* in the Turkish case. However, the most often mentioned groups working against the *millet* are PKK and FETÖ, which are terrorist organizations. Even if, the notion group (4) and (5) are considered suitable for the definition of 'the elite' of the proposed populist ideology, terrorist organizations certainly do not hold the 'real power'. Indeed, they are only 'enemies' who are in a fight against Turkey and its people. Thus, mentioning of terrorist organizations causes a great extension to the notion of 'the elite,' if it is considered included in the populist discourse. It can be confidently concluded that the backbone of Erdoğan's dualistic discourse is composed of terrorist organizations, rather than 'the elite' or any ruling minority. The second component or core concept of the proposed populist ideology is, therefore, not confirmed by Erdoğan's case. First, due to being in power for more than a decade and defeating the *vesayet*, and second due to Turkey's unique political circumstances, Erdoğan uses different notions such as terrorist organizations rather than 'the elite'.

Will of the people

The third core concept of the proposed ideology of populism is 'the will of the people'. Stanley (2008) claims that the concepts of 'the people' and popular sovereignty remain central to modern politics. So it makes sense for Stanley that an ideology would arise arguing that popular sovereignty and the people concepts play a role (2008). It is doubtful that these concepts are unique enough to make up an ideology in an already established liberal democracy. This concept, the sovereignty of the people, has been the key concept of the modern political organization

since Rousseau. In Turkey, the modern republic was found on the principle that "the sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation" of Atatürk. As Stanley also admits, "even the most pragmatic of ideologists must take the people sovereign power seriously if only at the election time" (Stanley, 2008, p. 102).

Graph 7: Number of Mention Times of *Milli İrade*

According to Mudde (2017), populists argue that politics should be in line with the general will of the people, and they depict themselves as the true representative of it. More, the general will of the people is preferred as opposed to solutions of the elites that prioritize special interests (Mudde, 2017). It is true that the will of the people, or *milli irade,* is a notion that Erdoğan uses. For example, he used the notion of *milli irade* in around 41% of the one hundred thirty-nine speeches analyzed. Especially, in his conflict with the tutelage regime, he emphasized on the will of the people very often. Yet, after defeating the tutelage regime, the use of the term has also changed. Since the policy-makers have been from the AKP side for years, 'special interests' is not a notion that is used as opposed to the general will of the people. Rather, it is the choice of the electorate for governing the country.

Graph 7 shows the frequency of the use of the notion *milli irade* by quarters of the year. Each dashed line signifies an important political event:

Line (A): June 2015 parliamentary elections

Line (B): November 2015 renewed parliamentary elections

Line (C): April 2017 referendum for the constitutional amendments bringing the presidential system

Line (D): June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections,

Line (E): March 2019 local elections

Line (F): June 2019 renewed Istanbul local election

There are periods of time that the notion of *milli irade* is never mentioned. Both of the gaps, the first and second quarter of 2016, and the first quarter of 2018 corresponds to the times with no election.

When examined in relation to the election dates embedded in the graph, one can argue that this notion is used to either reminding of the previous electoral results as a way of campaigning the upcoming elections or capitalizing the recent elections. This provides support for Stanley who argued that the politicians use this notion at least in the election period. Yet, this might not be unique enough to be a core concept of an ideology. Still, the data shows us that Erdoğan is using this notion quite often. The third component or core concept of the proposed populist ideology is, therefore, confirmed by Erdoğan's case, even though it seems like he is using this notion in a strategic way.

Conclusion

It has been already extensively discussed that the ideational approach regards populism as a thin-centered ideology. Although the originator of the term Freeden (2017) does not categorize populism as a thin-centered ideology, the adherents of the ideational approach agree that it is thin-centered because it does not provide clear answers for great social problems as other ideologies. There are many doubts expressed about categorizing populism as an ideology for practical reasons. There are no theorists of populism, there is no clear ideological unity among populists, and politicians do not identify themselves as populists. Yet, scholars still think it is still an ideology because it has a restricted set of core concepts such as the notion of 'the people,' 'the elite' and the will of the people. In this chapter, each core concept has been discussed in the light of the findings obtained from the analysis of Erdoğan's speeches.

The first proposed core concept 'the people' seemed to exist in a modified way in Erdoğan's speeches. The word Erdoğan uses, *millet,* implies a religious and sectarian division and not as neutral as 'the people'. Still, Erdoğan very often uses it by assigning it to a political meaning. Such political meaning is evident in comparison with other terms he uses such as *halk*, which also means the people, but with the most neutral sense. The third proposed concept 'the will of the people' also takes its place in the discourse of Erdoğan, yet not with consistency. As shown, Erdoğan generally uses the word around the election periods.

