Master’s Degree programme
International Relations
Second Cycle (D. M. 270/2004)

Final Thesis

Ethnic Urban Conflict: the education system as tool and battlefield in the struggle for Jerusalem

Supervisor
Ch. Prof. Marcella Simoni

Assistant supervisor
Ch. Prof. Antonio Trampus

Graduand
Davide Ruscelli
Matriculation Number 840424

Academic Year
2016 / 2017
# Table of Contents

## 1. ETHNONATIONALISM AND SPACE IN A CONTESTED JERUSALEM

1.1 ETHNONATIONALISM: THE POLITICS OF CULTURE .................................................. 16
   1.1.1 Thinking the nation: an overview .................................................................... 18
   1.1.2 “Hot” and “banal” nationalism: complementary strategic dimensions ............... 27
   1.1.3 Ethnonationalism and Religion ................................................................. 30
   1.1.4 Seizing the ethnonation .................................................................................. 31
1.2 ETHNOCRACY ......................................................................................................... 32
   1.2.1 A pre-modern legacy: Neo-milletization ....................................................... 37
1.3 “HOW MANY CITIES”? THE ETHNONATIONAL STRUGGLE FOR JERUSALEM: JERUSALEM’S URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE CONFLICTING GEOGRAPHY OF SPACE ........................................... 39
   1.3.1 Changing space(s): a brief history of Jerusalem’s urban development ................ 42

## 2. FORGING THE NATION(S): DEVELOPMENT OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE

2.1 MASS EDUCATION: IDEOLOGY AND STRUCTURE .................................................. 54
2.2 FROM THE MILLET-STRUCTURE TO THE INDEPENDENCE/NAKBA .................. 55
2.3 THE STATE’S SUPREMACY: THE COMPELLARY EDUCATION LAW, THE REFORM AND THE “TRIANGLE STRUCTURE” ........................................ 58
   2.3.1 The Compulsory Education Law: the State enters in the educational arena .......... 59
   2.3.2 Mamlakhtiyyut .............................................................................................. 60
   2.3.3 The School Reform Act .................................................................................. 63
2.4 ARAB EDUCATION .................................................................................................... 64
2.5 EAST JERUSALEM: THE CAPITAL AND ITS “COUNTRY” ...................................... 66
   2.5.1 Oslo and everything after .............................................................................. 69
2.6 AN UNFINISHED PROJECT? .................................................................................. 70

## 3. EDUCATION SYSTEM(S) IN JERUSALEM

3.1 CONTEXTUALIZING THE JERUSALEM EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE ................................................................. 74
3.2 INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS ......................................................................................... 75
   3.2.1 The Israeli Ministry of Education ................................................................. 75
   3.2.2 MANHI .......................................................................................................... 77
   3.2.3 Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of Education ............................................... 78
3.3 EDUCATIONAL STREAMS IN THE JERUSALEM’S EDUCATIONAL ARENA ......... 80
   3.3.1 Public Hebrew Education (Mamlakhti) ......................................................... 81
   3.3.1.1 Yad be Yad .................................................................................................. 82
   3.3.2 Public State Religious Education (Mamlakhti Dati) ...................................... 84
   3.3.3 Public Arab Education .................................................................................. 85
   3.3.4 Recognized but unofficial education: Haredi Education ................................. 87
   3.3.5 East Jerusalem private school network ....................................................... 89
   3.3.6 Waqf schools .................................................................................................. 92
   3.3.7 UNRWA schools ............................................................................................ 94

## 4. EFFECTS OF AN ETHNOCRATIC APPROACH TO EDUCATION ADMINISTRATION

4.1 AN INTERTWINED WEB OF EDUCATIONAL STREAMS ......................................... 98
4.2 THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION FACED TO THE LOGIC OF ETHNOCRACY ............... 99
4.3 INTERNAL RECONCILIATION, EXTERNAL SEGREGATION ........................................................... 104
  4.3.1 Closing the gap .................................................................................................................. 105
  4.3.2 Learning about the Other ............................................................................................... 107
4.4 FAILURE AND HOPES FOR PEACE EDUCATION ................................................................ 109
4.5 GLOBAL EMERGING TRENDS AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE PALESTINIAN IDENTITY ................................................................. 111

CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................... 115

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 117

SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE: BOOKS AND ARTICLES ................................................................... 117
WEB SITES ................................................................................................................................... 126
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES ............................................................................................................. 127
OTHER SOURCES ...................................................................................................................... 128
INTERVIEWS ............................................................................................................................... 128
Introduction

The status of Jerusalem and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been at the center of the international community’s debate for the past century to say the least. The Balfour declaration has just recently become a century old and this strip of land between the Dead Sea and the Mediterranean Sea has undoubtedly changed. At its heart lies Jerusalem, one of the world most famous and symbolically important human settlement. Palestinian and Israelis are still fighting for its control with different means and tools. The city reunited in 1967 is still looking for a peace that is still far from being achieved.

This thesis focuses on the ethnicisation and the ethnocratisation of education, particularly education administration in the city of Jerusalem, looking at how the city and its people have been shaped, influenced by education and how it is still having an impact on the struggle for the supremacy over the capital of both Israel and Palestine.

Education and Ethnicity: an alliance for the nation-state

The role that education plays in ethnonational conflicts is crucial. The beginning of the era of the nation-state marked the transformation of education into a public service with the object of galvanizing and mobilizing citizens for the newborn nation. The symbiotic relation between the emergence of mass education and the nation-state system reflects the significant role that education plays in the formation of ethnonational identities and in preserving the sense of timelessness belonging to the ethnonation across generations¹.

¹ Soysal Y. N. & Strand D. (1989); Meyer J. W., Ramirez F. O. & Soysal Y. N., (1992); Weiss S. E. (2000);
Over the years, this link between the nation and public mass education has evolved. In the case of Jerusalem however, the bond between education and ethnonationalism remains. In this research, I look at how public administration of education is influencing on the co-existence of multiethnic communities within Jerusalem.

I chose education because it is at the same time a symptom and cause of social relationship. This means that power balance in modern nation-state is reflected into the education system, the main tool of nation-building for the past two centuries. The education system is also spreading this difference, which in the case of ethnocratic states, like Israel\textsuperscript{2}, goes along ethnic lines. The system is then the main tool to deepen this difference and in Jerusalem the status quo, «this unwillingness to cooperate is part of the how the society is ethnically constructed»\textsuperscript{3}.

Nonetheless efforts to go in the opposite directions and to build bridges instead of creating divisions are there, and they are worth to be taken seriously to understand what chances are left for peace in an heavily ethnocratic divided city.

The role of religion in defining ethnic allegiance in the case of Jerusalem is almost unique also due to the symbolic power of the city in the literature and rituals of all the three major monotheistic religion. It is almost impossible to avoid its power when walking on the streets of the city. The passage from pre-modern education, mainly happening in a religious setting, to modern public mass education in Jerusalem is then result of a compromise between the secularist and religious groups of the ethnonational movement.

The main aim of this thesis is to offer a critical account of the ethnicization of basic social services provision in Jerusalem, and to a certain degree in the overall Israeli-Palestinian space and the role that ethnicity has played in the process of nation-building and in fueling the conflict.

\textsuperscript{2} Yiftachel O. (2006);
\textsuperscript{3} Levy G. (2002);
More in-depth this thesis shows how this ethnicization has been institutionalized in the modern mass education system and has therefore contributed to raise barriers among the population and break down possible bridges for peace. The analysis therefore starts where this process has its root, which is the late Ottoman Era and the time of the British Mandate in Palestine.

Divided city in a divided land: the case of Jerusalem

Jerusalem is widely described as a divided city. A lot of research has been produced on Jerusalem, mainly looking at politics, history and the role of Jerusalem within the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Of course, I am not the first one to focus on education in Jerusalem. I have however adopted a different point of view, looking at Jerusalem’s education system as one, West and East together.

