Swinging Diplomacy
The Role of Jazz in U.S.-Japan Relations

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Abstract

While in recent years, there has been put more interest towards the role of culture in International Relations, the majority of studies focuses solely on cultural diplomacy as either a tool of propaganda during Cold War foreign policy, or as a way in order to create peace and mutual understanding. There is yet, however, no consent among scholars in regard to the definition and function of cultural diplomacy. In particular, the field of music diplomacy, thought its undeniable presence in the history of international relations, has yet received little attention. In this regard the aim of the thesis is to give a more accurate picture of the power and role of both cultural diplomacy and music diplomacy in international relations, by looking into detail to one of the most dynamic bilateral relationships in international relation's history, namely the U.S.-Japan relation and the role of jazz during the occupation period.

Abstract

Negli ultimi anni è possibile osservare un crescente interesse verso il ruolo della cultura nelle relazioni internazionali. Tuttavia, la maggior parte degli studi si concentra esclusivamente sulla diplomazia culturale come strumento di propaganda durante la politica estera della Guerra Fredda, o come un modo per creare pace e comprensione reciproca. Si evidenzia dunque un assenza di consenso tra gli studiosi in merito alla definizione e alla funzione della diplomazia culturale. In particolare, il campo della diplomazia della musica (ritenuta la sua presenza innegabile nella storia delle relazioni internazionali), ha ricevuto ancora poca attenzione. L’obiettivo della tesi è perciò quello di fornire un quadro più preciso del potere e del ruolo della diplomazia culturale e della diplomazia musicale nelle relazioni internazionali, esaminando in dettaglio uno dei rapporti bilaterali più dinamici nella storia della relazione internazionale, vale a dire il Relazioni USA-Giappone e ruolo del jazz durante il periodo dell’occupazione.

Keywords: cultural diplomacy, music diplomacy, jazz diplomacy, U.S.-Japan relations, jazu kissa
This thesis is devoted to my family, friends and all the lovers of jazz and music out in the world.
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Introduction

Culture and diplomacy have a long history in international relations, which can be traced back to the ancient times. As Richard T. Arndt (2006) notes for instance in ‘The First Resort of Kinds: American Cultural Diplomacy in the twentieth century’, kings during the Bronze Age were sending diplomats on a regular basis to other neighbouring kingdoms to exchange precious gifts. The cultural gifts, varying from gold and fine robes to horses and slaves, functioned as an important cultural diplomacy device for the king, as they gained allies, while at the same time fostering the king’s prestige among other kingdoms. Similarly, also music has been used as a cultural diplomacy instrument throughout history, dating back as far as to early modern Europe. One of the earliest accounts for this, as Anne Spohr (2014) notes in ‘Concealed music in early modern diplomatic ceremonial’, was the usage of concealed music by Danish king Christian IV during the sixteenth century, in order to impress his foreign guests and improve Denmark’s image abroad. However, despite there exists a fair amount of evidence that proves the usage of culture and music as diplomacy device throughout international history, cultural diplomacy remains one of the most neglected issues within the field of international relations. In fact, a large part of the current state of research on the subject was instead contributed by scholars coming from other fields of studies, such as musicologists, historians or anthropologists. A remarkable exception to this make the works of Jessica Gienow-Hecht (2015) ‘Music and international relations in the twentieth century’ and of Cécile Prévost-Thomas and Frédéric Ramel (2018) ‘International Relations, Music and Diplomacy: Sounds and Voices on the International Stage’. Both volumes discuss a wide set of diverse case studies that illustrates the multiple usage of music as diplomacy device in international history, and thus offered valuable resources for framing the role of music in international relations in realms of this thesis. The lack of research of cultural diplomacy in the field of international relations, can be explained to the predomination of realist and liberalist theory during the twentieth century, which both neglect the role of culture. Instead, cultural diplomacy only started to be considered within the discipline by the ‘cultural turn’ in international relation’s theory during the late 1980s. However, even though the cultural turn has contributed to a growing interest of the role of culture in the field, it has failed at the same time to contribute to a clearer view on the topic. Indeed, the subject remains one of the most vexed debates within the field of international relations due this day. In simple terms the main
debate can be divided into two camps. The first camp, is largely based on Joseph Nye’s (1990)\(^1\) definition of cultural diplomacy, in the form of ‘soft power’. According to this view, cultural diplomacy is used by a state in order to promote foreign policy interests. On the other hand, the second camp refers to the definition of Milton Cumming\(^2\) (2004), who describes cultural diplomacy as the promotion of shared values, ideas and mutual understanding. According to this view, cultural diplomacy is thus not a foreign diplomacy tool, as in the definition of Nye, but represents the mutual interest of two states, with the goal to promote cooperation and harmony. Similar, also the discussion of the role of music as cultural diplomacy device in international relations, can be divided into two fractions: on the one side music is regarded as a tool of power and violence and on the other side it is seen as a (from politics) neutral ground, which offers the opportunity to bring harmony, universal values and peace among states. However, as this thesis argues, neither of the two approaches is satisfactory in explaining the full role of culture and music in the realms of international relations. In fact, I agree with Gienow-Hecht (2015), Mario M. Zamorano (2016)\(^3\) and Erik Pajtinka (2014)\(^4\) that there are major problems in both approaches that become visible when looking at the usage of culture and music through a historical perspective. By taking a historical perspective, it becomes evident that throughout time, cultural diplomacy has been used by multiple agents, including both state actors and non-state related actors, to promote diverse objectives, including harmony and violence, over time and space. Thus, the perception and usage of culture as of music are not constant throughout time, place and actor. Instead, as this thesis argues, they are of a multiple complex nature, which is shaped through the continuously changing relationship between this three variables. In this regard, I argue that it is not advisable to frame cultural diplomacy, either by soft power theory, or by mutual understanding alone, but to take a broader approach that represents both spectres. Thus, this thesis will analyse music as a cultural diplomacy device, through a constructivist approach of international relations and by a broad definition of cultural diplomacy, which acknowledges the changing role of

cultural diplomacy in relation to the time, space and agents in which it is set in. I will use for this purpose the definition by Pajtinka, who coins cultural diplomacy as ‘a set of activities, undertaken directly by or in collaboration with diplomatic authorities of a state, which are aimed at the promotion of foreign policy interests of this state in the realm of cultural policy primarily by means of fostering its cultural exchange with other (foreign) states’ and that cultural diplomacy ‘can be aimed at the promotion of mutual understanding among states, but this should not be regarded as its final goal, but only a means of realising its final objectives’ which is ‘foreign policy interests’ (Pajtinka 2014: p.100). By doing this, I try to avoid ‘cultural blindness’ and seek to contribute to a more suitable answer to the leading question of the thesis: ‘What is the role of music as cultural diplomacy device in international relations.’ In order to find an answer to this question, I provide a case study, which focuses on the more precise question: ‘What role did jazz music, as a cultural diplomacy device, play in the realms of U.S.-Japan relations from the pre-war period to the end of the occupation period.’ I have consciously chosen the genre jazz for the case study for several reasons. Foremost, jazz provides an excellent example for the diverse usage of cultural diplomacy in context to the time, space and actor, due to its worldwide presence and popularity during a period of rising international tensions. Jazz has been introduced to Japan in the 1910s, where it received increased popularity among the Japanese population, which lasted throughout the Second World War and the occupation period. It was hence present during a period in which Japan and U.S. relations were facing major tensions. This fact arguably makes jazz as a cultural diplomacy device, to a relatively interesting subject to look at. Furthermore, jazz was (and is) still largely perceived worldwide, as the representative for American classical culture. The fact that jazz remained present in Japan, even during a time where Japan and the U.S. were officially at war with each other, thus exemplifies as I argue, the importance that states as authoritarian regimes give to music as cultural diplomacy tool. Moreover, while there is a broad spectre of works focusing on the U.S-Japan relation during the occupation period, there are yet only few volumes available concerning the role of music and the genre of jazz. An exception for this makes Taylor E. Atkins (2001) work ‘Blue Nippon: Authenticating Jazz’, which offered valuable information about the history and perception of jazz in Japan and functioned as one of the primary sources in regards to this thesis. Another interesting work concerning the issue provides Alexander Coyle’s (2014) ‘Jazz in Japan changing culture through music’, which discusses the role of jazz in context to identity. However, Atkins is primarily focused on
the question of Japanese jazz and authenticity, while Coyle is focused on the role of jazz and identify. Both do however not consider the role of jazz as cultural diplomacy device in the Japan U.S. relationship. Other primary sources for this case study include also works, which focus on the history of music in Japan in a broader sense. Michael Bourdaghs (2012) Sayonara America, Sayonara Nippon, for instance discusses the history of the establishment of Japanese-Pop. ‘JAPANOISE: Music at the edge of circulation’, by David Novak’s (2013) is focused on special elements in the world of Japanese music. Finally, another valuable source concerning the history of Japanese jazu kissa, provides Michael Molasky’s (2005) ‘Sengo Nihon no jazu bunka: eiga, bungaku, angura’.

Let me now shortly outline the structure of the thesis. The thesis is divided into three parts: theory (chapter one and two), history (chapter three) and case study (chapter four). The first chapter is devoted to the issue of terminology of culture and cultural diplomacy theory. It provides a historical perspective to highlight the changing perceptions and usage of culture and cultural diplomacy in international relations. Further, it gives an introduction to diverse theories about cultural diplomacy within international relations and estimates to illustrate why constructivist theory is the most favourable approach to the subject. The second chapter sets music and jazz in the context of cultural diplomacy and international relations. It provides a historical perspective on the multiple usage of music and jazz throughout international relations. The second part of the thesis, is devoted to a historical overview concerning the U.S.-Japan relationship from the 1910s to the end of the occupation in 1952. Chapter three, will discuss into more detail how political and economic factors as well as the change of international political dimensions, led to growing tensions in the bilateral relationship. Further, it will look into detail at the two phases of the occupation period and discuss the diverse policies and regulations by SCAP, as well as their effect on U.S.-Japan relations. Finally, the last part of the thesis is devoted to the role of jazz in the U.S.-Japan relationship. The case study is divided into three parts. The first part, will analyse how jazz has been used by state related actors, in form of Japan’s military leader ship during the wartime and the SCAP during the occupation period. The second part, is devoted to the usage of jazz music by individual non-state related actors. For this I will provide the example of the usage of diegetic jazz in Akira Kurosawa’s movies Fallen Angel and Stray Dog and the Boogie Woogie singles of Shizuko Kasagi and Ryōichi Hattori. Finally, the last part of the case study is devoted to the role of Japanese jazu kissa as a space of cultural diplomacy during the war and postwar period.
Chapter 1

1. Cultural Diplomacy: An introduction

‘Even with the best airport security measurements and visa regulations imaginable, one can never replace the strength that comes from a sustainable dialogue and understanding between cultures or “civilizations”. Cultural diplomacy is an enormous opportunity to avoid or minimize such clashes, albeit an opportunity that has not yet been fully understood or perfectly applied.’ (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: p.552)

Cultural diplomacy has a long history in international relations, which can be traced back to the exchange of cultural goods between different kingdoms in antiquity (Stelowska 2015). Yet, the subject has long been neglected (with the exception of a few scholars) in the field of international relations. It was only recently that the issue attracted the interest among international relations scholars, which can be explained through the little attention on the power of culture by the two dominant traditional theories within the field, realism and liberalism. In realism, culture is seen as a mere ‘add-on’ of the dominating sources of international relations structure, such as economic, political or military power. Liberalism in contrast only considers the role of culture in a global universal form and neglects the role of cultural diversity (Valbjørn, 2006). Instead, cultural diplomacy only started to be considered in the discipline through the so called ‘cultural’ (Jackson, 2008) or as others define it ‘aesthetic’ turn (Bleiker, 2001) during the late 1980s. However, although the cultural turn has contributed to a growing interest of the role of culture in the field, it has failed at the same time to contribute to a clearer view on the topic and led to more complicated questions than satisfying solutions to the issue (Jackson 2009); (Rowley and Weldes 2016). I believe therefore that the assumption of Gienow-Hecht and Donfried quoted above, is quite suiting when regarding the issue in a contemporary context. Even though, cultural diplomacy has the

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potential to reduce conflicts and to manage world politics in a more peaceful way, there is still a lack of understanding how it works and in what way it should be used. Indeed, the subject remains one of the most vexed and complicated debates within the field of international relations (Valbjørn, 2006). Due to this day there is no consent among scholars in how to define, structure, explain or approach cultural diplomacy. Much of this can be explained to the intangible nature of culture that continuously (re)defines what we perceive as such (Reeves 2004). For example, culture may be defined through its visible elements, such as language, race, cuisine or fashion. At the same time it may be also defined by hidden elements, such as social values, norms or certain religious rituals (Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones 2007:pp.27-29). Hence, the intangible nature of culture makes cultural diplomacy difficult to measure in regular quantitative terms, as there is no universal approach to the issue. However, I believe it would be naïve to not recognize culture, at least as variable in the complex structure of international relations. Further, I agree with Reeves (2004), Schneider (2006), Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010), Zamorano (2016) and many others that the diverse and complex nature that defines culture, its interpretation, purpose, structure and our relation to it, is something that demands to be considered and observed from a multidisciplinary perspective and therefore also by international relations scholars. In this regard, I suggest to look at the role of culture through a historical perspective in order to determine its changing role through actor, space and time. Moreover, in terms of international relations I argue that a constructivist approach is the most favourable option, as it regards the structure of international relations in realm of the exchange of values and ideas.

Thus, this introductory chapter estimates to contribute to a better understanding of not only what cultural diplomacy is, but further aims to distinguish in what way its role in international relations has changed over time, space and actor. The first part of this chapter will therefore be devoted to the issue of terminology of culture and cultural diplomacy. It will determine the problematic of the changing definition and use of culture in international relations, by looking at the issue first through a historical perception. Further, after

considering the historical context I will then argue for a suiting definition of both culture and cultural diplomacy in realms of this thesis. The second part of this chapter, will look into the dimensions of the relations between cultural diplomacy and international relations. First, I will look into the two core theories of the field, realism and liberalism and argue in more detail, why neither of these approaches is satisfactory to explain the role of cultural diplomacy in international relations. Second, I will look into soft power theory and Neo-Gramscianism, which emerged during the so-called ‘cultural turn’ in international relations and argue why both of these approaches are also not desirable. Finally, I will argue for why constructivist theory as a more favourable approach on cultural diplomacy in international relations.

1.1 The problematic of the definition of culture

One of the core issues in regards of the field of cultural diplomacy, which is simultaneously also one of the main explanations for the lack of attention by scholars for the field, can be attributed to the complexity to define what cultural diplomacy is, how it is structured and what it is aimed for. In fact, scholars to this day still have no consent in a shared definition of cultural diplomacy. This issue may be explained due to the fact that it is already problematic to agree on a precise definition of culture itself. In fact, depending on the space, time or study field of an author, one will come across a multitude of different definitions for culture, such as:

‘Culture ... is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.’
(Tylor 1871: 1)¹³

‘Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiment in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other, as conditional elements of future action.’ (Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952: p.47)¹⁴

“Culture is the collective programming of the human mind that distinguishes the members of one human group from those of another. Culture in this sense is a system of collectively held values.” – (Hofstede 1991: p.5)¹⁵

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Importantly, while the above mentioned quotations are expressing a variety of different interpretations of culture, it is to note that each definition is equally true. This is the case, as Julie Reeves (2004) for instance points out, due to the fact that our definition and perception of culture and therefore also its structure and purpose, have been continuously changing over time and space. In other words, time and space do not only influence the diverse definitions of culture, but also the way we interpret them. For example, the initial perception of culture, was rooted in the Italian word ‘cultura’ (coming from the Latin term colere), which referred to the cultivation of soil and animals. The term was then borrowed by the French, who turned it into ‘culture’ and associated it with manners and etiquette, through which culture was regarded by fifteen and sixteen century Europeans. German intellectuals then during the ninetieth century introduced their own version of ‘Kultur’, which regarded it from a more humanist, spiritual side, and so on (Reeves 2004: p.14-17). In other words, when analysing culture, it is necessary to remember the changing meaning of culture to both the author and reader over time and space. For instance, what a French individual understood as culture when reading a definition of a French author during the eighteenth century, is likely to vary, from the perceptions of culture that an Austrian individual, who was reading a book by an Austrian author on culture, would have had during the same period. At the same time there may be a difference in the perceptions of culture by a German author and reader during the mid-twentieth century, in contrast to the ones of a German author and reader during the twenty-first century. The meaning of culture, hence, is dependent on the current space and time the reader and author is situated in.

Further, similar to the definition of culture also the purpose of it changed over time, space and actor. The usage of cultural gifts as both way of diplomacy and distribution of power can be tracked back to the ancient times. During the Bronze Age for example, kings would send their diplomats abroad, carrying cultural gifts, varying from sacks of gold, to fine robes, furniture, jewellery, ornaments, cosmetics, slaves, horses and so on, to other kingdoms (Arndt 2006: pp.1-24)\(^\text{16}\). Importantly the exchange of cultural gifts for the kings had a two-sided function: On the one hand, the gifts were used as a diplomatic instrument to gain allies and reduce disputes. On the other hand, they did also expressed power. A good example for this double function of culture, is the distribution of silk garments by the Byzantines to Western

medieval rulers. During the early Middle Ages, the Byzantium dominated the production of luxury silks, which were sent as gifts to the multiple kingdoms across Europe. The silk robes had a special role in the sense that they functioned as an expression of Byzantine political ideology by ‘mediating between the Byzantines’ political theory of “One God, one Christ, one emperor” and the reality of multiple kingdoms beyond their borders’ (Woodfin 2008: p.44). Each of the robes was decorated with images of eagles, griffins, lions or hornets, which were the prominent symbols of imperial power and dignity of the Byzantine empire. On the one hand the wearing of the silk robes gave the foreign rulers power by ‘symbolically investing the competing rulers as official members of the Byzantine court’. On the other hand, the Western European dignitaries were distributing their dependent relation to the Emperor, by wearing the Byzantine robes at court (Woodfin 2008: pp.43-44). As can be seen through this example, culture has been both used as a means to promote mutual understanding as well as a means to promote and secure power, already during ancient times. However, as this thesis is focused on more recent history, namely between the pre-war period to the end of the occupation period in 1952, I argue that in order to find a suitable definition for culture and thus cultural diplomacy, it is necessary to take look into the distinct perception of culture during the last two centuries.

1.1.1 The institutionalization of Culture

What we define and interpret as ‘cultural diplomacy’ today, is highly linked to the events that took place during the institutionalization of culture from the late nineteenth century of Europe. Gregory Paschaldis (2009) distinguishes here between four phases in the development of modern cultural diplomacy: Cultural Nationalism (1870’s-1914), Cultural Propaganda (1914-1945), Cultural Diplomacy (1945-1989) and Cultural Capitalism (1989-now). During the nineteenth century European intellectuals and artists, as well as volunteering organizations, introduced cultural diplomacy bodies as a new way to manifest their prestige abroad. Their initial goal was to help spread the national language and high-culture to places where

governments had limited participation and to foster their prestige (Zamorano 2016: pp. 169-170). A variety of scholars, point to France to be the birthplace of the institutionalization of cultural diplomacy. In Paris of the late nineteenth century, a group of French scientists, diplomats and writers, established the Alliance Française (1883) and the Mission Laique français (1902). Both institutions, were privately funded and sought to manifest control in the French colonies and abroad, by promoting the French language and culture (Faucher and Lane 2013: pp.285-286). Shortly after, also other European countries followed the French example and created their own cultural institutions, such as the German ‘Allgemeine Schulverein zur Erhaltung Deutschtums im Auslande’ (1881) or the Italian Società Dante Alighieri (1889) (Paschalidis 2009: pp.277-278). It is important to note, however, that the German and Italian cultural institutions had diverse objectives in comparison to the French. French scholars (and later also the British and Americans) regarded culture as an individual matter, embodied by intellectual and personal endeavour, education and improvement. In contrast to this, German scholars defined their ‘Kultur’ as a national concept and the spirit of the German speaking people (Reeves 2004: p.20). This difference becomes also evident when looking at the aim of the German and Italian cultural institutions in comparison to the Alliance Française. Both the Italian and the German cultural institutions initially did not use culture for the purpose of expansionism, but instead to foster the ‘cultural nation’ for German and Italian expats. In this sense, the ‘Allgemeiner Schulverein zur Erhaltung Deutschtums im Auslande’ promoted German language in German-Speaking communities in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Similarly, the institutes of the ‘Società Dante Alighieri’, were placed largely around major trading ports in the East Mediterranean Sea to promote Italian language for Italian immigrant communities. One reason for this diverse purpose of culture may be attributed to the fact that both Italy and Germany achieved national unification rather late compared to France, and were thereby preoccupied in promotion of culture through their ‘national space’ (Paschalidis 2009: pp.280-281). This diverse use and interpretation of culture among the European states fostered even more with the turn of the century.

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1.1.2 Culture and the two world wars

During the early twentieth century, the rise of the Great War strongly influenced the status of culture. While it is to note that during the interwar period there was also the promotion of culture as a means of mutual understanding by nongovernmental workers. This point of view of culture, unfortunately was not strong enough to remain, considering the rising tension in the 1930s, where states started to lose sight of this vision of international cooperation and communication (Iriye 2004).

Instead, there was the developed of a new awareness of the power and influence that cultural diplomacy would provide for their foreign interest. Culture in this sense was started to be largely viewed and used for the promotion of propaganda, both by authoritarian and liberal states. This process started with the transformation of former privately funded cultural institutions, into public apparatuses of the state. Again the French were making the first step, by establishing the ‘Bureau des écoles et des œuvres’ (1909). The objective of the new Bureau was to coordinate the different cultural agencies located in foreign nations and to establish a network of cultural institutes in order to spread awareness for French culture abroad. In 1923, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs further established the first office for cultural diplomacy in history. The strong interest in the promotion of French culture, art and language, fostered further with the rising political tensions in Europe in the 1930s. France had strong interest to win friends abroad by increasing the export of French art. In particular, the support of America and the American public, which was still holding cautious neutrality, was seen as a major objective by the French, both during the first and Second World War (Paschalidis 2009: p. 280). It is to note that the French were not the only state, which used cultural propaganda in order to convince the Americans from their cause. Also, Great Britain during the Second World War launched an intense propaganda campaign in form of an international broadcast. The broadcast was addressed at American listeners and had the purpose to convince the American audience to object their neutral position and come to Britain’s aid (Cull 2008: p.42-43).

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Also in Germany and Italy, culture started to be taken with more interest by the state from the late 1920s onwards. One reason for this was that culture started to be associated more and more with evolutionary theory of social sciences by Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck\(^\text{22}\). Differently than the evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin, the one of Lamarck stresses both environmental influence and biological inheritance, which resulted into an increased interest in ideas of race among social scientists and anthropologists during the late 1920s (Reeves 2004: pp.24-26). When Hitler took over control in Germany, the predominating role of culture as a peaceful promoter of German national space changed drastically. Under the Nazi regime, culture instead started to be regarded as an efficient weapon of war. Cultural politics were used by the Nazis in an aggressive matter to claim ‘German-speaking identity regardless of nationality’ and to assert the ‘cultural superiority of the so-called Aryan-race over others’ (Mulcahy 1999: p.10)\(^\text{23}\). The aggressive use of culture by the Nazis happened through different apparatuses. For instance, in 1941, Hitler turned the private cultural association ‘Deutsche Akademie’ (1923) into an official institution of the state, which sought to promote German Language abroad and foster its proper place as a world language (Paschalidis 2009: pp.280-281). Moreover, the Nazis politicalized other aspects of culture by eliminating and censoring any non-Germanic element in literature, film, music, theatre or art (Reeves 2004: pp.86-87). Simultaneously, there was a strong promotion of any German related cultural good, as in the case of the pieces of Wilhelm Richard Wagner (Trueman, 2012)\(^\text{24}\). Hence, what should be perceived and interpreted as culture by the German people was strongly defined and controlled by the Nazi regime. Culture in the German case worked as an aggressive tool of propaganda.

\(^{22}\) It is to note that the evolutionary theory in social sciences was not solely present in Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy, but in fact widely spread from the 1920s onwards. During this time race used to be a credible and common way to distinguish differences among people, as one may do with cultural differences today (Reeves 2004: pp.86).


At the same time, also in fascist Italy culture started to be used more and more for propaganda purposes. In 1926 for instance, Mussolini assigned the state controlled institutes ‘Instituti Italiani di cultura’, to take over the functions of the Dante Alighieri Societies in order to promote and spread fascist propaganda within Italy and abroad (Paschalidis 2009: p.281). In particular, literature, music and cinema were widely used to increase Italian hegemony, express a common heritage and promote the benefits of fascist life (Illiano and Sala 2012: pp.9-13). Importantly, the cultural propaganda was not circulating among the German and Italian people only, but was also aimed at neutral states in Eastern Europe and Latin America, as well as to potential enemy’s as the United States or Great Britain. However, the rising presence of German and Italian cultural institutions in the neutral regions alarmed the Anglo-American states and led them to develop their own cultural institutions with counter propaganda programs in respond. Britain did this in form of the ‘British Council’ in 1934, after the rise of Italian institutions in the Balkans and Eastern Europe (Paschalidis 2009: pp.280-281). The British Council sought to promote British life abroad, encourage the study of English literature and render abroad available British contributions to literature, science and fine arts (Mulcahy 1999: p.9). The United States, followed the British four years later by the creation of the ‘Division of Cultural Relations’ after the ‘cultural offensive’ of Nazi Germany in Latin American countries during the 1930s. The Division was based on a proposal for a Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, which was formed by the American government during the Pan American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in Buenos Aires in 1936 (Mulcahi 1999: p.10). The convention sought the promotion of American educational and cultural programs through the reciprocal exchange of unofficial groups such as labour unions, youth groups or social services organizations. Furthermore, the exchanges should strengthen cultural and intellectual relations between the States and other nations, as well as improving the American image as a ‘good neighbour’ abroad. Moreover, there was also a clear political overtone, as the United States had their own interest in the cultural dominance within the Latin American regions, and therefore saw the ‘well-organized and well-subsidized’ cultural institutions of Nazi Germany as a threat (Mulcahy 1999: pp.10-12). In this sense, during the Second World War culture was used and perceived from not only authoritarian, but also liberate states, although through less aggressive means, in order to

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promote propaganda messages. However, with the end of the Second World War in 1945, culture received again a restructure in its definition and purpose.

