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ABSTRACT

Sul finire del diciannovesimo secolo, la scoperta dei più grandi giacimenti d'oro del mondo nella regione del Witwatersrand (Sudafrica) creò i presupposti per dare luogo ad una vera e propria rivoluzione. La nascita dell'industria mineraria aurifera che ne seguì e il suo sviluppo sino a diventare la più produttiva su scala mondiale sono il punto di partenza di una narrazione che si estende su diversi livelli di analisi. Seguendo le tracce storiografiche essenziali a partire dalla seconda metà del secolo scorso sino ai giorni nostri e riscoprendo fonti primarie quali testimonianze individuali, inchieste, risoluzioni governative e trattati internazionali, è stata compiuta un'indagine sui principali eventi che hanno coinvolto la Repubblica del Transvaal dal 1886 sino allo scoppio della Guerra "Anglo-Boera" nel 1899. La costante considerata, tuttavia non scritta, è la crescita esponenziale della produzione aurifera alla base dei più grandi mutamenti economici, sociali e (almeno in parte) politici avvenuti nel periodo di transizione che nella ricerca si conclude idealmente con l'inizio del conflitto.

Entro dieci anni dai primi ritrovamenti, l'oro divenne propellente per la crescita economica di un paese sino ad allora principalmente agricolo. L'indotto che ne derivò e la crescente necessità di infrastrutture (ferrovie e porti) e grandi capitali catapultarono l'economia di una piccola nazione nell'arena dell'allora nascente finanza internazionale, come testimoniato dalla creazione di una borsa indipendente (JSE) e dalla crescita di rilevazioni aurifere. L'arrivo di capitali finanziari resta tuttavia ai margini nella riflessione sull'impatto sociale e demografico causato dal boom minerario. Ingegneri americani e minatori europei (principalmente britannici) si aggregarono a questa 'corsa all'oro', ma ciononostante le esigenze di forza lavoro non vennero soddisfatte e una collaborazione tra le compagnie minerarie, il governo e la colonia portoghese del Mozambico si concluse nell'istituzione di un sistema migratorio regolato in funzione dell'industria. La gerarchia del lavoro

nelle miniere di fine ottocento risultò essere compartimentalizzata e affondare le sue radici in un razzismo strutturale. Le crescenti necessità dell'industria estrattiva sembrarono inoltre trovare un ostacolo nell'amministrazione di Kruger e in particolare nelle sue politiche economiche. Seguendo un approccio a tratti protezionistico e autarchico [è il caso del sistema di concessioni (i più noti sono i monopoli della dinamite, del traffico ferroviario e della produzione di alcool) o del rifiuto di entrare a far parte di accordi commerciali regionali] il governo del Transvaal sembrò porre un freno alla fecondità economica derivante dalla produzione mineraria.

Nel 1895, all'insoddisfazione di parte dei 'magnati' dell'industria aurifera si aggiunse la crescente tensione sul piano politico tra migranti (bianchi ed europei) e governo scaturita dalla necessità di riforme sociali (lo scontro riguardo l'ottenimento della cittadinanza assunse un ruolo preponderante). Per la prima volta direttamente, le forze sociali contrapposte al governo di Kruger sembrarono trovare un appoggio nell'amministrazione coloniale britannica, divenendo parte ideale di un fallito colpo di stato. Da questo momento, il confronto diplomatico tra la Repubblica del Transvaal e l'amministrazione coloniale si avviò inesorabilmente verso il conflitto.

Le cause della guerra che ne risultò variano al variare della prospettiva dell'osservatore. È certo che gli eventi narrati coprono una breve parentesi temporale di relazioni "pacifiche" tra l'impero britannico e la Repubblica del Transvaal, in quanto la seconda guerra anglo-boera può essere letta come la definitiva risoluzione di un antico conflitto o come il completamento di un progetto coloniale di conquista regionale. D'altro canto resta tuttora difficoltoso (anche se l'argomento non è provato) non considerare la rivoluzione d'oro come concausa del trauma politico. Essa produsse infatti un aumentato interesse in termini commerciali e monetari (le vicende si svolgono durante l'epoca del Gold-Standard) da parte dell'establishment britannico per l'area sudafricana e un crescente vantaggio economico che avrebbe quindi potuto facilitare le finalità indipendentistiche della Repubblica del Transvaal.

I

The New Economic Framework

1.1 The early years and the shaping of the industry: 1886-1892

The rise and growth of the gold industry intensified and spread a revolutionary process already started by the diamond boom in region of the Northern Cape Colony. The gold would become the most important export of South Africa and the engine that would lead the industrialization of the country and its entrance on the capitalist economic system. From the first rush in the middle 1880's and during the first three decades of its existence, the South-African gold-mining industry would become the largest in the world. The gold production, compared to the raw materials would expand and grow at an impressively higher pace, developing as the core strategic activity of the country and, as L. Katzen¹ suggested, probably causing a reduction of the importance of agriculture, until then, the most important sector in the economic structure. Following the gold boom, the whole region (and the future South African Union) would have been shaped by great demographic, economic and political changes determined by labour migration, urbanization (exemplified by the foundation of Johannesburg) and capital investments and, eventually, part of those factors would indirectly provide some conditions that could boost the conflict with the British empire².

¹ L. Katzen, *Gold and the South African Economy: The influence of the goldmining industry on business cycles and economic growth in South Africa, 1886-1961*, Cape Town, Balkema, 1964, pp. 44 – 45.

² The reasons of the war are obviously numerous. However, it is impossible not to take into account the scale of the impact that the gold discoveries had on the shaping of the context that hosted the development of the following political events, in particular the relations between the British colonial powers, the Boer government of the S.A.R. and the gold-mining community.

Within the Witwatersrand region, the gold boom started during a period of political crisis (the First Anglo-Boer War was just finished but the issues that led to the conflict were not yet solved) and economic depression. Several random findings of gold happened during the eighties and the seventies of the 19th century³, but only between 1885⁴ and 1886, the prospectors⁵ finally proved the existence of a ‘great belt of gold-bearing reefs’⁶ in the area around the present-day Johannesburg.

From an economic perspective, one main institutional feature linked to the early development of the gold-mining industry was represented by the creation, by B. Wollan, of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1887⁷. Despite this institution and the event of its foundation have not been taken into account in numerous researches, it would represent a driving force for the following economic dynamics that would lead to the prosperity of the industry in the region. The reason underlying the creation of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was the practical need to have a place where companies involved in financial transactions could be physically present. An independent stock exchange in the locus of production, and far from ‘The City’ (London Stock

³ F. Jeppe, “The Kaap Gold-Fields of the Transvaal”, *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography*, Vol. 10, No. 7, 1888, pp. 438-446.

⁴ F. Abraham, *Witwatersrand Gold Mines: A True and Unvarnished Account of their Origin and Progress, translated from the German by H.C. Simonsen*, London, British Library, 2017, (Effingham Wilson & Co., Royal Exchange, 1892), p. 15.

⁵ P.H. Emden, *Randlords*, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1935, pp. 98-99. The discovery of gold could be defined as an outcome of a persistent and organized research work. The author refers to three different major starting point of the gold discoveries. Confidence Reef (F. Struben), Main Reef (G. Walker) and Langlaagte (G. Honeyball). The debate regarding the discovery is still a theme that arouses curiosity. For instance, see: <http://www.miningweekly.com/article/fred-struben-and-wits-gold-discovery>: consulted: December 30, 2017, updated: February 26, 2016, <http://www.miningweekly.com/article/which-gerge-discovered-the-wits-main-reef-series>: consulted: December 30 2017, updated: April 22, 2016.

⁶ South African History Online (SAHO), Colonial History and Development of Johannesburg, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/discovery-gold-1884>, updated: April 28, 2016, consulted: October 02, 2017

⁷ Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), JSE Overview, <https://www.jse.co.za/about/history-company-overview>, consulted: October 04, 2017.

Exchange) could, in first place, discourage major financial speculation and secondly, it could simplify the access in the stock market for the South African mining companies (framework of low requirements for being listed)⁸. In the short term, as we will see, the size of the stock market and the assets of the companies could not avoid a severe crisis strengthened by speculation⁹ (assuming the LSE still being the nerve centre of the finance industry). However, in the long term, the importance of the foundation of this institution (which was the most sophisticated outcome of the rise of the gold-mining industry) would show up. The ‘luckiness’ of the birth of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was based on the specific financial condition of those decades. The modern global finance anchored in the international gold standard system¹⁰ [with its need for gold reserves to ‘print’ money avoiding inflation (deflationary pressure of gold)] and the gold-mining stock market were just dawning and the JSE took an advantage that would have made it one of the most influential financial centres of the world. Furthermore, the need of capitals brought about the establishment of a national bank. In 1891 the Nationale Bank der Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek was founded¹¹.

The hallmark of the Witwatersrand’s gold industry first real development derives from the physical property of the ore extracted and in part (financially), from the presence of a flourishing diamond-mining industry in the neighbouring region. The ores were easy to find in large quantity in the first period, however, they were of low-grade quality and the recovery of

⁸ M. Lukaszewicz, “From Diamonds to Gold: The Making of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 1880-1890”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 43 No. 4, 2017, pp. 715-732.

⁹ *Ivi*, pp. 730-731.

¹⁰ In reference to the monetary supremacy of the British Empire, the Gold Standard and the Witwatersrand Gold, see: R. Ally, *Gold & Empire: The Bank of England and South Africa’s Gold Producers, 1886-1926*, Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press, 1994, pp. 11-28.

¹¹ A. Webb, “Blainey and early Witwatersrand profitability: some thoughts on financial management and capital constraints facing the gold mining industry, 1886–1894”, *South African Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 12, No. 1-2, 1997, p. 143

gold would be more complex. The whole processing of the gold, therefore, required high level technology in terms of machinery and chemicals (the use of cyanide¹², through the newly invented MacArthur-Forrest process)¹³. This gold-mining industry needed obviously large amounts of capital¹⁴. Large scale investments and a structured strategy for the exploitation of the gold reefs could be made only by great pre-existing companies (machinery and capitals had to be imported from England or from the near Kimberley diamond fields). Mainly because of these reasons, the early gold-mining activity in South Africa could never take the form of an unequipped and amateurish gold rush made by individual diggers or small companies. Most early economic-historians, firstly, G. Blainey¹⁵, while referring to the early gold-mining industry and its further development (involving all the economic and political consequences), made a clear-cut differentiation between deep level-mining and outcrop companies operating in the sector. The existence of a specific deep level mining group of companies was already conceptualised by early contemporary analysts¹⁶. This theory of a substantial distinction in structure and behaviour between the two types of companies has been debated and denied¹⁷. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that, after less than ten years from its discovery, the exploitation of gold involved large structured companies (among those first companies some of the representatives and magnates were the already known diamond-industry lords Barnato, Eckstein, Farrar, Jeppe and Rhodes) and public institutions. The extent of the mining revolution

¹² F. H. Hatch, J. A. Chalmers, *Gold Mines of the Rand: Being a Description of the Mining Industry of Witwatersrand, South African Republic*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 232.

¹³ Encyclopædia Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/technology/cyanide-process> consulted: October 06, 2017

¹⁴ R.V. Kubicek, *Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice: The Case of South African Gold Mining Finance, 1886-1914*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1979, p. 40.

¹⁵ G. Blainey, "Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid", *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1965, pp. 350-366.

¹⁶ T. Reunert, *Diamonds and Gold in South Africa*, London, J.C. Juta & Co., 1893, p. 102.

¹⁷ Paragraph 4.2.1

that was taking place in the Rand is immediately displayed by the precedence that the industry had over the public and political involvement. Indeed, in 1886, the first public institutional step in connection with the birth of the mining industry, was the appointing of a mining commissioner (and the creation of an elected Diggers' Committee) by the Republic's government of Pretoria. The Committee would govern the city of Johannesburg and the Witwatersrand. Later, it would be replaced by the Johannesburg Sanitary Board until 1897¹⁸, when finally, the municipality of Johannesburg was formalised¹⁹.

In terms of public relations, of all the activities carried on by the mining companies during the first gold boom (1886-1890), one of the most prominent was the constitution of the Chamber of Mines in 1889²⁰ as the major representative association of the gold-mining 'community'. In addition to the official publication of statistics, the Chamber would put emphasis on the promotion, protection and lobbying of the mining industry interests. Indeed, it would have a major role in the struggle to determine the policies concerning labour and wages. During the last decade of the nineteenth century the Chamber would come out as a great political force within the region. Although it has generally been considered as a unitary body which related in contrast to the public administration (Boer government), both this distinction and the sense of unity within the mining élite are not unvaried patterns. For instance, inside the mining industrialist community, the diverging positions and approaches would result indeed in a 'secession' of a group of magnates led by J.B. Robinson. In 1896, the secessionist would join

¹⁸ The structural corruption of this body would generate the recurrent demand (and protest) for its suppression. See C. Webb, *The Uitlander Movement in the South African Republic before the Jameson Raid*, Thesis (B.A.), Johannesburg, University of the Witwatersrand, 1952, pp. 17-18.

¹⁹ T. Pogue, *The evolution of research collaboration in South African gold mining: 1886-1933*, Thesis (Ph.D), Maastricht, Universitaire Pers Maastricht, 2006, p. 90.

²⁰ The official recognizing of the Chamber of Mines dated 1889, however, the Chamber official site <http://www.chamberofmines.org.za/about/history> and L. Callinicos, *A People's History of South Africa, Vol. 1: Gold and Workers*, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 2017, p. 18 refer to a previous foundation in 1887.

in the Association of Mines²¹, however, this organization would last just until the following year.

The involvement in the public debate started in 1891 through the creation of the South African Mining Journal (S.A.M.J.). This would have been the official mining press. Data, reports, minutes and speeches of the mines' officers and magnates were published. Moreover, as pointed out by B. Bozzoli, the Journal was probably not only the official voice of the industry, but also the ideological guarantor and the most direct instrument to influence the public opinion about the utmost importance of the interests of the gold industry as a whole²². The journal, as the other bodies of the gold-mining sector, would both sponsor the mining industry and raise criticism against the maladministration of Kruger government. Another essential source of pressure for the government was notably represented by the Association of Mine Managers²³, formed in 1892. The Association had the most radical approach in dealing with the Kruger's regime. For instance, it would push the state, through the Chamber of Mines, to increase the Hut Tax²⁴ and to implement the mobilisation and regulation of the labour force flow toward the gold mines²⁵.

²¹ P. H. Emden, *Randlords*, Cit., pp. 333-334.

²² B. Bozzoli, *The Political Nature of a Ruling Class: Capital and Ideology in South Africa: 1890-1933*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, pp. 34-35.

²³ *Ivi*, p. 289.

²⁴ This kind of regulation could force the workers to tie themselves to the mining districts. The 'Hut Tax is a type of poll tax levied on inhabited dwellings or huts generally at an early stage in the development of an economy when it is not feasible to introduce an income tax. The hut tax was a type of taxation introduced by British colonialists in Africa on a per hut or household basis', in <https://definitions.uslegal.com/h/hut-tax/>, consulted: December 13, 2017. For instance, see: Law No. 6 of 1880 and Law No. 24 of 1895 in *Laws, Volksraad Resolutions, Proclamations, and Government Notices Relating to Natives and Coolies in the Transvaal*, translated by S.H. Barren, W.A. Macfadyen, and J.H.L. Findlay, The Government Printing Works Pretoria, 1901, pp. 12-17 and pp 61-66.

²⁵ B. Bozzoli, *The Political Nature of a Ruling Class*, Cit., pp. 41-42.

1.1.1 Large companies and the ‘Randlords’

«In order to *make* money, in the new goldfields it was necessary to *have* money, to have a large working capital, to be in a position to prospect on an extensive scale and not on individual claims». ²⁶

As highlighted before, the main feature of the early gold-mining industry in South Africa was the exclusivity of its enterprises. Only large capitals, big companies and finance houses could take part in the development of the gold production mechanism. At the heart of the functioning and the creation of the industry, P. Emden identified the essential activity of the mining magnates, the so-called ‘Randlords’. The gold-mining tycoons were the only players that could effectively make ‘big money’ by exploiting gold industrially²⁷. Considering the origin of the gold fortune as the outcome of the dream of few mythical men has to be regarded as a simplifying historiographical expedient. However, the role of this magnates, mentioned in the sketches about their biographies²⁸, is still a substantial part of the history of the gold-industry itself. The pattern of their dominance in the industry during the early years is manifested by their propensity to act as speculators and gamblers²⁹, as a consequence of the necessity to involve large capitals in risky investments in the exploitation of gold deposits whose scale and therefore profitability were not predictable. Among the names of the most influential magnates, it is appropriate to remember C. Rhodes, B. Barnato, J.B. Robinson, S. Neumann, G.H. Farrar, S. Marks, I. Lewis, A. Bailey, H. and F. Eckstein, G. Albu, E. Lippert, J. Porges, J.P. Fitzpatrick, J. Wernher, O. Beit .

²⁶ P.H. Emden, *Randlords*, Cit., p. 223.

²⁷ *Ivi*, p. 101.

²⁸ *Ivi*, pp. 114-222.

²⁹ *Ivi*, p. 223.

Without drawing conclusions about their acting on the public sphere and their influence upon politics, it could be noted that the signature feature that linked these business men is that all of them (excluding Farrar) made their fortunes with the diamond mines of Kimberley. Most of them had links with European financial partners [primarily British (Rothschild), French (Crédit Lyonnais) and German (Deutsche Bank)] and besides, were European-born. All the South-African (Robinson, Lewis, Bailey and Fitzpatrick) came from British colonies and had close relations with the imperial establishment.

Thinking about the gold-mining industry of the Witwatersrand in the early days as a political tool employed by the British imperialist machine is again a helpful but tricky and unfair simplification made by some historians since the early days. Nonetheless, with the exception of S. Marks, whose friendship with the president of the South African Republic S.J.P. Kruger is well documented³⁰ and B. Barnato with his mediating role³¹, the gold-mining industry could be regarded as a body completely separate from, and mainly in contrast with the Boer administration.

By the 1890s, the structural composition of the gold mining sector went through a grouping process (124 companies would merge in few finance groups)³² which led to the creation of a coalition of nine holdings to centralise and synchronise the activities. The main finance groups, emerged were Werner Beit & Co. (Hermann Eckstein & Co. or Corner House), Cecil Rhodes and Charles Rudd's - Gold Fields of South Africa Limited. (later Consolidated Gold Fields of S.A. Ltd.), Barnato's Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co., the J.B. Robinson Group, the A. Goerz & Co. Ltd., Albu's General Mining and Finance Company, Farrar's Anglo-French

³⁰ R. Mendelsohn, *Sammy Marks: 'The Uncrowned King of the Transvaal'*, Ohio University Press, 1991, pp. 86-101.

³¹ P.H. Emden, *Randlords*, Cit., p. 141.

³² L.M. Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2001, p. 120.

Co., S. Neumann & Co., Lewis and Marks Group (African & European Investment Co.), and Abe Bailey Group (South African Townships)³³. The strategy of grouping (creation of holdings) and amalgamation (of new and old companies) would enhance the credibility and trust among foreign investors, contributing partially to overcome the initial financial crisis. Practically, the grouping system would lead the industry towards a rationalization in terms of centralization and coordination of technology, accountability and management processes³⁴.

The occurrence that unearthed the exclusive need for a large-scale, highly specialized industry was the beginning of a financial crisis in 1889.

1.1.2 The first crisis

By March of 1889, the year of a huge speculative wave, was recorded a fall of 60% in market shares (London Stock Exchange)³⁵ and the gold-mining companies' shares could not exceed the 5% of their value³⁶. The market collapse could be read as an expression of the panic caused mostly by the new awareness about the complexity of the gold processing method, the working cost related to it and the financial mis-management of the mining companies³⁷. Other major factors that would aggravate the depression, originated from the link of the industry with the international financial system³⁸ and from a severe draught that caused a lack of water for the

³³ P.H. Emden, *Randlords*, Cit., p. 207.

³⁴ J.J. Van-Helten, *British and European Economic Investment in the Transvaal with specific reference to the Witwatersrand gold fields and district, 1886-1910*, Thesis (Ph.D.), Philosophy, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, University of London, 1981, pp. 106-109.

³⁵ W. Graham, "The Randlord's Bubble 1894-6: South African Market Gold Mines and Stock Market Manipulation", Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History, University of Oxford, 10 august 1996, p. 6.

³⁶ C.E. Fivaz, "Presidential Address: How the MacArthur-Forrest Cyanidation process ensured South Africa's golden future", *Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy*, Vol. 88, No. 9, 1988, p. 312.

³⁷ A. Webb, "Blainey and early Witwatersrand profitability", Cit., p. 134

³⁸ L. Katzen, *Gold and the South African Economy*, Cit., p. 65.

mining activity and a triplication of the price of food³⁹. In addition, the crisis of Argentinian Bond 1890 that caused the collapse of the investment bank Baring House would affect directly the London Stock Exchange and widespread worldwide.

Besides these main factors, one suggestion of a more pragmatic perspective of the conditions that lead to the crisis could be found in these illustrative statements of a contemporary observer.

F. Abraham highlighted as first cause the lack of practical working experience:

«People imagined that when the samples assayed two ozs. per ton, the working result would be the same, and that everywhere by doubling the stamps the quantity of gold produced would likewise be doubled. This, however, was a gigantic error. The costs of working also were estimated, for want of experience, at twenty-five to thirty shillings per ton, whereas they really reached twice that amount. People were undoubtedly honest in what they said – they believed themselves - and being mostly employed at the mines, had it from the managers – who themselves believed it. But then who were the managers? Engineers, men of all classes, in many cases former diggers, but never really competent men. Indeed, how was it possible to find in so short a time, for so many new works, experienced mining managers; more especially as in this hitherto totally unknown formation, experience had still to be acquired».⁴⁰

He further suggested one other possible cause:

«In consequence of a failure in the rainfall, an unusually severe drought set in at the Cape, the mills fell short of water, and the transport of stores from Kimberley became

³⁹ P. Harries, *Work, Culture and Identity: Migrant Laborers in Mozambique and South Africa, c.1860-1910*, Portsmouth, Heinemann or Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press, or London, James Currey, 1994, p. 109.

⁴⁰ F. Abraham, *Witwatersrand Gold Mines*, Cit., p. 23.

impossible, as the draught animals could not be fed during a sixteen days' journey over arid desert. A famine reigned in Johannesburg. Some mines had to stop altogether, the output of others fell off considerably, even after at length the rains began to fall – the reason could not long be kept a secret».⁴¹

And, of course:

«In the best producing mines, at a certain depth, layers of pyrites had been unexpectedly met with. Such deposits are found in most gold fields, but in spite of warnings from experienced geologists, no means had been provided for treating them».⁴²

Despite the fact the author was writing right after an economic depression (1892), he gives us a good perspective on the future of the industry:

«I will however, attempt to prove that to the panic of 1889, and the period of apparent collapse from 1890 to 1891, are due to the present unexampled development of the Witwatersrand, and from it in turn will proceed the approaching opening up of further gold regions in South Africa, which will, in all human probability, supply sufficient quantities of the precious metal to revolutionise the commerce of the globe»⁴³.