On the contrary to the first and third core concepts of the proposed populist ideology, the second proposed core concept of the populist ideology, 'the elite' seems greatly extended in the speeches of Erdoğan. It has been discussed that the political foundation in Turkey created a different political setting compared to European countries, hence 'the elite' mostly meant the tutelage regime or *vesayet* controlled by the military and the judiciary. Yet, such establishment completely ended especially after scholars especially after 2014, when the scope of this study starts. The vague forces or external forces, sometimes explicitly the West, seem to find their place in the discourse of Erdoğan. However, the designated terrorist organizations such as PKK and FETÖ seem to be mentioned the most. The adherents of the ideational approach propose the 'holding the real power' condition to define 'the elite' in order to differentiate it from any other political enemy. These terrorist organizations, on the other hand, are not described as 'holding the real power' and thus cannot be counted as 'the elite'. Rather, they should be considered only as 'enemies'.

In this context, Carl Schmitt's influential work *The Concept of the Political* (2007) originally published in 1932 provides an important explanation. Schmitt argues that the political can be reduced to the distinction between the friend and the enemy (2007). He claims that such distinction, friend and enemy corresponds to the moral arena as 'good and evil,' just like ideational scholars argue that 'the people' is good and pure, while 'the elite' is evil. He states that the enemy is not necessarily evil, but in order to garner support from such distinction emotional and moral elements are utilized, and thus the enemy is likely to be presented as also evil (Schmitt, 2007). One can conclude from Schmitt's perspective that the populist dualism between the people and 'the elite' is no more than constructing the political.

This obviously resonates with the Laclaun approach. Laclau came to a conclusion based on his identification of the people and 'the elite' as 'empty signifiers' that populism is "a way of

constructing the political" (Laclau, 2005, p. xi). This study provides strong support for this claim of Laclau since it shows that when Erdoğan consumes all the anti-establishment and anti-elite discourse after being in power for twelve years, he can continue a discourse, which is still considered populist, with other enemies.

It can be concluded that, if populism is analyzed through discourses, speeches and words, as Laclau and ideational approach do, then the ultimate finding will not be that populism is an ideology, rather nothing more than constructing the political. Therefore, the ideational approach, either quantitatively or qualitatively, can explain why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as a populist only partly. There are notions in the discourse of Erdoğan that the adherents of the ideational approach never mentioned, such as terrorist organizations. Some notions presented by the ideational approach do not take place in Erdoğan's discourse. Plus, there is more than speeches in Erdoğan's and the ascribed populism he enacts. In the next section, there will be an attempt to explain why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as a populist through the strategic approach.

4.   The Strategic Approach Applied to Erdoğan

In this chapter, I want to explain why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as a populist through the strategic approach for defining populism. The strategic approach conceives populism as a way of obtaining and maintaining power, with certain distinct characteristics. Scholars fail to reach a consensus on these distinct characteristics. Therefore, certain components from three main scholars of the strategic approach will be assessed in this chapter. The three main scholars are Kurt Weyland, Kenneth Roberts, and Robert Barr. The components they propose and discuss are that the strategical purpose of populism, outsider status of the political actor, use of anti-establishment appeal, plebiscitary linkages or personalist leadership, and the mobilization type. I will assess each component of the strategic definitions, in an attempt to exemplify them with Turkey's Erdoğan. For each part, I will try to present examples and counterexamples mainly from secondary sources. I argue that that strategic approach partly explains why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as populist. While it should be clear that Erdoğan uses populism to maintain his power and support, the characteristics generally derived from Latin America are not always reflected in Erdoğan's case. The conclusions reached in the chapter are that the strategic approach can explain why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as a populist to a great extent. First, Erdoğan did face great challenges that could have potentially pushed him to use a populist

strategy to preserve his power. Second, Erdoğan is an outsider, since he rose to power from parties that are outside of the political establishment. However, this chapter shows that anti-establishment appeal is not a part of Erdoğan's populist strategy, and rather he developed other ways to maintain his public support. More, the plebiscitarian linkages and personalistic leadership are confirmed by Erdoğan's case. However, there are doubts about whether those characteristics are rooted in populism or the transformation of Turkey into a delegative democracy. Lastly, in agreement with certain scholars from the strategic approach and disagreeing another, Erdoğan's party AKP does not reflect an unorganized form of mobilization. The analysis in this chapter is distinct from the other works, because it applies not only one single definition from the strategic approach to Erdoğan, but assesses all the main definitional claims from three main scholars of the strategic approach.