1.1.3 Culture during the post war period and the Cold War

During the post war period, culture continued to have a prominent role in foreign relations in form of ‘cultural diplomacy’. Culture during this time was continuously politicized and thus widely regarded as an extended period of propaganda. This point of view can be explained due to the role of cultural diplomacy as tool or ‘weapon’ of foreign policy during the Cold War (Paschaladis 2009: pp.282-283). During the Cold War, cultural diplomacy was in its blossom period. The ongoing conflict between the U.S. and Soviet Union in the Cold War, initiated the establishment of a series of cultural programs and institutions, from both nations, with the purpose to foster their ideological messages through the world (Gienow-Hecht, 2015)26. In their paranoia of the ‘red threat’ the State Department started to open up American Cultural Centres and libraries in Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa. The main objective of this centres was to promote American values, ideas and contribute to a more positive image of the United States abroad. Next to the cultural centres, cultural diplomacy was directed also through American artists and musicians. Washington sent a variety of its best orchestras and bands around the globe to promote a positive image of the American way of life (Schneider 2006: pp.192-193). At the same time, the USSR countered this, by using their own cultural facilities and artists to win the hearts and minds of people in neutral regions (Schneider 2005: pp.157-158)27. They were furthermore, highly critical towards Washington’s usage of the jazz ambassadors, considering the still active segregation laws within the southern states. The excessive launch of cultural facilities by both the U.S. and the Soviets, hence, invites to consider the usage of culture during this period as a sole tool of the ideological war between capitalism and communism. However, while it is true that the intense promotion of inter-war cultural competition led to the creation of a variety of cultural resources during the Cold War


years, it is important to yet consider also another demarcation point, which is modernity. As Zamorano (2016) for instance argues, the usage of culture has become more complex during the post war period, due to the rise of globalization. Indeed, through globalization and modernization a variety of new agents in form of non-state related actors, such as supranational organizational bodies, local social movements or private individuals entered the game. These new players, contributed to new dimensions of the subject and simultaneously made cultural diplomacy more complex, in the way that it started to represent not only state interest, but further non-state related objectives (Zamorano 2016: pp.171-172). In particular, supranational international organizations play powerful actors in this regard, as they are determining international norms due to their bureaucratic structure which to deliver goals that others want. This, bureaucratic structure as Finnemore argues, gives international organizations a special sphere of authority and the ability to shape the behaviour of others in both direct and indirect ways (Barnett and Finnemore, 2005)\textsuperscript{28}. One of the most prominent examples, of such supranational organizations in terms of culture was the creation of UNESCO in November 16, 1945 (Paschalidis 2009: pp. 282-283). The creation of UNESCO contributed to a rebalance of power within the agents of cultural diplomacy on the global stage. The organization questioned the neo-colonial order and promoted the incorporation of popular and traditional culture into the context of the international political dialogue. Furthermore, it introduced the stage to new actors (nations), which had little acting power in cultural diplomacy before (Zamorano 2016: p.171). In this sense, during the Cold War period there was also a more comprehensive, non-élist understanding of culture, which can be also linked to the increasing global and public address of external cultural policy. Nevertheless, the more dominating conception of cultural diplomacy during the Cold War period remained as culture to be a powerful tool in pursuing other states for the own foreign interest. This will become also evident, when looking at two conceptions of cultural diplomacy in international relations, namely soft power theory and Neo-Gramscianism, to which I will come to in the second part of this chapter.

1.1.4 Culture in the post-Cold War age

Finally, with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1998 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ‘ideological cultural war’ was over and the perception and usage of culture started to become more orientated on the representation of the nation. Today, states have less interest in the promotion of culture for mere ideological reasons. Instead culture is used more and more as a sort of ‘national brand’, with the purpose to create long-term mutual understanding and cooperation with other states for economic reasons. The coined term for this usage of culture is ‘nation branding’, which originates from the advertisement sector of the 2000s. Different than cultural diplomacy of the Cold War period, nation branding, does not limit itself in positive or negative diplomacy and gives no significance to ideology. Nation branding in this sense is focused on the process of culture and not on its outcome (Gienow-Hecht 2018: pp.264-266)

The purpose of nation branding, shortly, is to establish a positive image of a state, and to establish a country profile, which ‘identifies and sets the country apart from others on the international market’ (Villanueva 2018: p.688). Nation branding, involves the usage of national symbols, which may be in form of celebrities, private brands or companies from the country in question. Furthermore, there is also a strong usage of stereotypes, since they are easy to recall for the audiences. However, it is to note that nation branding is not apolitical, but also involves state interest in form of market strategy (Villanueva 2018: p.688-689). The rise of the globalization has caused a high competition between states to maintain an attractive image among the world stage. States from Latin America, to East Asia, have all launched their own nation brand, which have significant variations. For example, after the Cold War, the nations of former Soviet Bloc in Easter Europe were perceived by the West through a rather grim and grey image. As a result, the individual states initiated a severe reconstruction of their national image. The Hungarian government, for instance set up a

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‘National Image Centre’ in order to manage and re-construct a new image of the country abroad. Similarly, the Latvian government for example, did this in form of the establishment of a Latvian institute (1998) to educate the global community about all aspects of Latvia’s history, culture and society (Szondi 2006: pp.9-10). In contrast, in Latin America, nation branding attained more acceptance from the foreign ministries only from 2006. Moreover, the Latin American States had very diverse structures and objectives for the promotion of their national brand. The government of Colombia for example, launched its nation branding program in order to dissociate itself from the bad reputation of the 1980s and 1990s. The Chilean government, on the other hand used their national brand to promote the most profound aspects of contemporary Chilean life, such as the wine industry, the usage of solar power plants or the production of international TV broadcasts (Villanueva 2018: p.688-689). Of course nation branding, is not the only usage of culture in contemporary international relations. There are also multiple other usages of culture in regards of improving intercultural dialogue. Likewise, international programs and events, as the Erasmus Mundus Program, the Eurovision Song Contest, or the Viennese Life Ball can be all examples for the usage of cultural diplomacy as a means to foster mutual understanding and international cooperation. In other words, today’s cultural diplomacy is strongly multilateral. This means it has become gradually more complex in terms that it has taken off from one country to many, it is intervening through a multinational context, there are diverse actors both coming from the state and private and it is not restricted to industrialized countries only, but a global phenomenon (Zamorano 2016: pp. 173-174).

In summary, cultural diplomacy through a period of little less than a hundred-fifty years, has been constantly re-interpreted and re-constructed. How it is perceived and for what cultural diplomacy is used for, has been dependent on the time, place and involving actors. Moreover, what becomes evident when looking through the history of the past two centuries, in terms of power relations, cultural diplomacy has been both interpreted and used by states in order to promote power as well as mutual understanding. This will become also evident when observing the changing role of music in international relations in chapter two and more strikingly for this thesis, the role of jazz in the case of U.S. Japan relations in chapter four.

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Culture as music do not have a singular use, but are of a multiple complex nature, which is constantly changing over time. In this regard, I believe that it is neither advisable to regard the role of culture through either just the perspective of state interest, or the one of mutual understanding. Instead, I believe it is necessary to consider cultural diplomacy in a broader sense, which is considering its interchanging complex nature, which includes both state interests as well as the objectives of other non-state related agents. In this sense, I will neither consider the popular definitions of Josef Nye in form of soft power, nor the one of Milton Cumming in form of mutual understanding in realms of this thesis. Instead, I will use the definition coined by Erik Pajtinka, who refers to cultural diplomacy as ‘a set of activities, undertaken directly by or in collaboration with diplomatic authorities of a state, which are aimed at the promotion of foreign policy interests of this state in the realm of cultural policy primarily by means of fostering its cultural exchange with other (foreign) states’ and adds that cultural diplomacy ‘can be aimed at the promotion of mutual understanding among states, but this should not be regarded as its final goal, but only a means of realising its final objectives’ which is ‘foreign policy interests’ (Pajtinka 2014: p.100). By following Pajtinka’s definition, I have the room to look at the role of cultural diplomacy through a multilateral perspective, while also considering state interests. Further, for the term culture, I do however, agree with Mary Einbinder (2013)\(^{32}\) that a broad definition is the most favourable option to describe the subject in regards to international relations. Therefore, I refer as Einbinder does, to culture through the definition of the UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity, which defines culture as a ‘set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group’ that ‘encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs’ (UNESCO, 2001)\(^{33}\). This broad definition regards culture both in the sense of its social and artistic form, and is therefore favourable when looking at culture through the expression of jazz.

Finally, there is also the need to explain the issue of the usage of scholars concerning the terms public diplomacy and cultural relations. When doing research in the field of cultural diplomacy, one will come across a variety of works, which either argues for the equalization, substitute or separation of cultural diplomacy with the former two terminologies. Public


diplomacy was first coined by America professor Edmund Gullion in 1965, in order to avoid the term propaganda. The term received great attention and popularity during the cold war, where it was used to describe international politics. However, as in cultural diplomacy, through the usage of the term by different agents, over space and time, also public diplomacy is referring to diverse issues (Zamorano 2016: pp.168-169). As this thesis defines cultural diplomacy in a broader sense, and is considering the changing role and meaning of cultural diplomacy, depending to the relation of actor, space and time, I therefore argue that a differentiation between the two terms is not necessary. In regards to cultural relations, Richard T. Arndt argues for a separation between the two terms. According to him cultural relations ‘grow naturally and organically, without governmental intervention’, while cultural diplomacy involves ‘governmental intervention in the support of national interest (Arndt 2006: xviii). However, this thesis rejects the necessity for the separation of the terminologies, as it argues that cultural diplomacy is both used by state and non-state related agents. Now that the definition of culture, in form of this thesis is cleared, it is further necessary to determine the approach that is most favourable to analyse cultural diplomacy in international relations, which I argue is a constructivist approach. For this an observation into the state of research of cultural diplomacy in international relations is necessary.

1.2 Cultural Diplomacy in International Relations

Although, there has been a lack of interest in the subject of cultural diplomacy among the field of international relations, it is to note first that traditional international relations have not been fully ‘blank’ of the issue before the cultural turn. In fact, as Valbjørn argues, there has been more than one voice, arguing for a closer examination of the subject in the past. In the 1960’s for example, Adda B. Bozeman and Samuel Huntington, have insisted on the role that culture has on the objectives from which diverse states are operating from. Further, both have argued for the importance to understand the basic elements of religion and philosophical understanding of each nation in order to compensate state’s foreign interests and thus, their foreign policies (Valbjørn 2006: pp.62-63). Moreover, there have been also earlier discussions about the role of culture coming from non-western scholars (Valbjørn 2006: pp.59-61). However, the majority of international relation scholars up until the late 1980s tended to neglect the subject, which was a result of the dominant position of the opposing traditional
theories of international relations, namely realism and liberalism.

1.2.1 Realist theory

Realist theory of international relations, is strongly concerned with the relations of states and their continuous struggle for the balance of power, which is defined in the geographic, military and economic sense, or as Josef Nye coined it ‘hard power’ (Nye, 1998). Realism was particularly common approach for many international scholars during the post war and Cold War period. According to the definition of Kegley and Wittkopf, realism is ‘a paradigm based on the premise that world politics is essentially and unchangeably a struggle among self-interested states for power and position under anarchy, with each competing state pursuing its own national interests’ (Kegley and Wittkopf 2006: p. 31). The core assumption of realism is that the international policies are made from an ‘international anarchy of sovereign states’ who are rooted in a constant search of self-interest, which leads them to maintain their power advantage over other states in order to avoid their own domination (Jackson and Sørensen 2013: pp.75-76). There are three main approaches in realism; classical realism, strategic realism and neorealism. First, classical realists like Thomas Hobbes or Hans Morgenthau are concerned with normative analysis of world politics. According to them the international system is based on the ‘balance of power’, which the leaders of a state seek to maintain in order to prevent a hegemonic world domination by any one great power. The balance of power assumes that ‘peace and stability are most likely to be maintained when military power is distributed to prevent a single superpower hegemon or bloc from controlling the world’ (Blanton and Kegley 2017: p.25). Second, strategic realists, focus mainly on the foreign policy decision-making, which is based on the rational logics of game theory by Thomas Schelling. According to Schelling, diplomacy and foreign policies are based solely on certain interests of a state and that, thus, moral choice does not matter (Jackson and Sørensen 2008: p.66). Finally, the neorealist approach argues that international relations should be analysed by the structure of the system instead of human nature. According to the leading proponent of

neorealist theory, Kenneth Waltz, it is the international structure of anarchy in which states exist - not the evil nature of humans- that explains the fierce completion between them. Further, for Waltz the balance of power is forming automatically through the ongoing anarchic structure and is not dependent on the decisions that state leaders (Blanton and Kegley 2017: pp.26-27). To sum it up, realism has a rather pessimistic view on the process of international relations, which understands it as a ‘zero-sum game’ where either the evil, self-interested and egoistical nature of human beings (in case of classical realism) or anarchic international structure (in case of the neorealistic view) drive state interests and therefore their foreign policies. Realism is opposed to the idea that there is a trend to the development of international policies, which are comparable to domestic political life and instead argues that due to the differences of each sovereign state, every nation has to act according to their own interest (Jackson and Sørensen 2013: p.96). Culture from a realist perspective, hence, plays no role in international relations as it is, as all things, ‘inevitably trumped by power’ (Valbjørn 2006: p.58). However, as this thesis argues, fortunately, states do not act solely in means of ‘hard power’, but instead are using also cooperative and peaceful means of foreign policies. For instance, in the form of cultural diplomacy, which may create dialogue and cooperation and achieve mutual understanding. Further, this thesis disagrees with the realist assumption that state interest is the only important actor to explain international relations. It is important to note that states are not the only actors within the international arena, but also the actions of non-governmental agents, supra-national agents or private agents are playing an important role. As a result, I argue that a realist approach to analyse the role of cultural diplomacy in international relations is not favourable, as it tends to reduce international relations to something that is one-dimensional, solely centred on ‘power politics’ and neglects other forms of foreign policy, apart from military and economic action.

1.2.2 Liberalist theory

In contrast to realism, liberal theory has a more optimistic assumption on world politics, it argues for the belief in reason and moral as well as the possibility of progress in international relations. As of the definition by Kegley and Wittkopf, liberalism is "a paradigm predicated on the hope that the application of reason and universal ethics to international relations can lead to a more orderly, just, and cooperative world, and that international anarchy [lack of a
hierarchy/world government] and war can be policed by institutional reforms that empower international organizations and laws’ (Kegley and Wittkopf 2006: p. 28). While liberalism considers the realist assumption that the anarchical structure of international relations and the self-driven interest of the individual that cause the threat of war, it further argues that there is also room for cooperation, both domestically and internationally. For liberals hence, war is a global threat that has to be tackled by collective action (Jackson and Sørensen 2013: 93; 96-97). Moreover, liberalist theory assumes that human nature is essentially good and there exists a fundamental concern for others. It objects realist assumption that sinful human behaviour, as war and violence, are the product of flawed individuals, but instead blames evil institutions for it. Moreover, liberalist theory considers the impact of domestic politics on state behaviour, the economic interdependence of states and the impact of the promotion of global norms and institutions in promoting international cooperation (Blanton and Kegley 2017: pp.28-29). However, also liberalism fails to comprehend the full capacity of the power of culture. This is due to the main problematic that within liberalist theory, culture is only regarded in the sense of a Global Culture, a World Culture or a shared International Political Culture. Cultural diversity, on the other hand is not considered, because it is argued to be unimportant or even dangerous for the accomplishment of cooperation between states (Valbjørn 2006: pp. 57-58). As this thesis argues however, cultural difference can play a core role in the establishment of mutual understanding. For this reason, also a liberalist approach in realms of this thesis is not favourable to analyse the role of cultural diplomacy. Both realism and liberalism are not considering the role of culture in international relations, which explains also that the only recent interest in the subject (Pajtinka 2014: p.95). It was only with cultural turn in the late 1980s, culture started to be taken more seriously in international relations. However, the rise of interest in the field has not contributed necessarily to a better understanding in the subject, but rather raised new and even more complex questions.

1.2.3 The cultural turn in international relations: Soft Power Theory

In 1990 the American neorealistic political scientist Joseph Nye, in an attempt to tackle the Hobbesian view on international relations coined the term ‘soft power’. Soft power refers to ‘the ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own’ (Nye 1990: p.16). In other words, the
term objects the traditional mimetic assumption that states can only obtain power through either military or economic means, namely ‘hard power’, and instead considers also culture as a means of power of a state. Nye argued that soft power was increasingly becoming more important than traditional mimetic hard power, as it gives state’s the ability to access larger channels of information (Kim 2016: p.298). The soft power theory remained one of the core approaches of cultural diplomacy in international relations, in particular when referring to U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War period. However, while it is true that the soft power approach considers the role of culture in international relations and has contributed to more awareness to the subject, it has at the same time caused another form of ‘cultural blindness’ in the field (Valbjørn 2006). For example, Rowley and Weldes, point out that the definition of cultural diplomacy in regards to soft power leads to the issue of too casual claims (Rowley and Weldes: 2016). This becomes evident when looking at some of the statements of Joseph Nye in accordance to explain soft power:

‘Young Japanese who have never been to the United States wear sports jackets with the names of American colleges. Nicaraguan television broadcast American shows even while the government fought American-backed guerrillas. Similarly, Soviet teenagers wear blue jeans and seek American recordings, and Chinese students used a symbol modelled on the Statue of Liberty during the 1989 uprisings. Despite the Chinese government’s protests against U.S. interference, Chinese citizens were as interested as ever in American democracy and culture’ (Nye 1990: p.169)

While there is a common sense in the proposition of Nye, which indicates the influence one culture may have over another, it is however, as Rowley and Weldes argue, troublesome in the sense that it is based on the assumption that the receiving countries of cultural diplomacy simply absorb the foreign culture without questioning, adapting or discussing the content. There is no reason given why young Japanese are wearing the sport jackets, nor what intentions American policy makers would have with exporting American fashion in the first place. Instead, Nye simply assumes that the Japanese, Nicaraguan, Soviet and Chinese teenagers are influenced by American culture, because they are used to watch Hollywood movies in the cinema or consume other American goods. What is problematic with this is that

by this definition assumes that ‘images are simply injected into people’s heads by popular
cultural texts and institutions and that, once so injected, people both want to and do act in
accordance with them’ (Rowley and Weldes: 2016: p.7). However, as Gienow-Hecht (2010),
Fosler-Lussier (2015), Zamorano (2016) and others have highlighted in their studies, is that
cultural diplomacy is not just a one-way relationship, where the sender simply projects his
objectives on a passive receiver, but instead there it is a two-way slope. In this regard the
sending and receiving country are standing in an ever changing and dynamic relationship with
one another, which involves various actors on both sides, who each on their own portray their
own objectives and may influence the objective of the other (Fosler-Lussier 2015: pp.123-126).
In other words, viewing cultural diplomacy as something that is given, without questioning
the different objectives of the actors including the receivers involved in the process, is
unsatisfactory, as it oversimplifies cultural diplomacy without really explaining its role in
international relations.

Second, there prevails an oversimplification about the meaning made and
communicated through culture. Many scholars point out that cultural diplomacy is a mediator
of a certain message, which is created by the sending country and perceived by the observing
one the way it is intended to be seen. The flaw with this approach, is that it again leaves out
the point of view of the receivers of cultural diplomacy and reduces the sending agent to a
monopoly actor (Rowley and Weldes: 2016: pp.8-9). Moreover, the presence of these causal
relations are often analytically privileged, which further reduces the role of cultural diplomacy.
For instance, in regard to cultural diplomacy as soft power tool, some scholars just assume the
mere status quo, be it the state, a conflict like the cold war, national interest and so on, as
already given. However, in order to understand the dimensions of cultural diplomacy it is
necessary to look also where it has its roots in in each case. In other words, in order to
understand the effects and power of cultural relations it is necessary to look into the
relationship of two countries in the first place, intending: how the political status of each
country is; what possible national interest could be; what the overall local situation is to begin
with; and how cultural diplomacy contributes to this status quo (Rowley and Weldes 2016: pp.
9-10). This argument is further, supported by Zamorano (2010) who points out the
multidimensional nature of cultural diplomacy, which is not only depending on the actors
involved, but also the place and time it is set in. According to Zamorano, the mode, structure
and objective of the cultural diplomacy of a state, is as multiple as the existing definitions over
the term. This is because each nation, due to its own traditions, history, social values and culture, has developed a different use of cultural as diplomacy device over the time (Zamorano 2016: pp.172-173). This argument has been examined in the section above, which showed the changing perceptions and usages of culture in the Western world during the past two centuries. The assumption is further shared by Gienow-Hecht and Dormond, who argue that there are striking differences in the approaches of Cultural Diplomacy depending on the acting country and time. The policies may range from a set of friendly liaisons with the neighbouring countries to usage of cultural diplomacy in area of crisis (Gienow-Hecht and Dormond 2012: pp. 437:467). Cultural diplomacy, hence, depends on the cultural mindset of a nation and the actors which are involved, as well as the immediate organizational and structural circumstances. As culture defines what cultural diplomacy is, indeed no cultural diplomacy is the same. Instead each nation has their own distanced cultural diplomatic representation which is rooted on the very cultural tradition within the nation. It is therefore advisable to consider also the makings of their own cultural traditions and how the relation between culture and power is formed (Villanueva 2018: pp.683-685).

This leads to another issue with the definition of Nye, which often regards cultural diplomacy in terms of American foreign policy only and hence tends to reduce it to propaganda measurements. However, by looking through the usage of cultural diplomacy through history, no cultural diplomacy is the same. In fact, there are multiple variations how a nation organizes, interprets and adopts its cultural diplomacy, depending on its own social, historical, political and cultural background. Depending on the policy of the state, cultural diplomacy may receive a generous or tight budget, there may be different areas on which the single countries are focusing on and moreover, there may be different motives in the cultural diplomacy of a country. For instance, one could come to very different assumptions by comparing the current cultural diplomacy between Great Britain, France and Germany. While Germany and France are more focused on the promotion of linguistics, Britain is more focused on education. There is further a differentiation in the vey construction of cultural diplomacy. For example, French cultural diplomacy tends to be more centralized, interventionist and constitutive, whereas in the case of Britain, cultural diplomacy is managed through a decentralized model (Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones 2007: pp.23-26). Soft power theory in this sense is therefore is not satisfactory to explain the dimensions of cultural diplomacy, since it reduces the power of cultural diplomacy to state interest and describes it in too causal terms,
without considering the influence of other non-governmental, private or foreign actors. Further, it reduces the subject to a discussion of foreign policies of the United States, assuming that every nation is pursuing their cultural diplomacy in the same mode, which is de facto not the case.

1.2.4 The cultural turn in international relations: Neo-Gramscianism

Next to soft power theory, also Neo-Gramscian theorists considers the role of culture in international relations in form of cultural hegemony. The primary contribution of neo-Gramscianism to international relation theory was made by Canadian political science scholar Robert W. Cox (1926-2018) in 1981 (Lacher 2008)\(^{39}\). Neo-Gramscian is a critical theory approach of the study of political economy and international relations, which is based on the *Prison Notebooks* of the Italian Marxist, philosopher and communist Antonio Francesco Gramsci. The notebooks that Gramsci wrote during his imprisonment in fascist Italy between 1929 and 1935 (Cox 1983: p.162), included various topics ranging from Italian history, to the French Revolution, Fascism, Fordism and so on. Importantly, they also discussed cultural hegemony. As Cox argues, Gramsci understood cultural ideology to be used by the bourgeoisie class, as an alternative power tool to violence or economic forces, in order to maintain their dominating power in capitalist societies (Cox 1983: pp.163-164)\(^{40}\). Moreover, cultural hegemony does not use force nor economic need, but is accomplished through the consent of ordinary people by using ‘common sense’, which is the acceptance of the political, economic and social status quo by the masses (Pasha 2008, p.157)\(^{41}\). Thus, according to Gramsci the ruling classes achieved domination over the working classes in a society through the manipulation of language, morality, common sense and other aspects of culture. Cox has taken Gramsci’s theory on hegemony further and puts it in an international context. He defines hegemony as ‘[...] order within a world economy with which a dominant mode of production, which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of


production.’ (Cox and Sinclair 1996: p.137)  

While also the Neo-Gramscian approach considers the role of culture in international relations, I argue that it is, as soft power theory, not a favourable approach to define the full role of cultural diplomacy in international relations (at least in realms of this thesis). This is because the theory reduces the power of cultural diplomacy to hegemony and does not consider its usage in form of harmony. Moreover, the approach implies that culture is used only by the ruling class and that the receivers of cultural hegemony are passive to its messages. This however, as will become evident through looking at the usage of culture and music through a historical perspective is not the case. Hence, as argued before, neither realism, liberalism nor soft power theory and Neo-Gramscianism, are favourable methods to analyse the power of cultural diplomacy in international relations, I therefore suggest a fourth approach in form of a constructivist perspective.

1.3 Cultural Diplomacy and Constructivist theory

Constructivism, in contrast to liberal and realist theory, argues that International Relations are based on ‘a sphere of interaction through which state’s identities and practices are created’ (Jackson and Sørensen 2013: p.160). The most prominent advocate of constructivist theory is Alexander Wendt. According to him, ‘the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature’. (Wendt 1999: p.73). It states that political reality is not based on material forces, but is instead dependent on minds, values and ideas. As a result, international relations, according to constructivist theory, should not be reduced to the constant search of power and interest. Instead other variables, such as culture ought to be considered (Jackson and Sørensen 2013: p.163). Hence, constructivist claim that political reality is not based on material forces as in liberalism or realism, but instead is dependent on minds, values and ideas, which are seen through a process of constantly changing relationships to each other. In other words, the approach argues that, if the ideas and values change, the international system will change too. Culture in this sense is regarded as something relevant that contributes actively to the

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structure of the international system, which makes the constructivist theory the most favourable approach in international relations.

Some international relation scholars, who follow a constructivist approach to the issue, further refer to cultural diplomacy coined by definition of Milton Cumming (2004)\(^4\)\(^4\), who defines cultural diplomacy in form of the promotion of shared values, ideas and mutual understanding, which is capable to contribute to a better understanding between different states (Cumming 2004, p.3). According to this definition, cultural diplomacy is, thus, not a foreign policy tool – as in Nye’s soft power –, but instead based on the mutual interest of two states, which share each other’s different cultures in the means to promote cooperation and peace. Einbinder for example, examines in her study the role of the East-Western Orchestra and UNESCO in a way to promote peace and cooperation between young Palestine and Israeli musicians (Einbinder 2013). However, as argued before the definition of Cumming is not satisfactory when considering the role of cultural diplomacy through a historical perspective. There are two major problems in the approach. First, there is the problematic that the approach tends to give culture a too superior role, while neglecting the influences of other important variables, such as political, economic or military interest (Jackson 2008); (Pajtinka 2014). Second, by neglecting these variables, scholars who use this approach ironically tend to regard culture in form of a constant structure. This is ironic in the sense that the constructivist theory considers international relations through the continuous exchange of relations, which intends that culture thereby is something intangible. The issue in practice, however, is that some scholars do not account the transition of the effects of culture overtime, but rather conceptualize it as an ‘independent and largely unaffected’ from the structural context of policies (Jackson 2008, pp. 160-161). However, as has been shown in the first section of this chapter, the definition and usage of culture and cultural diplomacy are not stable. Instead what the individual sees as culture and how one uses it, is determined by the interaction of other social, political or military factors that occur during the certain time and place the agent is living in (Gienow-Hecht 2010); (Zamorano 2016). This will become also evident, as this thesis argues, when observing the role of jazz in the U.S-Japan relations in chapter four. As will be explained jazz was not only used as a diplomacy tool of the SCAP delegation during the occupation period, but also from Japanese policy makers, Japanese

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individuals and student groups. Furthermore, the function and perception of jazz was not constant, but changing over time both from the side of American as well as Japanese actors. That said, I still argue that constructivism is the most favourable approach in analysing cultural diplomacy. However, I believe it is necessary to use a broader definition of cultural diplomacy, which both regards state interest as well as objectives of mutual understanding and to put the role of cultural diplomacy in relation to the time, space and agents in which it is set in. By doing this I argue, one is not only able to obtain a better understanding of what cultural diplomacy is and what it is used for, but this will further provide a way to avoid ‘cultural blindness’ in international relations in the future.