After the 1889-90 collapse, the increasing findings of more deep-level deposits of gold would influence a restructuration of the industry in terms of technology and labour. From the political perspective, some scholars observed that at this point started the polarization of the industry

⁴¹ *Ivi*, pp. 27-28.

⁴² *Ivi*, p. 28.

⁴³ *Ivi*, p. 29.

towards the British entrepreneurs, or, at least, the progressive exclusion of the Transvaal Boers from the positions of power within the gold-mining industry⁴⁴.

In 1892, the path out of the financial crisis began. However, a new speculative wave was rising, and it would break amid a political turmoil.

1.2 Recovery, boom and crisis: 1892-1895

1.2.1 The technological need

The first arrest of the financial flow was primarily determined by the finding of pyritic ores and by the perception of this news among the investors. The efficiency in extraction of gold (by amalgamation process) from a 65-70% decrease to 50% and this would be reflected in a drop of profitability. In 1890, with the introduction of the Macarthur-Forrest process⁴⁵ was shown that the efficiency in gold extraction could reach the 85%-90%⁴⁶. The beneficial impact of the introduction of the cyanide process on the gold-mining activity was suggested by C.E. Fivaz⁴⁷.

The positive test was carried out by the African Gold Recovery Syndicate (A.G.R.S.) that granted the license until 1891. Soon, the A.G.R.S. first commercial plant was acquired by the Robinson mine. The technological revolution and the extent of the use of cyanide were irreversible. However, some difficulties arose from the lack of local professionals and the commercial rivalry with other competitive extractive methods such as chlorination⁴⁸.

⁴⁴ P. Richardson and J.J. Van-Helten, "Labour in the South African Gold Mining Industry, 1886-1914", in S. Marks, R. Rathbone, *Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa: African class formation, culture and consciousness, 1870-1930*, New York, Longman Group Ltd, 1982, p. 81.

⁴⁵ for a summary of the development of the method see C.E. Fivaz, "Presidential Address", *Cit.*, pp. 309-318.

⁴⁶ *Ivi*, p. 312.

⁴⁷ *Ivi*, p. 313.

⁴⁸ T. Pogue, "The evolution of research collaboration in South African gold mining", *Cit.*, p. 82.

1.2.2 The Bubble: 1894-95

The beginning of the financial recovery could be found in 1893. The discovery of new coalfields in the Transvaal⁴⁹, the technological revolution enabled by the cyanidation process, the restructuration of the industry towards deep-level mining⁵⁰ and the formation of a grouping system were the major trends that the industry was following to fuel a new economic growth.

The boom in the gold shares market peaked at the end of September 1895⁵¹, when ‘it passed on to London, spread over Berlin, Vienna and New York, lost hardly any of its intensity in Madrid, Constantinople and Cairo’⁵². The unregulated and speculative market share of the gold mining companies was at the height in the City while in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange the mining companies were continuously registered without a reckoning⁵³. The excitement of the stock market would not last for more than three months. In September 1895, due to a crisis of the money market in Paris, the gold shares started losing value. The market share of mines collapsed at the beginning of 1896. The direct causes of this second collapse had a purely financial nature and were rooted in the overvaluation of the gold-mining shares. W. Graham investigated the factors producing the bubble. Except for the possible mistakes deriving from his theoretical model, he found that the market distortion derived from the market inadequacy. The incorrect reading of past and present information about the prices or the asymmetry in terms of the access to those information created the financial bubble⁵⁴. By following the general interpretation of the event, the researcher concluded arguing that the Randlords, also through

⁴⁹ P.H. Emden, *Randlords*, Cit., p. 238.

⁵⁰ W. Graham, “The Randlord’s Bubble 1894-6”, Cit., pp. 8-9.

⁵¹ *Ivi*, p. 20.

⁵² P P.H. Emden, *Randlords*, Cit., p. 240.

⁵³ R.V. Kubicek, “The Randlords in 1895: A Reassessment”, *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1972, pp. 86-88.

⁵⁴ W. Graham, “The Randlord’s Bubble 1894-6”, Cit., pp. 28-29.

the media (journals) had a role in inflating the shares prices. However, if the magnates manipulated the market mainly for speculative reasons or rather to ensure more capitalisation to their companies is still not entirely comprehensible. The profits deriving from the uncontrollable trading of share (first and foremost among European small investors) would stagnate for at least the two following years. Moreover, what appeared to be an assured direct consequence of the second crisis, linked with the upgrading of the mines in terms of operations, was the end of the capillary speculations resulting from the collapse of under-capitalised mining companies and the proven necessity of large scale investments related to long-term industrial plans (critical to restore the profitability of the extraction)⁵⁵. At the start of 1899, once the deep-level operations were at full pace, a recovery could begin again.

⁵⁵ A.H. Jeeves, "Aftermath of Rebellion: The Randlords and Kruger's Republic after the Jameson Raid", *South African Historical Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1978, pp. 103-104.

II

The Political Economy of the S.A.R.

What appears to be a key feature on the development of the relation between the mining industry and the governmental institutions is the confrontation about the adjustment of public policies that could result more beneficial for the operations of the gold-mines. Even if the Kruger's administration, obviously in its own interest, tried to cope with the imperatives of the industry, the historiography and the history itself have given us a sense of backwardness and slowness of the political and institutional answer⁵⁶, to a swiftly changing socio-economic environment (this is, however, an impression derived also significantly from the campaign of the gold-mining industry itself). Is it reasonable to assume that the magnitude of the development of the mining industry worked as an endogenous factor in pushing the S.A.R. institutions not to handle the political stability within its borders and beyond?

From a mere commercial perspective, the two most noticeable marks of the structural failure are the disinclination to embark in regional custom unions with the neighbouring countries and the policy of granting concessions. The concessionary contracting form and a certain degree of protectionism were maintained until the outbreak of the Boer war, as it was perceived, firstly by Kruger, as the key to preserve the economic independence of the country⁵⁷. The concessions covered most of the essential supply for the new urbanizing areas (such as Johannesburg).

⁵⁶ S. Marks and S. Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State", *History Workshop*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1979, pp. 60-61.

⁵⁷ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War: 1899-1902*, New York, Longman, 1996, p. 54.

Water, tramways, electricity and gas⁵⁸ but also sugar, wool, oil⁵⁹ and liquor were all licensed products. The Gold laws, since the early years, would ensure to the State the rights on digging areas and on precious metals⁶⁰. Each and every case would deserve a follow-up. Although, the vital themes were the issues about the governmental policies on the provision of dynamite, railways and alcohol.

2.1 The dynamite monopoly

With the advent of the mineral revolution, the new-invented dynamite (patented in 1867 by Alfred Nobel), would become one of the key instruments of the mining activity and so, a primary resource for the industry. The production, the sale, the distribution, the concessions and rights over the dynamite were a major issue for the mining industry and for the economy of the South African Republic.

The first problematic peculiarity of the dynamite in the Transvaal was the fact that there was no open-market. The state granted exclusive concession to a private producer (or producers), leaving the door open for the formation of monopolies. Since 1887, Edward Lippert obtained the right to manufacture dynamite, gunpowder and explosives for sixteen years. In 1888, under his proposal and with the support of the French Société Centrale de Dynamite, the South African Explosive Company (Zuid Afrikaansche Maatschappij voor Ontploffbare Stoffen Beperkt or

⁵⁸ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 24.

⁵⁹ C.T. Gordon, *The Growth of Boer Opposition to Kruger: 1890-1895*, Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 39.

⁶⁰ For a brief summary of the 'gold law' framework, see: E. van der Schyff, "South African mineral law: A historical overview of the State's regulatory power regarding the exploitation of minerals", *New Contree*, No. 64, North-West University, Potchefstroom, 2012, pp. 139-144.

French Company) was founded and the monopoly transferred to it⁶¹. During the first two years of its activity, the French company was in competition with the Anglo-German company Nobel Trust, however, once the French Company started the production in 1889 and the demand of dynamite could be met, the monopoly took shape. The direction of the political economy of the S.A.R. determined by Kruger, would obviously help the national production. The exclusivity of the concession was also accompanied by the duty-free status on imported raw materials to produce dynamite. The import of dynamite (as a finished product) was forbidden, particularly from U.K. and Germany⁶². The dynamite concession's holder would import raw material from Europe and sold the product. Predictably, the price was immediately considered to be too high by the mining sector. Despite the growing pressure from the industry representatives (Chamber of Mines), who complained about the disadvantageous consequences of the policy of granting concessions and the fact that some level of corruption was demonstrated to exist inside the administration and the people involved in the dynamite industry, this monopoly would last until the end of the Kruger regime. The issue of the dynamite seemed to have an adverse effect also on the public image of the administration.

As a contemporary observer stated in 1900 in a commentary about the dynamite market:

«How far the dynamite affair falls under corruption, how far under financial maladministration, it is difficult to determine. In either case it constitutes a grave scandal...».⁶³

⁶¹ J.J. Van-Helten, *British and European Economic Investment in the Transvaal*, Cit., p. 210.

⁶² *Ivi*, p. 211.

⁶³ J.A. Hobson, *The War in South Africa: Its causes and effects*, London, James Nisbet & Co. Limited, 1900, p. 88.

In fact, aside from the ‘classical’ issue of the price, the first troubles related to the production and the use of dynamite were approached by the mining industry and the government in 1892. A governmental commission was set⁶⁴ to answer the concern about the quality and nature of dynamite. The investigation became necessary because of the rising levels of industrial injury and mortality⁶⁵. The toxic fumes and unbalanced or partial explosions⁶⁶ were affecting the workers and driving diggers away from mines. The dynamite was proved to be dangerous⁶⁷ and the governmental enquiry investigating the importation of ‘guhr impregné’ (a duty-free compound to produce dynamite) by E. Lippert through the French-based company (Société Centrale) revealed that the compound was simply low-quality dynamite. What was defined a ‘Gigantic Fraud’⁶⁸, represented an embarrassment for the Kruger’s administration and deteriorated his profile amongst the S.A.R. political and industrial élites. What was more problematic was that the nature of this market in the early years could not actually develop and enhance a local industry of dynamite (following the autarchic approach to economy preferred by the Boer administration).

In August 1892, the dynamite license owned by the French Company was cancelled by the Volksraad⁶⁹. The concession returned in the hand of the government which firstly made a temporary agreement to import 45,000 cases of dynamite from Britain, France and Germany⁷⁰

⁶⁴ M. Meredith, *Diamonds, Gold and War: The British, the Boers, and the making of South Africa*, New York, PublicAffairs, 2007, p. 272.

⁶⁵ J.J. Van-Helten, *British and European Economic Investment in the Transvaal*, Cit., p. 219-220.

⁶⁶ J.J. Stevens, *Fuelling the Empire: South Africa Gold and the Road to War*, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2003, p. 216.

⁶⁷ M. Meredith, *Diamonds, Gold and War*, Cit., p. 273.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁹ Parliament, ‘the legislative assembly of the South African Republic before it became the Transvaal province of the Union of South Africa’, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Volksraad>, consulted: November 13, 2017.

⁷⁰ J.J. Stevens, *Fuelling the Empire*, Cit., p. 217.

and the market was therefore re-opened to the international producers (to solve the problem of scarcity). Subsequently, the concession was offered to a contract-based agent (L.G. Vorstmann) that would manage the production, sale and distribution of dynamite for fifteen years. To avoid the formation of a pure monopoly, the Chamber of Mines proposed that the mining houses should produce their own dynamite. However, in June 1894⁷¹ the monopoly of the dynamite was concentrated in the newly-formed South African Explosives Company, Zuid Afrikaansche Fabriek voor Ontploffbare Stoffen (the Z.A.F.O.S. first plant was established at Modderfontein in 1895, due to the need to create a national industry to supply the raising demand of explosives)⁷² with the financial participation of the Nobel-Dynamite Trust, the Latin Trust⁷³ (represented by the Société Centrale) and E. Lippert⁷⁴. As stated in Article I of the concession: «The Government appoints the second undersigned, to the exclusion of all other persons, as the sole agent for the carrying out of the monopoly for the manufacture, the importation and exportation, the trade in and the sale of gunpowder, fireworks, ammunition, dynamite, and other explosives of whatsoever nature. The agent shall have the right to establish a company for that purpose»⁷⁵. The agent exploited indeed the possibility to operate with foreign companies and capitals. What seemed to be a solution was just the starting point of another crisis. Again, the configuration of the dynamite market called for protests among mining industrials and the

⁷¹ J.A. Hobson, *The War in South Africa*, Cit., p. 89.

⁷² AEL Mining Services, Our History, <http://www.aelminingservices.com/about/our-history>, consulted: November 14, 2017.

⁷³ J.J. Van-Helten, *British and European Economic Investment in the Transvaal*, Cit., pp. 215-219.

⁷⁴ *Ivi*, p. 224-227.

⁷⁵ The Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, *The Mining Industry: Evidence and Report of the Industrial Commission of Enquiry*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, “The state dynamite monopoly”, p. 565.

dynamite issue would be a key point of the debate during the Enquiry of the Industrial Commission of 1897⁷⁶.

The state monopoly would be an asset for the internal economy, however, it looked like it turned instantly into an exclusive crony privilege. Hobson, referring to the events leading to the 1897 Enquiry, highlighted that:

«The evidence makes it clear that the "monopoly," though nominally a " State" affair, is really in the main a private business. The Government agent is not an independent official to guard the interest of the State, but a private profit-monger buying and selling in the interests of two related companies⁷⁷, each of which makes a huge profit out of the affair». ⁷⁸

The awareness of the risks that a monopolistic market would produce were taken into account. More deeply, what emerged from the Enquiry of 1897 was that the largest problems for the industry were in first place the unsatisfied demand by Z.A.F.O.S. in terms of production of explosives; the other big deal was represented by their high prices (the prices structure could be seen as naturally deriving from the monopolistic nature of the market, consequent indeed on the political choices). Another crucial element that should be considered reading these first

⁷⁶ *Ivi*: Is one of the most useful collections of testimonies and reports to understand the issues of the gold mining industry in its first decade. "Economic problems in the region led the Volksraad of the South African Republic to set up a Commission of Enquire in 1897 to investigate high tariffs, labour and transport costs which were adversely affecting the mining industry. The 1897 report reissued here was not that of the commission itself, but contains much of the evidence and statistical material presented to it, in the hope that the mining industry would adopt its recommendations. As such, this detailed resource remains relevant to economic historians of South Africa and the British Empire." For a summary of the activity of the Commission, see: I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, pp. 162-171.

⁷⁷ The Nobel Dynamite Trust and the South African Explosives Company.

⁷⁸ J.A. Hobson, *The War in South Africa*, Cit., p. 91.

records, is the suggestion about the presence of a structural problem that would affect the South African economy's early development. The supply of vital raw materials and components (and, on the other hand, of technical skilled workers) necessary for the core industry, in this case the dynamite⁷⁹, would depend largely on importation.

«... you make the nitro-glycerine and sulphuric acid here. You import sulphur? Yes.

You import the saltpetre? – Yes.

You import the glycerine? Yes.

You import the gühr? – Yes. You import cotton⁸⁰?

Yes. Then, what on earth do you make here? – I make dynamite.

Now, you admit you import all these things. You have to pay freight on sulphure, on saltpetre, on glycerine, on gühr and on the cotton. You have to pay your workmen about three or four time sas much as you pay them at home. Now, you import all these articles.

Where does the advantage come in to the country? What advantage has the country got?

– What is the advantage to a country of any industry?»⁸¹

As said before, despite the troubles, the collisions and the debates around the dynamite monopoly, this status would be maintained and supported by Kruger until 1899. Before the war, the administration would begin the 'Peace Negotiations' trying to reach a 'Great Deal', with the mining magnates proposing them a monetary compensation and the cancellation of the concession⁸². But the meetings could not get things moving.

⁷⁹ *Ivi*, p. 88.

⁸⁰ Used for the production of blasting gelatine (gelignite).

⁸¹ The Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, *The Mining Industry*, Cit., p. 408.

⁸² J.L. Thompson, *A Wider Patriotism: Alfred Milner and the British Empire*, London, Pickering & Chatto, 2007, p. 43.

2.2 The troubled connection: the development of railways

«You must consider, gentlemen, it is not the railways which make the gold mines, it is the gold mines which make the railways».⁸³

In the first years since the discovery of gold, the history of the Transvaal was undertaking a drastic swing and some essential outcomes were already tangible. The discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand was shaping the behaviour of all the Southern African political actors and was affecting the relations between the South African Republic and the neighbouring regions.

As observed by Davenport⁸⁴, during the years of the gold boom, the pure conflictual nature of political relations between Boer nations and the British colonies' administrations was somehow set aside and partly relieved by a polarisation of economic interest in the area. The need to create a transportation system with the rich newly-discovered gold fields was an issue of common interest⁸⁵. To carry out the industrialisation process, the Transvaal mining economy had to import stuff from abroad. In particular, the deep-level mining required heavy equipment that only the railway system could move at 'cheap' price⁸⁶. Vice versa, the large amounts of gold, coming from the reef and heading towards the rest of the world, could be more efficiently exported to the harbours (Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban and Laurenço Marques) by train. A commercial interdependence and a growth in the volume of trade would positively influence

⁸³ The Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, *The Mining Industry*, Cit., p. 11, Mr. G. Albu evidence.

⁸⁴ T.R.H. Davenport and C. Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*, London, Macmillan Press LTD., 2000, p. 213

⁸⁵ For a summary record of the railway system before the gold discoveries, see, e.g. J.W. Jagger, "The railways of South Africa", in *South African Journal of Science*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1905, pp. 40 – 41.

⁸⁶ K.E. Wilburn, "Engines of Empire and Independence: Railways in South Africa, 1863-1916", in K.E. Wilburn, C.B. Davis and R.E. Robinson, *Railway Imperialism*, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1991, p. 29.

the economy of the whole Southern Africa. However, the temporary development of cooperative relations was just a result of coincidence.

By the 1886 boom through the 1890's, due to the impressively expansion of the gold-driven economy of the Transvaal region, a facilitation in transport and communication with the outside world would become necessary. As witnessed by a petition of the Chamber of Mines in 1890 to P. Kruger:

«the burden from which relief is most urgently required is the heavy cost, uncertainty and delay of transport caused by the absence of railways...».⁸⁷

The construction of the railways reaching the Transvaal was the answer for an urgent necessity, however, its development would encounter political obstacles. The idea of a railway network that would link Cape Town to Johannesburg was in the mind of the president Kruger since 1884, but the Cape colony administration rejected the proposal for two times. Since the discovery of gold, the drastically changing situation would instead catch the eyes of C. Rhodes and drawing the attention of the British empire colonial administration. In the original project, the line linking the Cape Colony to the South African Republic would be managed by the Cape Government Railways (C.G.R., the South-African British railway company based on Cape Town) and would have Kimberley as the major rail yard (under the guardianship of C. Rhodes). Nonetheless, the railway could be firstly addressed only through the Orange Free State. From Port Elizabeth, via Bloemfontein, the Colesberg line would reach Johannesburg⁸⁸ and it would

⁸⁷ J.J. Stevens, *Fuelling the Empire*, Cit., p. 194.

⁸⁸ R. A. Janse Van Rensburg, *The History of the Rail, Transport Regulatory Environment in South Africa*, 1996, p. 4.

be taken over by the O.F.S. Government itself in 1897⁸⁹. In 1891, the Nederlandsch Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorweg Maatschappij (N.Z.A.S.M.), which was the pioneering leader in railways in the Transvaal, managed the Sivewright agreement⁹⁰ with the C.G.R. (1891-1894) to link the Cape railways to the Transvaal, enhancing a growth in trade between the Cape and Johannesburg. The line linked to the Cape was not the primary option for the government because for political reasons (the inconvenient imperial British influence over the South African Republic) the government always preferred the Delagoa Bay Line. However, the financial ‘fear’ and the Transvaal crisis caused by the 1889 bubble along with the stagnation of the industrial growth, obliged the Kruger’s administration to manage this agreement with a British company, which depended on the Cape Colony⁹¹. The agreement would also favour the monopolistic position of the C.G.R. which could determine the freight rates all along the line⁹² (both in the Cape Colony and In the Republic of South Africa). In 1892, the building of the rail network that connected Cape Town and Port Elizabeth to Johannesburg was completed. During the same year, Kruger began the negotiations to open an iron route reaching the Durban Port and passing through the Natal. Despite being the company which would manage the railway in the S.A.R, the N.Z.S.A.M. originally objected to the construction because it would represent a competitor of the Delagoa Bay line. Due to its greater length, this line could assure to the company more profits (the difference in rates was based on the quality of product transported, but mostly, on

⁸⁹ Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Cape Government Railways, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cape_Government_Railways, Updated: September 01, 2017, consulted: October 29, 2017.

⁹⁰ Agreements between the Cape and the Netherlands South African Railway Company, quoted in K.E. Wilburn, “The Nature of the Rothschild Loan: International Capital and South African Railway Diplomacy, Politics, and Construction, 1891-1892”, *South African Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1988, pp. 4-19.

⁹¹ S.E. Katzenellenbogen, *South Africa and Southern Mozambique: Labour, Railways and Trade in the Making of a Relationship*, Frome, Manchester University Press, 1982, p. 23.

⁹² J.J. Stevens, *Fuelling the Empire*, Cit., p. 219.

the distance). However, in 1894, with the signing of the Charlestown Convention⁹³, the extension of the railway line from Durban to Johannesburg through the Natal colony⁹⁴ was allowed. The most controversial point of the agreement was the Article XVIII which would guarantee an open framework on the regulation of overseas goods allowances, and so it could penalise the Cape Colony line trade⁹⁵. The difficulties raised by the development of the railway system are also expressed by the failure of the construction of the Selati line (linking the goldfields). The concession was granted to Baron Eugène Oppenheim who turned to be nothing more than a speculator. Irregularities with the Oppenheim's account book were discovered and the following bankruptcy of the company caused the start of a legal battle. The construction of the line thus stopped in 1894⁹⁶.


⁹³ Agreement between Natal and South African Republic of 1894, *South African Treaties, Conventions, Agreements and State Papers*, Cape of Good Hope, W. A. Richards & Sons, 1898, pp. 201 – 211.

⁹⁴ “The Railway extension from Charlestown to Johannesburg: copy of agreements, dated 3rd and 12th February and 25th April 1894 between the Governments of the colony of Natal and the South African Republic”, in *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection*, 1894.

⁹⁵ S.E. Katzenellenbogen, *South Africa and Southern Mozambique*, Cit., pp. 25-29.

⁹⁶ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., pp. 41-45. For a study on the sources, see: D. Diespecker “Problems with a historical document — Cd 623 and the history of the Selati railway”, *Kleio*, Vol. 29 No. 1, pp. 58-67.

1. Southern Africa Railways in 1892*



*Image extracted from: *The Railroad and Engineering Journal*, Vol. 66, No. 12, 1892, p. 571.