The Choice of Definitions

Next to the ideational approach, the strategic approach is the other predominant approach for defining populism. While the ideational approach relies on and analyzes the ideas expressed by populist actors, the concern of the strategic approach is the concentration of power by populism (Barr, 2017). This leads certain scholars to investigate populism from a political perspective, focusing on the agency and the actions (Barr, 2018). The main divergence between the ideational approach and the strategic approach most probably rooted in the geographies that they study. While the strategic approach mainly employed by scholars of Latin America, the ideational approach gained prominence among scholars of European populism (Barr, 2018). In Latin America, populism caused personalist leaders who generally concentrated the power in their hands, such as Perón, Fujimori and Chávez. In Europe, on the other hand, populism mostly stayed in the opposition, and even if they seized the power through elections, a concentration of power was not possible except for Eastern European experiences such as Hungary and Poland.

The leading scholars of the strategic approach are Kurt Weyland, Robert Barr, and Kenneth Roberts, which come up with the same essence of populism but with slightly different definitions. All agree that populism is a mechanism of mobilizing support (Barr, 2018). The differences are about delimiting the definition in order to differentiate populism from other mechanisms of mobilizing support. For Weyland (2001, 2017), the accompanying features of populism are the existence of a personalistic leader and its unorganized relationship with the masses. Roberts (2006, 2007) plays a negating role in the strategic approach, claiming that the

organization is dependent on the context of the country. Moreover, he regards anti-establishment appeals are strategic in populism just as economic policies are. While his findings on the organization challenge the definition of Weyland, his claim about the anti-establishment appeal challenges the definition of Barr (2009). Barr (2009, 2017) accepts the findings of Roberts on the organizational features of populism and does not include such criteria for his definition of populism. Yet, he claims that the combination of a political outsider or maverick, plebiscitarian linkages, and anti-establishment appeal are definitional characteristics of populism (2009). His definition indirectly presupposes a personalist leader. According to him, the political outsider condition plus plebiscitarian linkages in combination would inevitably create a personalist leader (Barr, 2017).

When the agreements and disagreements analyzed comparatively, the proposed components of the strategic approach for defining populism are as follows: (1) political strategy, (2) an outsider as a leader, (3) anti-establishment appeal, (4) plebiscitary linkages or personalistic leadership, (5) unorganized mobilization. In the following sections, each of these proposed components of the strategic approach will be analyzed in the context of Turkey and Erdoğan's political personality. The aim will be detecting the holding and failing components for the strategic definition.

Populism as a strategy

The distinct aspect of the strategic approach is that it regards populism as **a certain** "political project of building and maintaining power" (Barr, 2009, p. 40). Then, the question addressed here whether Erdoğan utilized populism to build or maintain power. It would be hard to argue that Erdoğan was still trying to build power in between 2014 and 2019. He and his party had been ruling for the last twelve years with consecutive and uninterrupted victories since the first elections they had participated. Therefore, Erdoğan did not need to build political power through populism. Did he need to maintain his power? It is most likely that the answer to this question is positive.

As Hawkins (2018) argues, ultimately every politician, including populists, is driven by the desire to maximize her votes and stay in office. Therefore, there should be reasons explaining why Erdoğan needed to employ populism as a strategy. Türk, who describes populism as 'a medium of mass mobilization' (2018), explains why Erdoğan potentially would need to employ a

populist strategy. According to him, Erdoğan has been facing maybe the strongest opposition and/or challenge starting from the year 2013.

Firstly, 31 May 2013 witnessed the Gezi protests. The police violence on Taksim Gezi Park transformed a minor protest into nationwide protests against Erdoğan and his government that went beyond the borders of Istanbul. Türk describes Gezi protests as 'a cultural clash' between the youth plus white-collar population of Turkey and Erdoğan (2018). Erdoğan responded to these protests with mass rallies calling respect to the 'nation will'. This move would be considered populist for both the ideational and strategic approaches. There have been mass rallies before, and the emphasis was on the 'will of the people' or *milli irade*, yet the difference of these rallies is on the motivation. The strategic approach would pay attention to the timing of these mass rallies. Since they come right after Gezi protests, it is interpreted as a show-off of mass support as a response to the protests against him.