Chapter Conclusion

What becomes clear, when looking at cultural diplomacy through a historical perspective, is that the role of culture in international relations has been continuously changing and rearranging itself, depending on the agents, space and time. The complex role of culture has indeed a long tradition in international relations, which was already used in the Bronze age to both represent power and mutual understanding. The two world wars of the last century, further promoted the association of culture in terms of power and propaganda. This perception also dominated the post war time, where the ongoing race between the capitalism and communism initiated the creation of a series of cultural institutes and programs. However, culture during the same time was more and more used for the creation of cooperation and mutual understanding. Within the field of international relations, the issue has been long disregarded due to the dominance of liberalist and realist theory. This changed only with the ‘aesthetic turn’ in the late 1980s, from which the most dominant theory was coined by the term ‘soft power’ by Joseph Nye. However, while the soft power theory prevails the dominant approach towards the role of cultural diplomacy in international relations and brought new interest into the field, it has simultaneously contributed to a new wave of ‘cultural blindness’ and confusion. This is because soft power theory reduces the role of cultural diplomacy to be a mere subject of state interest. Next to soft power, also Neo-Gramscianists consider the role of culture, in form of cultural hegemony. Also this approach tends to create cultural blindness, in the sense that it reduces the role of culture to the hegemony of the ruling class of a state, while ignoring the role of the receivers. However, this thesis argues when looking at the issue
from a historical perspective it becomes evident that cultural diplomacy is of a more complex structure, which involves three interacting variables: agents, space and time. First, cultural diplomacy is depended on the exchange of a wide set of agents including state actors, non-governmental organizations, private actors and individuals from both the sending and receiving state. These diverse agents do not always act on mere state interest, but act according to their own objectives. Second, the actions of the diverse agents are determined by the space they are living in. This means no cultural diplomacy is the same, but it is depended on the country it is set in. This could be also seen in the example between American cultural in comparison to Japanese cultural diplomacy in the third section of this chapter. Third, cultural diplomacy is interpreted and used differently according to its time frame. There is a big difference in what was perceived and used as cultural diplomacy during the 18th, 19th, 20th or 21st century in comparison to each other. Importantly, these three variables stay in constant relation to each other and are therefore continuously reconstructing our usage and perception of cultural diplomacy. As a result, as argued a more favourable approach to soft power, lies in constructivism, as it considers also intangible resources of power such as values and ideas.
Chapter 2

2. Music, Diplomacy and International Relations

‘The goatherd of Switzerland and the Tyrol—the Carpathian boor—the Scotch Highlander—the English ploughboy, singing as he drives his team a-field, — peasant—serf—slave—all, all have their ballads and traditionary songs. Music is the universal language of mankind,—poetry their universal pastime and delight.’

In 1835, American poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, published his book *Outre-Mer: A Pilgrim Beyond the Sea*. While his book remained a rather little success, his words seemed to have made an impression on the minds of people. Today, this definition of music as the universal language, has been used by ambassadors, politicians, writers, artists and musicians alike. However, when looking through the role of music through a historian perspective, this perception of music becomes somewhat troublesome. The most prominent example for this, as Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht (2015), Leon Botstein (2004) and others point out is Ludwig von Beethoven’s ninth symphony. The ‘Ode to Joy’ in its over 200 years of existence, has been used to represent and serve diverse beliefs, politics, purposes and people: ‘Romantics saw the “Ode to Joy” as the climax of their art, German nationalists as a symbol for heroism and “Germanness”, French republicans as the Marseillaise de l’humanité, communists as a prophecy for a world without class distinctions, Catholics as the Gospel, Adolf Hitler as his favorite birthday tune, Rhodesia as a national anthem, the European Union as a unifying hymn, UNESCO as part of the world heritage register, and so on.’ (Gienow-Hecht 2015: p.3). This example shows the problem that arises with the definition of music as universal language. A piece of music may be enjoyed on a universal level among different nations, however, the same song may be interpreted and used in different ways depending on the time, place and actors involved. This however, does not mean that music’s role in international relations is obsolete, on the contrary, the complexity and multiplicity of actors and processes involved,

makes music an interdisciplinary field, which demands to look at it on an international perspective. Hence, in order to understand the complex role which music plays in international relations and its dimensions of ‘power’, it is necessary to take a look into the history of the relationship between music and international relations. This chapter therefore, seeks to discuss the role of music through a historical approach, while considering the two main themes in the debate on music as cultural diplomacy tool: violence and harmony (Prévost-Thomas & Ramel 2018: pp.8-10). First, we will look into the relation of music towards cultural diplomacy. The next section will then attempt to highlight the diverse dimensions of music diplomacy, by looking through a series of cases in which music has been used to achieve different goals; including music as diplomacy tool, propaganda instrument and harmony builder. Furthermore, since the case study of this thesis is concerned with jazz, it is necessary to distinguish between the diverse genres music diplomacy. The second part of this chapter thus, is devoted to the speciality of jazz diplomacy. Here, the diverse roles jazz has played in the international arena, as well as its unique bond to the United States will be discussed.

2.1 Cultural Diplomacy and Music Diplomacy

Even though, having received more and more attention by scholars of the field of international relations lately, music diplomacy has been studied from the largest part by musicologists and historians (Gienow-Hecht 2015: pp.3-4). The restriction of research in this field, may be explained by two factors: first the incoherence of music with classic international relations theory (realist approach) and second the problematic of the irrationality and abstract nature of music in relation to power and diplomacy.

As explained in the first chapter, according to the traditional realist approach, all cultural factors, including music, have little relevance shaping the international stage. Instead, only sources of “hard power” were seen as an essential method in order to explain the

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47 There are of course also other interesting themes by scholars in realm of music, such as the connection of emotion or neuroscientific studies, which would demand their own thesis to be written. For more information, see also: Levinin, D. J. (2009). ‘Current Advances in the Cognitive Neuroscience of Music’, New York Academy of Science, pp. 211-231.

dimensions of international relations (Schneider 2006, p.191), (Zamorano 2016: p.175). This approach changed with the so called ‘cultural, aesthetic and acoustic turn’ in international relations, which drew scholars attention gradually to the theories of soft power and cultural diplomacy, and by that also to music (Prévost-Thomas & Ramel 2018: p.3), (Mahiet, Ferraguto & Aherendt 2015: p.7). The second reason for the prominence of other scholars in the field of music diplomacy, is linked to the complexity that defines music’s relation to power. As with cultural diplomacy, the universal message of music can be perceived and interpreted differently depending on place, practitioner and time. This resulted in a debate among scholars, to defy the true power of music. The main discussion can be divided into two camps: music as an ‘apolitical’ neutral ground for harmony on the one side and music as a tool of power and violence on the other one. While in the former, music is seen as a (from politics) neutral ground, which offers the possibility to bring harmony, universal values and peace among states, in particular during periods of crisis. At the same time the latter, associates music as an unpredictable power, which was, is and will be misused for propaganda, violence and destruction (Ahrendt, Ferraguto & Mahiet 2015: pp.2-5).

However, more recently there has been a third approach towards the discussion, which was introduced by Danielle Fosler-Lussier (2012). In her study, Fosler-Lussier points to the paradox that comes along with the debate. She claims that just because cultural diplomacy, or in the case of music, music diplomacy, points towards an imperialistic goal, it does not mean that music itself has to have the same significant political message. Additionally, in some cases music might not have a message at all (Fosler-Lussier 2012: pp.54-55). This argument is important, as it stresses out the complex framing of the relation between music and politics. This will become also evident through the examples of jazz diplomacy in the second part of this chapter. Jazz, even though initially not intended to be used as a propaganda tool by the US State Department, had been nevertheless conceived as one by the other nations. Further, the nation’s worries that jazz could ‘Americanize’ and suppress their own national heritage led to intense public discussions, which ultimately gave jazz, may it be initially intended for political means or not, an imperialistic meaning.

The second point that Fosl-Lussier stresses is the relevance of the audience of music diplomacy: ‘Music was not only pushed across borders by nation-states seeking to impose their influence: music was also pulled across borders by people who wanted it’ (Fosler-Lussier 2012: p.60). This intends thus, that the receiving nations of music diplomacy, are not only aware of the political intentions of the sending state, but furthermore, are active players, which seek their own advantages by getting certain kinds of music into their country. The reasons for ‘pulling music in’ may verify from state to state, from the expression of political freedom in oppressed nations, to the aspiration to be part of the international stage, to own local policies interests, or simply the admiration for the genre itself (Fosler-Lussier 2012: pp.60-63). Music diplomacy, as cultural diplomacy, hence, has a more complex relationship than just the promotion of either peace or violence. Reducing music just to a tool of propaganda, would intend that the receiving states were just passive listeners. At the same time, it would be foolish to regard the role of music as completely apolitical. I agree therefore with Fosl-Lussier that music diplomacy is not just ‘an abstract “flow” but a result of specific and reasoned choices to push or pull music across borders’ (Fosler-Lussier 2012: p.63). Hence, in order to get a full understanding of the role of music diplomacy in international relations, and in realm of this thesis the role of jazz as cultural diplomacy device in the U.S.-Japanese diplomacy, it is necessary to consider both the sides of the senders and receivers.

2.2 Music diplomacy through international history

The majority of the research of international relation scholars in this field, is devoted to the Cold Ward cultural diplomacy of the U.S. and the usage of musical power as propaganda tool during the Second World War. However, as will become evident by looking through historical examples, music’s role, in its function as cultural diplomacy, was and is not limited to one purpose, nation or genre only. Instead there have been multiple functions and actors in music’s history, which were not only active all across the globe, but furthermore, represented democratic states as much as in authoritarian ones. Thus, what this section achieves to highlight, is the multifunctional dimensions of the power of music diplomacy in international relation history.
2.2.1. Music, kings and power

Music diplomacy has in fact a long history, dating back as long as to early modern Europe. In her essay, Anne Spohr (2014) gives an example how the Danish king Christian IV used concealed music on his court ceremonial in order to distribute power in the sixteenth century. The king invited several foreign monarchs to his castle in Rosenborg, Copenhagen, in order to impress them with his ‘magical’ music installation- a room where the musicians were hidden in a separate wall from the eyes of the audience. The goal was to impress the foreign ambassadors in order to win influence and promote his status as the ‘harmonic king’, as well as to improve the image of Denmark abroad after the defeat of the thirty year’s war. The hidden music, left a strong impact the other European monarchs, starting them to import the method also to their own nations (Spohr 2014: pp.19-43).

The usage of music was however, not restricted to kings only. Also, diplomats commonly exchanged music, instruments and occasionally even musicians. Michela Berti 51 (2018) for example, writes in her essay ‘Europe in Rome/ Rome in Europe Diplomacy as a network for cultural exchange’, about the importance of the celebration of feste- a medium through which ambassadors, cardinals and nobility could show their magnificence. The festive occasions functioned in terms of both political and religious power, in Rome of the seventeeth and eighteenth century (Berti 2018: p.23). Berti describes how diplomats from France, Spain, Rome and Portugal communicated with each other through the organization of these musical events, and how the Roman scene through these exchanges became highly international. The feste further, had high reputation among the public, who by spreading their word, helped creating an international channel which distributed the Roman concept through Europe (Berti 2018: pp.23-41). Another example for music and diplomacy brings Mark Ferraguto’s52 (2018) case study on acting Diplomats and Musical Agents in eighteenth century Vienna. The study discusses how the participation and organization of musical events were essential parts in the duties of a diplomat and how diplomatic involvement helped the distribution of music through Europe by creating a musical infrastructure. In the name of their kings and emperors,

diplomats were sent through Europe to collect the newest music and to write musical reports. These reports further included important information about the culture, customs and style of a country (Ferraguto 2018: pp. 45-49). There was also the creation of ‘insider networks’ through the concerts and balls held in the salons of the embassies, connecting politicians, musicians, intellectuals and artists from diverse international backgrounds. Moreover, diplomats did not act solely in the name of their emperor or king, but had also their own initiatives to promote certain artists (Ferraguto 2018: pp.55-64). Music in this sense was from an early stage onwards an important diplomatic instrument, which was in order to represent the power of the nation and king, but furthermore, also helped improving the national image abroad. This role of music became even more important with the start of the industrial revolution.

From the nineteenth century onwards, music started to be recognized more and more as a powerful diplomacy tool in defying the image of the nation. Policy-makers in Europe started to use music in the hopes to improve their national representation and to further, promote their ‘attractiveness’ to other countries. During this period, indeed the power of music was given as much credit as to be capable to change the perception of an entire population of barbarians to one of poets. This claim of power can be explained through the fact that the image of the nation had also a direct impact on the social relation with other states, which was crucial for future possibilities for trade (Gienow-Hecht 2015: p.268.) This association of music and representation of a nation intensified during the interwar period and finally hit its peak during the Second World War, where music more and more started to be associated with national identity and propaganda.

2.3. Music and violence

Music through history, has been also used as integral part of warfare. For example, the strategic use of music played an important role during America’s Civil War. During the Civil War era, people engaged on a large scale in group singing at outdoor meetings and rallies. Also a soldier’s life during this time was literally structured by music. Music was used in this sense not only for entertainment, but also for the announcement of each military event,
starting from reveille and drills, to meals and finally battles (McWhirter, 2014). Nothing better demonstrates the power of music as in its relation to propaganda and censorship. The term propaganda was first coined by Pope Gregory XV through institutionalization of the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of Faith) in 1622, and described a variety of phenomena. However, I agree with Luis Velasco Pufleau, that the most suiting definition comes from Max Weber, who refers to propaganda as a ‘dispositif’ that involves one or several strategies of domination which seek not only to influence but also to cause identification with and conscious support for a power that is perceived as legitimate’ (Pufleau, 2014). From the First World War onward propaganda was institutionalized through the world, including both totalitarian states as much as liberal nations. Furthermore, the propaganda ministries were given high importance during times of political tensions and war, as they controlled the information flows and were supposed to manage the social order, once tensions had been softened (Pufleau, 2014).

As any other art form, also music was used in order to shape a moral message of the world. In this context, music was ritualized through propaganda mechanisms in order to promote certain political ideological messages, trigger emotions and to construct imaginary scenarios. One of the most prominent cases of musical propaganda, is the usage of Nazi Germany of pianist Wilhelm Richard Wagner in order to promote national image of classical German culture as well as their anti-Semitic scheme (Trueman, 2012). Next to Germany, also Japan’s military leadership, as will become evident in chapter four, used propaganda music in order to promote nationalist feeling and ‘Japaneseness’ among its population (Atkins, 2001). While music as a propaganda device had undeniably being used by authoritarian regimes through history, it is necessary to consider that also liberal states and even NGOs have used music as a propaganda tool, if yet not always directly visible. The allied powers, for example all have used music in order to promote their national values and culture during the

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During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviets organized musical tours in order to push their ideologies around the world (Fosler-Lussier, 2015). A more recent, and somewhat odd, example for this are humanitarian songs during causalities. Pufleau, in his study about the case of humanitarian songs during the Ebola crisis of Ethiopia in 2014, points out that Humanitarian songs, despite their perceived atypical nature, tend to change the idea of the donor about the source of the causality and reduces the receiving states to the role of helpless victims. Further, the source of the issue is reduced to a moral issue, without defining who was responsible for the causality in the first place (Pufleau, 2014). However, what one has to keep in mind with the relation to music as propaganda tool, as remarked earlier, is the fact that the audience does not necessarily listened to the music passively, but may be very aware of the intensions of the sending state and may seek their own advantages. For instance, during the Cold War both Peru and Iraq insisted on accepting only the very best American Orchestra’s into their countries as it distributed affirmation of their states importance in the international arena (Fosler-Lussier 2015: pp.123-126).

2.3.1. Music and protest

‘If you look at the role that music, and much more than music-theatre and opera-played in societies and the totalitarian regimes, it was the only place that political ideas and social totalitarianism could be criticized. In other words, a performance of Beethoven… under any kind of totalitarian regime… suddenly assumes the call of freedom.’ (Barenboim and Said 2004, p.44)

Famously, music played also an important role in resistance movements and labour unions. During the twentieth century there was a worldwide rise of diverse social movements, which also used music in order to express their discontent with certain political or social status quo. The protest songs included various different themes from ‘discontent with perceived

problems in society, covering a wide variety of issues and concerns ranging from personal and interpersonal to local and global matters’ (Damodaran 2016: p.5)\(^6\). Moreover, protest songs were also used in order to recruit members, create a feeling of solidarity and to mobilize forces against the incriminate power. Additionally, protest songs are given a special role due to their emotional link, which can create a feeling of belonging and togetherness among the movements members (Damodaran 2016, pp.1-6). As will be discussed in the next part of this chapter, before rock n’ roll and punk, it was jazz that was often linked to resistance movements. More importantly, in the case of Japan, jazz had been used in order to express resistance both against the military regime during the war and during the American occupational period (Atkins 2001).

2.3.2. Music and Harmony

Despite, music’s role as propaganda instrument, music at the same time has been used on various occasions to promote harmony, peace and cooperation among states. After the Second World War musical events as the *Llangollen International Eisteddfod music festival*, the first international music festival, in Wales 1947, to the first *Eurovision song contest* in Lugano, Switzerland in 1956, to 1969 *Woodstock Festival* up to the *I love Hip Hop festival* in Morocco 2009 and the 2013 *Azilut Concert of Peace*, all represent the harmonic power of music to bring people from different cultural, religious and social backgrounds together (Lianu 2016: pp. 196-198).\(^6\) In particular, during times of high tensions, music diplomacy can become a powerful tool, since its ‘neutral’ nature gives it space to move where traditional diplomacy and hard power cannot. For instance, the International Society for Contemporary Music (ISCM) has played an important role during the rise of the Second World War. Founded in Salzburg, Austria, in August 11, 1922, the ISCM was created with the goal to promote contemporary classical music in order to reduce cultural tensions. Its basic chores included the promotion of international cooperation and utopian values. The loose organization, its

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decision to not follow a certain music school, and insistence on an apolitical position toward the rising tension, gave the ISCM the unique position to include also enemy states among their international members. This proofs the organizations harmonic power, considering the hostile climate during which the ISCM was founded. And despite, the exaggeration of ideological tensions during the merge of WW2, the ISCM further, remained its political neutrality until today (Shreffler 2015: pp.58-82)\(^62\).

A more contemporary example is the West Eastern Divan Orchestra, in relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict. The Orchestra was created by Jewish Daniel Barenboim and Palestinian pianist Edward Said in the 1990s. Their core idea was to fight prejudice and intolerance with art, which they hoped to establish by the creation of a neutral platform, where young Palestine and Israeli could interact with and to build a bridge between Palestine and Israeli musicians. Through their tours the orchestra brought together young skilled musicians from various different backgrounds, including Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia and Lebanon. Their shared interest in music, opened possibility to explore common grounds as a feeling of togetherness. Today, the orchestra remains as one of the only instances were young Palestine and Israeli can meet, exchange and debate experiences (Einbinder 2013: pp.41-47).

Importantly in the realm of this thesis, also within the Cold War and US cultural diplomacy, music created diplomatic and harmonic relations. Even though, the US State Department intensions were clear to use cultural diplomacy in order to distribute American values and ideas among the other states, it is equally important to note the connection between producers and the audience as both active players (Fosler-Lussier 2015). The American Symphony and Orchestra tours included high organizational efforts, which demanded the cooperation between embassies, local politicians, audiences and musicians alike. Their cooperation with the musical events, further, contributed to the creation of new diplomatic relationships and enabled also political exchanges between the states and the host country, where critics against the United States was often high. A good example for this was the cooperation between the key student leaders and the US embassy in La Paz, Bolivia in 1965. The gig of the University of Michigan Jazz Band at the University of San Andrés, marked the start of a close relationship between the embassy and the students, who were known to be highly critic towards US policies. After the success and through the continuous dialogue

both the embassy and students started working together, in organizing further concerts, student exchanges to the US. Furthermore, their cooperation also made political exchanges between Bolivia and the US possible (Fosler-Lussier 2012: p.57). What becomes clear through these examples is that music’s role in international relations is of a multidimensional and complex nature, going beyond the simple differentiation of music as either just a tool of propaganda or as a harmony builder. Through history music has been used by different actors in order to promote both imperial desires as well as pacifist intentions, a paradox which will become even more evident when looking at the dimensions of jazz diplomacy.

2.4. Jazz Diplomacy

‘Jazz provides an unparalleled field for investigating the connections between music, politics, race, and money’ (Brown 2005: p. 107)\textsuperscript{63}

Since this thesis will discuss the relations of U.S.-Japan diplomacy through the role of jazz, it seems only natural to give, next to music diplomacy, also an introduction into the particular dimension of jazz and jazz diplomacy. As explained in the first part of this chapter, music though history has embodied different functions in the international arena, and jazz is no exception to this. Having its root in the port of New Orleans, jazz gradually made its way through the globe, provoking a real ‘jazz fever’ in the 1920’s. Thought jazz’s uniqueness, was casually pointed to its improvised, quick and vivid nature, what makes jazz truly unique (compared to classical music) is its well documented history, as well as its wide set of political and cultural representation and interpretation among the international stage

Not only has jazz been around the corner for around hundred years, but also did jazz experience its ‘golden age’ through periods of massive geopolitical tensions and social changes. Jazz celebrated intense popularity among young people across Europe, the far East and Asia, both during the interwar period. Surprisingly, this did not change through the merge of the Second World War, thought nationalist right-wing camps (if not successful) did not hesitate in their attempts to first censor then ban jazz altogether from their agenda (Atkins, 2001); (Brown, 2005); (Studdert, 2014)\textsuperscript{64}. Jazz has been further, used during the Second World


\textsuperscript{64} Studdert, W. (2014). Music goes to war: How Britain, Germany and the USA used Jazz as Propaganda in World War II. PhD. University of Kent.
War as propaganda tool, both from the authoritarian as well as the Allied powers. From the 1950’s onwards, considering the rise in the new music styles rock, followed by pop, as well as the new abstract, direction\textsuperscript{65} jazzmen were driven to, jazz’s popularity among the younger generation slowly started to decline (Brown 2005: p.100). However, as Brown, Fosler-Lussier and Gienow-Hecht note, from the start of the Cold War jazz received the attention of a completely new audience; namely official policy makers, who saw in jazz a promising ‘secret’ weapon to battle Communism during the Cold War.

The second speciality of jazz and its diplomacy, hence lies in its diverse function as tool of propaganda, identity shaper and Cold War ‘wonder weapon’ through history. During the first two decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, jazz was largely seen in regard to represent the new urban society, and discourses focused on issues concerning mostly race, class and gender. With the rise of geopolitical tension during the end of the interwar period, however, jazz slowly turned into a tool for governmental policies both for authoritarian and liberal states (Brown 2005: p.97). What this part of the chapter hence, seeks to highlight, is the complex multidimensional and multinational nature of jazz diplomacy through its history, which sets it apart from other musical genres during this particular period. First, it will discuss how jazz’s role has changed from the interwar period to the merge of the Cold War, by giving several examples from both liberal as well as authoritarian states. Second, it will look into the role of jazz in relation to national identity, and through its use as propaganda tool during the Second World War. I will then discuss jazz’s role in the relation of national identity and nation branding after the Second World War.

Finally, no history of jazz would be complete without its relation to US foreign policy from the 1950s onwards. The Unites States as the birthplace of jazz, played an important role in the international discussion about its functions and identity. As will be shown in the following pages, jazz’s link to America was one of the leading topics in the discussions about jazz diplomacy early on, since many jazz-critics saw it as a powerful tool for the ‘Americanisation’ of other nations. Simultaneously, jazz had, due to its roots in African-American culture, a controversial image within the United States. This turns jazz diplomacy in regard to U.S. foreign policy into a paradoxical, complex matter which demands a detailed observation linking jazz to U.S. foreign policy. Thus, this chapter will only look shortly into the

\textsuperscript{65} From the 1960s onwards jazz players started to experience gradually with ‘free jazz’, which was not necessarily suitable for the masses (Brown 2005, p.100).
beginnings of jazz diplomacy in the relation to the Cold War foreign policy of the United States. Instead, a more detailed and complex review on the dimensions of U.S. cultural diplomacy and jazz will follow in chapter three.

2.4.1. Shipping jazz to the world

The rapid distribution of jazz and its growing worldwide popularity, did not come by hazard, but was due to three main factors; the increase of Cross-Atlantic and Cross-Pacific cruise ships, the distribution of records and jazz’s connection to dancing. From the twentieth century, the access to new transport technologies, next to tourism and exchange of products, also had an effect on the international traffic of musicians. The big cruises started hiring jazz players in order to entertain their passengers through the long journey. This way jazz musicians set land on various different destinations, distributing their music both in Europe and Asia (Atkins 2001: p.55-56). Another, big part played the establishment of the first jazz records. As early as 1917, the white New Orleans musicians Dixieland Jazz Band, after the initial black Original Creole Orchestra (black musicians) refused to play due to lack of payment, produced the first jazz record in history. The record was sold internationally and led to growing interest of jazz among listeners as well as musicians. Soon musicians started to copy the new music, in order to satisfy the growing demand from the audiences. Lastly another important factor for its popularity, was jazz link to dancing. In the early 1920’s dance halls popped up through Europe and Asia, being filled by young people who related jazz with a modern cosmopolitan way of life (Brown 2005: pp.94-95). The increased popularity of jazz soon caused a division of two camps, discussing the possible effects the new music may have on the population. On the one hand jazz was welcomed as the representation of modernity and cosmopolitan values, on the other hand, it was seen as threat to the cultural authenticity of the nation (Atkins, 2001).

During its early stages, jazz was seen by many as the representation of modernity, of a transnational cosmopolitan society. Young people in Germany, France, but also Japan, celebrated jazz as their representation of a new alternative lifestyle (Jordan, 2002); (Brown, 2005); (Atkins 2001: pp.107-109). Following the ‘Jazz fever’ soon followed critical voices, from conservative and right-wing camps, who would often refer to it as ‘noise’ in TV, newspapers or the radio. Critics were worried that the wild lifestyle of jazz would have a terrible effect on society, since it encouraged uninhibited dancing between different classes, gender and races. According to these critics’ jazz was the representation of the ‘other’, which threatened to
'Americanise' their own authentic culture (Brown 2004: p.95-96). In interwar France for example, jazz was under major discussion in relation to ‘frenchness’. Right-wing groups claimed that jazz was a threat to French culture, as it would turn them into Americans. At the same time French jazz fans, argued that the very spontaneous and wild nature of jazz (which was under critique by the right-wing), was in fact valuable or even helpful for the healing of French culture (Jordan 2002: p.198-192). The discussions about the ‘frenchness’ and the authenticity of jazz continued to the rise of the Cold War. However, with the occupation of France by Nazi Germany in 1940, the debate about jazz started to become more political. Since, the German authorities banned jazz from the radio, because it collided with their racist and anti-Semitic ideology, it was soon linked to a form of left French resistance against the regime (Jordan 2002: p. 207). After the fall of Nazi Germany, France continued to link jazz with French identity and antidote to fascism. During the occupation period of Germany, the French troops strongly promoted jazz through radio broadcasts, organization of concerts and jazz tours, due to the linkage of their own occupation (Thacker 2014: p.107).

2.4.2. Jazz and nationalism

The French were not alone pointing weight at the influence of jazz on its society and national identity. During the rise of the Second World War, both authoritarian and liberal states, started to give jazz a more and more political role. In the war years, there developed an intense ‘radio war’ between Germany and Britain, where jazz was started to be used as a propaganda weapon (Studdert 2014).

Unsurprisingly, within the Nazi regime, but also imperial Japan, jazz started to be associated with the ‘enemy music’, as it portrayed cosmopolitan and capitalistic ideas. There were several attempts both in Japan and Germany to ban jazz altogether, which however, turned out easier said than done. This was for one point due to the fact that music was an important asset to guarantee military and civilian morale. Second, even after banning jazz from the agenda, the music still was incredible popular among the German and Japanese population. It was an open secret that Senior Luftwaffe officers were regularly tuning in to British radio stations on their way back home. In fear to lose the ‘radio-war’ against Britain (or

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other neighbour countries who had a more liberal attitude towards jazz), who started to use jazz in order to attract German listeners to its broadcast, the Nazis rather than to ban jazz, simply tried to make it ‘German’ (Brown 2005: pp.97-99).