2.2.1 Portuguese, British, German and the Transvaal: the railways and Delagoa Bay

As already mentioned, one essential development, already begun before the discovery of the main reef, was the construction of an 'Iron Road' linking Pretoria (the administrative capital, near Johannesburg) to the Sea (Mozambique) through the Delagoa Bay Route (the line would

start in Lourenço Marques)⁹⁷. The construction of the line had already the approval of the former president Burgers as a project of integration of the Boer region. But this early project never materialized⁹⁸. To figure out the early development and the growing economic and political relevance of the line, it could be appropriate to mention the enterprises of Edward McMurdo⁹⁹. From 1883 to 1889, the American businessman McMurdo was holding the concession for the Delagoa Bay line on the Portuguese soil. During the first years, the stalemate about the possible widening of the railway line was represented by the ambition of McMurdo to acquire the concession over the Boer soil and the respective desire of the Kruger's administration (through the N.Z.A.S.M.) to purchase his concession. The Portuguese government showed up a hazardous ambivalence when, while granting the concession to McMurdo, signed a secret memorandum with the N.Z.A.S.M. that gave it the licence to build a second railway parallel and competitor to the McMurdo line¹⁰⁰. Against this backdrop, the construction of his line from Lourenço Marques began in 1886. But, even so, with the discovery of gold, the situation would become much more intricate.

With the support of British capitals, McMurdo founded the London-based company Delagoa Bay and he gained more bargaining power in the argument over concessions. After at least three failed attempts of negotiations with the Kruger's administration and the constant refusal of the incorporation of foreign investments, the breakthrough would not be reach until the death of

⁹⁷ Transnet Freight All, *Railway Country, 150 Years of Rail in South Africa*, <http://www.transnetfreightrail-tfr.net/Pages/default.aspx>, consulted: October 10, 2017.

⁹⁸ S.E. Katzenellenbogen, *South Africa and Southern Mozambique*, Cit., pp. 16-18.

⁹⁹ K.E. Wilburn, "Rails Crossed Imperialists, Republicans and Edward McMurdo 1883–1889", *South African Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 82-103.

¹⁰⁰ *Ivi*, p. 85.

McMurdo himself¹⁰¹. In 1889, the secret memorandum deal was formalised with a Transvaal-Portuguese agreement¹⁰².

The railway, managed by the Netherlands-South African Railway Company¹⁰³, would be finished at the end of 1894¹⁰⁴ (the official opening was in 1895)¹⁰⁵ and it would connect to the C.F.L.M. (Caminho de Ferro de Lourenço Marques). The direct link to the Sea would establish a British-free harbour area rival to Cape Town and immediately dependent on the Transvaal industry. This railways' network configuration could, moreover, favour the integration of the Northern-East region. The evidence is that the construction of a railway system assisted the economic development of the area, however, the involvement of different stakeholders (Dutch and German investors, the Kruger Administration, the British traders and the Chamber of Mines) and their relations, experienced some great difficulties.

Following the comprehensive study of J.J. Van-Helten¹⁰⁶, who deeply analysed the ties of N.Z.A.S.M. with German capital, the complexity and importance of the railways' issue becomes more understandable. The international dimension of the Transvaal railways construction is represented, in the first place, by the relation started in 1884 by Kruger with N.Z.A.V. (Nederlands-Zuid-Afrikaanse Vereniging), a political association created for strengthening and improving the Dutch-Boer political and economic relations¹⁰⁷. The N.Z.A.V.

¹⁰¹ *Ivi*, p. 101.

¹⁰² Agreement between Transvaal and Portugal of 4 September 1889, quoted in K.E. Wilburn, "Rails Crossed Imperialists", *Cit.*, p. 101.

¹⁰³ Conditions of Concession granted to the N.Z.A.S.M., 1890, *South African Treaties*, *Cit.*, pp. 219-228.

¹⁰⁴ C. Webb, *The Uitlander Movement in the South African Republic before the Jameson Raid*, Thesis (B.A.), Johannesburg, University of the Witwatersrand, 1952, p. 38.

¹⁰⁵ C.T. Gordon, *The Growth of Boer Opposition to Kruger: 1890-1895*, Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 59.

¹⁰⁶ J.J. Van-Helten, *British and European Economic Investment*, *Cit.*

¹⁰⁷ J.J.V. Kuitenbrouwer, *A war of words: Dutch pro-Boer propaganda and the South African war (1899- 1902)*, Thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2001, p. 27.

was the first point of entry, for the Kruger administration, to reach the European political élite and the capital and finance (mostly Dutch) for the construction of the railway. The concession was granted to R.W.J.C van den Wall Bake and, after the foundation of the N.Z.A.S.M. in 1887, this company establish such a monopoly. Nonetheless, the freedom of manoeuvre in the enterprise's management of projecting and re-investment appeared to be limited by the nature of concession that would assign the last power of decision to the Pretoria government¹⁰⁸, while assuring it the 85% of the profits deriving from the operation of the railway company¹⁰⁹.

This concession would give reason for protests carried out by the most progressive side of the Volksraad (in particular by P.J. Joubert), which condemned the inefficiency of the N.Z.A.S.M. and its reprehensible economic and political power, making this issue one of the signature song of the political opposition to Kruger¹¹⁰.

Nonetheless, the involvement of the European finance in the project would begin to increase. Indeed, because of the changed situation on the possibilities of exploitation of the region due to the discovery of gold, the commercial German bank Berliner Handelsgesellschaft (B.H.G.) and Robert Warschauer & Co., started investing in the N.Z.A.S.M.¹¹¹. As the company grew in economic importance, its relations with German capital (B.H.G.) and the bank's subsidiary manufacturing companies¹¹² became more effective. It soon became evident that the German economy (in terms of trading) was taking advantage¹¹³ of the integration (from manufacturing

¹⁰⁸ K.E. Wilburn, "The Nature of the Rothschild Loan: International Capital and South African Railway Diplomacy, Politics, and Construction, 1891-1892", *South African Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1988, p. 6.

¹⁰⁹ J.S. Olson and R. Shadle, *Historical Dictionary of the British Empire*, Vol. 2, Westport, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996, p. 794.

¹¹⁰ C.T. Gordon, *The Growth of Boer Opposition to Kruger*, Cit., pp. 58-85.

¹¹¹ J.J. Van-Helten, *British and European Economic Investment*, Cit., pp. 173-178.

¹¹² *Ivi*, p. 93.

¹¹³ *Idem*, "German Capital, The Netherlands Railway Company and the Political Economy of the Transvaal, 1886-1900", *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1978, pp. 373-375.

production to the distribution carried out by N.Z.A.S.M.) by meeting the demand of machinery in the Transvaal. Germany was perceived as the major potential enemy by UK in both economic and political terms in Southern Africa at least until the Anglo-German Agreement of 1898 (in the case of the Delagoa Bay line, the financial difficulties of Portugal were leaving gaps that could be filled by foreign investments¹¹⁴; before the agreement, the Portugal financial position was worrying the British about the possible selling of Portuguese colonies to Germany¹¹⁵). Therefore, the condition of economic advantage hold by the German export industry would raise suspicion amongst British¹¹⁶, leading the ruling class to a sort of ‘paranoia’ and again, raising the tensions with the Boer administration.

Some sort of ‘exclusion’ of the British in the political and economic participation is difficult to deny. As we have seen, Kruger had a preference in attracting non-British capitals and in developing the Lourenço Marques line, giving to the East line the priority over both the line coming from the Cape Colony and Natal¹¹⁷. The railway from the Mozambican port was likely used as a political tool to secure the independence from the British imperialism¹¹⁸.

We realise that this issue was well known to the contemporary observers by reading a report of a British shipping agent:

¹¹⁴ “The Anglo-German Conventions of August 20, 1898 (MAY 1898-JULY 1899), No. 65. Memorandum by Mr. Bertie on England and Portugal in Africa” in *British Documents on the Origins of War: 1898-1914*, edited by G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley, London, H.M.S.O., 1927, pp. 44-87 and P.R. Kneisel, *England, Germany and the Portuguese colonies, 1898-1914*, Thesis (Ma), University of Louisville, 1942, p. 154.

¹¹⁵ S.E. Katzenellenbogen, *South Africa and Southern Mozambique*, Cit., p. 22.

¹¹⁶ J.J. Van-Helten, *British and European Economic Investment*, Cit., pp. 203-208.

¹¹⁷ K.E. Wilburn, “The Nature of the Rothschild Loan”, Cit., p. 5.

¹¹⁸ *Idem*, “Engines of Empire and Independence”, Cit., p. 30.

«The only railway seriously projected is that which is intended to connect Pretoria with the Portuguese railway at Komati... The Cape Government are at this moment constructing an extension of their great line to Kimberley northward to Vryburg... but the President will not suffer a railway to come into the Republic on this side. Similarly, the Natal government are extending their lines towards Barberton, but here again 'Oom' Paul [P. Kruger] stops the way. He will have nothing but the line to Delagoa Bay *viâ* Komati». ¹¹⁹

During the early days, the Lourenço Marques line was considered too badly-maintained and inefficient and the Delagoa Bay harbour did not draw the attention of the European imperial powers. But as the economic output of the Transvaal started growing, the issue became a cornerstone in the political calculations for the Southern Africa area. As pointed out by P. Henshaw, there was a set of well-defined economic factors that worried the British administration (represented by the Colonial Office) about the future of Delagoa Bay and of the railway linked to the Transvaal. An exclusive exercise of commercial power in the area held by a different nation (Germany or French) would affect the British economy in terms of flow of gold from the Transvaal (that could more likely reach competitors of London); trade volume in South Africa (as happened with preferential rates); profitability of investment in gold-mining (the control of the route would guarantee a fall in import prices and so offsetting the high prices derived from monopolies) and finally, as the trade on the Delagoa Bay line would increase, it

¹¹⁹ D.H. Houghton and J. Dagut, *Source Material on the South Africa Economy: 1860-1970*, Vol. 1, Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 259.

could threaten the financial stability of the Cape and Natal colonies (their debt position was compensated by revenues resulting from trade)¹²⁰.

The opportunity to increase the leverage in the Transvaal area originated during the first crisis of the mining industry (early 1890's), when the interruption of foreign investment inflow, the under-capitalisation, the high costs and the low revenues resulted in a liquidity crisis of the N.Z.A.S.M.. The financial weakness of the company put additional pressure on the Kruger's administration and the absence of valid alternatives forced Pretoria to take into consideration the opening of a dialogue with the neighbouring Cape Colony administration. On the other hand, Rhodes, following his vision of instrumental 'railway imperialism'¹²¹ for the unification of the South African region, tried to take advantage of the situation. He would nonetheless make only a small step on the expansion of the imperial sphere of influence. Since the late 1890s, his original plan was based on the fact that the securing of the control over the Portuguese line would favour a commercial union as an initial step toward the creation of a federation led by the British Empire.

Between the years 1888 and 1890, the Republican's need for a harbour led to a set of negotiations with the British representatives (primarily Rhodes and the High Commissioner for Southern Africa H.B. Loch). The S.A.R. government would offer to the British the exclusivity on the Northern territories (Matabeleland) and in exchange it asked for an access to Kosi Bay (South of Lourenço Marques). Although, the slowness of negotiations and the constant change of positions would not result in the opening of a 'sea route'. The only results achieved, but not linked to the harbour issue, was the official acquisition of control by the S.A.R. over

¹²⁰ P. Henshaw, "The 'Key to South Africa' in the 1890s: Delagoa Bay and the Origins of the South African War", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1998, pp. 531-535.

¹²¹ K.E. Wilburn, "Engines of Empire and Independence", *Cit.*, p. 31.

Swaziland¹²² and the occupation of the Eastern area (from Swaziland to the sea) by the British¹²³.

Despite all this, the formalisation of an agreement between Great Britain and Portugal¹²⁴, determining the spheres of influence, would cut out the British from the Southern-Mozambique area (in particular Gazaland) and guarantee the Portuguese occupation.

A direct confrontation between U.K. and Germany took place in 1894, when, during the outbreak of the Luso-Gaza war¹²⁵, a military squad was sent to the port to protect the British diplomats. The German government reacted dispatching a cruiser in the bay. The worst consequences were avoided by the intervention of Lord Kimberley (British Foreign Secretary) and Marschall von Bieberstein (German Foreign Minister). There were no direct political and military outcomes. However, the tensions between the two countries persisted¹²⁶.

The businessman James Sivewright¹²⁷ managed an agreement favourable to the C.G.R.. The company benefited of fixed good rates and gained control over the importation of construction goods through the line¹²⁸. These terms would nevertheless last just until 1894.

In the meanwhile, what could read as another major (indirect) progress in the development of the British colonial influence (through the building of a common railway system), was the Rothschild Loan. In 1892, the Rothschild Investment Bank of London, in contact with Rhodes, granted a loan to finance the N.Z.A.S.M.. The agreement focused mainly on the financing of

¹²² Convention between Great Britain and the South African Republic for the Settlement of the Affairs of Swaziland of 1894; the Articles VII and VIII ensured an equal treatment for British residents (compared to the Boer citizens), *South African Treaties*, Cit., pp. 48-52.

¹²³ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961, pp. 50-51.

¹²⁴ Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal, defining the Spheres of Influence of the Two Countries in Africa of 1891, *Ivi*, pp. 42-47.

¹²⁵ B. Vandervort, *Wars of imperial conquest in Africa: 1830-1914*, London, UCL Press, 1998, pp. 149-156.

¹²⁶ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., pp. 46-49.

¹²⁷ Who retained the concession of water supply for Johannesburg, see: *Ivi*, p. 24.

¹²⁸ K.E. Wilburn, "The Nature of the Rothschild Loan", Cit., p. 8.

the company for the building and management of the Eastern line (Delagoa Bay Route). The funding allowed the struggling Kruger's administration to reach a financial stabilisation of the railways budget. Conversely, the partial benefits obtained by the Rhodes' administration were remarkable as well. According to the agreement, the Cape Colony could carry its railway to Pretoria¹²⁹, it would control the traffic coming from South of Kroonstad¹³⁰, it would retain privilege on tariffs and proceeds from the Cape Town and the Eastern line and, in addition, all the project of railway extensions and lines¹³¹ of connection between Transvaal and the neighbouring region were theoretically banned.

In 1894, as mentioned above, the expiry of the Sivewright agreement would topple the Cape privileges. The managing director of the N.Z.A.S.M. Middleberg, by fixing the transport rates, would benefit the Delagoa line (following the governmental bias)¹³². In 1895, the monopoly of the Dutch railways and the high rates imposed over the traffic coming from the Cape led the British merchants to cover the 'last mile' (Transvaal soil) with the ox-wagons. At the same time, the Cape government appealed to the London Convention¹³³ to defend its commercial

¹²⁹ C.T. Gordon, *The Growth of Boer Opposition to Kruger*, Cit., p. 65.

¹³⁰ *Ibidem*, Kronstaad is a city South of Johannesburg.


¹³¹ K.E. Wilburn, "The Nature of the Rothschild Loan", Cit., p. 16.

¹³² J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., p. 38.

¹³³ The Convention of London was the agreement that regulated the relations between the United Kingdom and the S.A.R.. It ruled the independence of the S.A.R. over its internal politics, while it confirmed the United Kingdom as the 'paramount power'. Article XIII: «Except in pursuance of any treaty or engagement made as provided in Article IV of this Convention, no other or higher duties shall be imposed on the importation into the South African Republic of any article coming from any part of Her Majesty's dominions than are or may be imposed on the like article coming from any other place or country; nor will any prohibition be maintained or imposed on the importation into the South African Republic of any article coming from any part of Her Majesty's dominions which shall not equally extend to the like article coming from any other place or country. And in like manner the same treatment shall be given to any article coming to Great Britain from the South African Republic as to the like article coming from any place or country. These provisions do not preclude the consideration special arrangements as to import duties and commercial relations between the South African Republic and any Her Majesty's colonies or possessions» in H. Williams, F. C. Hicks, S. J. P. Kruger, C. van Boeschoten, W.J. Leyds and F. W. Reitz,

position. In response, Kruger closed the fords (drifts) of the Vaal river¹³⁴. The British government eventually regained the opening of the drifts through a military ultimatum. The trade on the railways recover regularly. Nonetheless, the increased traffic on the two new lines caused the heavy detriment of the volume of trade coming from the Cape Colony¹³⁵.

2. Delagoa Bay, the Great Game



The strategic significance of the Eastern line for the British colonies was not only a reflection of a manifest financial interest. The finalisation of the British process of conquest and annexation would have been facilitated by the full encirclement of the Boer Republics. The geopolitical shift could be virtually represented by the control of the access point to the last area of Southern Africa not subject to the domination of imperial powers, the Delagoa Bay. The

“Selected Official Documents of the South African Republic and Great Britain: A documentary perspective of the causes of the war in South Africa”, *Annals of the American Academy of political and social science*, No. 14, 1900, pp. 7-14.

¹³⁴ The border between the O.F.S. and the Transvaal.

¹³⁵ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., pp. 64-65.

structural financial crisis of the Portuguese Empire during the end of the century would make the occupation of the Southern African region a prerogative of Germany and Great Britain.

2.2.2 Mines and railways

In South African Republic's politics, the position and the performances of the Netherland South African Railway Company would be subjects of much debate. Primarily, the progressives (in opposition to the Kruger administration, institutionally headed by the Commandant-General P.J. Joubert) complained about the labour policy of the company: almost all the workers recruited were Dutch migrants and, furthermore, they received higher wages, free medical and recreational facilities that were not available for the Boers Citizens¹³⁶; thus the local population did not have direct benefits.

Secondly, aside from the political establishment, the other concerns would come from the productive sector, notably, from the gold-mining industry. A considerable problem was directly affecting the economic viability of the gold mines, and, it was attributable to the N.Z.A.S.M.. In 1890, the company obtained the concession to build and exploit the first railway of the Transvaal, in the core of the mining area. A line of 27 km (no more than 60 in the following years)¹³⁷ called 'Randtram', despite being disconnected from the railway system, would become the main artery in the Witwatersrand for the transport of coal coming from Boksburg towards the gold mines.¹³⁸ However, the management of the line would receive considerable criticism from the Chamber of Mines. In a letter of the Chamber of mines signed by the president J. Hay and addressed to the industrial commission of 1897, was noticed that the

¹³⁶ J.J. Van-Helten, *British and European Economic Investment*, Cit., pp. 180-182.

¹³⁷ J.W. Jagger, "The Railways of South Africa", *South African Journal of Science*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1905, p. 43.

¹³⁸ H. Heydenrych, "Die Randtram: Die Eerste Spoorweg in Transvaal", *Historia*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1987, p. 1.

mining companies complained about the scarcity of coal in 1893, 1895, 1896¹³⁹. A little earlier, in 1890, the Chamber raised awareness about the high freight rates on the transport of the coal. But, if the function, and so the price of the coal, was so vital for the industry (the coal was primary energy source), it is also true that the level of tariffs imposed by the N.Z.A.S.M. seemed to have a negative effect on the economy as a whole.

As the concession to the Cape Governmental Railway on the lines of Transvaal expired in 1894, the N.Z.A.S.M. could soon obtain the monopoly on the railways in the South African Republic¹⁴⁰ and own the chance to determine and get the freight rates. It would therefore deprive the state of one of its most effective revenue-raising instruments. With Articles XVII, XXXII, and XXXIX the N.Z.A.S.M. obtained the right to collect duties on imported stuff¹⁴¹. Predictably, the exploiting of tariffs on 'the last mile' (on the S.A.R. soil) by the Netherland Railways raised protests among gold mining magnates.

As highlighted in the incipit of the report of the Chamber of mines' Committee on railways of 1897:

«The Following Statements have been prepared with care, and accurately reflects the general disadvantages under which the industry suffers at the hands of the railways. The spirit of the Government to assist the mining industry is interpreted by the admission of all gold mining machinery and materials used for gold mining at 1½ per cent of the value. This policy however, is defeated by the railway carriage rates over which section are considered to be phenomenally high». ¹⁴²

¹³⁹ The Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, *The Mining Industry*, Cit., pp. 477-479.

¹⁴⁰ J. S. Olson and R. Shadle, *Historical Dictionary of the British Empire*, Cit., p. 794.

¹⁴¹ J.J. Van-Helten, *British and European Economic Investment*, Cit., p. 171.

¹⁴² The Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, *The Mining Industry*, Cit., p. 493.

The hypothetical discrimination in freight rates applied on the Transvaal by the N.Z.A.S.M. is demonstrated by the benchmarking of tariffs applied on the railway routes in the different neighbouring regions¹⁴³. For the gold-mining representatives, the high rates were perceived as a brake on the growing process of the Witwatersrand economy. Later, in the same report they would state that

«we come to the conclusion that the Netherlands Company has acted beyond its province in regard to rates, and that measures should be taken to remedy the unequal and preposterous charges which are generally being levied on over-sea goods destined to Johannesburg, which is the chief center of consumption».¹⁴⁴

The gold-mining industry criticism towards the N.Z.A.S.M. policies would peak with the official proposal to the S.A.R. Volksraad to nationalise the railways¹⁴⁵.

2.3 The liquor Industry and the drunken worker

The indirect economic, political and social effect of gold discoveries in the South African Republic is well represented by the market of Liquor. This subject has been mentioned by different scholars in economic-policy terms, however, the most extensive reading could still be considered the one made by C. van Onselen¹⁴⁶. If we assume the paradigm of an economy (of the South African Republic at the time of gold-discoveries) based mostly on agriculture (the development of the liquor industry could be an indirect outcome of agricultural surplus) and

¹⁴³ *Ivi*, p. 494.

¹⁴⁴ *Ivi*, p. 495.

¹⁴⁵ Appendix I.

¹⁴⁶ C. van Onselen, "Randlords and Rotgut: 1886-1903", in *Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand 1886-1914, Vol. 1: New Babylon*, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1982, pp. 44-102.

promoted by governmental autarchic policies (in this case, the Kruger's approach to economic policies), it is understandable why the first government-sponsored industrial project (outside Pretoria) was realised in the Hatherley farm¹⁴⁷. The company was called Het Eerste Fabrieken Agrarian and after, De Eerste Fabrieken in de Zuid Afrikaansche Republick Ltd. ('The First Factory') and it would be one of the greatest companies in the Transvaal. Through the governmental concession policy and the high import duties the industry could grow up without any obstacle. The concession, firstly owned by A.H. Nellmapius, would be granted later (1883) to a new company formed by Nellmapius himself, I. Lewis and S. Marks. In 1892, the Hatherley Distillery Ltd. was listed in the L.S.E.. In a very short time, the company became one of the largest financial investment-attracting activity in South Africa, being also one of the main local outlets for the mining industry surplus.

The mining profits were primarily re-invested in the liquor industry (in this case toward the Hatherley Distillery). Nonetheless, the relation with the production and sale of alcohol was far from being linear. By following the marxist approach of van Onselen¹⁴⁸, we find that the alcohol consumption (precisely the abuse and dependence on it) among rural migrant workers could be a useful tool to create a vicious circle of subjugation to the mining industry. The same paradigmatic picture of alcohol is considered by Bozzoli, who refers to the contemporary understanding of liquor as a need for black and as a tool for the industry¹⁴⁹. The money earned by working in the mines would be spent in liquor as leisure pursuit, but the dependence would force the workers to spend constantly most of their income on it and this lack of savings

¹⁴⁷ S. Trapido, "Imperialism, Settler Identities, and Colonial Capitalism: the hundred-year Origins of the 1899 South African War", *Historia*, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2008, p. 60.