The second major challenge Erdoğan faced was the 17 and 25 December graft investigations against his family and some government officials as well as the prominent members of his party at the end of 2013 (Türk, 2018). The officers who secretly belonged to the Gülen movement allegedly made the corruption investigations. The graft allegations were dismissed without any further investigation, claiming that the voice records were fabricated in a bid to topple the government (Türk, 2018). Thus, the Gülen movement arose as a new open enemy against Erdoğan. The third and maybe the greatest challenge against Erdoğan's rule came when a group within the military and related to the Gülen movement attempted to seize power on 15 July 2016 but failed. Türk argues that Erdoğan used populism as 'a medium of mass mobilization' in the times of such crises (2018).

However, the challenges Erdoğan faced were not limited to extra-political events as Türk lists. After being elected as the president in August 2014, Erdoğan left his party in line with the constitutional requirements. Ahmet Davutoğlu was elected as the chairman of the AKP and carried the party to the June 2015 elections. Although AKP came out as the first party, receiving more than 40% of the votes, Davutoğlu lost the majority in the parliament to form a single-party government. Since the start of AKP, Erdoğan's political career and discourse had been strongly established on single-party governments and stability, hence the results regarded as a defeat by Erdoğan. Esen and Gümüşçü (2016) argue that AKP's desire to stay in power after this electoral result caused political pressure on the opposition, censorship in the media and 'implicit

endorsement of violent attacks against the opposition by AKP supporters' (p. 1581). Therefore, another reason why Erdoğan would employ a populist strategy can be his desire to stay in power, despite the electoral defeat or at least a major decline in support for the first time since 2002.

One can conclude that it makes sense for Erdoğan to employ a populist strategy since serious challenges faced him and threatened his continuance to be in power. Yet, one can still argue that politicians employ numerous strategies to build and maintain power. What are the distinctive features of the proposed populist strategy? Scholars gave different answers to this question. The accompanying or the delimiting components of the strategic definitions of populism will be elaborated below within the context of Erdoğan and Turkey.

Outsider as a leader

Barr considers 'being an outsider' as a condition to be a populist (2009). According to him, a political outsider is a politician who rose to power outside of the established party system. One can assume that Barr gives such a definition based on parliamentary or presidential democracies with two established parties as center-right and center-left. Such a political system has been hardly the case for Turkey. As Mardin puts it, CHP represented the 'bureaucratic center' while DP (and other parties on the conservative or right lineage) resented 'democratic periphery (1973). Şimşek (2013) explains the peripheral origin of conservatism in Turkey through the lack of aristocratic tradition in the country.

Based on this understanding of conservatism in Turkey, scholars usually classify Erdoğan as an outsider (i.e., Aytaç & Öniş, 2014; Castaldo, 2018; Aytaç & Elçi, 2019). Although Barr defined maverick as someone who became known in established parties but then rose to power through outside of established parties (2009), Aytaç and Öniş categorize Erdoğan as a maverick as well, citing that he rose to power outside of the party he became known (2014). Hence, considering him as a maverick would be a stretch to the definition of Barr, since the lineage of *Milli Görüş* has been considered even more periphery than the center-right lineage parties with its ultra-conservative or Islamist political views.

However, scholars have good reasons to classify Erdoğan as an outsider. He became known in *Refah Partisi* or RP (Welfare Party), which was a party with the *Milli Görüş* movement. *Milli Görüş* (National Outlook) was ultra-conservative or Islamist political movement under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. Considering the military (and the High judiciary), which sees itself as the protector of secularism and nationalism of the state ideology,

Milli Görüş represented a peripheral ideology. Indeed, this movement consisted of six parties: *Milli Nizam Partisi, Milli Selamet Partisi, Refah Partisi,* and *Fazilet Partisi* are all parties belonged to the same tradition of *Milli Görüş*. They have been all closed down on the grounds that they violated the principle of secularism of the constitution, except for *Milli Selamet Partisi,* which was one of the all parties closed down after the coup d'état of 1980. Erdoğan came to prominence from this political background. Even himself was convicted because of a poem he read during a mass rally due to its anti-secularist tones. Erdoğan left *Milli Görüş* and founded AKP with a group of friends. Özbudun notes that the new party moved from political Islam to conservative democracy (2006).

Even though the Islamic or ultra-conservative tones decreased in the party ideology, Erdoğan kept facing a challenge from the secularist establishment. AKP itself survived a closure case in 2007 by one vote of margin on the basis of violating the principle of secularism in the constitution. The same year, the military published a memorandum disapproving of the candidacy of Abdullah Gül for the presidency, whose wife wears a headscarf. Based on the whole history of *Milli Görüş* and AKP, one can convincingly argue that Erdoğan is an outsider according to the definition of Barr (2009), since he rose to power outside of the political establishment, and indeed, against it.

