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# Terrorism, Deradicalization Processes and Security: A Framework for Analysis

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## ABSTRACT

A partire dall'11 settembre 2001 il terrorismo viene considerato dalla maggioranza degli Stati della comunità internazionale come la più grande minaccia della nostra epoca. Per terrorismo si intende incutere paura e terrore a scopo politico. L'11 settembre segna una presa di coscienza, da parte degli Stati Uniti e di molti altri Paesi, dell'esistenza del terrorismo di matrice islamica e della necessità di impedire che altri attacchi si verifichino in futuro. A partire dal 2001 la lotta al terrorismo è diventata la priorità assoluta degli Stati Uniti e degli altri Stati occidentali. In molti Paesi sono state messe in atto misure di sicurezza antiterroristiche e molti hanno partecipato attivamente alla lotta al terrorismo, ad esempio con l'invio di truppe in Paesi come l'Iraq e l'Afghanistan.

Questa tesi si concentra sui programmi di "de-radicalizzazione" del terrorismo, cioè su quei progetti non militari dediti a contrastare il fenomeno della radicalizzazione estremista. In questo elaborato vengono descritti i metodi utilizzati in questi programmi per arginare il jihadismo. Per jihadismo si intende lo sforzo politico, militare o personale di un individuo musulmano. Il primo è lo slancio per raggiungere un determinato obiettivo, quello militare invece è interpretato come la guerra santa contro gli infedeli, ossia uno strumento armato per diffondere l'Islam, cioè la religione musulmana. Il jihad personale è una lotta interiore con il fine di migliorare se stessi, raggiungere la perfetta fede comprendendo i misteri divini. Vengono inoltre descritti i principali attori coinvolti nei programmi di de-radicalizzazione e l'uso di questi all'interno, o insieme, alle strategie anti-terrorismo o contro-terrorismo: dagli sforzi sociali di basso profilo alle politiche di alto livello nel dibattito sull'anti-terrorismo e sul terrorismo.

Il primo capitolo dell'elaborato si concentra sui meccanismi psicologici che, provocando nell'essere umano paura e terrore, contribuiscono al diffondersi del fenomeno del terrorismo. Tali meccanismi variano in base a delle circostanze, spesso ignorate, che, tuttavia, risultano essere fondamentali per riuscire a capire quanto il terrorismo riesca a far presa sulla suscettibilità umana e quanto, un individuo suscettibile, possa essere influenzato da tale fenomeno. La paura della morte, l'isteria sociale, la guerra e la sua brutalità, la contrapposizione tra il terrore e la sicurezza (individuale, nazionale e internazionale) sono alcuni dei fenomeni presi in considerazione in questo capitolo.

Il secondo capitolo analizza la definizione di terrorismo, individuando gli eventi cardini della storia, che hanno contribuito alla sua descrizione. Inoltre, viene anche analizzato il concetto di sicurezza umana, il quale pone al centro la protezione dell'individuo da aggressioni esterne, così come quello di sicurezza internazionale, dedita a proteggere sia l'individuo, sia i confini e i territori, sia la cooperazione fra Stati e la promozione della pace. In questo capitolo, inoltre, vengono confrontati alcuni metodi conosciuti con cui i servizi informativi britannici e dell'Arabia Saudita (Paese del Medio Oriente di maggior successo nel campo dell'intelligence e delle strategie anti e contro-terroristiche) ottengono prove ed informazioni sensibili.

Il terzo capitolo verte sui processi di radicalizzazione e de-radicalizzazione. La radicalizzazione viene definita come il modo in cui un individuo aderisce ad un'ideologia estremista e utilizza la violenza per i suoi fini, che, nel caso del terrorismo islamico, viene giustificata come atto religioso. Al fine di avere due prospettive diverse concernenti i programmi di de-radicalizzazione vengono paragonati i processi utilizzati del Regno Unito- prospettiva occidentale- e quelli usati dall'Arabia Saudita- visione mediorientale.

Il quarto capitolo invece analizza le strategie di contro-terrorismo, dando in primis una definizione di strategia e poi descrivendo quelle riguardanti l'anti-terrorismo.

## INTRODUCTION

September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 is a very important date in contemporary history, it marks the day in which the Western world discovered a new threat: terrorism of Islamic matrix. Since then, firstly because of the attacks in New York and in Europe, carried out by Al-Qaeda (“the base” – terrorist organization led by Osama Bin Laden) and more recently by ISIS (Al-dawla al-Islamiyya, in Arabic), Westerners have felt that they are constantly in danger. It is no coincidence that Islamist terrorism is able to arouse the deepest fears and worries at a world level, so much to stir wars, while opening or powering new and old conflicts. However, terrorism is a much larger phenomenon, of various entities and of all kinds, but only a few years ago it assumed an international relevance. Defining what it is, among other things is not an easy task, precisely because there is no single mode of attack or specific reason that can define this phenomenon.

The term today very often, has entered more and more strongly our lives, but what is good to keep in mind is that it has had far more distant origins. In fact, already in the nineteenth century terror and terrorist – those individuals who rebelled against a power considered illegitimate, made their appearance. But it is only from the twentieth century onwards that one can talk about how this phenomenon has also expanded to common people. Terror while expanding was no longer limited to a specific geographical area or a specific social group; such frightened individuals while fearing further repercussions, consequently changed their way of living, talking and how they related to one another. What is true is that there are many types of terrorism, to date at its basis, there is racism, cultural differences and more importantly those related to religion which can be attributed. In fact, it is very often the extremist and violent ideology to which individuals appeal themselves if they do not see positive alternatives from their own government or simply they lack trust and confidence in it in terms of security, very often deemed unstable for mere political ends or personal interests. This type of terrorism is called “religious” because it is based on an extremist ideology of religion itself.

However, it is possible to identify a common trait for the acts defined as “terrorist”: the will to destabilize and frighten a population through the systematic use of violence by underground organizations with political aims. As a consequence, the term “terrorism” means different things for different people. This is also, at least partially, the reason why terrorism has never been satisfactorily defined. Some experts have argued that it is a complex phenomenon because it is connected to the political sphere, concepts of war, to increasingly developing propaganda methods and religion, used a justification for violence. Others, still argue that one should analyze the motivations and strategies of the individual with terrorist tendencies. As a result, terrorism needs to be analyzed through its historical evolution and the counter-strategies used by law enforcers to combat it.

Currently, this phenomenon influences various sectors of policy-making on the international level, to an extent that has not been previously achieved. In fact, after 9/11 numerous legislations have been put into action by different presidential administrations, first of which the Bush Administration. During his presidency, President George Bush declared a global “war on terror” which not only had undefined goals but was and is impossible to achieve in a long-term perspective. To this extent, terrorism goes beyond religion and cultural differences, and does not limit itself but rather spectacularizes the sentiments of terror and fear, thanks to its methods of attacks. As a result, preventing and guaranteeing security of freedom and liberties that were once enjoyed by people, particularly Americans seeing that the first dreadful and most deadliest attack happened on U.S soil – began to have top priority along with norms and legislations taken to contrast this threat both internationally and domestically.

Through the means of this research and also thanks to the reading of the book “Paura: una storia culturale” by Joanna Burke, I intended to investigate on the mechanisms of fear that are intrinsic to the human species and can be generated and developed by various means and according to different

circumstances. In the first chapter of this thesis, I tackle the situations in which fear and terror reign with little to no control and analyze what the consequences are, if such feelings are protected repeatedly and for a long period of time. Reasons in doing so, is concerned with observing how a primary emotion often negatively connotated can actually be used positively and serve as a survival instinct, an alarm bell that goes off only when one feels secure and protected enough. Purpose of such chapter is not only to define what fear and terror are aside from being emotions, but also investigating in the rubbles of history and through various perspectives, how terror and eventually terrorism spread themselves in the heart and minds of individuals and lastly how a continuous use of the “terror language” influences the lives of many as well as political decisions and defensive approaches.

Secondly, in the chapter following the first – the focus is on the definition of Terrorism, often improperly attributed to a certain culture or religion, namely Arab and Islam as well as to broadly explain what security is and how it works, in terms of protecting individuals (human security), borders and territories via military means (international security) while also giving a broad excerpt on the intelligence services of countries like the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, in order to compare and demonstrate two strategic perspectives, one being essentially European or in better words Western, and the other being Middle Eastern. To further the concepts of the chapter I tackle the phenomenon of the “state of exception/emergency” that made its appearance recently on the political agenda of many countries when in confrontation with the threat that is terrorism – and deepen its purpose through the explanation of a legislative but drastic measure known as the “Patriot Act.”

In regards to the third chapter, the purpose is to analyze the processes of radicalization and de-radicalization while trying to avoid generalizations. To this end the study tries at least to give correct information as a basis for a sort of means of integration while reinforcing those ideas dedicated to contrasting and persecuting terrorist acts of violence. For this purpose the designated study demonstrates how de-radicalization programmes can and should be adopted in the future by other countries aside from U.K and Saudi Arabia, in order to counter the spread of terrorist and extremist perspectives even online through Internet resources. Also, this part of the thesis compares and contrasts the two branches of the Islamic religion, i.e Sunni and Shiite muslims, in regards to their activism often connotated as violent extremism and radical ideology.

The research concludes itself in the fourth chapter, as its title reveals, in which different perspectives and a general definition on the preemptive and counter-terrorism strategies is given. The topics outlined here are the types of counter-methods used, i.e preventive or military, the United State’s Counter-terrorism strategy as well as that of two other countries namely U.K and Saudi Arabia and lastly but certainly not least the perspectives of the Conference on Security and Defense in Europe and the OSCE (Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe). The chapter in essence outlines the relationship between strategies and cooperation efforts both military and non, and that as such should be promoted as a successful preemptive method when confronting oneself with the dread of terrorism.

My interest for this topic has greatly increased in response to university lectures, readings of books by leading terrorist experts Martha Crenshaw and Richard English, personal experiences even if indirectly, working as unarmed airport security guard for American and Canadian flights over this summer, as well as living abroad for the most part of my life. Precisely because of these reasons, terrorism deserves to be presented again and broadly analyzed, so that such a study may be beneficial for the better understanding of this crime and further implement both nationally and internationally, methods of prevention, allowing people to be free from fear. The aim of this study is to determine how it is possible to define this phenomenon of violence, first explaining the cultural and sometimes psychological mechanisms that generate fear and terror in the individual –

effectively counter Terrorism and its forms, better understand how radicalization develops and lastly if the de-radicalization programmes proposed by the chosen states, namely United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, are effectively successful methods to be adopted by other countries in the future, such as prevention and protection measures.



## Chapter 1

### “Mechanisms of Terror and Fear”

#### 1.1 Introductory remarks

“ذاته بحد الخوف هو نخافه أن عاينا الذي الوحيد لشيء -  
-Franklin D. Roosevelt-

Fear is one of the primary emotions, common both to the human and many animal species and it is a feeling almost linked to a survival instinct, a sort of an unpleasant alarm bell which rings constantly because it must not be ignored. Unlike the animal world, fear in humans has a double value: instinctive and cultural. Its instinctive (innate) part often degenerates into “*phobia*” (dictionary defined as: “*an exaggerated usually inexplicable and illogical fear of a particular object or situation*”<sup>1</sup>), something difficult to understand or control. It often puts individuals on alert and protects them from dangers, but at times it simply makes them fear something without any specific reasoning; some could be afraid of the dark, spiders (even the ones who are not poisonous), some of snakes and so on. On the other hand, the cultural factor represents a less insurmountable obstacle, a fear that with knowledge and awareness one can for sure stem and overcome. Even if fear is usually a negative emotion, it is legitimate enough to ask oneself if it truly is so.

After all, fear is a precaution that allows human beings to define their limits, indeed even being afraid is a survival attempt to not run into dangers, pain and difficulties. In fact, fear is born with us and accompanies us in every circumstance. Fear is healthy to the extent that it limits individuals, prevents them from going to the brink, otherwise it risks to negatively invade their perception of the world and of the things that happen. In this case, fear becomes limiting and does not allow them to act and move forward, to evolve. To fear however, “*a strange paradox is linked; on one hand there is a situation of wellness which allows to resolve with ease most of the problems related to survival by offering to more and more people the possibility of education and care. On the other hand, however, the increase of such security has a high cost, that is the proliferation of fear itself.*”<sup>2</sup>

In fact, the continuous and excessive research for security leads to a dangerous “*emotional swing, from boredom to panic with worrying effects on everyday life*”<sup>3</sup> - this indicates how both science and technology are structurally unable to give a direct answer to the problems linked to human existence. The more the achievements aimed at guaranteeing personal and collective security increase, the more symbolic and emotional ties increase with fear. Therefore, fear and anxiety are those hidden messages that lead to armored doors, sophisticated banking secrecy methods, armed stocks, surveillance cameras, and lastly but certainly not least metal detectors and checkpoints at the airport. This happens when security becomes the primary living criterion and thus leads to a proliferation of fear while trying to avoid risks rather than facing them.

In the face of these fears, the sophisticated methods of security and the responses to these problems, if taken all individually, one can guess that the only real qualm that unites them is the “*terror of death,*”<sup>4</sup> a theme that has crossed in various facets both the twentieth and twenty-first century. The only certainty in life is that sooner or later it will end and this is what terrifies. Yet why should it

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/phobia>

<sup>2</sup> G. Cucci, “I mille volti della paura,” pg. 1, Roma 2007, [www.isfo.it/files/File/Segnalazioni/Cucci-Paura](http://www.isfo.it/files/File/Segnalazioni/Cucci-Paura), PDF, e-book.

<sup>3</sup> G. Cucci, “I mille volti della paura,” pg. 2-3, Roma 2007, [www.isfo.it/files/File/Segnalazioni/Cucci-Paura](http://www.isfo.it/files/File/Segnalazioni/Cucci-Paura), PDF, e-book.

<sup>4</sup> Joanna Burke, “*Paura- Una Storia Culturale*”, 2015, pg. 3-4.

ever terrorize people so much, if it is such a certainty? They might as well live life to the fullest, with the knowledge that sooner or later it will end, without increasing any eventual and suffocating anxieties. There are then more “social” fears of our society, among them: social networks, television, magazines, more alarming news stories and many other instruments that consist in the terror of being judged different, marginalized and lastly excluded.

When fear and terror reign indiscriminated, this leads to unpleasant consequences such as sadness and depression because of the human obsession with an evil that in the end does not exist, a sort of invisible enemy that leaves individuals impotent and paralyzed. The growth of such emotions within our contemporary society can evolve into a big “*business*.”<sup>5</sup> Just think of insurance companies, who find their source of inexhaustible wealth in individuals who worry about their health or for other reasons are willing to invest money to escape the greatest fear, “death”. In this sense, fear and terror become an instrument of manipulation and control of the masses. A simple “red code” alarm can trigger panic in a population and this is also visible in the general and film literature. A striking example of this is the film by M. Moore “*Fahrenheit 9/11*” (G. Cucci, “*I mille volti della paura*”, pg. 3). It narrates how collective fear and mass hysteria generated and managed by those in power, distract the public opinion from other and maybe more important themes.

In regards to more important themes, there is that of the “fear of terrorism.” Every act of terrorism is characterized by the will to create “terror” amongst a population, through the systematic use of violence according to patterns and logics that are foreign to the conventional war, both civil and fought on foreign territory. Fear is the political instrument par excellence, it is the apprehension and angst that people have of hurting their collective well-being and the intimidation of governments or other structured groups towards men, women or children. The reason why these two types of concerns have a political rather than private nature, is simply due to the fact that they have consequences on society and are emanated from it. Political fear arises from conflicts within society or between different ones; in this sense it can have wider consequences. Among these can be: the determining of government policies, new group ahead of power, creation or abrogation of laws etc...

According to the author Joanna Burke and looking at the history of terrorism, especially in Europe, one sees how this spread initially as a weapon for political purposes, referring to the attacks committed by anarchists or socialists in the nineteenth century, while it was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that the first terrorist groups began to develop, linked to right and nationalist forces (Joanna Burke “*Paura –Una storia culturale*”, pg. 370). It is then in the ‘70s that in Europe one witnesses the exploit of political and ideological terrorism (think of the “black” and “red” terrorism of the years of lead in Italy, the ETA attacks in Spain and the IRA in Ireland). These phenomena, however, are cases of internal terrorism. Different is the phenomenon of “**international terrorism**”, which has seen an escalation since the ‘70s and that has its roots in the birth of “*Islamic Fundamentalism*”<sup>6</sup>, which is based on the distorted use of religion to achieve its objectives.

Terrorism is still widespread in many countries today, but what is known is that it is a local phenomenon characterized by a strong political sentiment. Even Islamic terrorism, until a few years ago, was a circumscribed phenomenon at a national or regional level, born as a result of the fact that many Islamic countries, for example Egypt, Syria or Iran, after being freed from colonialism, they tried to “westernize” by copying Western political systems, laws, culture and customs. Islamic Fundamentalism, however, is not based on a real defense of the Islamic religion, but uses it as an

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<sup>5</sup> G. Cucci, “I mille volti della paura,” pg. 2-3, Roma 2007, [www.isfo.it/files/File/Segnalazioni/Cucci-Paura](http://www.isfo.it/files/File/Segnalazioni/Cucci-Paura), PDF, e-book.

<sup>6</sup> Joanna Burke, “*Paura-Una storia culturale*”, 2015, pg. 371-372.

instrument to divide the Muslim world from the Western world for political and economic ends. Religion then becomes the bulwark to “justify” terrorist attacks and recruit individuals willing to sacrifice themselves in the name of the cause for a defined superior good (Joanna Burke, “*Paura-Una Storia Culturale*”, pg. 372-373).

If one pauses to think about the latest acts of terrorism, and the manner in which they have taken place, what strikes and comes to the attention is certainly the absolute disregard for life on the part of the terrorists and their ability to “face” their victims and despite this, mow them without hesitation. Therefore, fear and terror and then terrorism turn to ordinary people. Terror then becomes that of the inhabitants of a certain area or those belonging to a certain social group that, following an attack and because of angst, change their way of living, speaking and expressing themselves in order to avoid repercussions or further onsets.

Furthermore, considering that fear and terror are innate emotions in our society and that they are at times visible and at other invisible and by observing them either in their past or present manifestations, one can reflect on the future, in which there is a continuous use of the “terror language” and in which fear is something that has been inherited, the tremor is at its base and there will always be a sense of anguish about the unknown that can be glimpsed in the rubble of history. Let us see what they are.

## **1.2 DEATH**

Death is a fascinating yet painful concept at the same time. It is fascinating because it is mysterious as it represents something unknown to people and painful since it deprives them of the dearest affections. Our contemporary culture and society struggles to talk about it, trying to exorcise it in various ways: with silence, irony but as far as individuals try to keep it away, it reappears one way or another. Not all deaths are the same; there are tragic ones and others that do not immediately arouse feelings of piety or anguish. Death in war exists because of violence, but there is also death without guilt (referring to casualties or someone dying of obvious crimes).

*“In the twentieth century, the fear of dying was mitigated by social security measures, security and containment of mass panic and by sophisticated medical techniques, but it was in the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries that it had a radical change.”*<sup>7</sup> In order to save themselves, people lose interest in their relations with the others and their terror and fears are accentuated by taking the form of individual conflict. The uncertainty about death, premature burials, reanimation and the entrustment of life to the hands of the doctors resulted in a general mistrust and a further amplified panic. This uncertainty revolved around the contrasting and different professions of gravediggers, doctors and embalmers. A further sense of dread of death was the hostility of religion, according to which one had to fear death and not desire a following in the afterlife. The border between life and death remaining indetermined is what frustrates people, indeed even the very fact of being human makes them anguished - (Joanna Burke, “*Paura- Una storia culturale*”, pg. 39-44).

The problem, however that arises for the twenty-first century authorities is precisely to find a way to prevent people from understanding what their biggest fear, that is “death,” stems from. Losing this control, those in power are no longer able to manipulate or manage the masses. It is a form of dialectical fear, expressed in a generic way and in indefinite forms, them being the fear of “immigrants”(those guilty of every economic and social evil), health viruses that differ in form and

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<sup>7</sup> Joanna Burke, “*Paura-Una storia culturale*”, 2015, pg. 23.

influence each year or the fear of alleged chemical, bacteriological and nuclear weapons that justify wars and violence. Whoever produces fear is always a manipulator and a potential oppressor. Fear in general and the fear of death become the best ways to generate consensus. An easy consent, built only on the natural fears of people, who are not given the chance and confidence to be really free to choose their own future.

At this point, the real problem is not fear or the fear of death itself, but is the relocation of the sense of death to the limit in time and within our contemporary society. The limit that fear poses, must be redefined by reaffirming the extreme limit and the angst as well as need to confront it: we are mortals, to be alive means to be afraid of death.

### **1.3 SOCIAL HYSTERIA**

Mass or social hysteria is a phenomenon and term used to describe a situation in which physical or psychological symptoms are manifested and spread quickly everywhere in communities and sometimes in entire cities and countries. During an attack individuals affected by this, could experience uncontrollable bursts of laughter, fainting, trembling, dizziness, muscle weakness or any other type of symptoms that appear to have no physical cause. For centuries throughout the world, various cases of hysteria have been reported, which provide an interesting insight into the complex nature of the human psyche. In Europe during the two World Wars and in the United States after 11 September 2001, cases of mass hysteria or in other words mass panic, intensified considerably. Within the crowds, ideas and feelings have a strong contagious power, which allows opinions to penetrate and take root. This mechanism of contagion is nothing but the effect of suggestibility, which occurs when an image is evoked and that same picture pervades each of those present and convinces the individuals to act accordingly.

Suggestibility evokes the inhibitors of the limits of an individual, which is thus dominated by the instincts: overwhelmed by the unconscious, the soul of the mass turns primitive. The most appropriate example is the feeling of panic: if in a crowded place people flee and scream, instinctively the others act accordingly; without ascertaining what is happening, they run frightened in the direction of the crowd. Therefore the power of a word does not depend so much on its meaning as on the image it evokes. This can be easily seen in a radio drama of 1926 called "*Broadcasting from the Barricades*"<sup>8</sup> – which sowed panic in Great Britain while talking and giving a realistic image of a frightened and more importantly, unemployed crowd or it can be seen in another radio broadcast called "*War of the Worlds*"<sup>9</sup> – twelve years later, which caused great panic amongst Americans because of their belief on the landing of martians. Fear and panic in these cases arose from the sense of uncertainty of the relationships with others.

This uncertainty and fear spread even more through mass media, which in one way or another trigger these emotions along with a sense of anguish, forcing the individual to be susceptible. The only difference is that fear is immediate while distress is something internal to individuals themselves such as fear of failure or unawareness of a threat. Mass media play a lot on the often unrealistic or satiric language to be used while spreading the news, and on people's susceptibility. It is no coincidence that on "*September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 many people were surprised of the attack*"<sup>10</sup>, trying not to believe it had occurred, given the previous events or fantasy stories about martians and so on.

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<sup>8</sup> Joanna Burke, "*Paura-Una storia culturale*", 2015, pg. 167-168

<sup>9</sup> Joanna Burke, "*Paura-Una storia culturale*", 2015, pg. 189-191

<sup>10</sup> Joanna Burke, "*Paura- Una Storia Culturale*", 2015, pg. 190

Fear is always someone afraid of something; it is an emotion that individuals, social groups and entire communities or nations experience in the face of circumstances set out to be dangerous. Although fear can also be a sign of protection for individuals, because it plays an important role in survival, if manipulated artfully by those who sow terror it triggers a behavioral response, such as an escape. One that can be either purely physical in nature, which leads the person to avoid certain situations perceived as potentially dangerous in those so-called “*sensitive places*”<sup>11</sup> or critical infrastructures, such as airports, train stations, squares, monuments – or it can present a psychological behavior led by constant mortification of one’s actions allowing the feelings of solitude, self-enclosure and isolation to prevail.

#### **1.4 THE WAR**

The history of mankind is characterized by the alternation of periods of war and peace that have changed both the territorial and political and social structures of the populations concerned. A series of battles lasting for years and years, in fact, entails a very high cost for a country in economic terms, but above all human: the victims grow day by day, the state in which civil society is forced to live is marked by poverty and anguish. Wars, for their violence and for the rapidity of events, remain more imprinted in the memory, and inspire literature, theater, cinema, sometimes exercising a charm that make people forget the horrors of killing and death, destruction of assets and economic resources. War, paradoxically is not simple and blind violence, but it is rather organized and regulated. It starts off with a declaration, and usually ends with a treaty of peace; which during the period is regulated by rules that limit the acts of violence somehow. According to Joanna Burke, war is by definition an instrument, albeit a particular one, of international relations: a state uses force when it cannot propose or impose its will on another state (“*Paura-Una Storia Culturale*”, pg. 198-203).

*“Fear in this case is the way the body prepares itself for action”*<sup>12</sup> - the adrenaline kicks in, the heart beats faster and breathing is accelerated; the war itself has a tremendous emotional impact on everyone both at home and in battle. In fact, the very evolution of societies has become a factor that should limit war and the acts of violence that revolve around it, but rather acts as a catalyst for other onsets. Even today there are many people who are forced to live in constant fear and under the threat of bombs. In essence, war generates horrors, cruelty, chilling and unheard massacres, out of shared morality, however it also often reveals an occasion in which men show off their best qualities, them being: brotherhood, camaraderie, solidarity, piety, altruism and lastly but certainly not least important, courage. Within the concept of war and the fear that it produces, a proven mechanism is recognized: a group or state, enact a coalition against an external enemy (real or perceived) to whom all are vices and defects are attributed. Those in battle justify this by killing.

War along with the sentiment of fear that it generates, is a dramatic reality that involves thousands of innocent people and that does not help to solve problems, rather it makes them worse. It represents an unreasonable and selfish creation by mankind, who instead of trying to find a peaceful solution to the various problems, prefers to discard it and use violence. The means of war may change but its generic content and causes remain unchanged. It is precisely the essentiality of obtaining one’s own interests for which war and then fear originate. Making or declaring war is wrong, it always is, because killing is a mistake. True fear arises from this, not being able to face normal daily life with serenity along with the inability to manage one’s own fears. An example of

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<sup>11</sup> Joanna Burke, “*Paura – Una Storia Culturale*”, 2015, pg. 186-191

<sup>12</sup> Joanna Burke, “*Paura- Una Storia Culturale*”, 2015, pg. 203

this is the “*feeling of panic*”<sup>13</sup> that is triggered by hearing the alarms or the bombs that fall. It is a paralyzing fear, where the options are either fight and survive or die.

## **1.5 TERROR**

The term “terror” today, indicates not so much the political persecution as precisely the use by a group or a single individual of an act of violence defined as illegitimate aimed at inciting terror among the members of a community or group. Moving away from the general definition of terror, one can understand how it evolved into terrorism. One can consider the terrorist attacks as real acts of war or perhaps as symptom of an underground war, but no less present to face. It would be better to think of new ways on how to intervene and treat it, while fighting the contempt for the existence of others and instead promoting respect for diversity and the encounter between cultures, religions and different opinions. Terror, is defined as “*a state of intense fear*”<sup>14</sup> – as such it stems from the primary emotion that is fear. However, it is possible to identify a common trait and a link between terror as a feeling and terror as in instrument; that is the desire to destabilize and frighten individuals through the systematic use of violence.

Giving a wider media attention, all that has been done is nothing but increasing the sense of anguish and fear already inherent in mankind. Although the spread of terror was a phenomenon already known in previous centuries, starting from September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001, a certain awareness grew. Fears were accentuated and it was thought that “*any type of danger, terrorist attacks included suddenly seemed to hide everywhere.*”<sup>15</sup> What were once deemed as safe places, after 9/11 became dangerous, examples of this are: the buildings that could easily collapse (in fact, it would have taken just two airliners), the usage of the word “terrorist” triggered no small fear and lastly the simple traveling by subway, train or precisely airplane, unleashed awe and anxiety amongst people, particularly and firstly American, but then it spread globally.