Paradoxically, after not being able to abolish jazz, Nazi Germany’s Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, initiated to use ‘enemy music’ himself as a propaganda weapon against the Allied powers. This, as will be discussed in chapter four, was also a tactic followed by the Japanese military government. Goebbels, was well aware of the power and popularity of swing and jazz not only within Germany, but even more abroad and decided due to its wide reachability to use it as propaganda tool. In the respond to a parody song ‘Siegfried Line song’ by the British propaganda channel ‘Soldatensender’ (soldier channel), the Nazis responded with airing a new broadcast featuring jazz music on their program ‘Germany Calling’. The program, famous for its speaker ‘Lord Haw Haw’ (William Joyce), which was founded in 1938, aired its shows completely in English language with the purpose to target British, Irish and American audiences for Nazi propaganda. Moreover, the program aimed at the British included a jazz broadcast program called ‘Charlie’ (Karl Schwedler) and his Orchestra, which used American-jazz songs with satirical political content, pointing out the miserable conditions of Britain during the war (in comparison to Germany) and blaming prime minister Winston Churchill for the suffering of the British population (since he refused Hitler’s peace offering). The broadcast aired regularly after air raids by the Germany ‘Luftwaffe’ (Studdert 2014: pp.109-113). Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine the full capacity of ‘Charlie and his Orchestra’ on the British audience, due to the lack of media coverage. However, it is indeed nevertheless a striking example of how jazz in accordance to the WWII climax was gradually detached from the cultural discourse, and instead got attached a political role. This political link to jazz continued also during the post war period.

2.4.3. Jazz and identity

After World War II, the Allies made plans for a re-education of Germany in all major social areas including politics, education, media and arts, and with that of also music. During the occupation of Germany, the allied forces, among classical music also used jazz in order to battle the remaining fascist roots, as well as to improve their image (or rather the image of the occupation) among the German population. By using music, instead of ‘hard power’ measurements, the allied powers wanted to find a balance in order to deal with post-war
Germany. Music was ought to create a ‘neutral-stage’ during the occupational period, were tensions between Germans and the allied were still strong. The strict denazification program and economic instability, which was partly caused by the policies of the Allied powers, had caused discomfort among the German population. The goal was to use music as a sort of diplomacy tool in order to gain the German trust. By gaining the German trust, the Allied hoped to prevent Germany to fall back into fascism and instead to remain in its peaceful state also in the future. Furthermore, the re-education process represented next to humanitarian and international spirit, also the own national ideas of the allied powers. By the program Great Britain, France, the United States and the Soviets, each hoped to implant some of their own nation’s values and ideas to Germany, which gradually led to cultural competition between the powers (Thacker 2014: p.95-97). What followed was the accumulation of German musicians through the country, the organisation of concerts, rebuilding of concert halls and establishment of radio channels. In this setting, jazz played a vital role in the formation of new relations between the occupiers and occupied. This was due to the fact that jazz, represented both for the German population as well as for the allied powers, a neutral stage which was not linked to the Nazi-regime. As discussed before, was widely popular among young urban Germans, who identified jazz with modernism and cosmopolitan values and already well distributed through the nation. At the same time, the allied associated jazz with high culture, representing humanitarian and anti-fascist values (Thacker 2014: pp.108-109). In this sense, jazz proposed an optimal possibility to form ties between German population and the allied.

2.4.4. Jazz and the Cold War

The most widely discussed field of jazz diplomacy by intellectuals involves the foreign policy during the Cold War. Importantly, the usage of jazz as diplomacy and image shaping instrument during the Cold War period, was (if prominent but) not limited to U.S. foreign policy only. In fact, jazz diplomacy turned out to be a policy measurement which was adopted through the Western world. Mario Dunkel67 (2014), for example portrays the interesting case of West Germany, which used jazz in order to create a new image for its nation, as a non-fascist, non-communist and peaceful democracy. After world war two, the reputation of West

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Germany was understandably bad, and propaganda articles from East Germany fuelled fears through Europe that it did not overcome its fascist roots, and yet was about to stand in front of another outburst of right ideologies. Jazz was perfect, as the music was banned, even though not successfully, by the Nazi regime and therefore, represented West Germany’s opposition to the ideology. It served further, as being the most ‘American’ thing, as a representation of West Germany to be anti-communist as well. Both institutionalized as well as private actors, such as Joachim-Ernst Berendt contributed to the promotion of jazz through the country: there were radio stations attributed to it, books, television, concerts, German jazz ambassadors, high promotion by the German state (in form of funds to the Goethe institute) and so on (Dunkel 2014: pp.150-152).

2.4.1 Jazz diplomacy and the United States

Leaving the multinational dimensions of jazz diplomacy aside, undeniable the biggest actor in jazz diplomacy was the United States. Interestingly, the United States initially did not use jazz as official music diplomacy. In the case of the German occupation, the U.S. was first keen to use classical music orchestras instead, since policy makers feared to confirm the Nazi-stereotypes of the U.S., as a land without real culture. Furthermore, there was not really the necessity to promote jazz through governmental programs, as soldiers would bring jazz to Germany eventually (Thacker 2014: p.107). The lack of interest in the power of jazz by U.S. politicians, however, drastically changed through the rise of the Cold War, were next to ‘hard power’, cultural diplomacy tools were increasingly used by both superpowers in order to convince the rest of their world of their ideology (Gienow-Hecht, 2015), (Davenport, 2009)\(^{68}\), (Von Eschen, 2004)\(^{69}\). In 1956 the Eisenhower administration initiated a worldwide cultural program, in order to improve the (cultural and political) image of the United States abroad. By sending hundreds of ‘Jazz Ambassadors’ around the globe, president Dwight D. Eisenhower aimed to reshape U.S. bad image (Davenport 2009: p.1-5). The national representation played an important role in Cold War politics, since a positive image was seen as a necessity to guarantee the sympathy of ‘neutral’ states and to prevent them to fall for the rival’s ideology.


However, this was not always easy, since the Soviets used cultural diplomacy to promote their own values and ideas as well. During Cold War, the Soviet Union started Anti-American campaigns through the West, distributing the U.S. as a self-centred, individualistic and racists nation, which was discriminating its own people. These ‘Hate America’ campaigns, were in particular highlighting the racial discrimination presented in the states. During the 1950’s and 60’s the Soviet Union sponsored a variety of cultural programs, in fact triple as much as the US, also in order to promote positive image of communism and socialism. The targets consisted to a great part of decolonizing countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East (Davenport 2009: pp. 11-12). Moreover, the targeted countries hardened jazz diplomacy further, as the foreign audience had their own purposes and ideas how the bands had to look like. American jazz bands were closely observed and put under high critique, if they did not fulfil the high standards demanded by the local audience (Fosler-Lussier 2015: pp.125-126). The promotion of jazz further, presented a challenge due to national tensions and scandals within the U.S., following the civil right movement. In other words, U.S. jazz diplomacy can be regarded as a sort of cultural paradox: While African-American musicians were travelling as free man promoting American culture and values through Europe and Asia, their brothers and sisters at the same time, were kept on being discriminated and censored. Unsurprisingly, some of the jazzmen were not supporting the foreign office intensions to use their music as promotion for American values, and started to speak critique through their songs towards American race issues (Davenport 2009: p.15). The race issue played also played a role in the case of jazz diplomacy in Japan, as will be discussed in chapter four (Atkins, 2001).

Chapter Conclusion

In summary, as this chapter achieved to demonstrate, both music and jazz diplomacy played an important role in the history of international relations. However, I agree with Fosler-Lussier, that scholar’s intension to either coin music diplomacy in terms of ‘violence’ or ‘harmony’ is troublesome, since it disregards the multidimensional and complex nature of music as a cultural diplomacy instrument. Over time, music has been both associated in imperialistic and pacifist means, however, it is the relation between producers and the audience that defines its true power. As the examples from the impressed guests who brought the concealed music to their own nations, to the use of jazz music from French left-wing resistance groups, up to the critics and demands for professional jazz groups during the Cold War suggest, the audience
were not silent listeners, but in fact active players in the game. Furthermore, the usage of the allied of music as effective diplomacy tool to gain the trust of the German population, also points at the cooperating relation that music enables between producer and listeners. In other words, in order to understand the full capacity of music diplomacy, and in the matter of this thesis its role in regards to Japan and U.S. relations, it is hence, also necessary to look at the social, cultural, historical and political backgrounds both from the sending and receiving country.
3. U.S.-Japan Diplomatic relations

‘When I visited Japan in November a year ago, I told Prime Minister Nakasone that there’s no relationship that is more important to peace and prosperity in the world than that between the United States and Japan.’ (Reagan, 1985).

Bearing the words of the 40th president of the United States in mind, there is hardly any diplomatic relationship as multi-faceted and spinning as the one between the United States and Japan. Through their 165-years of diplomatic history, their complex bilateral relationship has shifted back and forth between friendship and rivalry. Moreover, their relationship was not always based on equal grounds. This complex and vexed nature of U.S.-Japan relations can be traced back up to the very beginning of their bilateral relationship, which was marked by the controversial ‘knock’ of Commodore Matthew C. Perry in 1853. On July 8, 1853, Perry arrived with his heavily loaded ‘black ships’ on Uraga bay to demand Japan’s reopening to the West. While there are diverse reasons for why Perry’s mission was fruitful, arguably one of the most crucial factors was that the in Japan ruling bafuku stood before an internal dilemma between sakoku (keeping the country closed) and kaikoku (opening the country). On the one hand the isolation has been the most peaceful period in the nation’s history, which was desired to be continued. On the other hand, the closure had led to Japan’s lag in technological developments (in particular in the military sector), which made it vulnerable to Western nations (Atsumi and Bernhofen 2011: pp. 2-3). Moreover, when the Qing dynasty was defeated by the British after the First Opium War in 1842, the bafuku were even more pressured to change their policies with the Western powers (Minohara and Iokibe 2017: pp.4-70).

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72 China has been traditionally regarded by the Japanese leadership as a benchmark. Hence, when the dynasty got defeated by the British, the bafuku feared that Japan would face a similar fate, if they did not comply to the West (Atsumi and Bernhofen 2011, pp. 2-3).
In other words, when the Americans knocked at Japan’s doors with their heavily armed fleets, the bafuku stood little chance but to open up Japan in order to avoid a violent outcome. Less than a year later, on March 31, 1854 the Treaty of Peace and Amity, also known as the Kanagawa Treaty, was signed between the United States and Japan (Atsumi and Bernhofen 2011: p.5). Once Japan was successfully opened, the Americans pushed further for the creation of a commercial treaty. This task was assigned to Townsend Harris, who concluded the Shimoda convention in 1857 and the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Amity and Commerce, also referred to as the Harris Treaty, on July 28, 1858 (Atsumi and Bernhofen 2011: p.6). Importantly, even though the Americans insisted on their peaceful and friendly intentions in the creation of the treaties, it is to note that both the Harris Treaty and (later also) the Kanagawa Treaty came to be known as the first ‘unequal treaties’ of Japan. This was due to the fact that both contained a most-favoured nation clause, which was unilateral in obligation, unlimited in scope and unconditional in operation (Murase 1976: p. 275). Moreover, the American treaties influenced the creation of similar treaties between Japan and other Western powers, all including a most-favoured nation clause. From the 1870s onwards the Japanese leadership started to demand a revision of the unequal treaties. However, it was only in 1899 with the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, that Japan gained back its legal equality with the west (Murase 1976: pp.279-281).

As discussed in the first part of this thesis, in order define the changing role of cultural diplomacy, as well as music and jazz diplomacy, it is necessary to consider the actors, space and time it is set in. Thus, the following chapter seeks to give a broad introduction through the diplomatic history of Japan and the U.S. from the pre-war period (to world war one) to the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Mutual Security Treaty in 1952. The first

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74 The unilateral nature of the treaty was initially not an issue from the Japanese side due to prohibition of Japanese to go abroad. This position changed however, when Japan started to be more included within the international stage. Moreover, the unconditional nature of the clause gave Japan an unfavourable bargaining position, as it gave allowance to Americans to claim any benefits from third states (Atsumi and Bernhofen 2011: pp.4-5).

part of this chapter, focuses on the rise of tensions during the first two decades of the twentieth century, including Japan’s Twenty-Two Demands (1914), the American refusal of the equality clause at the Paris Peace Conference (1919) and the two anti-Japanese sentiment movements in California (respectively 1910 and 1924). The focus will then lie on their relationship during the interwar period. Here there will be discussed three incidents, which led to rising tensions between the two nations: the Manchurian incident (1931), domestic tensions within Japan’s politics and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (1937). The second part of this chapter then is devoted to the occupation period (1945-1952). First, I will analyse how the occupation was structured and define the role of the main three actors: Supreme Commander MacArthur, the Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and parts of the Japanese population. I will then discuss the democratization, demilitarization and decentralization policies of SCAP during the first period of the occupation into more detail. Second, I will analyse the change of the occupation policies during the ‘reverse course’. I will look into detail how, the change of international politics through the rise of the Cold War conflict and the outbreak of the Korean War, had influence on the American course of the occupation. Finally, I will discuss how the occupation ended, by looking at the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the bilateral Security Treaty of 1952. Moreover, I will look into detail how these two treaties changed Japan’s international status after the occupation and what effects it had on the U.S.-Japan relationship.

3.1 Japan and U.S. relations before and during World War One

Beyond the unequal treaties, Japan and the U.S. remained during the rest of the nineteenth century on a rather coordinable relation. This however, changed with the shift to the twentieth century, where both the United States and Japan thanks to their military victories, in the Spanish-American War (1898), the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), joined the European powers on the international political stage (Teramoto & Minohara 2017: p.23). Indeed, the first two decades of the twentieth century of Japan-U.S. relations were marked by a series of tensions and continuous use of diplomacies in order

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to reduce conflict. As these friction points were vital for the development of the pre-war Japan-U.S. relations, I believe it is necessary to shortly outline the three most profound issues. The primer example for American-Japanese tensions is their conflicting territory interest on China. Following the rise of the First World War in 1914, Great Britain asked Japan for its assistance to fight German armed merchant vessels in East China Sea. On the grounds of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, as well as to improve their status as the major power in East Asia, Japan answered the British demand by declaring war on Germany on August 23, 1914 (Sōchi 2015: pp.36-40). By October 1914, Japan was in complete control over the German territory in China, and initiated its ‘Twenty-One-Demands’, which fostered tensions between the States and Japan. At first, the U.S. held a rather neutral position, however, this changed when Japan forced military troops into the area, which threatened America’s own interest of keeping an open door policy in China. On May 11, 1915, President Woodrow Wilson issued the second Bryan note, declaring the U.S. opposition to any Japanese actions, which would infringe Chinese sovereignty (Sōchi 2015: p.49-50). However, Wilson did not take stronger forms of actions, considering the rising conflict in Europe and to maintain good diplomatic turns with Japan. After some negotiations, they came to a compromise in form of the Ishii-Lansing agreement on November 2, 1917. With the agreement Secretary of State Robert Lansing acknowledged Japan’s special interest in Manchuria, while the Japanese Foreign Minister Ishii Kikujirō agreed to place no limitations on the State’s Open Door Policy of China (Minohara, Takahara & Murai 2017: p.56). The agreement was however, short-lived and cancelled in 1922 after the conclusion of the Nine-Power Treaty in Washington (Scott, 1923).

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78 The demands were presented to Yuan Shinkai by the Japanese ambassador Hioki Eki in Beijing, on the 18th January, 1915. They were divided into five groups and ranged from the recognition of its new obtained territories, in Manchuria and Mongolia, to the Chinese acknowledgment of its interest in Han-Ye-Ping Iron and Coal group, to open costal labours to other powers. The final demand was the most controversial one, which sought to include Japanese advisors to the Chinese government as well as the joint administration of the local police (Minohara, Takahara & Murai 2017: pp.52-53).
Another source of tension between Japan and the U.S. consisted of the refusal by the United States of Japan’s request for the inclusion of a racial equality clause into the Covenant of the League of Nations during the Paris Peace Treaty conference of Versailles in 1919. The Japanese as part of the Allied powers, insisted on three demands during the conference. First, ensuring of the inhibition of former German interests in the Shandong province, including the rights in railroads, mines and settlement in Qingdao. Second, ensuring the control by Japan of former German Pacific islands north of equator. And third, the demand of the inclusion of a racial equality clause81, which was a clause against the discrimination of other races by white powers, into the League of Nations covenant. The equality clause was of special interest for Japan, since itself has been victim of Western prejudice and discrimination before and during the First World War. The main aim for the equality clause was to foster Japan’s international prestige and to prevent new anti-Japanese bills to be invoked in the future. Whereas, the former two demands were accepted mutually (though the second was passed under a compromise to divide the former German territories into three parts), the latter one was rejected, by Britain and Australia. Disappointed by this, the Japanese representatives hoped for the approval of the American side. However, pressured by the influence of local white politics within the U.S, President Wilson objected the equality clause. This decision led to a strong discontent and anger among the Japanese representatives, who felt treated unequally by the Western powers (Minohara, Takahara & Murai 2017: pp.58-61). The refusal of the equality clause, is of great importance in the development of the pre-war relations of Japan and the States. This is because it became an important argument for the Japanese right-wing military power leaders, to justify their distrust to Western powers and to raise anti-American sentiment within Japan during the 1930s.

A final tension point, made the immigration question in form of the two anti-Japanese sentiment movements in California in 1910 and in 1924 (Minohara, 1996)82. Following the discomfort of the Californian population on the rise of the immigrant community, local politicians started campaigns for the promotion of a new land law, which sought to limit the access to ownership for Japanese immigrants. The so called, Alien Land Law, or anti-Japanese

law (Daiichiji hainichi tochihō), sought to prevent Japanese and other Asian immigrants from ‘owning outright any farmland as well as limiting the length of land leases to a maximum of three years.’ (Minohara, Takahara & Murai 2017: p.48) Unsurprisingly, the legislation provoked new tensions between Japan and the States, as Tokyo saw the bill as a violation of Japanese pride, prestige and its international status. Also American Presidents William H. Taft and later on also President Wilson, realized the gravity of the issue and worked together with Japanese diplomats in order to prevent the bill of being passed (Minohara, Takahara & Murai 2017: pp.46-49). Nevertheless, the Alien Land Law was passed in California in 1913, though it is to note that it turned out to be ‘toothless’, as it was widely ignored by the residents (Gaines and Cho 2004: p. 275). With the outbreak of the Great War, the immigration question shortly went off the table of discussion. However, the issue was once again brought up after the conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference, with the difference that the second bill ought to be implemented on a national scale. The new legislation was again issued on the grounds of the Californian issue of the immigrant community. However, another contributor to the anti-Japanese sentiment made Japan’s foreign policy towards China. This was because the Chinese revolution of October 1911, has strengthened some American affinity towards China, seeing it as a sort of ‘sister republic’ to the United States, which has to be protected. When Japan announced its Twenty-Two Demands in 1915, it caused a massive resurgence of anti-Japanese sentiment through the States (Minohara 1996: pp.46-47). The second Alien Land Law was passed under the Immigration Act on May 15, 1924 (Hattori and Minohara 2017: pp.72). The Alien Land Laws, caused major frictions between Japan-U.S. diplomacy, as they injured America’s moral leadership and led to Japan’s disillusionment with American diplomacy and the West. Even though, the second bill provoked less friction between Japan-U.S. diplomacy, it nevertheless, had a negative effect on the Japanese perception of America and the West (Hattori and Minohara 2017: pp.71-73). It is important to consider these three points of friction in Japan-U.S. relations, as they have prefaced the path of the downspin of American-Japanese relations during the interwar period.


3.1.1 The Manchuria incident of 1931

The 1930s were a tumultuous period in international relations. The bank crash on October, 24, 1929, resulted into an economic chaos and financial depression through the industrialized world. As a result, U.S. and European business leaders started to cut down international trade and instead focused on self-centred economic blocs. In order to cut down trade costs, the industrial states further introduced a number of tariffs, import quotas and exchange controls on foreign products (Grossman and Meissner 2010: pp.326-328)\(^{85}\). This had also a strong impact on the Japanese economy, which due to its lack of natural resources and its focus in the export of textile industry, was highly dependent on international trade (Kimura 2013: pp. 3-6)\(^{86}\). As a result, millions of Japanese men and women were unemployed, and there was a high increase in poverty among farmer villages. The Great Depression had also an effect on the perception of the American capitalist model in Japan. The crash of the U.S. economy in 1929, led to growing doubts about the efficiency of capitalism among Japan’s leadership and businessman (McClain 2002: pp.405-408)\(^{87}\). Moreover, the decline of the equality clause during the Versailles Peace Conference (1917) and the two Anti Alien Land Laws in California, have contributed to a growing negative perception about Western policies in general and raised voices for Pan-Asianism \(^{88}\) policies among Japan’s military officers and bureaucrats (Ayden, 2013)\(^{89}\). There were furthermore, three important developments during the inter war period, which contributed to the downspin of U.S. Japan relations: the Manchurian incident of 1931, the unstable domestic political situation in Japan and the out-break of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937.


\(^{88}\) Pan-Asianists have been active in Japan since the turn of the twentieth century, however, it was only through the events of the Manchurian incident and the withdraw of Japan from the League of Nations in 1933 that their gained a broader reception among Japanese bureaucrats and military officers (Ayden 2013: p.57).

The bad economic situation, coupled with the growing military influence in Japan’s politics, brought further up again the interest conflict between Japan and U.S. on China. The peak of this conflict made the Manchurian incident of 1931. Following, the increased international tariffs barriers on Japanese products abroad, the decline of its gold stocks and the problem of the lack of raw materials and overpopulation, Japan’s economic and military planners started to turn to oversee conquests in order to protect Japan’s economy. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army, led by Kanji Ishiwara, plotted to destroy a part of the South Manchuria Railway with a bomb attack (Ferrell 1955: p.66)\(^90\). Even though, the blow was so weak that it did little to no harm to the rail tracks, it was yet enough to give the Kwangtung Army a reason to march into the region. Ishiwara, sought to blame the attack on the Chinese, in order to ratify military action, which would allow the Japanese army to expand its territories. A leaked telegram, however, made clear that the attack was coming from the Kwantung Army. This was reported to Prime Minister Reijirō Wakatsuki, who commanded an immediate removal of the Japanese troops in China until an agreement was reached. However, the Kwantung Army, turned out to be beyond the control of the Japanese state and initiated the attack on Jinzhou. Further, attempts by the Japanese government as well as by Western powers to stop the group failed. Instead, Ishiwara, restricted to his demand that Chinese troops had to be removed as well and was planning on another attack and invasion of Qiqihar. U.S. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, made a final attempt to clear the situation, by leaking a confidential paper, which was expressed by Japanese Ambassador Kijūrō Shidehara and declared Japan’s plan to abort the attack on Jinzhou. However, Stimson’s plan failed, as the Japanese cabinet suspicious already before the leak had decided to put Shidehara under interrogation themselves. Finally, under the pressure of national critique, the Wakatsuki cabinet had no choice but to resign, which included the dismissal of Shidehara. This action, arguably marked the first domino in the downspin of pre-war U.S.-Japan relations. In particular, the dismissal of Foreign Minister Shidehara had a big impact regarding the bilateral relations, as he held a cosmopolitan and cooperation policy of Japan, and further, was known for his pro-U.S. attitude (Kubo, Hattori and Hatori 2017: pp.84-86)\(^91\). Furthermore, following


the Manchurian incident, also the League of Nations Council got alarmed and sent the Lytton Commission, to investigate the situation. The Commission released a report in October 1932, declaring that the actions brought by the Japanese military were not legitimate for self-defence and that the new proclaimed state of Manchukuo could therefore not be seen as genuine independence movement. Instead, the region, under the suggestion of the report, should obtain an autonomous government and be guided under the sovereignty of China. However, due to domestic tensions within Japan it never came to an agreement and Japan withdrew from the League of Nations on February 24, 1933 (Kubo, Hattori and Hattori 2017: pp.86-88).

3.1.2 Change in Japan’s domestic politics

Next to the Manchurian incident of 1931, also a development in Japan’s domestic and foreign policies had an impact on the Japan-U.S. relationship. The domestic political situation within Japan grew steadily unstable from the 1930s onward. After the success of the Manchurian incident Japanese military forces and civilian bureaucrats increasingly obtained influence of the Japanese government and the Japanese public. The assassination of Prime Minister Inukai, on May 15, 1932 caused a reorientation within the Japanese government. The senior statesmen decided to reduce the power of party cabinets, which in their eyes have been incapable to solve the economic crisis and to manage Japan’s foreign policy satisfactory. Instead, a ‘national unity cabinet’ was put into place, which should give the power to capable individuals outside of political parties; namely military members and civil bureaucrats. Saitō Makoto, a retired admiral, was chosen to become the new head of state (McClain 2002: pp.423-424). Moreover, in the realm of U.S.-Japan relationship, the new agenda of Japan from this point onward, had a very sceptical attitude towards the West and its capitalistic ideologies, including scepticism towards the efficiency of democracy. There was furthermore, a rise in the promotion of Japanism, as an alternative to Western influence, which sought the preservation of Japan’s traditional values. The conservative ‘Japanists’ in 1930, saw themselves as the defenders of such values and followed a very patriotist agenda, which was intolerant towards anyone who failed to support the imperial-family nation. Moreover, the political changes had an effect on the distribution, availability and censorship of Western culture, including literature, films and more strikingly music (McClain 2002: pp.426-428). One example of this,
was the creation of two governmental and semi-governmental public diplomacy organizations: the Greater Asia Association in 1933 and the Society for Promotion of International Cultural Relations (Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai) (KBS) in 1934 (Bukh 2014: p.468). The two cultural institutions, had the objective to promote Japanese values and ideas, with the former focusing on Asian nations and the latter aimed at the West. The Greater Association initiated a series of programs within the Japanese colonies in Korea, Taiwan and the puppet state in Manchuria, including Japanese language courses, educational exchange programs to Japanese Universities, performances of Japanese artists, exhibitions, films and literature. The main objective of the Association was to achieve better control over the colonies, as well as to facilitate their assimilation with Japan. Furthermore, there was also a strong use of cultural propaganda and censorship, including anti-American campaigns over Japanese radio stations, the ban of Anglo-American literature, films and music and a restriction to teach the English Language (Otmazgin 2012, pp.42-46). The KBS on the other hand was aimed at Western states, with a special focus on the United States from 1934 to 1937. The main objective of the KBS was to spread accurate information about Japan through the West in form of the promotion of cultural programs. It is important to note that, while Japanese domestic politics after the Manchurian Incident (1931) and the withdrawal of the League of Nations (1933) were gradually turning towards an anti-American sentiment, Japanese foreign policy still followed policies of international principles of cooperation and mutual understanding. The KBS for instance, until 1937, was acting on an ‘apolitical’ agenda, with the aim to improve Japan’s foreign relations through the promotion of culture abroad. This was party because the Japanese government hoped to compensate its international reputation after the Manchurian Crisis and the withdrawal from the League of Nations (Abel 2013: pp.19-27). Moreover, during the Manchurian crisis well into the 1933, there were several efforts by Japanese diplomats to persuade Japan’s cause in Manchuria towards Western and in particular U.S. audiences. This as Sandra Wilson, argues indicates that Japan though the tensions over the Manchurian incident and its withdrawal from the League of

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Nations, was not seeking a cut of Japan-U.S. relations right away (Wilson, 1995). In fact, both the United States and Japan tried to maintain a positive relationship in the economic and cultural area between 1934 to 1937. This changed however, with the rise of the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937.