However, there is one important detail that should be reminded of. Can someone still be classified as an outsider after twelve years of being power? The answer to this question should be affirmative. Being an outsider is about the beginning of a political career. He still often mentions the headline written about him when he was convicted. In the headline, it was claimed that Erdoğan would not be able to get elected ever, even for a reeve. Erdoğan held more than fifty meetings with the Reeves during the years 2015 and 2019, and he began his speech reminding this headline. Therefore, it is justified to classify Erdoğan as an outsider; thus, Erdoğan supports the argument of Barr (2009) that being an outsider is essential for being populist.

Anti-establishment appeal

Another criterion proposed by Barr (2009) is the use of anti-establishment appeal by the populist leader. This condition, in a way, minimizes the whole ideational approach. The difference is that Barr (2009) thinks that anti-establishment appeal is not necessarily unique to populists, and it leads to populism only if it existed in combination with other proposed populist elements, namely an outsider leader, purpose of building or maintaining power and plebiscitarian

linkages. He believes that being an outsider enables the populist leader to employ anti-establishment appeal convincingly.

Erdoğan has been using anti-establishment rhetoric during the early years of his power (Aytaç & Öniş, 2014). He was depicting the society divided into two camps and criticizing the tutelage regime or the elites (Dinçşahin, 2012). Moreover, Yabancı claims that anti-establishment appeals, especially notions like 'the nation,' 'New Turkey' 'Old Turkey' antagonism were constant in Erdoğan's speeches. Interestingly, Yabancı's study shows that the early studies of AKP did not emphasize its populism, but rather its transition from Islamism to the center (2016). This confirms Barr's (2009) claim that the anti-establishment appeal alone is not sufficient enough to label a party or a leader as populist.

On the other hand, the qualitative study showed above that between the years 2014 and 2019, Erdoğan was targeting the establishment only in 13.7% of his speeches. He started to construct appeals in confrontation with the terrorist organizations, unspecified forces, or the West, instead of the establishment. This consequence is plausible if we consider that Erdoğan has been successful in defeating the establishment. Yabancı, in her excellent analysis, draws attention to the erosion of the credibility of using anti-establishment appeal after years of power (2016). She argues that especially after the Gezi protests of 2013, AKP's 'populism has taken a new shape' (Yabancı, 2016). Dependent labor unions and confederations were established as well as associations for women's issues. Thus, it moved the antagonism that is necessary for lingering on power to the civil society and moved beyond the simple 'the people against the elite' rhetoric (Yabancı, 2016). Yabancı's work shows that Erdoğan and his party carried on populism in a different social field. Anti-establishment rhetoric, especially for the populists in power for many years like Erdoğan, can fade away and be replaced by different methods and strategies.

Erdoğan's case shows that anti-establishment appeal is not a condition to be a populist. In fact, other scholars from the strategic approach implicitly agree with this statement. Roberts argues that some populists use redistributive economic policies while others use anti-establishment appeal (2007). This hints that, just like economic policies that are regarded by instrumental by both dominant approaches, the anti-establishment appeal is also no more than an instrument. Erdoğan, who uses any enemies now and not only the establishment, proves the statement of Kurt Weyland, too. He argues that populist leaders depict themselves as protectors

of the country from the enemies (2017). Utilizing rhetoric that creates antagonism between enemies like PKK, FETÖ and arguably the West, Erdoğan presents himself as the protector of the country.

Plebiscitarian linkages or personalistic leadership

In the first instance, plebiscitarian linkages and personalistic leadership might seem two distinct concepts. Yet, as Barr convincingly argues, the plebiscitarian linkage inevitably creates a personalistic leadership, because of its polarizing nature (2018). It comes to point that the electorate votes for or against the personalistic leader. While Barr emphasized the former (2009), Weyland emphasized the latter (2001). Therefore, both of these concepts will be analyzed in the context of Turkey together.

After the victory Erdoğan and his party achieved in the 2002 parliamentary elections, there have been four local elections (except the renewed Istanbul local election in 2019), five parliamentary elections, two presidential elections, and three referenda. In total, there have been fourteen public votes in seventeen years. The plebiscitarian linkage obviously expressed primarily with referendums. Three referendums were conducted for the amendment of the constitution.