¹⁴⁸ C. van Onselen, "Randlords and Rotgut: 1886-1903", *Cit.*, p. 52.

¹⁴⁹ B. Bozzoli, *The Political Nature of a Ruling Class*, *Cit.*, p. 71.

accumulation would strengthen the availability of ‘proletarianized’ labour force. The sale of alcohol by mining managers to black workers was initially encouraged also by the mining magnates. However, as the social situation was becoming worse (the consume of alcohol favoured violence and a rise in criminal behaviours among workers), the position of the industrialists, in line with the public opinion and the government, would change slightly.

In 1891, the government passed a law that would limit the use among African workers while trying to face the alcohol abuse problem¹⁵⁰. Nevertheless, the illicit liquor trade would withstand the regulations during the decades to come. At least, as seen, some concerns from the gold-mining industry would eventually arise due to the growing injuries and unproductivity of the workers which were also supplied with low quality alcohol.

«You say here that the mine managers – that is mining people – encourage the sale of liquor to natives? – Yes.... You say that natives are supplied with bad and spurious liquor».¹⁵¹

The alcohol consumed by the South African miners was the one from the Hatherley Distillery; however, a large alternative source of supply was represented by the only market competitor of the South African liquor. Those alcoholic products were coming from the Portugal colony of Mozambique, through the Delagoa Bay line. The Portuguese liquor could enter the market and be sold with no additional prices due to the advantages deriving from the free trade agreement between Mozambique and the Transvaal¹⁵². In this way, it would undermine the production and

¹⁵⁰ P. Harries, *Work, Culture and Identity*, Cit., pp. 120-121.

¹⁵¹ The Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, *The Mining Industry*, Cit. p. 354.

¹⁵² Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Portugal and the Transvaal Republic, Lisbon, December 11, 1875, Art V. “The transit of the products of the soil and of the industry of the South African Republic through the Portuguese territory of the Province of Mozambique, as well as the transit through the same territory of

the primacy held by the Hatherley Distillery to the point of stopping its profits in 1897¹⁵³. During the same year, the pressures from the Chamber through the Commission of Enquiry led eventually the government to enact the total prohibition of the sale of alcohol to Africans¹⁵⁴. However, the market of illicit liquor and the high consume among the miners would persist until the end of the S.A.R..

merchandize of any origin or nationally imported through the Bay of Lorenzo Marques, and bound to the above-named Republic, shall be entirely exempt from any duty whatsoever”.

¹⁵³ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., p. 25.

¹⁵⁴ A.H. Jeeves, *Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy: The Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour Supply 1890-1920*, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985, p. 44.

III

The Miner

3.1 Black or white, racism and law

The workforce, in terms of ethnic composition, has been considered a cornerstone on the debates concerning the development of the South African society, economy and politics.

The apartheid system which rose after the Second World War has undoubtedly some of its roots on the structural racism already developed at the early stages of the South African mining industry. The racist mindset that permeated the Transvaal population (this generalisation could help us to understand the coming events of South African political history) has been highlighted, among others, by C.T. Gordon. Despite the fact that some mine managers and few individual politicians thought that some sort of equality between black and white could exist at least in job positions within the gold mines, the general feeling, also expressed through public speech and reports, was one of indisputable white supremacism¹⁵⁵.

The Marxist studies¹⁵⁶ brought to light the nature of the labour pattern in the gold-mining industry and the importance of the legal framework related to it.

As already observed, most of these laws were customary for the African colonies. Some key regulations and the legal system articulation shall therefore be indicated to better understand the background on which the gold-mines would develop in the South African Republic’.

¹⁵⁵ C.T. Gordon, *The Growth of Boer Opposition to Kruger*, Cit., pp. 1-7.

¹⁵⁶ For the early period, B. Bozzoli, *The Political Nature of a Ruling Class*, Cit. and H.J. Simons and R.E. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1969.

The pass law system that would guarantee major control over the migrant workforce¹⁵⁷ will be discussed later on this part. As it has been already suggested, the liquor law system tried to prevent the production and consumption of alcohol among the natives.

The gold laws prohibited the natives to both extract and own gold without permissions, an aspect about which the legislators were particularly worried was indeed the theft of gold (in 1894, the government and the chamber of commerce established a dedicated investigation unit)¹⁵⁸. The privilege of residing developed also the characteristics of a racist policy (a similar treatment was applied to both natives and Asians¹⁵⁹). In addition, the hut tax would favour the condition of economic necessity and the anti-squatting laws¹⁶⁰ determined the forced relocation of natives.

In terms of ‘job policies’, the general tendency for all the early decades of the industry was an explicit racial distinction reflected in the employment position which later would become the colour bar¹⁶¹. The racial construction of the job system is clearly detectable in most of the evidences of the time. The highly skilled jobs (e.g. engineering and chemistry) and the control positions (the in-deep management function was mainly performed by unskilled workers) were usually occupied by white people. Because of the complexity of the deep-level mining and the lack of specialists in the Southern Africa region, the technicians came mostly from Europe and

¹⁵⁷ See also: B. Bozzoli, *The Political Nature of a Ruling Class*, Cit., p. 42, the author quotes the Laws No. 22, No. 23 and No. 24 of 1895 that regulated the recruitment of workforce.

¹⁵⁸ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., p. 58.

¹⁵⁹ See: Law No. 3 of 1885 ‘Relating to Coolies, Arabs, and other Asiatics’ in C. Jeppe and J. H. Gey van Pittius, *Statute Law of the Transvaal: 1839-1910, Vol. I: 1839-1900*, Pretoria, 1910, South African Republic Authority, pp. 135-139.

¹⁶⁰ See: Law No. 21 of 1895 or the ‘disease law’ in *Ivi*, pp. 329-330.

¹⁶¹ E.N. Katz, “Revisiting the Origins of the Industrial Colour Bar in the Witwatersrand Gold Mining Industry, 1891-1899”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1999, pp. 73-97.

For an analysis of the industrial ‘colour bar’ during the twentieth century see: *Johnstone, Class, Race and Gold: A Study of Class Relations and Racial Discrimination in South Africa*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976.

the United States¹⁶². From an ideological point of view, white workers (mainly the British) could retain more bargaining power and occupy better working positions also because of their political legitimacy (the possibility to take part into politics) and their organizational capacity¹⁶³ (represented by the trade unionism tradition).

The bulk of the labour force was therefore represented by unskilled African miners¹⁶⁴. In addition, over the years, the African work would increasingly coincide with the underground operations¹⁶⁵. As the mining activities were evolving, a specialized labour structure took shape within the mines and the whites skilled professional miners gradually lost the essential task on their activity, namely the physical activity part of their job. Nearly all of them would take up the role of managers and supervisors. However, since the last decade of the century, due to the structural racism, compared to African workers, they could retain an advantageous position.

This separation is somehow theoretically solved by examining the group of workers (or ‘gang’) as a production unit. The hierarchical structure ties in with the interdependence between white chiefs and black workers. This interdependence is the result and the cause of the industrial vision of the group of workers as a distinct gear of the production process¹⁶⁶.

E. Katz¹⁶⁷, by deepening the analysis, takes stock of the early development of the racist compartmentalisation of the gold-mining workforce. The key character at the root of the official separation system would be the State Mining Engineer J. Klimke. The concern about the high rates of accidents within the mines caused by the dynamite and what was perceived as an

¹⁶² See: E.N. Katz, “The role of American mining technology and American mining engineers in the Witwatersrand Gold Mining Industry 1890–1910”, *South African Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2010, pp. 48-82

¹⁶³ B. Bozzoli, *The Political Nature of a Ruling Class*, Cit., pp. 76-78.

¹⁶⁴ For instance, see: in The Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, *The Mining Industry*, Cit., p. 218, ‘labour is accomplished in the proportion of, roughly, 1 white man to 8 or 10 black’.

¹⁶⁵ P. Richardson and J.J. Van-Helten, “Labour in the South African Gold Mining Industry”, Cit., pp. 82-83.

¹⁶⁶ B. Bozzoli, *The Political Nature of a Ruling Class*, Cit., pp. 80-82.

¹⁶⁷ E.N. Katz, “Revisiting the Origins of the Industrial Colour Bar”, Cit., pp. 77-79.

improper use of it, led Klimke to draw a set of law¹⁶⁸ for the safety of miners. The indirect outcome would be the formation of a certification system within the miner specialists' community, provided by trade unions. Lately approved by the Volksraad, these laws would give instruction about the tasks and the hierarchies in the workplace. Due to the widespread racist background of Klimke and of the decision-making bodies, the main cause of the accidents was identified in the African workers.

As a result, the industrial colour bars were firstly legitimised and became operative. These regulations, amongst other, are clear instances of what would become the segregation system. With the respect to the relational organization of the black and white workers within Transvaal mining industry, is still worthwhile to mention early studies connected with the racial debate. H.J. and R.E. Simons¹⁶⁹ focused on the struggle of white miners against the black African long-term workers, the latter being perceived as competitors on technical jobs. The role of trade unions and miners' organizations such as the Witwatersrand Mine Employees' and Mechanics' Union (1892) and the Transvaal National Union (1892), by promoting the defence of the white miners' rights were, on the other hand, an instrument of exclusion and discrimination of non-white workforce ('African, Asian or Coloured')¹⁷⁰. In the 1896's Mining Code¹⁷¹, the manifest racial distinction was nuanced¹⁷². Since the mid-1890s, as Bozzoli observed, the industry was permeated by a more liberal approach, and it was concerned more about the cost advantages

¹⁶⁸ The starting point of this legal framework could be represented by the Law No.3 of 1893 concerning the mining regulation "The first formal mining law introduced long-overdue safety measures and the first explicit industrial colour bar. This stipulated that no African, Asian or Coloured might prepare charges, load drill holes or set fire to fuses", analysed by P. O' Malley, The Nelson Mandela Foundation <https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01646/05lv01704.htm>, consulted: December 01, 2017.

¹⁶⁹ H.J. Simons and R.E. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa*, Cit., pp. 52-73.

¹⁷⁰ *Ivi*, pp. 53-55.

¹⁷¹ Law No. 12 of 1896, quoted in *Ivi*, p. 55.

¹⁷² E.N. Katz, "Revisiting the Origins", Cit., p. 88.

than about the racial issue. In 1894, for instance, an effective proposal of an equal treatment for white and black semi-skilled workers was developing¹⁷³. Nonetheless, for the mine's white managers, the activities of non-white workers were undoubtedly assumed to be subordinated to white ones. Two new colour bars were introduced. They referred to the attribution of technical tasks such as the activities of banksmen, onsetters and engine driver. In 1897¹⁷⁴, the last standing colour bar regulation was applied to the engine driver job¹⁷⁵.

3.2 The Mozambicans

One issue that has been deeply analysed in economic and social terms in its structure is the formation of the labour force for the mining industry. As the mining industry was growing, it needed to create, enhance or at least find labour force. During the first decade of the gold discoveries, the importation of labour was not systematic, neither fully institutionalised, it was however immediately explicit what would be its structural importance for the industry.

The movement of consumer goods, raw materials and machinery was at least only a part of the flow towards the Transvaal region during the gold boom. What would mostly shape the South African society for the years to come was the migration of workers. First and foremost, the labour migration was facilitated by the already mentioned Delagoa Bay line. The railway coming from Mozambique, managed by the N.Z.A.S.M. could be the unofficial transport provider for the movement of African workers to the mines. The overall key role of the railway system for the supply of labour, probably figured by the mining industry, has been efficiently summarised by G. Pirie¹⁷⁶. At the early stages of gold-mining, the supply of labour was not a

¹⁷³ B. Bozzoli, *The Political Nature of a Ruling Class*, Cit., p. 86.

¹⁷⁴ Law No. 11 of 1897, quoted in *Class and Colour in South Africa*, Cit., p. 56.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷⁶ G. Pirie, "Railways and Labour Migration to the Rand Mines: Constraints and Significance", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1993, pp. 713-730.

pressing problem and the railways were not well developed. As the industry would grow, a beneficial functional relation could be built with the railways. A larger pool of places where to pick up workers could reduce the cost of labour (competitive workforce), the transport could be faster and as the travel would be easier, the workers would have more 'energy' to start working immediately¹⁷⁷. Despite the interdependence between the mines and the railways in the management of the migratory system, some motives of dispute would have been brought again to light by the gold-mining representatives about the cost. Besides, during the earlier years, as already observed, the conflict focused also on the portion of African migrant labour kept by the N.Z.A.S.M. for the building and maintenance of the railways that was subtracting labour force to the mines and preferring African workers instead of local Boers¹⁷⁸.

As highlighted by most of data presented by scholars¹⁷⁹, the majority of workforce was made by African workers and a large portion of this was represented by foreign workers coming from Mozambique.

The common feature of the black African workforce (both the migrant and the peasant) was its seasonality.

Indeed, for the first decade of the industry, the African workers would usually work on a continuous basis just for three or four months¹⁸⁰, returning periodically to their village and so posing a problem to the mines management.

¹⁷⁷ *Ivi*, pp. 713-715.

¹⁷⁸ J.J. Van-Helten, *British and European Economic Investment*, Cit., p. 189.

¹⁷⁹ Appendix II.

¹⁸⁰ H.J. Simons and R.E. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa*, Cit., p. 52.

The recruiting of workers for South Africa (Natal) among Mozambicans was a common practice since the 1850s¹⁸¹. The inflow of Tsonga workers to the Rand began with the development of the Barberton mining activity in 1884 but, with the discovery of the Johannesburg reef, Barberton would become only a temporary stop on the travel to the new mines¹⁸². There are multiple factors that shaped these migrations, however, they were widely caused by the interests of the gold-mining industry. During the last decade of the nineteenth century, this mass movements would have an economic impact on the Transvaal Republic but would also began to affect the demography and the society of the Mozambican chiefdoms. There is a vast range of ‘internal’ causes that favoured this migratory process. In the long term, the pressures deriving from the environment would impact on the structure of the Tsonga society and would fuel the emigration. One factor has been represented by the climate change in the Mozambique region that was weakening the agriculture-based economy¹⁸³. The fragility of the agricultural economy would appear during the rinderpest¹⁸⁴ affecting the Mozambican cattle in 1897. On this occasion, the guaranteed flow of workforce in the mines could permit easily the reduction of 30% of miners’ wage¹⁸⁵. The other major environmental factors

¹⁸¹ P. Harries, "Labour Migration from the Delagoa Bay Hinterland to South Africa: 1852-1895", in *The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, Vol. 7, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, 1977, pp. 61-76.

¹⁸² *Ivi*, p. 64.

¹⁸³ G. Napoleão, *The reduction of Mozambican workers in South African mines, 1975-1992: A case study of the consequences for Gaza Province - District of Chibuto*, Thesis, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 2008, pp. 17-18.

¹⁸⁴ For an illustrative study about the economic effects of the rinderpest in Southern African societies at the end of the nineteenth century see: P. Phoofolo, "Face to Face with Famine: The Basotho and the Rinderpest, 1897-1899", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2003, pp. 503-527.

¹⁸⁵ A.H. Jeeves, *Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy*, Cit., p. 43.

enhancing the emigration were the recurring locust plagues and droughts¹⁸⁶ affecting the maize-based diet (low in protein) and the generalised famines¹⁸⁷.

The political and economic situation in the Southern Mozambique region was also fuelling the migratory movements. M. Harris¹⁸⁸ suggested that, in addition to the situation on which migrant were obliged to expatriate and forced to migration, a facilitation of the process could be found also in wages' differential. If the employment situation in the Transvaal mines was awful, the same thing could be said about the local employment under the Portuguese colonialism. The difference lied in the fact that the work as a miner in the Rand offered higher wages compared to all the other available works in Mozambique and it created a spending power otherwise unattainable with the agricultural activity. After the defeat of 1895 (and 1897) resulting from the Luso-Gaza war, the Tsonga people had basically no choice. Nonetheless, few African groups could survive by finding an alternative income in the earnings coming from the commercialisation of agricultural products¹⁸⁹. Besides, as reported by C. Bundy¹⁹⁰, some Africans could purchase and hire land for grazing to retain some form of independence.

Generally speaking, the working activities of migrated Tsonga people would be managed by colonialist in both Mozambique and South Africa. Assuming this fact, is possible to imagine that they would 'prefer' a better paid job. The definitive consolidation of the Portuguese colonial power would also push the local Tsonga inhabitant to move inland, to the borders with the South African Republic, streamlining the recruiting activity. A regulated recruiting activity

¹⁸⁶ N. Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa, Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy*, Cape Town, Wiley-Blackwell, 1994, p. 52.

¹⁸⁷ P. Harries, , "Labour Migration from the Delagoa Bay Hinterland" Cit., p. 68.

¹⁸⁸ M. Harris, "Labour Emigration among the Moçambique Thonga: Cultural and Political Factors", *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1959, pp. 59-61.

¹⁸⁹ N. Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa*, Cit., p. 52.

¹⁹⁰ C. Bundy, "The Emergence and Decline of a South African Peasantry", in *African Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 285, 1972, p. 382.

would also improve the conditions of the migrants, protecting the future workers during the travel and assuring that they could survive long enough to reach the mines as the travel was impressively dangerous and paved of premature deaths by fatigue and starving and kidnappings by landlords¹⁹¹. The cyclical issue of labour shortage in the Rand mines would become a structural problem for the Portuguese-Mozambique economy.

The interrelation of economic causes and effects involving both the mining industry and the Tsonga society¹⁹² has been highlighted by P. Harries¹⁹³. The old chiefs (numzane)¹⁹⁴ could maintain the control of power by the taxation on migrant labour and the extortion of the bridewealth¹⁹⁵; these local measures of retaining a part of the wage would push the workers to stabilise permanently in South Africa, depressing the Mozambican economy and depopulating the region (statistics for the first decade of the mining industry indicates that 15-20% of the Mozambican male population migrated permanently and 30-35% temporary)¹⁹⁶. The absence of young men would lead to a drop of the agriculture production favouring, again, the migration to the mines. The overall impact of the workforce migration was so deep on the Tsonga society that virtually all the scholars quote and agree about the fact that the young male's emigration

¹⁹¹ P. Harries, *Work, Culture and Identity*, Cit., pp. 116-118.

¹⁹² This term is an interpretative simplification that relates to the ethno-linguistic area of North-East South Africa and South-Mozambique, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Tsonga>, consulted: November 22, 2017. For the origins of the definition, see: L. Vail, *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989, pp. 85-90.

¹⁹³ P. Harries, "Kinship, ideology and the nature of pre-colonial labour migration: Labour migration from the Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa, up to 1895", in S. Marks and R. Rathbone, *Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa: African class formation, culture and consciousness, 1870-1930*, New York, Longman Group Ltd, 1982, pp. 142-166.

¹⁹⁴ P. Harries, *Work, Culture and Identity*, Cit., p. XIX.

¹⁹⁵ P. Harries, "Kinship, ideology and the nature of pre-colonial labour migration", Cit., p. 151.

¹⁹⁶ *Ivi*, pp. 154.

to the Rand mines was culturally embedded became frequently a rite of passage within the Tsonga clans.

If during the early years the chiefdoms had some bargaining power upon the migrant workforce directed to the mines¹⁹⁷, with the stabilisation of the imperial Portuguese power in the Mozambican region after the Luso-Gaza war of 1897 and the institution of the 'Regulamento'¹⁹⁸ and the consequent colonial organisation of coercive labour exportation, this marginal autonomy of the migrant workers would be removed and thus facilitating the reduction of wages¹⁹⁹.

The lucrative management, the building of the workers' expatriation system from Southern Mozambique and the interdependence between the South African mines and the Mozambican administration have been however figured as possible effects of the weakness of the Portuguese colonial regime in that region²⁰⁰.

As we have seen, the dissolution of the Tsonga society and the structuring of the Portuguese colonial system had a role in the building of the mining workforce. Nevertheless, the greater pressure to institute an effective migratory labour system would of course originate from the mining industry itself²⁰¹. But before we reach that point, more players, which would be involved in the creation of the gold-mining workforce and in the recruitment of the workers both locally and abroad, must be mentioned.

¹⁹⁷ Ivi, pp. 156-157.

¹⁹⁸ 'Regulamento para Engajamento do Indigenas da Provincia de Mocambique para o Trabalho na Republica Suã Africana', published in the *Boletim Oficial*, no. 50, 11 Dec. 1897, Portaria no. 109 de 1897, Mozambique Statute of 1897, quoted in B. Paton, *Labour Export Policy in the Development of Southern Africa*, Houndmills, Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 370.

¹⁹⁹ E.N. Katz, "Outcrop and deep level mining in South Africa before the Anglo-Boer War", Cit., p. 324.

²⁰⁰ G. Napoleão, "The reduction of Mozambican workers in South African mine", Cit., p. 21.

²⁰¹ A.H. Jeeves, "The South African Gold Mines and the Struggle for the Labour of Zambesia, 1890-1920", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1983, p. 395.

In addition to the Portuguese colonial officers, the Tsonga local chiefs and the mining industry (that, how it will be highlighted, was far from acting as a unitary body, specially about the labour policies), the independent recruiters and their role must be considered. The focus on the role of these agents, 'external' to both the mining industry and the governments has been brought up by A.H. Jeeves²⁰². The recruiters, having an increasing weight in the economic chain, could become a major political force in the labour-policies decision making. This condition was caused by different factors. Firstly, the industry was at its infancy and it could not act monopsonistically. Secondly, the recruiting market was not regulated, and the agents worked in a grey area, using both violence and personal connections with chiefs and notables²⁰³. Thirdly, Jeeves suggested that the Kruger's administration was lacking in economic-policy instruments²⁰⁴ to set up a structured labour system²⁰⁵ and had to deal with contrasting interest groups about this topic.

3.2.1 The workforce and the creation of a migratory system

«The Government should also do everything to bring about an abundant supply of black labour and give the mines reasonable control of it through the proper administration of the Pass Law and all other laws connected with the native question, and should encourage this labour to the utmost extent, realising its vast importance to the prosperity of these Fields and to this Republic».²⁰⁶

²⁰² A.H. Jeeves, *Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy*, Cit., pp. 4-6.

²⁰³ *Ivi*, p. 18.

²⁰⁴ *Ivi*, p. 15.

²⁰⁵ *Chibaro* or *Shibalo* refers to the forced labour system directed, during the early mining era, to the African population, established and performed by colonial governments and industries in Central and Southern Africa.

²⁰⁶ The Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, *The Mining Industry*, Cit., p. 220.

It did not take long time to the Chamber of Mines to try to institutionalise a migratory labour policy despite during the early years of its operations it did not receive the full backing of the Transvaal government. After an attempt to monopolise the governmental Native Registry Department in 1890, the Chamber established a Native Labour Committee that would manage the recruitment of African workers from the neighbouring regions (the Cape Colony, the Basutoland and Natal). However, the office could not arrange advantageous deals and did not pursue effectively its object²⁰⁷. In 1893, the Chamber's Native Labour Department (N.L.D.) was established. The Department would manage the importation of workers from the Delagoa Bay through the Lourenço line with the support of Transvaal officials²⁰⁸. This institution could not even achieve a small outcome mostly because of the already cited competition between mining companies and with independent agents. Nonetheless, the operation of recruiting standardisation was impossible also because of a lack of finance for the office and the unstable political situation in Southern Mozambique²⁰⁹. Besides, P. Harries highlighted that during the first years, the uncooperative behaviour of the Kruger's administration would make the Chamber totally accountable for the administration of the whole migratory route²¹⁰. N. Worden observed, for instance, that one major political reason underlying the approach of the government was the avoidance of a possible monopolisation of the labour market by the mining industry, to the disadvantage of the Boer landlords²¹¹. Despite the frictions between the industry and the government, the fact that the role of the state was vital for the economic development

²⁰⁷ N. Levy, "The State, Mineowners and Labour Regulation in the Transvaal, 1887-1906", Collected Seminar Papers, University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, No. 27., 1981, p. 25.