3.1.3 The Sino-Japanese war: the break of Japan-U.S. relations

The final point of friction in the Japan-U.S. of the interwar period, was indirectly caused with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. A slight misunderstanding between Japanese and Chinese soldiers near the Marco Polo Bridge, soon escalated into a full-scale conflict between the two nations. However, both China and Japan refrained to call officially for war, as they feared this would violate the American Neutrality Act of 1935. This changed however, when the ongoing conflict with China started to have major influence on Japan’s economy. The continuous military actions in China made the island state increasingly dependent on the supply of machinery and natural resources, which ironically were delivered by the States. In an attempt to loosen the American control over Japan’s economy, the military leadership sought to expand the Japanese territory to South East Asian regions, which were rich in natural resources (Kubo, Hattori and Hattori 2017: pp.94-95). As a respond to this, the States initiated military and economic sanctions against Japan in 1940, the same year Japan joined the Tripartite Act with Germany and Italy. The sanctions were in form of the stationing of troops in Hawaii and the control of key export products, such as armaments and ammunition. However, this had the contrary effect and pushed the Japanese military even further South. In a final attempt, Washington froze Japanese assets within the U.S. and started a boycott on oil embargos to Japan, which was later followed also by the Netherlands and Britain. Japan now stood in a manoeuvre-powering dilemma; on the one hand the military groups were aware of the U.S.’s military power, however, on the other hand Japan’s oil reserves were slowly running low and would only last for less than a year. Both Japan and the State’s made a final attempt of negotiation, which unfortunately turned out to be unfruitful. In October 18, 1941 War minister Tōjō Hideki took over control and less than two months later the surprise

96 For more information on the issue see also: Anderson, I.H. Jr. (1975). The 1941 De Facto Embargo on Oil in Japan: A Bureaucratic Reflex. Pacific Historical Review 44/2, pp.201-231.
attack of Japan on Pearl Harbor followed, on December 7, 1941. This was the final strike, and after the declaration of war by both Germany and Italy four days later, the United States entered into the Second World War (Kubo, Hattori and Hattori 2017: pp.95-97; pp.99-101). Finally, the war ended with the two bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, costing the life of hundred thousand civilians and leading to Japan’s surrender on September 2, 1945. With the end of the Second World War, there was also the start of a new era of U.S.-Japan relations: the occupation period of Japan.

3.2. Post-War relations: the occupation period

‘Over all things and all men in this sphere of the universe hangs the dread uncertainty arising from the impinging ideologies which now stir mankind...[W]hich concept will prevail over these lands now being redesigned in the aftermath of war: this is the great issue which confronts our task in the problem of Japan- a problem which profoundly affects the destiny of all men and the future course of all civilization.’
(Supreme Commander McArthu)\textsuperscript{97}

Even thought, the occupation followed a unified policy by the Allied powers, in reality a big part of responsibility and acting power lied in the hands of the United States. This was partly due to the fact that the United States was concerned about the growing Soviet influence in East Europe and Asia and thus tried to limit the occupied area of Soviets as much as possible. When Stalin suggested to perform a divided occupation, as in defeated Germany, Washington immediately declined. Instead, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) under Supreme Commander Mac Arthur took over (Shibayama and Kusunoki: 2017: pp. 114-115)\textsuperscript{98}. Furthermore, the States dominated the occupation policies due to their special power within the policy bodies. For example, within the SCAP, the U.S. had a special veto right, which gave American representatives the power to deadlock undesirable decisions of the Commission. Furthermore, Supreme Commander Mac Arthur made sure all demands of the American side were represented rightly. He did this by occasionally skipping meetings, up to ignoring recommendations, which were out of U.S. interest. These objectives included the

dismemberment of the Japanese empire, the revision of the Japanese constitution, the reduction of power of the zaibatsu, as well as the reduction of linkage between Shinto and the government (McClain 2002: pp.524-525).

In summary, the occupation policy was build up out of three policy-making bodies, the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) based in Washington, the Allied Council of Japan based in Tokyo (ACJ) and finally the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) with its general headquarters (GHQ) in the Dai Ichi Insurance Building vis-à-vis of the Imperial palest. The FEC, consisted out of the representatives of thirteen (status by the end of the occupation) nations including China, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippines. The Commission was a high-policy making body, for the formulation of policies, principles and standards in regards to the accomplishment of surrender. Furthermore, it reviewed any directive request by a commission member formulated to the Supreme Commander, or a direct action made by SCAP himself, which was within the jurisdiction of the Commission. However, the FEC had no authority for territorial adjustment recommendations, nor for the conduction of military actions (CMH online, 2006)\(^99\). The Allied Council of Japan, initially an advisory body, acted as the executive actor of the Commission, which discussed issues and gave advice to SCAP for the implementation of new policies. The ACJ, was made out of the four allied members; the United States, the Soviet Union, China and a member representing jointly Britain, Australia, New Zealand and India. Finally, SCAP, which refers both to the office composed by the representatives of the U.S., the Soviet Union, China and Australia, as well as the person in charge, namely Douglas Mac Arthur, was the agent of the Commission (McClain 2002: pp. 524-525).

Importantly, different than in the case of the multilateral German occupation, the occupation of Japan was unilateral and all policies were directed indirectly by the SCAP. Moreover, the Japanese political system and bureaucracy remained largely intact and was capable of operating and complying SCAPS directives. The Japanese governmental channels were paired with parallel sections or agencies of the SCAP GHQ to work as guidance (Dobbins

Furthermore, there was the creation of a Central Liaison Office in Tokyo and other liaison offices in each of Japan’s prefectures. These offices were the primary channel for communication between the staff section of the GHQ and the Japanese government sections. This construction of the occupation, further allowed an easier and smoother application of policies in Japan than in the case of Germany. In contrast to Germany, the occupation of Japan was centred around one state (or moreover one person; Mac Arthur) only and had therefore little obligations to negotiate with other countries (Endo 2006: pp. 56-57). Moreover, it is also important to note that the Japanese were not ‘passive objects manipulated by American players’, but held an active role in putting their own rights and interests into the reform and reconstructive process as well policies (McClain 2002: pp.525-527). The maintenance of the Japanese bureaucracy allowed critics of the occupation policies, to intervene (if not always successful) to SCAP’s. Furthermore, there have been also SCAP policies, as the land reform, labour movements or women right activities, which were highly supported by the Japanese population.

3.2.1 Actors of the occupation

There have been three main actors involved in the dynamics of the occupation period of Japan; SCAP, namely the Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur on the American side and Yoshida Shigeru, aka. the pocket Churchill and importantly the Japanese people themselves on the Japanese side. In particular, commander MacArthur played a critical role during the occupation. Known as the ‘blue-eyed Shōgun’, MacArthur did not only represent the occupation as a whole but American policies, values and culture as well. The Supreme Commander was from very conservative nature and known for his stubborn and dominant character, which in form of his policies sometimes collided with the wishes of Washington. The power of his persona may be underlined by his famous first encounter with Japanese emperor Hirohito. MacArthur boldly ordered the emperor to his personal residence in the former U.S. embassy. The historical meeting was further, captured in a photo, which made

the front page of all Japanese newspapers one day later. The picture (Fig.1) showcased the small Japanese emperor in his fine robe, next to the lanky commander who wore his casual uniform. Arguably the image, highlight pretty good the new power relationship between the two nations; a strong, powerful America next to a small inferior Japan. It is needless to say that the photo had a big impact on the first public perception of the occupation (McClain 2002: pp.524-526).

MacArthur’s Japanese counterpart during the occupation was Yoshida Shigeru, which also hold the nickname Pocket Churchill due to his passion of cigars, arrogant behaviour and conservative policy. Yoshida was has served as Japan’s prime minister in two turns (May 22, 1946- May 20, 1946 and October 15, 1948 to December 7, 1954 )during the occupation period (MacDougall 1988: p.55)\textsuperscript{102}. As an internationalist he had advocated during the 1920s and 30s a peaceful policy towards China and Japan’s expansion in Northern Asia in form economic terms. Furthermore, he advocated the necessity for the cooperation of Japan and the West. During the Pacific war, Shigeru opposed Japan’s bond with the Axis powers and even sat in

prison for a few months due to his role in forming the Yohansen group. Hence, he was in the eyes of SCAP an excellent ally. However, Yoshida also hold discomfort towards some of SCAP’s policies, this played in particular a role, concerning the zaibatsu issue during the second phase of the occupation (McClain 2002: pp. 527-528).

Finally, some groups within the Japanese population also played an active role in the process of the occupation. Not all saw the occupation as something initially bad. In particular, minority groups, who had been oppressed during the war were in favour of occupation, as they saw it as a sort of liberation from the old regime and as a possibility to shape a positive future of Japan. These groups consisted to a big part out of women movements, labour leaders and political activist of the left and communist groups, who had been freed by the U.S. But also among the ‘ordinary’ Japanese people there were several voices hoping for a better future through the influence of the States. This was particularly true in the case of the American-directed public health measures (1945-1949) during the occupation, which contributed to an improvement of Japan U.S. relations on a local level (Nishimura, 2008). The aftermath of the war had left Japan in shreds. There was a shortage in food supplies, jobs, housing and medicine. In particular, the food crisis and the lack of a functioning health care were troublesome. Through the war Japan lost one third of its wealth, while inflation sky rocketed. Civilians during that time spent on an average 70 percent of their income on food. Furthermore, the bad harvest and consequences of war also triggered a massive food crisis, leading to famine. During the early stages of the occupation the American troops imported emergency supply, in form of corn, milk powder and corned beef, to prevent massive starvation during the winter of 1945-46 (McClain 2002: pp.528-533). Moreover, Japan’s healthcare system was destroyed and there was a major lack of medicine. This further, led to the flourishment of diseases, such as cholera and polio leading to the death of about 100,000 people. Until 1951, tuberculosis alone demanded 100.000 victims annually. Moreover, people suffered also from psychological trauma from the terrors of war. In particular, former Japanese soldiers suffered reprobation within society, be it on the one hand since according to some they brought shame among the nations, or because horrific stories of the Nanjing Massacre had made their rounds. There was also the rise of corruption, crime and black

markets. Many women joined the underworld, and sold their bodies for prostitution in order to gain money and food, which caused an increase in sexual transmitted diseases. And also natural disasters as the earthquake on June 28, 1948 north to Kyoto contributed to the bad health condition of Japan (Nishimura 2008: pp.427-430). As a result, the efforts of the medical services of the local U.S. Army military government teams of SCAP were largely welcomed by the Japanese population. Moreover, the promotion of health by the Americans, countered the widely held negative views on the occupation and gave some of the Japanese people hopes for a better future through the occupation reforms. Nevertheless, it is important to note at this point that the people of Japan also confronted SCAP reforms as active agents, by voting for elections, supporting the land, women and labour reform or looking carefully at the proposals for the amendment of the constitution (Gordon 2009: pp. 225-227)\(^{104}\). A part of the Japanese people, in this sense were also active players during the SCAP occupation. As will become evident in the example of the land reform and labour movements, the consent of the Japanese people was crucial for the successful implementation of some of the new regulations. Moreover, even though SCAP practiced heavy censorship on Japanese mass media and Communication services, some Japanese individuals, as film maker Kazuko Kurozawa also managed to express their discontent towards the occupation (Bourdaghgs, 2012)\(^{105}\).

### 3.2.2 The first phase of the occupation: demilitarization and democratization

The American policy of the occupation period from 1945 to 1952, can be observed in two parts: The first phase marked by the three d’s, demilitarization, democratization and decentralization. In contrast, the ‘reverse course’ during the second phase was marked by the five r’s; reconstructing the economy, restraining labour, rehabilitating individuals driven away from jobs and professions, rearming the military and realigning Japan fully with Western nations (McClain 2002: p.550). In a public statement on October 11, 1945 MacArthur addressed the important mission of the occupation including the ‘liberalization of the constitution, the emancipation of women, the encouragement of labour unionization, the


opening of schools to more liberal education, and the “democratization” of Japanese economic institutions’ (McClain 2002: p.534). By this measurements maintaining a peaceful and harmonic Japan would be guaranteed and the nation would be brought back to their traditional peaceful order, which they had subjugated for centuries. Washington, initially believed that the responsibility for Japan’s feudalistic nature and imperialistic turn during the second world war, lied within the military, the zaibatsu conglomerates and right-wing extremists. Hence, MacArthur demanded the reformation of both Japan’s state and society. What followed was the first stage of the occupation policy; the demilitarization of Japan.

First, SCAP stripped Japan from its former territories in China, South Korea, Sakhalin, Manchuria, and Taiwan. Then followed the abolishment of the military and navy and the demobilization of more than five million troops, as well as the relocation of three million Japanese civilians living abroad. Third, under the directive of ‘Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office’ of 1946, SCAP initiated a nationwide ‘purge’, which would remove ultranationalist persona (who had played a key role during the war) from both important public positions. The purge included posts in bureaucracy and also lower levels in society. By 1948, the purge had cost 200.000 Japanese their jobs. Furthermore, it affected diverse camps of Japanese society from police officers, to newspaper reports, bureaucrats and politicians, up to prominent figures, which were supporters of the SCAP reforms like woman’s suffrage leader Ichikawa Fusae. There was a mixed public reaction towards the purge. Some saw it as necessity for the unforgivable war crimes, whereas others thought of it as being too tough and turn innocent people into criminals. There were also attempts to prevent people from being purged within the central bureaucracy (McClain 2002: pp.534-535), (Gordon 2009, p.228). The final stage of the demilitarization was the Military Tribunal for the punishment of the major war criminals of the Far East on May 3, 1946 (Tsurumi 1990: p.15)106. The tribunal concluded with the execution of seven out of twenty-eight former high-ranked military and governmental leaders, including Kenji Doihara and the two former prime ministers Hirota Kōta and Tōjō Hideki. In total SCAP posed six thousand men under trial for war crimes (committed either under battle or on civilians under the occupied states), of which more than nine hundred were executed. Importantly, emperor Hirohito was not conducted, instead he was dismantled from all of his political powers and reduced to a representative figure of the nation. The reason behind this was that SCAP hoped, by sparing the emperor, to be able to use his

imaginative power to maintain stability within Japan and to utilize this as a ‘protective umbrella’ in order to gain support from the Japanese population (Tsurumi 1990: pp.14-21).

The second policy was the democratization107 of Japan. As a next step, SCAP sought a major political reconstruction, including the revision and liberalization of the Japanese constitution, which should guarantee civil liberties for Japanese population, the empowerment of the emperor and demanded the Japanese government to be responsible to the electorate. On Japanese side, the opinion about the democratization was divided. On the one side, few politicians shared the opinion that a whole reconstruction of Japan’s political structure was necessary. Shidehara and other conservative politicians as Yoshida, insisted that it would be enough to rephrase just a few sets of liberal laws and democratic movements, such as the extension of woman’s rights (Shibayama and Kusunuki 2016: pp.116-118). Furthermore, the Japanese government, under the first Shidehara cabinet (October 9, 1945-May 22, 1946), came up with their own drafts of a new constitution by Matsumoto, which was however declined by Mac Arthur for being too lash (Dower 1979: pp.318-319)108. On the other side, the Japanese public tended to have a different picture and indeed was in favour of a more drastic makeover of the constitution, as SCAP has proposed. In particular, there was strong support towards the demilitarization of power, expansion of personal liberties and any legacy, which would prevent the causalities of the war to ever occur again (McClain 2002: pp.537-539); (Gordon 2009: pp.28-29). SCAP finally assigned General Courtney Whitney, chief of SCAP’s government section with the task to put together a draft committee, in order to write a ‘guide’, later known as the MacArthur constitution, which the Shidehara cabinet could follow. The Mac Arthur constitution was forwarded to the Matsumoto committee on February 13, 1946 (Dower 1979: p.319). The three most profound changes included the displacement of the emperor’s role to a civil monarchy and representative figure, the separation of the

107 The Japanese government of 1945, had a constitutional, but not fully parliamentary shape, in the sense that sovereign power was vested to the emperor, but political power was divided among a small set of political elites. These elites consisted of the industrialists (zaibatsu), military actors, the bureaucracy and groups close to the emperor. From 1925, the representatives in the Diet could be elected every male Japanese over the age of 25. However, the appointment of the prime minister was reserved to the emperor. Furthermore, the military under the old government was not subordinated to civilian control, which had been exploited during the Second World War. There was also a lack of freedom of speech and assembly (Dobbins et.al.2003: pp. 27-28). Dobbins, J., McGinn, J. G., Crane, K., Jones, S.G, Lal, R., Rathmell, A., Sawnger, R. and Timilsina, A. (2003). Chapter Three: Japan, pp.25-54. In: America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, 1st ed. Pitsburg: RAND Corporation.

Shinto religion from the state and importantly Article 9, which dismantled Japan for its sovereign right to fledge war. Known as the peace clause the article stated that ‘the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes [...] land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained’ (McClain 2002: p.540). Furthermore, thirty-one Articles of the draft were attributed to fundamental civil rights of the Japanese people which were ‘guaranteed as eternal and inviolate rights’, absolute and could not be limited by law (as in the case in the old constitution). These rights included; ‘the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness’, ‘universal adult suffrage, the freedom of assembly and speech, academic freedom, free universal education, promotion of public health and social security, choice of occupation, marriage based on mutual consent, the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively, and the right to ‘maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living’ (McClain 2002: p. 541). Importantly, SCAP did not force Shidehara’s cabinet to implement the institution, but encouraged the cabinet to use the draft as a reference in order to come up with their own. However, the cabinet took too long and the outcomes in the eyes of MacArthur were not satisfactory enough. As a result, the constitution was pledged by an ultimatum, which would indicate consequences for the emperor due to his relations during the war, if the Japanese government would not cooperate. After some discussions between Shidehara and MacArthur, the document was passed to the Diet on October 7, 1946. It was then promulgated on November 3, 1946 as an amendment of the original constitution of 1889 and finally taken into effect on May 3, 1947 (McClain 2002: pp. 539-542). To this day Japan remains the only country in history, whose constitution has been made by another country. The new constitution has further, not been amended after it was taken into force in 1947 (Endo 2006: p. 59).

3.2.3 The Decentralization of power: from the zaibatsu bashing, to the land reform and the promotion of the labour movements

One of the main issues of the reformation of the occupation was devoted to the rebuilding of the Japanese economy. From the beginning of the occupation the SCAP put strict directives to limit and control the production of Japan’s industrial base. Obviously, any sort of war production was prohibited. However, SCAP further controlled and limited certain branches of Japanese production including ‘iron, steel, chemicals, nonferrous metals, aluminium,
magnesium, synthetic rubber, machine tools, automotive vehicles, ships, heavy machines, and so on’ (Schaller 1985: p.31). In order to reduce the limitations on Japan’s economy, the final policy of the first phase of the occupation period was thus occupied with the decentralization\(^{109}\) of political power within Japan. The decentralization phase concluded three major policies: the bashing of the zaibatsu, the land reform and the promotion of labour unions.

Although, both Washington and Tokyo agreed on the necessity to rebuilt Japan’s economy, there have been some frictions concerning what reforms to use. These frictions were mainly rooted in the diverse interpretation of what has caused Japan’s military rise in the first place. Japanese policy makers, as Shigeru Yoshida, claimed that the issue was just a ‘short stray away from the right path’ as a result of the depression and world crisis of the 1930’s. MacArthur, instead believed that the problem was imbedded deeper in Japan’s historical development. Moreover, Washington was worried about the maldistribution of wealth and legacy of political oppression, which was feared to trigger totalitarian movements of both Left or Right camps. Hence, in the eyes of the American’s there was the necessity to reform major economic and social factors in order to guarantee a harmonic and peaceful Japan also in the future. And this included also the almighty zaibatsu (Schaller 1985: pp. 29-30). Washington had reason for their distrust of the zaibatsu, since there was evidence that the conglomerates were receiving a bargain through the expansion of the Japanese empire in East Asia during the war and that the zaibatsu have tried to obscure their support of the war by blaming the military leadership instead (Bisson, 1954)\(^{110}\). Furthermore, it was believed that such big monopolies, would make the creation of a sustainable democracy rather difficult, if not impossible. In 1944, it was estimated that the four zaibatsu banks were holding 74,9 percent of all Japanese bank loans (Yamamura 1964: p.541)\(^{111}\). This arguably gave the zaibatsu clan a massive hold of power. Hence, SCAP believed that it would be rather hard if not impossible, to create a functioning middle class, while the zaibatsu would be still in control of

\(^{109}\) The decentralization of political power within Japan was also determined within the Potsdam Declaration of 1945. It stated that ‘there must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence in Japan of those who were responsible for Japanese aggression, and that irresponsible militarism must be driven from the world before there could be any order, peace, security, or justice’ (Borton 1948: p.146). Borton, H. (1948). Occupation Policies in Japan and Korea. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 255, pp.146-155.


wage cuts and have influence within the political arena (Schaller 1985: pp.31-33). The zaibatsu dissolution was also supported by the Japanese Social Democrats and Communist parties, who thought of it as the best alternative to complete nationalization measures (Yamamura 1967: p.3). On the other side, the Conservative parties of the Japanese government, including prime minister Yoshida and business allies insisted that the role, which was attributed to the zaibatsu was wrongly given. They argued that as capitalists, the clan did not have an intention in encouraging or profiting from the war, but instead it was the military force, which initiated the production of weapons. According to this argument, it was thus only a financial reason, which forced the peaceful industrialists into war. Instead, the blame should be taken fully by the then ruling military government (Schaller 1985: pp.33-34). Moreover, there was also support for the zaibatsu to stay in place, coming from the conservative camp of the State Department. Ex-Ambassador Joseph Grew for example, argued in name of the Japan Lobby that the monopoly power was justified, since Japan’s lack in raw materials demanded its economy to keep the prices for import and export products low (Schaller 1985: p.31). Furthermore, when SCAP’s Economic and Scientific Section (ESS), requested that all of the four major zaibatsu clans submit their dissolution plans, the Yasuda zaibatsu took the matter into their own hands. On October 12, 1945, Hajime Yasuda of the Yasuda zaibatsu paid a visit to Robert Kramer, the head of the ESS, to propose the Yasuda plan. The proposal anticipated an economic reform, in which the Yasuda family would resign voluntarily from all of their business positions. MacArthur, saw this as a first step, however insisted that a formulation of a broader policy would be necessary (Sumiya 2000: p.157). As a result, also the zaibatsu were added on the purge list in 1947. This however, turned out less effective than the blue-eyed Shōgun had whished, as many zaibatsu simply opened up new businesses. What followed was a number of laws promoted by SCAP, of which the two most important were the ‘Anti-Monopoly Law (Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade) of April 1947 and the Decentralization Law (Law for the Elimination of Excessive Concentrations of Economic Power) of December 1947’ (Dower 1979: p.343). The former, fell under the general tradition of anti-trust legislation and prohibited cartels to seize monopolistic holding

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113 Grew has served as the American Ambassador of Japan from 1932-1941. Further, he had served as the chargé d’affaires for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the American Ambassador of Denmark, Switzerland and Turkey and twice Under Secretary of State (Schaller 1985: p.31).
companies. The latter law, however, sought to dismantle any corporation that was a monopoly in the Japanese market and would hinder newcomers to enter. The unorthodox and drastic nature of the law, triggered open attack upon the occupation reform policy and MacArthur, from both Yoshida and parts of the Japanese population (Downer 1979: pp.343-345). This was little surprising considering that the law involved the closure of more than one thousand firms (McClain 2002: pp.543-545). Moreover, the change of international conditions through the rise of the Cold War, led to increased critique against the Decentralization Law also from the American side. Indeed, the zaibatsu issue was of such magnitude that it would come back three years later, during the second phase of the occupation.

In contrast to zaibatsu issue, there have been also several SCAP policies, which were widely supported by both the Japanese elite and its peoples. Two major steps, marked the promotion of labour movements and the land reform. With the promotion of labour movement, SCAP sought to bring more balance between management and employees. The improvement of the working conditions, so SCAP saw it, were an essential part for the decentralization of economic power. What followed was the abolition of the ‘feudal’ relationship between the management and employee, in order to guarantee a better distribution of incomes. Furthermore, MacArthur, hoped to create a wider middle-class by this. SCAP further, promoted the status of workers, guaranteeing them the right to organize strikes and demonstration. This was taken into action by the Trade Union Law of 1945, which ‘guaranteed all workers both in the private and public sectors (excluding firemen, police and prison guards) the rights to organize, engage in collective bargaining, and participate in strikes’ (McClain 2002: p.545). In 1947, followed the creation of the Ministry of Labour. The new policies, received a wide support by Japanese bureaucrats as well as the formation of a wide range of Japanese labour Unions. By 1948, the number was at 6.7 million workers divided through 33.900 unions (McClain 2002: p.544-546).

Another important part of the decentralization policy, marked the land reform, which sought to promote democracy and prevent the resurgence of militarism. SCAP saw the high tenancy rights during interwar period as a trigger for the depression in the rural area. In 1945, agriculture made still around half of Japan’s GDP, however, only a small part of the farmers was owning the land. SCAP feared that the poor conditions could lead to uproars and unrest

115 Additionally, to this there were two other labour related laws, the Labour Adjustment law, inspired by the Wagner Act and the Labour Standard Law, which were passed by the Japanese government later on (McClain 2002: p.546).
in the rural areas and hence, initiated a land reform program. In 1946, the Land Reform Bill was implemented, which authorized Japan’s government to acquire ‘all land belonging to absentee landlords’ and ‘permitted resident landlords to keep only as much land as their families could cultivate, plus an additional amount they could rent out’ (McClain 2002: p. 547). Compensation followed through rice prices and production costs. The land then later was resold to tenants at the purchase price, which could pay either by cash or through a thirty-two year 3.2 percent mortgage. Further, the land reform affected a wide quantity of Japanese population; Within the reform 2.3 million acres of land were purchased by the state and then later resold to 4.7 million tenant farmers. Similar to the labour movement, SCAP was receiving strong support from both the Japanese government as well as the farming population, which arguably led to the success of the reform. The land issue has been seen in Japan as a social problem already before the arrival of the allied powers. Unsurprisingly, solely the landowners opposed the reform, as they felt treated unfairly. Through the reform, also their status changed. By the conclusion of the land reform, landowners were not any longer the elite of villages, instead there was the formation of a broad class of independent farmers, which supported principals of democracy and capitalism, much to the delight of McArthur. At the same time, land-poor families were benefitting from the reform, since it gave them the possibility to purchase land on low price. By the completion of the reform in 1950, 90 percent of all paddy was cultivated by resident-owners (McClain 2002: pp.547-548).

3.2.4 SCAP’s education reform and the women’s equality clause

Next to the support of labour unions and the land reform, SCAP made several reconstructions in regard to Japan’s education system and the civil rights of women. Following the recommendation of American educators, who came to Japan, SCAP further sought to decentralize Japanese schools and restructure them on base of the American system. Under this new policy, schools were enabled to select teachers, decide texts and set a preferred curriculum. What followed was the reinterpretation of Imperial Rescript of Education in 1947, in form of the Fundamental Law of Education, with the primary goal to achieve ‘individual dignity and endeavour to bring up people who love truth and peace’ (McClain 2002: p.549). Furthermore, all of the former textbooks were rewritten on the bases of virtues of peace and democracy. The education reform, received great support by the Japanese teachers, who
wanted to get rid of the militaristic values and ideologies at school, which in their eyes contributed to death and war (McClain 2002: pp.548-549).