However, it is argued that Erdoğan has been in constant campaign mode through speeches he gives on TV (Selçuk, 2016). More, the new presidential system Erdoğan insisted to bring requires 50% plus one vote to be elected for president. This constitutional amendment passed in a referendum in 2017 by 51.4% of the votes. The referendum and the presidential elections, coupled with Erdoğan's constant campaign mode transformed the political question in the country to accepting or rejecting himself (Selçuk, 2016). This is exactly how the plebiscitarian linkage created a personalistic leader.

Apart from such a dualistic division on Erdoğan's personality, there are other aspects of personalism that Erdoğan strongly carries. First, recently he started to be called by certain nicknames such as *Reis*, which generally used in Turkish for the captains. Secondly, The personalism also implies the concentration of power into Erdoğan's hands. This is not necessarily of the state power but also in the leadership of AKP. Taş (2015) carefully explains how AKP transformed from the leadership of a trio into a one-man rule. Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç were considered in the leadership next to Erdoğan since the start of AKP, by the date September 2015 neither of them took an office. Taş (2015) claims that one-man rule of AKP

started as early as 2012. Hence, one can argue that just plebiscitarian linkages also personalist leadership is confirmed by Erdoğan's case, only if both plebiscitarian linkage and personalist leadership are directly and solely related to the populist strategy.

In his analysis of the concentration of power in the hands or Erdoğan, Taş (2015) provides important insights into the personalism of Erdoğan. However, the subject of his work is not populism, but the transformation of Turkey politically. Basing on Guillermo O'Donnell's *Delegative Democracy* concept, Taş (2015) explains how Turkey transformed from tutelary democracy to delegative democracy. Delegative democracies are characterized by free elections, a degree of opposition one the one hand, and unrestrained presidentialism and authoritarianism on the other (Taş, 2015). Therefore, a personalist leader is argued to be an essential feature of delegative democracy, too. Here is how a delegative president explained by Taş: *In order to save the country in the face of mounting problems, this paternal figure, caretaker of the nation, is entitled to govern the country according to whatever he or she thinks is best* (2015, p. 778). This depiction accurately fits the persona Erdoğan creates through his discourse as confirmed by Taş (2015). He even interpreted Erdoğan's great desire to transform the country into a presidential system as a sign of delegative democracy (Taş, 2015).

The question faced at this moment is whether certain characteristics existed in populist authoritarian leaders are rooted in populism or delegative democracy. Just like Weyland (2017) describes the personalistic leader which he sees essential to populism, O'Donnell regards the delegative president as 'the embodiment of the nation and the main custodian of the national interest' (1993). One can very well argue that the populist leaders analyzed, they all led to delegative democracies in their countries, and therefore, it could be hard to attribute personalism to any of them undoubtedly. At least in Erdoğan's case, in which Turkey is classified as a delegative democracy and Erdoğan as populist, the personalism of Erdoğan cannot directly provide support for this component of the strategic approach. It could also be that these characteristics of Erdoğan are actually results of the transformation of turkey to a delegative democracy.

Unorganized mobilization

By contrast to Weyland who emphasized the unorganized nature of populism, Roberts argued that the labor organization and partisan organization traditions are central in determining the organizational features of populism in a certain country (2006). Barr agrees with the findings

of Roberts, and therefore he does not include any organizational features in his definition (2017). The strongest criticism came from the ideational approach was based on the centrality of the organizational features of the strategic definition (i.e., Mudde, 2017). The organizational features of populism will be analyzed in the context of Erdoğan and his party.

Selçuk emphasizes Erdoğan's constant appearance on TV and the media with speeches and claims that he maintains his direct and unmediated relationship with the masses throughout his rule (2016). While this finding is completely in line with Weyland's definition, there are other organizational features AKP carries. As already mentioned above for the anti-establishment appeal, Yabancı (2016) created dependent labor organizations and confederations. This finding goes against Roberts's argument that in the countries with a weak labor organization, populists rely on other forms of organizations. Yabancı claims that AKP created labor organizations in a country where labor organizations are traditionally weak since the 1980 coup d'état (2016).

In addition to Erdoğan's unmediated direct communication with the masses, and the creating of dependent labor organizations, AKP itself represents a very good example of partisan organization. According to the office of the Attorney General of Turkey, there are 9,931,103 members registered for the AKP by the date of July 2019. The importance of the party is evident in Erdoğan's come back to the party membership after the constitutional amendments in 2017. He had left the party after he was elected for president in 2014. His comeback supports the claim of Castaldo who states that AKP was not Erdoğan's electoral machine (2018) as the parties of Fujimori.