I decided to focus on Jerusalem precisely for the variety of its education system, not comparable to any other city of the Israeli-Palestinian space.

East Jerusalem residents are estimated to be 380,000, most of them living under the poverty line and facing severe challenges in accessing basic social services.

A crucial starting point for this discussion is that not all children enjoy the same opportunities to learn. Quite obvious, but still useful to bear in mind. Several factors have been identified as levers for this inequity of education systems, such as curriculum, teaching methodologies, social and cultural factors and of course availability of schools and schooling material. I decide not to focus too much in details on these features of the education system in Jerusalem. Indeed they are important and a comparison on aggregated data of the inputs of the municipality of

the system will probably support one of the main pillar of this thesis which is the unequal ethnocratic treatment of the East Jerusalem population.

I wanted to focus however on the role of education in reinforcing and nurturing divisions and fractions in a city affected by an intractable ethnic conflict. I wanted to look at how education daily administration and the agreement between Palestinian and Israeli is deeply twisted by an ethnocratic logic.

Among the main sources for this study, a special mention goes to three key studies looking at Education and Ethnicity in Jerusalem or in Israel.

First, my research follows the publication of Rawan Asali Nuseibeh titled "Political Conflict and Exclusion in Jerusalem: the provision of education and social services". Nuseibeh focuses on the political struggle over Jerusalem, but mainly looks at the failure of the system in East Jerusalem. The State of Israel and the Jerusalem Education Administration body (MANHI) are the main responsible for preventing Palestinian children residing in East Jerusalem to enjoy their right of education.

On the other hand, I tried to combine Nuseibeh’s approach with the research on ethnicity and education of Gal Levy, an Israeli sociology who has conducted several studies on the role of ethnicity within the Israeli education system, particularly the historical evolution of this system.

Last but equally important, my analysis heavily relies on the ethnocratic framework developed by Oren Yiftachel, adapting it to the needs of analyzing the administration of education.

Structure of the thesis

My objective is then to contribute to the state of research in this particular field by adding a new perspective.
The starting point for my work is the declaration by the Israeli government on the reunification of Jerusalem. Indeed, the military outposts that were literally cutting the city in two parts before 1967 were removed after the 6 days war. However, the daily life of people could not be as different.

In the first chapter of this thesis, I focus on the theoretical architecture of my research. Since I deal mainly with ethnicity and nationalism, I explain what I mean when I employ those terms and how the scientific community has arrived to the current multiple views on nation and ethnicity.

I also deal with one of the most important concept for this thesis, ethnocracy. Ethnocracy, as briefly mentioned above, is a concept I borrow from Oren Yiftachel, an Israeli political geographer, who coined the term to describe Israel's politics in relation to land and space. In the first chapter of this thesis, I will get into the details of ethnocracy and its scientific use in sociology and political science. Before dealing with this concept, I provide the reader with a quick overview of the scientific debate on two key concepts: ethnicity and nationalism. By doing so I position myself in the current debate about ethnicity and nationalism, particularly adopting a multi-paradigmatic cross-cutting approach to ethnonationalism and by employ the concept of multiethnic nationalism, in line with the concept of ethnocracy as developed by Yiftachel. All these key concepts will then help the reader understanding how education is at the same time a tool and a battlefield in the struggle for the control of Jerusalem.

Linked to that I briefly introduce the role of Jerusalem for the ethnonational communities and its recent history. To quote Hillel Cohen, author of a book on the recent history of Jerusalem
“Understanding the unique nature of the [...] struggle for and in Jerusalem requires familiarity with the history of Jerusalem as a religious and national focal point for the Palestinians [and Israelis] and with both the Israeli and Palestinian processes that have led to the creation of the unique [...] Jerusalemite identity”

The (selected) narration of the events, which have shaped the city, is necessary to understand the unique context and situation of Jerusalem when compared to the rest of the Israeli-Palestinian space.