In accordance to the educational reform, SCAP enlarged the University system, renamed imperial institutions and more importantly, gave women access to higher educational institutions (Gordon 2009: pp.231-231). Finally, SCAP urged the Japanese government to further revise the Meiji Civil Code, in order to abolish the feudalistic role of male authority within the Japanese household over the wife and children as well as the privilege of eldest son. Already prior to the revision of the constitution MacArthur, has changed the election law, giving women the right to vote. The First Postwar General Election in Japan on December 17, 1945, granted all men and women aged 20 years and above the right to vote (Endo 2006: pp.62). Before the new constitution, Japan’s social system was highly male-dominated, women were forbidden to own property, they had neither legal, political nor economic rights, within school boys and girls were separated in education, there had been no colleges for women and there was no lawful adultery for women. This changed with the new legislation, which prohibited contract marriage, rewrote the status of marriage and divorce and finally granted equal rights to women in regard to property, inheritance and aspects of family life. The new constitution followed further, the opening of twenty-six women’s universities and the introduction of coeducational public high schools. Furthermore, with the new law in place women were for the first time eligible to be elected for public office and to serve as social workers and police officers (Endo 2006: pp.62-63). It is noteworthy that next to McArthur, also, Austrian-born Beate Sirota Gordon, played an important role in the establishment of women’s rights in Japan. Gordon, who grew up in Tokyo and was later on educated in America, came back to Japan during the occupation to work for SCAP’s Government Section. She was highly involved in the creation of Japan’s new constitution, in particular, Gordon made efforts in promoting Articles 14 and 24. The former, would provide women’s equal rights and the latter woman’s civil rights (Endo 2006: pp.66-67). Even though conservative voiced concern about the new policy, the majority of the Japanese population, however, supported reform. In particular women right activist, who had pledged against the discriminating role years before the war (McClain 2002: pp.549-550).

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3.2.5 SCAP and censorship

Another reform involved the dissolvent of militaristic propaganda in Japan’s communication services and mass media. On September 10, 1945, SCAP announced its Freedom of Speech and Press Directive, which sought to end governmental control and censorship of the Japanese press and promote freedom of speech for Japanese news agencies and communication facilities (Braw 1991:p.27-28). Within Japan’s new constitution, Article 21 stated that ‘no censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated’ (Braw 1991: p.29). However, while Supreme Commander MacArthur was enthusiastically promoting the importance of freedom of press and freedom of speech to the Japanese people, ironically, at same time SCAP pursued their own program of censorship and ‘democratic’ propaganda in Japan. In fact, the Press, Pictorial, and Broadcast Division (PPB) responsible for the control of Japan’s Mass Media during the occupation, within SCAPs Civil Intelligence Section (CIS former G-2), was already created several months before the end of the Second World War (Jones 2001: p.125). The American censorship involved a wide range of sectors everyday life including education, medical care and kabuki. The most concerned area of censorship, however, was directed at Japan’s mass media (newspapers, radio stations and books) and other means of communications (mail, telegrams, telephone, film and photographs). For instance, on September 18, 1945, SCAP imposed a ten-point Press Code Guideline stating that:

1. News must adhere strictly to the truth
2. Nothing shall be printed which might, directly or by inference disturb public tranquillity
3. There shall be no false or destructive criticism of the Allied Powers.
4. There shall be no destructive criticism of the Allied Forces of Occupation and nothing which might invite mistrust or resentment of these troops.
5. There shall be no mention or discussion of Allied troops movements unless such movements have been officially released.
6. News stories must be factually written and completely devoid of editorial opinion
7. News stories shall not be coloured to conform with any propaganda line.
8. Minor details of any news story must not be overemphasized to stress or develop any propaganda line.
9. No news story shall be distorted by the omission of pertinent facts or details.

10. In the makeup of the newspaper, no news story shall be given undue prominence for the purpose of establishing or developing any propaganda line.\textsuperscript{121}

In addition to the Press Code, there was also the Civil Censorship Detachment, which gave instructions concerning the censorship procedure. For instance, there were strict instructions that the censorship should not be mentioned in any way among the publications and there was a prohibition for a public discussion of the censorship due to the sensibility of the topic. Moreover, the censorship was not only used to remove unsuitable content, but also as a mode to influence what was written and published. A common topic was the question of war guilt (Braw 1991: pp.40-42). Any violation of the code, was punished with the suspension of the media outlet. In case of a heavier violation of the rules, there was also punishment in form of confiscation or a threat of a stricter line of censorship (Braw 1991: pp.82-88). The press censorship soon involved a wide range from Japanese Mass Media, including the precensorship of Tokyo’s five big newspapers: Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri Hichi, Nippon Sangyo and Tokyo Shimbun. Also Radio broadcasts were highly censored and only allowed to contain news, music and entertainment. The only exception to this made the Radio Tokyo, as it was directly under the supervision of SCAP (Braw 1991: p.42). There were furthermore strong controls on communications outside of Japan’s mass media. Also Books, magazines and movies were strictly controlled by the SCAP. In realms of the education reform for instance, SCAP’s Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E), censored\textsuperscript{122} all textbooks, which were promoting ultra-national and militaristic ideas (Thakur, 1995)\textsuperscript{123}. On November 19, 1945, the CI&E further released a statement which listed thirteen criteria under which film, with the inclusion of private collections, would be banned and censored (Harris 2013: p.55)\textsuperscript{124}. Furthermore, there were also controls concerning private mail coming from outside and inside Japan. This was in order to gain valuable information about the black markets and criminals (Braw 1997: p.40). It is to note that even though the strong censorship by the U.S. occupation, some Japanese

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\textsuperscript{121} SCAPIN 33, September 18, 1945, box 8553, SCAP.
\textsuperscript{122} It is to note that it was the Japanese government, who originally initiated the censorship of history textbooks, prior to the occupation period. On August 26, 1945, the government had ordered to conceal all militaristic phrases from school textbooks with black ink. This was an attempt to give a favourable impression of the Japanese ministry to the SCAP (Thakur 1995: pp.264-265).
\end{flushleft}
individuals still managed to express their discontent through hidden messages. As will be discussed in the following chapter, in particular jazz was used by some Japanese individuals to indirectly express their critique on the occupation censorship.

### 3.3. The second phase of the occupation

The rise of the Cold War in the late 1940’s changed the course of the occupation into a new direction. Through the rise of Communism in Eastern Europe, Mao Zedong in China and the intensifying hostility between the two Koreas, U.S. officials strongly feared that Japan would yet become another victim of Communism. Hence, SCAP’s new objective was to assure a stable, democratic Japan, which could sustain Communism and would act as an important Pacific ally of the U.S (McClain 2002: pp.550-552). This development in international relations unsurprisingly turned the Japanese communists (who had been released from imprisonment of the militaristic regime by MacArthur during the first phase of the occupation) and the Japanese Communist Party, in the eyes of Washington to a potential threat. As a matter of fact, neither Washington nor the SCAPGHQ trusted the Japanese Communists initially, but only tolerated them as long as they served American objectives. This was for example the case during the zaibatsu bashing (1947), which had been supported by the Communist Party. Another point marked the support of the Communists for the labour union and land reform. However, when the Japanese Communists and Marxism started to gain more influence across Japan’s universities and labour unions, SCAP’s tolerance finally stopped (Kumano 2010: pp.515-519).\(^{125}\)

The starting point for the so-called ‘reverse course’ of the occupation policies, may be marked with February 1, 1947, where Japan’s Industrial Labour Unions planned their first General Strike demanding higher pays (McClain 2002: p.552). However, MacArthur banned the demonstration in the last minute, with the argument that it would lead to social chaos and could be deadly of the still weak Japanese economy. The ban was little surprise as the movement was known to be sympathetic towards communist ideology, which was now seen as threat. This point forward opened the way for a series of backtracking policies on labour

unions, which were supported by SCAP as well as prime minister Yoshida. In 1947, SCAP amended the National Public Service Law to outlaw strikes or other dispute tactics and collective bargaining for regular government employees. In December 1948, followed the revision of the National Public Service Law, which denied civil servants the right to bargain collectively or to strike and the Public Corporation Labour Relations Law, which denied the right to strike to workers in public enterprises. The restriction was further extended to local civil servants by the Local Public Service Law (December, 1950) and to workers in local government-owned enterprises by the Local Public Enterprise Labour Relations Law (July, 1952) (Dower 1979: pp.338-339). With the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, the SCAP and Yoshida further initiated the so-called ‘red purge’. The purge sought to remove all communist influence from government positions, labour movements and information facilities. Starting with the national newspapers, the red purge removed 705 employees from 50 newspaper companies. In fall of 1950, the purge was extended on corporations in industries including coal, steel, shipbuilding, chemistry, railways and mining, costing the jobs of approximately 15,000 employees (Hajimu 2012: pp.556-557).

The second change of occupation policies, was followed with the conclusion of the decentralization policy in 1949. This was because Washington increasingly saw the political stability of Japan connected to its economic stability. Unsurprisingly, this led to a new objective of the occupation, which sought to encourage economic revitalization by ending the zaibatsu bashing and reversing the demilitarization policy (McClain 2002: pp.550-552). The rising criticism coming from the American Council on Japan (ACJ)/Japan Lobby, Washington and Conservative Japanese policymakers, put the Supreme Commander under pressure to overthink his decentralization law of 1947. In particular, the Japan Lobby, had a big influence towards the zaibatsu issue (Schonberger, 1977). Immediately after the announcement of MacArthur’s purge on the Japanese business executives in early 1947, the Lobby launched a sustained campaign against the dissolution program in general. The main argument was that

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126 In particular, Japanese Conservative politicians have been worried about the growing national influence of leftist circles. The main fear was that the leftist national networks could disturb the social order and the state. Moreover, Yoshida feared that the communist influence could lead to riots that would have a negative effect on his administration (Dower 1979: pp.300-303).


the purge of zaibatsu and the decentralization law would ultimately lead to an economic disaster and this simultaneously would leave Japan vulnerable to Soviet influence. Furthermore, it was argued that the policy was simply too expansive for the U.S. Treasury.\textsuperscript{129} The U.S. paranoia of the Soviet threat was indeed so big, that George F. Kennan in March 1948, visited MacArthur personally in Tokyo to deliver Washington’s order (McClain 2002: pp.551-553). Furthermore, there was also high demands for a reconsideration of the policies coming from the Japanese side. Japan’s prime minister Shigeru Yoshida for instance, had on several occasions demanded SCAP to redirect its policies to advance Japan’s economy and guaranty stabilization. Yoshida was of the opinion that responsible bureaucrats, conservative party leaders and business leaders had to be left alone by SCAP, in order for the system to work (Dower 1977: pp.343-346). MacArthur, tried to resist, but due to the rising pressure from Washington, the Japan Lobby and Yoshida, he had not much choice, but to give in to the new direction. In 1949, the Supreme Commander announced the successful conclusion of the decentralization program, which ended the zaibatsu bashing (McClain 2002: p.554).

Finally, there was also an alteration of the demilitarization policy of the SCAP. Through the rise of the international threat through Communism and the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950, Washington rethought Japan’s role as a possible point for military defence in East Asia. However, due to Japan’s Peace Constitution, Japan was vulnerable to an attack by its communist neighbours. In particular, Article 9. of the new constitution was of an issue, since it outlawed war and military forces as legitimate expression of state power. As a result, MacArthur, although initially refusing\textsuperscript{130} to implement the interpretation, announced on New Year’s Day of 1950 a new interpretation of Article 9. with the argumentation that Japan was in need to protect itself from the communist threat in China (Endo 2006: p.70). Prime Minister Yoshida agreed to SCAP’s request and established the National Police Reserve on August 10, 1950 (NPR)\textsuperscript{131}, a 75.000 men strong paramilitary force for the purpose of self-defence and to ensure domestic tranquillity. Furthermore, the Japanese Coast Guard was stocked up with

\textsuperscript{129} The U.S. Treasury spent in the first two years of the occupation period alone $600 million on salaries and food supply (McClain 2002: p.552).
\textsuperscript{130} Washington has issued a defence force of 150.000 inductees to support the Japanese police as early as in 1948. However, MacArthur refused to implement it right away, since he still had deep suspicion about the Japanese military scheme. With the outbreak of the Korean War, however, MacArthur had to give in to the demands of Washington (McClain 2002: p.544).
8,000 men (Kuzuhara 2006: p.96-97). The National Police Reserve, by 1954 the Japan Ground Self Defence Forces (JGSDF), helped the U.S. to defend Japan against the communist threat for years during the Cold War. Today the JGSDF is tasked with the maintaining of internal security in Japan. However, there remained an ongoing debate in how far their power should be stretched (Endo 2006: pp.70-71).

3.3.1 Truman’s relief of MacArthur

By the final years of the occupation there was more and more sentiment for the establishment of a peace treaty. As a matter of fact, there has been a call for a peace treaty as early as in 1949, from both SCAP and the State Department. It was believed that the remanence of troops was counterproductive in the long run as it limited Japan’s international trade expansion. There was furthermore, also support for the treaty coming from the American public opinion, which called for its troop to be brought back home. Despite his important role during the occupation, MacArthur, did not participate in the negotiations on the peace treaty of Japan. Instead, on April 11, 1951 (one year ahead of the end of the occupation) president Truman announced that MacArthur would be released of his duty as military commander and from his SCAP position (Endo 2006: p.76). As a matter of fact, president Truman has never really fond of the Supreme Commander, for a series of reason. However, a crucial point made the dispute between Truman and MacArthur in 1951, during the Korean War. The General disagreed with the president on the military policy towards China and criticized Truman’s decision publicly.

Since MacArthur’s public statement represented a threat, both in military and political spheres, to the President’s authority Truman declared the General as insubordinate and initiated his relief (Spanier, 1959)133. Japan reacted to the dismissal of Commander MacArthur with shock. For many Japanese the blue-eyed Shōgun, has represented more than a political persona, a father figure during the years of the occupation and many thought that his guidance was necessary to fully recover the nation. The overall positive sentiment for the General can be also read in a statement by the Mainichi newspaper, which was published one day the Supreme leader left Japan:

‘MacArthur dealt with Japanese people not as a conqueror but a great reformer. He was a noble political missionary. What he gave us was not material aid and democratic reform alone, but a new way of life, the freedom and dignity of the individual... We shall continue to love and trust him as one of the Americans who best understood Japan's position. We wanted his further help in nurturing our green democracy to fruition. We wanted his leadership at least until a signed peace treaty had given us a send-off into the world community.’ (Endo 2006: pp. 77-78).

On the day of his departure on April 16, 1951, prime minister Yoshida complimented MacArthur personally for his accomplishments in Japan as one of the marvels of history. Even emperor Hirohito payed a visit to the American embassy to give his farewell. There were furthermore two million Japanese civilians on the route between the embassy and the airport saying goodbye to the General and his family by hissing American flags. Moreover, there were discussions making the former SCAP an honorary citizen and plans to build a statue of him at the Tokyo bay. However, the ‘MacArthur fever’ did not last. Following a demeaning statement by MacArthur himself, in which he declared his position of the occupation of Japan and famously named the Japanese as a nation of ‘12-year olds’, the reputation and admiration he had built up during the occupation was shattered. Many Japanese reacted with great disappointed to his statement, as they have trusted and obeyed his policies, yet to be stabbed into their backs. Indeed, the shock was so great that the plans for MacArthur’s statue were abolished and his status of honoured citizen never was put into place (Endo 2006: pp. 76-79).

3.4. The end of the occupation: The San Francisco System

Nevertheless, a peace agreement was reached also without the support of the ex-Supreme Commander. Opinions were divided what the treaty should include. On the one hand, there were voices for a tough treaty, coming in particular from the South East Asia and Great Britain. In the case of the South East Asian countries, this sentiment was due to the fact that people still felt the maltreatment by the Japanese military during the occupation period, and believed that Japan should pay for its crimes or at least for the necessary reparations. For Great Britain, a strong Japan would mean a strong competitor in the Asian Market, which led the nation pushing for economic limitations. On the other side, there was sentiment for a softer charitable treaty from the side of Japan. Furthermore, both the rise of Cold War and tensions between North and South Korea, influenced Japan’s role in the treaty (McClain 2002: p. 556). In the end a compromise was reached, on September 8, 1951 in form of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) (Hara 2001: p.361). The United-States and seventy-four of Japan’s former
enemies signed the treaty, excluding the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{134}, Poland, Czechoslovakia and China (the latter was not invited). The Peace Treaty went into force on April 15, 1952, by President Truman, which also marked the day of the end of the occupation (Department of State Bulletin, 1952)\textsuperscript{135}. With the enforcement of the Peace Treaty, Japan returned to the international community. The San Francisco Peace Treaty on its whole was generous and non-restrictive. All restrictions on Japan’s sovereignty, economy and military were dismissed and Japan was exempted from its reparations, with the exclusion of the reparations which in service to Southeast Asian nations (Shibayama and Kusunuki 2016: pp.123-124). Moreover, the Peace Treaty recognized also the assistance and support for Japan’s application for the United Nations (McClain 2002: pp.557-558). However, the Peace Treaty received also critique, due to its too vague clauses in its Articles, which contributed to multiple unresolved problems between Japan and its neighbours. For instance, the territorial clauses in Article 2. of the Peace Treaty neither specified final designation nor precise geographical boundaries of the territories\textsuperscript{136} that Japan renounced (Hara 2017: pp.4-7)\textsuperscript{137}. Another point of critique made the link of the SFPT to the bilateral Security alliance between the United States and Japan.

Since the enforcement of the Peace Treaty intended that Japan had to give up its effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defence, Japan and the United States, additionally to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed on the same day the Mutual Security Treaty in San Francisco. The controversial Security Treaty included five articles, which became the legal basis for the stationing of U.S. troops in and about Japan. Further, it permitted the U.S. to use this troops to ‘contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down largescale

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\textsuperscript{134} The chief objection on the Russian account for the treaty was to the stationing of American troops in Japan, which was signed with the separate bilateral Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan. Another issue played the claim for the southern Sakhalin and Kurile islands (Farley 1951: p.163). Farley, M.S. (1951). San Francisco and after. \textit{Far Eastern Survey} 20/16, pp.162-164.


\textsuperscript{136} The post-war territorial disputes may be classified into three parts: territorial disputes (Southern Kuriles, Dokdo/Takeshima, Senkaku/Diaoyu, Spratly/Nansha and Paracel/Xisha), divided nations (Korean Peninsula and Cross-Taiwan Strait) and status of territories (Taiwan and Okinawa problem). These disputes remain unsolved to this day (Hara 2017: p.3). For more information concerning the territorial dispute see: Hara, K. (2017). \textit{The San Francisco system and its legacies: continuation, transformation and historical reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific}. London: Routledge.

internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers’ (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008)\textsuperscript{138}. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who had initially opposed the military rearming, agreed to this demand on a note of the Japanese emperor. Furthermore, a crucial factor for Yoshida’s decision played his dedication to restore Japan’s sovereignty, no matter the price. When the Korean war broke out in 1950, Yoshida came to the conclusion that Japan’s manoeuvring power has narrowed to two alternatives: ‘sovereignty with continued U.S. military presence in Japan, or no sovereignty at all (Dower 1979: p.374). As a result, Yoshida signed the Mutual Security Treaty on September 8, 1951, leading to the placement of U.S. military force of 300,000 to 350,000 men within Japan (Endo 2006: pp.73-74). While Yoshida considered the implementation of the San Francisco System as the greatest triumph of his career, the treaty ultimately led to the end of the Yoshida era in 1954. This was because the Security Treaty, left a number of issues unaddressed, which led to major critique from both Japanese and American camps. For instance, the treaty neither confirmed the sufficiently the charter of the United Nations, nor did it explicitly refer to America’s obligation to defend Japan (Shibayama and Kusunoki 2016: p.124).

The Japanese public opinion on the Security Treaty was divided. According to a survey by Asahi newspaper in September 1952, only 18 percent of Japan’s population truly felt liberated, while 39 percent did not and 43 percent did not know (Dower 1997: 372). Even though, Japanese opinion polls showed support for the troops, there was nevertheless critic that Yoshida sold the nation to the United States by bartering true independence for nominal sovereignty. In the eyes of these critics the Security Treaty was nothing more than a ‘subordinate dependence’ for the authorization of American soldiers, which could quell domestic riots and disturbances, when requested by Japanese officials (Dower 1997: 371). A major point of critique from the Japanese side was the issue of constitutional quandary. According to this argument, the Security Treaty was ‘unconstitutional and/or contrary to Japanese Law’, since Article 9. of the constitution prohibited Japan to maintain armed forces and to from entering into any military arrangements (Sakurada 1998: p.14)\textsuperscript{139}. Another


critique concerned Article 2. of the Security Treaty (McClain 2002: 558-559), which declared that ‘Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or rights, powers or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of manoeuvre, or transit of ground, air, or naval forces to any third power’ (Dennett and Durance 1951: pp.266-267)\(^\text{140}\). American camps on the other hand, criticized the unilateral nature of the Security Treaty, which required Japanese military response only when Japan itself was attacked. Another argument was that the costs by the U.S. for the Security Treaty ultimately outweighed its benefits (Sakurada, 1998). In 1960, the Security Treaty was revised into the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which is in force until this day. However, the revision caused new criticism since it continued to allow the presence of U.S. bases and endorsed the subordinate role of Japan in the Cold War order. The critiques ultimately resulted into massive nationwide demonstrations in Japan. Under the so-called Anpo-movement\(^\text{141}\), hundreds of thousands of rioting students, trade union members and left wing activist, came together onto Japan’s streets to oppose the treaty. There was a petition with over ten million signatures against the revision of the Security Treaty. The protests left thousands injured and one person killed. Further, it forced the cancellation of a planned visit to Japan by President Dwight T. Eisenhower and toppled the conservative minister Kishi Nobusuke. The Anpo-movement can be regarded as one of the largest protest movements and one of the most significant political crisis in Japan’s postwar history (Jetsy, 2012).\(^\text{142}\)

3.4.1 The Okinawa issue and U.S.-Japan relations

It is needless to say that the troops, remain a sensitive issue until this day in Japan-U.S. relations. There have been several incidents involving misconducts by U.S. servicemen, such as raping Japanese women, accidents through drunk driving and military helicopter crashes. In particular, the Okinawa islands have been centre of the debate. The Okinawa issue is of particular complexity. The Ryūkyū islands have for much of their history been an independent

\(^\text{140}\)Dennett and Durance (1951). Bilateral Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan (September 8, 1951). Documents on American Foreign Relations 9, pp. 266-267.


kingdom, which had been partly subservient to China. The islands only became a part of Japan’s prefecture’s in the late nineteenth century and often found itself at odds with Japan’s national government about land-use matters. After the defeat of the Battle of Okinawa (April 1.-June 22., 1945) the islands remained occupied by the American military until the reversion to Japan on May 15, 1972 (Egami 1994: pp.828-829)\(^{143}\). Moreover, the Ryūkyū islands received a different treatment than the main island of Japan during the occupation period. Different than in the rest of Japan, the competence and functions of the Government of the Ryūkyū islands were very limited. Instead, the Civil Administration was fully controlled by the U.S. Army and Navy from 1945 to 1950. The strong interest in the islands of the U.S. military rooted in Okinawa’s strategic position in East Asia, which became increasingly important after the rise of the Korean War (Blackford 2007:pp.160-163)\(^{144}\). The San Francisco System of 1952, further contributed to this divide of Japan’s ‘peace state’ at the mainland and the a ‘war state’ in American-controlled Okinawa. This was because Article 3. of the San Francisco Peace Treaty neither confirmed nor denied Japanese sovereignty of the Ryūkyū and other islands, but guaranteed sole U.S. control until a UN trusteeship agreement over the islands was reached (Hara 2017: p.17). By 1955, 40.000 acres (12,7 percentage) of the total land area of the islands was occupied by U.S. forces (Egami 1994: pp.829-830). In 1972, the administrative rights of Okinawa were returned to Japan. However, also Okinawa’s reversion came into critique, since U.S. military bases continued to exist on the islands. By 2018, 31 U.S. Military exclusive-use facilities and about 25.8000 military personnel remain on the densely populated islands (about 1,3 million inhabitants) (Okinawa Prefectural Government, 2018)\(^{145}\). The Okinawa problem, to this day continues to be one of the major issues in contemporary Japan-U.S. relations. The most recent example, were several accidents of U.S. attack helicopters on Japanese school grounds during autumn 2017 and January 2018. Unsurprisingly, the incidents


have led to a growing local opposition to the U.S. presence (BBC 2018)\textsuperscript{146}; (The Japan Times 2017)\textsuperscript{147}.

**Chapter Conclusion**

In summary, U.S.-Japan relations are of a complex, multifaceted nature, which were not always based on equal grounds. Their relationship between 1853 to the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952 went through countless ups and downs. The United States were the first nation, which successfully achieved the opening of Japan after over two-hundred years of closure and assisted Japan on the re-entering into the international stage. However, it was also the one who introduced Japan to its first unequal Treaties in 1858, denied Japan’s demand for the equality clause at the Peace Conference of Paris in 1919 and ultimately dropped the two bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. This incoherent relationship to Japan continued also during the occupation period. During the first phase of the occupation the SCAP under Supreme Commodore Douglas MacArthur, introduced a series of policies that acted on the benefit of the Japanese population and gave them liberties they would have hardly obtained under the old regime. For instance, SCAP’s reformulation of Japan’s constitution and Article 9., contributed to the creation of a pacifistic, democratic Japan, and to the establishment of the strongest ally of the U.S. within East Asia. On the other hand, the occupation also introduced a series of controversial policies. While promoting the freedom of speech and criticizing censorship during Japan’s militaristic regime, SCAP at the same time initiated its own censorship and propaganda programs. Moreover, with the rise of the Cold War, SCAP reversed several of its earlier policies under the argumentation to protect Japan from the ‘red threat’. The final strike, made the conclusion of the two treaties in 1952 that shaped the San Francisco System. The San Francisco Peace Treaty, had a major impact on Japan’s position in the post-war world as it assured democracy and economic prosperity. However, the system at the same time also left Japan with a series of unresolved frontier problems with its neighbours, which continue to this day. The bilateral Security Treaty on the


other hand, assured U.S. dominance and lasting presence in Japan, by stationing troops on Japanese territory. This resulted into high critiques from the Japanese side and finally led to major protests, when the Security Treaty was revised in 1960. The U.S. bases in Okinawa, to this day remain a major point of friction between the two nations. The perception on whether America’s actions during the war and the occupation period legitimate may be let open to discussion to the individual observer. However, it would be foolish to deny that the policies of SCAP did not have an influence on the Japanese economy, politics and society. and lastly also on its culture. In this sense I argue it is important to consider the historical background of U.S.-Japan relations between the period of the 1910s to the end of the occupation in 1952, as it also influenced how jazz was interpreted and used during that time.
Chapter 4

4. U.S.-Japan relations and jazz

Jazz made its first entrance to Japan through ocean liner bands during the 1910s. The establishment of new transport technologies during the late nineteenth century had enabled a booming traffic among the pacific. Shipping companies increasingly stated to hire musicians to entertain their customers. Through their travels to the United States, Japanese musicians were introduced to jazz, which they imported back to Japan. One of the first jazz bands was the Hatano Jazz Band, which was founded by graduates of the Tokyo Music School in 1912 (Mitsui 2014, p. 5). In March 1920, the opening of the first (of many) commercial dance hall(s) in Yokohama, marked the beginning of a nationwide ‘jazz fever’, which would have its peak by the end of the 1920s (Atkins 2001: p. 54-55). More than a mere dance music, however, jazz also represented American culture and cosmopolitan values. This as E. Taylor Atkins (2001), Alexandra Coyle (2014) and Miriam Silverberg (2006) point out, turned jazz into the centre of a national debate on Japan’s cultural identity that emerged during the 1920s and 1930s and would continue in the postwar era.