As seen, organizational features are not mutually exclusive. Erdoğan's party, AKP, expresses different kinds of mobilization at the same time. Erdoğan himself kept on unmediated direct communication with the masses with his constant presence on the media and almost daily speeches. There are more than five hundred speeches on the official website of the presidency and this excludes the campaign speeches he made. In addition to that, AKP himself forms an immense organization with almost ten million members and numerous offices around the country. Civil society is also a tool AKP reaches his control for his mobilization. It can be concluded that an unorganized mobilization is not a definitional character of populism, as the case of Erdoğan and AKP suggests. Rather, any type of mobilization can be utilized for strategic purposes.

Conclusion

The analysis of the strategic approach in the case of Erdoğan provided us great insights. Erdoğan faced serious challenges and crises to his hold on to power during the years 2013 and 2014. He utilized a populist strategy to maintain his power and actually became successful in it. Erdoğan also confirms the second component of strategic definition, a political outsider. Scholars agree that Erdoğan rose to power from a periphery party. Indeed, he used his outsider status to employ an anti-establishment appeal, however, especially after more than a decade of being in power anti-establishment appeal lost its utility. Rather, Erdoğan used different rhetorical tools like terrorist organizations coupled with the creation of a dependent civil society. Therefore, the anti-establishment appeal cannot really be argued to have an essential place in the populism of Erdoğan. Next, Erdoğan did use plebiscitary linkages and he presented himself as a personalistic leader. He consolidated the power both in the party and in the state. Erdoğan confirms this component of the definition as well. Lastly, AKP stands as a very organized party with many members, and Erdoğan does not see it as his electoral machine at all. Rather, he uses many types of mobilization methods. Therefore, Erdoğan does not confirm the 'unorganized mobilization' feature of populism as articulated by Weyland (2001).

5.   Conclusion

This study aims at explaining why Erdoğan is labeled as populist. This explanation requires her from existing approaches for defining populism. The dominant approach is the ideational approach, which argues that populism is a specific set of ideas. Accordingly, the discourses of the politicians are the primary resources to investigate. Certain notions or ideas are regarded as unique to the proposed populist ideology. The other approach for explaining populism is the strategic approach. According to the strategic approach, populism is a specific strategy to gain and exercise power. For this approach, the agency and its actions are regarded as more insightful compared to the discourse of the politicians.

By using the ideational and the strategic approach, this study tried to explain why and to what extent Erdoğan is labeled as populist. The first explanation was given by using the definition and the method created by Hawkins (2009, 2010). The analysis of one hundred thirty-nine speeches Erdoğan made between August 2014 and June 2019 through Hawkins's method provided us important findings. When the Hawkins Method applied to these speeches, the

average populist score (0-6 scale) Erdoğan got turned out to be 3.39. This score corresponds to the Hawkins Grade of 1. This result is quite contrary to the score found by Team Populism and published in *The Guardian,* though the same method was applied. However, maybe the more interesting result about the Hawkins Method was the fluctuation of scores through time. Erdoğan's speeches could take very different values with a visible correlation with certain political events such as the elections and the attempted coup d'état. This suggests a very important conclusion: the populist discourse, as defined and described by Hawkins, can be used strategically according to the political events. If one argues that the correlation has no causality (due to the limitations of this study it is not possible to test it here), then still we are left with a random fluctuation. Graph 4 shows that the speeches of Erdoğan get grades in a wide range, making it impossible to argue that he has a certain level of populist score that is constant or consistent.

The very same speeches also provided important insights into the concepts used by Erdoğan. The concept of *millet* is used almost in the same manner with 'the people' that is used by European politicians labeled as populist. Erdoğan is found to be using this notion in almost 90% of his speeches. One can conclude that *millet* constitutes a fundamental element of Erdoğan's discourse. It is also found that the notion of *millet* is used differently from 'the people': it implies a religious and sectarian connotation rather than including every part of the society. Maybe more interestingly, it is found that Erdoğan places certain terrorist organizations rather than a 'conspiring elite' on an adversary to *millet*. These terrorist organizations are FETÖ, the Gülenists, and PKK, the armed Kurdish insurgency. In almost 62% of his speeches he mentions FETÖ, and in a little bit more than 53% of the speeches he mentions PKK. Mentioning of terrorist organizations should be considered as unique to Erdoğan due to the distinct political circumstances in Turkey. One can also argue that being in power more than a decade inevitably led Erdoğan to find adversaries other than 'the elite'.