Although terror spreads amongst people as a sense of anguish and anxiety, to it there is also a positive connotation. It allowed the identification of an exterior enemy, which in the face of 9/11 and since then has been the “*muslim.*”<sup>16</sup> This has sparked the phenomenon of “Islamophobia” not just amongst Americans but worldwide. Many muslim individuals were soon targets for aggressions or homicides, as violent hatred spread. The image of the “*arab on a camel*” was substituted by the “*bearded extremist holding a rifle and not allowing young girls to go to school*”<sup>17</sup> and what was once considered just a religion, was then identified as violent extremism.

Terror and eventually terrorism began to create a “*trauma society*”<sup>18</sup> – one that while experiencing atrocious events, later on had psychological repercussions as well as PTSDs (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders). Fear of death continued to be the supreme terror, and tragedies were seen as psychological wounds rather than what they actually were, unfortunate events. To this extent, psychology and its various methods were applied and studied to overcome such fear. In essence, as terror spread amongst the population and then globally, the panic that succeeded it – destroyed the sense of security that was present before 9/11, or at least it was thought to be there and thought to be able to maintain.

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<sup>13</sup> Joanna Burke, “*Paura- Una Storia Culturale*”, 2015, pg. 206.

<sup>14</sup> <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terror>

<sup>15</sup> Joanna Burke, “*Paura – Una Storia Culturale*”, 2015, pg. 374-375

<sup>16</sup> Joanna Burke, “*Paura –Una Storia Culturale*”, 2015, pg. 379

<sup>17</sup> Joanna Burke, “*Paura – Una Storia Culturale*”, 2015, pg. 380

<sup>18</sup> Joanna Burke, “*Paura –Una Storia Culturale*”, 2015, pg. 381-383

## **1.6 SECURITY VS. FEAR**

Unfortunately, people nowadays are very afraid. They are frightened by what is unknown, from strangers (to whom the worst crimes are attributed); people feel less free and secure. Security in this case, is going to school without worries and fear of a person pulling out a gun and conducting a massive shooting, or even this freedom can be detected in simply waiting the metro or bus, without these means provoking a massacre while exploding or crashing into people at the stop. Security can also be identified in going around with a group of friends without the fear of being raped or better yet work in a skyscraper without it collapsing due to an airplane crash. Feeling safe, means being free from concerns and anxieties, feeling secure from damages, risks and an uncertain future.

However, people normally resort to violence and trigger fear in order to claim to the state more freedom and rights often going against the law and with the only goal to harm the general security of a state first and then that at the international level. This often happens in terrorist attacks, when some individuals commit crazy actions, causing beyond thousands of deaths just to claim their own God or more state autonomy. Security and freedom are two sides of the same story, if one prevails the other diminishes drastically. They should be put on the same level of importance, in order to guarantee the avoidance of shortcomings internal to the state and in the life of each citizen. For this purpose, security and freedom should go hand in hand. To this extent, the role of law enforcement agencies, which work for the security of all and the role of important decision-makers, who are responsible for enacting laws or agreements that guarantee the freedom of the individual, are crucial.

Fear is linked to security and freedom because it regards those relations of power which lead to negotiations between oneself and the others and it divides people into hierarchies. Fear is then not only seen as a simple emotional response but rather as something able enough to create subordination while representing social situations. Examples of such can be *“a woman’s fear of being diagnosed with cancer and consequently becoming hysterical while talking with a doctor, or even a panicking AIDS patient who can be perceived as gay or someone to be afraid of.”*<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, fear reactions to terrorist attacks are merely further scares. The closure of frontiers, the preventive attacks in hostile lands or soldiers in war more willing to commit atrocities than in everyday life when afraid, are all examples of types of apprehensions. In essence, fear as an emotion has been a historical driving force which encouraged people to think deeply before going into action. The only antidote to fear is a sense of security led by courage, which allows people to take into account possible risks, without closing one’s eyes when facing them.

Fear, even if it is a positive emotion, it makes people insecure and in order to overcome it one must resort to knowledge, which can be a good starting point for managing what one fears. However, it is easier said than done: by familiarizing ourselves with our innermost fears, the tremble feeling never does go away, it remains hidden. Being able to overcome it is an extreme undertaking. The solution perhaps lies in the middle: since fear serves as a shield it is best to begin to familiarize with our “monsters”, whatever apprehension it may be and try to live it out irrationally and considering it as a normal component of human life.

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<sup>19</sup> Joanna Burke, *“Paura – Una Storia Culturale”*, 2015, pg. 357-359.

## Chapter 2

### “Terrorism”

#### 2.1 Introductory remarks

Our geopolitical scenario has always been characterized by new threats to the security of States, which assume different aspects of asymmetry and are multi-faced. The terrorist threat is one of those.

#### But what is terrorism?

There are several definitions given to the phenomenon, both in the academic and legal field. To name a few: “*The unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims*”<sup>20</sup> - “*Acts of terrorism are criminal acts directed against a state and which aim, or are of a nature, to provoke terror*”<sup>21</sup> and last but not least - “*Any action...that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.*”<sup>22</sup> The term per sé usually includes the illegitimate use of violence by sub-groups within a state to spread terror, attacking civilians and/or symbolic targets (ex. Twin Towers / Pentagon). It usually occurs to draw attention, provoking a serious reaction and attribution of the opponents moral determination, in such a way to influence change, be it political or else.

Most terrorists think and hope that by the usage of violence, they will initiate a disproportionate reaction by a State, they will seek an immediate impact, but this – if it happens – often takes years or decades to reach somewhat meaningful results. The success of such acts is based on one key variable, i.e “target selection.”<sup>23</sup>

In this aspect, what is interesting is the twenty-year plan of AL-QAEDA, which clearly states that it is pursuing a “*definitive victory*” (i.e the establishment of a global Caliphate by the year 2020), a plan with numerous stages, each of which has specific objectives and pursuits. The first stage is called “Awakening” and began with the 9/11 attack in 2001, after this comes the “*Opening (the) Eyes*” stage, which takes place in 2002-2006, this phase is followed by the “*Arising and Standing Up*” (2007-2010), which by the year 2013 will have brought about the “*Downfall of Apostate Muslim Regimes*” stage. Once the regimes have been changed, the next stage would be the “*Declaration of the Caliphate*”, which involved the mobilization of Muslim forces in the years 2013-2016, culminating finally into the “*Total Confrontation*” phase (2016-2020).<sup>24</sup>

The motivations underlying violence can be multiple; political (left and right, anarchists, fascists etc.), for animal rights and last but certainly not least important, religious. Because of such motivations a concept called “*coercive diplomacy*” is what states have tried to achieve long before 9/11, but were not all in all successful for various reasons. Before looking at such different and unsuccessful cases, one must ask him or herself what is: ““coercive diplomacy”?”

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<sup>20</sup> <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/terrorism>

<sup>21</sup> 1937 League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and the Repression of Terrorism

<sup>22</sup> 2004 U.N Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel Report – Martha Crenshaw “*Explaining Terrorism*”, 2011, pg. 2.

<sup>23</sup> Abrahms M., “*Why Terrorism Does Not Work?*”, International Security, Vol. 31, No.2 (Fall 2006), pg. 55, PDF e-book.

<sup>24</sup> Rudner M., “*Al-Qaeda’s Twenty-year Strategic Plan: The Current Phase Of Global Terror,*” 2013, PDF e-book.



According to Crenshaw (2011: pg.137-163), it is “*forceful persuasion as a response to terrorism*”, or in other words, the act of states using threats in a diplomatic way rather than trying to negotiate. A somewhat successful case was that of retaliation against Iraq in 1993, in which the plan was to kill former President Bush in a car-bomb while he was visiting Kuwait.

According to FBI and CIA investigations Iraqi secret services were behind it all, and the decision to use force against Iraq was done in full secrecy, in order to deter Iraq from further terrorist attacks against the United States. Other problematic cases were that of Iran in 1996 and even more importantly the dealing with the lethal organization known as Al-QAEDA. This last conflict was rather complicated, because the U.S goal was to “*destroy completely or at least make continued terrorism impossible.*”<sup>25</sup>

In the age in which we live in and particularly after 9/11, the motivation behind some of these cases is often linked to an ideology of Islamic matrix. This ideology in Middle Eastern studies is called “Jihad,” which in origin is a twofold struggle; on the one hand against oneself to defeat the temptations given by the modern world and on the other against Muslims who do not follow the Sunna, the law of the Prophet. Currently and for a small minority of Muslim individuals, this “Jihad” has taken on the meaning of a war of offense with terrorist ways, according to the Koranic teachings, it is a war to be fought only for defensive purposes.

In these terms, the most known case of the XXI century is the 9/11 attack, in which four planes were high jacked and, of the four, two crashed into the Twin Towers in New York, the third crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, DC, and the last aircraft was taken over by some passengers and crashed into a field in the state of Pennsylvania. The foray was ordered by the leader of AL-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden in 2001. The highjacking of such planes offered a whole new range of mobility and security issues.

The acquiescence of States to the threats and then demands of terrorists and the media coverage of such events encouraged further assaults which varied in form and size. According to English (2009: pg.11-24), linked to this, there is a psychological dimension to terrorism, which in many cases (ex. Israel vs. Palestine, 9/11 atrocity, 7/7/2005 attack, etc...) helps explain why terrorists act the way they act, how they are radicalized and how the recurring theme in any conversation and/or debate on terrorism, translates as “*revenge.*”<sup>26</sup> In fact, media exposure has been a second toll on people’s lives, in the sense that after various terrorist attacks, people changed their behavior (ex. avoided air travel after 9/11, so more car accidents arose. / PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorders] such as insomnia, anxiety, intrusive thoughts [i.e flashbacks] and even an “emotional tension” occurred through excessive media exposure and through social networks). Therefore, one must ask him/herself “*why do people resort to terrorism?*” According to a scholar, known as Samuel Huntington and his compelling article “*The Clash of Civilizations*”<sup>27</sup>, brings about the theme of the nowadays’ intense hostility between Islam and the West, which divided the global politics into two realms, one welcoming freedom and democracy, and the other despotism and religious fanaticism. In which, he then notes the link between religious belief and terrorist activity, thought to give partial reasoning to such violence. Religion in this case is used as a tactic, to give terrorist some type of justification to their wrong-doings.

In this way, such cruelty can have long or short-term results; in regards to the short-term outcomes an example could be the release of prisoners whereas the long-term result would be that states concede to the demands of terrorist groups or leaders. This was known to be Osama bin Laden’s

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<sup>25</sup> Martha Crenshaw, “*Explaining Terrorism*”, 2011, pg. 163.

<sup>26</sup> Richard English, “*Terrorism, How To Respond*”, 2009, pg. 30-31

<sup>27</sup> Richard English, “*Terrorism, How to Respond*”, 2009. Pg. 32-37

former strategic and political rather than religious logic.<sup>28</sup> His disdain towards the Western world fueled his goal of trying to Islamize the world, which consequently goes beyond the definition of terrorism itself and lastly becomes a non-conventional type of warfare.

One way to look at these dramatic situations is through the historical lens, with a focus on State Security: 9/11 and what came after, changed forever the security strategies in various parts of the world. For example, before that time there was no definition of the “critical infrastructures” (ex. Venice S. Lucia train station / Calatrava Bridge, in Venice-Italy) which are the foundations of a framework “*whose destruction may impact the defense and economic security of a city,*”<sup>29</sup> and long before that - no questions were posed on whether it was necessary to check a luggage on board flights, or even on how to treat or deal with a terrorist (these are all weight and measures within the law that did not include the 2001 Patriot Act). Other cases in point can be that of the changing of holiday/vacation destinations (ex. Sinai and the Red Sea), which led to a decrease of tourism in most Middle Eastern countries, the change in the percentage of people working in the secret services (from 1991 onwards, they were sent home and the intelligence agencies decreased by 25-30%, then they changed again, since September 11<sup>th</sup> – which in this case represents a year zero for our analysis). Further examples of such alterations is that of bollards in the historic centers of many cities, which consist of concrete blocks (usually colored) and steel that serve to block access to a restricted traffic area using a car; it’s a form of architecture made especially after 9/11 and placed in areas of Great Britain, Paris and maybe Switzerland (for example) to avoid a car attack on twenty or more people and last but certainly not least, after September 11<sup>th</sup> a literature has resurfaced, the one about **SPY STORIES & MOVIES**, which was approached by other foreign writers and screenwriters prior to the genre but in a more dull way.

The phenomenon, in fact, led to numerous legislative changes (eg. Patriot Act, Terrorism Act 2000) in the Western world, led to the creation of task forces and has been included in multiple debates on the international level. It has also led to the creation of strategies to combat terrorism, which are divided – roughly- onto two sections: Anti-Terrorism (AT: reaction) and Counter-Terrorism (CT).<sup>30</sup> The (direct and indirect) causes and the consequences of terrorism are examined. There are “*preconditions,*”<sup>31</sup> which create a situation favorable to the usage of terrorism, and with these come “*precipitants, which are explicit events that precede the occurrence of terrorism.*”<sup>32</sup> The preconditions are then furtherly divided into “*enabling or permissive factors.*” “*Modernization*” is one of these, because it creates different levels of vulnerability due to the complex levels of society and the economy. Other factors are that of “*urbanization, because it increases the number of targets and methods*”, a government’s inability to prevent terrorism and “*social facilitation*”<sup>33</sup> which refers to the social habits and ideologies that make the usage of terrorism morally and politically justifiable.

Among the same, can be reported as an example the “*internet, as an important resource, because it is a means of communication, recruitment, propaganda and fundraising*” or even “*religious beliefs*”<sup>34</sup> that can be a cause of terrorism and its lethality.

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<sup>28</sup> Richard English, “*Terrorism, How to Respond*”, 2009, pg. 40-47

<sup>29</sup> Steven M. Rinaldi, James P. Peerenboom, Terrence K. Kelly, “*Identifying, Understanding and Analyzing Critical Infrastructures Interdependencies*”, Dicembre 2001, IEEE Control Systems Magazine, PDF e-book.

<sup>30</sup> <http://fieldcommandllc.com/anti-terrorism-vs-counter-terrorism-tactical-edge-summer-2011-pp-68-70/>

<sup>31</sup> Martha Crenshaw, “*Explaining Terrorism,*” 2011, pg. 35-37.

<sup>32</sup> Martha Crenshaw, “*Explaining Terrorism,*” 2011, pg. 36

<sup>33</sup> Martha Crenshaw, “*Explaining Terrorism,*” 2011, pg. 37-38.

<sup>34</sup> Martha Crenshaw, “*Explaining Terrorism,*” 2011, pg. 65.

To defeat terrorism, there have been talks about de-radicalization policies for a few years by now. But first the term “*radicalization*” should be defined; it is “*the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.*”<sup>35</sup> Whereas, “*de-radicalization*” is somewhat the contrary, it is “*the process of abandoning an extremist worldview and concluding that it is not acceptable to use violence to effect social change.*”<sup>36</sup> Under these aspects, “*another contested term is Islamism*”<sup>37</sup> which has various connotations, for starters Islamists are Muslims that have a political-agenda which is indeed Islam-based, or are those who don’t agree with a direct separation with the authority and religious belief but rather prefer their linkage. “*Islamic Radicalization*”, is the adoption of such belief with the aim of creating an Islamic state while waging Jihad, both violently or non-violently.

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<sup>35</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 1 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book.

<sup>36</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 1 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book.

<sup>37</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 2 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book.

### **2.1.a GLOBAL JIHAD: AL-QAIDA & THE ISLAMIC STATE**

By the end of the 1980s, many “*mujaheddin (fighters engaged in jihad)*”<sup>38</sup> started to create ties and collaborate with national organizations that had a fundamentalist Islamic matrix. Many territories became terrorism and guerilla lands, in which those engaged in the Afghani-jihad continued to pursue their goals. This network of violence and extremism did not dissolve, in fact it only grew stronger thanks to the work of Osama Bin Laden, who when exiled from Saudi Arabia (due to his dissent with the politics of the royal family), found shelter in Sudan. Bin Laden, provided a huge asset, establishing “*offices*” to raise additional funds for the purchase of weapons and then to spread terror, first locally then on a global level. In this regard, Osama was called “*the Sheikh of terror*”<sup>39</sup> – and became the undisputed leader who would have waged global jihad.

The structure of Al-QAIDA as an organization, began on three levels: “*central or hardcore, intermediate groups and the base.*” The hardcore is composed of jihadist veterans whereas the second level of the organization is the “glue” between the hardcore and the base. Finally the base, is composed of “cells” that are spread across and all around the world and which provide for the effective execution of any attacks. The headquarters of AL-QAIDA is “*Jalalabad*,”<sup>40</sup> a city in eastern Afghanistan and a favorable territory for the continued spread of jihad and the increase of the compactness of its terrorist organization.

An important historical date that changed forever the history of Al-Qaida, was September 11, 2001, the day when a suicide bombing type of attack caused 3000 deaths and countless injuries whilst hijacking three planes, two of them on the Twin Towers, the key symbols of American capitalism and power and one against the Pentagon. Having been an attack on American soil, the legislative and military reactions have had a particular tightening. In terms of regulations, the “*US Patriot Act*”<sup>41</sup> was created, which placed the safeguarding of its national security at the center of its objectives, while limiting the freedoms its citizens once enjoyed. On the military level, on the other hand, campaigns were carried out, in areas held accountable and supporters of Al-Qaida. They were called “*Enduring Freedom*.”<sup>42</sup> The first campaign was held in Afghanistan, territory in which the war force was used massively whilst destroying the training camps, arms depots and Al-Qaida’s infrastructures as well as its adherents.

Some, however, were able to escape this mass destruction and go elsewhere. In fact, at the beginning of 2002, the hardcore members became “*nomads*” while searching new and favorable scenarios and surroundings to recreate the most powerful terrorist organization which they once were part of. Despite this transformation and displacement elsewhere, two other attacks were committed, this time in Europe; one in “*Madrid in 2004 and the other in London a year later*”<sup>43</sup>. These were further evidence of the organization’s ability to fall and regenerate into other forms, increasingly dangerous and ruthless. There was no decline of militant jihad, not even after the death of their leader Osama Bin Laden, by American raid.

Under these conditions, “*the Islamic State or ISIS (in arabic DAESH, acronym of Al-Dawla Al-Islamiyya fi Iraq wa l-Sham)*”<sup>44</sup> - made its entrance in the geopolitical field and after some attacks took world fame. Its main figure and leader is the terrorist Al-Zarqawi, who created a branch of Al-

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<sup>38</sup> Stefano D’Auria, “*Il terrorismo Islamista Il terrorismo Islamista: Dalle origini allo stato Islamico - strategie e normative di contrasto*”, pg. 95

<sup>39</sup> D’Auria, op. cit., pg. 98

<sup>40</sup> D’Auria, op. cit., pg. 99

<sup>41</sup> D’Auria, op. cit., pg. 99

<sup>42</sup> D’Auria, op. cit., pg. 100

<sup>43</sup> D’Auria, op. cit., pg. 101-102

<sup>44</sup> D’Auria, op. cit., pg. 102

Qaida in Iraq which eventually evolved into today's DAESH. His right hand man is Al-Baghdadi, who currently is the leader of ISIS. The strategies that the Islamic State uses can be divided into "seven main points:

- 1) *non-recognition of the boundaries drawn by the colonial powers (Sykes-Picot agreements of 1916)*
- 2) *radical struggle through jihad*
- 3) *difficult relationship with the management of Al-Qaida*
- 4) *war against the Shiites*
- 5) *use of Internet to broadcast brutal executions of hostages*
- 6) *use of suicide bombing*
- 7) *being offensive against the West*"<sup>45</sup>

Since the appearance on terrorist ground of Al-Zarqawi, there has been a certain distrust between him and the qaidist leader Osama Bin Laden, former undisputed terrorist leader. However, Al-Zarqawi did prove to the world his ruthlessness, through numerous attacks; examples of such are: "suicide bomber in 2003 against Jordan's Embassy in Iraq, U.N's venue in Baghdad, and lastly the terrorist attack in November 2003 against the Italian Army Base and civilians in Nassiriya."<sup>46</sup> It took an "american task force in June 2006"<sup>47</sup> to kill Al-Zarqawi and pass the leadership to Abu Ayyub Al-Masri of Egyptian origins, in October 2006 – date in which the Islamic State of Iraq was also established with the intention of creating a big Caliphate that included all six Sunni governments of Iraq. In 2008, further attacks between the U.S forces and the Iraqi ones were carried out, resulting in the driving away of rebel ISIS supporters towards Mosul while destroying their safe havens. Two years later, Al-Masri and his right hand man, Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi were killed near Tikrit, during a raid between Iraqi and U.S forces.

Considering the events in Syria during the Assad regime and the Arab Springs that created a huge power vacuum, ISIS found its leader in the figure of "Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi"<sup>48</sup> - current caliph. He is also supported by the so-called "foreign fighters", those engaged in the Syrian civil war coming from neighboring Arab countries and some Western countries. In 2012, he was elected caliph and commander and officially created the Islamic State in September 2013 with the intention of annihilating the Shiites and dismantling the Iraqi security apparatus, its opponent and ally of Western countries. With this proclamation, the definitive rupture with central Al-Qaida was established.

Despite the many brutal terrorist attacks (ex. Charlie Hebdo, Bataclan etc.), the true operational method of ISIS lies in its "strategy of global communication and propaganda", through public executions of hostages, made via the Internet and which generated further terror in the viewers; advertising via social networks and digital forums, which manipulated the minds of men and women and their feelings of protest whilst being seen as migrants and finally through the "franchise of terror" or in other words, making the oath of its supporters public through a "twitter update or youtube video."<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> D'Auria, op. cit, pg. 103

<sup>46</sup> D'Auria, op. cit, pg. 103-104

<sup>47</sup> D'Auria, op. cit, pg. 104-105

<sup>48</sup> D'Auria, op. cit, pg. 106

<sup>49</sup> D'Auria, op. cit, pg. 107-108.

### **2.1.b HUMAN SECURITY**

Security is undoubtedly given from the possibility of defending oneself. When one is attacked by someone or something else, be it an earthquake, a killer or act of violence, safety depends on the ability to avoid negative consequences on oneself. However, the best security is given by prevention. Among its means, those that prevail are the ones enforcing the laws, i.e the police, who sometimes finds itself exercising a disproportionate defense against the actual danger. When the individual sense of security is exasperated and threatened, the use of personal defense weapons is also used. Nevertheless, the concept of human security is both powerful yet controversial, therefore a definition must be outlined. Normally, safety is linked to state sovereignty and military threats, in which the state is the only referent object. This differs when talking about human security because it puts the individual at the center and broadens the concept of both national and international security.

Human security has three elements: “*focus on the individual in terms of security, multidimensional nature and universal/global scope.*” Its origin is traced in the “*U.N’s Human Development Report of 1994*” which defines seven types of security; them being:

- 1) *economic security*
- 2) *food security*
- 3) *health security*
- 4) *environmental security*
- 5) *personal security*
- 6) *community security*
- 7) *political security*”<sup>50</sup>

The first refers to the assurance of an income to the individuals who are productive, the second assures the availability of basic food at any time and to anyone whereas health security includes the prevention from diseases and threats to nature. Personal security, on the other hand, is the protection of individuals from any form of physical violence, be it domestic or rape. Community security refers to the protection and preservation of values and relationships from violence and loss, and lastly political safety includes the defense of basic human rights and freedom of individuals.

To this concept of security, “*Human Development*” is also linked and a key factor. It values the capacities of mankind to confront and overcome conflicts and violence, which have further consequences such as (for example): “*illiteracy, poverty, diseases etc.*” – Aside from this, two differences within human security must be explained, and those are: “*freedom from want and freedom from fear.*”<sup>51</sup> The first has the protection of individuals from violent conflicts as its main goal whereas the second includes the decline of threats such as poverty or diseases. In essence, the main goal that human security revolves around is the “*safety from violence*”<sup>52</sup> and in order to do so states, the international community in general, NGOs and Government agencies need to work together and provide it also in the face of terrorist threats. In fact, terrorist agents often and willingly use poverty, illiteracy and other consequences of war conflicts to their advantage. It is easier for them to plan out attacks when a community or state is to some extent and for one reason or another, weak.

In order to promote the protection of human beings, the most important institution and action was established, and that is the “*International Criminal Court (ICC)*” along with other tribunal for war

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<sup>50</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, “*The Globalization of World Politics – An introduction to international relations*”, 2014 – 6th edition, pg. 449 chapter 29

<sup>51</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, op. cit, pg. 449-452

<sup>52</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, op. cit, pg. 453-455

crimes and the “*Anti-Personnel Landmines Treaty*.”<sup>53</sup> The ICC headquarters are in The Hague, Netherlands even if it can process the crimes anywhere in the world. The crimes however must be international, and they can be: genocide, war crimes or aggression, prosecution of war criminals. This court along with other treaties are part of peacekeeping and building missions, that further enhance human security whilst assisting reconstruction and recovery of conflict zones. To this is linked and fundamental the concept of “*humanitarian intervention*” promoted by the United Nations and some NGOs. Intervening in such way enhances the responsibility of states towards their citizens, in the sense that all individuals are suitable for protection from violence, immediate killings and should have complete access to a peaceful daily scenario rather than a conflicted one. Humanitarian intervention, however, if it firstly used regulations and sanctions, nowadays it added a military side to it; which in some cases is justifiable but in others it is not.

For this purpose, the concept of “*Responsability to Protect*” was released. It focuses on how to protect those individuals that are in immediate danger, be it from violence of any sort or injustice and abandons the focus on state-sovereignty. This responsibility can be divided into three pillars:

- 1) “*State protection of its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and other acts of violence.*”
- 2) “*responsibility to assist and encourage other states in doing the same, lies in the hands of the international community whilst addressing the causes of conflicts and allowing prevention to emanate.*”
- 3) “*responsibility to take timely actions through diplomatic or humanitarian intervention and work case-by-case, lies upon the international community as well.*”<sup>54</sup>

Furthermore, considering that human security can only be enhanced through the cooperation and work of the entire international community and its security agencies, what must be understood is that the problem that arises from terrorism and its attacks, particularly the one happened on 9/11, revives the once state-centric approach and puts it under another perspective, which is that of the individual and his or her civil liberties in addition to the various conventions and regulations also related and which must not be threatened but not even banned altogether.

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<sup>53</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, op. cit, pg. 458-459

<sup>54</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, op. cit, chapter 31, pg. 486- 491

## **2.2 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**

The terms “*defense*” and “*security*” go together when talking about the global phenomenon that is terrorism. The first, according to some, should only regard the military dimension whereas the second should have more global meaning because it refers to “*all the threats and non-military instruments, be them economic, demographic and technological.*”<sup>55</sup> The only difference between these is the diversity of the actors involved (i.e States/ Coalition of states/ Alliances and last but not least the International Community). The defense can be either national or collective, whereas security is either national, collective or international/global. “*Both collective defense and security correspond to a state-centric point of view of the international system.*”<sup>56</sup>

### **But what is collective defense and security?**

The first, is the defense towards the presumed or real external threats, put into action by States that are members of an alliance or coalition. The difference between alliance and coalition, is essentially that the first is permanent and solid while the other is created for a specific reason and in a specific time period. In order to maintain both, there needs to be great leadership and a series of measures that will guarantee member states, that in case of difficulties or problems, the allies will not violate the agreements made. For “*collective security*” we intend the one that relies on the states as bases of the international system while continuing to maintain to some extent its sovereignty. Its primary concept is based on the “*indivisibility of Peace, both regionally and on a world level.*”<sup>57</sup> To this, are linked various and numerous institutions (i.e OCSE – Organization for the Security and Co-operation in Europe for the regional level and the UN for the global level). These institutions have the ultimate goal of facing the internal threats, for example a member state becoming the “*enemy*” in order to restore the status-quo.

The “*collective security*” has the goal of finding a solution and/or compromise, which is at an intermediate level between national defense of the alliances and the global government. It is in a way, “*internationalized*” because it maintains order and stability worldwide. States in this case have equal rights that are weighed the same. The efficacy of the collective security is based on the ability of the member states to give rules and procedures adequate to defend borders and territories. The ultimate goal of such institutions is to celebrate peace worldwide by creating it rather than forcing it upon others.