In the second chapter, I introduce the education topic by describing its history. On one hand I enquire on the historical development of mass education in the post-Ottoman British Palestine and how the Yishuv and the Zionist political parties have successfully created an alternative system, separated from the main public system, which I show, has hindered the development of mass education accessible for Palestinian Arabs. At the same time, I compare public education during the Mandate with the elites belonging to the minorities, which received a better education in new established schools with the support of European nations. The foundation of the State of Israel has then changed the environment of education policies. It is exactly there where the ethnocratic logic started shaping the education system. The Oslo agreements have then introduced a new player, the Palestinian Authority.

________________________

In the third chapter, I then describe the current education system in Jerusalem, a unique system or better a patchwork of seven different systems across both sides of town.

In the fourth and final chapter I will draw some conclusions on the current trends of education, particularly on the impact that education and education administration have on the society and how the ethnocratic logic is preventing the creation of a space for peace. On the contrary, it fuels negative images of the other. The current situation then sees a more compact Israeli Jewish landscape, thanks to the predominant situation of the Jewish ethnonation and particular of the secular and orthodox subgroups, while the neo-milletization of the palestinian population reaches its peak. The only example of peace education despite being successful on the individual level lacks of mass support and therefore it does not have any significant impact for the Jerusalem societies.

Notes on Terminology

Jerusalem it is a very complicate and sensitive topic, as demonstrated again by recent developments on the international political arena around the issue of the final status of the city.  

---

6 The decision of the current United States of America’s (US) administration to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel marked an historical rupture with the politics of the US. Almost universally identified as a pro-Israeli move aimed at provoking Palestinians, President Trump’s move was not supported by any other G7 member nor other members of the UN Security Council or NATO. In fact, another member of NATO, Turkey, co-sponsored with Yemen a resolution calling on other countries to refrain to establish diplomatic missions in Jerusalem. The resolution was presented at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on December 21 2017. One hundred and twenty eight countries supported the resolution, thirty-five abstained, twenty-one did not participate in the vote and nine countries rejected the resolution. The latter were Guatemala, Honduras, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Togo and, of course the US and Israel. https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/22/middleeast/jerusalem-vote-united-nations-list-intl/index.html;
When employing the term East Jerusalem residents I refer to East Jerusalem Palestinian residents. It is indeed true that the term “East” Jerusalem it is not precise as it refers to all the neighborhoods that were on the Jordanian side of the Green Line after 1949, include some areas lying north and south of the town. However, I use this term as I consider it being the most appropriate to define the different mix of population living in those neighborhoods. I do not refer to Jewish Israeli settler living in some of the East Jerusalem neighborhoods. In my opinion, this classification is more neutral than “Arabs” as some Palestinians light not be ethnically Arabs. I also use Palestinian as a synonym in some parts of this study, but still by using East Jerusalem inhabitants I also want to stress the uniqueness of the situation in Jerusalem compared to what happens in other mixed towns in Israel or even if compared to the macro-level of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

I have adopted the same principle for West Jerusalem. However since the difference between Secular Israeli, Orthodox Israeli and Ultra-Orthodox, from an education administration perspective, is recognized by the state I tend to use those definition as well. It is also worth noting that within the ultra-orthodox microcosm some groups do not consider themselves as Israeli. Due to the limited space and to keep the focus on the main objective of my research I did not go into details of this aspect, nor I have dealt with the main religious differences between Christian groups in East Jerusalem.

Transliteration from Hebrew and Arabic is not scientific, as I have used the most commonly used transliteration in social research (ie. Mamlakhtiyut).

**Methodology**

The research conducted for this dissertation is grounded in fieldwork, mainly consisting of interviews with civil servants or managers of education service institutions.
I conducted a total of 13 semi-structured interviews\(^7\) whose objectives was twofold: on one hand I was motivated by the need to collect information on the actual functioning of the different education systems and on the other hand to shed light on the metanarratives beyond individual’s perception of the right to education. In certain cases, upon request, I have decided to keep their identity secret. Therefore, only the initials and the role of the interviewees are mentioned both in the footnotes and among the sources at the end of this work in the bibliography section. Further to the interviews, I have mainly worked on the existing literature on the main topics I touch in this research: ethnonationalism, ethnicity, ethnocracy, Jerusalem and education policies.