Apart from the primary sources, namely the speeches of Erdoğan, the search derived from secondary sources also provided important conclusions on Erdoğan. In line with the agreement of the scholars (i.e., Aytaç & Öniş, 2014; Castaldo, 2018; Aytaç & Elçi, 2019), Erdoğan should be categorized as an outsider due to the unique center-periphery relations in modern Turkey. He represented the religious and conservative portion of the society that used to be excluded from the political level. This enabled his use of anti-establishment rhetoric, but only

after he defeated the bureaucratic establishment and only until he created his cadres in the bureaucracy. Rather, he employed different strategies to appeal to people such as creating a dependent civil society, such as establishing for instance labor unions or women's associations managed by acquittances. This created a civil society that backs the government and the president in their decisions. Furthermore, Erdoğan's party AKP is found to be essential to the political career of Erdoğan. The new party introduced a new ideology for him that paved to way to appeal to greater masses in Turkey. His turning back to AKP as the chairman after the constitutional amendments shows that AKP is more than an electoral machine to him. It is also shown that his monopoly of power within the party coincided and maybe even caused his monopoly of power in the state apparatus.

This study makes three direct impacts to the scholarship on populism and the capacity of the existing approaches on explaining the populism of Erdoğan:

First, it shows that the Hawkins Method seems ontologically flawed. The whole method is established on Chávez, and the politicians are compared only to Chávez. More, the holistic grading and analytical grading technique are blended in such fashion; the method loses its analytical utility. It cannot differentiate between intuition and empirical findings. One can observe that during the application of the rubric, the Team Populism graders fall into this trap (Hawkins et. al., 2019). Consequently, and especially when it is applied to a big number of speeches of Erdoğan, the grades assigned here does not correspond to the grades Team Populism found. On the contrary, the findings point that Erdoğan uses what Hawkins calls populist discourse strategically. More, the fluctuation of the populist score measured by the Hawkins Method, even if accepted as random and without a causal relationship with the political events, hints that populism is not a worldview or consistent set of ideas. If populism is accepted to be a worldview, then the Hawkins Method fails to measure it since Erdoğan's speeches could take any grade at any period, with a great fluctuation.

Second, the definition of Mudde, or in other words the ideational definition, only partly explains the populism of Erdoğan. Erdoğan does use a notion, *millet,* that would substitute 'the people,' and also *milli irade* which would substitute the will of the people; however, 'the elite' in the discourse of Erdoğan no longer dominantly exists. Rather, other enemies are expressed with much more frequency. Consequently, when one of the 'core concepts' of a 'thin-centered ideology' fails to be universal then we can no longer talk about a 'populist ideology'. Although

Turkey was under a tutelary democracy during the first years of Erdoğan's power, he used very little anti-establishment rhetoric. His anti-establishment rhetoric increased only after he was successful at weakening and transforming the tutelary regime. Therefore, it means that Erdoğan has not been vocal in his criticism *because* a powerful establishment did exist. Only after the establishment was defeated, he could talk about it more often. This is a fascinating finding that shows that avoiding an anti-establishment appeal does not necessarily mean that there is no ruling establishment. Finally, this study interestingly confirms that if one studies populism on the words, the conclusion one can make will be what Laclau arrived: populism is only a way of constructing the political. Because 'the elite' changed in the discourse of Erdoğan and it became only 'the enemy'. As Carl Schmitt points out, friends and enemies or us and them constitute the basis of the political. However, both the ideational approach and the Laclauan approach ignore anything else other than the discourse. Populism involves more than words.

The third conclusion, and maybe the most important one, is that populism is something strategic. Instead of changing his ideology, it makes more sense to argue that Erdoğan used populism to maintain his power. This study confirms that Erdoğan's power was threatened, and he used populist strategies to stay in power. This is also in line with the prominent works on the scholarship of Erdoğan and populism (i.e., Aytaç & Öniş, 2014; Yabancı, 2016; Aytaç & Ezgi, 2019). In this study, it is found that anti-establishment appeal and unorganized mobilization are not essential for the strategic definition of populism. On the other hand, Erdoğan's case confirmed the importance of the outsider status, the plebiscitary linkages and the personalistic leadership. Although it is confirmed by an analysis of Erdoğan, that populism implies a strategy to win and maintain power, it still needs to be explained that how populism is distinct from other strategies, for politics itself is about power relations.

Erdoğan's case can be definitely useful for disproving definitions or definitional components since they claim to be universal. However, a component that is confirmed by Erdoğan cannot be definitional still, since there can be other examples against it. For example, Hungary's Orbán is not an outsider. Or why Macron is not considered as a populist although he is a personalistic leader and a maverick (if not outsider)?

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