Rest assure that the 9/11 terrorist attacks have not been neither the first nor the last incidents on American soil, they have however caused an abrupt shift in defense and security measures and have firstly connotated terrorism as “*a matter to which law and measures should be enforced but would rather view it as a threat to national security and to the military dimension*”<sup>58</sup> on a worldwide scale. These shifts meant more prevention of attacks rather than just mere responses or retaliations. Among these, examples can be:

- *“Regorganization of Government agencies*
- *Improvement of technological security projects*
- *Creation of major systems to secure borders or help in the detection of nuclear threats*
- *Detention of alleged or real terrorists at the Guantanamo Bay prison, in Cuba*

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<sup>55</sup> Carlo Jean, “*Guerra, strategia e sicurezza*”, 1997, pg. 253.

<sup>56</sup> Carlo Jean, “*Guerra, strategia e sicurezza*”, 1997, pg. 253-254.

<sup>57</sup> Carlo Jean, “*Guerra, strategia e sicurezza*”, 1997, pg. 257-258.

<sup>58</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, John Paul Godges, “*The Long Shadow of 9/11 – America’s response to terrorism*”, 2011, pg. 133-137 chapter 11, Santa Monica (CA), RAND Corporation, PDF e-book.



- *More intrusiveness in security searches at airports*
- *Less accessibility to different areas of public sites*
- *Creation of different legislative measures (eg. Patriot Act)*
- *Creation and establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, an organization whose aim is the response to criticism about its performance and in charge of security and safety in the homeland.*<sup>59</sup>

Security in this case is a term often contested, most scholars however agree that it “*implies freedom from threats to core values (for both individuals and groups).*”<sup>60</sup> The main problem when it comes to talking about security is the ongoing process of globalization, which within the years brings new risks and dangers, be them international - terrorism, financial crises, global warming, conflicts that arise while using the media and cyberspace and last but not least nuclear accidents. These are all threats that are “*outside the control of nation-states.*”<sup>61</sup> The latter leads us to the fact that the process of globalization has both positive and negative aspects for the states worldwide. On the positive account it brings states in contact with each other and “*facilitates dialogue between them on the matter of increased interdependence, the proliferation of weapons technologies, encourages cooperative effects of international institutions,*”<sup>62</sup> whereas on the negative note globalization often means “*fragmentation, rapid social change, increased economic inequality, terrorism, threats to cyber security, cultural and religious identities.*”<sup>63</sup> Surely, on this last aspect the military dimension is not only part of it but is the most important trend, because it allows states to not be over competitive to one another. However, it is safe to say that this dimension is offset for the Middle East, as demonstrated by the various conflicts on its soil. Military force is both used by “*terrorist movements and agencies who reject the status quo and as an instrument of arbitration when states are in conflict with each other.*”<sup>64</sup>

To this extent further terms and key concepts should be defined in order to truly understand the importance of international security and its toll on our global community. These are:

- “*security community*”
- “*security regimes*”
- “*acceptance of common security*”
- “*democratic peace theory*”<sup>65</sup>
- “*securitization theory.*”<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, John Paul Godges, “*The Long Shadow of 9/11 – America’s response to terrorism*”, 2011, pg. 133-144 chapter 11 and pg. 200-201 chapter 16, Santa Monica (CA), RAND Corporation, PDF e-book.

<sup>60</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, “*The Globalization of World Politics – An introduction to international relations*”, 2014 – 6th edition, pg. 229 chapter 15.

<sup>61</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, “*The Globalization of World Politics – An introduction to international relations*”, 2014 – 6th edition, pg. 231 chapter 15.

<sup>62</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, “*The Globalization of World Politics – An introduction to international relations*”, 2014 – 6th edition, pg. 240 chapter 15.

<sup>63</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, “*The Globalization of World Politics – An introduction to international relations*”, 2014 – 6th edition, pg. 240 chapter 15.

<sup>64</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, “*The Globalization of World Politics – An introduction to international relations*”, 2014 – 6th edition, pg. 241 chapter 15.

<sup>65</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, “*The Globalization of World Politics – An introduction to international relations*”, 2014 – 6th edition, pg. 234-235 chapter 15.

<sup>66</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, “*The Globalization of World Politics – An introduction to international relations*”, 2014 – 6th edition, pg.237 chapter 15.

“*Security Community*” is essentially a group of people that attains itself within a specific territory, has a sense of community towards one another and whose practices are strong to the point that they assure peaceful changes and solutions to social problems that may or may not arise within the stated populace. By “*security regimes*” we intend the process by which states tend to co-operate to handle disputes and avoid an escalation of violence which often results into war. Then comes “*acceptance of common security*” which is basically the principle that organizes state efforts of risks, dangers and conflicts reduction and gives the importance and high priority to the maintenance of world peace. The last two terms are often misunderstood and confused between each other; the first is a theory which contends that peace is achieved in a democratic way, meaning there is an “*ideological commitment to human rights*”<sup>67</sup> and that states do not go to war unless necessary or justifiable (e.g 2003 Iraqi War), whereas the second is considered a “*speech act*” in the sense that there can be “*extraordinary measures to ensure survival and is a social construction that can be anything a political authority/actor says it is.*”<sup>68</sup>

Seen on what this utmost account relies on, it is common sense that it leads to the concept of “**Anti-terrorism**.”<sup>69</sup> It is described as the efforts to prevent acts of violence and diminish their occurrence and effects while at the same time instilling vigilance, protecting vital targets and identifying the terrorist actors and their future attacks. Since anti-terrorism strategies have a strategic nature, they rely mostly on data and mainly on “**four factors**”:

- 1) “**Trends**”
- 2) “**Potentials**”
- 3) “**Capabilities**”
- 4) “**Intentions**”<sup>70</sup>

Trends refer to the activeness of terrorist groups, their methods and usage of violence, their favorite targets, the potentials on the other hand refer to the “*ability to set limits on the possibilities*”, it is essentially the response to a threat which determines its credibility. For capabilities we intend the successful accomplishment on an opponent’s action through specific means (i.e nuclear bombs, electronic equipments useful for an attack etc..) and last but not least comes the fourth factor – intentions- which describe the targets/goals that are being considered by the terrorists for an eventual attack (eg. Environmental change, end of death penalty etc..).

Reality of all of this, is that both defense and security on one hand and prevention on the other are on the same line and are complementary rather than mere alternatives. To further this point, fighting against terrorism and its propaganda, “*adequate means of intelligence should be developed, in order to locate terrorist networks and their activities (i.e recruitment, financial aid, arms race, target selection and attack preparation)*”<sup>71</sup>. The intelligence activity is similar to the fight against transnational organized crime rather than the one against war. However it’s nevertheless important to prevent it in any way possible and with whatever means.

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<sup>67</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, “*The Globalization of World Politics – An introduction to international relations*”, 2014 – 6th edition, pg. 234 chapter 15.

<sup>68</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, “*The Globalization of World Politics – An introduction to international relations*”, 2014 – 6th edition, pg. 237 chapter 15.

<sup>69</sup> <http://fieldcommandllc.com/anti-terrorism-vs-counter-terrorism-tactical-edge-summer-2011-pp-68-70/>

<sup>70</sup> <http://fieldcommandllc.com/anti-terrorism-vs-counter-terrorism-tactical-edge-summer-2011-pp-68-70/>

<sup>71</sup> Roberto Toscano, “*La violenza, le regole*”, 2006, pg. 54-55.

## What is Intelligence?

Intelligence is all the complex and more or less covert actions that have the ultimate goal of acquiring information relevant to the risks or threats that are incumbent on the State and thus allow their analysis by those in power or have at least the authority to do so. It is different from the mere “investigative action”, because intelligence is covert, the latter is overt and its aim is the respect of the law which is regulated by formal procedures. Another difference between the two is the diversity of actors involved. For the intelligence, there can be no direct judicial effects, in the sense that whatever information is found cannot be used in court, whereas for the investigative action, it can.

In this sense, Intelligence has the security of the state as a primary goal, “*aimed at protecting political and economic interests, which in turn are susceptible to threats from multiple, potentially hostile, domestic and foreign entities.*”<sup>72</sup> The first element of intelligence is the classic espionage which aims at acquiring information on every single subject or matter of State interest; be it from the behavior of neighboring states to potential enemies, up until including the technological advancement of the economic competitors. This offensive information can be used either tactically or strategically in regards to the military dimension. When used tactically the researched data regard foremost the “*balance of power in circumscribed areas and the weapon potential of the possible opponents*” whereas when used strategically the researched data obtained and then processed, regard the “*general political goals and the military plans of selected states.*”<sup>73</sup>

There are different categories of Intelligence, examples of such are: Humint, Techint or Sigint and Imint. The first is the abbreviation of Human Intelligence, and it identifies “*all the investigative activities that are conducted by humans (i.e diplomatic, tourist and journalistic sources).*”<sup>74</sup> Techint stands for Technological Intelligence, which is in a continuous updating and can evolve into Sigint, which stands for Signal Intelligence, and includes Comint (Communication Intelligence) and Elint (Electronic Intelligence), these all revolve around information gathered through decryption, electronic signals and interception of communications. Lastly, Imint (Imagery Intelligence), is essentially identified in aerial and satellite espionage and obtains information through the elaboration of images coming from space and outerspace; it is as any other intelligence category in continuous advancement and vital to limiting the arms race (eg. Cuban Missiles in 1962).

The importance of such categories and intelligence itself stems from the fact that possessing and controlling information is an essential factor of security. The states need to be informed in order to prevent and eventually counter any type of attack. To this extent a few guidelines have been given but more important are the “*early warning and risk indicators*”<sup>75</sup> - and these are:

- 1) *“loss of the political space for the opposition, society and the media*
- 2) *social, economic and political exclusion of some groups from the development trend*
- 3) *high percentage of youth unemployment*
- 4) *rapid decline of the access to basic services and opportunities to earn a living for oneself*
- 5) *increase in social inequalities*
- 6) *increasing violations of human rights*

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<sup>72</sup> Germano Dottori, “*Un’Intelligence per il XXI Secolo*”, Dicembre 1999, Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, pg. 23-25 capitolo 1.

<sup>73</sup> Germano Dottori, “*Un’Intelligence per il XXI Secolo*”, Dicembre 1999, Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, pg. 25 capitolo 1.

<sup>74</sup> Germano dottori, “*Un’Intelligence per il XXI Secolo*”, Dicembre 1999, Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, pg. 26-27 capitolo 1.

<sup>75</sup> Roberto Toscano, “*La violenza, le regole*”, 2006, pg. 55-56.

7) *increasing perception of existing threats*

8) *internal and international migration flows due to economic and political reasons.*<sup>76</sup>

In terms of defense and intelligence the **United Kingdom** has been very efficient and has established two services (**MI-5 and MI-6**), of which “*MI-5 (or Security Service) has since its birth been the competent internal service that has the exclusive job of counterintelligence and espionage on British soil.*”<sup>77</sup> Its primary goal is to counter the infiltration of foreign information services in the U.K, and then it has also moved on to anti-narcotics, the fight against the mafia and illegal immigration. MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service) on the other hand, is in charge of obtaining and providing information regarding the actions or intentions of people outside the British Isles and executing other missions connected to the actions or intention of said people, relevant to the national and international security, with particular regards to the foreign policy and the defense (“*Un’Intelligence per il XXI Secolo*”, 68). The graph and diagram below explain such goals and functions.

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


Figura 1 Resources Pie-Graph of MI-5 Goals

<sup>76</sup> Roberto Toscano, “*La violenza, le regole*”, 2006, pg. 55

<sup>77</sup> Germano Dottori, “*Un’Intelligence per il XXI Secolo*”, Dicembre 1999, Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, pg. 66-67 capitolo 2.

<sup>78</sup> Germano Dottori, “*Un’Intelligenc per il XXI Secolo*”, Dicembre 1999, Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, pg. 69 capitolo 2.




Figura 2 Organization of the Secret Information Service (MI-6) - Great Britain [Source: liMes, 1997]

<sup>79</sup> Germano Dottori, "Un'Intelligence per il XXI Secolo", Dicembre 1999, Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, pg. 70 capitolo 2

Within U.K's secret services there is a third, which is specifically military. This third service is the "Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS)"<sup>80</sup> - and its functions are only of analysis and evaluation, it does not have operational tasks. It is under the responsibility of GCHQ (Government Communication Headquarters). The Government Headquarters are a "Civil Service Department, under the responsibility of the Foreign Office" (*Un'Intelligence per il XXI Secolo*, 71), it performs important functions and gives useful advices to the government for national defense from internal threats such as radicalization and for international defense from external threats such as terrorism. GCHQ is based in Cheltham and collaborates with the American agency, NSA and is depend on it for satellite informations.

In these terms radicalization and intelligence often go together. Without intelligence and the information it collects there cannot be the phenomenon of radicalization, in the sense that it would have no point of existence. While terrorism and its consequences brings and projects its shadows and fear on international relations, it reinforces also the urgency of reducing its frequency, territorial extension and duration over time.

In this regard, it is best to see this urgency under another point of view, that of the Middle East. In fact, **Saudi Arabia** and its secret services have been efficient in countering terrorism and defending its homeland from internal and external threats.

Saudi Arabia, being a former Arab leader and state for regional stability and development, has proposed a "Saudi Defense Doctrine (SDD)"<sup>81</sup> which responds to the needs of the shifting political arena and comes up with two goals in terms of security and survival. The first goal is to protect the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) from internal threats (terrorism & religious extremism) and the second is to protect the Arab world from political struggles and regionally maintain order. To fulfill such aims, the doctrine has outlined seven further objectives, without which the primary two goals cannot and will not be achieved not now or in the near future. These seven goals are:

- "homeland defense
- successful counter-terrorism efforts
- support the defense of partner states
- be prevalent in power projection missions
- hinder the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
- establish two separate commands for cyberspace and space
- bolster inter-agency partnerships."<sup>82</sup>

The first goal (i.e Homeland defense) is the protection of borders and territory important to KSA. It is divided into three subgroups, geographically speaking; North, South and Sea lanes. Saudi Arabia has also different levels of relationship with its neighbors: Jordan, Iraq and Iran in the north, Red sea to the north-west and Yemen to the south. With its northern partners, these relationships are either close or deeply in tension. Iraq in this case is the biggest threat, since it has become a gateway for drug smugglers, terrorist cells and violence. Jordan on the other hand is the most close and strategic ally, whereas Iran is not because of an assault to the AL-MUKHTAR BRIGADE, which fortunately did not cause injuries or damage. To this extent, Saudi Arabia makes military

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<sup>80</sup> Germano Dottori, "Un'Intelligence per il XXI Secolo", Dicembre 1999, Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, pg. 69-72 capitolo 2.

<sup>81</sup><https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Saudi%20Strategic%20Doctrine%20-%20web.pdf>

<sup>82</sup><https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Saudi%20Strategic%20Doctrine%20-%20web.pdf>

defense and border control imperative and its ultimate goal. Yemen, in the south, instead is also a problem that needs to be dealt with, because of the insurgence of an Al-Qaeda cell called, “*Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the continuous infiltration of illegal immigrants.*”<sup>83</sup>

Lastly, Saudi Arabia’s maritime and air surveillance is important for the protection of its tradings and oil fields. KSA’s air force has been improved and used strategically to deter attacks on sensitive targets (ex. “Fahd line” – established in 1984 over the offshore oil fields which then extended to the Saudi Red Sea coast). This last protection is important because it protects critical infrastructures on which Saudi Arabia’s economy relies on and is very dependent. These infrastructures are offshore refineries and pipelines. Another problem linked to this is piracy, a tactic used by terrorist organizations in the Gulf of Aden (entry to the Red Sea).

Secondly, succeeding in counter-terrorism efforts is imperative for KSA but is approached with different point of views, particularly three (i.e home defense from terrorist attacks, defense against these abroad and then defense against the spread of extremist ideology both at home and abroad). The kingdom of Saudi Arabia itself is a target due to its leading role in oil exportation and being the holiest center for Muslims (particular are the citites of Mekkah and Madinah).

To further the importance of SDD’s third goal, KSA should implement more manpower and strenghten the relationships with its allies and contain the effects of what has been known to be in 2010, the ARAB SPRING, on the region. In order to do so, it implements and strenghtens foreing aid programs for the maintainence of stability both regionally and in the Muslim World in general.

According to the SDD, in regards to the fourth goal, Power Projection, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia needs to establish preemptive actions to rapidly counter the threat that is terrorism, regional unrest and other crises. There needs to be actions that are twofold, on one hand they project power both nationally and internationally and on the other project such power while influencing the Muslim World. In terms of actions on a regional level KSA is limiting the influence of Iran in the region by weaking it and deterring its aggressive attacks on ethno-religious groups. Internationally, KSA wants to portray itself as an alternative to Western intervention in the Middle East by proving its own solutions to problems. And on a more religious level Saudi Arabia needs to continue to project its influence internally of the Muslim World, being also the cradle of Islam with its two very important and holy sites, Mekkah and Medinah.

For the fifth aim, the kingdom needs to plan and project its military strategies with the sole function to deter the spreading of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by increasing detection, prohibition, prevention of them falling into the wrong hands and lastly containment. To this extent Saudi Arabia and its intelligence is responsible for the gathering of data and information that will allow prevention, which gives Saudi intelligence a great amount of importance, even if the kingdom itself has not yet developed a “*nuclear weapons program.*”<sup>84</sup>

The sixth goal for KSA is to establish two separate commands for cyberspace and space and in order to do so the country must modernize its military programmes and adapt them to the technological development of nowadays. In order to achieve this goal, the kingdom should view it through three perspectives. The first by “*expanding cyber expertise and awareness,*” then

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<sup>83</sup><https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Saudi%20Strategic%20Doctrine%20-%20web.pdf>

<sup>84</sup><https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Saudi%20Strategic%20Doctrine%20-%20web.pdf>

developing a cyber-security branch, and finally “*solidifying partnerships with other agencies*”<sup>85</sup> to enhance security and defense. These actions are compulsory and function as a way of survival, because Saudi Arabia is not only dependent on collected data and informations but needs them in order to counter terrorism and its attacks.

The seventh and final goal of the Saudi Defense Doctrine, gives the rest a reason of existence. To strengthen partnerships with different defense agencies and military institutions means to ensure their effectiveness when threats are posed. In order to do so this action should focus on three tasks: “*advancement of the coordination and consistency of national security-intelligence-foreign policy / adaption of defense mechanisms in accordance with the needs of the international, domestic and regional arena and lastly creation of an inter-agency procedures to ensure effectiveness of the various intelligence and defense agencies.*”<sup>86</sup> For this purpose the Saudi National Security Council was established in October 2005, which was supposed to coordinate Saudi defense, intelligence strategies and foreign policy while maintaining an amount of flexibility in its adaptiveness to the challenges posed by terrorism and other threats both internally and externally.

Placing limits to the usage of force and/or intelligence is imperative both for Western countries and the Middle East, in order to counter the threat of terrorism, meet other challenges and continue the balance of power and state sovereignty. “*Defeating terrorist groups is not an easy task and will not only be achieved by military counter-terrorism, but by global political change that will deligitimize fundamentalism, be it religious or political and violence.*”<sup>87</sup> To this extent governments and intelligence agencies cannot act independently but need to create a close network that will enhance their work’s effectiveness and will counter terrorism in a better way.

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<sup>85</sup><https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Saudi%20Strategic%20Doctrine%20-%20web.pdf>

<sup>86</sup><https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Saudi%20Strategic%20Doctrine%20-%20web.pdf>

<sup>87</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, “*The Globalization of World Politics – An introduction to international relations*”, 2014 – 6th edition, pg. 369 chapter 23.



### **2.3 STATE OF EXCEPTION/EMERGENCY**

Starting from 11 September 2001, the state of exception or state of emergency takes shape in both the political and legal spheres. The great debate that began in the early 2000s, regarding the limitation of personal liberties in the areas of security checks within airports, led to the formulation of a series of extraordinary procedures in the security controls that at the end, as in classic operation of the states of emergency, are permeated and indeed have been strengthened.

Both in the United States and in Canada, the government response to the 9/11 attacks was prompt and translated, only a few days after the tragedy, into extraordinary measures aimed at countering the terrorist danger and averting, through the adoption of preventive measures, the repetition of similar events. In this sense it is important to underline how the common conscience has naturally and univocally oriented towards an instance of protection and prevention that has been addressed to the institutional powers in unison.

The direct consequence of this attitude is found by observing the impact that the terrorist emergency exerts on the hierarchical scale of priorities and shared values in a state of law: public security rises to primary value, becomes a fundamental and priority right and is set as basis for the tendency to compress the guarantees of individual rights. We are witnessing a phenomenon that subtly takes root in democratic systems: it is the "normalization of the emergency" which by definition is an extra-ordinary situation and as such should be tackled with exceptional and time-limited instruments. It is instead observed that the state of emergency serves as a legitimizing factor of the issue of laws that are so special, since they are intended for the regulation of extraordinary situations, but which however lack the requirement of temporality, an indispensable element to give a concrete sense to the formal definition of specialty.

It thus happens that anti-terrorism legislation does not go alongside the ordinary regulatory system, placing itself as instrumental in overcoming a state of exception, but has an impact on domestic law by integrating into the legal system in a permanent way and undermining the fundamental guarantee apparatus, which forms the basis of modern democracies and should therefore be intangible, indisputable and undisputed.

These are realities that must last very little and must be circumscribed by force, but which can not be eliminated because they represent the release valve for social issues that otherwise could not be expressed, the difficulty lies in seeking a balance between these two things. The function of politics must keep these situations circumscribed without transforming them into situations that last over time. Law does not admit the condition of exceptionality, politics on the other hand does.

#### **2.3.a. MEASURES INTRODUCED AT AIRPORTS AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACKS:**

After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the perception of airports has changed drastically and airports all over the world have been subjected to a real 'revolution' of security systems, with a succession of bans and controls more and more ironclads. Only 48 hours after the attacks, on the planes around the world the access of any type of knife was forbidden, first tolerated if it was 100 mm long, while from November 2001 the security in the US airports was entrusted to an agency of the Department of State, the Transport Safety Administration (TSA).

The following month, **Richard Reid** attempted to blow up the Paris-Miami flight by hiding a bomb in his shoes. Since then, in all US airports, but also in different airports of the planet, the control of passenger shoes has become a routine. In 2006 the most rigorous measure was launched: any type

of liquid (gels, creams, shower gel, water, drinks, perfumes) was banned by airplanes if in quantities exceeding 100 milliliters. Alternatively, passengers are allowed to carry it in the hold baggage or purchase it once past the control gate.

Three years later, the failed attack by **Nigerian Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab**, who had hidden explosives in his underwear, led to the implementation of the most extreme measure, the body scanner, a technology that in practice 'denuding' the passenger through X-rays and that has sparked a planetary wave of controversy: the scanner, report its detractors, invades privacy and is harmful to health.

In Italy, in 2011, experimentation began of a millimeter-wave body scanner that reproduces a stylized image of the passenger, while the European Parliament said 'yes' to a voluntary use of machinery. In the US, despite the controversy, the government holds on and at every airport there is at least one active body scanner. At the same time the staff is authorized to proceed with the so-called 'pats down', body searches that have raised quite a few controversies.



Figura 3 Security checks at the airport



Figura 4 Shoe check at gate control

### **2.3.b. PATRIOT ACT**

On October 25, 2001, just over a month after the attack, the US Senate approved, with only one vote against, the Uniting and Strengthening America by the Providing Appropriate Tool Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, best known to all like the US Patriot Act, converted into law by the signature of President George W. Bush the next day.

This is a law that aims to strengthen the national security of the United States after the attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, greatly reducing the rights traditionally enjoyed by American citizens and those who, despite not having obtained citizenship, reside in America . The Patriot Act, in fact, greatly increases the possibilities of police bodies and federal agencies to perform telephone and computer wiretaps, to search homes or jobs of citizens without their knowledge, to withdraw from schools, banks, hospitals, universities and libraries all the documents and personal information about each individual, on his economic transactions, on his health conditions, on the sites he visits and the books he or she reads.

Furthermore, the Patriot Act allows the US Government to hold, in the presence of certain conditions but without time limits, any foreigner who has violated immigration laws or who, for various reasons, is considered a threat to national security.

The transfer of personal data abroad is an issue that, until recently, was governed by the agreement between the United States and Europe called **Safe Harbor**, or safe harbor. The agreement was not created for security reasons, but to give stability to trade relations between the two sides of the Atlantic, taking into account the economic and political differences between the two legal systems. In any case, the Safe Harbor has also had the purpose of offering adequate protection to the personal data of European citizens, subject to treatment by US companies. The latter, through the agreement, are committed to respecting the principles of the European system.

Many doubts have also been expressed regarding the time taken to keep the data, considered excessively long, and on the effectiveness of this long conservation for investigative purposes, especially considering that the individuals in transit are millions. Personal data should be kept no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which they were collected. So it is much more sensible to retain data with the stated purpose of controlling entry into US territory in view of the identification of terrorists, and not for a period of 8 years, as required by the US government.

The latest anti-terrorist security regulations are those introduced by Homeland security, the US Department of Homeland Security, which for "security reasons" have imposed on 8 countries in North and Middle East Africa the putting in hold of all the electronic devices larger than a mobile phone. The eight countries involved, allies and partners of the United States, are: Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the Arab Emirates and Morocco.

The newly elected President Trump also signed 2 executive decrees that block the refugee reception program. The motivation lies in the fear of a possible terrorist attack. The administration has therefore denied from 29 January 2017, for 3 months, passengers also with a regular visa, from countries such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen.

This has caused chaos in airports all over the world and has raised a media fuss, as organizations that are fighting for the recognition of human rights have called for the immediate withdrawal of the 2 decrees. Trump reiterated that the decrees have the specific purpose of avoiding a new September 11 and remembers the attack on the twin Towers.

## Chapter 3

### “Radicalization and Deradicalization processes”

#### 3.1 Introductory remarks

Defining radicalization and deradicalization is very difficult, mostly because scholars cannot seem to agree on an exact definition of the two terms. For this purpose, many studies have been made. In general, “*radicalization is the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change*” – whereas deradicalization is “*the process of abandoning an extremist worldview and concluding that it is not acceptable to use violence to effect social change.*”<sup>88</sup> The above two terms differ from “*disengagement*” which is the “*process of changing one’s behavior by refraining from violence and withdrawing from a radical organization*”<sup>89</sup> - and can be of two types: “*conditional or selective*”, the first depends “*on receiving something in return*”<sup>90</sup> while the latter mainly depends on the variation of the degree of disengagement. This term, in turn differs from “*role change*” - “*the disengagement from terrorism of a person by not executing violent attacks even if that individual remains affiliated with the radical organization.*”<sup>91</sup>

Disengagement begins with a trigger, which in other words is a “*traumatic event or emotional crisis*”<sup>92</sup> that helps create a sense of doubt and mind-opening in an individual within a group. During this time, this individual evaluates his or her pros and cons upon exiting a radical organization or giving up an extremist viewpoint. Violence in this case, plays a significant role. Once inconsistency of an ideology or way of acting is brought up in the mind of a radical, he or she is now open to diverse ideas. This becomes a period of reflection, which not only leads the extremist but also the organization itself to eventually unravel.

To the extent of disengagement, there are some factors called “*push*” and others called “*pull*”<sup>93</sup> that have either negative or positive effects on the individual. The first are the negative ones, which encourage disengagement whereas the second ones are positive because they are attractive to the point of secluding the person away from a radical organization and/or group. Both of these then

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<sup>88</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 1-2 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book.

<sup>89</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 4-5 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book.

<sup>90</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 6 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book.

<sup>91</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 5-6 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book.

<sup>92</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 13-15 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book.