When I deemed it necessary, I have used primary sources, particularly when quoting international treaties and agreements.

\(^7\) Corbetta P. (2003) ;
Figure 1: Map of Jerusalem in 2010. Source: Cohen H. (2011) p. xiii
1 Ethnonationalism and space in a contested Jerusalem

In the first part of this study I will address a fundamental theoretical framework necessary to understand the political and social dynamics that have been forging the city of Jerusalem in the last century. This first part is composed by three different stages contributing altogether to frame the reality of the educational system within the city's communal boundaries. Main objective of this chapter is to explain the theoretical framework employed in the analysis of the Jerusalem educational system and the impact of this latter on creating peace and a cohesive society. While education and particularly management of the education system are the main focus of this research, « [they] cannot be effectively studied or developed in isolation from the background of the people it is intended to serve »\(^8\). Therefore aim of this chapter is to describe the theoretical and historical milieu developed around the issue of Jerusalem in the contemporary era.

The “first stage” is focused on the interpretation of concept such as nation and ethnicity. Both concepts carry a lot of problematic baggage, which may compromise the quality of the research, if I would not explain their meaning in this specific context. The “second stage” is meant to be a sort of historical and ideological background to the struggle for Jerusalem, mentioning mainly the events relevant to the urban development and the spatial transformation of the city.

The second stage aims at linking the theoretical perspective of ethnonationalism with the historical development of the spatial battle over Jerusalem. In this part of the chapter, I will briefly expose the ethnocratic theory conceived by Oren Yiftachel, professor of geography at the Beer Sheva University and author of several studies on the ethnic logic of power and the

\(^8\) Abu-Saad I., Champagne D., 2006, p. 1035;
ethnicization of space in the Israeli-Palestinian territory. The ethnocratic theory will be used to understand how the composition of the Jerusalem society is influenced by a multiple ethnonational and ethnoclassist logic, particularly relevant in the development of the education system. The institution of millets will be employed as a key concept in this analysis. In the israelo-palestinian space, the combination of a modern ethnonational ideology with a sense of pertaining to traditional communities yielded a particular framework characterized by a constant political tension over resources in order to symbolically mark space and places. The ethnocratic structure based on the neo-milletization of the society reaches its peak in the extremely fragmented Jerusalem area.

Space and spatial development are therefore the main characters of the third “stage”, where the development of the city in the modern era is meant to provide to the reader an historical-geographical framework wherein the city's current divisions are embedded. Spatial dimension is key in the struggle for deeply divided cities. In Jerusalem space has a deep symbolic dimension and it plays a fundamental role in the parallel dynamics of Judaization and Palestinian steadfastness (sumud). More relevant for our case study, it also serves as functional background to the geographical distribution of the different school streams to limit the territory of influence. This analysis of Jerusalem's current situation (and a brief summary of the historical processes which led to it) together with the ethnonational and urban ethnocratic

---

9 Other than Jerusalem, several divided cities have been subject of political and historical researches. Beirut, Belfast, Hyderabad, Mostar and Nicosia. For further reading see Bollens, 2007 and Calame & Charlesworth, 2009;

10 Judaization is the term employed to describe the territorial politics of Israel in Jerusalem, the West Bank and other Arab inhabited areas of Israel such as Galilee. Sumud describes the survival strategy adopted by Palestinian Arabs of marking the territory by physical presence avoiding large-scale uprising against Israel; this attitude has been interrupted/disowned by the 2 Intifada and other recent revolts. On the concept of Judaization see Hirst D., 1974, pp. 3-31. On Sumud see Tamari S., 1991, pp. 57-70;
regime theoretical framework, will explain how « the contest over schools is the contest for the city »\(^{11}\) and how the education system has nurtured divisions and barriers among the city’s communities.

Understanding the content that shapes ethnic and national subjects entails an examination of the main vehicle for shaping those subjects, i.e. the modern state and the so-called “hyphen” between state and nation. The first approach to the Jerusalem question will therefore pass through the discussion of what is meant with the term “ethnonation” and how it will affect the analysis of the Jerusalem educational system.