²⁰⁸ P. Harries, *Work, Culture and Identity*, Cit., p. 111.

²⁰⁹ S.E. Katzenellenbogen, *South Africa and Southern Mozambique*, Cit., p. 38.

²¹⁰ P. Harries, "Labour Migration from the Delagoa Bay Hinterland to South Africa", Cit., p. 65.

²¹¹ N. Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa*, Cit., p. 32.

of the mines was pointed out by Jeeves²¹². The spheres where the state administration would be helpful were the creation of a more effective recruiting system (to face the generalised unwillingness to work) and the operationalisation of a stabilising law system to overcome the recurring dissents between mining companies.

In 1895, after the end of the Luso-Gaza war, the Portuguese could gain effective control on the Southern Mozambique and an agreement between the Chamber and the Mozambican government was reached²¹³. The Regulations for Employment of Native Mozambicans in the South African Republic started operating²¹⁴.

As far as the formation of an immigration system is concerned, in the South African Republic, the agreement was followed by the first decisive step made by the Chamber in 1896. The Chamber of Mines, the Association of Mines and the Association of Mine Managers joined together to create the Native Labour Supply Association Limited²¹⁵. Pretty soon it would become the Rand Native Labour Association (R.N.L.A., later W.N.L.A.), which, in two years, would employ more than 30.000 Mozambican workers²¹⁶.

What made possible to structure the migration movement towards the Transvaal was the regulatory framework. Throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century and part of the twentieth century, the movement of African workers, their citizenship and the urbanization process were regulated by a Pass Laws' apparatus. The exploitation of and control over the African workers by the white mine owners and the assignment of exclusive rights of mining

²¹² A.H. Jeeves, "The Control of Migratory Labour on the South African Gold Mines in the Era of Kruger and Milner", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1975, pp. 3-4.

²¹³ P. Harries, "Labour Migration from the Delagoa Bay Hinterland to South Africa", *Cit.*, p. 65.

²¹⁴ G. Napoleão, "*The reduction of Mozambican workers in South African mine*", *Cit.*, pp. 22.

²¹⁵ B. Bozzoli, *The Political Nature of a Ruling Class*, *Cit.*, p. 69.

²¹⁶ S.E. Katzenellenbogen, *South Africa and Southern Mozambique*, *Cit.*, p. 39.

activities to white people would have also been favoured by the Gold Laws²¹⁷ and the already existing Master and Servant Law²¹⁸. As N. Levy observed, the role of the state, on developing the migratory flow originating ‘far’ from the Transvaal (outside South Africa), was vital to assure the legitimacy and to strengthen the stability of the system²¹⁹. For this specific period, the coercive law applied was the Native Pass Law²²⁰. It was approved by the Volksraad in 1895 and implemented in 1897 and it concerned the regulation of the entrance of ‘natives’ into the South African Republic. To work as a miner, the migrant should have a pass to travel and work ‘subscribed’ by a white South African hirer. Once in the Transvaal mining area, the miner had to show its pass for the district and he received a metal arm badge that gave him three days to find a job. If he could not find a job, he had to move to another district or return home. The regulatory system had a sort of ‘super partes’ status and operating behaviour, and indeed, as P. Harries observed, it restricted the range of alternatives of hiring acting as a mediator between workers and the employers through the monetization of the passes²²¹. To fight the independent market, from 1897, the Transvaal government built up a system of license and certificates for recruiters. Simultaneously, the control of migration was managed also by the Portuguese

²¹⁷ The starting point of the ‘gold legislation’, referred to the racial issue, can be traced with the Gold Law of 1886. The granting of mining licences excluded ‘coloured, coolie and Chinese’ which were not employed by white hirer. This principle would be preserved and transferred to the following gold laws at least until 1907. See: N. Levy, “The State, Mineowners and Labour Regulation”, Cit., p. 24.

²¹⁸ Masters and Servants Act no.15 of 1856 analysed by P. O’ Malley, The Nelson Mandela Foundation, <https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01646/05lv01672.htm>, consulted: November 25, 2017.

N. Levy quotes the Law No. 13 1880 in *Laws, Volksraad Resolutions, Proclamations, and Government Notices Relating to Natives and Coolies in the Transvaal*, translated by S.H. Barren, W.A. Macfadyen, and J.H.L. Findlay, The Government Printing Works Pretoria, 1901.

²¹⁹ N. Levy, “The State, Mineowners and Labour Regulation”, Cit., p. 27.

²²⁰ Law No. 22 and Law No. 23 of 1895 restricted the freedom of workers to withdraw or move from mine to mine

²²¹ P. Harries, *Work, Culture and Identity*, Cit., p. 128.

Curator of Native Labour²²² or Curiadoria, a Portuguese office located in the Witwatersrand²²³. Despite all these efforts made by the gold-mining industry to regulate the migration, the ‘official’ recruiting associations could begin to monopolize the migratory flow only after the Anglo-Boer war.

²²² S.E. Katzenellenbogen, *South Africa and Southern Mozambique*, Cit., p. 41.

²²³ “The Mozambican Miner: A Study in the Export of Labor”, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, IICM, Maputo, 1977, p. 15.

IV

The Political Shock

4.1 The Uitlanders²²⁴, government and citizenship

Following the whole historical literature, it becomes necessary to refer to the European and British migration to understand what would be the most enduring debate concerning the immediate and direct political outcomes²²⁵ of the gold discoveries in the Witwatersrand.

Almost all of the migratory inflow was composed by Mozambicans. However, the gold rush during the first stage attracted even several European, American and Australian white workers. As already mentioned, the inflow of the Americans has been considered as an answer to the need of professionals and managers (mostly engineers)²²⁶. Differently, the European migratory inflow²²⁷ would represent the coming of people of various nationalities (mostly British and German, French and Dutch to a lesser extent) which would be employed in various fields and

²²⁴ Afrikaans word that meant 'foreigner', «used by South African Republic's 'native' Boers and referred to 'any British or other non-Afrikaner immigrant in the Transvaal region in the 1880s and '90s». <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Uitlander>, Emden (and all the following scholars suggested that also the immigrants from the Orange Free State or the Cape Colony would be considered Uitlandes, in P.H. Emden, *Randlords*, Cit., p. 291.

²²⁵ A.H. Jeeves, "The Rand Capitalists and the Coming of the South African War, 1896-1899", *Historical Papers*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1973, p. 61.

²²⁶ J. Teisch, "Home is not so very far away: Californian Engineers in South Africa, 1868-1915", *Australian Economic History Review*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2005, pp. 139-160.

²²⁷ For some indications about the original statistical sources, see: C.T. Gordon, *The Growth of Boer Opposition to Kruger*, Cit., pp. 139-140; Richardson and J.J. Van-Helten, "Labour in the South African Gold Mining Industry, Cit., pp. 82-83, and J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., pp. 1-3.

both high and low-skilled jobs. Once stabilised, these newcomers would reproduce a heterogeneous group of foreigners diversified in terms of income ('class') and national origins²²⁸. However, the biggest difference between the newcomers and the native Boers was the tendency of the first group to take part in professional and industrial activities (the Boer community was mostly an 'agrarian' society), to be involved mostly in commercial business on a temporary basis²²⁹ and to occupy the urban and sub-urban area rather than the rural one²³⁰. Nevertheless, for the explanation of the subsequent political events, it is fair and useful to consider the Uitlander community as predominantly British.

«Managers, engineers, miners, technical experts, and the tradesmen and middlemen who live upon them, these were the Uitlanders, drawn from all the races under the sun, but with the Anglo-Celtic vastly predominant».²³¹

The British Uitlanders shared some cultural aspect totally distinguished from the ones of the Boer inhabitants of the Transvaal region (and especially Johannesburg). However, aside from the perception of these migrants among the conservatives, some major issues developed around their legal status²³². Once thinking about the political activity of the white migrant community,

²²⁸ D. Cammack, "An Illusion of Unity: Uitlander Politics before the Anglo-Boer War", University of Witwatersrand, *African Studies Seminar Paper*, 1984, pp. 2-3.

²²⁹ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., pp. 47-48.

²³⁰ The separation of Boer and British community in economic terms (urban and rural activities) could be seen as an historiographic artifice, however it seemed to be instrumental for early research. See: "The poor white in South Africa: The Carnegie Commission Report", *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 91, 1933, p. 611.

²³¹ A.C. Doyle, *The Great Boer War*, Auckland, The Floating Press., 2011, p. 29.

²³² For a contemporary analysis from the perspective of international law, see: M.Y. Guyot, "Les Boers et les Uitlanders", *Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée*, Bruxelles, Vol. 12, No. 1 in *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection*, 1899, pp. 7-12.

is proper to notice that the local Boers did not act uniformly in contraposition to them. Indeed, the politicians belonging to the progressive side would potentially support their cause in most of the political confrontations.

The key themes of protest were about the basic right of citizenship, the taxation (in particular for gold producers), the corruption of the government and its policy of concessions²³³. In addition to the franchise issue, another theme on which the community of migrants and the progressives were really receptive has been represented by the public education.

The xenophobia towards the Uitlander community²³⁴ found indeed a practical implementation through the regulation of the educational system. The wave of protests was encouraged by the inefficiency and, most important, by the exclusivity of schooling. The state of things is exemplified by the approach of the Superintendent of Education. Dr. Mansvelt. During the early nineties, the governmental preference, in terms of financial aid, was given to the Dutch language school and the use and teaching of English was limited because it was perceived by the more conservatives decision-makers as a possible starting point for the loss of the independence²³⁵.

The issue of the Uitlanders inflow within the South African Republic and the social and political consequences of their presence would be catalysed in the debates over the 'Franchise Law'²³⁶ (it is fair to assume that this regulation contained the key elements for out-comers to access to a fuller citizenship of the Transvaal Republic, the Franchise Law corresponded in fact with the

²³³ For instance, see: H. Meysey-Thompson, *The Transvaal crisis: remarks on the present condition of affairs, together with a reprint of an article by him in the 'Nineteenth Century' review on the 'Real grievances of the Uitlanders'*, London, Simpson Low, Marston and Company, 1899, pp. 11-30.

²³⁴ C.T. Gordon, *The Growth of Boer Opposition to Kruger*, Cit., pp. 13-14.

²³⁵ *Ivi*, pp. 111-125.

²³⁶ Appendix III.

right to vote.). The restrictive nature of this law was implemented in 1882²³⁷. To obtain the right to vote, the newcomers should have been living in the S.A.R. for at least five years, they should do an oath of allegiance and pay a naturalisation fee of £25. During the decade preceding the Anglo-Boer war, the discussion about the possibility of its extension would mobilize the public opinion and all the political forces within the state.

As pointed out by C. Webb on his study about the Uitlanders' politics for the first decade of the gold-mining industry, a political emotion and a movement had been existing since the discovery of the Barberton reef. The request for a political representation and the official recognition of the rights of the newcomers, linked to the demand for a reduction in taxation for the gold-mining community, would soon develop in a claim for the extension of the franchise²³⁸.

At least up until 1890, the political discontent would not have a legitimate and official recognized political position. Nonetheless, the 'Uitlanders' movement would organized firstly in the Barberton Movement that would result in the Transvaal Republican Union²³⁹ (1888-1890). This first organization was substituted almost immediately by the Political Reform Association and its counterpart, the Transvaal International Political Association²⁴⁰ (1890). This early associations, despite the importance of the instances of which they were representative, would last only for few months.

The major institutional outcome deriving from the political pressure of migrants and newcomers (who were entirely matching with the rising gold-mining community) was the creation by law²⁴¹ of a second parliamentary chamber. However, the First Volksraad (the Upper

²³⁷ C.T. Gordon, *The Growth of Boer Opposition to Kruger*, Cit., p. 140.

²³⁸ C. Webb, *The Uitlander Movement*, Cit., pp. 4-7.

²³⁹ *Ivi*, p. 5.

²⁴⁰ *Ivi*, p. 11-12.

²⁴¹ Appendix IV.

House) was a reproduction of the pre-existing parliament, remaining the highest and last authority on the South African Republic. The administrative innovation was embodied in the institution of the Second Volksraad (the Lower House)²⁴². Despite the fact that it was the official representative court for a large part of the population (migrants and progressives Boer), the activity of this second chamber had been limited to its representative formality, without resulting in any political achievement. Following the rewording of the Law in 1890, the newcomers could obtain the right to vote for the Second Volksraad within two years, however, the possibility to influence directly the political decisions represented by the right to vote for the First chamber could only be obtained after fourteen years of residence and having reach the age of forty. Most adversely, as stated by P. Kruger in 1891, the First Volksraad had the exclusivity over the management of the finances of the state and the right of veto on all the resolutions proposed by the Second Raad²⁴³.

The unfulfilling answer of the Kruger's administration to the demands and pressure of the Uitlander community fuelled the formation of a new extra-parliamentary association in 1892, the Transvaal National Union. This organization would not effectively empower the Uitlanders' position in the decision-making process. However, it would bring together a large part of the mining professional community, notably the management. As stressed by J.S. Marais, it is also suggestive the direct involvement of some mining magnates in supporting the causes of the Uitlanders. In this case, the financial backing of L. Phillips, at the time president of the Chamber of Mines²⁴⁴ (in addition, he would mark some important steps on that wave of active protest against the existing government that would peak with an attempted military coup).

²⁴² C. Webb, *The Uitlander Movement*, Cit., p. 13.

²⁴³ C.T. Gordon, *The Growth of Boer Opposition to Kruger*, Cit., pp. 144-145.

²⁴⁴ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., p. 59.

From the year of its foundation to 1894-5, the T.N.U. led and organized several public mass meetings, producing continuously political proposals and resolutions addressed to the government in the legitimating form of petitions²⁴⁵. Since the beginning of its activity, the leader of the T.N.U. Charles Leonard had been promoting the circulation of a Manifesto²⁴⁶ to foster the dissemination of the discontent and to keep it alive. Nonetheless, the government did not adopt any legislative solution to reach a compromise with the association. The first event that could be seen as a turning point from the merely political contestation to a revolt was the reaction of the British community to the application of the existing commandeering regulations²⁴⁷.

In 1894, the economic and political pressures caused the South African Republic's intervention on the Northern border, against the chief Malaboch (Mmalebôhô) during the Bagananwa war²⁴⁸, heightened the unrest among the Transvaal's Uitlanders, especially the British. The use of unconventional military tactics²⁴⁹ and the killing of Bagananwa civilians during the last part of the conflict would affect detrimentally the whole public opinion²⁵⁰. Moreover, from the specific angle of the British subjects, an additional discontent arose from the fact that, despite they did

²⁴⁵ C. Webb, *The Uitlander Movement*, Cit., pp. 15-29.

²⁴⁶ After the end of the Jameson's raid, the conspirators decided that this manifesto, with the addition of ten objectives, would be proposed to Kruger as a new constitutional framework.

²⁴⁷ Commando Law No. 2 of 1883 quoted in T.J. Makhura, "Another Road to the Raid: The Neglected Role of the Boer-Bagananwa War as a Factor in the Coming of the Jameson Raid", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1995, p. 261.

²⁴⁸ For an analysis of the development of the conflict in a comparative perspective, see: L. Kriel, "The Scramble for Soutpansberg: The Boers and the partition of Africa in the 1895", *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*; Vol. 31, No. 2, 2003, pp. 74-93.

²⁴⁹ Such as the use of dynamite and the induced smoke inhalation. In particular, the brutal use of dynamite could hypothetically have a bad effect among these Bagananwa which could be employed in the gold-mines.

²⁵⁰ T.J. Makhura, "Another Road to the Raid", Cit., pp. 262-265.

not have the recognition of full citizenship, they should be enlisted in the S.A.R. army and provide for their own war equipment.

The Uitlanders Defence and Protection Association was promptly formed to support the commandeered British. Besides, the fact that actually they were not being protected by any international regulatory framework²⁵¹ on this issue caused a growth of request of intervention toward the British administration (the first appeal was directed to the colonial administration in South Africa, after an unsatisfactory answer, a second request was sent directly to the British government). When the High Commissioner for Southern Africa Sir Henry Loch arrived for the first time in Pretoria, he was received by a group of Uitlanders singing British patriotic anthems, and another address was delivered to him. After the agitation, five British protesters were arrested. The state of affairs was perceived so perilous that the High Commissioner managed a diplomatic solution²⁵². On the one hand, the government conceded the 'most-favoured-nation treatment²⁵³ to British subject with regard to military service'²⁵⁴ and the franchise was granted to British subjects who served in the conflict against Malaboch and during the occupation of the Swaziland²⁵⁵. On the other, however, the Uitlanders were still

²⁵¹ *Ivi*, p. 260; Indicative claims of the British community were, for instance, Articles XXVIII and XIX of the Pretoria Convention (1881) and Article XIV of the London Convention (1884); in *South African Treaties*, Cit., p. 400 and p. 28.

²⁵² 'Papers Relating to the Commandering of British Subjects in the South African Republic in 1894, and the Visit of the High Commissioner to Pretoria', pp. 1-41, 1896. In *Miscellaneous pamphlets on South African Republic*, London, H.M. Stationery office by Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1896-99, pp. 98 -137.

²⁵³ For Instance, see: D. Schreuder and J. Butler, *Sir Graham Bower's Secret History of the Jameson Raid and the South African Crisis, 1895-1902*, Cape Town, Van Riebeeck Society, 2002, p. 28.

²⁵⁴ quoted in C. Webb, *The Uitlander Movement*, Cit., p. 4.

²⁵⁵ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., p. 54.

expropriated of money and properties to cover the war expenses and the Volksraad approved a law²⁵⁶ to forbid the public meetings that could threaten public peace.

4.2 The Jameson's Raid

Between the end of 1895 and the beginning of 1896 (29 December – 2 January), the dissatisfaction of the Uitlander community seemed to converge in an attempted coup d'état. The historical sources are several and differentiated and the debate over the origins and the motives of the so-called Jameson's Raid is not concluded yet. Considering that a complete inquiry could represent an intricate stand-alone study²⁵⁷, it is still essential to comment briefly this political incident. The survival of the Republic was undermined by a possible explosive consequence of a sum of factors, both exogenous and endogenous.

From the point of view of the British administration, the opportunity to take military action came straight from the diplomatic confrontations regarding the drift crisis. Furthermore, from a long term perspective, the stabilization of the German imperial presence in Southern Africa and the issue of Delagoa Bay²⁵⁸ made this region a prominent issue on the British colonial agenda²⁵⁹. The internal element, considered vital for the success of the operation, was the pre-existing environment of rising hostility to the Kruger administration among the Uitlanders community and the most progressives politicians. The calculation made upon these conditions, resulted in an increasing interference of the British power and in a military intervention.

²⁵⁶ Law No. 6 of 1894 on the right of meeting and assembling of persons, in C. Jeppe and J. H. Gey van Pittius, *Statute Law of the Transvaal*, Cit., pp. 256-257.

²⁵⁷ For instance, see: E. Longford, *Jameson's Raid: The Prelude to the Boer War*, London, Panther Books, 1984.

²⁵⁸ Paragraph 2.2.2.

²⁵⁹ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., p. 75.

From the election of Lord Salisbury as Prime Minister in 1895 and the inauguration of Joseph Chamberlain as Secretary of State for the colonies, the British imperialist impetus in South Africa had been growing until the war. But the imperial project of Chamberlain did not fit entirely with a military expansionist policy. Indeed, being aware that competitive imperial powers were taking shape (firstly Germany, but attention was paid also to the consequences in the long period of the advantage kept by the Russian Empire and the U.S.A. in terms of availability of natural resources)²⁶⁰, to maintain its supremacy, the British Empire would primarily establish a fixed and uniform trade system²⁶¹. The securing and harmonization of the commercial network, based on fiscal union and political federations was the colonial aim that was not yet achieved in the Southern Africa sphere of influence. This situation was due to the reluctance of Kruger to enter in international custom unions under the heavy influence of the British colonies²⁶². The silent or inattentive direct connivance of major British institutional powers on the execution of the raid, especially the role of Chamberlain, has been long debated since the earliest historiography²⁶³. It is quite assured that the High Commissioner would allow the military intervention only subsequently the outbreak of an internal rebellion²⁶⁴. It has become apparent that the Colonial Secretary and the High Commissioner Robinson had a role in the operation. Despite the encouraging position of the British administration, one of the possible reasons that conducted to the failure of the military action could be ascribed to the non-

²⁶⁰ *Ivi*, p. 72 refers to the influence of the Seeley's theories; see: J. R. Seeley, *The expansion of England: two courses of lectures, 1834-1895*, London, MacMillan & Co. 1914, pp. 317-359.

²⁶¹ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., p. 73 and J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., p. 67.

²⁶² G. Maasdorp, "A century of customs unions in Southern Africa 1889–1989", *South African Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1990, pp. 10-13.

²⁶³ For a critique of the historiography (until 1964) about the chamberlain in the raid: see: M.G. Holli, "Joseph Chamberlain and the Jameson Raid: A Bibliographical Survey", *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1964, pp. 152-166.

²⁶⁴ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., pp 121-122.

linearity of interests between the U.K. central government, the colonial administration and the conspirators²⁶⁵, and the risk of the infringement of the international balances resulting from a military action. A plot to overthrow the Kruger government was already been imagined by the High Commissioner Loch with the complicity of the mining magnate L. Phillips. However, the project was officially rejected²⁶⁶. Once Loch was substituted by H. Robinson (a ‘man of Rhodes’) and his Imperial Secretary G. Bower²⁶⁷, the original idea of a military intervention began to materialise. Indeed, the voracious mind behind the raid was undoubtedly Rhodes. A reasonable impression on the relation between Rhodes and the British colonial administration in the perspective of a the theory of railway imperialism was given by K. Wilburn. By reading the so-called ‘missing telegrams’, the scholar suggested the direct link between the raid and the previous drift crisis as key events of a single project representing the British imperialist momentum²⁶⁸. However, the discussion about the imperial complicity fades into the background when analysing the role of C. Rhodes. Being simultaneously Prime minister of the Cape Colony, mining magnate (de Beers Consolidated mines and Consolidated Goldfields Company), and the key executive figure²⁶⁹ of the British South Africa Company²⁷⁰ (B.S.A.C.),

²⁶⁵ Chamberlain and Rhodes envisioned a British Transvaal colony. The internal conspirators were basically plotting to remove Kruger and calling for an independent republic regardless. The situation is appropriately illustrated by the ‘flag issue’, see: J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger’s Republic*, Cit., pp. 88-91.