<sup>93</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 15 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book.

lead to “*exit barriers*”<sup>94</sup> – i.e. opinions that make the output from such an organization troublesome. These impediments are not the only things that can prevent an individual from disengaging, they can be influenced by “*membership, utility, costs and benefits*.”<sup>95</sup> Membership can bring protection, status gain within the group, needs met, sense of excitement, utility brings doubts on whether or not disengaging is beneficial and cost and benefits when materialized, allow the radical to reach a turning point and/or definitive decision.

After the turning point and definitive decision, the radical needs to develop a new identity and reintegrate him or herself into society. He or she needs to encourage a moderate behavior, get an employment and keep it and eventually be accepted again into society. If all of this occurs, the radical is less likely to reengage in violent behavior, conversely if this does not occur, and the radical has a sense of sympathy towards radical ideologies or former groups, recidivism is for sure going to increase. For this purpose, de-radicalization programs worldwide have been created and implemented. Their goal is “*to sway away the attitudes of an ex-radical and his or her family members, by providing them with financial and emotional support*.” A critical factor linked to this is the “*attitude of the community toward the former extremist*”<sup>96</sup> - in fact it is the de-radicalization programs’ responsibility to shape the point of views of society, in order to help the disengagement of the radical. To this extent, there is a level of commitment that has a great impact and important implications both for policymakers and former extremists. There are three types of commitments:

- 1) “Normative commitment: individuals who believe in a group’s ideology often feel a moral imperative to remain in a radical organization.”
- 2) “Affective commitment: is an emotional attachment to the other members of the organization and to the group itself.”
- 3) “Pragmatic commitment: refers to the practical factors that make it difficult to exit a group.”<sup>97</sup>

To this are linked different types of members within the extremist organizations:

- 1) “*Hard-core members*: are those who are deeply devoted to the group and/or group’s ideology, they have been present in the group for a long time and have participated in the planning and the execution of violent acts.
- 2) *Activists*: have also participated in violent acts but have not been within the group as long as others.
- 3) *New-comers*: are those who have been recently recruited and therefore have been within the group for a short time.
- 4) *Supporters*: those who are not fulltime members but are those who occasionally support and assist the radical group through funds, for example.

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<sup>94</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 16-17 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book.

<sup>95</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 17-20 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book.


<sup>96</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 20-25 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book.

<sup>97</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 24-25 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book.

- 5) *Sympathizers*: those who are not in the front line of the group’s violent acts, however, they identify with the ideology and goals of such radicals. They give passive assistance.”<sup>98</sup>

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**Figure 1.1**  
**Disengagement Trajectory of an Individual Exiting a Radical Organization**



RAND MG1053-1.1

### **3.2 THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS**

As previously stated, it is the process by which an extremist individual adopts a certain ideology and carries it out with violence and justifies the acts as methods to effect social change. It normally has three key components:

- 1) *“Motivation- The quest for significance*
- 2) *Group ideology*
- 3) *Social process- group dynamics of radicalization.”*<sup>100</sup>

The first factor is put at an individual level since it represents the individual’s motivation towards radicalization whereas group ideology is a factor that approaches the radicalization process at a cultural level, in the sense that it plays a key role in determining the individual’s choices. The third and last factor analyses radicalization at a social level, meaning that it considers group dynamics an important variable.

**Motivation** is often religious or political in nature and an example of such can be either the creation of a new Caliphate i.e ISIS or the removal of occupying forces in a specific territory (ex. Syria). Other reasons that may explain the motives behind terrorists and their acts can include honor, humiliation, revenge, social status etc. Whether the motives are driven by religious or political

<sup>98</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, *“Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists”*, 2010, pg. 25 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book.

<sup>99</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, *“Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists”*, 2010, pg. 12 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book.

<sup>100</sup> Prof. Dr. Arie W. Kruglanski, Mr. David Webber, *“The Psychology of Radicalization, 2002*, pg. 380-382, College Park, [www.zis-online.com](http://www.zis-online.com), PDF e-book.

nature or honor, revenge or other reasons, all of these have one key driving force, which is called “*the quest of significance*”.<sup>101</sup> It is the need for a person to matter to someone, to be someone of importance, to have self-esteem and respect. In order to gain such significance, three conditions must be identified:

- 1) “*Significance loss*: the individual feeling of insignificance which occurs through dishonor or shame.
- 2) *Psychological avoidance*: if humiliation occurs as a result of the individual’s group identity or membership, this feeling becomes a social identity significance loss, and an example can be the recent “Islamophobia” felt by Muslim immigrants to Europe or other host countries.
- 3) *Significance gain*: an incentive-gain, i.e the status of being a hero or martyr, the restoration of the fundamental human need to be important.”<sup>102</sup>

**Group ideology**, on the other hand, leaves a variety of means selection to the individual, through which he or she attains a goal. Such methods of goal achievement are not always unique and socially shared, however one can choose between various “*culturally-prescribed alternative means*”<sup>103</sup> that allows the individual to NOT BE radicalized (ex. becoming an actor, important doctor etc.). However, those few who are highly committed, violent extremism is an option often referred as culturally prescribed, in order to achieve significance. To this is linked a “*terrorism-justifying ideology*” – which gives specific instructions and how to-type methods to the person. Before explaining such theory, one must identify what an ideology is. According to Prof. Kruglanski, it is “*a collective belief system to which group members subscribe.*” Ideology and radicalization are related because the first pinpoints the radical endeavor as the chosen mean to the gaining of individual significance.

The **Terrorism-Justifying Ideology** is composed of three elements: grievance, culprit and method. Grievance is identified as a form of injustice suffered by the (radical) group, the ideology at this point blames an external group or person as responsible for such feeling, and yet tries to find a solution to the problem by cleansing the group’s dishonor. After finding both grievance and the person responsible, the next step of this theory is probably the most difficult, because it needs to find a “*moralization of terrorism and killing*”<sup>104</sup> –normally it is done through good rethoric and semantics. The first, sets the premises that may or may not imply the usage of violence against specific targets or may allow its usage given and under only certain circumstances. In this sense, the destruction of the group’s enemy is essential to avoid the “*inevitable perpetrated evil.*”<sup>105</sup> If approached semantically, this theory outcasts and labels the targets of violence as non-human while denying them human characteristics and considering them as destructive individuals to the group or society.

On this account, identifying these scapegoats is difficult because the distinction between enemy combatants and civilians is often unsustainable. It is fleeting because, civilians can be eventual combatants, and as such hold the responsibility of their governments’ actions and are not therefore

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<sup>101</sup> Prof. Dr. Arie W. Kruglanski, Mr. David Webber, “*The Psychology of Radicalization*”, 2002, pg. 380-382, College Park, [www.zis-online.com](http://www.zis-online.com), PDF e-book.

<sup>102</sup> Prof. Dr. Arie W. Kruglanski, Mr. David Webber, “*The Psychology of Radicalization*”, 2002, pg. 380-382, College Park, [www.zis-online.com](http://www.zis-online.com), PDF e-book.

<sup>103</sup> Prof. Dr. Arie W. Kruglanski, Mr. David Webber, “*The Psychology of Radicalization*”, 2002, pg. 382-383, College Park, [www.zis-online.com](http://www.zis-online.com), PDF e-book.

<sup>104</sup> Prof. Dr. Arie W. Kruglanski, Mr. David Webber, “*The Psychology of Radicalization*”, 2002, pg. 383, College Park, [www.zis-online.com](http://www.zis-online.com), PDF e-book.

<sup>105</sup> Prof. Dr. Arie W. Kruglanski, Mr. David Webber, “*The Psychology of Radicalization*”, 2002, pg. 383, College Park, [www.zis-online.com](http://www.zis-online.com), PDF e-book.

neutral and to some extent innocent; in other words this makes them perfect and legitimate targets. Whether semantically or rhetorically approached, the aim here is to portray a violent act as morally justifiable while giving importance to those who carry it out. When all this occurs, the individual then firmly believes that this mechanism has a likelihood of success. An example of this can be the success narratives given by terrorist propaganda, namely Osama Bin Laden's:

*“America is a great power possessed of tremendous military might and a wide-ranging economy, but all this is built on an unstable foundation which can be targeted, with special attention to its obvious weak spots, it will stumble, wither away and relinquish world leadership.”*<sup>106</sup>

Lastly, the **social process-group dynamics of radicalization**, are nevertheless important and related to radicalization because one does not commit to an ideology without social connections or group pressure. Because an ideology can be given as mutual and common truth, those who are devoted to it are willing to sacrifice their own lives for a “*bigger cause*”- they in other words are those who get influenced and socially pressured more easily. While individual decisions can be more settle, group ones may not, in fact their determination in acting violently will be more extreme. It is therefore important to have a deep understanding of group dynamics and how these networks give guidance to the individual along the road to radicalization in order to counter it and terrorism itself.

It is also important to distinguish between the vast variety of pathways to radicalization and understand that the above three ingredients are important to this process, but what is crucial to this are the various means of communication, media and recruiters. To start radicalization there needs to be the arousal of the quest for significance, which serves as a motivation for searching attention. This attention is found withing the ideology that one pursues and is one that needs a readressing. The Terrorism- Justifying Ideology in some cases may come first, then the social contat and then the person may or may not become radicalized. There is no specific order of events, however media exposure is a key variable. The process of radicalization thrives in an environment in which there is a shared sense of injustice real or perceived among the people, the nit intersects with the social dynamics of a person or group, lastly and only then may lead to violent acts and militancy. Media exposure as said above is important, because “*through video and audio recording, books, magazines, speeches on Internet and other sources, violent acts advocated and justified.*”<sup>107</sup>

The usage of such means is a relevant tool for the propaganda of terrorism. It seeks to de-humanize possible targets, reinforce bonds between the single person and group, mix emotional and rational point of views together to then enable the indoctrinated individual to resort to the only possible solution – that is violence- which is consequently transformed into an acceptable framework that redefines what is good and what is bad and justifies it. This process is then renamed “*violent radicalization*”.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Prof. Dr. Arie W. Kruglanski, Mr. David Webber, “*The Psychology of Radicalization*”, 2002, pg. 383, College Park, [www.zis-online.com](http://www.zis-online.com), PDF e-book.

<sup>107</sup> European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, “*Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism*”, 15 May 2008, p6. 16-17, Brussels, PDF e-book

<sup>108</sup> European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, “*Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism*”, 15 May 2008, pg. 16-18, Brussels, PDF e-book






Figure 2. A significance-quest model of radicalization.

### 3.3 ISLAMISM, ISLAMIC ACTIVISM OR VIOLENT EXTREMISM?

Islamism can be defined as a stream of the religion that is Islam, and to it are linked the different confrontational responses. These answers could be either political, missionary or jihadi, but before analyzing them, one should firstly understand the differences and distinguish between Shiite and Sunni Islamism. Shiite Islamism constitutes the minority of Islam whereas Sunni are roughly 80 per cent or over of Muslims worldwide. Being a minority and wanting to defend their own interests and more importantly their community's one, Shiites are more communal activists rather than violent and radical like their fellow Sunni counterparts. Their activism has remained unified for this purpose and also thanks to the leadership and political role of the religious authorities, also known as 'Ulamà.

Sunni Islamism, on the other hand, is viewed by Western powers as fundamentalist, radical and violent and as such it is divided into three types. It is also seen as "*political activism*"<sup>110</sup> - because some of its varieties seek power and give importance to this over religion. An example of this stream of Islam is the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and their affiliates in Jordan and Algeria.

<sup>109</sup> Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. B. Langer, Anna Sheveland, Malkanthi Hetiarachchi, Rohan Gunaratna, "*The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism*", 2014, pg. 79, Oxford-USA.

<sup>110</sup> International Crisis Group, "*Understanding Islamism - Middle East/North Africa Report N°37*", 2 March 2005, pg. 1-2, PDF e-book.

Another type of Sunni activism is missionary - hence its main goal is not power but the preservation of Muslim traditions and identity. The last type is Jihadi - or the armed struggle, which is in turn divided into three segments: "*internal (against unlawful muslim regimes), irredentist (fighting for a land occupied by foreigners), and lastly global (combating western powers).*"<sup>111</sup>

In essence, Islamic activism is the "*assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws or policies that are held to be Islamic in character*"<sup>112</sup> - but it is also a phenomenon that Western discourse has represented as intense violent actions within the context of the "war on terror" and while reacting to the devastating September 11, 2001 attacks. Islam as a religion, eventually became the central theme of political debates and is concerned more with law and governance in this sense, rather than the promotion of peace. The concept of "*political Islam*"<sup>113</sup> made its first appearance during the 1979 Iranian revolution, where an "*apolitical Islam*" was the main objective. During this period, many people strengthened the ranks of fundamentalism, considered to be the real answer and form of opposition to the regimes that had occurred over time, united by a social strain and to encourage the spread of fundamentalist and revolutionary ideas, was the presence within the movement of various social components belonging to the middle class but also farmer.

In fact, during "*Mohammad Shah's last regime (1919-1980), millions of people have been torn from the country side to carry out social reforms launched at the time, with the consequence of generating the continuous repression of political and religious dissent.*"<sup>114</sup> This was possible until opposing the regime were many, including the movement that has managed thus far and more effectively to appear in the eyes of the people as a jihadist organization that defended the Iranian Umma (community) was the fundamentalist group led morally by *Khomeini*<sup>115</sup> (1902-1989).

Political Islam as a concept appeared to be a threat only when its politics began to have anti-western perspectives. When it is jihadi based, two concepts must be further developed and their actors underlined. The first is called "*Al-Salafiyya al Jihadiyya*"<sup>116</sup> - a current of political Islam composed by radicalized people but who have discarded violent actions when promoting their activism whereas the second is called "*Al-Qutbiyyin*" - another current of political Islam composed of those whom were influenced by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb's (Egyptian activist) radical thought of waging violence or in better words Jihad towards local regimes before waging it globally. The main actors in both of the currents are the "Jihadis" - people who promote activism through acts of violence, believing it is rightful and a mere military defence to safeguard the "Dar al-Islam"(house of Islam-area under Muslim rule) and the Umma (community)" from those considered as infedels and thus enemies.

An important factor is the mixture of these two currents, which led to Osama Bin Laden's creation of his Al-Qaeda network. The consequence is that Islamic political movements agree that there is no one straightforward definition to what an "*Islamic State*" really is and is not even found within

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<sup>111</sup> International Crisis Group, "*Understanding Islamism - Middle East/North Africa Report N°37*", 2 March 2005, pg. 1, PDF e-book.

<sup>112</sup> International Crisis Group, "*Understanding Islamism - Middle East/North Africa Report N°37*", 2 March 2005, pg. 2, PDF e-book.

<sup>113</sup> International Crisis Group, "*Understanding Islamism - Middle East/North Africa Report N°37*", 2 March 2005, pg. 2-3, PDF e-book.

<sup>114</sup> Stefano D'Auria, "*Il terrorismo Islamista Il terrorismo Islamista: Dalle origini allo stato Islamico - strategie e normative di contrasto*", pg. 93, PDF.

<sup>115</sup> Stefano D'Auria, "*Il terrorismo Islamista Il terrorismo Islamista: Dalle origini allo stato Islamico - strategie e normative di contrasto*", pg. 94, PDF.

<sup>116</sup> International Crisis Group, "*Understanding Islamism - Middle East/North Africa Report N°37*", 2 March 2005, pg. 4-5, PDF e-book

the Holy Qur'an. However, they do agree that it can be expressed in different forms, in fact in order to do so the followers of such currents and ideologies have dropped slogans which were previously favored in such a way as to dissociate from the violence concept that is intrinsic to Islamic fundamentalism. This disruption led to the breaking of fundamentalist thoughts, the abandonment of the project of creating the Islamic State ("*Al-Dawla Al-Islamiyya*"), while emphasizing the "*demand for justice (al-Adala) and freedom (al-Hurriyya)*".<sup>117</sup>

The key to this is based on insistence of the Shari'a (Islamic Law) while playing an important role in political agendas. To this are linked two key factors: the "*need for itjihad (intellectual effort of interpretation) and the need for deliberation and deliberative instances that will represent the community (i.e assemblies and parliaments) while enforcing law*".<sup>118</sup>

Another amplifying factor of fundamentalist ideas and an historical occasion, is that of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. This attack was seen as an onset towards the "*Dar Al-Isam, and so a jihad was summoned by the 'Ulamà.*"<sup>119</sup> It was initially financed by the rich monarchs of Saudi Arabia and by U.S Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in order to officially destroy the local military stations of the Red Army in Kabul (capital of Afghanistan). This "holy war", namely Afghani jihad, had a decisive role in the evolution of Islamic fundamentalism on a global scale. Abdallah Azzam, Islamic scholar, ideologically prepared the "*mujaheddin*"<sup>120</sup> while the U.S and Pakistan's secret services (ISI) offered their financial and military support. The important figure, however, was Osama Bin Laden, who coordinated the whole operations and next to him was the Egyptian pediatrician, *Al-Zawahiri*. This phase was ideal for the global jihad to mature and evolve, but nevertheless it was also a period in which there were many and the first ideological contrasts. "*Azzam was convinced that the commitment of the mujaheddin was not supposed to stop after the battle against the Soviets, but should have gone on, up until becoming a global clash with the jahiliyya (pre-islamic contexts, those muslim environments that act differently from what the fondamentalist call the pure and authentic islamic message.*"<sup>121</sup>

Therefore, 1979 was a major and important year that allows us to understand the evolution of jihad and its concept as "holy war". Its important for different reasons, them being:

- 1) "*the commitment in battle of the mujaheddin, the outside help and favorable political conditions.*
- 2) *Azzam's death which led to the leaderships of Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri.*
- 3) *the disintegration of the Soviet empire, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, which helped the Ummah to include further communities.*"<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> International Crisis Group, "*Understanding Islamism - Middle East/North Africa Report N°37*", 2 March 2005, pg. 6-7, PDF e-book

<sup>118</sup> International Crisis Group, "*Understanding Islamism - Middle East/North Africa Report N°37*", 2 March 2005, pg. 7, PDF e-book

<sup>119</sup> Stefano D'Auria, "*Il terrorismo Islamista Il terrorismo Islamista: Dalle origini allo stato Islamico - strategie e normative di contrasto*", pg. 95, PDF.

<sup>120</sup> Stefano D'Auria, "*Il terrorismo Islamista Il terrorismo Islamista: Dalle origini allo stato Islamico - strategie e normative di contrasto*", pg. 95, PDF.

<sup>121</sup> Stefano D'Auria, "*Il terrorismo Islamista Il terrorismo Islamista: Dalle origini allo stato Islamico - strategie e normative di contrasto*", pg. 96, PDF.

<sup>122</sup> Stefano D'Auria, "*Il terrorismo Islamista Il terrorismo Islamista: Dalle origini allo stato Islamico - strategie e normative di contrasto*", pg. 96, PDF.

### 3.3.a. SHIITE ISLAMISM

Despite being a minority, Shiites have remained integrated and has not been divided into “*separate political, missionary and jihadi forms of activism*”<sup>123</sup>; this is due to the political role and practice of itjihad (interpretation of the scriptures) of the ‘Ulama. In this stream of Islam, there are 3 variants: “*Zaydis, Ismailis and Twelvers*”. In present day, the Twelvers are the largest and practice “*political quietism*” while the Zaydis and Ismailis established Islamic states according to their doctrines. The twelvers, however, are considered to be the (religious) authorities, within the shiite community, since they are tolerated by their Sunni counterparts also due to their political uninvolvedness.

Although being politically quiet, Shiites are communal when it comes to political activism. In fact, in Gulf States, Lebanon and Pakistan it is the basis of their activism, besides their numerical majority. In Lebanon, for example the population started to mobilize in 1970, while denouncing social deprivation and under the leadership of Musa Sadr, which then “*culminated in the establishment of Hizbollah (disciplined movement that tried to emulate Iran’s Islamic rule, free Lebanon from Israeli presence and eventually destroy Israel).*”<sup>124</sup> Another important political representation that they had was in Iraq (1960) through the Baath party, which unfortunately escalated to a profound transformation due to the loss of representation of dictatorial nature and the Iranian Revolution’s impact, its opposition was then “*the clandestine party Al-Da’wa*”<sup>125</sup>, which resorted more often than not to violence.

In regards to this, Shiite communalist politics tried to embrace modernist ideas of pluralism, equal rights, citizenship dissociated from religious identity, while avoiding the exhibition of sectarian behaviour towards who are not part of the Shiite community. They resort to “*violent sectarianism*”<sup>126</sup> only when they are under attack. Their doctrine is called “*Vilayet-e-Faqih (government of the Islamic Jurist), which is a necessity and its authoritarian powers are entrusted to a man qualified enough to practice the Shari’a. This man is the “jurist- faqih”, who has the most important qualities for this role, them being: “full knowledge of the law, and practice of total justice during law execution.*”<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> International Crisis Group, “*Understanding Islamism - Middle East/North Africa Report N°37*”, 2 March 2005, pg. 18, PDF e-book

<sup>124</sup> International Crisis Group, “*Understanding Islamism - Middle East/North Africa Report N°37*”, 2 March 2005, pg. 21, PDF e-book

<sup>125</sup> International Crisis Group, “*Understanding Islamism - Middle East/North Africa Report N°37*”, 2 March 2005, pg. 21, PDF e-book

<sup>126</sup> International Crisis Group, “*Understanding Islamism - Middle East/North Africa Report N°37*”, 2 March 2005, pg. 22-23, PDF e-book

<sup>127</sup> International Crisis Group, “*Understanding Islamism - Middle East/North Africa Report N°37*”, 2 March 2005, pg. 22-23, PDF e-book

### **3.4 THE DERADICALIZATION PROCESS**

The deradicalization process is both the method “*how individuals or groups abandon extremist groups and ideologies and the process of moderating one’s belief.*”<sup>128</sup> However, the term also refers to those types of programs whose primary actors are detainees or prisoners and the ultimate goal of such procedures is to persuade them into not using violence and deradicalize future terrorists, by reversing their extremist ideology. An important distinction within the process must be made, and that is that of the concept of “*disengagement, which is the process whereby an individual experiences a change in role or function that is usually associated with a reduction of violent participation.*”<sup>129</sup> The programmes are run by governmental agencies and operate firstly on an ideological level, assisted by Islamic clerics (hence radicalization and de-radicalization are most often than not linked to this religion) in order to convey the message that the usage of violence against unarmed civilians is against the Qur’an and its teachings. The clerics are in charge of having a “*religious dialogue with the prisoners or detainees making moral arguments the means of significance gain.*”<sup>130</sup> This denies terrorists’ claims that violent acts are useful for a victory.

A further important note, before talking about the various and ambitious programmes throughout the world needs to be made, and that is that of “*explicit and implicit deradicalization*”<sup>131</sup> - which the former’s goals are direct pursuits of the terrorism justifying ideologies of the detainees and the latter focus more on the detainees’ emotions and wishes. Explicit deradicalization demands a religious dialogue on a correct interpretation of the Islamic teachings whereas implicit deradicalization gives “*vocational courses*”<sup>132</sup> for the reintegration into society of the detainees. In order to do so, family members, relatives and friends may be involved within the process, so they will convince the detainees to not engage in violent acts nor ideologies.

In addition to the “*loss of ideological appeal, which happens at the micro (first and individual level)*”<sup>133</sup> - also the “*intellectual doubt*” is a key variable which is amplified by exposing the detainees to different standpoints either through books, media or other affiliates to the group, making this factor a meso (group) one. After the individual and group levels, comes the societal (or macro) level, to which usually the prison environment is linked and is helpful in creating the ideal situation for deradicalization or in other words give a “clean slate” to the former extremists.

However, in order to start the process of deradicalization, a few and important steps must be

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<sup>128</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 1-5 chapter 1, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>129</sup> John Horgan & Kurt Braddock, “*Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs*”, 2010, Pennsylvania, USA, PDF e-book.

<sup>130</sup> Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. B. langer, Anna Sheveland, Malkanthi Hetiarachchi, Rohan Gunaratna, “*The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism*”, 2014, pg. 84-85, Oxford-USA.

<sup>131</sup> Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. B. langer, Anna Sheveland, Malkanthi Hetiarachchi, Rohan Gunaratna, “*The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism*”, 2014, pg. 87, Oxford-USA.


<sup>132</sup> Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. B. langer, Anna Sheveland, Malkanthi Hetiarachchi, Rohan Gunaratna, “*The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism*”, 2014, pg. 88, Oxford-USA.

<sup>133</sup> Bertjan Doosje, Fathali M. Moghaddam, Arie W. Kruglanski, Arjan de Wolf, Liesbeth Mann, Allard R. Feddes, “*Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization*”, 2016, Amsterdam and Washington, DC, USA, pg. 82, PDF e-book.

mentioned and those are:

- 1) **“Shield of Resilience”**<sup>134</sup>: a sort of defense against persuasion of ant-radical thoughts external to the group. In order for de-radicalization to start, this shield needs to fall apart.
- 2) **Sensitivity**: in which the “quest for significance” (as discussed earlier) is involved along with “*personal uncertainty*” which is caused by an individual sense of uncertainty be it in the workfield, at home or among friends and family and is only reduced by the sense of belonging to a specific group with clear norms and values.
- 3) **Group membership**: in which “*mutual commitment*”<sup>135</sup> is essential, the individual starts at the margins and then through loyalty becomes an official member because he or she has bonded or had special ties with other affiliates. Their proof of loyalty is shown through “*initiation rituals*”, which often demand the breaking of family ties and friendships that are either contrary to the ideology or values of the group or just simply do not belong to it.
- 4) **Action**: to this is linked the “*confrontation with death of a relative*” which helps the former extremist to better plan an attack in the sense that he or she does not withdraw out of fear. In order to avoid such withdrawal and to prepare for violence, group leaders demand that individuals make a testament via media or by a written document.

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The (de)radicalization process and its determinants. From Doosje, De Wolf, Mann and Feddes [18].

<sup>134</sup> Bertjan Doosje, Fathali M. Moghaddam, Arie W. Kruglanski, Arjan de Wolf, Liesbeth Mann, Allard R. Feddes, “*Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization*”, 2016, Amsterdam and Washington, DC, USA, pg. 82, PDF e-book.

<sup>135</sup> Bertjan Doosje, Fathali M. Moghaddam, Arie W. Kruglanski, Arjan de Wolf, Liesbeth Mann, Allard R. Feddes, “*Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization*”, 2016, Amsterdam and Washington, DC, USA, pg. 82, PDF e-book.

<sup>136</sup> Bertjan Doosje, Fathali M. Moghaddam, Arie W. Kruglanski, Arjan de Wolf, Liesbeth Mann, Allard R. Feddes, “*Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization*”, 2016, Amsterdam and Washington, DC, USA, pg. 80, PDF e-book.

A further important note is that of “*collective and individual*”<sup>137</sup> deradicalization. Collective deradicalization is a group process by definition, and differs from individual deradicalization in so many ways. There is a “*process of negotiation*” to handle, in which a strong leader needs to rethink and convince others to withdraw from the group and the extremist ideology based on an incorrect religious dialogue or interpretation of its teachings. After this process, comes “*peer pressure and social networks*”, two factors that allow a weighing of the costs and benefits of disengagement vs. continued violent acts and a continuous moral questioning. Then comes a “*turning point*”<sup>138</sup>, in which the leaders of the group are those who decide to exit or not and the rest just follow through. On the other hand individual deradicalization, is by definition a single handed process. A person works by him or herself to exit from an extremist group, but their withdrawal decision is extremely difficult to take.

Other important factors that allow either collective or individual deradicalization are: “*international context, the impact of demonstration effects, the growing level of counterterrorism cooperation among states, state repression and a strategic crisis.*”<sup>139</sup> The demonstration effects have a two course of action: the first happens when a starter group is deradicalized other groups follow their same path, while disapproving what was once a shared ideology (this is called “*intergroup demonstration effect*”<sup>140</sup>) – the second action happens when deradicalization programmes are successfully run by the government and are an encouragement for other states to adopt the same methods (“*interstate demonstration effect*”<sup>141</sup>). Whereas state repression is fundamental and enables deradicalization because it disables a safe haven and increases the possibility of an extremist or a radicalized person to question his or her commitment to the act of violence and see if it is effectively bringing any benefit to him or herself or in general. Lastly, a strategic crisis happens when the former extremist questions everything, from ideology to action planning.