1.1 Ethnonationalism: The politics of culture

Central to the analysis of the educational system in the Jerusalem municipality is the way in which notions of ethnic group, nation and state are entangled with the geo-political implications of the conflict.

Ethnonationalism and its practical implications among Jews and Palestinian Arabs will help to clarify the ideological context surrounding the development of the educational system in the Jerusalem area. As reported by Evan Weiss, author of a field study on Palestinian education in Jerusalem, «when approaching Israeli and Palestinian nationalism, it is also useful to have a theoretical framework that helps explain nationalist conflict»\(^{12}\). Explaining this concept would serve as a basis upon which the theory of ethnocracy (and its practical perpetration through the educational system) would be treated in the next part of this chapter.

\(^{11}\) Lipman P., 2007, p. 170, 8-9;

\(^{12}\) Weiss E. S., 2002, p. 12;
The concepts of nation and nationalism obviously have a parental relationship and both have been, together with the notion of ethnicity, at the center of a renovated interested in the field of social sciences since the collapse of the Soviet Union and other state entities of the Communist and Socialist world, notably the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In a relatively recent study on the concept nation and ethnicity Siniša Malešević, a prominent sociologist working in the field of ethnic identity, reported that

"despite their ancient origins in the Greek and Latin worlds and their sporadic use in the past, both concepts are [...] fairly modern[,] acquiring their contemporary meanings in the last two hundred (nation) or fifty years (ethnicity)."

In the current debate around these concepts, the different theories and approaches are divided in four main groups: primordialism, modernism, ethnosymbolism and post-modernism. A brief analysis of the main features of each approach will be useful to gradually understand the complexity of the meaning of nation. Furthermore this concepts will be useful in clarify deconstruct the meaning of ethnocracy as explained later in this chapter.

---

14 Malešević S., 2006, pp. 25-26;  
15 In social sciences the production of -isms is sometimes redundant as it may be in this case. Nonetheless the major part of the literature on this theme employs this categorization. In order to be clear, while referring to other works in the field I decided to follow this structure, despite its tendency to -isms may result to strict for the approach I employ in the following pages. On the ambiguitues of such concepts, see Conversi D., 2002 and Conversi D., 2011;  
16 Due to the objective of this thesis I will not describe in-depth the internal debate among nationalism scholars but I will rather mention the main theoretical streams of this social studies' branch, in order to help the reader understand my stand within the current landscape of theoretical studies on ethnonational conflict.
1.1.1 Thinking the nation: an overview

Primordialism has been the first paradigm to be developed to explain nations and nationalism and it has historically been adopted *en masse* by nationalists themselves\(^\text{17}\). The primordialist approach theorized the racial origins and the eternal existence of nations and nationalism and it has been largely rejected after World War II, mainly because of the terrifying consequences produced by various extreme forms of nationalism\(^\text{18}\). Since then, primordialism has gone through a revision aimed at changing the strict race-nation correlation and present in a more politically correct version. Nowadays primordialism postulates the prominence of the “natural” on the cultural\(^\text{19}\). For primordialists, kinship ties rather than cultural expressions are the foundation of the nation. Developing this discourse, they affirm that we can find nations anywhere and in any historical era. In the words of one of his most prominent exponents, Pierre L. van den Berghe, a nation is «a political conscious ethny, that is, an ethny that claims the right to statehood by virtue of being an ethny »\(^\text{20}\). However, reducing the nation to extended kinship ties fails to explain the emergence of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism and it does not allow us to capture the complexity of the current development of ethnic and political struggle in Jerusalem. Moreover, employing a primordialist approach it could be misleading on the way to search a political logic behind ethnic policies embedded in the Jerusalem’s recent history\(^\text{21}\). The perennialist idea claiming the existence of the nation throughout past centuries

\(^{17}\) Ichijo A., Uzelac G., 2005, p. 51;

\(^{18}\) Smith A. D., 2009, p.4;