²⁶⁶ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., pp. 77-78, and J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger’s Republic*, Cit., p. 63.

²⁶⁷ His narration of the raid: D. Schreuder and J. Butler, *Sir Graham Bower*, Cit., pp. 33-68.

²⁶⁸ K.E. Wilburn, “The Drift Crisis, the ‘missing telegrams’, and the Jameson Raid: A centennial review”, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 25, No.2, 1997, pp. 233-235.


²⁶⁹ J.S. Galbraith, “The British South Africa Company and the Jameson Raid”, *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1970, p. 147.

²⁷⁰ The main chartered company of South Africa that took control over Rhodesia. Charter of the British South Africa Company of 1889, *South African Treaties*, Cit., pp. 358-365. For a detailed history of the company up to the raid, see: J.S. Galbraith, *Crown and Charter: The Early Years of the British South Africa Company*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974.

he was definitely one of the most powerful player of the South African scramble. He thought he could end the game of British conquest through a military intervention within the S.A.R.. The first step to the strike should be the strategical positioning of armed forces and the obvious solution would be to station a military force near the border of the S.A.R..

After much lobbying to the Chamberlain administration and a confrontation with the local chiefs²⁷¹, Rhodes could finally obtain the control over a portion ('strip') of Bechuanaland territory near the S.A.R.²⁷². The final choice of the positioning of the troops, that was mostly driven by a logic of military tactic, was officially made possible by the approval of a railway agreement between the chiefs Bathoen I, Sebele, Khama²⁷³ and Chamberlain.

3. Pitsani, stationing of Matabeleland mounted police and Bechuanaland border police*



*Image extracted from: <http://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/capecolonymaps.htm>

²⁷¹ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., pp. 83-84.

²⁷² I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., p. 79.

²⁷³ N. Parsons, *King Khama, Emperor Joe, and the Great White Queen: Victorian Britain through African Eyes*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998, pp. 201-252.

The presence of police troops would be justified by their protective function for the building of the railway²⁷⁴. The chosen outpost was Pitsani and L.S. Jameson, Administrator of Southern Rhodesia, would have been the leader of the operation in charge of the Bechuanaland border police and the Matanbeleland²⁷⁵ mounted police²⁷⁶. Although it is likely that Rhodes in person tried to stop the operation at the last minute²⁷⁷, Jameson decided to move towards the city. The raid began in the morning of December, 28 and last until 2 of January, when Jameson surrendered to the Boers commandos without even having reached Johannesburg²⁷⁸. The ‘military expedition’ resulted in an embarrassing debacle. Among the factors behind the failure there were certainly technical reasons, namely the undersized military force and the lack of weaponry. Nevertheless, the worst mistake relied on the timing of the operation. The offensive was supposed to begin concomitantly with an uprising by the Uitlanders in the city²⁷⁹ but the moment Jameson started marching, no riot had blown up.

The overstatement of the internal dissent represented the other key miscalculation. In 1895, on the heels of the activities of the T.N.U., a Reform Committee was established to act as catalyst of internal rebellion. The leading members were C. Leonard (leader of the T.N.U.), J.H. Hammond²⁸⁰ (an American engineer and manager employed by Rhodes), F. Rhodes (brother of

²⁷⁴ B. N. Ngwenya, “The Development of Transport Infrastructure in the Bechuanaland Protectorate 1885-1966”, *Botswana Notes and Records*, Vol. 16, 1984, p. 74.

²⁷⁵ Region of Southern Rhodesia, now South-Western Zimbabwe. The B.S.A. police, led by Jameson, run and won the war against king Lobengula in J.S. Galbraith, *Crown and Charter*, Cit., pp. 287-309.

²⁷⁶ E.A. Walker, “The Jameson Raid”, *Cambridge Historical Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1940, p. 283.

²⁷⁷ R. Rotberg, *The Fountder: Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 524-532 quoted in I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., p. 92.

²⁷⁸ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., p. 94.

²⁷⁹ *Ivi*, p. 80-81.

²⁸⁰ His narration of the raid: A. Ireland, “The True Story of the Jameson Raid as Related to Me by John Hays Hammond”, *The North American Review*, Vol. 208, No. 754, 1918, pp. 365-376 and J.H. Hammond, *The Transvaal Trouble*, New York, Abbey Press, 1900.

C.) and at least four mining magnates: Fitzpatrick²⁸¹, Phillips²⁸² (Hermann Eckstein and Co.) Farrar (East Rand Proprietary Mines, held in part by Wernher, Beit and Co.)²⁸³, and C. Rhodes himself. Again, the disorganization and the virtual absence of insurgent citizens turned the plot into a fiasco.

4.2.1 The gold-mining magnates, the debate on the ‘Blainey thesis’ and the economic interpretation²⁸⁴

The collusion of the gold-mining community in the attempted coup has been repeatedly addressed since the early historiography on the raid. Hobson put at the center of the debate the notion of capitalists as an instrument of the British imperialism²⁸⁵. However, being the Hobson’s interpretation overly generalizing, the study by G. Blainey shall be taken into account in the deepening of the examination of the relation between industry and politics. Blainey could indeed be seen as the initiator of a renewed interest, among scholars, about the degree of the involvement of the mining magnates on the coup and their leading economic rationale. As observed, the major mining groups involved were the Consolidated Goldfields and the Hermann Eckstein & Co., headed respectively by Rhodes and Beit. The analysis focused on the reading of the raid as a reaction of deep-level mining to the Kruger’s economic policy. The already mentioned key issues for the mining industry (dynamite monopoly, scarcity of labour,

²⁸¹ His narration of the raid: J.P. Fitzpatrick, *The Transvaal From Within: A Private Record of Public Affairs*, London, William Heinemann, 1899, pp. 137-199.

²⁸² His narration of the raid: L. Phillips, *Some Reminiscences*, London, Hutchinson & Co., 1924, pp. 135-172.

²⁸³ G. Blainey, “Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid”, *Cit.*, p. 364.

²⁸⁴ D. Denoon, “Capital and capitalist in the Transvaal in the 1890s and 1900s”, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1980, pp. 111-118 and I. Phimister, “Unscrambling the Scramble for Southern Africa: The Jameson Raid and the South African War Revisited”, *South African Historical Journal*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1993, pp. 203-220.

²⁸⁵ J.A. Hobson, *The War in South Africa*, *Cit.*, pp. 203-205.

drunkenness of workers, cost of coal and railway taxation, with the addition of a *mijnpachtbrieven*²⁸⁶ and the issue of *bewaarplaatsen*²⁸⁷), magnified by the crisis of 1895, would have a different impact according to the nature of the mine, operating ‘outcrop’ or ‘deep-level’. Blainey argued that these factors burdened more the deep-level mines²⁸⁸. The scholar deserves credit for highlighting the economic reasons of the raid. Nonetheless, Blainey was extremely critical of the political interpretation of the event produced by the previous historiography²⁸⁹ and, maybe overreacting, he downplayed all the political motivations and features of Rhodes²⁹⁰.

R. Kubicek stressed the economic interpretation, conducting an exhausting analysis on the financial behaviour of the two mining groups involved (by their heads) in the raid. While explaining the restructuring of the companies in view of the deep-level operations during 1893, Kubicek revealed the differences between the two groups. The Goldfields appeared to be less structured in terms of management and of shareholdings²⁹¹ (the capitalisation was made by small investors, unlike the Wernher Beit group and this is a first factor that could produce differing needs of governmental economic policy). This may be due to the fact that Rhodes was not fully concerned about the operations of his mining companies²⁹². The downsizing of the vision of Rhodes as a pure businessman could again leave some room to the political interpretation. The relationship between the two magnates and their cooperation in the plot

²⁸⁶ *Mynapcht*: governemental mining concession on soil exploitation that entailed a payment of a rent.

²⁸⁷ Areas on which mining was forbidden. The outcrops mines were entitled to use the surface for operations different from digging while the mining rights were still held by the state. A delay on the assignments of the rights, auctioned by public calls, was another contentious issue. G. Blainey, “Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid”, *Cit.*, p. 360.

²⁸⁸ G. Blainey, “Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid”, *Cit.*, pp. 356-362.

²⁸⁹ *Ivi*, p. 352.

²⁹⁰ *Ivi*, p. 366.

²⁹¹ R.V. Kubicek, “The Randlords in 1895”, *Cit.*, p. 101.

²⁹² *Ivi*, p. 89.

could be seen as an implication of an emotional connection²⁹³ rather than a common background of their companies in terms of structure and deep-level operations. Thus, the absence of any common and specific economic constraint compounded by the Kruger's policy²⁹⁴ (taxation) and the financial health of the companies (specifically Wernher, Beit & Co.), resulted for Kubicek in the annihilation of the circumstance theorized by Blainey.

The Blainey thesis was recovered on a study by R. Mendelsohn. Going through the economic hypothesis, he reassessed the structure and financial position of the two mining groups. His first point is that the outcrop mines could have minimally avoided the tax burden. However, this is not supposed to have directly and adversely affected the deep-level mines²⁹⁵. Rhodes was apparently more involved in company business (both the management and the extractive operations) with regard to what Kubicek claimed²⁹⁶. The relationship between him and Beit would have a prominent economic nature, as revealed by the commitment of the two companies on a common project to develop the deep-level system²⁹⁷. The different structure of the mines therefore seemed to be the dividing line between the conspirators and the magnates who were not involved in the raid. The large deep-level companies, based on long-term projects and aiming at the development of economies of scale, would have a closer interest in bringing down the government and its fiscal system²⁹⁸.

²⁹³ *Ivi*, p. 98.

²⁹⁴ *Ivi*, p. 102.

²⁹⁵ R. Mendelsohn, "Blainey and the Jameson Raid: The Debate Renewed", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1980, p. 161.

²⁹⁶ *Ivi*, p. 166.

²⁹⁷ *Ivi*, p. 168-169; in addition to the Rand Mines and the Werner Beit, this industrial improvement seems to have been effectively pursued only by the Farrar's East Rand, who participate to the raid. This evidence seemed to be supportive of the Blainey thesis.

²⁹⁸ *Ivi*, p. 170.

The last step on the debate about the Blainey thesis has been made by E. Katz. The scholar has corrected the economic interpretation ruling out the distinction of mines in terms of depth, operations and use of new technologies²⁹⁹. Thus, the mining companies were so miscellaneous (even ‘mixed’) that the differentiation could be ascribed only to a linguistic expedience. Analysing the costs of the mining activities, she came to the conclusion that the labour was a major cost and the crisis of labour supply in 1895 would affect in particular the poorer and less-structured companies that actually did not take part in the raid. Besides, the Kruger’s agenda appeared not to penalize the mines on the basis of their capital costs³⁰⁰. To sum up, for Katz, the political motives could still be considered valid while the outcrop/deep-level theory should be set aside. The ‘political’ interpreters of the raid have been considering almost certain that after the raid the mining magnates seemed to get less directly involved in the Transvaal politics³⁰¹. Besides, as S. Trapido has recently reaffirmed, although their voice would find few times the support of the British colonial administration, the political activity of mining magnates and capitalists in general cannot be linked directly to the imperialist plan³⁰². Indeed, the scholar reiterated the prominent economic nature of the coup³⁰³. A. Webb has recently partly reviewed the Blainey thesis. While reconfirming the refusal of the economic interpretation of the event, he reassessed the assumptions of Blainey, focusing on the fact that the mines were not profitable before 1894, and that financial constraints (determined, for instance, by the high cost and lack of labour and by the irrational planning of investment in machinery) had been a constant since the rise of the industry³⁰⁴.

²⁹⁹ E.N. Katz, “Outcrop and deep level mining in South Africa before the Anglo-Boer War”, *Cit.*, pp. 311-312.

³⁰⁰ *Ivi*, p. 319.

³⁰¹ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger’s Republic*, *Cit.*, p. 162.

³⁰² S. Trapido, “Imperialism, Settler Identities, and Colonial Capitalism”, *Cit.*, pp. 61-63.

³⁰³ *Ivi*, p. 69.

³⁰⁴ A. Webb, “Blainey and early Witwatersrand profitability”, *Cit.*, p. 129.

V

The Empire Struck Back

5.1 The Lion's awake: 1896-1897

Right after the end of the failed coup, Robinson and Bower moved to Pretoria to manage a diplomatic solution as representatives of the Cape Colony administration. Chamberlain pushed them to secure an improvement of the regulatory framework for the Uitlanders through, if necessary, a not too veiled military threat. However, the political expertise of the High Commissioner, suggested him to act carefully and, postponing the dispute about the Uitlanders, he managed to obtain the amnesty for most of the rebels³⁰⁵.

Subsequently, the two businessmen Marks and Sivewright suggested to Chamberlain to arrange a meeting with Kruger. A possible definitive diplomatic solution could be reached in the terms of a favourable review of the London Convention, in particular through the abrogation of the Article IV³⁰⁶, and through the resizing of the institutional role of Rhodes (now relieved of his duties in the B.S.A.C.). These were the expectations of Kruger, representing the 'injured party'. On the other side, Chamberlain would offer a monetary compensation and the disarmament of the B.S.A.C.. However, he would never discuss the reduction of the duties, and furthermore, he could never open a dialogue with regard to the Uitlanders issue as it would be seen by Kruger

³⁰⁵ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., pp. 104-108.

³⁰⁶ Chapter V.

as British interference on S.A.R. internal politics. Thus, the meeting did not take place and the proposals developed into a diplomatic stalemate³⁰⁷.

Nonetheless, Rhodes finally resigned from the position of Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. The members of the Reform Committee were arrested, while Chamberlain promised to set up a Commission of Enquiry in London. The Reform Committee leaders were firstly sentenced to death but soon this sentence was reduced to the point that the reformers could leave the prison as long as they would not get involved in politics for at least three years³⁰⁸. The trial, apart from providing us evidences for the reconstruction of the event, had not a major impact. The situation seemed to be stabilised. However, the British colonial administration was becoming more and more tangled in the internal politics of the S.A.R. and the local and regional frictions began to assume an Imperial scope.

During the first half of 1896, the course of action taken by the British administration developed in two ways: the diplomatic offer and the military threat. While waiting for the beginning of a fecund dialogue with Kruger, the heads of the British Colonial Office persisted in envisioning a military intervention and in trying to chase up a *casus belli*³⁰⁹ to attack the S.A.R.. Since the armed units of the B.S.A.C. were employed in the raid, an unrest of the Ndebele and Shona in Matabeleland could begin³¹⁰. This eventuality could justify a reinforcement of the garrisons both in the Cape Colony and in Natal. But, having assessed the insufficiency of the military

³⁰⁷ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., pp. 108-121 and I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, p. 114.

³⁰⁸ E. Longford, *Jameson's Raid*, Cit., *partim*.

³⁰⁹ To notice: in 1896 was compiled a Memorandum (white book) for the use of the Colonial Office entitled: '*The Case against the South African Republic*' by G.V. Fiddes, quoted in J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., p. 116.

³¹⁰ B. Porter, *The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850–2004*, Pearson Longman, Harlow, 2004, p. 208; for a more detailed narration of the Matabeleland conflicts, see : M. Meredith, *Diamonds, Gold and War*, Cit., pp. 323-329.

resources, and moreover the catastrophic implications of the action (as the conflict would have the nature of a civil war that would jeopardize the stability and the inter-national relations for long), both the colonial administrations did not align with the plan of the Colonial Office and the outbreak of the war could be delayed³¹¹. The ‘physical’ confrontation would be avoided, the battle would be however fought affecting the public opinion and appealing to the international regulation.

Considering the military way unworkable for the several reasons mentioned earlier, during the years following the raid, the Colonial Secretary began to create the ideal climate to promote or at least justify the British position in South Africa among the British internal public opinion and the government. His first and prompt move was to take up and redress the Uitlander issue, turning it into an imperial and most importantly a British matter³¹². The Uitlanders’ increasing presence was expected to be the preferential political tool and social power within the S.A.R. that could undermine the government. The Colonial Office campaign to foster the imperial consensus was based on the publication of despatches and public addressing³¹³ (mostly managed by Chamberlain himself). An Imperial South African Association was formed³¹⁴, and to obtain the political approval of his conduct, a Blue Book on the South African situation was drawn up for the House of Commons³¹⁵. The diplomacy of Chamberlain was based also on the military threat. However, with the awareness of the subsequent events, it seems that the menace

³¹¹ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger’s Republic*, Cit., pp. 114-121.

³¹² I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., pp. 111-122.

³¹³ A.N. Porter, *The Origins of the South African War: Joseph Chamberlain and the Diplomacy of Imperialism*, 1895-99, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1980, p. 111.

³¹⁴ *Ivi*, p. 108. The aim of the association was manifest: ‘To Uphold British supremacy and to promote the interest of British subjects in South Africa’. To get a sense of the of the propaganda purposes: for Instance, see: *The British case against the Boer republics*, issued by the Imperial South African Association, Westminster, 1900.

³¹⁵ *Correspondence relating to Affairs in the South African Republic* [C.-8063.], London, printed for H.M.S.O., by Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1896 quoted in A.N. Porter, *The Origins of the South African War*, Cit., p. 109.

of the use of force was conceived just as a diplomatic strategy and it would never develop into a military escalation that could drive to a war. Nonetheless, a major factor that would cause the war could be attributed to the recruitment of a new High Commissioner. Alfred Milner proved indeed to undertake a more offensive policy toward the Kruger's government.

5.1.1 The polarizing of the positions

Since the failed coup d'état, the old tensions between the S.A.R. government and the migrant (in particular British) community kept growing. Nevertheless, after the turning point of the 1895, this subject reached a critical mass that would initiate a radical transformation for the course of events. The 'Uitlanders grievances' would receive the direct consideration by the British colonial administration.

The government of Pretoria, aware of the incoming political storm during the first phase of the raid, made a move to try to sort things by approving a review of the laws (for instance, railway tariff reduction and backing to English-speaking schools)³¹⁶ and by proposing the establishment of a municipal council instead of the corrupted sanitary board of Johannesburg. The proposal of these solutions appeared to be belated and fatuous. After the raid, the willingness of the S.A.R. government to discuss about the Uitlanders and migrants rights gradually collapsed while leaving the door open to an increasing feeling of suspicion.

The reaction of the Kruger government after the Jameson's fiasco consisted primarily in the hardening of the policies regarding the migrant community. Since 1895, the Volksraad had been

³¹⁶ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., p. 102.

engaged in drafting a law³¹⁷ that would establish the proceedings to be applied with regard to the subjects considered as threat for the internal stability of the S.A.R.. Every individual assessed as a ‘danger’ to public safety would be expelled. Besides, from the beginning of 1897, an immigration law³¹⁸ that would restrict the inflow of ‘undesirable foreigners’, came into operation. On the other side, a resolution³¹⁹ of the Volksraad entitled the franchise right only to those who acted in defence of the Republic. Furthermore, the government passed a press law that would gag newspapers critical of the government (but actually it could not)³²⁰. The review of the S.A.R. internal legal framework, with particular reference to the laws regarding the migration and the expulsion, would be the target of the British Colonial Office ‘offensive’ as it would reinterpret these new laws in the light of a possible violation of the London Convention (Article XIV)^{321 322}.

In the regional legal framework playing field, the other law from which the Colonial Office tried to punch through was the Article IV³²³ of the same convention. For instance, the British

³¹⁷ Law No. 25 of 1896 ‘Regulating the right to expel foreigners’, in G.W. Eybers, *Selected Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History: 1795-1910*, London, George Routledge and Son, 1918, pp. 505-508.

³¹⁸ Law No. 30 of 1896, this law, however would affect more the Indian community than the white Uitlanders, quoted in J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger’s Republic*, Cit., p. 129.

³¹⁹ Resolution of the First Volksraad, 17 August 1896, Art. 1205, “The full Franchise granted to those who fight against Jameson” in G.W. Eybers, *Selected Constitutional Documents*, Cit., p. 508.

³²⁰ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger’s Republic*, Cit., pp. 129-132.

³²¹ Article XIV: «All persons, other than natives, conforming themselves to the laws of the South African Republic (a) will have full liberty, with their families, to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the South African Republic; (b) they will be entitled to hire or possess houses, manufactories, warehouses, shops and premises; (c) they may carry on their commerce either in person or by any agents whom they may think fit to employ; (d) they will not be subject, in respect of their persons or property, or in respect of their commerce or industry, to any taxes, whether general or local, other than those which are or may be imposed upon citizens of the said Republic». In “Selected Official Documents of the South African Republic and Great Britain”, Cit., p. 12.

³²² J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger’s Republic*, Cit., pp. 124-129.

³²³ Article IV: «the South African Republic will conclude no treaty or engagement with any State or nation other than the Orange Free State, nor with any native tribe to the eastward or westward of the Republic, until the same

authority plead the law experts to find a favourable interpretation of its application on the treaties of the S.A.R. with Portugal and Netherlands³²⁴ (in detail, those referred to the extradition)³²⁵, on a later ‘mutual assistance alliance’ agreement between the South African Republics³²⁶ and on the perceived German interference on Transvaal politics (since the Kaiser’s ‘congratulations’ telegram sent to Kruger)³²⁷. The independence of the S.A.R. in the making of international agreements would be preserved, however, the agreements must not be evaluated prejudicial to the British interests and they could not come in force until the final approve of the queen of the U.K.

The tensions kept on growing and they would never stop. From the end of the raid, while the Kruger’s government had to deal with serious internal issues³²⁸, the interference (effective or tried) of the British authorities in S.A.R. politics would be the leitmotiv of the relations between the two countries.

has been approved by Her Majesty the Queen. Such approval shall be considered to have been granted if Her Majesty’s Government shall not, within six months after receiving a copy of such treaty (which shall be delivered to them immediately upon its completion), have notified that the conclusion of such treaty is in conflict with the interests of Great Britain or any of Her Majesty’s possessions in South Africa». In “Selected Official Documents of The South African Republic and Great Britain”, Cit., p. 8.

³²⁴ N.J. Botha, *The History, Basis and Current Status of the Right or Duty to extradite in Public International and South African Law*, Thesis (Ph.D), University of South Africa, 1992, p. 97.

³²⁵ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger’s Republic*, Cit., pp. 122-124.

³²⁶ Paragraph 5.1.2.

³²⁷ *Ibidem*.

³²⁸ For instance: the economic crisis, the Uitlanders’ grievances and a dispute between the judgemental body and the government (the Chief of Justice J.G. Kotzé on the case *Brown v Leyds* of 1897). For the last, see: D. van der Merwe, “*Brown v Leyds* no (1897) 4 or 17: A constitutional drama in four acts”, *Fundamina*, Vol. 23, No. 1, Pretoria, 2017 (being published); in 1898, under the Law No.1 of 1897 (in op.508-513), Kotze was dismissed by Kruger as the tensions around the issues would not stop. The reaction of Kotzé, see: J.S. Kotzé, *An Appeal to the Inhabitants of South African Republic (Transvaal)*, Pretoria, John Keith, 1898.

5.1.2 The South African League

Before the raid, the only official political voice that took charge of the British petitions within the S.A.R. was the T.N.U., which was promptly suppressed after the Jameson's fiasco. Nonetheless, the political representation of the Uitlanders would be embodied by the South African League. The crucial difference between before and after is based on the fact that before, the political opposition to Kruger came from internal forces (Uitlanders and a part of the mining community) while after the British colonial power was committed straight to the S.A.R. politics. This political party would indeed operate as an instrument to enhance the imperial factor in the Transvaal³²⁹.