In essence, individual and collective deradicalization are complementary to each other, but even if they differ in circumstances or methods and possibly collective is more efficient because it involves a larger number of people, they are both ideal methods of countering terrorism or Islamic extremism.

Since the process of deradicalization has been explained in a thorough manner, it is also important to understand how it is applied in the world, particularly Europe and the Middle East. For this purpose, two countries have been chosen as case studies, namely United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia.

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<sup>137</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 159 chapter 6, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>138</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 159-166 chapter 6, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>139</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 160-161 chapter 6, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>140</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 160 chapter 6, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>141</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 160 chapter 6, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

### 3.4.a. UNITED KINGDOM'S DERADICALIZATION PROGRAMME:

The United Kingdom implemented for the first time their deradicalization programme (which stems from a counterterrorism strategy) after the July 7, 2005 bombings in London. This programme is called “**CONTEST**”<sup>142</sup> and is divided into four major steps: PREVENT (prevention of terrorism and radicalization by exposing the factors), PURSUE (search for terrorists and their sponsors), PROTECT (protection of the public and the government) and lastly PREPARE (preparation for eventual consequences of an attack). It partners with local police, NGOs and other government agencies in the face of the threat of radical Islamism, prevents violent extremism from spreading and gives priority to a short-term goal of “*reducing this immediate security threat.*”<sup>143</sup> The first component of CONTEST, is aimed at supporting those who approve an extremist and violent ideology, by creating imam (“*the person who leads the prayer in a mosque*”<sup>144</sup>) advisory boards and idealing forums that talk about Islamophobia and extremism. The second step is aimed at preventing further radicalization in mosques, schools, prisons, community centers or worse the Internet. The Protect phase of CONTEST aims at giving full support to those individuals who are vulnerable to extremist ideas by giving them mentorship and training in countering radicalism. The last phase, i.e Prepare, aims at making local communities resilient to this extremism and violence, while also bringing some Muslim leaders to moderation and enhancing the empowerment of the younger muslims, be them men or women.

To CONTEST, another programme is involved and linked; its name is “**CHANNEL PROJECT**”<sup>145</sup>, a programme based in local communities, which while relying on police and local authorities tries to identify those who are becoming radicalized and tries to redirect them towards the right track. In order to do so, the project relies on the guidance of local authorities that eventually may or may not include the intervention of friends and family of the suspected individual. Considering the fact that U.K.’s goal in terms of security and facing violent Islamic (in this case) extremism is to counter the radical message behind the ideology, there needs to be a means of communication that is both secure and effective, this is the purpose of the “**RICU** (*Research, Information and Communications Unit*)”<sup>146</sup>. It is an institution that develops and implements a “strategic communication component” of the second and renewed version of CONTEST; which is called “**CONTEST-2.**” The RICU observes the general audience in detail, trying to understand its demographics and attitudes that may lead to violent extremism. They evaluate the state, the media means used and tries in the end to influence the audience and encourage the non-use of violence.

CONTEST-2 on the other hand, has a different approach. Its goal is to assert point of views that fail to support violence while still respecting the law, but are rejecting the common values that make up a community and its cohesion. Although it tries to work alone, it cannot run everything and be

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<sup>142</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 124 chapter 5, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>143</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 124-125 chapter 5, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>144</sup> <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/imam>

<sup>145</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 126 chapter 5, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>146</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 127 chapter 5, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book



effective by itself, therefore having partners (possibly Muslim) is the better option for a greater outcome. It partners with “*mainstream Muslim organizations*” for fundings. One of these is the “*Progressive British Muslims organization*”, which made its appearance in July 2005 after the London bombings, to give voice to British Muslims who felt unrepresented. It works with local authorities to fight extremism and promote integration under the values of “*equality, freedom of speech, respect of all faiths, human rights and democracy.*”<sup>147</sup>

There are other British deradicalization programmes that are implemented or have started to be. These are: “*British Muslim Forum, Sufi Muslim Council, Faith Matters and lastly Quillam foundation.*”<sup>148</sup> The first is a small group which started out in March 2005 and gives voice to Sunni Islam, (a branch of Islam in which “*Sufism, the esoteric or mystical dimension of Islam*”<sup>149</sup> is found) as well as collaborating with local authorities in banning the organizations that either promote violence and prejudice. The Sufi Muslim Council, on the other hand, is an organization that was implemented by the British government itself in July 2006. Its goal is to make peace between the traditional Islamic scholarship and contemporary society, while providing methods useful to this purpose and denouncing terrorism. It works mostly on the ideology and educating British policymakers. Faith Matters, instead, fights radicalization thanks to the efforts of “*Fiyaz Mughal, deputy president of the Liberal Democrat Party*”<sup>150</sup> in the United Kingdom.

Lastly, the **Quilliam foundation** is most likely the most important counter-radicalization programmes in the U.K after CONTEST and CONTEST-2. Its base is in London and was established by Ed Husain and Maajid Nawaz, “*two former affiliates of the Hizb Al-Tahrir (Party of Liberation, a non-violent political party*<sup>151</sup>).” It researches, trains and provides outreach activities as alternatives to Islamism as a political ideology. The foundation started off in 2007, and another of its goals was that of developing a Muslim identity in the West. Its work has various steps that allow a counter extremism approach, and these are:

- 1) “*Media activities*: broadcasting articles in the British media
- 2) “*Training*: trains national and local government personnel via workshops as well as training the U.S department of Homeland Security on being aware of radicalization.
- 3) “*Work in academic institutions*: usually done in higher education institutions.
- 4) “*Community events*: could be morning sessions with local imams, then afternoon ones with teachers, politicians and police. They are gatherings in which issues such as terrorism, Islamic State, Muslims in politics etc. are tackled.
- 5) “*Debating Islamists*: the foundation’s staff members start off public debates with Islamists.”<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 127 chapter 5, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>148</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 130 chapter 5, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>149</sup> <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sufism>

<sup>150</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 131 chapter 5, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>151</sup> <https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/hizb-ut-tahrir>

<sup>152</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 132-133 chapter 5, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

To involve participants or future members, the foundation relies heavily on the narratives provided by its staff. Their stories have highlighted the importance and role of “*counter-narratives*”<sup>153</sup> – which try to make the process of deradicalization as normal as possible for the adherents. This allows a rethinking of both commitment and ideology. Other important factors that allow Quilliam as a foundation to be effective in combatting violent extremism and promote change, are: “*theology, open dialogue, appearance, funding, positive role of the Internet.*”<sup>154</sup> The first provides highlights on the mistakes made by the Islamist movements, and is useful to former extremists as a start of their deradicalization. Secondly, the open dialogue permits the “*overcoming of prejudices*”<sup>155</sup> and gives a sense of security to the individuals. Great emphasis is put on being heard and giving out different yet valid standpoints. Then comes appearance, refers to the physical type – hence not conforming to the traditional Muslim dress by the foundation’s staff while appearing in media, was a factor fundamental to the building of trust between the staff and former extremists. Although, the traditional dress does develop their identity in reference to Britain’s secularism, the dress does not make the priest or in this case the imam- in the sense that “*beliefs and worship should be conducted in private*” and not to be seen as starters of extremism. Funding, on the other hand, firstly came from the private sector up to 2011, and was seen as a negative characteristic by those vulnerable to radicalization. Lastly, is the importance and positive role of the Internet, its platforms if used correctly are an important gathering point of information that can promote a different point of view than that of violence and extremism. Giving importance to its rightful usage, the Internet and its resources may diminish “*the chance of having an identity crisis, which often acts as a catalyst towards extremism.*”<sup>156</sup>

Although, opposed to Middle Eastern programmes and deradicalization approaches, the United Kingdom’s one should and may guide us all to a much more clear prevention planning and strategy development, but can only happen if those who put their efforts in researching and tackling the radicalization phenomenon, are able to find the factors that start it off and give specific advice when it comes to taking action and “political” decision making.

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<sup>153</sup> Ruth Manning, Courtney La Bau, “*In and Out of Extremism- How Quilliam Helped 10 Former Far-right and Islamists Change*”, August 2015, pg. 27, United Kingdom, Quilliam Foundation, PDF e-book.

<sup>154</sup> Ruth Manning, Courtney La Bau, “*In and Out of Extremism- How Quilliam Helped 10 Former Far-right and Islamists Change*”, August 2015, pg. 27-34, United Kingdom, Quilliam Foundation, PDF e-book.

<sup>155</sup> Ruth Manning, Courtney La Bau, “*In and Out of Extremism- How Quilliam Helped 10 Former Far-right and Islamists Change*”, August 2015, pg. 27-34, United Kingdom, Quilliam Foundation, PDF e-book.

<sup>156</sup> Ruth Manning, Courtney La Bau, “*In and Out of Extremism- How Quilliam Helped 10 Former Far-right and Islamists Change*”, August 2015, pg. 32-33, United Kingdom, Quilliam Foundation, PDF e-book.

### **3.4.b. THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA'S DERADICALIZATION PROGRAMME:**

After 9/11, Saudi Arabia has started off its deradicalization programme for suspected terrorists and Islamist militants. While similar to European programmes in terms of goals, it differs in terms of approaches. To firstly fight domestic insurgency after the attacks on the compounds in May 2003 in Riyadh (Saudi Arabian Capital), the Kingdom implemented some security measures besides its counter-terrorism methods. These measures aimed at deligitimizing those wrong interpretations of the Qu'ran and its teachings. For this purpose, the "*Saudi Arabian Counseling Program*"<sup>157</sup> was established and aimed for a behavioral change through many means, some of them being open dialogue and sociologically and psychologically intervening. The programme begins to operate in a more structured and formal way, rather than U.K's one. It is organized this way because it is coordinated by the "*third-highest ranked official of the Ministry of the Interior, Prince Muhammed Bin Nayef*."<sup>158</sup> The program's first goal is the reintergration of individuals within society after they have abandoned violent extremism and its ideology. Those who are eligible to participate in this program are even those who carried out an attack with success; however they are not granted early release from the deradicalization program as for those who have committed "minor" crimes.

The Counseling Program is divided into four subcommittees, which are of the religious, psychological and social, security, media realms. The first is clearly formed by clerics or "*religious experts*" that use open dialogue as a method of persuasion for deradicalization, while also talking about the participants' past experiences and how they interpret the Qu'ran. The second subcommittee, is formed by psychologists and sociologists that work together in evaluating either the psychological problems (real or suspected) of the participants and assert their family needs by counseling them, while the former extremists are detained. The security subcommittee is in charge of "*monitoring detainees during and after their participation*."<sup>159</sup> It allows avoidance and repetition of errors in the future, while questioning how and when the participants got into trouble. The last subcommittee, i.e the media, is in charge of the role and rightful usage of the internet means that are made available to the participants. The most important subcommittee above all, is the religious one, since it treats the participants as victims rather than offenders and for this purpose it tries to provide a better explanation of the Islamic teachings to them.

To further implement this program, a six-week workshop program was developed. It involves two clerics and a social scientist that collaborate with around twenty participants. Within this workshop topics of discussion may vary from "*loyalty to rules of jihad*."<sup>160</sup> After the end of the program there is an examination as well as a psychological one. If the participants pass either ones they are reintegrated within society and go on to the "*aftercare phase*." At this point they enter a rehabilitation facility called the "*Care Rehabilitation Center (CRC)*." It is paradise for detainees, since they have access to everything from fresh air to art therapy. It is a better opportunity as opposed to deradicalization programs in prison and an "extension of the six-week workshop." Aside from the detainees who participate in the program, their friends and families are also recruited from the program's staff in the hope that they will be a helping hand in the deradicalization process of the detainees. However, if there is a fallback to violence and extremism from the supposed deradicalized participant, the family and the friends are held accountable, both on a social and

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<sup>157</sup> John Horgan, Kurt Braddock, "*Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs*", 2010, pg. 276, Pennsylvania, USA, PDF e-book.

<sup>158</sup> John Horgan, Kurt Braddock, "*Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs*", 2010, pg. 277, Pennsylvania, USA, PDF e-book.

<sup>159</sup> John Horgan, Kurt Braddock, "*Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs*", 2010, pg. 277, Pennsylvania, USA, PDF e-book.

<sup>160</sup> John Horgan, Kurt Braddock, "*Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs*", 2010, pg. 278, Pennsylvania, USA, PDF e-book.

financial level.

The Counseling Program of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia works with different methods in order to promote deradicalization amongst the people and throughout the entire country. Its main method, works around the concept of “*benevolence*”<sup>161</sup>, meaning that staff members presume that the supposed extremist and then detainee was previously “abused, lied to and misled” and as a consequence resorted to violence, while also abandoning “*the correct path.*” To implement such concept, former detainees became part of the Advisory committee, allowing more legitimacy to be promoted and shown by the programme. In the face of such practice, high importance is given to the detainee’s “*social and practical needs.*” For starters, if the prisoner was he who provided financially for the family, the committee gives an “*alternative salary*”<sup>162</sup> to his family members, then if he had children to take care of, schooling and health care are needs that are also provided. All this provision is aimed at implementing deradicalization and preventing “further radicalization.”

Support and aftercare continue to be implemented and given even after the detainee’s release. Further assistance is given also for finding jobs, cars, housing and other benefits. One benefit can be the employment in the government or in the private sector or even the regaining of one’s job. The committee provides training programmes that aside from enabling deradicalization, also allow those who are released to start their own businesses, funded obviously by the government. Another important note, is that along with the continuous support to both detainee and his family members, if there is an important event be it a wedding or funeral at least and the special release is granted as a “leave” – at least three of the relatives need to guarantee the return to the program, the center or prison. “*If the detainee on leave does not return, one of the three guarantors must take his place.*”<sup>163</sup>

Furthermore, since the Counseling programme is divided into subcommittees and the most important is the religious one – a factor that helps in recruiting the staff members particularly clerics, is “*communication style*”<sup>164</sup> which does not have to in any way whatsoever be one-sided as if one is the professor and the detainee is the student. It needs to be comprehensive, “*motivated by love, compassion and a drive*” that will help and allow the deradicalization process to start for the detainee. The style must be executed in this way in order to provide further legitimacy to both the program and the Saudi government, which are often seen as a form of punishment rather than alternative by the general public.

To ensure further legitimacy, there needs to be more involvement of the family members, both during and after the program. Therefore, what the program tries to convey is that getting involved with terrorists and firmly believing to anything they say or view as truthful is wrong and that will only have tragic consequences. This whole process is not meant to be an “*interrogation nor an*

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<sup>161</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 66-67 chapter 3, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>162</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 66-67 chapter 3, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>163</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 67-68 chapter 3, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>164</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 68-69 chapter 3, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

*investigation,*”<sup>165</sup> these two are different procedures that take place in the period before the insertion into the program of deradicalization and are done in order to evaluate the individual who is supposedly or it is certain that is an extremist.

Upon completion of the program and passing of the final exam, the last verdict for release is left to Saudi officials who are part of the Security subcommittee and are also responsible of monitoring those released in order to prevent re-radicalization and the spread of violence and terror through attacks. Although being often criticized by the general public, the Saudi Arabian Deradicalization Program is one of the strongest programme in the Middle East. It has “*an eighty percent success rate and a twenty-percent failure rate*”<sup>166</sup> which is characterized mainly by the refusal of the detainees to commit and participate in the program or after being released were rearrested. The success rates are very high because those who have been released upon successful passing of the examination and firm belief of non-reengagement to violent extremism, were merely “*supporters of terrorism*”<sup>167</sup> and not terrorists themselves. Those closer to the extremist belief for security purposes have not been released.

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<sup>165</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 72-73 chapter 3, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>166</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 76-77 chapter 3, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

<sup>167</sup> Angel Rabas, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Chez, Christopher Boucek, “*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*”, 2010, pg. 76-77 chapter 3, Santa Monica (CA), Rand Corporation, PDF e-book

## Chapter 4

### “Strategies of counter-terrorism”

#### 4.1 Introductory remarks

Countering terrorism and its forms is not an easy task, for this purpose strategies and enforcement regulations have been implemented by Western and Middle Eastern states. Today’s terrorism is a very different phenomenon from those of the past or from others still existing and widespread at the local level; which is characterized by innovative and modern methods of attack and propaganda, which are creating many problems for the states’ intelligence agencies, especially when they are facing attacks by small groups or individuals. The most immediate answer is the closure of borders, the expression of nationalist attitudes and of xenophobia (fear of the stranger) and racism towards an entire category of people. This solution, however, can hardly be resolute and, indeed, marks the factual victory of the terrorists: to lessen the climate of peace and freedom that has dominated in the past seventy years in the West, exploiting an indistinct hatred for Muslims (in this case), as a weapon to create a new rift between the Islamic World and the West.

Despite this, what is peculiar is the “*strategic genetics*,”<sup>168</sup> i.e the preparation of forces and defense planning. To it is linked the “*strategic culture*,”<sup>169</sup> which represents the way in which states face a threat and the related problems it entails, such as those affecting decisions and by their nature substract themselves from any compromise or negotiation. When it comes to conflict or terrorism one must take into account their “*logic of utility and identity*”<sup>170</sup>. The first comprises the evaluation of the costs and benefits while the second includes the principles and the basic values and consequently precedes the logic of utility. The strategic field is linked to politics, and the strategy must be reinvented according to the threat that arises. The strategy in this case, military, is more influenced by human sciences (“*soft politics*”) than from the technological (“*hard politics*”) ones and works on the will of the adversary, either directly or indirectly. In a direct way, the “*diplomacy of violence*” is used, that is intimidating or coercing the adversary whereas indirectly, it leverages on the “*partial destruction of the opposing forces*”<sup>171</sup> in order to induce them to surrender.

For this purpose, a definition of what a strategy is, needs to be given. It is the “*logic of action*”<sup>172</sup> – and in military terms it comprises different types of politics such as: security, defense, military politics (“*Grand Strategy*”) and the operational strategy (“*Grand Tactic*”). While connecting politics, it defines the aims of the conflict or attack, whereas “*tactics*”<sup>173</sup>, which differ from what strategy is, concern and guide combat and military maneuvers. The success rate of a strategy lies in knowing how to evaluate costs, benefits and above all the forces (military and non) and those of the enemy, in this way the available resources are used to attack for defense or to fall back. Political decision-making in the strategic sphere varies according to circumstances. If they are more durable operations over time, the range of military and response maneuvers is extended, if it lasts less it shrinks.

There are of course, different types of strategies including:

- 1) “operational

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<sup>168</sup> Carlo Jean, “*Guerra, strategia e sicurezza*”, 1997, pg. 34

<sup>169</sup> Carlo Jean, “*Guerra, strategia e sicurezza*”, 1997, pg. 35

<sup>170</sup> Carlo Jean, “*Guerra, strategia e sicurezza*”, 1997, pg. 36-37

<sup>171</sup> Carlo Jean, “*Guerra, strategia e sicurezza*”, 1997, pg. 37-39

<sup>172</sup> Carlo Jean, “*Guerra, strategia e sicurezza*”, 1997, pg. 65

<sup>173</sup> Carlo Jean, “*Guerra, strategia e sicurezza*”, 1997, pg. 66-67

- 2) logistics
- 3) organic or social
- 4) psychological
- 5) technological”<sup>174</sup>

Operational strategies regard battles and those military schemes and are implemented in succession, due to the vast breadth of firearms and ammunitions used in response to a threat or to enemy fire. In regards to logistics, there is a further type called “*Grand Logistics*” – in reference to the massive weapons production capacity and has nothing to do with the supply and support of the forces in conflict or under threat. The organic or social dimension of a strategy is as important as the rest, but refers to the duty and patriotic sentiment of the individual as well as the involvement of everyone who voluntary choose to take up arms for defensive purposes.

The psychological dimension is important when tackling the concept of consensus, which is the main goal of propaganda. Without an individual’s consent it cannot exist nor can it spread amongst a population as an ideology. The technological strategy goes hand in hand with the psychological one, due to the impressive spread of scientific and technological development. It is no coincidence that the general public is easy to scare when it comes to threats from nuclear weapons or terrorist attacks due to explosive devices. Despite all these typologies the common feature is that they put the internal politics first and then the external or international politics at the center of their methods or decisions. Internal politics are determined by the convergence of military, political and institutional forces – in the sense that the State itself does not have complete monopoly over a territory or an individual like it would have had in the past. The current counter-terrorism strategy, in fact needs to take into consideration the opinions and then decisions of “*international forces, religions, multinational companies and of course the media.*”<sup>175</sup>

The efficacy of a strategy depends upon the factors mentioned above as well as balancing their weight without giving too much importance and attention to one of them rather than to another. If that is the case, it only will lead to ruinous defeats, strategically and militarily speaking. A strategy must by its nature, incorporate all the factors and take them into consideration from the first to the last one, in order to be efficient. To this is linked the concept of “*Grand Strategy*”, which according to Martha Crenshaw, are the “*vital interests of a State*” and determine the means and methods on how to deal with them and their related threats. It in other words, incorporates everything from defense to prevention. “*Policy*”<sup>176</sup>, on the other hand, determines the different levels of priority inherent in the Grand Strategy.

Upstream of the military and counter-terrorism strategies there is the “*Global Strategy*”, considered a “*strategic level*”, that is politics - after which the national and international interests succeed. There are different strategic levels and those are:

- 1) “*Grand Strategy or national security strategy*
- 2) *National military strategy*
- 3) *Theatre strategy*
- 4) *Operational strategy or Grand Tactics*”<sup>177</sup>

The first refers to the political goals intended to be pursued, the second determines the military objectives and divides the resources needed accordingly. The theatre strategy implements military

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<sup>174</sup> Carlo Jean, “*Guerra, strategia e sicurezza*”, 1997, pg 70-72

<sup>175</sup> Carlo Jean, “*Guerra, strategia e sicurezza*”, 1997, pg 72-73

<sup>176</sup> Martha Crenshaw, op. cit, pg. 168

<sup>177</sup> Carlo Jean, op. cit, pg. 75-77

forces in order to attain the Grand Strategy at a political and strategical level while determining precise methods on how to attain it. The operational strategy, finally, is based on the combination of countering and combat methods and the combat itself. On the other hand, at a tactical level, one focuses more and almost exclusively on combat or countering. Considering the difficulty in countering terrorism and its various and brutal forms, an important concept might as well be underlined and that is “*Strategic choices and their determinants.*”<sup>178</sup> The choices exploit the opportunities or potential weaknesses, thus striking by surprise and consequently claiming a state’s interests. What needs to be considered when talking about the counter-terrorism strategies are the costs and risks involved in obtaining a certain result or objective. The more ambitious the targets are, the greater the risks and the related costs.

To this end, the various “*strategic forces*”<sup>179</sup> are designed and defined as well as the types of wars, namely: “*war of people, guerrilla warfare and the dread that is terrorism.*”<sup>180</sup> The strategic forces are basically defense and attack, but are then subdivided into further categories:

- 1) “*intellectual forces*
- 2) “*moral forces*
- 3) “*material forces*”<sup>181</sup>

The first type of forces, determine who conducts a particular strategy that may or may not win a conflict or a deadly phenomenon like terrorism. The heart of it is the resoluteness aimed at overcoming various indecisions on the actions to be taken, therefore it is not only the manifestation of military force and it very much depends on the circumstances. It deems necessary, as a strategic category, to take into account the “*relationship between defense and attack,*”<sup>182</sup> if it defends individuals it defends them to prevent further attacks or acts of violence, but if it decides to attack, there can be risks and serious repercussions, such as further brutal events that are justified as aggressions on behalf of a god (in the case of terrorism), or another cause. Moral forces refer to the bridge between the intellectual and material forces. The “*psychological factor*”<sup>183</sup> is linked to this, meaning that inculging fear, fatigue and giving value to audacity in the military realm, refers to knowing how to take risks while trying to prevent repercussions. They are not improvised forces but need perseverance and are at the basis of good management and useful use of resources.

Moreover, material forces are inherent in the logistic and technological dimensions of the strategies – which as previously stated, the former refers to the massive production of weapons and the latter to the rapid technological and scientific development. As forces, they depend and are linked to the political and strategic goals of a state as well as the “*relationship between quality and quantity*”<sup>184</sup>. Which in the face of counter-terrorism, it is better to have less resources and be able to use them responsibly than have more and not be able to do otherwise. They also value and analyze the costs and benefits that determine their use.

In regards to the different types of wars, they should be put into context and be deeply outlined. The war of people and also guerrilla warfare, are in essence the ones which mobilize everyone and anyone willing to take up arms for defensive purposes or in other words they refer to all those

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<sup>178</sup> Carlo Jean, op. cit, pg. 83-85

<sup>179</sup> Carlo Jean, op. cit, pg. 89-91

<sup>180</sup> Carlo Jean, op. cit, pg. 169-174

<sup>181</sup> Carlo Jean, op. cit, pg. 89-91

<sup>182</sup> Carlo Jean, op. cit, pg. 92-93

<sup>183</sup> Carlo Jean, op. cit, pg. 94-96

<sup>184</sup> Carlo Jean, op. cit, pg. 95



“*military initiatives*”<sup>185</sup> that have a strategically planned defense and a tactical offense, which have the ultimate goal of dividing and weakening enemies and carry out a long-term action, whilst retaining one’s own military forces. These types of war aside from having a direct strategic value they also have one that is of great political importance. It refers to the will of a population to not compel to an external threat but to defend itself at any cost without surrendering. Next to these, terrorism and its forms needs to be considered. Violent acts are considered to be terrorism when their purpose and psychological impact are superior and aimed at spreading fear and terror. In this sense, terrorism is not just a tactic but also a strategy since its goals are deliberately carried out for political purposes. However, this act of violence differs from guerrilla warfare because the latter has “*no political goals but only territorial.*”<sup>186</sup>

Terrorism among its various forms, can also be of two types: “*strategic or pathologic.*”<sup>187</sup> The former aims at attaining political goals whereas the latter aims at maintaining either a territory or population under control through the spread of terror or organized crime. Terrorism contrary to guerrilla warfare operates in cities, in which terrorist organizations act deliberately yet underground. Guerrilla instead works with the support of the population, establishes itself in the countryside and lastly differs in goals. Its organization, in military terms, needs time and the existence of favorable scenarios in order to create its military units. Terrorism on the other hand, has civilians as attack targets with a very high symbolic value, its “*logistics network*” is divided into cells that decrease the vulnerability by infiltrating within the “*intelligence or other security services – and lastly it is supported by foreign States.*”<sup>188</sup> A further difference between the two is that guerrilla is the form of privileged violence against dictatorships, colonial forces, and works against them to regain control; whereas terrorist acts express themselves via minor groups, and sometimes gains support from another state to destabilize another. Its the weakest form of the use of force by a State, those who are stronger tend to use other methods of coercion or power, such as embargos or military threats.

Furthermore, **counter terrorism** strategies differ from anti-terrorism ones, because they “*focus more on the efforts and methods*” that a state used or still uses to hinder terrorists and future attacks. In contrast to the defensive anti-terrorism strategy’s nature, counter-terrorism is indeed “*offensive*”<sup>189</sup> – and only under certain circumstances strategic. It is however “*interrelated*” with the anti-terrorism approach, because cannot exist without the other. Without the gaining of intelligence and further information thanks to surveillance of real or alleged terrorists, one cannot thwart neither them nor terrorism itself.

The fight against terrorism requires effective responses and a great management capacity of the informations and the influence of the technological and scientific development processes, from biological, chemical to nuclear – in regards to weapons or explosive devices. This challenge, in addition to the fight against the jihadist Islamist type of terrorism, has forced Western states and some Middle Eastern ones, to run for cover and organize in possibly very short timescales, that response deemed the most effective. It has called them to measure themselves not with mere organized crime but rather with new and real “*criminals of a subtle often fleetingly elusive nature.*” These criminals are considered “*enemies of the State and its people*”<sup>190</sup> - a consideration that has become more pronounced after the attacks of the 11<sup>th</sup> September, 2001.