As had been explained in the former chapter, Japan with the turn of the new century has entered a new standpoint on the international stage. The victories in the Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895), the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905), and foremost in World War I., had positive effects on Japan’s economy. As a result, there was the development of a stronger nationalistic sentiment within Japan. This development is particular true after World War I., where nationalistic voices were getting more supporters and higher influence in Japan’s politics. Still, at the same time there was also the development of a small group of cosmopolitan internationalists in the urban centres of Japan. This group celebrated cosmopolitanism and modernism as a long road to a peaceful future (Silverberg 20-23). Magazines during that period advertised western clothes, movies and music. Department stores promoted images of moga and mobo the icons of the era and Japanese equivalent of the American modern girl and boy. And Japan’s youth wildly danced in dance halls to American jazz and boogie (Atkins 2001: pp. 100-103). However, at the same time there was also a

growing critique towards western culture and values, coming from traditionalist and conservative camps in Japan. The rejection of the equality clause by the Americans at the Paris Peace Conference (1919), as well as the two Anti-Japanese sentiment movements in California (respectively 1910 and 1923), were seen by many critics as evidence for the individualistic, capitalistic-driven and selfish nature of westerners. Moreover, American pop culture was seen as a threat of public morality and Japanese indigenous culture, as it promoted vulgar and filthy behaviour among Japan’s youth. Following the rise of the military regime after the Manchurian incident in 1931, Japan’s military leadership finally suppressed the unwanted elements of American popular culture. At the same time however, it started to promote elements, which were seen useful for the war effort (Coyle 2014: 11-13). The debate however, returned with the end of the war and the start of the occupation period.

In their works, Coyle and Atkins, are largely concerned about the role of jazz as an expression of Japanese identity and the authenticity of Japanese jazz. However, this thesis concerns the question what role jazz had as a cultural diplomacy tool in realms of U.S.-Japan relations from the interwar period to the end of the occupation. Following, my hypothesis that cultural diplomacy takes different forms according to the actor, space and time it is set in, this case study chapter hence anticipates to outline how jazz during this period has been used from American and Japanese actors to promote both violence and harmony. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part, will analyse how jazz has been used by state related actors. For this I will illustrate how jazz was not only censored by the Japanese military regime during the war period, but has been also used to promote the regime’s morality propaganda messages. I will then analyse how SCAP during the occupation period used jazz as a channel for ‘democratic propaganda’ and censorship. The second part, analyses how jazz has been used by Japanese individuals as cultural diplomacy device. First, I will look at the usage of diegetic jazz to express critique against the occupation and modernism, in the two Kurosawa movies Drunk Angel (1948) and Stray Dog (1949). Next, I will take a look on how jazz simultaneously was used in Kasagi and Hattori’s boogie songs to express a liberation from the wartime regime and to promote universalism. Finally, the last part of the chapter will focus on the role of jazu kissa. I will highlight how the cafés have had the dual role as a ‘free space’ to learn jazz, as well as a bridge to connect Japanese ordinary people to American culture.
4.1 Jazz and state actors

4.1.1 Jazz in wartime Japan

The growing influence of the Japanese military during the 1930s, led to significant changes in Japan’s politics, economic structure, as well as to a transformation of Japanese culture and society. With the rise of the military regime, there was also an increase in criticism towards western modernism, claiming that its unmoral nature had a bad influence on Japan’s youth, and would pollute the indigenous culture of Japan (Atkins 2001: p.111). As discussed in the previous chapter following the Manchurian incident in 1931, the Japanese government established a series of governmental and semi-governmental public diplomacy organizations, including the Greater Asia Association (Dai Ajia Kyōkai) (1933) and the Society for Promotion of International Cultural Relations (Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai) (KBS) (1934). Under the war time regime, the KBS received a major organizational reconstruction and change in its bureaucratic system\footnote{Initially the KBS had been under the supervision of the Branch of Cultural Affairs by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The Branch was however, dissolved in 1940 and the KBS was then under the supervision of the Foreign Cultural Policy section of Cultural Propaganda (Shibasaki 2011, pp.32-33).}, which turned it into the official instrument of Japanese cultural propaganda and censorship (Shibasaki 2011)\footnote{Shibasaki, A. (2011). Activities and Discourses on International Cultural Relations in Modern Japan: the making of KBS (Kokusai Bunka Shinkō Kai), 1934-53. Journal of Global Media Studies 8, pp.25-41. Available at: http://repo.komazawa-u.ac.jp/opac/repository/all/32614/rgm08-03.pdf [Accessed: 07 Jan. 2019].}. The main purpose of Japan’s cultural propaganda was to reduce foreign influences, while promoting pan-Asianism and Japanese morals. It was aimed at the Japanese population and its colonies in Taiwan and Korea, as well as in the puppet-state Manchukuo. In particular, language played an important role in this. For instance, the military government put a ban on English newspapers, literature and movies through the empire. Moreover, there were constant Anti-American campaigns on the Japanese radio -which next to other mass media was also under the control of the military\footnote{The Japanese radio had been under state supervision from the very beginning of Japanese radio broadcasting in March 1925. This was because of the Wireless Telegraphy Law of 1915, which declared in Article 1. that the ‘wireless telegraph and wireless telephone service shall be under the control of the Government’ (NHK 2002: pp.33-34). After the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, radio broadcasts were further restricted. Daily broadcasts ‘began at six in the morning and closed at around eleven-thirty at night’, moreover listeners were urged to leave their radios on through the day to hear important announcements by the government and military (NHK 2002: p.64). NHK (2002). Broadcasting in Japan: The twentieth Century Journey from Radio to Multimedia. Tokyo: Komiyama Printing Company.}. as well as a ban of teaching English in Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma and Singapore\footnote{Japan had acting power in Malaysia, Indonesia, Burma and Singapore, due to the expansion of its empire during the war. From 1942 to 1945 the regions were under Japanese occupation (McClain 2002: pp.494-498).}. There was even a campaign warning
about the dangers of drinking Coca-Cola. At the same time the Greater Asia Association, promoted Japanese language and culture in Japan’s colonies to foster pan-Asianism (Otmazgin 2012, pp.43-46).

After the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937, the Japanese military authorities also tried to ban jazz, since it was the representative music of ‘Americanism’. In particular, jazz dance halls and the community that supported it, were seen by many advocates of the new regime, as the ultimate representatives for the ‘spiritual and moral decay that modernism and American materialism’ supposedly put on the Japanese society (Atkins 2001: 111). From the late 1920s onwards, the government had put several restrictions on the halls, which should hamper business. For instance, the Hyōgo prefectural government- in an attempt to save ‘morals’- had put a code in November 1928, which required proprietors, dancers and instructors to apply for permits and register with the police their personal data. The code was later extended to employees and customers behaviour, including the prohibition of the consumption of alcohol, a separation between guests and dancers and curfew at eleven o’clock (Atkins 2001: pp.112-113). Stricter restrictions, however, only began with the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937. In March 1938, the Japanese Home Ministry passed the National Mobilization Law, which gave the government the ability to control popular discourse, including jazz, through law and suppression (Gailey-Schultz 2014: p.35)154. The law resulted into strong police enforcement among Japan’s dance and leisure establishments, forcing the closure of several dance halls for lack of business in 1939. Finally, in 1940 the military government put a national ban on dance halls. With November 1, 1940, the last dance bar in Japan was closed (Atkins 2002: pp. 139-141).

Ironically, while Japan’s military purged jazz dance halls during the emerge of the war, it has been also using jazz within its cultural propaganda programs. In fact, the only place were Japanese jazz players could legally play jazz during that time was within state-run facilities. One reason for this, as Atkins argues, was due to the wide popularity of the genre among Japan’s youth, which provided a valuable channel in the spread of the ‘spiritual re-education’ of the Japanese people for the military regime. Instead of banning jazz altogether from Japan, the military regime thus, started to turn jazz ‘Japanese’ in order to fit its propaganda messages of morality. As a result, the government called musicians into service to perform and clarify

the new appropriate role of jazz. This happened for instance, through the coining of the term ‘light music’ -a form of primarily instrumental music, which for non-specialists is hard to distinguish from regular dance music or jazz of the interwar period- which replaced the term jazz from the agenda. The main purpose of the term was to set a differentiation between the vulgar and morally bad American jazz and the soft and morally good Japanese jazz (Atkins 2001: pp.141-149). As a result of this, jazz in form of ‘light music’ was audible from officially sanctioned and ubiquitous ‘comfort tours’ to entertain Japan’s troops, sailors and munitions workers through Japan and its empire. Japan’s jazzmen were put into service by the military regime, to raise the morale of soldiers abroad and people at home. Moreover, there were even strategic jazz broadcasts aimed at the enemy, which were conducted by the propaganda program ‘Zero Hour’ of NHK. From March 1, 1943, NHK began to broadcast light music and popular songs towards Allied troops, with the aim to demoralize them (Atkins 2001: p.157). It is needless to say that the broadcast turned out to be more entertaining for the Allied troops than to really re-educate them. Jazz only vanished in the late hours of the war. In April 1944, the military regime put a national ban on standard jazz and Hawaiian instruments. However, the ban had little gravity considering the lack of concerts and the Japanese population had bigger issues to worry about than losing the saxophone (Atkins 2001: pp.155-159).

4.1.2 SCAP’s jazz democracy

With the end of the war, jazz was ‘brought back’ to Japan by the Allied occupation power. As had been discussed in the former chapter, SCAP introduced a series of democratic policies and reforms during the occupation. However, at the same time SCAP made also use of cultural diplomacy in form of censorship and ‘democratic’ propaganda through Japan’s mass media to promote the occupation’s goals. All facilities of Japanese media, from newspaper to literature to radio stations and cinemas were strongly controlled by SCAP’s information agencies. Importantly, SCAP did not only censor what was published, but also sought to influence what was written about the United States. The general goal of the censorship and ‘democratic’ propaganda program, thus, not only to promote democracy, but also sought to create a positive image about American culture and values among the Japanese population. The latter, played an even more important role with the rise of the Cold War conflict during the second
part of the occupation (Braw 1992: pp.21-31)\textsuperscript{155}. In 1950, president Truman announced the establishment of a multi dollar campaign, called the *Campaign of Truth*. The campaign sought to educate and moreover, warn the international community about Communism. Further it sought to contribute to an accurate image of American culture, values and ideology. Key countries for the program included France, Italy, and Japan (Matsuda 2006: pp.3-5)\textsuperscript{156}. In order to spread its democratic messages and positive image, SCAP utilized a series of American cultural goods in form of literature, films, music and sports. Western freedoms and values, such as the liberalization and democratisation of women, were for instance expressed in form of the visualisation of romanticism (kissing-scenes) in Hollywood Films (McLelland, 2010)\textsuperscript{157}. During the wartime, Japan’s military government had put strict gender roles on Japan’s population, which were distributed through Japan’s mass media. Women had been cast as mothers whose purpose was to ‘breed’ sons for the empire, while men were regarded as fighting machines. ‘Sex’ had been reduced to a means of managing resources. Moreover, Japanese war propaganda portrayed Japan as the antithesis of the sexual vulgar westerner. As a result, any form sexual expression, including kissing, in Japanese film and other media was strongly censored by the military regime. The kissing scenes in the American movies, hence, were interpreted by many Japanese as a liberation of the sexual expression and of the predominating gender roles of the wartime (McLelland 2010: pp.511-524). Another example was the increased promotion of American sports. The promotion of baseball and other team sports sought to increase Western democratic values as fair play, teamwork and individual accomplishments. Baseball had been already popular in Japan before the war, however, as Western movies it had been also victim to censorship during the war period (Harris 2013: p.55)\textsuperscript{158}.

Next to movies and sports, SCAP used also jazz as a cultural diplomacy instrument to foster a positive perception of America in Japan. In particular, the radio, played an important role, since it had become the centre medium of entertainment and information after the war.


and therefore offered a wide audience. According to a nationwide NHK survey in spring 1946, Japanese households listened on average four hours and fifty minutes to the radio (NHK 2002: p.89). With the start of the occupation the radio, came under the control of SCAP’s bureau of Civil Information and Education (CI&E), which turned it into the authority’s primer voice to the Japanese audience. The radio’s broadcasts were filled with ‘democratic propaganda’ messages, to promote democratic thinking and international goodwill to the Japanese audiences. On September 22, 1945, SCAP further introduced a set of comprehensive directives for ‘news, drama, poetry, comedy, variety shows, lectures, talks, announcements, and advertising’ (Atkins 2001: pp. 172). From this point onward, jazz together with other contemporary western music, was blared from the speakers of occupation-controlled radio stations and promoted through its SCAP-CIE Information Centres (Coyle 2014: pp.33-34). Moreover, also the Japanese government contributed to the distribution of jazz, by hiring Japanese jazz players in order to contribute to the ‘democratic propaganda’ on the radio as well as to entertain the American troops. SCAP further approved in 1948 a royalty deal, which allowed Columbia and Victoria recording companies to sell and press records by U.S. artists through their Japanese subsidies (Atkins 2001: p.172).

While jazz was accessible through the radio broadcasts, it is important to note that jazz performances on a large scale were promoted in entertainment facilities, which were restricted to the usage of U.S. troops and civilian personnel only. For instance, the Recreation and Amusement Association (RAA), which had been established by the Japanese government within a week of Japan’s surrender, initiated a nationwide network of cabarets, dance halls and nightclubs with live musical entertainment for the exclusive use of the occupational forces. (Atkins 2001: pp.174-175). Moreover, the majority of singles that played on the radio, featured white jazz artists of America only. This was as Coyle argues, because of the still dominant opinion in America that white jazz was the most accurate mode to represent America during that period159 (Coyle 2015: p.31). This was nothing new, since white jazz players have been already used in the past to convey the idea that only white musicians could efficiently articulate and play the black sound. During the 1920s, jazz came to be seen as American classical music, which led to a fundamental problem in its meaning. This was because the majority of white Americans were concerned that black-oriented music would

159 Afro-American jazz men (the majority of the jazz diplomats send abroad where male) were only sent, by America’s cultural diplomacy program to Japan with the end of the occupation (Derschmidt 1998: p.305).
represent the democratic nation in its raw form, which was ‘overly emotional’ and ‘needed to be civilized’. A wide part of white Americans, thus opposed the thought that a black art form would define America to the outside world. Thus, Paul Whiteman and other white jazz artist were promoted internationally in order to shape jazz into a white medium, which still had the sound, but was a more refined and suitable representor of America on the international stage (Rustin 2008: p.366-367). It is needless to say that this definition raised also high criticism nationally and internationally. The racial decision by SCAP to display mainly white jazz in Japan’s radio is important to consider, as it turns jazz not only into a ‘force for the Americanization of Japan’ but implies at the same time a reminder for the ‘whiteness and superiority of America’ over Japan (Coyle 2014: p.31). Furthermore, as will be discussed later on, the ‘bleaching’ of jazz, also played an important factor in the history of Japan’s jazu kissa during the occupation period.

4.2 Jazz and non-state players
4.2.1 Jazz as form of protest: Kurosawa’s Drunken Angel and Stray Dog

Despite SCAP’s censorship on Japan’s mass media that prohibited any sort of negative criticism towards SCAP policies during the occupation period, some artists still managed to express their discontent indirectly. One of the reasons for this was the incoherent relationship of the two SCAP agencies responsible for managing the film censorship. The Civil Censorship Detachment (CDD), was responsible for the censorship of motion pictures, publications and radio broadcasts, and monitoring telephone calls, telegrams and postal service. The Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E), on the other hand was responsible for the ‘re-education’ of the Japanese people (NHK 2002: pp.80-81). Its objective included to oversee the mass media, but also to give advice and encourage Japan’s artists (including filmmakers) to depict qualities and subjects, which would act in favour to the occupation’s goals (Harris 2013: p.52-53). In other words, the CDD applied censorship and cut out details before the release of a film, while the CI&E at the same time added content along the lines. According to Lars-Martin Sorensen (2009), this byzantine relationship of the SCAP agencies, was one of the

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161 For a detailed list on the subjects that CI&E suggested filmmakers to depict see also: Harris 2013, p.53.
main reasons why Akira Kurosawa (1910-1998) and other Japanese directors were able to slip controversial content through SCAP’s censorship (Sorensen 2009: pp.101-102)\(^{162}\).

For Kurosawa and other Japanese artists, the arrival of the American troops initially meant liberation, since the democratic policies of SCAP promised an end of the oppression of freedom of speech and censorship of the former Japanese military regime. However, there were soon voices of critique after SCAP simply replaced the old censorship with its own and ‘depurged’ former war criminals during the ‘reverse course’ of the occupation. Moreover, Kurosawa was known to be a critique towards mass culture and consume. Mass culture including jazz, as Michael Bourdaghs (2012)\(^{163}\) argues, represented for Kurosawa not freedom, but a form of slavery, which would lead to the ‘nationwide castration of Japanese men’ (Bourdaghs 2012: pp.14-15). Furthermore, as James Doering (2015)\(^{164}\) adds, Kurosawa was also aware of the growing problems of crimes and corruption during the occupation in Japan. This critique towards American consume-culture, becomes also visible through the director’s usage of diegetic\(^{165}\) jazz in his films during that period (Doering, 2015). Jazz, which symbolically represented America, is continuously played in scenes of crimes, corruption and weakness both in *Drunken Angel* (Yoidore tenshi) (1948) and *Stray Dog* (Nora inu) (1949).

\section{4.2.1.1 Jazz in Drunken Angel}

*Drunken Angel* is set in the slums of destroyed and by tuberculosis (TBC) haunted post-war Tokyo. It tells the story of Doctor Sanada (Takashi Shimura), an alcoholic, who is treating people of TBC and other diseases in his clinic and Matsunaga (Toshiro Mifune) the local arm of the yakuza of the neighbourhood. Through the plot of the film, it turns out that Matsunaga is also suffering from TBC. The doctor and his assistance Miyo (Chieko Nakakita) - the ex-wife of the imprisoned gangster Okada (Reisaburo Yomamoto) - try to help the young men to beat the disease and find a new path of life. Heartened by this Matsunaga tries to follow the

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165 ‘Diegetic music refers to music that arises from within visually depicted world and is presumably audible to the characters in the film’ (Bourdaghs 2013: p.17). Kurosawa has made use of music already in some of his earlier works, however, it was only in Drunk Angel that Kurosawa used music more actively (Harris 2013: pp. 56-57).
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doctor’s advice and live a better life. However, when the former yakuza boss Okada returns from prison, Matsunaga returns to his old habits, which ultimately lead to his tragic death (Drunken Angel, 1948). Importantly, as Bourdaghs and Coyle point out, Kurosawa uses in Drunken Angel diegetic music through the film to signify the presence of threat. For instance, diegetic music is used in order to signify the return of Okada, the main villain of the movie (Drunken Angel, 43:00). Through the film the main characters are listening and commenting to a guitar player, who is playing music outside of doctor Sanada’s clinic. One night, a stranger appears and asks the man to give him his guitar to play an old song. Okada’s return is announced by Miyo, the former wife of Okada, who instantly recognizes the gangster’s song and warns the doctor of Okada’s return (Bourdaghs 2012: pp. 18-19). In later scene, Okada is playing again the same song on the guitar inside of Matsunaga’s old apartment, before the latter arrives and tries to kill him (Drunken Angel, 1:25:00).

More importantly, however, is Kurosawa’s use of diegetic jazz music. Jazz in Drunken Angel does not only signify a threat, but it literally makes the main character Matsunaga sick. Arguably the most thrilling scene of the movie involves an outstanding performance of Kasagi Shizuko, the Japanese Queen of Boogie, who is performing Jungle Boogie in the No.1. dance hall (Drunken Angel, 53:10). Importantly, the nightclub scene marks the point in the movie, where the doctor’s treatment begins to fail. Driven by irrational desires, Matsunaga enters a downward spin, which ultimately ends up in a tragic death. Up until Okada’s return, Matsunaga tries to follow the doctor’s advice to live a healthier lifestyle. However, when the former boss returns from jail, Matsunaga falls back into old habits, intoxicating himself both with alcohol and the dance music. The scene cuts back to the doctor slapping Matsunaga for disobeying his advice (Bourdaghs 2012: pp.19-21). As Stephen Prince (1999) argues further, the cutting-back and forth between the half-death Matsunaga to the band during the scene, suggests that the ‘disturbance of the indigenous culture is killing Matsunaga as much as the tuberculosis. The very codes of Western cinema become signifiers of corruption and of Matsunaga’s fall from power (and life)’ (Prince 1999: p.85).

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167 Kurosawa makes also use of visual symbols to portray threat. For instance, the first appearance of Okada, the villain of the film, is set in the background No.1. sign of dance hall, which is visible just beyond his shoulder. The No.1. is the same club Okada and Matsunaga visit later in the nightclub scene (Stray Dog, 43:47).
also indicates the ‘castration of Japanese masculinity’. Matsunaga, as Coyle, points out has virtually no power to decide whether he wants to re-join or defy the gang, but he is ‘frail and impressionable’. Coyle adds further, that ‘the fact that jazz is played during this scene is no coincidence, but rather Kurosawa pointing to the source of many’ of the issues of the occupation period, including ‘America- and, more importantly, the failure of the Japanese people to react’ (Coyle 2015: p.41). Jazz appears two more times later in the movie. The second time during a scene again featuring the dance hall, this time during the day. In scene the visible suffering Matsunaga is left behind at the table by Okada and his former girlfriend Nanae (Michiyko Kogure), who go to dance (Drunken Angel, 56:50). The third time, jazz appears loudly through the speakers at the black market, which play a jazzy version of the *Cuckoo Waltz*. The visible-sick Matsunaga in the scene, goes through the market on the search for Okada and is confronted with the change of hierarchy status as yakuza leader (Drunken Angel, 1:20:40). Here American jazz signifies weakness, in form of the Matsunaga’s fall from power.

4.2.1.1 Jazz in *Stray Dog*

Jazz is also used in Kurosawa’s *Stray Dog*, which is set during an intense heat wave in Tokyo in 1949. *Stray Dog* tells the story of the young detective Murakami (Toshiro Mifune), who tries to find his pistol, which been stolen on a crowded bus. The film follows Murakami together with his superior officer Satō (Takashi Shimura) as they try track down the perpetrator in the streets of Tokyo. However, soon the perpetrator starts to commit crimes with Murakami’s pistol, increasing Murakami’s obsession to find the gun theive. After another incident with the pistol, the two detectives manage to track down the yakuza Yusa (Isao Kimura), at the house of the villain’s girlfriend Harumi Namaki (Keiko Awaji). Yusa however, manages to flee by shooting at Sato. After a pursuit through the woods, Murakami finally gets a hold of Yusa and arrests him (*Stray Dog, 1949*)169.

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Also in *Stray Dog*, Kurosawa makes no direct reference to the socio-political situation of the occupation period. Instead, as Yoshimoto (2000)\textsuperscript{170} points out, the film foregrounds certain words and phrases. For instance, ‘Japaneseness’ is portrayed through names of hotels as Sakura Hotel, Azuma East Hotel and Yayoi Hotel (Japan’s prehistoric time). There is also a reference to censorship through a textual surface in the film, visualized by Yusa’s personal notes. The gangster’s notes contain a number of blacked out mistakes, which can be interpreted as reference to censorship blackening out of school and textbooks in immediate postwar years. Furthermore, Yoshimoto adds, that the character of the villain Yusa, is strongly marked by American signifiers. For instance, in one of the last scenes of the movie the identity of Yusa is reviled through his rice ration passport book, or *beikoku tsūchō*. The word *beikoku* [米穀] means ‘rice’, but it is also a homonym for *beikoku* [米国], which translates into ‘the United States of America’ (Yoshimoto 2000: pp.164-165). Moreover, Coyle adds that Kurosawa continuously connects criminal activity and corruption with American cultural aspects during the same scenes within the movie. For instance, during their search for the pistol Murakami and Satō also visit a baseball match and a jazz dance hall (Coyle 2015: p.42).

*Jazz* is also used to depict scenes that feature criminal activity. For instance, *Tokyo Boogie Woogie* (another song sang by Kasagi) is playing in the background during a long lasting scene were Murakami is searching for his pistol (Stray Dog, 19:50). The happy and upbeat song, as Coyle points out, is in strong contrast to the scene in which Murakami tries to find his pistol on the chaotic and criminal streets of Tokyo. It is as she says the ‘juncture in which the line between Murakami’s life of pursuing justice and criminal activity begin to blend’ (Coyle 2015, p. 42). Jazz is used again in a later scene, where Murakami accuses Harumi, the lover of the antagonist of the film, to be connected with the theft of his pistol in a dance hall, where jazz music is playing in the background (Stray Dog, 1:06:00). The scene opens with a group of female dancers, who are moving with the jazz music to entertain the male customers at the club. Once the dancers finish, the scene moves backstage, where the dancers lie down to rest from the summer heat. While the camera is panning over their bodies, the jazz song continuous to play silently in the background. The scene ends with the revile of Harumi as one of the dance girls (Coyle 2014, pp.42-43).

Considering the examples given above, the usage of jazz between SCAP and Kurosawa are quite different. SCAP, used jazz and other American cultural goods as cultural diplomacy tool-in form of propaganda- to promote positive aspects of the occupation’s democratic policies and American values. Kurosawa instead utilized jazz to depict his complex feelings about the occupation in a discreet way. Both in *Drunken Angel* and *Stray Dog*, jazz appears audible for the audience as well as Kurosawa’s characters. Jazz is used, by Kurosawa, as a discreet way to indicate the negative aspects of the American occupation, capitalist culture, but also as a critique for the failure of the Japanese people to react. In this sense, I argue the usage of jazz by Kurosawa during his movies in the occupation period can be regarded as an example for cultural diplomacy in form of protest and critique towards the occupation. However, jazz had been also used by other Japanese artists during the occupation period, to promote a more positive message. Two examples of this are Shizuko Kasagi and Ryōichi Hattori.

### 4.2.2 Shizuko Kasagi: Japan’s ‘Queen of Boogie’

Shizuko Kasagi (1914-1981), also commonly known by the Japanese as the *Queen of Boogie*, was an important icon of the occupation period. As Hiromu Nagahara (2017) remarks ‘Kasagi’s boogie-woogie’s have been enshrined in the postwar Japanese memory as an icon of social and cultural liberalization, as well as a wave of Americanisation that has been associated with the occupation era’ (Nagahara 2017: p. 157). Kasagi started her career in 1927 at the age of thirteen with the Ōsaka Shōchiku Girl Revue. However, until the late 1930s the singer remained only a regional celebrity. In 1939, Kasagi started to work for the Shōchiku Revue Show (Shōchiku Gakugeki Dan), where she met the celebrated composer Hattori Ryōichi. Their first recording was *Bugle and a Girl* (1939), which Kasagi performed within the Shōchiku Revue Show. Together they would produce more than fifty recordings from the period between 1940 to 1956, including the national hit singles *Tokyo Boogie* (1947), *Jungle Boogie* (1948) and *Shopping Boogie* (1950) (Hosokawa 2007: p.168-169). What made Kasagi truly unique, was the way she used her powerful singing voice. Kasagi mastered to adapt her natural voice into the rhythmic malleability of American jazz, which only few Japanese singers during that time

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were able to do (Hosokawa 2007: pp.170-172); (Bourdghas 2012: p.21) Moreover, Kasagi accompanied her songs with very passionate and powerful, but also comedic dance performances. As one fan remarked after visiting her show in 1939 ‘If Miss Kasagi abandons the whole-bodily expression in her singing, her act would be rather dull (T.F. 1939 cited in. Hosokawa 2007: p.176). However, her wild dance performances also brought Kasagi into critique. Especially after the attack on Pearl Harbor and the outbreak of the Pacific War, Kasagi has been singled out on several occasions for ‘special harassment’ due to her provocative dance moves on the stage. The singer has been even taken by the police for the offence of wearing fake eyelashes (Bourdaghs 2012: pp.12-13). Despite this critique and the war on the ‘enemy music’ by the Japanese military regime, Kasagi with her orchestra kept performing also during the war period. After 1940 however, Kasagi’s performances were reduced to interval shows during film exhibitions and moral boost performances for the Japanese troops. One of the songs she sang for the troops was *Pretty Aire* (Aire kawaiya), a song about a girl names Aire, who is walking with a bird cage from village to village to see her favourite white bird (Hosokawa 2007: p.179-181).