The league, based in the Cape, would serve as a political force to pursue the imperial interests (in particular the federative scheme and the Uitlander's grievances) within the institutions of the colonies of the Cape³³⁰ and the Natal and in the South African Republic. Meanwhile, once the raiders could return to politics (after the three years ban), the Uitlander Council was formed along the lines of the Reform Committee. Its lobbying activities seemed to be the direct expression of the 'big' mining industry³³¹.

5.1.3 The regional and international reaction

The consequences of the attempted and failed raid were logically noticeable at the regional level. The immediate reaction of the O.F.S. (already part of a treaty of friendship³³² with the S.A.R.), was to send military force on the Vaal river for protective purposes.

³²⁹ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., p. 131.

³³⁰ In the Cape Colony the league would create a political front with the Rhodes' progressives in opposition to the 'Afrikaner bond'. J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., pp. 161-170.

³³¹ D. Cammack, "An Illusion of Unity", Cit., pp. 8-10.

³³² Political Treaty between the S.A.R. and the O.F.S. of 1889 in C. Jeppe and J. H. Gey van Pittius, *Statute Law of the Transvaal*, Cit. pp. 175.

During the following months, the president of the O.F.S., M.T. Steyn, reiterated the support to the S.A.R. towards a project of a Federal Union (something like the ‘United States of South Africa’)³³³, moreover he withdrew the granting of the railway concession to the Cape line and manage to assign it to the N.Z.A.S.M. In 1897, the countries updated the treaty³³⁴ emphasising its nature of mutual support and defence³³⁵. This strengthening of relations between the Boer Republics³³⁶, as well as the S.A.R. rearmament³³⁷, represented a nightmare that materialised in the minds of the British colonial administrators.

Nonetheless, the raid seemed to trigger a series of events that would influence the whole international arena jeopardising the already unstable situation. The first destabilizing factor was a telegram of congratulations by the Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany to Kruger³³⁸. As already mentioned, the tension between Germany and U.K. had been rising since the stabilization of the German presence in the region (in particular in South-West Africa)³³⁹. Nonetheless, the political link between the German and the Boer administrators would never come into being as a direct and practical support and, despite the commercial-diplomatic missions of Leyds in Europe, Kruger would never find allies among the imperial powers³⁴⁰ also because of the British refusal to recognise the complete status of diplomats to the S.A.R. representatives³⁴¹. The intention was the maintenance of the status quo as stipulated by the London Convention.

³³³ A.N. Porter, *The Origins of the South African War*, Cit., p. 98.

³³⁴ Political Treaty with the O.F.S. of 1897 in C. Jeppe and J. H. Gey van Pittius, *Statute Law of the Transvaal*, Cit., pp. 361-362.

³³⁵ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., p. 105-106.

³³⁶ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger’s Republic*, Cit., p. 159.

³³⁷ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., p. 153.

³³⁸ E. Longford, *Jameson’s Raid*, Cit., pp. 101-107.

³³⁹ During the Berlin Conference of 1884 the German West Africa was recognised.

³⁴⁰ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., pp. 106-111.

³⁴¹ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger’s Republic*, Cit., pp. 213-214.

At the same time, the issue of Delagoa Bay³⁴² related to the commercial presence of other European empires, had become a great concern for the U.K. colonial policy in Southern-Africa. The first problem seemed to be posed by the growing presence of German migrants and financial capital in the mining activities³⁴³. Besides, the harbour would become the hub for a shipping service (funded by French and German investors) and the project of a French cable telegraph inter-continental line was on track³⁴⁴. The last major peril could result from the renovation of the Eiffe or (Katembe) concession³⁴⁵. Being the Lourenço Marques harbour inadequate, the need for warehouses and facilities for the increasing trade led the S.A.R. government to borrow a concession from Portugal. The granting would be managed by the German F.R. Eiffe which would improve the harbour capacity and enhance its internationalization, regardless of the British commercial preference³⁴⁶. This again increased the suspicion among the British colonial officers. These commercial developments represented obviously a threat to the imperial trade system. The solution could be found with the attainment of the railway concession (as already explained) and with the negotiations of new commercial agreement with Portugal³⁴⁷. The British diplomats tried to use the loan solution to put more pressure. However, the Portugal administration maintained its super-partes position.

The combining of a growing insecurity feeling of the British power and the controversy on Article IV of the London Convention eventually reached the peaked on April of 1897 while a

³⁴² Paragraph 2.2.1.

³⁴³ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., p. 108.

³⁴⁴ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., p. 152.

³⁴⁵ Also for a summary of the commercial presence of the German Empira in the Southern Africa arena, see: M.S. Seligmann, *Rivalry in Southern Africa, 1893-99: the Transformation of German Colonial Policy*, Houndmills, Macmillan Press, 1998, pp. 32-47.

³⁴⁶ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., pp. 152-153.

³⁴⁷ A.N. Porter, *The Origins of the South African War*, Cit., pp. 95-97 and J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., p. 155.

display of strength (the despatch of maritime units to the Delagoa Bay) by the British authorities could lead Kruger to a reconsideration of the last laws adopted³⁴⁸.

The stability of international powers in the region, was finally attained with the Anglo-German Agreement of 1898³⁴⁹. The main objective of the agreement was the maintenance or at least the re-affirmation of the status quo in the spheres of influence and the expansionist projections of the two empires. In this case, the pivotal argument was the long-standing contention over the Delagoa Bay. The countries made a bargain over the partition of the Portuguese colonies in the event of default. Besides, the Portugal got loans from Britain and Germany while the Katembe concession was approved on the condition that the company would remain 'Portuguese'.³⁵⁰

5.2 To the end: 1897-1898

To conclude the background preceding the war and to prevent a thematic diversity, only significant developments will be mentioned.

The ineffectiveness of the Industrial Commission of 1897, the repeated complaints of the mining community and of the Uitlanders, the slow structural collapsing of the Transvaal administrative machine under the imperatives of a changing economic and social landscape in addition to its corruption and lack of organization, the uncertainty of international investors (because of the stagnation in reforming) and the absence of political allies on Europe³⁵¹ (specially the loosening of the German interest also due to the agreement with U.K.) seemed to put Kruger on the spot (however, he was still able to be re-elected in 1898).

³⁴⁸ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., pp. 135-139.

³⁴⁹ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., pp. 214-217.

³⁵⁰ R.D. Fiala, *The Anglo-German agreement over Portugal's African colonies, 1898*, Thesis (MA), University of Nebraska at Omaha, UMI, 1963, pp. 51-110.

³⁵¹ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., pp. 168-171.

If the Kruger policy kept on fuelling the discontent (despite the openness to dialogue over the contentious taken up the state attorney J.C. Smuts), it is to say that the assignment of Milner as new High Commissioner since 1897 would be the decisive factor in fostering the conflict. To monitor, influence and destabilize the internal state of affairs of the S.A.R., his right-hand men would be the British agent C. Greene³⁵² (substituted for a limited period by E. Fraser³⁵³ which would handle the Uitlander's political strength and put forward the rights of the Cape 'coloured'³⁵⁴ which moved to the Transvaal as workers³⁵⁵) while Fitzpatrick would be the connection with the mining community³⁵⁶.

The conflictual approach of Milner about the South African issue has been shown in detail³⁵⁷. Furthermore, some events happened during its tenure should be mentioned.

In March 1898, Milner made a statement in Graaff-Reinet. While invoking the fidelity of the Afrikaans of the Cape, he referred for the first time publicly to the war as a solution for the inertia of the S.A.R. policies. In December, Thomas Edgar (British Uitlander) was killed by the Transvaal police after a brawl. The crime and the perceived abuse of authority of the S.A.R. police was instrumentalised (also by Chamberlain and Milner) to revitalise the Uitlander protest

³⁵² *Ivi*, p. 128.

³⁵³ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., p. 218.

³⁵⁴ «Individuals assigned to this classification originated primarily from 18th- and 19th-century unions between men of higher and women of lower social groups: for instance, between white men and slave women or between slave men and Khoekhoe or San women. The slaves were from Madagascar, the Malayan archipelago, Sri Lanka, and India». <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Coloured>, consulted: February 05, 2018.

³⁵⁵ by trying to ensure them a better legal treatment than the one given to natives, substituting the pass with the payment of a certificate. Nonetheless, this solution would prove to be insufficient as the certificate was excessively expensive. J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., pp. 179-182 and pp. 236-237.

³⁵⁶ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., pp. 198-206.

³⁵⁷ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., pp. 171-202 and A.N. Porter, *The Origins of the South African War*, Cit., pp. 175-202.

movement against the Kruger government. Indeed, a first public petition was drawn up and addressed directly to the queen³⁵⁸.

During the same period, with the expiry of the dynamite monopoly and its re-assignment advocated by the government, the tensions with the mining magnates led to the reviving of old complaints. At the beginning of 1899, E. Lippert (presumably under the advisement of Smuts, W.J. Leyds³⁵⁹, and F.W.Reitz, the State Secretary) acted as negotiator of the S.A.R. offering to the mining industry's representatives the establishment of a qualified state financial administrator, the settlement of the bewaarplaatsen and a review of the franchise, by lowering its obtainment to five years (Kruger would personally favour the choice of nine years for the new comers and seven years for the naturalised residents). Nevertheless, the dynamite concession would not be withdrawn, and the magnates would have the responsibility to placate the Uitlander's agitation.

Fitzpatrick was the representative of the mining community and the British colonial interests at the same time. Once he received the written proposal (as an official statement by the government), the negotiations could start. Fitzpatrick could create a united front, gaining more leverage by the simultaneous submission of the demands of the mining magnates³⁶⁰ and the Uitlanders. The negotiations failed but the 'anti-Kruger' sentiment kept growing³⁶¹.

³⁵⁸ J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., pp. 237-243 and I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., pp. 226-229.

³⁵⁹ "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the South African Republic in Europe".

³⁶⁰ first of all, the dynamite concession, for which they offered 600000£ and found the support of the British authorities since the monopoly was affecting the British dynamite companies trade. J.S. Marais, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*, Cit., pp. 243-247.


³⁶¹ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., 229-247.

During the negotiations, Milner pushed the colonial offices and the press³⁶² (a strategy that would be used until the ultimatums) to raise the level of the confrontation while a second Uitlander petition (edited by the S.A.L.) was sent to the queen. Despite the franchise issue was not the focal point, all the ‘classic’ grievances such as the inadequacy of the administration of Johannesburg, the ineffectiveness of the Industrial Commission, the subjugation of the judgemental body by the government and the arbitrariness of the police, were presented. The Colonial Office and the British government endorsed for the first and definitive time the Uitlander positions, hitting the point of no return regarding their direct involvement in Transvaal politics³⁶³. Since March of 1899, Kruger seemed to open up the possibility to reassess the franchise law and in May he asked the Volksraad to draw up a law that would guarantee to the Uitlanders the enfranchisement after nine years (four for the naturalisation and five to obtain all the rights), however he still would not change his mind about the dynamite concession.

³⁶² A.N. Porter, “Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897–1899”, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1973 pp. 334-337 and C.A. Robinson, *The Power Behind the Press: English Newspapers in the Transvaal, 1870-1899*, Thesis (MA), The University of British Columbia, 1898, pp. 144-155.

³⁶³ A.N. Porter, “Lord Salisbury, Mr. Chamberlain and South Africa, 1895–9”, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 17.

4. The new franchise*



'Political Cartoon by J.M. Staniforth.

Paul Kruger, attempts to gain favour by reducing the voting time for the 'Uitlanders'.

Joseph Chamberlain looks on³⁶⁴.

*Image extracted from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Slow_and_Sure_-_JM_Staniforth.png

5.3 The final round

The conference of Bloemfontein³⁶⁵, the last match between Kruger and Milner, started at the end of May and it would not last more than one week. During this last negotiations Kruger gave ground once more by reaching the proposal of a seven years retrospective enfranchisement (naturalisation in two years and citizenship after another five years) and the increasing of the number of seats on the First Volksraad³⁶⁶ to five (for the Rand). Nonetheless, Milner would not accept what Kruger offered, since the High Commissioner insisted for the achievement of a five years retrospective enfranchisement and seven seats on the Volksraad. As it may seem, a

³⁶⁴ https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Slow_and_Sure_-_JM_Staniforth.png consulted: January 03, 2018

³⁶⁵ Capital of the O.F.S., the place was offered by the prime minister Steyn, who made the last attempt to 'arbitrate' the confrontation and to prevent the inevitability of the clash.

³⁶⁶ For the election procedures: '*Of the Volksraad, the Highest Authority, or the Legislative Power*' in "Selected Official Documents of the South African Republic and Great Britain", Cit., pp. 19-23.

negotiation genuinely occurred. However, the firmness of Kruger (he perceived the enlargement of the franchise as a possible starting point for the subversion of the Boer establishment) and Milner's unwillingness to find a compromise, made the conclusion already decided in advance. Thus, the negotiations were abruptly terminated³⁶⁷.

Throughout the following months, further efforts to break the impasse were made. Firstly, Reitz tried to restate the international arbitration as part of the solution, but the British authorities would not initially accept any involvement on the dispute by other international powers. The simultaneous diplomatic and conciliatory actions of W.P. Schreiner³⁶⁸, J.H. Hofmeyr³⁶⁹, the O.F.S. president Steyn, A. Fischer³⁷⁰ and Smuts could not help to achieve a breakthrough.

Although the Volksraad passed a new franchise law³⁷¹ in July, the situation would irreparably deteriorated. The approval of this new franchise law prevented the military escalation, since the British administration could not justify the war through this *casus belli*. On the other side, Milner persisted in adding fuel to the fire³⁷². The terms of the franchise law were once again considered unsatisfying and the process of applying for the citizenship, mainly because of the bureaucracy, was posing difficulties in the obtaining of the enfranchisement. The British Colonial Office asked for the institution of a Joint Enquiry³⁷³ (of British and Boer representatives) on the franchise law and for a new conference that would be held in Cape

³⁶⁷ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., pp. 283-285.

³⁶⁸ Cape Colony prime minister, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/william-philip-schreiner>, updated: May, 05, 2016, consulted: February 10, 2018. Interestingly, his sister Olive E.A. Schreiner was a vibrant intellectual, feminist and anti-war campaigner.

³⁶⁹ Member of the Cape Parliament as leader of the 'Dutch' party.

³⁷⁰ Member of executive council and volksraad in O.F.S.

³⁷¹ Law No. 3 of 1899, 'The Franchise Law' in "Selected Official Documents of the South African Republic and Great Britain", Cit. pp. 47-52.

³⁷² I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., pp. 293-325.

³⁷³ Proposal of Great Britain for a joint inquiry of August 1899, in "Selected Official Documents of the South African Republic and Great Britain", Cit., p. 53.

Town. Furthermore, while holding talks with the British agent in Pretoria, Smuts submitted a new set of proposals that contained the offer of a five years enfranchisement and eight additional seats in the Volksraad (for the Rand) on the condition that the U.K. would open to international arbitration, would not interfere in Transvaal internal affairs anymore and would abandon its suzerainty claim on the South African region.

The British administration opened up to the international arbitration, mostly due to the precedent established by The Hague Peace Conference of 1899³⁷⁴. Nonetheless, the suzerainty status could not be called into question. The negotiations stopped once again.

A further proposal was made by the Colonial Office, but since the franchise issues could not be used as a leverage to justify the growing British pressure (the Kruger administration had always proven to be willing to negotiate on this issue), the new strategy was to re-extend the claims (insisting again on the issue of the suzerainty, the independence of the judiciary and the Uitlanders rights)³⁷⁵.

The intervening diplomatic exchanges and the Colonial Office hesitation in sending an ultimatum were most likely relying on the need to buy some time to ensure a significant presence of British colonial troops in South Africa (in August 1899, it was decided the relocation in Durban of 10000 troops coming predominantly from India). Additionally, the tactical delay had grounds on the risk of international embarrassment and internal political instability if U.K. waged war to the S.A.R. without a legitimate reason.

Nevertheless, the news of the impending arrival of British troops and the realisation that no equitable arrangement could be made, pushed the Boer Republics to take the first step. The bloc

³⁷⁴ In particular, the dispute could be managed within the newly created Permanent Court of Arbitration provided for by the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899.

³⁷⁵ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., p. 365.

of the Boer side was officialised by a resolution³⁷⁶ of the O.F.S. Volksraad. An ultimatum was sent by the S.A.R. to the British government and two days later, on 11 October 1899, the O.F.S. troops began the attack on Natal³⁷⁷.

5.4 Some considerations on the the economic and political interests towards the conflict, as seen by previous historiography

Following the scheme of the debate around the causes of the Raid³⁷⁸, the discussion on the nature of the war is even more sensitizing among historians. Indeed, since the outbreak of the war, the academic world was divided between different interpretations (firstly on the broad categories of the political or economic explanation). The narrative of the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war obviously followed the diplomatic and political stages of the relation between the British Empire and the S.A.R., but, even though the war could indeed be perceived as a political fact, the economic reasons have been a constant on the historiography of the war.

In 1900, Leo Amery stated that the reasons of the war were based on the political conflict between the British and S.A.R. governments, two confrontational opponents. By doing that, he rejected the economic interpretation³⁷⁹. Hobson, being a liberal anti-imperialist, was the first to take into account the motives of the mining industry as a major factor for the explanation of the war. Subsequently, the scholars challenged or at least resized the economic interpretation. For

³⁷⁶ Resolution of Orange Free State Volksraad of September 1899, 'Dual Alliance of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State', in "Selected Official Documents of the South African Republic and Great Britain", Cit., pp. 62-63.

³⁷⁷ I.R. Smith, *The origins of the South African War*, Cit., pp. 348-381.

³⁷⁸ Paragraph 4.2.1.

³⁷⁹ I.R. Smith, *The Origins of the South African War (1899–1902): A Re-Appraisal*, *South African Historical Journal*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1990, pp. 27-28.

instance, an ‘early’ scholar like G.H.L. LeMay³⁸⁰ observed that the mining capitalists did not represent a homogeneous group. The other major study that could be still considered a pillar for the understanding of the war is the work of Marais which, moreover, appears to be one of the major sources of the political interpretation that is based on the focus on the British Colonial administration. However, this study seemed to radicalise the issue, making the outbreak of the war simply an outcome of the imperial policy³⁸¹. Along these lines, R. Hyam reduced the economic motivation to a local and short-term issue, while the colonial policy seemed to be the most important factor³⁸².

In his study, Jeeves took a step forward, claiming that also the conventional ethnic distinction within the mining community (summed up by scholar as J. van der Poel, R. Robinson and J. Gallagher)³⁸³ based on the opposition of British and German or ‘Anglo-saxons’ and ‘Cosmopolitans’, proved to be a weak theory, Jeeves argued that for all the years before the war, the mining companies behaved basically independently from both the Boer and the British administration³⁸⁴. However, in 1898, the S.A.R. government imposed a new tax (5%) on gold profits. This, added to the continuing attacks to the mining magnates and capital by the ‘pro-government’ and ‘pro-workers’ journal *Standard and Diggers News*, together with the old problems of the dynamite monopoly and the drunkenness of the worker, appeared to lie behind the political aligning of the mining community with the South African League. Although the

³⁸⁰ G.H.L. LeMay, *British Supremacy in South Africa, 1899-1906*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965 quoted in A.H. Jeeves, “The Rand Capitalists”, *Cit.*, p. 66.

³⁸¹ *Ibidem*.

³⁸² R. Hyam, *Britain’s Imperial Century, 1815–1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion*, London, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1993, p. 244.

³⁸³ J. Van der Poel, *The Jameson Raid*, Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1951 and R. Robinson and J. Gallagher with Alice Denny, *Africa and the Victorians*, New York, Doubleday & Company, 1968 quoted in A.H. Jeeves, “The Rand Capitalists”, *Cit.*, p. 66.

³⁸⁴ *Ivi*, pp. 65-72.

mining tycoons (Jeeves suggested the case of the Wernher Beit group) would prefer to continue dealing with the Kruger's government putting pressure on it, the growing political influence of Milner seemed to be a decisive driver to turn the mining community completely against the Boer government³⁸⁵. Another major comment on the South African war context was made by S. Trapido and S. Marks. Analysing the moments before the war, they firstly reduced the academic illusion of a soloist political approach of Milner, as he belonged to a well-defined Weltanschauung pervading large part of the British political establishment (Imperialist nationalism and Social Imperialism³⁸⁶). Furthermore, they observed that the long-term needs and imperatives of the mining industry could find at least more favourable conditions under the imperial administration (for example, another problem the mining industry faced under the Kruger administration was the inability to reduce the wages of the white workers). And moreover, their evaluation of the British involvement in the war invoked some considerations about the importance of gold reserves (for the Bank of England)³⁸⁷ as a guarantee for the preservation of the pre-eminence of the Sterling in the currency exchange and the stability of the commercial empire³⁸⁸. A similar remark about the inefficiency of the Boer government in fulfilling the request of the mining industry and of the British (and German) investments and trade, and the importance of gold for the 'British banking community' came from Van-Helten³⁸⁹. Nonetheless, the scholar seemed to change his mind on a review of the work of

³⁸⁵ *Ivi*, pp. 72-80.

³⁸⁶ S. Marks and S. Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State", *Cit.*, p. 55.

³⁸⁷ R. Ally, *Gold and Empire*, *Cit.*, pp. 11-28.

³⁸⁸ S. Marks and S. Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State", *Cit.*, pp. 52-62.

³⁸⁹ J.J. Van-Helten, "British capital, the British state and economic investment in South African 1886-1914", *Collected Seminar Papers*, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, No. 24, pp. 1-9.

Kubicek³⁹⁰ and in a following article³⁹¹, since he no longer conceived the need of gold as the primary cause of the conflict and he reconsidered the needs of capital as an element independent from the imperial strategy³⁹². E. Hobsbawm, without any room for misunderstanding stated that the war was made for gold³⁹³. (R. Owendal, with regard to the Natal Colony, assumed that one main ‘positive’ reason for its involvement in the war lied on a quest for a commercial unity on the region, particularly in relation to the railways trade)³⁹⁴. A.N. Porter, in a commentary about the origins of war, following the approach of his main work³⁹⁵, focused again on the importance of the British imperial policy-making as the leading factor causing the war, and while re-affirming the predominance of the political interests he invalidated (maybe naively) the importance of the gold and the need of a new political economy as key elements in fostering the conflict³⁹⁶ (because, for instance, gold supplies were not running low and whenever the British administration would control the Transvaal it could not control directly the extraction of gold, being it a prerogative of the mining industries). I.R. Smith, for his part, criticised the fact that historians of the war, while focusing on the economic reasons, forgot several times the political and diplomatic events. Surpassing the concept of a conflict between nationalities, the scholar recommended the notion of the conflict as a civil war³⁹⁷. And noting the different degree

³⁹⁰ R.V. Kubicek, *Economic Imperialism*, Cit.

³⁹¹ J.J. Van-Helten, “Empire and High Finance: South Africa and the International Gold Standard 1890–1914”, *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1982, pp. 529-548.