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<sup>185</sup> Carlo Jean, op. cit, pg. 169

<sup>186</sup> Carlo Jean, op. cit, pg. 170

<sup>187</sup> Carlo Jean, op. cit, pg. 172

<sup>188</sup> Carlo Jean, op. cit, pg. 172

<sup>189</sup> <http://fieldcommandllc.com/anti-terrorism-vs-counter-terrorism-tactical-edge-summer-2011-pp-68-70/>

<sup>190</sup> D’Auria, op. cit, pg. 109

Considering both Western states and those of the Middle East and International Organizations, those who have had successful or drastic counter-terrorism strategies or programs are: The United States, the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia. On a more global level, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been fairly successful in addressing the issue that is terrorism and combats it militarywise.

#### **4.2 THE UNITED STATES' COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES:**

The United States' counter terrorism strategy has notably been the most drastic compared to the European and Middle Eastern ones. In the face of what is considered the most atrocious terrorist attack of Islamic matrix on American soil, it being the 9/11 onset, there has been a legislative and domestic political process downsizing. In fact, on September 14<sup>th</sup> 2001, former President George W. Bush, emanated the “*XXXII National Emergency Act*” – a federal law that declared, at that time, a state of exception/ (national) emergency which would have augmented the need for security measures and prevented another attack of that devastating scale. Then, just a month later, the same president emanated the “*USA Patriot Act*”<sup>191</sup>, another legislation that contrasted jihadist terrorism and at a local level, limited some individual liberties that were once enjoyed by American citizens before the attack on the Twin Towers on that fateful date.

Aside from limiting individual liberties, the Patriot Act also granted the permission to use methods of inquisition such as “*arrests, interceptions, seizures and searches of both body and household*”<sup>192</sup> as well as increasing the powers of both the judiciary and the police. Apart from this limitation, the U.S counter-terrorism strategy also led to the emanation of a “*Military Order*”, two months after 9/11 as well as creating a controversial agency called the “*Military Commission.*” Both of them subject the real or alledged terrorists, to American military jurisdiction, which identifies such individuals as either “*public enemies or enemy combatants.*” This takes place on the basis of various gathered information and elements, two of which are highly important and are:

- 1) if there is a reason to think that a suspected individual is actually a terrorist.
- 2) if there is State interest that these people be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Military Commission.

Succeeding these two elements, there are “*factors that identify a person as a terrorist*”<sup>193</sup> and them are:

- 1) who was or has been member of the terrorist organization known as AL-QAIDA.
- 2) who has committed, acted on behalf of or supported terrorist attacks that would have caused lively damages on American soil and undermined the security of American citizens as well as national security.
- 3) who has deliberately hosted the above described individual, whilst supporting the terrorist cause.

According to the elements thus far outlined, special detention is expected if these elements are found to be truthful after accurate investigations. The incarceration takes place in the base of the US

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<sup>191</sup> D’Auria, op. cit, pg. 109-110

<sup>192</sup> D’Auria, op. cit, pg. 110

<sup>193</sup> D’Auria, op. cit, pg. 111

Navy, at “*Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*”<sup>194</sup>. The penalty given to such individuals, is at the discretion of the military commission and it may vary from the “lighter” sentence, i.e the confiscation of assets and the mere detention, or the “harder” punishment, that is the death penalty, which however requires unanimity within the decision-making process of the commission itself, to be performed. In addition, to these legislative measures there are other methods of counter-terrorism that the U.S has enacted since 9/11. They have been however, kept secret due to violations of civil liberties such as privacy; under the will of President Bush. They are called “*Extraordinary Renditions*” – or in other words special transfers of people suspected of terrorism that must be handed over to American jurisdiction even if they were to be in another country. They are transfers to prison facilities in countries in the Maghreb or in the Middle East, and serve the purpose of detention, investigation and prevention of other and any type of attack.

Further examples of extreme counter-terrorism strategies, are the “*Terrorism Surveillance Program*” – which uses unauthorized interceptions that violate the freedom of thought and right to confidentiality and the “*National Security Letters*”<sup>195</sup> –special documents that allowed the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) to obtain any information even sensitive data about an individual via phone operators or libraries.

According to these findings and leading terrorism expert Martha Crenshaw, “*American counter-terrorism policy is not just a response to the threat of terrorism, whether at home or abroad, but a reflection of the domestic political process.*” – In fact, if the first round of strategies implemented by the U.S and the Bush Administration were military based, those succeeding them were not. The national policy agenda needs to be set and the decision-making process, however so fragmented, needs to deal with all issues or threats simultaneously and including the entire political elite, from the president to the executive branch all the way up to “*terrorism experts and the media.*”<sup>196</sup> The political elite is divided into two branches – “executive and legislative” who are then subdivided into congress, political parties, opinion-makers, lobbies and lastly outside government decision makers which are called “*interest groups.*”

The Executive branch involves numerous agencies with overlapping authority and who try to elaborate an efficient as well as possible solution to an issue, namely terrorism. The first problem it encounters is the definition of such phenomenon – it is constantly changing due to its dependence on circumstances. If it is identified as a crime, it will be treated as such and dealt by law enforcement agencies such as the FBI. If instead it is considered to be a threat to national and then international security, military forces in conjunction with the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) will take the required measures. Also, since terrorism as a phenomenon varies in forms, and could also be defined as “*bioterrorism*” if it acquires harmful material to humans and threatens to use it in an attack, other counter-terrorism agencies can and will be involved, such as “*HHS (Health and Human Services) or CDC (Center for Disease control)*”<sup>197</sup>.

Congress, on the other hand, has the job to find the needed funds for any counter-measure the executive branch and its numerous agencies find towards terrorism. It plays a crucial role, since it can either block or agree to a solution and put it in action, even if the President has not yet decided or proposed which one to use. Congress is part of the legislative branch, as such it is in charge of foreign relations, security issues (terrorism in this case), intelligence (both the gathering of information and efficient investigation) and lastly, finance. The congress is then subdivided into

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<sup>194</sup> D’Auria, op. cit, pg. 111-112

<sup>195</sup> D’Auria, op. cit, pg. 114-115

<sup>196</sup> Martha Crenshaw, op. cit, pg. 183

<sup>197</sup> Martha Crenshaw, op. cit, pg. 186

two legislative bodies, namely “*the Senate and the House of Representatives.*”<sup>198</sup>

Then come the political parties and the so-called opinion makers, i.e interest groups or think tanks that are external to the government but within the policy/strategy making business. The parties promote an idea or solution in accordance to their current of thought, whereas the interest groups, gather the needed “*scientific and technological information*”<sup>199</sup> to then promote their favored issue. In this way, they force policy-makers to recognize a problem and find a way to efficiently solve it, however if they find that their methods are against civil liberties or deny the basic human rights, they will do anything in their power to go against the decisions taken.

Within these think tanks, there can also be families of victims of terrorism, that may pressure the government into taking certain decisions when making policies. An example can be the very much contested “*Airport Security Act of 1973*” in regards to the terrorist attack on the Pan Am flight 103, which also requested further investigation on the bombing-event and eventually led to the creation of the “*Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism*”<sup>200</sup> – that modified or in better words intensified its procedures both on and off board, in order to better handle such atrocious mishaps. Apart from these legislative norms, the media have also been very important, with their methods of transmitting dramatic events but at the same time showing a threat, that is terrorism, they try to speed up the resolution processes and to flaunt them in such a way also to attract the attention not only of the general public but of the political elite as well. In this sense, trying to find or develop an efficient policy and/or strategy that counters terrorism will forever be difficult.

It is no coincidence that during the Bush Administration, the response to the attacks of 9/11 were based upon the “*global war on terror*”- which had a military approach and focused on changing Afghanistan’s regime, one ruled by the Talibans, those who gladly gave “*sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden*” and his organization. Then the same administration focused on seeking down alleged Islamist extremists and terrorists throughout the world whilst putting down Saddam Hussein’s leadership in Iraq. Eventually it had accomplished this via intelligence reports on supposed “*weapons of mass destruction (WMD)*”<sup>201</sup> – which contrary to common belief, appeared to be untruthful. A consequence that emerged from the whole Iraqi mishap is that Iran had continued to influence the region, sponsor terrorism and confirmed to be a threat to U.S allied Arab countries, i.e Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In addition, towards the end of President George W. Bush’s term, he had already carried out “*three wars*”, one in Afghanistan, the other against terrorism of Islamic matrix and lastly the one in Iraq, with the political goal of spreading “*democracy and free-market reforms*”<sup>202</sup> through the entire Middle East. The Administration’s task for its foreign policy was to change or overthrow with military force any regime that could have bred future terrorists and consequently terrorism, but also to reorganize different social, economic, religious etc.. aspects of those regions while promoting the common value of democracy. The goal was bound to be unattainable.

Succeeding the Bush Administration, came Obama’s one in 2008. In order to counter terrorism he wanted to “*reshape U.S policy*” by making amends with the Muslim world and essentially the Middle East whilst resolving the problems left behind by the previous president. In this regard, he declared that by 2010 he would have pulled American troops out of Iraq but completed this task at the end of 2011, a year later than the date promised. Secondly, another troop withdrawal was declared but in a different region, i.e Afghanistan – hoping to do so by 2014. In this part of the

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<sup>198</sup> Louise Fawcett, “*International Relations of the Middle East*”, Fourth Edition, Oxford, 2016, pg. 363, chapter 16.

<sup>199</sup> Martha Crenshaw, op. cit, pg. 189

<sup>200</sup> Martha Crenshaw, op. cit, pg. 189

<sup>201</sup> Louise Fawcett, op. cit, pg. 371

<sup>202</sup> Louise Fawcett, op. cit, pg. 372

Middle East, he augmented military forces culminating in the “*special forces attack against AL-QAIDA*” and the death of its leader Osama Bin Laden, in May 2011. This is deemed the most successful event during his presidency and most efficient counter-terrorism strategy used. This event apart from attaining such an achievement, it also implemented the use of “*remotely piloted aircraft (drone) strikes*.”<sup>203</sup> Furthermore, the Arab Uprisings in 2010, demonstrated the merits and the defects of Obama’s foreign policies in the Middle East. The strong points regarded the spread of democracy after taking down “Arab authoritarianism”- via a “*NATO-Led coalitions for humanitarian intervention*” whereas the flaws of such foreign policy were the “*red line*”<sup>204</sup> in Syria and its threat of using and eventual use of chemical WMDs that killed opposing forces as well as numerous civilians in Damascus and the non-support to U.S allied Arab countries, namely Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrein.

A new presidency was on the rise, the one of Donald Trump in January 2017. During this time and on the account of countering terrorism and providing efficient strategies, he continued to pursue the goals and use the methods of the previous two administrations whilst emphasizing the entry restriction and the control process of refugees and immigrants. His domestic policy as well as counter-terrorism methods focus on identifying radical Islamists, “*stopping foreign fighters and avoiding the spread of radicalization and recruitment*”<sup>205</sup>. Along the line of counter-terrorism measures he also emphasized the need to develop cybersecurity, since Internet nowadays is the easiest means of communication and extremist engagement that terrorists use. One legislative measure, worth mentioning of the previous administrations, i.e the Bush, is the installment of the “*FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) of 2008*”<sup>206</sup>, which enhanced security online and surveillance of non-US citizens that would have been living abroad or just traveling and was supported deeply by Donald Trump.

Considering that the terrorist threat of today differs from that of 9/11, the counter-terrorism debate that revolves around U.S domestic policy deepened and enforced intelligence and laws that before that eventful date most probably would have even existed or been created. In fact, even the threat of ISIS differs from that of Al-QAEDA, while using the methods of spectacularization of terror, through precisely the attacks, the suicide-bombing, the infiltrations and so on. Its attacks have three ways of being planned; the first revolves around inspiration by the group (meaning that ISIS takes responsibility of the actions of its members even if these generally do not have close ties with the group), then via attacks facilitated by those affiliated (hence “*secret communication*”<sup>207</sup> between the leaders and the perpetrators is involved) and lastly, onsets planned directly by the leaderships who have full responsibility and provide support for their bases in the Middle East. .

The threat of terrorism is not new to Americans, however its manifestation is. With the rise of Da’esh, came also “*homegrown violent extremists (HVEs)*”- those individuals being either American citizens or of other nationalities, that have worked or lived in the U.S and who promote, support or plan the terrorist cause and intend to recruit other advocates. They differ from those people called “*lone wolves*”- extremists who plan and carry out alone, the attacks intended to spread terror. They differ in terms of tactics used, since they rely on opportunities and believe that no advanced skills are required for the violent acts they plan to commit. Their targets are defined

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<sup>203</sup> Louise Fawcett, op. cit, pg. 372-373

<sup>204</sup> Louise Fawcett, op. cit, pg. 375-377

<sup>205</sup>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)6\\_21898\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS_BRI(2018)6_21898_EN.pdf)

<sup>206</sup>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)6\\_21898\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS_BRI(2018)6_21898_EN.pdf)

<sup>207</sup>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)6\\_21898\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS_BRI(2018)6_21898_EN.pdf)

“soft” – due to their vulnerability and unprotection, them being either “hotels, concert venues or even cultural sites.”<sup>208</sup> In order to recruit other members, these people use the Internet and social networks, making it seriously challenging for law enforcement agencies to control, investigate and eventually disrupt this type of terrorist propaganda.

A counter-terrorism success that can be attributed to President Trump, is his new “National Security Strategy” – one that puts America and its national security first, by promoting shared values and protecting and securitization of its citizens as well as its borders and territories. In addition to this, he implemented the “National Defense Strategy” – which regarded the “*reemergence of strategic abilities between nations and the acknowledgement of the changing character of war*”<sup>209</sup> and the various counter terrorism strategies as well as making the “*Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002*”<sup>210</sup> a priority. To this reform act Trump added the “*Diversity Immigrant Visa Programme*”<sup>211</sup> – which randomly selects individuals and makes them eligible enough to be visa holders and enter the United States.

Apart from implementing such tough measures, President Trump issued a “*Travel Ban*”<sup>212</sup> in 2017. This tool restricted entrance to chosen Middle Eastern nationalities. The countries included within it were: Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libia, Sudan and Somalia. The restriction apart from gaining media coverage in regards to some violations of civil liberties and augmenting forestalling measures in airports was successful enough also in limiting illegal immigration and the spread of radicalization. The Trump Administration also counters violent extremism with programs updated in 2016, similar to those of United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia (as described in the previous chapter) and that were part of Obama’s strategies against terrorism and radicalization. In fact, in regards to countering terrorism and its extremist forms, Trump implemented the “*Terrorism prevention Partnerships*”<sup>213</sup> – which educate and spread awareness among people and allow them to recognize suspicious attitudes via selected data and profiles. These measures also extend to different fields them being, border control, airport security, investigations and law enforcement and extremist rehabilitation in society, just to name a few.

Besides partnering with local communities and government agencies, the Trump Administration, also collaborated with companies that provide technological assistance and with social media networks, for example, Twitter, Facebook and leading Internet browser known as Google, to counter radicalization and terrorist recruitment. These enterprises form the “*Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism*”<sup>214</sup> and with the gathering and sharing of data among other partner states implement programs that prevent terrorism and extremist propaganda to spread and create a sort for “safe-haven platforms” for their Internet uses, so that they can be dissuaded from committing to violent extremism. The war on terrorism is unattainable, it is perhaps better to wage war on the

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<sup>208</sup>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)6\\_21898\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS_BRI(2018)6_21898_EN.pdf)

<sup>209</sup> <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>

<sup>210</sup>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)6\\_21898\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS_BRI(2018)6_21898_EN.pdf)

<sup>211</sup>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)6\\_21898\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS_BRI(2018)6_21898_EN.pdf)

<sup>212</sup>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)6\\_21898\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS_BRI(2018)6_21898_EN.pdf)

<sup>213</sup>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)6\\_21898\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS_BRI(2018)6_21898_EN.pdf)


<sup>214</sup>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)6\\_21898\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS_BRI(2018)6_21898_EN.pdf)

smaller terrorist groups and counter the money by one in order to defeat terrorism once and for all. To put this idea into action the U.S. needs to understand that waging war on an ideology and trying to contain recruitment and radicalization is somewhat difficult and to some extent counterproductive, instead as a country they should focus on the grievances of these communities and start from there. Once this is realized and clear, the war on terrorism will end, otherwise it will never truly be a “mission accomplished” by any presidential administration.

The figure below demonstrates, and sums up the milestones achieved by the United States of America since the 9/11 tragedy.

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Figure 1 – Milestones: selected acts and agreements since 9/11



<sup>215</sup>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)6\\_21898\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS_BRI(2018)6_21898_EN.pdf)

### **4.3 THE UNITED KINGDOM'S COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES:**

The country's goal when it comes to countering terrorism is to possibly avoid or at least reduce risks within its territories as well as its overseas interests. Law enforcement agencies, society, intelligence departments and the British Government must be involved and collaborate together on this topic and ensure the general public that they can live freely and in peace, provided that the preemptive methods used remain efficient and are focused to be long-term solutions. For these purposes the programme called "*CONTEST*" was created, along with its "brother", namely "*PREVENT*"<sup>216</sup> – both of them were reviewed because they were considered not up to date and to some extent not efficient over the years, considering the forever changing phenomenon, that is terrorism. The first British project has been revised multiple times and aims at reducing the risks posed by terrorism and is divided into four workstreams, i.e Pursue, Protect, Prepare, Prevent. Pursue intends to stop terrorist mishaps, Protect, on the other hand, has the goal to reinforce general protection and extend it both to Britain's population as well as its territories, borders and stakes overseas, Prepare focuses on mitigating the casualties caused by terrorist attacks. Lastly Prevent – aims at limiting radicalization and reducing terrorism supporters, and although being intrinsic to CONTEST, it is considered a separate project due to its continuous updates.

In regards to the "**pursue**" part of the first programme, its purpose is stopping further attacks, while ascertaining dangers at their starting point stage. To do so, it revised its previous organizational structure, in the sense that it "*reduced the length of time for which suspects can be held before charging them with terrorist offences*"<sup>217</sup> as well as using interceptions as a means of identification and prosecution of those suspected to firmly support the terrorist cause. For this purpose, close work with police agencies and intelligence agents is needed for successful "outcomes apart from international collaboration when investigating on terrorist activities that look towards British interests offshore. Pursue as part of CONTEST, is also in charge of assuring "safe" detention of its terrorist suspects if deported and in these terms it is bound by legal and human rights obligations.

As a sub-project of CONTEST, Pursue has been revised in 2009, guaranteeing the British government, full intelligence agency cooperation along with the advancement of suspect prosecution and vetting and developing better forms of technological communication between the governance, law enforcement agencies and if needed and more globally speaking, the European Union. Aside from deporting individuals who through investigative measures are found to be terrorists or support extremist groups, another strategy used by Pursue is "*control orders*" – which are considered to be intrusive yet beneficial to the prevention of further attacks or threats and the spread of radicalist point of views; also they are used when prosecution and foreign deportation are impossible. These orders are managed by the "*Home Secretary*," whether there are more urgent matters to be dealt with, the responsibility is posed upon the "*High Court*"<sup>218</sup> who will need evidence, possibly material, to truly believe that a person is either a terrorist him or herself or has engaged in such violent activities.

Since prosecution and deportation have become top priority for the counter-terrorism strategies put into action by the British Government, some points on this debate must be outlined. For prosecution to exist and operate there firstly needs to be material evidence of the suspected activity, and for this

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<sup>216</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, "*CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism*," July 2011, pg. 10-11, PDF e-book.

<sup>217</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 11

<sup>218</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 48-49



reason it uses the controversial method of interception, which involves retrieval of deleted social media conversations or messages, images, articles, links, essentially everything that can be intercepted and used in court (in the worst case scenarios) or just as proof during investigations that lead to detention. However, this method in order to work it needs a “*warrant*” – legal documented authorization. Then there is the factor of “*deportation*” – which aside being bound to legal and human rights obligations, it needs forms of “*assurance*”<sup>219</sup> if the suspects are to be deported abroad, that they risk no harm. This procedure has been criticized by some, in regards to the element of “*torture*” as a means of confession for investigative purposes. The ability to prosecute and deport is a means of success for the Pursue part of the CONTEST project, however it does not eliminate entirely the threat that is terrorism and its propaganda.

**Protect**, contrarily to the previous part of CONTEST, is in charge of strengthening protection of both public and U.K’s territory while reducing their exposure to threats. These are ultimately assessed by the “*annual National Risk Assessment*” – a report that annually investigates on the occurrence of terrorist threats and provides guidelines to the Protect workstream to counter them. The evaluation improves vetting processes in regards to entrances and exits of borders, in fact an agency responsible for this has been created, it being the “*Boader Command*” – internal to the “*National Crime Agency*” – who both address threats and operate in sync to contrast terrorists and their awful activities. In the field of airport and aircraft security, these two agencies have been indeed successful, also thanks to the newly improved “*scanning technology*” and “*no-fly lists*” – which prohibit people from traveling and boarding on means of transport in and out of the United Kingdom. Further work, however, in this field needs to be made in regards to “*cargo security*.”<sup>220</sup> This part of CONTEST is very important when dealing with crowded infrastructures, for example museum sites, airports and even cafés. It is no coincidence if armed policemen or military forces are spotted in the cities close to shops or key sites. The crowded places are critical, because they are attractive to terrorists, since if attacked the lives lost rates will be fairly high.

On the account of border security, the United Kingdom as well as the United States, implemented the “*Passenger Name Record (PNR)*” – a transcript of the personal information of a passenger, from his or her name up to the travel itinerary. It helps prevent, detect and investigate offences deemed to be of terrorist nature. U.K aviation authorities presume that thanks to the 2011 additional security procedure, i.e “*facial and fingerprint matching*”<sup>221</sup> and to the Protect workstream they have reduced and enhanced public and territorial security as well as general vulnerability. However, terrorism is forever changing and developing both technologically and scientifically, so being on preemptive alert always is an absolute and primary priority that must be shared and extended also to further states.

**Prepare**, instead lessens the impact of terrorist activities, while augmenting public resilience which can only be done if efficient and immediate communication between emergency services and the people affected by the supposed threat are carried out. This aspect of CONTEST is vital, when dealing also with WMDs which can be “*biological, chemical or worse, nuclear*”<sup>222</sup> even if the probability of an attack and use of these weapons is minor, at the moment. As a security project, Prepare needs to manage also various types of crisis and give an appropriate answer to the urgency.

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<sup>219</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 50-51

<sup>220</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 79

<sup>221</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 83

<sup>222</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 93

For this purpose, it cannot work alone and so relies on the military and governmental efforts and the “*Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR)*” was written. In accordance to the review the “*Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)*” was formed to plan strategically the responses needed to counter-terrorism and other emergencies. Its responsibility lies in:

- 1) coordination of a resilience programme that deals at large with different emergency circumstances.
- 2) leadership of specialized programmes that counter terrorist threats on U.K soil. While using and implementing forces that are not normally used for minor emergencies.

What has been successful in Prepare is the consequence planning which provided the needed competences to react and counter different emergencies from the minor one to the most substantial, such as terrorism and extremism. The programmes and different agencies within the Prepare component of CONTEST, concentrate on the “*public-sector*”<sup>223</sup> but offer assistance also to the private by improving resilience and sharing of information to other departments of security.

Lastly, the work group **Prevent**, intrinsic yet separately updated project and key to the counter-terrorism strategy of CONTEST, is responsible for involving international efforts as well as other sectors in the fight against terrorism. Apart from giving priority to the same responsibilities and methods of its previously outlined sub-groups, it focuses deeply on the element of RADICALIZATION, which extends to the multiple forms of terrorism itself and stems from ideology. Clearly, Prevent alone cannot operate or change a way of thinking, nevertheless it can challenge the extremist point of views and via de-radicalization programs and group assistance dissuade further terrorist supporters and lastly, assure to some extent security for both general public and its territories. Prevent as a counter-terrorism strategy is integrative in nature, hence it is determined in spreading shared values amongst the population, particularly to those deemed vulnerable to extremist perspectives. It is inclusive of any type of community and empowers them while providing advice, support and relative funds.

Its main goal is to prevent people from becoming terrorists and engage in violent acts, and does this through understanding and open dialogue with communities exposed to extremism. It assumes that the process of radicalization is ongoing and its ideology is intensively resilient and addresses terrorism’s multiformity which threatens U.K’s national security. Prevent is dependent on the government and its larger projects of prevention, due to the necessity of funds. Because of its intrinsic to CONTEST nature, although separate in methods, it is linked to the Pursue procedure. The linkage works because both act carefully when trying to disrupt terrorist activities. Henceforth, Prevent challenges more the ideology behind terrorism, than the dreadful phenomenon itself, while reaching out to smaller groups who are exposed to extremism and eventually become radicalized via Internet or other forms of recruitment. Prevent is never involved in dialogues on topics of theology, because as a project it thinks that the best way to counter-terrorist acts is by empowerment and open dialogue to Islamist communities who may or may not be in grievance. Through its research on radicalization and extremism, it aims at enabling law enforcement agencies “*to take the appropriate actions*”<sup>224</sup>

Considering its nature and goals, Prevent operates in a variety of sectors, them being:

- 1) “*Supporting vulnerable people*”

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<sup>223</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 94

<sup>224</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 63-64

- 2) *Supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalization*
- 3) *Health sector*
- 4) *The Criminal Justice System*
- 5) *Overseas*
- 6) *Counter-terrorism on the Internet*<sup>225</sup>

The first regards aiding individuals who are deeply exposed to violent and extremist perspectives. Its purpose is dissuasion and avoidance of engagement in such atrocious activities. Since Prevent works in sync with the Channel Project, its supportive methods are often identified as “*de-radicalization*” – which disrupt terrorist activities as well as impede further recruitment. Considering this project, Prevent is a counter-terrorism strategy, whereas Channel is a “*police-led, multiagency partnership*” and the element that is found in both methods of terrorism prevention, is that they extend their preemptive tools to all forms of terrorism and need to be top priority also for other states. What is fundamental is the “*improvement of data collection*” – since there needs to be evidence of suspicious behavior or activities. This necessity led to the creation and practice of the “*Case Management Information System*”<sup>226</sup> – i.e a framework that assesses risks and threats according to circumstances and coordinates both Channel and Prevent operators and interventionists. Those who intervene influence very much the people deemed vulnerable, henceforth credibility and farther outreach are key factors. In fact, the intervention may also come from those who were previously detained and former extremists themselves.

Secondly, Prevent in its intervention and support in those sectors and institutions who risk radicalization, has been rather notable. Considering that radicalist perspectives tend to spread in “*uncontested*” whereabouts and through undeniable leaderships, Prevent aims at opening dialogues with the latter. While operating in these fields, the project spreads awareness of risks and methods used by radicalists as well as creating a fit counter. It closely works with schools and especially the younger generation, considering that the extreme perspectives can and might be spread through teaching materials and staff. For this purpose, it trains teachers and the “*Department of Education*” in recognizing the risky signs of younger radicalization. The basis of this work relies on the help from the schools in regards to protection and their cooperation with Prevent and Channel. This extends also to institutions of higher education, namely universities and colleges. Further help and support comes from the “*Department of Business, Innovation and Skills*” – which provides understanding of risks on and off university or college grounds.

Along with schools and universities, Prevent aims at spreading its goals and not to mention support also to “*Faith institutions*”<sup>227</sup> since terrorism historically speaking, has accentuated its methods through the justification of violence and referring it to theological teachings. These organizations play an important preemptive role, since they can challenge the ideology behind the violent acts and will often have the authority to do so. The dialogue is intended to be double sided and not done unilaterally, otherwise it would be found useless. In regards to the health sector, Prevent works concurrently with the “*National Health Service*” with the aim to spread care to every institution, be it a prison, hospital or community and train professionals into doing so along the line of counter-terrorism and radicalization prevention as well. The project does this via “*briefings*” and giving mental health of the offender the importance it deserves, thus proving that by building trustworthy relationships and demonstrating credibility, Prevent can operate efficiently and successfully in the

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<sup>225</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 64-76

<sup>226</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 64-65

<sup>227</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg 68.

counter-terrorism debate. It ensures advice and support while intervening in this sector, to the general public, regional and local organizations.