With the end of the war and the lift on military restrictions on jazz by the Allied occupation, Kasagi made her comeback to national popularity. Her first postwar debut was the revue *Jazz Carmen*, which had been again composed by Hattori. More remarkably however, was her up-beat single *Tokyo Boogie Woogie* (1947), which became not only a major hit across Japan, but also transformed Kasagi into an icon of occupation period culture (Bourdaghs 2012: pp.30-32). Importantly, different than in Kurosawa movies, jazz was not portrayed in Kasagi’s boogie-songs as something negative. Instead, her songs celebrated the occupation period as an end of the oppression of the military regime. Jazz in this sense was used as a cultural diplomacy instrument to promote the positive aspects of the occupation. As Bourdghash points out, Kasagi’s songs in particular embodied the feeling of liberation from the oppression of the female body (Bourdghash 2012: pp.34-35). Further, the songs also expressed the regained feeling of a cosmopolitan society and universalism, which is also visible in the lyrics of *Tokyo Boogie Woogie*:

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173 Hattori had left Japan during the war for Shanghai. He returned after the war has ended, where he would reunite with Kasagi (Bourdaghs 2012: pp.29-30).
‘Tokyo boogie-woogie, happy rhythm
Hearts throbbing, exciting songs
What reverberates across the ocean: Tokyo boogie-woogie
The boogie dance is the world’s dance’ (Bourdaghs 2012: p.32)

Also consumerism and mass-culture are praised in the songs as newly gained liberties, introduced through the occupation. For instance, Kasagi’s Shopping Boogie consists largely of a list of things the singer might buy. The United States in the song are described as a paradise of consumption, where a Japanese woman can be free to enjoy life (Bourdaghs 2012: pp.33-34). Moreover, Kasagi’s fans did not only count a Japanese audience, but also the American soldiers were keen of the funky singer. When Kasagi recorded the Tokyo Boogie Woogie with Nippon Columbia Studio’s in-house orchestra in December 1947, there were supposedly hundreds of U.S. soldiers flooding into the studio to listen to the track (Bourdaghs 2012: p.32). From the 1950s onwards, Kasagi also made tours through the United States, including Hawaii, California and New York (Nagahara 2017: p.154). Furthermore, the U.S. tours by Kasagi and other Japanese singers during the Cold War period, were used as cultural diplomacy to promote a positive image of Japan, as the new exotic friend of the U.S and battle racist bigotry. Kasagi performed both in front of white American audiences as well as Japanese American ones (Bourdghash 2012: pp.58-60).

Despite, the overall positive representation of jazz in Kasagi’s boogies as an emerging symbol of new found freedoms of the occupation period, it is to note that her songs were not left out of critique. Music critic Saburō Sonobe for instance, argues that the Japanese masses after the war yearned for the ‘liberation of humanity’ and were unleashing their ‘primitive instincts’, which had led to the result of the rise of ‘physical exposure’ in Japan’s mass media. While he acknowledges the potential of Kasagi’s boogies, Sonobe is critical in how far the liberation would really go. For Sonobe, Kasagi’s songs were just an embodiment of ‘primitive sensuality’ that could become dangerous if not accompanied by rational scientific guidance (Sonobe 1950, cited Nagahara 2017: pp.156-157). Moreover, it is important to not forget that Kasagi’s songs were composed and written by Hattori, who was less keen about the expression of women liberties through jazz. Hattori’s lifework was first and foremost to erase the boundaries that existed between elite music and popular music, through the creation of symphonic jazz. Hattori was further a promoter of the ‘universal message’ of music and in
particular jazz, which for him ‘transcends the barriers of language and is understandable throughout the world’ (Bourdaghs 2012: p.40). Still, I argue it is important to consider Kasagi and her boogies as they embody a valid example on how jazz was used and interpreted from the Japanese side, as a cultural diplomacy channel to promote a positive image of both the occupation period but also of the U.S.-Japan relationship.

4.3 Japan’s jazu kissa

Next to movies, boogies and dance halls, jazz was also distributed through the so-called jazu kissa, which translates in English to jazz coffeehouse or jazz café. It is to note that the translation of coffeehouse is somewhat confusing in the sense that the consumption of coffee, thought being offered on the menus, only played a secondary role. Moreover, whisky and other alcoholic beverages would usually replace coffee inside the kissa. Also, the main purpose is not to consume coffee, but to engage in the listening and consuming of jazz singles and records that are played on a high volume from speakers in the café. To borrow David Novak’s words jazz kissa are ‘first and foremost places to listen’ (Novak 2013: p.94-95). Coffeehouses have been around Japan already starting from the 1888, however, ongaku kissa (music cafés) only developed later on, after the Great Kanto Earthquake (1923) and through the wider access of recording technology to Japan. The jazu kissa originates from the meikyoku kissaten (classical music café), which were displaying classical music accompanied by female hostesses during the 1920s. With the rise in popularity of jazz in Japan during the late 1920s, some café owners next to other western genres also started to distribute jazz singles in their coffee shops. The first jazu kissa was the ‘Blackbird’ (buraku bādo), which

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174 Occasionally jazu kissa also hold life performances, however, the main distribution of music usually followed through speakers.
176 Phonographs and records arrived in Japan shortly after their development in the United States. In 1896, the first phonographs and records (produced by Columbia) were imported to Japan by American merchant Frederick Whitney Horn. Horn also established the Japan-America Phonograph Manufacturing Company (1907), which was renamed to Japan Phonograph Company (Nicchiku) in 1910. However, records in Japan initially were heavily reliant on existing local musical forms, such as enka singers or naniwabushi, to attract customers. And there was yet little distribution of contemporary western singles. This only changed in the 1920s, when Western recording industry’s entered the Japanese market (Nagahara 2017: p.29-33).
177 Though the name of jazu kissa, indicates that the cafés were playing jazz only, it is to note that up until the 1950s, many of the jazz coffees were also featuring different styles of Western music, like classical music or tango. This was on the one hand because there was still limited access to new records during that time and on the other side that the main purpose of the kissa during the 1930s was to introduce Japanese people to the newest Western music (Molasky 2005: p.196).
opened its doors in 1929 across the street from Tokyo University (Molasky 2005 pp:195-196). Importantly, jazu kissa, are quite different from European coffeehouse culture. Different than the pompous and elegant coffeehouses of late nineteenth century Vienna (Vienna City Administration, 2018), the Japanese kissa are of rather small structure. They are usually small underground establishments, often holding just a handful of seats for their customers. Jazz guitarist and turntablist Ōtomo Yoshihide, for instance described the typical jazu kissa of the 1970s as:

‘2.5 by 6 meters of space. That and a pair of huge JBL or Altec speakers, a couple hundred jazz records and a bar counter were all that was necessary to open up your basic jazu kissa...’
(Novak 2013: pp. 96-97)

Despite their small size and lack of live performances, jazu kissa enjoyed great popularity among Japan’s population. This was because the cafés, different than the glamourous and expensive dance halls of that time, offered their customers a big record collection and quality sound systems on a small budget, while being surrounded by beautiful ‘record. For the price of a coffee, jazz musicians and other jazz lovers were able to get a grip of the latest singles from America (Atkins 2001: pp.74-75). Importantly, jazu kissa also had an educational role for several generations of Japan’s jazz musicians. During the 1930s, the cafés were —with few exceptions— the only source within Japan, where Japan’s jazz musicians could acquire the newest jazz styles of New Orleans. Before the 1960s, afro American jazz players hardly made tours to Japan. Indeed, there was little distribution of jazz in general and if, only in form of whitewashed jazz of Paul Whiteman (1890-1967) on the Japanese radio (Novak 2013: p.98). Instead, the closest place where Japan’s jazz musicians could exchange with American jazzmen was located in Shanghai, the ‘jazz mecca’ of Asia. During the 1920s and 30s, many of Japan’s finest jazz players, including drummer Yamaguchi Toyosaburō (1905-1970), trumpeter Nanri

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180 The special location of Shanghai and its lawless ambiance through its extraordinary treaties, has turned the city into a cultural melting point of Asia. Moreover, between the 1920s and 30s there was a strong presence of American bands in Shanghai. For instance, jazz legends as Louis Armstrong (1901-1971) and Teddy Weatherford (1903-1945) resided in the city during the 1920s (Atkins 2001: pp:83-87). Shanghai in this sense, was the closest place where Japanese jazz musicians could get to learn from real American jazzmen and not just records.
Fumio (1910-1975) or jazz composer Ryōichi Hattori (1907-1993), travelled to Shanghai in order to learn by ‘living the jazz life’ (Atkins 2001: pp.83-87). The small jazz cafés, in this sense were an important alternative for jazz players to study new rhythms and styles, without having to leave the country. The small spaces, who’s existence was dependent on staying on the top with the latest trends in the music genre, offered jazz players a valuable and cheap resource of knowledge that did not exist anywhere else within Japan during that time. As tenor saxophonist Matsumoto Shin remarked: ‘We couldn’t hear new records except in jazz coffeehouses and if we didn’t hear them soon, we thought we’d be behind the times. So we went to coffeehouses all the time’ (Atkins 2001: p.75). This educational role of the jazu kissa, became even more important during the occupation period.

4.3.1 Jazu kissa during the war period

With the outbreak of the Pacific war in 1941 followed by the declaration of jazz as the ‘Enemy music’ by the Osaka Mainichi and Tokyo Nichinichi on December 8,1941 (Nagahara 2017: p.113), also jazu kissa were more and more put under the control and surveillance of the military police. Fortunately, for the kissa the control and restriction were not of such a harsh agenda. In contrast to the dance halls, there has never been an official ban by the Japanese military regime on the jazz cafés. Instead, jazu kissa were able to operate until the closing years of the war. Nevertheless, it is to note that the restrictions and censorship out on jazz records, ultimately had an effect also on the operational power of the cafés. For instance, on January 13, 1943, the Information Bureau and the Home Ministry published a list demanding the ban of one-thousand Anglo-American songs (Atkins 2001: p.150). The prohibition included the performance, possession and distribution of the ‘enemy-music’. In June 1943, followed a record ban by the recommendation of the Music Culture Association, prohibiting the sale and performance of all Anglo-American sheet music. Unsurprisingly many of the songs of the list included jazz singles. The population was asked to hand in their records ‘voluntarily’ to the police or the Japan Recorded Music Culture Association. On some instance there was also a direct confiscation by the police in order to discourage kissa owners from violating the law. However, the law turned out to be little effective. Several kissa owners -but also private collectors- refused to give in their beloved records and simply hid them in their upper floors disguising the singles with Japanese covers. Another issue was many police officers lacked the
necessary knowledge to distinguish between the forbidden Western jazz and Japanese lighthouse music. Moreover, part of the confiscation team was supervised by jazz collectors themselves and therefore little effective (Atkins 2002: pp.149-152).

4.3.2 Jazu kissa and the occupation

The beginning of the occupation period the jazz ban was lifted and the number of jazu kissa increased in numbers again. There were some few differences between the jazu kissa of the pre-World War II period and the post-war period. The most obvious difference, was that many of the modern cafés lacked the kissa girl (kissa gāru) and record girl (rekōdo gāru). The former was responsible for taking orders and serving beverages to the customer. The latter was the clerk of the kissa. Of course there were also some facilities, which were still employing kissa girls to attract customers. However, from the 1950s the majority of the jazu kissa were having only one employee, the ‘master’ (masutā) (Molasky 2005: pp.196-197). The master, who was usually also the owner and manager of the kissa took over all responsibilities of the kissa girl. He, the master is usually always male, talks to the client, serves the drinks, snacks and importantly controls the selection of music playing in the kissa. Moreover, as Novak and Eckhart Derschmidt (1998)181 suggest, there was the development of a special relationship between the master and his clients182. The master’s role, can be somewhat interpreted to the one of a teacher, while the client can be seen as a student, who develops a loyal and exclusive relationship with the master. The listening of the records in this sense could be regarded as an orally transmitted music lessons for the clients (Novak 2013: pp.97-98). Moreover, this relationship was so strong that single jazu kissa could influence the reception of a particular recording. As Novak puts it ‘the reception of its ‘master’ might make or break the local reputation of a foreign artist’ (Novak 2013: p.98). In this sense, jazu kissa remained also during the occupation period an important space where jazzmen and jazz lovers could educate themselves about the newest trends of the music.

The function of *jazu kissa* as free space for the Japanese public to engage to American jazz is striking, considering the limited access to jazz records and jazz music during the occupation. As discussed before SCAP’s occupation policies next to the democratization, demilitarization and decentralization of Japan, also involved a series of cultural democracy policies in form of ‘democratic censorship’ programs among Japan’s mass media, including the radio (NHK 2002: pp. 79-80)\(^{183}\). From 1946 to 1951, radio stations under SCAP, broadcasted western music on a large scale. Much of it was classical music by Western composers such as Ernst Bacon, Aaron Copland, and Norman Lockwood. However, SCAP also allowed to play jazz, since it was seen as the quintessential American soundtrack. Importantly, SCAP made a difference in what kind of jazz should be distributed to the Japanese audience. The aired jazz was not aesthetically black jazz, but instead it was a lighter, softer and ‘bleached’ version in from of Paul Whiteman or George Gershwin’s (1947) symphonic orchestra jazz that were broadcasted on the radio. SCAP also promoted white jazz through music events at its SCAP-CIE Information Centres (Coyle 2015: pp. 30-31; 33-34). As has been discussed earlier the decision of the distribution of mainly white jazz, was not accidentally, but was based on a racial note of the 1920s to promote the idea of the ‘whiteness and superiority of America’ within Japan.

Strikingly, apart from the radio or SCAP’s Cultural Information Centres, it was still rather hard to get hands on jazz in Japan. There were some other accounts of jazz within movies approved by SCAP such as in the Kurosawa movies Drunk Angel and Stray Dog. There were some live jazz concerts in Japanese night clubs and cabarets. And occasionally there were also jamming sessions between the occupations G.I.s and Japanese jazz musicians (Atkins 2001: pp.179-184). However, there were yet few performances of American jazz players offered for the Japanese public. The first big American jazz men to play for Japanese audiences only arrived at the end of the occupation in 1952 in form of the *Gene Krupa Trio*, who were followed by the *Louis Armstrong All Stars* in 1953 and the *Norman Granz’s Jazz at the Philharmonic* in 1956 (Derschmidt 1998: p.305). Moreover, until the late 1950s, many Japanese families still could not afford the luxury of home entertainments (White 2012: p.61). As noted before SCAP has allowed to purchase foreign records via international post by 1948. However, these were usually put on high taxes, which made the records to a luxury good, unreachable for ordinary Japanese citizens (Novak 2013: p.97). For instance, one air-mail

record was costing ¥3,000, while the average university graduate salary was at ¥10,000 during that time (Derschmidt 1998: p. 307). Since the ‘raison d’être’ of jazu kissa remained also after the war to maintain up to date with the latest music, the kissa owners despite the high prices, were strong purchasers of the American singles. The strong competition would go so far that a kissa master would often write to the American label suppliers himself to be the first to get a hold of the latest singles (Novak 2013: p 97). Considering these circumstances, the jazu kissa had therefore a unique function in postwar Japan, as they were beside from SCAP’s radio stations and information Centres, the only space where Japanese could listen to contemporary jazz music. More importantly, the jazz singles, which were played were contemporary and included also Afro-American jazzmen. This variety of jazz styles provided an important space of learning, not only for jazz musicians during the occupation period, but also for anyone that was interested in jazz. It was further, among few exceptions, the only place that introduced Japanese people to contemporary American jazz, which was not ‘bleached jazz’. More importantly however, the jazz café offered a ‘free space for listening’ during the occupation period, since SCAPs censorship was not in effect. This is as I argue important to consider, since jazu kissa in this sense also functioned as a space of cultural diplomacy for ordinary Japanese people. Different than Japan’s military regime and SCAP, the jazz played in the kissa was not restricted, nor did it promote a certain image or message. There was no differentiation between black or white musicians, but what was important was the quality of the music. The jazu kissa in this sense offered during the occupation, a from the SCAP censorship free and affordable space, where jazz players as well as ordinary Japanese could listen, learn and connect to the outer world of contemporary American jazz as well as American culture. I believe it is not farfetched to consider them as a sort of cultural bridge that managed to connect Japan’s population with the outer world and contributed to a positive image of U.S.-Japan relations during the occupation period.

4.3.3 Jazu kissa after the occupation

After the end of the occupation in 1952, the popularity of jazu kissa continued to grow, reaching their peak in the 1960s. Moreover, during the 1960s and 1970s there was the creation of a more hard-core version of the jazu kissa, with louder speakers, darker records and stricter rules (Derschmidt, 1998). The modern cafés were less places to socialize, but to be ‘socialized, evangelized, and indoctrinated into the mental discipline of jazz appreciation,
and to a deeper understanding of the music’s message and spirit (Atkins 2001: p.4). Modern *jazu kissa* further developed a set of distinct manners that customers should follow: 1) It is forbidden to speak 184 2) the customer should take the seat indicated by the owner of the kissa 3) after two hours in the shop the costumer should consume a new beverage or leave the kissa 4) phones 185 should be put on silent mode 5) some kissa allow requests for singles, these should be prepared in advance and suitable (Molasky 2005: pp.193-194). Another change was that the kissa master would now often announce the newest singles and give a description to the record the style of the musicians. The set of strict rules to follow combined with the loud music also gave the modern *jazu kissa* a more cult like atmosphere, which for many new visitors was not always comfortable. Indeed, there were many that described their first visit to a modern *jazu kissa* as quite shocking:

‘the darkness, the tremendous volume of the music, the motionlessly listening guest, and the frequently strict and authoritarian master, who not only placed the records on the turntable, but also checked that his shop rules were being obeyed, all added to the impression that one entered a very special, almost religious room, a completely different world’ (Derschmidt 1998, p. 308).

Furthermore, with the revision of the controversial U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, *jazz kissa* also attained a more symbolic meaning. In particular, the counter culture student movement during the 1960s, used *jazu kissa* in Tokyo, Yokohama and Nagoya as underground meeting point for the organization of student protests. According to a survey of 1967 interviewing 1500 *jazu kissa* masters, 42 percent of the clients were college students (Atkins 2001: p.237). The role of *jazu kissa* during this time can be somewhat compared with the Greenwich Village folk houses in the U.S. Centres in New York. Many students found a place to express their solitude and anti-capitalist sentiment in free jazz musicians (and also other music genres as folk) such as John Coltrane, Albert Ayler or Cecil Taylorthery (Derschmidt 1998, p.308). The edgy and raunchy atmosphere of the jazz cafés of the 1960s, offered hence a perfect space for the expression of the countermovement. The kissa were used for alternative media distribution, hosting film screenings, lectures and meetings (Novak 2013: p. 96). For instance, *the Jazz Academy* band, consisting of jazz guitarist Masayuki Takayanagi, jazz double-bassist Hideto Kanai, pianist Masabumi Kikuchi and drummer Masahiko Togashi started to

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184 There are some *jazu kissa* that allow speaking. This is usually indicated through a sign within the café (Molasky 2005: p.193).
185 The rule on phones was obviously added only recently to *jazu kissa*. 

perform in Yokohama jazz coffeehouses in 1961. Due to their provocative performances the Jazz Academy rarely played at the same café twice. However, band leader Takayanagi succeeded to negotiate with the Ginparis, a chanson coffeehouse in Ginza, where the band used to play on Friday afternoons. In 1962 the band changed its name into New Century Music Workshop and turned it performances into ‘Jazz Seminars’. Their performances were usually highly visited by college students, artists and bohemians (Atkins 2001: pp.227-231).

Japan’s jazz boom, however, did not last forever. With the 1970s, the era of jazu kissa came to a slow end. One reason for this was the failure of the Anpo-student movement, to prevent the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (AMPO) of 1960 and of 1970. Another reason was that student-protest started to decline in general during the 1970s, since the former protesters slowly graduated from their universities and started to enter into the work life (Eiji, 2015)186. Furthermore, the development of newer and cheaper media technology, gave Japan’s teenagers wider access to records and stereo sets, which made the educational role of the jazu kissa obsolete. Moreover, the new generation of teenagers and students demanded more contemporary music in form of fusion music as rock and punk. This led many masters to re-invent their cafés in order to suit the needs of the new generation. The volume inside the cafés was reduced, the black walls were painted into brighter colours, there was the provision of manga (Japanese comic books) and alcoholic beverages. As Derschmidt notes ‘due to this expansion of services to anything that could possibly attract customers […] the jazu-kissa of the seventies resembled supermarkets (Derschmidt 1998: p. 310). Furthermore, there the invention of the Walkman in the 1979 and the CD in 1982, had replaced the LP as leading medium for the distribution of music. Additionally, there was also the promotion of a new kind of live-house music aimed at wealthy clientele (Derschmidt 1998: p.309-311). However, despite their decline through the changes in media, music genre and clientele, some of the jazu kissa have remained open in Japan today. According to a survey of the jazu kissa information site, there are 599 jazu kissa and jazz bars opened in Japan to this day (Jazu Kissa Anai, 2017)187, most of them situated in Tokyo. Though contemporary jazu kissa are more

reminding of jazu museums than coffeehouses, they still maintain certain flair and unique atmosphere, that is hard to find anywhere else in the world.

Chapter Conclusion

In summary, as this case study has highlighted jazz has been used and interpreted for many things, by various actors within U.S.-Japan relations from the interwar period to the end of the occupation. Depending on the actor, time and space, jazz has been used during the 20s, 30s, 40s and 50s in order to promote both social protest or dissent and harmony. During the war, American jazz was censored by the Japanese military regime. However, at the same time the military leadership recognized the valuable impact of the genre on its population. With the rise of the war the regime had used jazz as propaganda tool throughout the Japanese empire, by turning jazz through light music ‘Japanese’. On the other hand, jazz was also used to promote ‘democratic propaganda’ and a positive image of America by SCAP during the occupation period. At the same time SCAP also censored the image of jazz to primarily white jazz singers, in order to foster the image of a white American supremacy in Japan. However, jazz has been also used by Japanese individuals, to express their criticism on the occupation and its censorship. This was visible through the example of the usage of jazz as diegetic music in Kurosawa’s Drunk Angel and Stray Dog. Simultaneously, jazz was also used by Kasagi and Hattori’s Tokyo Boogie Woogie and other singles, to express the newly gained liberation from the military regime and a positive perception of the occupation. Finally, jazu kissa provided an example for the positive use of jazz, as the representation of a free space where Japan’s jazz players and public could learn and moreover, connect to an uncensored version of American culture. Jazz is just one of many examples how culture and music, can become important instruments in international relations for the promotion of both violence and harmony. While one should not overestimate their influence, I argue it is nevertheless important to consider their existence, next to political and economic factors in order to truly comprehend what we mean when talking about international relations.
Conclusion

In summary, the role of music as cultural diplomacy device, was and is to this day a highly neglected issue in the field of international relations. Due to the pre-dominance of realist and liberalist theory, the issue for the larger part of the twentieth century has received little attention by international relations scholars. This changed only with the cultural, aesthetic and acoustic turn during the late 1980s, which started to consider, next to economic and political factors, also the role of culture. However, while the cultural turn has contributed to an increased interest towards the subject, it has at the same time failed to contribute to a clearer view on the topic and led to more complicated questions than satisfying solutions to the issue. Indeed, the subject remains one of the most vexed and complicated debates within the field of international relations to this day. In simple terms the main discussion can be divided into two camps: The first camp acknowledges Joseph Nye’s definition of cultural diplomacy as ‘soft power’ device, which is used in order to promote state interest and foreign policy goals. The second camp, regards cultural diplomacy in terms of Milton Cumming’s definition, which is the promotion of mutual understanding, peace and harmony. However, as this thesis argued, by looking at the subject through a historical perspective it becomes evident that cultural diplomacy and music diplomacy, are not limited to just the promotion of state interest or the creation of mutual understanding. Instead culture as music have been used by a diverse set of agents, to promote different objectives over the course of time and space. This is because the perception of culture, and thus also the perception of cultural or music diplomacy, is linked to the social, political and economic dimensions it is set in.

For instance, chapter one highlighted the process of the changing perception and usage of culture, depending on space, time and actor, by looking at the history of institutionalization during the first half of the twentieth century in Europe. The example showed how cultural institutions were first used by the French in order to foster the French prestige and language in their colonies. At the same time Italy and Germany used cultural institutions in order to connect German and Italian expats living at the ports with the national society. The usage of cultural diplomacy then changes again through the rise of the second world war, where culture became for states more and more a tool of propaganda. When the war was over the role of culture as diplomacy device changed again, since new actors, in form of individuals, labour groups and non-governmental organizations were enabled to use cultural diplomacy in order to promote their own messages. One could see this alternative
use of cultural diplomacy as a means of protest, but also of harmony in the second chapter of this thesis, which was focused on the role of music as cultural diplomacy device. For instance, music was widely used by social movements in form of protest songs, in order to express their discontent with perceived problems in society and to promote a feeling of solidarity among members. At the same time music diplomacy was used due to its ‘neutral’ nature, to promote harmony. During the 1950s and 60s there was the emerge of music diplomacy in form of festivals and beneficial concerts, organized by non-profit organizations and individuals, in order to promote mutual understanding, cooperation and peace among states. One of the most contemporary examples for this is the West Eastern Divan Orchestra in relation of the Israel-Palestine conflict, by Jewish Daniel Barenboim and Palestine pianist Edward Said. What this examples thus indicate, is that the role of cultural diplomacy as of music diplomacy in international relations has been changing over time and space it was set in, and according to the actor it was used by.

This argument, was also illustrated in the case study of this thesis, which looked at the role of jazz as diplomacy device in realms of the U.S-Japan relations from the interwar period to the end of the occupation. As has been highlighted in the case study the perception and usage of jazz as cultural diplomacy device varied accordingly to the agent that was using it and to the space and time it was set in. For instance, Japan’s military regime has censored American jazz during the war period, since it linked it to American values that would poison the morality of the Japanese youth. However, at the same time the military leadership recognized the value of jazz due to its popularity among the younger generation in Japan, and used it in form of light music to promote propaganda messages. During the occupation period the SCAP used jazz music as part of their ‘democratic propaganda’ program in order to spread American values and promote a positive, but also white image of America. However, also Japanese individuals used jazz during the occupation period to promote different messages. The filmmaker Akira Kurosawa used jazz in his movies as a sort of protest and critique against the occupation, Japan’s Boogie Queen Shizuko Kasagi, used jazz to express the liberation that she perceived through the occupation and composer Ryōichi Hattori saw in jazz a way to promote universalism. Finally, the example of jazu kissa explained how jazz during this time was also representing a neutral and from censorship free space, where the Japanese population could connect to American culture. In other words, the role of jazz as cultural diplomacy device in the U.S.-Japan relationship during this forty-year period, was not limited
to either state interest, or mutual understanding only. Instead, jazz had multiple roles, which changed continuously over the actors that used it and the space and time it was set in. Moreover, the fact that jazz, although being the represent of classical American culture, continued to be present in Japan during a period where the bilateral relation was going through tuff tensions, highlight the power that jazz offered as a diplomacy device both on the American as on the Japanese side. Jazz is only one of many examples that embodies the diverse and complex role that music and culture can play in international relations. As has been explained in the very beginning of this thesis a large part of the research of the field is still coming from other fields of studies. However, I argue due to this multilateral and complex structure of culture, cultural diplomacy as music diplomacy, are subjects that demand to be observed also from an international relations perspective. While it is important to not overestimate the role of music or culture, I believe it would be naïve to not at least recognize them as another piece of the complex puzzle of international relations.
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