³⁹² J.-J. Van-Helten, “Review Article: Mining and Imperialism”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1980, p. 234.

³⁹³ E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire: 1875-1914*, New York, Vintage Books, 1989, p. 66.

³⁹⁴ R. Owendale, “Profit or patriotism: Natal, the Transvaal, and the Coming of the Second Anglo-Boer war”, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 209-234.

³⁹⁵ A.N. Porter, *The Origins of the South African War*, Cit.

³⁹⁶ A.N. Porter, “The South African War (1899-1902): Context and Motive Reconsidered”, *Journal of African History*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1990, pp. 47-57.

³⁹⁷ I.R. Smith, “The Origins of the South African War (1899–1902): A Re-Appraisal”, Cit., p. 25.

of the political involvement of the magnates during the last five years before the war, he stated that «the Siamese twins of the Jameson Raid and the outbreak of war in 1899 need separating»³⁹⁸. On the other side, R. Ally provided another piece for the development of an economic interpretation of the events. Emphasizing the role of the City as ‘the banker of the world’ and beating heart of the global financial activity, and reviewing the early linking between the London market and the South African mining industry, he finally suggested that despite «there was no direct casual relation between the interests of the City of London and British colonial policy»³⁹⁹, the existence of the relation was ‘indisputable’. This would result, for instance, from the mingling of political, financial and commercial interest within the British administration⁴⁰⁰. The use of gold by the Bank of England as a strategic asset influencing the colonial policy has indeed been recently reassessed by S. Knafo⁴⁰¹. In a review of their previous study (in response to Porter), Marks and Trapido, reaffirmed that gold (the control over its output) was not the direct motive of the war, however, the political control of the context where gold was produced (the political economy in line with the needs of the mining industry) was a major issue affecting the political events⁴⁰². More recently, F. Welsh has scaled down any great economic justification of the war, arguing the disaffection of the mine-owners with regard to war and the lack of need of gold of the Bank of England at that time⁴⁰³. The same position has been taken again by C. Saunders and I. Smith, which have found the reasons of the war on the political strategy of U.K colonialism rather than on the needs of gold and trade but, at least,

³⁹⁸ *Ivi*, p. 32.

³⁹⁹ R. Ally, *Gold and Empire*, Cit., p. 27.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰¹ S. Knafo, *The Making of Modern Finance: Liberal Governance and the Gold Standard*, New York, Routledge, 2013, pp. 171-172.

⁴⁰² S. Marks and S. Trapido, “Lord Milner and the South African State Reconsidered” in M. Twaddle, *Imperialism, the State and the Third World*, London, British Academic Press, 1992, p. 84.

⁴⁰³ F. Welsh, *South Africa: A Narrative History*, New York, Kondasha America, 1999, pp. 324-325.

they have recognised that the political threat represented by the Transvaal was a consequence of its growing economic power⁴⁰⁴.

Cain and Hopkins themselves seem to favour a more ‘political’ interpretation of the events as they contextualize the South African war on the long-term strategy of the British colonial empire⁴⁰⁵. A tentative summary of the achievements of this debate is proposed in the following conclusion.

⁴⁰⁴ C. Saunders and I.R. Smith, “Southern Africa, 1795-1910” in A.N. Porter, *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 616.

⁴⁰⁵ P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: 1688–2015*, New York, Routledge, 2016, p. 350.

VI

Conclusion

The initial idea of the thesis was to identify the principal outcomes of the Transvaal's gold discovery. The output of the research suggests that a revolution powered by the exploitation of gold actually occurred.

As explained in part I, the discovery of gold lured immediately major capitals; great holdings were formed, and the international finance greeted the Transvaal. In part II, it has been shown that the new situation and the indirect result of the rise of the gold-mining industry, namely the development of the commercial activities and the need of infrastructures, did not fit with the pre-existing institutional framework or, at least, these institutions could not keep pace with the economic boom. The assessment on the part III has provided some suggestions about the social impact of the rise of the gold-mining, in particular the stratification of the labour force and the nature and magnitude of the migratory process. In part IV, it has been explained that the political events grew their roots on the indirect outcomes of the gold revolution. The part V, even because of the historiographical abundance, left open whether the gold is connected to the 'Anglo-Boer War', and if it is, to what extent. In the narratives of the origins of the war, endless theoretical positions have been taken and, almost certainly, a definitive and monolithic reason cannot be accepted. What I completely failed to investigate and that may be interesting to examine is the possible reaction of the 'business community' (especially British) and its degree of collusion with British politics with reference to the gold discoveries in South Africa (since the first news).

The subject of the political impact of the South African gold discovery refers however to countless outlook. For instance, from a perspective of *longue durée* we could call into question the meaning of gold for human beings throughout history, while focusing on the shorter period we could fall into the analysis of the British expansionism and imperialism and the Scramble for Africa of the late nineteenth century. It is possible to talk about nationalities, ethnicities and single persons, as long as the choice is accompanied by some degree of intellectual honesty. The gold revolution at the end of the South African Republic, despite being a big coincidence, still has plenty to say.

Appendix I

Memorials of Chamber of Mines.

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ACQUISITION OF THE RAILWAYS BY THE STATE.

TO THE HONOURABLE THE CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE HONOURABLE
VOLKSRAAD :

The Humble Memorial of the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines:

SHEWETH :—

That the Netherlands South African Railway Company charges exorbitant rates for the carriage of goods—rates far in excess of those charged in the Free State and the neighbouring colonies, where there is State ownership of railways, and where, too, greater travelling facilities are offered to the public in connection with special events, such as agricultural shows, etc.

That while the Cape Colony and the Colony of Natal make on their working system about £1,500 per mile, the Netherlands South African Railway makes £3,291 per mile.

That these heavy charges hinder the development of industries and commerce within the Republic and impose a grievous burden on the whole country.

That under the present system no material change can be expected, for the Netherlands Railway Company is a purely commercial enterprise, and a body of shareholders possessed of powers such as those conferred by the Railway Concession will not be content with a fair return upon their investment, but will naturally seek to obtain the maximum possible profit, irrespective of the mischief to the general weal caused by such a policy.

That under these conditions it is desirable in the best interests of the State and its inhabitants that the railway system should be owned and worked by the State, so that it may be made to conduce to the furtherance of the progress and prosperity of the country, and afford cheap means of travelling for the people.


That provision has been made for the expropriation of the railways by the State.

That one of the terms of expropriation, so far as known to your memorialists, being a sum equal to twenty times the average dividends declared during the three years preceding expropriation, it is evident, owing to the increased profits which will be earned from year to year, that the longer the delay in acquiring the railways, the greater will be the amount to be paid to the Netherlands South African Railway Company.

Wherefore your memorialists respectfully pray your Honourable House to take such measures as you may deem advisable for the immediate acquisition by the State of the railways owned by the Netherlands South African Railway Company.

And your memorialists will ever pray.

Appendix II

black African workers in the Rand mines ('000)
1889-1899

- African (Katzenellenbogen, 1982)(Warwick, 1983)(Richardson, Van Helten, 1982)
- African (Harries, 1977, 1982, 1994) (Katz, 1995)
- Mozambican (Katzenellenbogen, 1982)(Warwick, 1983)(Richardson, Van Helten, 1982)
- Mozambican (Harries, 1977, 1982, 1994)

Appendix II (2)

Black African workers in the Rand mines 1889-1899 (sources)

Year	African	Mozambican and Northern Transvaal's
1889	10,000 ¹	
1890	14,000 ² - 15,000 ³ - 15,000 ⁴	7,000 ² - 8,750 ⁴
1891	14,000 ⁵	7,000 ⁴
1892	25,800 ⁶	
1893	29,500 ⁵	19,500 or 22,100 ⁴
1894	41,000 ⁷	
1895	40,000 ⁶ - 50,000 ³	
1896	60,000 ⁶ - 70,000 ⁵	
1897	69,127 ⁸	60,000 ⁹ - ¹⁰
1898	82,500 ⁸	
1899	97,800 ² - 107,000 ⁴	80,000 ¹¹ - 81,166 ¹²

¹ S.E. Katzenellenbogen, *South Africa and Southern Mozambique*, Cit.

² N. Levy, "The State, Mineowners and Labour Regulation in the Transvaal", Cit.

³ P. Warwick, "African Labour during the South African War", Cit.

⁴ P. Harries, "Labour Migration from the Delagoa Bay Hinterland to South Africa", Cit.

⁵ *Idem*, *Work, Culture and Identity: Migrant Laborers in Mozambique and South Africa*, Cit.

⁶ *Idem*, "Capital, State, and Labour on the 19th Century Witwatersrand: A Reassessment", Cit.

⁷ E.N. Katz, "Outcrop and deep level mining in South Africa before the Anglo-Boer War", Cit.

⁸ P. Richardson, J.J. Van-Helten, "Labour in the South African Gold Mining Industry", Cit.

⁹ P. Harries, "Kinship, ideology and the nature of pre-colonial labour migration", Cit.

¹⁰ G. Napoleão, *The reduction of Mozambican workers in South African mines*, Cit.

¹¹ B. Paton, *Labour Export Policy in the Development of Southern Africa*, Cit.

¹² M. Harris, "Labour Emigration among the Moçambique Thonga", Cit.

Appendix II (3)

The presence of Mozambicans could not be read on an ongoing basis because most of them were seasonal workers.

As suggested by scholars, the statistical production about the mining workforce is not completely reliable. The original surveys did not utilize a standard method of data collection (a major variable is the number of mines considered in each survey). Another problem results from the lack of complete information collected by the mines about their employed workers.

However, these limited statistical data suggest the existence of some kind of constant trend characterizing the workforce composition. The volume of black African workforce had been increasing throughout the decade (with the exception of the year 1891, when a reorganization of the industry led to a reduction in wages that discourage the miners from working; and the year 1894-5, when the Luso-Gaza war interrupted the migration of Mozambicans).

Appendix III

The Franchise Law (1890)*

No. 230. A MODIFICATION OF LAW No. 7, 1882.

[23 June 1890.]

LAW No. 5, 1890.¹

(Approved and confirmed by resolution of the Volksraad, art. 451, dated 23 June 1890.)

WHEREAS it is desirable for the coming into operation of a law for a National Representation consisting of two Volksraads to modify Law No. 7, 1882, entitled, "the Law to regulate the general franchise of the burghers of the South African Republic," therefore it is hereby affirmed and laid down as follows:

ARTICLE 1. The first article of Law No. 7, 1882, is hereby modified as follows:

In order to possess the franchise in the Republic one must be a burgher. With regard thereto the following regulations shall be of force:

- a. In order to be a burgher one must have been born within the Republic or must have been naturalised. In order to be a voter one must have reached the age of 16 years.

¹ Superseded by Law No. 13, 1891, for which see No. 224.

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b. Personen, niet in de Republiek geboren, maar van elders ingekomen, kunnen het burgerrecht verkrijgen en dus burgers worden, wanneer zij de hieronder vermeldde brieven van naturalisatie verkregen hebben en den gevorderden eed hebben afgelegd.

c. Zulke personen zullen in handen van den daartoe aangewezen ambtenaar den volgende eed afleggen:

"Ik . . . tot heden . . . geboren . . . verlangend burger der Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek te worden en voldaan hebbende aan alle voorschriften der wet betrekkelijk de naturalisatie, verzaak, zie af en doe afstand van alle gehoorzaamheid, getrouwheid en onderworpenheid aan alle vreemde Vorsten, Hoofden, Staten en Souvereiniteiten en in 't bijzonder den Vorst, het Hoofd, den Staat of de Souvereiniteiten waarvan ik tot nu toe een onderdaan en burger ben, en zweer als onderdaan den eed van getrouwheid en gehoorzaamheid aan de Regeering en hare wetten en het volk der Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek."

d. Vreemdelingen van elders ingekomen, kunnen toegelaten worden tot de naturalisatie, mits zij van den Landdrost van hun district of van den veldkornet hunner wijk het bewijs overleggen, dat zij zich minstens twee jaren hier te lande metterwoon gevestigd hebben en gedurende

b. Persons who were not born in the Republic but have come in from elsewhere may obtain burgher rights and thus may become burghers when they have obtained the letters of naturalisation mentioned below and have taken the oath prescribed.

c. Such persons shall take the following oath before any official appointed for the purpose:

"I . . . till to-day . . . born . . . be desirous of becoming a burgher of the South African Republic and having conformed to the demands of the law regarding naturalisation, abandon, discard and renounce all obedient allegiance and subjection to all foreign Princes, States and Sovereignities and in particular to the Prince, Head, State or Sovereignty which I have till now been a subject and burgher and as a subject I swear the oath of allegiance and obedience to the Government and its laws and the people of the South African Republic"

d. Foreigners who have come in from elsewhere may be admitted to naturalisation, provided that they submit proof from the Landdrost of their district or the Field-cornet of their ward of having resided in this country for at least two years, having conducted themselves during that time

1890]

FRANCHISE LAW

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dien tijd zich getrouw en gehoorzaam aan de wetten des lands gedragen hebben en zich ook minstens twee jaren lang hebben laten inschrijven op de veldkornetschapslijsten.

Het verzoek om naturalisatie wordt door den veldkornet, door middel van den Landdrost, met de noodige bewijsetukken aan de Regeering opgezonden en door deze aan den Staatsprocureur geregeerd, die de stukken, na ze in orde bevonden te hebben, terugzendt aan den Uitvoerenden Raad, die dan de brieven van naturalisatie uitreikt en den bedoelden persoon den eed afneemt of door een daartoe aangewezen persoon doet afnemen. De kosten der naturalisatie zijn $\text{f}5$.

e. Personen, onder bijzondere omstandigheden door de Regeering tot de naturalisatie mitgenoodigd, behoeven geen twee jaren in het land gewoond te hebben of bij den veldkornet ingeschreven te zijn geweest om tot de naturalisatie te worden toegelaten en behoeven ook geen som daarvoor te betalen.

2. Artikel 3 van genoemde wet wordt hierbij gewijzigd als volgt: De in bovenstaande artikelen vermelde burgers, die het kiesrecht hebben verkregen, hebben het recht om hunne namen als kiezers te doen aantekenen bij hunne respectieve veldkornetten, nadat zij

in a manner faithful and obedient to the laws of the country, and of having had their names enrolled for at least two years on the Field-cornets' lists.

The request to be naturalised shall be sent by the Field-cornet, through the Landdrost, accompanied by the necessary proofs, to the Government, and shall be referred by them to the State Attorney, who shall send the proofs, after having found them in order, back to the Executive Council, who shall then issue the naturalisation papers to the person concerned, and shall administer the oath or cause it to be administered by some person appointed for the purpose. The cost of naturalisation shall be $\text{f}5$.

e. Persons invited by the Government under special circumstances to be naturalised need not have resided in the country for two years or to have been enrolled by the Field-cornet in order to be admitted to naturalisation, nor need they to pay any sum therefor.

2. Article 3 of the said law shall hereby be modified as follows:

The burghers mentioned in the preceding sections, who have obtained the franchise, shall have the right to have their names enrolled as voters by their respective Field-cornets,

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het bewijs hebben geleverd dat zij het burger- en kiesrecht hebben verkregen.

3. [Verplichtingen der Veldkornetten ten opzichte der kiezerslijsten.]

4. Deze wet treedt in werking twee maanden na publicatie in de Staatscourant.

Locale Wetten der Z.A. Rep. IV. 27.

No. 231. VOLKSRAADSBSLUIT, 11 AUGUSTUS 1890.

Art. 1235.¹ De Raad vereenigde zich met Uitvoerende Raadsbesluit art. 502, dd. 9 Augustus 1890, en nam aldus het daarin vervatte concept Volksraadsbesluit als het besluit van den Volksraad aan.

Gemeelde Uitvoerende Raadsbesluit luidt: Aan de orde: Bespreking over het wenschelijke, dat, vooral met het oog op de tegenwoordige omstandigheden der Republiek, de Regeering gemachtigd worde door den E.A. Volksraad, zaken, waarvoor geen voorziening door den E.A. Volksraad is gemaakt en die niet kunnen wachten tot de aanstaande zitting van den E.A. Volksraad, zonder groote moeilijkheden te veroorzaken, te kunnen afdoen.

Besloten aan den E.A. Volksraad voor te stellen, evenals in vorige jaren, het navolgende besluit te passeeren:

De Volksraad besluit de Regeering te machtigen en op te dragen voorzieningen en regelingen te maken ten aanzien van alle zaken,

after they shall have submitted the proofs of having obtained burgher rights and the franchise.

3. [Duties of the Field-cornets with regard to voters' lists.]

4. This law shall take effect two months after its publication in the *Staatscourant*.

*Extracted from: G.W. Eybers, *Selected Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History: 1795-1910*, London, George Routledge & Sons, 1918, pp. 496-498.

Appendix IV

Law No. 4, 1890*

No. 219. TO ESTABLISH A NATIONAL REPRESENTATION CONSISTING OF TWO VOLKSRaadS.

[23 June 1890.]
Law No. 4, 1890.¹

(Approved and confirmed by resolution of the Volksraad, art. 460, dated 23 June 1890.)

ARTICLE I. The power to legislate shall rest with a national representation which shall consist of a First Volksraad and a Second Volksraad.

¹ Repealed by Procl. No. 34 of 1901.

2. The First Volksraad shall be the highest authority in the State, as was the Volksraad before this law came into effect.

The First Volksraad shall be the body called till the taking effect of this law the Volksraad. From the moment of such taking effect the name of that body shall be changed from Volksraad to First Volksraad. The persons, however, who constitute that body as members shall remain the same; only, they shall, from the moment mentioned, be called members of the First Volksraad instead of members of the Volksraad.

All laws and resolutions having reference to the Volksraad and the members thereof shall remain in force and be applicable to the First Volksraad and the members thereof, except in so far as any change shall be made therein by this law or by later laws.

3. The First and the Second Volksraad shall meet at least once a year.

Their ordinary meetings shall be opened in a combined session on the first Monday in the month of May under the chairmanship of the chairman of the First Volksraad. Special meetings may be called by the State President as often as he deems them necessary in the interests of the country.

4. The number of members of the Second Volksraad shall

be the same as of the First Volksraad. This number shall be later specified for both Volksraads by the First Volksraad.¹

5. [The oath of members.]

6. The manner of electing the members of the Second Volksraad shall be the same as that of electing members of the First Volksraad.

7. The members of the Second Volksraad shall enjoy the same allowances as the members of the First Volksraad and shall be under the same obligations as regards making their electors acquainted with their laws and resolutions.

8. The members of the Second Volksraad shall be chosen for the period of four years.

In the first ordinary session of the Second Volksraad it shall be decided by lot which members shall belong to that half who shall vacate their seats on the expiry of the first two years.

9. The members of the First Volksraad shall be chosen by those burghers possessing the franchise who have acquired the franchise either before the taking effect of this law or thereafter by birth, and who have reached the age of sixteen years.

The franchise for the First Volksraad may moreover also be obtained by those who for 10 years have been eligible for the Second Volksraad, on a resolution of the First Volksraad, and according to rules to be fixed by law hereafter.

10. The members of the Second Volksraad shall be elected

¹ By resolution of 2 Aug. 1890, art. 1168, each Volksraad had 74 members.

by all burghers possessing the franchise who have reached the age of sixteen years.

11. No one may place himself eligible for both Volksraads or in more districts or electoral divisions [than one] at the same time.

12. [Forbidden family relationship of members.]

13. [Military officers and officials are not eligible.]

14. [Coloured people, half-castes, persons of openly bad behaviour, and unrehabilitated bankrupts not eligible.]

15. In order to be able to take session as a member of the First Volksraad, any person lawfully chosen must be thirty years of age and a member of a Protestant Church, he must reside in the Republic, possess immovable property there, and must have obtained the franchise either before the taking effect of this law or thereafter by birth, or he must have obtained the franchise for the First Volksraad according to section 2 of art. 9.

16. In order to be able to take session as a member of the Second Volksraad, any person lawfully chosen must be thirty years of age, must have been a burgher possessing the franchise during the two years immediately preceding, must be a member of a Protestant Church, must reside in the Republic, and must possess immovable property there.

17. Each Volksraad shall elect its own chairman from its midst.

18. Each Volksraad shall appoint its own secretary, not being one of its own members, on the recommendation of the Executive Council.

19. Each Volksraad shall decide whether elections and the qualifications of its own members are in accordance with law.

20. [Each Volksraad shall lay down its own rules of procedure.]

21. The State President and the members of the Executive Council shall have session in both Volksraads, with the right to take part in discussions, but without a vote.

22. The *quorum* of the First as well as of the Second Volksraad shall consist of twelve members.

When in the Second Volksraad no *quorum* is present, its secretary shall immediately announce the fact to the First Volksraad.

23. [The sessions of both Volksraads shall be open to the public.]

24. [Minutes of their proceedings shall be kept.]

25. Each Volksraad shall have the right to punish its own members for disorderly behaviour.

Each Volksraad shall, moreover, have the right to expel a member by the decision of two-thirds of the votes recorded.

26. A period of three months shall be given the people in which to express their opinion on a proposed law to the Volksraads, should they so desire, except in the case of those laws which can brook no delay.

27. The Second Volksraad shall have the power further to regulate if necessary by law or resolution the following subjects:

I. The mining industry.

2. The making and the up-keep of wagon and postal roads.

3. The postal service.

4. The telegraph and telephone service.

5. The protection of inventions, samples [or patterns] and trade-marks.

6. The protection of authors' rights.

7. The utilising and up-keep of forests and salt-pans.

8. The combating of infectious diseases.

9. The condition, rights and duties of companies.

10. Insolvency.

11. Civil procedure.

12. Criminal procedure.

13. Such other subjects as the First Volksraad shall further specify by resolution or law, or as the First Volksraad shall specially refer to the Second Volksraad.

28. All laws or resolutions adopted by the Second Volksraad shall be made known by it as soon as possible, namely, at the latest within forty-eight hours, to the First Volksraad as well as to the State President.

29. The State President shall have the right, when he shall have received notice from the Second Volksraad of the adoption of a law or a resolution, to submit such law or such

resolution, within fourteen days after receiving the notice, to the First Volksraad to be dealt with by them.

The State President shall in any case be bound to inform the First Volksraad within the said period of the receipt of such notice.

30. If the State President shall not submit the resolution conveyed to him to the First Volksraad to be dealt with by them within the fourteen days mentioned in art. 29, and if likewise the First Volksraad shall not deem it necessary on their own initiative to deal with the said law or the said resolution within the said period of fourteen days, then the State President, unless he shall with the advice and consent of the Executive Council, deem such a course undesirable in the interests of the State, shall be bound to cause that law or that resolution to be published in the next issue of the *Staatscourant* unless the First Volksraad should be adjourned within the said period of fourteen days, in which case the publication in the *Staatscourant* shall take place only on the expiry of eight days after the beginning of the next following session of the First Volksraad.

31. No law or resolution adopted by the Second Volksraad shall be of force unless it shall be published in the *Staatscourant* by the State President.

32. The legal force of a law or a resolution published by the State President in the *Staatscourant* shall not be disputed, saving, however, the right of the people to present petitions concerning it.

33. This law shall take effect two months after its publication in the *Staatscourant*.

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