Then, Prevent also operates and aims at being supportive in the Criminal Justice System, since radicalization often occurs in prisons and among those detained. For these reasons, it cooperates with the “*National Offender Management Service (NOMS)*” – trying to keep up a constant coordination with the suspects as well as the professionals. The service on the other hand, focuses on researching ways of mitigation of the spread of radicalist perspectives that not only recruit followers but also promote violence and justify it through religious teachings. The preemptive attempts also extend towards younger people, suspected or convicted due to terrorist offences. The entire prevention work is in conjunction with that of the police, which in this sense, monitors neighborhoods and communities while developing internal contacts that collaborate and identify at-risk individuals. Among this, Prevent works also charity-wise, by observing the flow and gaining of funds.

Another important sector in which Prevent operates is the one concerning overseas interests. The elements involved in radicalization overseas and in third countries as well as U.K soil, are education and religious faith and the agency responsible in managing and safeguarding them is the “*Department for International Development.*”<sup>228</sup> This branch makes resilience to extremism in communities its top priority, while also concentrating on the long-term impact of the radicalization process and find an appropriate response. As a project, it focuses on various factors, some of them being: “poverty, spread of democracy and stability, support for educational reforms, and lastly conflict resolutions.” The purpose is to reduce poverty while correctly managing resources and addressing social and economic problems. Prevent operates concurrently with the department by increasing good governance and security.

Lastly, considering that radicalization nowadays spreads throughout the Internet, counter-terrorism strategies in this regard need to be implemented. The reasons and uses of Online communication, in this case, that need to be addressed are: “*propaganda, radicalization and recruitment, communication, attack planning and cyber attack.*”<sup>229</sup> Propaganda refers to those actions intended to promote specific ideas, allure a wider public adhesion and lastly psychologically influencing the masses while circumventing Internet censorship. Radicalization and recruitment, are usually processes that revolve around society as a whole, both on and offline, since the Worldwide Web is considered to be without nor does it pose a lot of limits in terms of materials researched and used by radicalizers. Particularly because the internet has little limits, the spreading of extremist ideas towards communities overseas so not just within the United Kingdom, is much broader and something that authorities and the Prevent project need to contain and somewhat fear. Communication, instead, refers to the action of transmitting online information “*between geographically disparate groups*”<sup>230</sup> – whereas attack planning, refers to the research material available to terrorists to plan onset towards precise targets and developing quickly the most fit methods of attack. Lastly, Cyber attack, regards to the terrorist threats done via electronic devices which are difficult to either retrieve or confiscate and the offenders difficult to prosecute.

Prevent on this topic is determined at making the Worldwide Web to some extent “*more hostile*” and less fertile grounds for terrorists. It does this by identifying and investigating the causes and

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<sup>228</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 70-71


<sup>229</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 73-74

<sup>230</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 74-75

those found to be responsible for the spread of extremist ideas and values. Secondly, as a project it tries to censor some materials and websites in order to disrupt such criminal activity while also implementing its counter-terrorism strategies online and reaching out to those more vulnerable. These serve to augment the general understanding of the terrorist and radicalization threats while also spreading awareness on the changing aspects of such phenomenons. Law enforcers are involved and with their authority try to remove as much as possible, the data that terrorist may use against the public. To this extent, the U.K works in sync with the United States, the latter being the “*biggest provider of Internet hosting services.*”<sup>231</sup> - The timeline below shows the terrorist attacks against U.K and its overseas interests occurred up until the year 2011.

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Timeline showing terrorist attacks against the United Kingdom and its interests overseas<sup>12</sup>



<sup>231</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 75

<sup>232</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 25

#### 4.3.a. THE NEW AND UPDATED PREVENT STRATEGY:

Considering the nature of the Prevent project and the continuous change of terrorist forms, the new and improved strategy focuses on three fundamental yet critical objectives – which need to be improved:

- 1) *“Challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it*
- 2) *Protecting vulnerable people*
- 3) *Supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalization”*<sup>233</sup>

For the first objective, the previously presented Prevent strategy has been unsuccessful although trying to reach out to those more vulnerable individuals, it failed as a project in the understanding of how an ideology works and is spread sometimes via terrorist propaganda as well as assuming that only “Muslim communities” could have been affected by radicalist point of views, when on the contrary, given a series of events and the radicalization of individuals born and raised on British soil – it was proven that this phenomenon had an impact not on just one religious faith or group. For this purpose, the new Prevent strategy tries to “*challenge the ideology*” behind violent acts, since it is a vital framework for the creation of any movement or organization as well as to the radicalization process. In order to counter-radicalist perspectives and limit their spread among those vulnerable, having a complete understanding of the differences between what is an ideology and what is theology is rather important. The first depends on its promoters and their goal of spreading ideological appeal to others, persuading them to adhere.

The New Prevent, in this case, challenges ideology to the extent of not allowing it to take advantage of liberties found within the United Kingdom (ex. freedom of speech) and use them in such an astute way to diffuse their message and justification of violence, without having consequences with the law as well as being prosecuted or in worst case scenarios, detained or deported. Furthermore, considering terrorism’s diverseness in terms of propaganda, implementing appropriate Internet censorship measures must be facilitated. To this extent, the new and improved counter-terrorism strategy needs to intervene and “*curtail illegal activities.*” To challenge an ideology is not an easy task, however, in order to do so a state, in this case the United Kingdom (but this extends also to a more global perspective), needs confidence when spreading its values – i.e “*democracy, rule of law, equality of opportunity, freedom of speech and the rights of all men and women to live free from persecution of any kind*” and also advocate them at any cost. On this account, this goal is a “*collective responsibility.*”<sup>234</sup>

Although adding a “*counter-ideological element*” to this new way of implementing the Prevent strategy poses a general concern, regarding its appropriateness, many individuals including government officials thought that it was rightful yet it will need “*factual information*” in order to avoid complications both as a principle and in practice. The goals of the new Prevent strategy in regards to this first objective need to be made clear, since it cannot impose its own judgement and also has to rely on the “*responsibility of the government*”<sup>235</sup> to facilitate the process while implementing efforts. In these terms the New Prevent should challenge ideology not by changing public opinion on the terrorism debate but by reaching out to smaller groups and empower them to the point that they themselves will find terrorism and radicalization repugnant. Also, it should open

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<sup>233</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, “*Prevent Strategy*,” June 2011, pg. 43-94, PDF e-book.

<sup>234</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, op. cit, pg. 43-44

<sup>235</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, “*Prevent Strategy*”, op. cit, pg. 44-45

dialogues with “*theologians*” and support them in their “*counter-narrative work*”<sup>236</sup> while not being involved on a religious level but on a more political one in order to tackle more specific terrorist threats. In essence, the New Prevent Strategy needs to provide the United Kingdom with an appropriate alternative based on credibility and spread of shared values.

According to the second objective of this new strategy, Prevent should handle this matter with care and build a much stronger relationship with the previously outlined Channel project. The counter-terrorism approach needs to assess and identify clearly all the risks posed by radicalization and its supporters. It considers the latter a process and not an event, considering the fact that there is the engagement and allure of “terrorist-related activity” – working in sync with Channel and law enforcement agencies allows prevention to begin and safeguard the vulnerability of individuals while providing extensive support. An important note however needs to be made, being preemptive and protective is not the same as surveilling via intelligence agents or methods, that is called “spying” and is linked to legal obligations. The purpose of data collection and preemptive support is not facilitate prosecution or detainment but rather dissuasion and non-engagement in order to live free and in peace. In these terms Prevent should handle with care the “identification of at-risk individuals and referral processes” so that to avoid including those who have nothing to do with extremism or that have never during their lifetime, engaged in violent acts.

For these reasons, some “indicators” have been identified, them being: “*expressed support for violence, possession of violent extremist literature, possession of materials regarding weapons and explosives or military training skills*” and so on. In order to avoid radicalization spread and further involvement in terrorist activity, a fundamental workshop within Channel and Prevent has been implemented – i.e the “*Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP)*.”<sup>237</sup> Depending on videos, it focuses on historical facts, social process of radicalization and other extremist and terrorist forms, when trying to counter-terrorism, spreading in fact awareness and providing an alternative. Apart from implementing project efforts, such strategy enhances also those of the police, which is in charge of the “*delivery of the Operation Hindsight Exercise*” – a method of prevention that give the necessary preemptive tools to both State authorities and local agencies so that the latter can operate on the vulnerability element, intrinsic to individuals and intervene fittingly. This type of support can be either social or personal. If it regards the social realm, supportive measures can be found within the solving of problems related to job search whereas if it is personal, they may regard relationships and public interactions.

To this extent Prevent, relies on the Channel guidance, which provides support on the basis of sharing (personal) information of those deemed vulnerable and thus creates a framework for analysis and research which ultimately covers different areas:

- 1) “*necessity and proportionality*: sharing and professionally judging the data and the risks that either the individuals or the public takes.
- 2) *Consent*: should be obtained prior to data sharing
- 3) *power to share*: there must be the authority to do so
- 4) *Data Protection Act and the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality*’<sup>238</sup>: responsibilities are met and respected by the Channel coordinator.

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<sup>236</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, “*Prevent Strategy*”, op. cit, pg. 52-53

<sup>237</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, “*Prevent Strategy*”, op. cit, pg. 57-58

<sup>238</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, “*Prevent Strategy*”, op. cit, pg. 58-61

In regards to the last objective, this updated Prevent strategy aims at including all the sectors and institutions that risk terrorist attacks or their adherents risk radicalization. The most important one are however, education, religious groups, criminal justice system and health. Prevent operates in sync with these because it considers the latter to have great influence on the choices and point of views of the people considered most vulnerable and at risk. In fact, the strategy tries to reassure the general public, state authorities and also each subdivision that everyone understands the potentialities of these types of threats and know how to propose and implement an alternative. Clearly, each solution differs according to the realm involved therefore “flexibility” is a key factor that will determine the ultimate success and credible prevention and protection of the United Kingdom’s national security.

Examples of successful strategies of the different sectors and the new Prevent strategy can be found in:

- 1) the “*Education Act of 2002 (yet recently updated)*”: which coordinates educational facilities and trains them to effectively counter-radicalization and terrorism itself. It promotes a balanced curriculum to be taught that will develop all types of skills from moral to cultural, while also preparing the younger generation to life and its responsibilities. The act itself aims at safeguarding younger people from radicalization and engagement in violent acts the same way it prevents and protects them from “*drugs, alcohol*” or intolerance and hatred.
- 2) “*Preventing Extremism Unit*”: created and implemented in the education sector, and combines the preemptive tools of counter-terrorism experts with the work of the Department of Education as a statutory authority. The purpose of their efforts is to educate those individuals who use Internet quite assiduously and give them the tools needed for online protection, some of which are police-led.
- 3) “*Prevent efforts in Mosques*”: became a priority after the bombings in London in 2005, and include open yet of low profile dialogues between imams and police and local authorities, the latter gives them advice and support on how to treat the terrorist and radicalist threats on a religious level.
- 4) “*Terrorism Act of 2006 (TACT)*”: used in conjunction with security and intelligence forces as well as the police in order to disrupt the continuous change of terrorism’s forms of recruitment and organizations via Internet. As an act it added two sections, the first identifies terrorist offences and actual encouragement, while the second regards the spread of terrorist materials among vulnerable people.
- 5) “*National Offender Management Service (NOMS-2010 update)*”: hence its efforts of protection, sentencing and punishment, rehabilitation and reintegration into society support, the service operates to reform the lives of terrorist offenders. To the service, a “security categorisation” has been added. It identifies the level of severity of the crimes committed by some individuals or those who have notably been identified as terrorists. The category is called “**Category A**” and is the highest level of severity, in fact detainees are convicted in prisons or facilities of maximum security. In total there are four categories (A-D) and aside from analyzing the level of severity, they identify the potential risks that might happen to national security if the detainee were to escape.



- 6) “*Charity Commission*”<sup>239</sup>: helpful and key in the new Prevent strategy since it devotes its efforts in exposing possible community grievances (ex. “improving basic facilities”) and being the center where ideas and perspectives are exchanged between different people. The commission, however, is in charge of investigating on activities of violent extremism and the “charity premises” and funds. It operates as an interventionist unit that regulates and ensures responsibility to the trusted charities and their supporters and questions whether or not to suspend a certain charitable activity if suspected of terrorist funding or if it does not comply with its responsibilities for terrorism prevention and as a charity.

Considering that the new and improved Prevent strategy is not a police-led programme but rather depends on different sectors and organizations both internal and external to government authorities, it is safe to say that by developing and enhancing various fields and collaborating in sync with such institutions it has successfully implemented itself as a counter-terrorism strategy and spread its confidence and credibility to the British public. One element however that needs to be continuously monitored because of its multiformity and terrorism’s multiple ways of manifestation is the data collection. The gathering of such information is important for security both nationally and internationally and should continue to be the number one priority for any state that receives terrorist threats, be them of atrocious nature (in regards to the involvement of explosives or WMDs) or more ideological, like for example the processes of radicalization and deradicalization.

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<sup>239</sup> Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, “*Prevent Strategy*”, op. cit, pg. 64/ 70/ 77-78/ 81/86/ 93

#### **4.4 THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA'S COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY:**

Considering that countering terrorism and its impacts is not an easy task for any state and the “*wave of violent attacks*” occurred after 2003 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, what had a successful launch was the counter-terrorism and violent extremism campaign of the Saudi Kingdom. The CT strategy implemented was and is considered to be soft in its methods, because they aim at fighting against those untruthful justifications of violence as well as the ideology behind extremism, and as such avoid using traditional military security measures alone. In fact, the Saudi Arabian counter-terrorism strategy is divided into three parts, each of which aim at protecting individuals within and outside the Kingdom, while differing in methods. The strategy itself is named **PRAC**, namely “*Prevention, Rehabilitation and Post-release and Care*” and is relatively new in terms of existence and operation. Apart from its recent four-year appearance the programs that it offers have been notably successful, to the point that other Middle Eastern countries are adopting similar strategies. The other countries are: “*Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia.*”<sup>240</sup>

The Saudi Arabian authorities aim at legitimizing the Kingdom’s laws while trying to eradicate the violent acts that lead to extremism. They do this by proposing an alternative yet rightful interpretation of Islam while emphasizing the importance of being loyal and obedient to the leaders of the Kingdom. On an important note, radicalization and violent extremism as previously outlined, spread out across the Internet in search of adherents and supporters. For this purpose, the Saudi Arabian counter-terrorism strategy is developing methods and preemptive tools that aim at combating such phenomena up to the point of prosecuting offenders in special courts and trials. The strategy is not so much a “war on terrorism” but rather on the idea behind it, while centering the counter debate on shared values, such as legitimacy, authoritarian role and what is allowed by the Muslim religion. Saudi Arabian government authorities, contemplate that extremists are not legitimate nor have the power to fully understand Islamic teachings and interpretations, and consequently spread the latter to others.

PRAC strategy combats extremism and the radicalization process along with the efforts enhanced by Saudi Arabian authorities. It aims at planning alternative methods that lead to the creation of “*interconnected programs*” with the goal of dissuading individuals either young or adult in becoming future terrorists and engaging in violent acts. The core of the PRAC counter-terrorism strategy is to rehabilitate through supportive measures, the suspected individuals and reintegrate them in the easiest way possible into the society, after they have been released from their detention facility. It is important to understand the structural organization of this counter procedure; the agency responsible for Saudi Arabian public security is the Ministry of Interior, who not only monitors security on a domestic level but also in terms of “*counterespionage (as well as intelligence), passport and border security and prison administration*” – just to name a few. The most authoritative figure within this strategy, lies within Prince Muhammad Bin Nayef (“*assistant minister of interior for security affairs*”).

Under his leadership the strategy divides into various branches, i.e the Advisory committee working in conjunction with different Ministries (“*Islamic Affairs, Endowment, Da’wah – call to faith, Guidance, Education, Culture –information, Labor and lastly Social Affairs*”<sup>241</sup>); the purpose is to engage every aspect of an individual’s life and together fight the extremist ideology. The message that the Ministry of Interior tries and wants to convey to the general public is that it is everyone’s responsibility to operate in sync in order to eradicate extremism and the violence linked to it. Furthermore, considering that the strategy itself relies deeply on both public and government

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<sup>240</sup> Christopher Boucek, “*Saudi Arabia’s “soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation and aftercare*”, Washington DC, September 2008, pg. 4, PDF e-book.

<sup>241</sup> Christopher Boucek, op. cit, pg. 6-7

engagement, it also emphasizes the importance of “*Saudi Traditions*”<sup>242</sup> – key factors in the Counseling program, part of PRAC. Since Saudi Arabia is a Muslim country intensively dependent on religion, it gives the presence of “*sheikhs or clerics*” in detention facilities, top priority and considers them vital in the rehabilitation process of those detained for terrorist offences.

In regards to terrorism, violent extremism, recruitment and radicalization it is imperative that a ministry, namely the Ministry of Education, monitors and raises awareness to both students and staff on the dangers of engagement in such activities. It provides this through literature, a review of the schools’ curriculums and after-school activities and printed material. This type of awareness campaign operates in the same way that “*American drug awareness*” ones do. To this extent PRAC has been successful to the point of fostering cooperation among everyone in the Kingdom, including its streets – henceforth “*billboard signs*”<sup>243</sup> with precise images that conveyed the message that terrorism and extremism are unjust and do not interpret Islam correctly, were hung, also to demonstrate the State’s devoted involvement to protection and security. After the preemptive phase, comes rehabilitation – in which renouncing the ideology behind the two atrocious phenomenons is key as well as de-radicalizing former supporters.

The program behind the rehabilitation phase is called “*Counseling*” – moment in which both detainees and Saudi security officials participate via open dialogues, the latter however and contrary to popular belief are not seen as forms of punishment but rather as acts of compassion. This program divides itself into branches directed by important subcommittees, namely “*Advisory, Religious, Psychological and social, Security and lastly Media*.”<sup>244</sup> Each work in conjunction with each other so to re-educate and re-integrate those detained into society. The core of these dialogues and their success is the religious legitimacy given to the program itself via government authoritative figures. This is induced by the credibility conveyed by “*former militant*”<sup>245</sup> individuals present within the Advisory committee. Also critical to the strategy, is satisfying the social needs of those detained together with the psychological and social factors, to which PRAC seeks to give assistance or at least a positive alternative. What is intended here is to ease distress that comes from radicalization and detention – if this supportive measure fails, extremism will continue its recruitment and spread.

Apart from prevention and rehabilitation, a further important aspect of Saudi Arabian counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization strategies is the “*aftercare program*” they provide. Such initiatives aim at supporting both former detainee and his or her family while reconducting them on the right path when reintegrated into society. Upon completion of the counseling phase, the aforementioned extremist is relocated to a rehabilitation site, which is not deemed a prison but rather a group dorm room. In such area, the surveillance officials do not wear uniforms as they would in prison, they mix well with those detained and instead of punishing them, they interact in a playful and kind manner. In this way, the building of trustworthy relationships, “*teamwork*”, and conveying benevolence and tolerance is facilitated as well as necessary. The recreational areas are not only concentrated in Saudi Arabia’s capital, Riyadh, but also in its provinces and the time spent within these facilities is around eight to twelve weeks. If the detainee feels he or she was kept for too much time rather than leaving on the planned date, it is his or her right to receive either repayment or taking the matter as well as the Ministry of Interior to court. This possibility internal to the soft counter-terrorism strategy conveys to the general public that the judicial system along with the Ministry of Interior operate “*in favor of the detainee*”<sup>246</sup> and not against.

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<sup>242</sup> Christopher Boucek, op. cit, pg. 6

<sup>243</sup> Christopher Boucek, op. cit, pg. 10-11

<sup>244</sup> Christopher Boucek, op. cit, pg. 12-13

<sup>245</sup> Christopher Boucek, op. cit, pg. 16

<sup>246</sup> Christopher Boucek, op. cit, pg. 19

Continuing to provide assistance and “social support” after the rehabilitation phase is also important for Saudi officials when countering terrorism and extremism. In fact, recidivism rates, the “*tendency to relapse into a previous condition or mode of behavior*”<sup>247</sup> are relatively low in Saudi Arabia due to the success of its counter-radicalization and terrorism strategies, which as previously stated, aim at combating the ideology behind the phenomena rather than waging war against these events. Success of the entire program is given as well, by the government’s efforts, because of their continuous involvement in the lives of those detainees that completed the tasks of the program offered. The positive outcomes of this strategy is furthered due to the spread of moral and cultural values and customs, typical of Saudi Arabia. Such shared practices can be identified in:

- 1) *“social responsibility*
- 2) *notions of honor*
- 3) *recognition of traditional or extended family hierarchies*: in this case, if the detainee were to escape when granted permission to be on leave for a family event, be it a wedding or funeral, at least three of his or her family members must ensure his or her return, otherwise all three will take his or her place.”

Although the program and its methods have made their appearance in recent years (2004), and so far the prisoners or terrorist offenders have been men, in “2008” there has been a report on the fact that a female perpetrator has gone through similar PRAC process. However, she was not detained in prison but rather in her respective home, attended by her family members. Other elements of success are also the deep relationships that the detainees have with their sheikhs or religious guides, both upon beginning and finishing PRAC as well as the general consideration that being a terrorist or extremist is wrong and will lead to tragic consequences either within the family or the social community. Therefore “*sincere repentance*”<sup>248</sup> – is a key factor. According to these results, the Saudi Arabian counter-terrorism and extremism measures can be deemed noteworthy mostly because throughout other Middle Eastern countries and European ones similar methods are being developed without the usage of military forces, even if they are also important.

In fact, considering that fighting against terrorism and its multiple forms requires efficiency when implementing security policies, targeted efforts by the government and strong national and international cooperation, as previously outlined, Saudi authorities are very involved in these missions. It is no coincidence, that in conjunction with the United States and in addition to its soft counter-terrorism strategy, Saudi Arabia has also created “*two joint task forces*”<sup>249</sup> – the first is responsible for investigating and prosecuting terrorist activities whereas the latter is designed to scout those who finance terrorism. The implementation of such measures enhances security throughout the Kingdom as well as along its borders. Furthermore, in more recent years, namely January 2017, Saudi Arabia decided to use their “*Saudi Security Forces (SSF)*” – to disrupt terrorist attacks and consequently capture the offenders. This military organization is similar to the U.S SWAT (Special weapons and tactics) team. The SSF have mainly seven objectives, them being:

- 1) *“Counter-terrorism operations “in all forms and methods”*
- 2) *VIP protection at home and abroad*
- 3) *Aviation protection for local and international flights*
- 4) *To guard and protect country embassies abroad in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)*

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<sup>247</sup> <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/recidivism>

<sup>248</sup> Christopher Boucek, op. cit, pg. 21

<sup>249</sup> <http://ksamission.eu.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/White-Paper-Counterterrorism-April2017.pdf>

- 5) *Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED)*
- 6) *Protection of critical installations and facilities*
- 7) *Supporting other security sectors and helping to maintain security during the Hajj (Pilgrimage to Mecca) in cases of disasters and crises.*<sup>250</sup>

Moreover, Saudi Arabia is involved in assisted by the United States in the “*United States Military Training Mission (USMTM)*” – which enhances Saudi’s territorial and public security via training in weapon usage, “*land navigation and “live-fire raid”* in order to combat militarily terrorism and extremism. Considering this approach and the deep cooperation with international forces, Saudi Arabian officials along with the United Nations, created the “*United Nations Counter-Terrorism Center*” in 2011. The center provides international cooperation as well as operating in non-military CT endeavours and deals with them according to either a global, national or local perspective. The center’s major financier is indeed Saudi Arabia, however it receives further funds from the other 21 member states.

In regards to financing terrorism, Saudi Arabia makes it its prerogative to control such money flow for the sake of combating the phenomemon and providing security. The Kingdom, in fact, has enacted and created various legislative measures as well as institutions for this purpose. The organizations/measures internal to the Kingdom, that control and combat these problems are:

- 1) “*Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)*”: directs all other institutions and advises them to use the rules and penalties provided for money laundering as it finances terrorism
- 2) “*Units within SAMA*”: control and monitors money laundering and assures that no Saudi Arabian local bank exploits it.
- 3) “*Money Intelligence units*”: if there were to be suspicious transactions where to or from Saudi Arabia, these units are in charge of monitoring such cash flow as well as notifying Saudi officials and instruct them to take action.
- 4) “*Closure of unlicensed monetary-exchange and transfer shops*”: to avoid illegal financing
- 5) “*Financial intelligence unite (FIU)*”: Saudi Arabia partners with and is member of the Egmont Group of Toronto, and has a continous sharing of informations regarding cash flow that finances the terrorist cause.
- 6) “*Observer status in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)*” obtained in 2015, Saudi Arabia hopes to be a fulltime member in 2018.
- 7) Monitors “*charity organizations*”<sup>251</sup>

Considering that Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam, it has since then attracted the attention of terrorist groups for which the government of Riyadh (capital), the ulema’, and the religious experts have always considered the phenomenon that is terrorism unjust, while also trying to counter the extremist ideologies behind it. The threat endured by Saudi Arabia has multiple forms and for this purpose it has implemented targeted actions to eliminate extremism at its roots, also taking on the role of regional and local leader as well as global partner in the fight against terrorism, making valuable use of its available preemptive tools, be them military or not. It is no coincidence that military actions have been used in order to regain control of those territories that for a period of time were under terrorist control. Among the counter-terrorism strategies, there are also actions against the financing of terrorirsm and spread of violent and extremist ideologies.

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<sup>250</sup> [http://ksamissioneu.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/White-Paper\\_Counterterrorism\\_April2017.pdf](http://ksamissioneu.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/White-Paper_Counterterrorism_April2017.pdf)

<sup>251</sup> [http://ksamissioneu.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/White-Paper\\_Counterterrorism\\_April2017.pdf](http://ksamissioneu.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/White-Paper_Counterterrorism_April2017.pdf)

These measures are necessary to ensure the security of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom. In fact, it has refined its mechanisms to identify those individuals and entities that violate Saudi Law for terrorist acts and has maintained a strict supervision of the banking sector, as described above, by restricting the branch of charitable organizations – illicit funds were generally collected secretly and transferred outside the country by those who attended Hajj, the pilgrimage to the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina. Regarding the fight against violent extremism, Saudi Arabia has laid the groundwork for a long-term strategy or in better words, responses, also implemented to respond to real or alleged accusations from international media on the topic of exporting extremism abroad.

These measures are part of the overall effort of Saudi Arabia to limit the spread of violent extremism, both within the country and abroad. Finally, the government of Riyadh did an excellent job in strengthening its anti-radicalization and rehabilitation programs, by organizing open dialogues that refuted violent Islamist extremist interpretation of the Qu'ran and ideology, as well as launching international conferences and enhancing cooperation with the media to talk about the dreadful phenomenon, i.e. terrorism. For this purpose, awareness campaigns were created, in particular, with the aim of strengthening the values that are the core of Islam and educating Saudi citizens, sheiks and clerics as well, about the dangers and consequences related to violent extremism. Finally, with regard to the de-radicalization and rehabilitation processes, the Saudi authorities have implemented very effective efforts that have proved to be more compelling at a global level, so much so that several other countries are implementing similar programs.

#### **4.5 (NATO) NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION'S COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY:**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is both political and military, since it promotes democratic shared values, is concerned with security issues and defence and encourages cooperations between states in order to avoid conflict – militarywise it advances resolutions that mobilize armed forces when diplomatic discourse fails. The fundamental purpose of the organization is to ensure global security and defense, to safeguard public freedom and liberties. NATO firmly believes in the concept of “*collective defense*”<sup>252</sup> – which binds member states together and since it creates an alliance, solidarity is at its core. The principle of solidarity was firstly invoked after the terrorist attack of 9/11.

Nato as a global institution with a military approach to terrorism or any other threat, in addition to its founding principle of collective defense, has the ability to manage crises before they become conflicts and promote peace through “*cooperative security*” – that rises through international agreements between member states and the monitoring of arms trade. Despite the “*Euro-Atlantic*”<sup>253</sup> context to date is peaceful, more and more countries are acquiring military capabilities as well as weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that endanger the security and stability of both NATO member states and the world as a whole. Other factors of instability are terrorism and extremism, which with their ideologies and methods of spectacularization of fear and terror, through the media or explosive attacks on people or symbolic infrastructures, do nothing but generate a continuous threat that needs to be dealt with as well as completely resolved.

In order to provide such security, NATO relies on the concept of “*deterrence*”- i.e the ability of ensuring the rightful use and mixture of military techniques and weapons. As an organization, it does this via cooperation between states, information sharing through intelligence agencies and lastly threat analysis. Apart from this, the organization seeks to promote peace and defeat threats like terrorism and extremism, through its “*Open Door policy*,”<sup>254</sup> in the sense that it allows membership to all those democracies that share common values on security and defense. According to the 2012 Chicago Summit, the “*policy guidelines on counter-terrorism*” were established for NATO; in fact the attack on 9/11 launched the “*Operation Active Endeavour*”- which allowed member states and Allies to adopt a military and strategic approach for defense against terrorism.

The mission was to enhance intelligence information sharing while also developing both scientifically and technologically, a response to the threat. This was possible also thanks to the “*Science for Peace and Security Programme*”<sup>255</sup> – which allows scientists, experts and NATO allied security authorities to come together and cooperate while addressing certain issues; them being: “*cyber defense, cyber terrorism and online recruitment, developing security devices such as surveillance cameras and sensors*”<sup>256</sup> – to this end it provides security without the usage of armed forces.

The aim of the guidelines handed to NATO is to:

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<sup>252</sup> <https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html>

<sup>253</sup> [https://www.nato.int/nato-static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_publications/20120214\\_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato-static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf)

<sup>254</sup> [https://www.nato.int/nato-static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_publications/20120214\\_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato-static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf)

<sup>255</sup> [https://www.nato.int/nato-static/fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_topics/ct-policy-guidelines.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato-static/fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/ct-policy-guidelines.pdf)

<sup>256</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_85373.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_85373.htm)

- 1) *“Provide strategic and risk-informed direction to the counter-terrorism activities ongoing in respect to NATO’s core values and tasks, which are collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.*
- 2) *Identify the principles to which Allies adhere*
- 3) *Identify key areas in which to undertake initiatives of prevention and protection against acts or threats of terrorism.”*

The military organization fulfills the above aims according to some founding principles, like:

- 1) *“compliance to International Law”* - while providing accurate responses to terrorism
- 2) *“support towards Allies”* – to which efforts of prevention and protection of freedom and liberties are linked
- 3) *“non-duplication & complementarity”* – in this case NATO coordinates its operations and ensures that they are targeted for a successful outcome
- 4) *“key areas”* – the focus of NATO and its Allies efforts are divided in three main sectors, i.e. *“awareness, capabilities and lastly engagement.”* The first ensures security through consultations between authorities and counter-terrorism experts, who take the most appropriate preemptive strategy in order to fulfill its tasks. In regards to capabilities, the organization considers them valuable expertise and fundamental for countering the terrorist threat, also it trains and educates its experts or operational forces according to different scenarios and emergencies. Lastly, the engagement phase requires a *“holistic approach”*<sup>257</sup> to a certain problem or threat while also needing vast series of both military and non-military techniques and means.

NATO as a defence system and military organization maintains its legitimacy and credibility because when it decides to intervene to resolve conflicts or counter a threat it assumes a political-strategic approach while providing preemptive and appropriate tools to its member states and Allies. Since the security dimension has enlarged itself compared to the military one, as a consequence of the emergence of more and more numerous and serious non-military threats, be them economic, technological, social or demographic - NATO in this sense, like other international military organizations, now as ever before is focused on the prevention of armed threats and seeks to promote peace worldwide.

It represents also one of the key players in the creation of a *“collective security system”* which tackles the problem of risk and crisis management, in a strategically ordered and rational way while including those that come from the Southern area of the World, namely: *“the Mediterranean, Middle East the new countries of Central Asia.”* In this regard, NATO divides its approaches into two: the first aims to form a sort of *“safety belt”* while the second aims more at a *“global security.”* Common trait of both, however, is the importance of the southern region of the world. The first approach is founded upon and seeks to resolve problems and manage crises without intervening militarily, hence limiting the possible damages - whereas the second seeks the opposite or at least mitigate both the political and social instability of these areas through a set of peaceful relations. However different the two approaches, are in a sense *“complementary”*<sup>258</sup> even if the first considers the American vision of the strategy and international politics to be taken, as being a founding State – while the latter requires a more targeted coordination of military and political forces and together they create a long-term response negotiations on terrorist threats.

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<sup>257</sup> [https://www.nato.int/nato-static-fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_topics/ct-policy-guidelines.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato-static-fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/ct-policy-guidelines.pdf)

<sup>258</sup> Carlo Maria Santoro, *“Rischio Da Sud- Geopolitica delle crisi nel bacino mediterraneo”*, Centro militare di studi strategici CeMiSS, Milano, 1996, pg. 189-190



To this end, coordination and clarification of the respective strategic objectives and joint action of the various member countries is urgently needed, aimed at ensuring both a general security within them and a more global defense of common values, first among all freedom and democracy – just to avoid ineffective or isolated answers that only generate further conflicts. In addition to these measures and organizational readjustment, it is no coincidence that already in 2016 – political and military authorities began to talk about creating a set of strategic measures focused for the South region – which was then confirmed in 2017.

This strategy was proposed by Italy, other founding State in addition to America, and was identified as “*Hub For the South*”<sup>259</sup> - a useful tool that will increase the sense of awareness in face of external or internal threats of terrorist nature and implement appropriate security and prevention measures.

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<sup>259</sup> [https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica\\_estera/organizzazioni\\_internazionali/nato.html](https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica_estera/organizzazioni_internazionali/nato.html)

<sup>260</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_77646.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm)

#### **4.6 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY, DEFENSE AND COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY:**

Before analyzing the European strategy against the terrorist threat, it should be made clear that there are three European statuses; the economic, political and human rights and finally the military one, composed of the NATO military and global entity. Therefore, the competencies attributed to it in the field of security and defense should be thoroughly outlined. In fact, the “*Western European Union*”<sup>261</sup> was created for these purposes, and is an institution that to some extent represents the collective, global and European security policy as well as it implements rules and strategies that serve as means of prevention and protection. Historically, the role of the Western European Union has been political coordination and decision-making support among the European members of NATO.

In fact, it makes its appearance through the “*1991/1993 Maastricht Treaty*,” which posed questions and proposed methods of response to internal and external threats, becoming the basis of a future collective security system. The main body of the Union is the Council, which analyzes problems or threats to peace on the initiative of the member states – all of this limits the decision-making power and therefore urges a review of the methods of consultation between states, ergo for this reason the Council was finally made permanent and an “*ad hoc group*” was created in order to make its political and above all military coordination more effective, represented by the numerous ministries of foreign affairs and defense. Moreover, mere consultation is no longer enough given the continuous changes in the nature of the threats and therefore needs to be continuously developed on several fields, such as “*arms control, the monitoring of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their sometimes illegal trade, the development of intelligence units and finally the training of experts on terrorism.*”<sup>262</sup>

For these purposes the “*Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP or PESCO)*” was created to defend common values, interests and the Union’s independence and to strengthen its external security. Such policy has been revised through the “*1999 Amsterdam Treaty*” – which conferred to the Secretary general of the Council, the role of High Representative, in order to give more visibility to PESCO as well as effectiveness of its foreign policies and procedures. Another important date is february 2001, which marks the signing of the “*Nice Treaty*”<sup>263</sup> a norm designed to strengthen the decision-making process of the Union and PESCO itself while also expanding its membership to other parties. It also consists in a targeted cooperation that binds member states to firmly engage in increasing their common military capabilities, which is the reason why PESCO has a logic of openness to third countries. It is aimed at creating an effective foreign policy that must also postulate military forces which have the goal of implementing and successfully completing humanitarian missions – the latter aimed at restoring peace, even with the use of armed force, in the face of the proliferation of new and increasingly aggressive threats, extremism and terrorism of different origins.

Another important aspect in regards to counter-terrorism or other threats, is that after the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty and various meetings held in various headquarters, namely, “*Helsinki, Feira and Nice*”<sup>264</sup> a gradual process of implementation of military capabilities was put into action by the European Councils – if of course NATO was not already engaged in such crisis management operations. This led to a more global approach which consisted in the Union’s determination in

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<sup>261</sup> Carlo Maria Santoro, op. cit, pg. 192

<sup>262</sup> Carlo Maria Santoro, op. cit, pg. 194-195

<sup>263</sup> <https://www.difesa.it/Content/semestrepr presidenzaUE/Pagine/LaPoliticaEuropeadiSicurezzaDifesa.aspx>

<sup>264</sup> <https://www.difesa.it/Content/semestrepr presidenzaUE/Pagine/LaPoliticaEuropeadiSicurezzaDifesa.aspx>

developing those decision-making skills autonomous enough to start off military operations in response to international crises. In fact, this development led to the so-called “*Petersberg Missions – which essentially aimed at humanitarian intervention and peace enforcement*”<sup>265</sup> while supporting PESCO.

The main objective of these political and strategic-military capacities was to establish “*by the year 2003, capable and self-sustaining military forces*” in the management of their naval, air and logistic resources and to operate and resolve in the shortest time and in the most effective way such crises. Furthermore, another important instrument, but above all intrinsic to PESCO, is the “*Foreign Security and Defense Policy (FSDP or PESD)*”<sup>266</sup> – which was established after the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, with the aim of maintaining peace by strengthening international security and minimizing risks and threats.

Even before this treaty, “2004” marked a fundamental element in the implementation of this policy, a new objective that aimed to broaden the strategies from an even more global perspective. These prevention methods are included in the “*2010 Headline Goal*” – which increases the national armed forces quantitatively and qualitatively as well as the development of adequate combined efforts between the aforementioned forces. The policy assigns everything to any kind of military force, from the police, civil protection and then to state authorities. These forces then base their preventive and strategic operations on “*four scenarios*”:

- 1) “*stabilization and reconstruction*”
- 2) “*conflict prevention*”
- 3) “*target strengthening of institutions*”
- 4) “*Humanitarian support operations*”<sup>267</sup>

To each of these situations is assigned the same approach, but different from the strategic-military one, i.e. “*Comprehensive approach*”<sup>268</sup> – which requires an increasingly structured cooperation between the various security institutions of the International Community, while developing the same concepts of security and defense but in larger terms. Future objectives of this approach and aforementioned policy are to: “*optimize the pre-existing defense and security systems, create an ad hoc “operation center” with headquarters in Bruxelles for PESCO activities stationed also in Africa, review of 2003 crisis management procedures which need to be updated, and lastly strengthen the collaboration with the U.N and NATO.*”<sup>269</sup>

In regards to the future objective which requires more cooperation between states, an important note should be outlined in regards to the partnership against terrorism between the U.S and the European Union. For this purpose, the partners decided to sign an “*operational agreement*” to tackle several issues, criminal activities included. The core of such deal is the sharing of information, both technical (regarding the training techniques and methods) and non. Considering this, a collaboration with the E.U Europol agency is imperative, in fact the two parties engage in agreements or counter-

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<sup>265</sup> <https://www.difesa.it/Content/semestrepr presidenzaUE/Pagine/LaPoliticaEuropeadiSicurezzaeDifesa.aspx>

<sup>266</sup> [https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica\\_estera/politica\\_europea/dimensione-esterna/sicurezza\\_comune.html#pesd](https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica_estera/politica_europea/dimensione-esterna/sicurezza_comune.html#pesd)

<sup>267</sup> [https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica\\_estera/politica\\_europea/dimensione-esterna/sicurezza\\_comune.html#pesd](https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica_estera/politica_europea/dimensione-esterna/sicurezza_comune.html#pesd)

<sup>268</sup> [https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica\\_estera/politica\\_europea/dimensione-esterna/sicurezza\\_comune.html#pesd](https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica_estera/politica_europea/dimensione-esterna/sicurezza_comune.html#pesd)

<sup>269</sup> [https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica\\_estera/politica\\_europea/dimensione-esterna/sicurezza\\_comune.html#pesd](https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica_estera/politica_europea/dimensione-esterna/sicurezza_comune.html#pesd)

terrorism strategies with offices such as: “*U.S Border and Customs Protection, FBI, the NYC Police Department and lastly but certainly not least, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).*” In the year 2016 a “*European Counter Terrorism Center (ECTC)*”<sup>270</sup> was established by Europol which aids in the investigative processes upon request of E.U state members.

The ECTC, focuses on effective strategies to give a response or at least an alternative to terrorism and extremism as well as their propaganda. It provides support during counter-operations, tackles foreign fighters, shares intelligence and expertise regarding how these issues are financed (in fact it collaborated in the establishment of the “*Terrorist Finance Tracking programme*” – which detects the plots of the attacks and who is responsible), investigates on online terrorist propaganda and extremism (to this extent it created the “*E.U Internet Referral Unit,*” a framework that uses the preemptive approach when investigating on terrorist and their online activities, it provides this service by using special databases that collect confidential information), controls “*illegal arms trafficking*”<sup>271</sup> and lastly but certainly not least it makes cooperation among terrorism-fighting authorities its core goal.

Given the follow up to 9/11, various attacks suffered in Europe and the multiplicity of (the thus far mentioned) strategies implemented by the various countries and international security and defense organizations to combat the phenomenon of terrorism, it is no coincidence if those methods aimed at creating material and above all military counter-terrorism capabilities in third countries, come to mind, thus creating an effective global strategy. The core goal is to create a “sustainable assistance model” that counters those challenges posed and within different geographical areas, for example the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region). For this reason, the European Union took action and comprised the “*security-sector reform (SSR)*”<sup>272</sup> – a series of strategies which according to the rule of law, enhanced the governance of those authorities that favor stability and security, better controlled borders and customs, transformed the military forces and finally trained terrorism experts and state authorities. All these efforts are part of the framework which counters terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization while also concentrating on understanding the roots and different manifestations of such phenomena.

The Security Sector Reform, is entitled to transform a state’s security system so that it can provide a sense of stability in the future., while indeed mobilizing armed forces but in the respects of human rights obligations. In fact, the reform emphasizes the concept of human security for the purpose of rendering the state in question’s ability to fulfill the pillars of the global strategy, which can be narrowed down to four – i.e pursue, protect, prevent and respond. According to the concept of Human Security, policy-makers and military authorities are able to address different issues, such as terrorism (to which a globally agreed definition is difficult to give), violent extremism and of course the roots and process of radicalization. The reform aims at expanding and overlooking different aspects of policy-making, some of them being:

- 1) “*accountability and institutions*”
- 2) *armed forces*
- 3) *security and intelligence services*
- 4) *border control*
- 5) *law enforcement services*

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<sup>270</sup>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)621898\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS_BRI(2018)621898_EN.pdf)

<sup>271</sup> <https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc#fndtn-tabs-0-bottom-1>

<sup>272</sup>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614644/EPRS\\_BRI%282017%29614644\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614644/EPRS_BRI%282017%29614644_EN.pdf)

- 6) *the judicial system*
- 7) *paramilitary units*”

The common trait among these aspects is that they all conclude that an effective “*cooperation between development and security actors*” is needed, both on the international level and individually speaking. To this extent resilience, “*the capacity of different layers of society to withstand, adapt and recover quickly from stresses and shocks.*”<sup>273</sup> Such apprehensions can be furthered by other issues, for example migration flows, climate change or even urbanisation. These methods demonstrate a state’s ability to use hard and soft power tools while providing good governance which in turn delivers stability and reduces the risks of future attacks or threats.

These are the purposes for which different programmes are implemented by the European Union as well as its Commission. These include: “*Witness protection programs / address the issues regarding foreign fighters (aimed to be used within the MENA region) / Instrument contributing to Security and Peace (IcSP).*”<sup>274</sup> The first program regards the protection of individuals who witness or whose presence in trials is very important when testifying on matters of terrorism or other cases that regard criminal activities. – it is a law enforcement effort that aims at protecting citizens and preventing future attacks in order to allow daily life to be conducted peacefully and in safety. The second provides initiative whose goal is to enhance border control management, as well as using de-radicalization programs effectively as a counter-terrorism or extremism method. Lastly, the third program is most probably the most vital of all three; it technically assists law enforcers in African areas, starting from the “*Arabian Peninsula even up to Pakistan.*”<sup>275</sup> The initiative comprises assistance and support in terms of aviation security and techniques that must be used when countering these dreadful phenomena as well as maintaining respect for human rights and above all human security.

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<sup>273</sup>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614644/EPRS\\_BRI%282017%29614644\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614644/EPRS_BRI%282017%29614644_EN.pdf)

<sup>274</sup>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614644/EPRS\\_BRI%282017%29614644\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614644/EPRS_BRI%282017%29614644_EN.pdf)

<sup>275</sup>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614644/EPRS\\_BRI%282017%29614644\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614644/EPRS_BRI%282017%29614644_EN.pdf)

**4.6.a. COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (Csce) AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE):**

The conference on security and cooperation in Europe represents an attempt to create a collective security system whose aim is to peacefully settle disputes and counter-terrorism. For the conference, it is imperative that there is “confidence building” among its member states; something however deemed ineffective throughout its history. However, the conference aimed to reduce the risks and threats of military confrontations in Europe, whether they were “*political, cultural or humanitarian.*”<sup>276</sup> For these reasons, the promotion of peace and constructive cooperation among the states are at the center of its strategies. In this regard the so-called “*multilateral preparatory talks*” were established – agreements that ended with the organization and definition of the negotiations. Finally, the conference decided to adopt the principles inherent in the “*1975 Helsinki Final Act.*”<sup>277</sup>

This Act was divided into three parts, the first of which concerned the founding principles of relations between states, the second the cooperation in various sectors, such as economics, science, technology and the environment and finally the third part focused on the human dimension of the concept of security itself. Following the vast “*verification conferences*”<sup>278</sup> – i.e those aimed at monitoring the progress of the strategies and cooperation, the OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, was born. The OSCE, is considered to be a vital security and defense for early warning, prevention, crisis management and post-attack reconstruction. Its counter-terrorism approach is cooperative in terms of security as it extends its counter-operations also to issues related with arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence-building and security measures, human rights, spread of democracy and economic and environmental security. All the States participating in OSCE activities enjoy equal status and decisions are made on the basis of the “*consensus principle*”

([https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica\\_estera/organizzazioni\\_internazionali/osce.html](https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica_estera/organizzazioni_internazionali/osce.html)).

In regards to counter-terrorism strategies, the OSCE focuses on a wide range of areas, them being:

- 1) “*promotion and implementation of an international legal framework*”
- 2) “*multidimensional counter-approach in regards to violent extremism and how it leads to acts of terrorism*”
- 3) “*prevention of terrorism financing*”
- 4) “*fighting against terrorism propaganda via Internet*”
- 5) “*promotion of open-dialogues and cooperation between both the private and public sectors along with government authorities.*”
- 6) “*Strengthening and implementing the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (issued in 2004) on the non-proliferation of WMDs*”
- 7) “*Stronger passenger and travel documentation for security purposes*”
- 8) “*Promotion and protection of basic Human Rights when putting counter-terrorism measures into action.*”<sup>279</sup>

With these focuses, it is clear the OSCE makes it imperative that comprehensive and strategic efforts are needed to prevent people from becoming future terrorists as well as disrupting attack plots and pursuing suspected individuals in court. Its measures need to be accountable in the sense

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<sup>276</sup> Carlo Maria Santoro, op. cit, pg. 196-197.

<sup>277</sup> Carlo Maria Santoro, op. cit, pg. 197

<sup>278</sup> Carlo Maria Santoro, op. cit, pg. 198


<sup>279</sup> <https://www.osce.org/countering-terrorism>

that the efficiency should be open to close examination by both executive and legislative authorities as well as the general public. The lack of such accountability of these measures may increase human rights violations and may weaken trust in these efforts.

In regards to prevention, what needs to be understood are the “*counter-radicalization measures*”<sup>280</sup> that the OSCE uses. Firstly, the radicalization process is dynamic and involves an individual accepting and justifying violent acts and extremist ideologies as something legitimate. Radicalization, however, can be considered a threat when it spreads hatred and incites people to act violently against either one another or a State authority. The factors that lead to extremism can not be identified in “race, religion or nationality” as not everyone of a particular background or origin are indeed terrorists. However the driving force that leads a person to engage in terrorist behavior is political or social grievances – hence why de-radicalization programs are not only enacted by different countries (for example, United Kingdom or Saudi Arabia) but also by the OSCE. In fact, in order to counter-terrorism and its multiple forms, the strategies implemented by state authorities and law enforcers must not only be credible and long-term but also sustainable and respectful of human rights and international standards of security.

The basis of these efforts should be the legal persecution of such unlawful actions and criminal individuals. Indeed it is the criminal justice system’s responsibility to clarify what actions are considered forms of terrorism and which type of individuals or groups are ideally terrorists. For this purpose, material evidence is required, so relying only on doubt and suspicion is not effective at all. To this extent, sharing of intelligence services and confidential information is crucial. Giving “*credible alternatives*” is what makes counter-terrorism strategies valid, addressing grievances and not exploiting them are also factors of successful outcomes. As a matter of fact, there can be “*Broad-based measures and targeted measures for countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT)*.”<sup>281</sup> According to the OSCE, the first address the conditions that drive an individual to resort to terrorism whereas the second pursue and prosecute those that incite hatred and justify violence and identify the people who are at risk of becoming terrorists or extremists.

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<sup>280</sup> <https://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true>

<sup>281</sup> <https://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true>

<sup>282</sup> <https://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true>

## *Conclusions:*

In exploring the dreadful topic of terrorism, I discovered distinct differences both in its multiplicity and the methods used by Western and Middle Eastern countries to contrast it. On one hand and more often than not people tend to generalize and make incorrect cultural assumptions when they should instead set the basis for a correct integration of cultures, religions and nationalities as well as supporting a peaceful coexistence among these factors. On the other, such phenomenon is different from that of the past. Having analyzed its evolutionary process in the Western, European and Middle Eastern world, one can therefore deduce that the modes of attacks and ways of propaganda, which are creating quite a few problems for states' intelligence and security systems - due to the difficulty of identifying those individuals of probable European or Western nationality rather than just Middle Eastern and that are organized in small or even in single cells, are aimed at provoking and generating terror via violent acts.

It is clear that in this context a coordinated system of information collection and then exchange between states is becoming increasingly necessary, as well as setting up prevention strategies. On the other hand, however it is necessary not to allow fear, terror and panic to run free and spread an apprehension when traveling as well as not to fall into the logic of hatred and indistinct racism towards individuals that are indeed Muslims, since the true objective of fundamentalist groups or organizations such as Al-Qaeda or more recently ISIS, is as thoroughly outlined in this thesis, to create a rift between the West and the Islamic world as well as provoking terror in individuals.

Furthermore, in analyzing the processes of radicalization and de-radicalization, not only did I discover that instead of treating a supposed terrorist individual as a criminal, countries like the United Kingdom and more importantly Saudi Arabia, treat that person as either a brother or close friend while opening a double-sided dialogue to persuade him or her to renounce the extremist perspective - but also that the Middle Eastern de-radicalization programme is the one with the most successful outcomes and contrary to popular belief the one with the lowest recidivism rates, even if the Kingdom implements a soft rather than hard counter-radicalization and terrorism approach. Also, who on one side is referred to as a terrorist, on the other can be considered a freedom fighter; depends on one's own perspective. The strategies of terror, however, are many -but they have in common the objective of arousing fear as a means to reach a goal. Attracting the attention of the public by the spectacularization of the attacks, to a political fact is often the main purpose of the perpetrators of terrorist acts. Terrorism could be defined as a form of violent action, which endangers civilians and therefore imposes a condition of widespread terror in order to obtain some results of political nature.

International terrorism, in this sense seems even more threatening, as its organizations have ramifications in many countries and financial support so conspicuous as it is hidden, perhaps also linked by rivalry between neighboring countries. This is how the global offensive against terrorism starts, in this case and recently against the one of Islamic origin. Thus it becomes a war against an invisible enemy that to a certain extent has no homeland and unfortunately has a disregard for human life so as to use in a "casual manner" suicide attacks or hold civil hostages whose lives then have a tragic end. It is not enough to carry out a traditional war against the countries that support terrorism or against terrorism itself, but it would be better to limit its expansion and recruiting methods online. To this extent, the intelligence services that I have insofar analyzed have been doing a successful job, in data collection, but not so much in its sharing, which needs to be enhanced and better coordinated between both intelligence agencies and other states.

Also on the basis of this research, one can move away from the definition of terrorism given up to now and then consider the terrorist attacks as real acts of war or as synonyms for an underground war but no less present to face. To this end, implementing new methods of prevention and protection, which will then have to promote a peaceful cultural, religious and ideological



coexistence, is something that Western states must somehow guarantee. To further this point, what I concluded is that even by identifying the factors that inhibit an individual to resort to violence or appeal to an extremist point of view, they are difficult to perceive and lastly counter.

However, the United Kingdom's approach to radicalization has been somewhat effective, in fact it is no coincidence if other countries in Europe are today trying to do the same. The programme revolves around four branches: Prevent, Protect, Pursue, Prepare – which are found within a broader programme entitled “CONTEST.” The mission of such framework is to prevent people from engaging in terrorist activities, protect those civil liberties that should be enjoyed freely, pursue those individuals suspected of terrorist offences and bring them to justice in appropriate trials and courts and lastly prepare against future attacks, by securing areas, enhancing security in critical infrastructures such as airports, museum sites, cafès etc. Successful counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism strategies stem from the way in which government authorities enact legislative and executive measures as well as collaborating either with other states or with their own law enforcers and the police when sharing sensitive data on suspected individuals. The goal for such information collection and partition is to challenge the ideology behind terrorism and extremism whilst protecting vulnerable people and support those at-risk sectors or institutions.

The aim of my thesis was to give a better understanding of terrorism and how it affects and influences security and policy-makers. The essay focused on the processes of radicalization and deradicalization, who their actors were and how successful can they be in terms of recidivism rates. Also, the first chapter was quite interesting to the point of giving and explaining in a psychological perspective, how the mechanisms that generate fear and terror lead an individual or the general public so susceptible to the point of panicking and creating more chaos than terrorism, even if this phenomenon is at the same time atrocious. Secondly, in regards to the chapters that investigated upon the definition of terrorism, security, state of exception and counter-terrorism strategies, I discovered that policy makers should think of a more equitable and sustainable anti-terrorism methods by all. To do this, a preemptive measure that goes beyond the politics and strategies of each State's government is necessary and then it should be developed in various civil societies, transnational networks whether or not they depend on circumstance or less of emergency, in order to finally let it be top priority for important organizations, such as the United Nations or the OSCE. These institutions ultimately, have the duty to implement it, thus establishing a mechanism that will safeguard over time and guarantee security for future generations to come. In fact, it is precisely in the absence of this that terrorism develops and in some cases appears to be unstoppable.

In conclusion, terrorism proliferates where there are precarious social conditions as well as tensions, and where poverty and despair reign indiscriminate. As long as there will be poverty and social inequality, terrorism and extremism will exist in various forms and in different places on the earth, so it will be difficult to eradicate them, if policy-makers do not make profound social and cultural reforms on a global scale. Perhaps the only way to combat this feeling of terror is doing something to eradicate terrorism as well as extremist perspectives and thus diminish the state of poverty; it is not a simple thing but the civilized world has the obligation to resort to all resources to put an end to such phenomena, and on the basis of this research, de-radicalization programs are the key.

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