\(^{19}\) Van den Berghe P. L. 1981, p.59;

\(^{20}\) Ibid, p. 61;

\(^{21}\) Jerusalem is characterized by a complex system of ethnic groups concurring altogether to shape the two principal ethnonational groups, the Palestinian and the Israeli. The same fact that this ethnic communities emerged, thank also to the particular political system of pre-1948 Palestine, reject the primordial claim of consanguinity and unity of the nation. Most of all, blood-ties does not constitute
presents some incongruities. Israel, for example, according to this theoretical stream is one of
the few example of perennial nations, and so it has been presented by many Zionist, but as an
analytical tool perennialism is unable to explain the purely “modern” character of Zionism and
its rupture with the past\textsuperscript{22}. Perennialism in those aspects, falling in a common trap, seems to
justify what is trying to explain\textsuperscript{23}.

Unlike primordialism, the other three theoretical streams share two basic concepts: the
modernity of nationalism; and constructivism as an approach to analyze the emergence of the
nation-state as universal form of sovereignty.

Constructivism can be explained as conceiving the nation as a result of a process involving
several actors. Historical processes and new approaches among the scientific community
served as fertile ground for constructivism and, as underlined by Rogers Brubaker, «today, few
if any scholars would argue that ethnic groups or races or nations are fixed or given; virtually
everyone agrees that they are historically emergent and in some respects mutable»\textsuperscript{24}. The
nation, more than a fact or better a subject, is a non-linear and reversible process\textsuperscript{25}.

How, when, and why this occurred is a matter of different interpretations. Analyzing the current
status of the nation and ethnic studies, Brubaker, a post-modern sociologist, points out the
main characteristics of this new field «that is comparative, global, cross-disciplinary, and
multiparadigematric, and that construes ethnicity, race, and nationhood as a single integrated

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{22} At the beginning Zionism was founded as a merely modern anti-religious and anti-diaspora
movement. See also Weissbrod L., 1981, pp. 777-803;
\textsuperscript{23} Hobsbawm. E., 2005, p. 82;
\textsuperscript{24} Brubaker R., 2009, p. 28;
\textsuperscript{25} Connor W.,
\end{flushright}
family of forms of cultural understanding, social organization, and political contestation»26. Among all these features, the multiparadigmatic dimension is paramount to the purpose of this study.

Proceeding in chronological order, modernism has been the first structured theory, which, as the name itself suggests, explained the emergence of nations and nationalism, in opposition to primordialist claims, as a pure modern phenomenon. This theory envisages the unique role of elites in creating a common past and common myths and in “nationalizing” the masses through the characteristic features of the modern state, such as a universal educational system27. In this thesis I will not use the modernist approach for two main reasons: the predominance accorded to the elites by modernists does not fit well the case of Palestinian nationalism and in general it was demonstrated, to be unverifiable when nationalism started to spread systematically28. As pointed out by Haim Gerber, professor of Islamic Studies at the Hebrew University and author of an ethno-symbolist study on the origins of Palestinian nationalism, « in Mandatory Palestine […] often there was much space for the lower classes [as] revealed in several situation where they seem a great deal more radical than their leadership »29. However, the modernist claim that nationalism is a modern phenomenon has clear examples in the uprising of the Zionist movements and the Palestinian national process. Ethno-symbolist on the contrary conceive the nation-formation process as an elites-led project modified in its direction and practical establishment by the non-elites component of the society.

26 ibid, p. 28; italics in original;
27 Gellner E., 1983, p.54;
28 In the dispute among the role of the elites in forging nationhood, most modernist and post-modernist stress on the enormous amount of written and artistic work produced by the elites in the pre-state nation-formation era. Ethno-symbolist on the contrary conceive the nation-formation process as an elites-led project modified in its direction and practical establishment by the non-elites component of the society.
29 Gerber H., 2008, p.211; Gerber refers here mainly to three events; the 1921 riots in Jaffa, the 1933 demonstration in Jerusalem and Jaffa and the beginning of the often cited 1936 Great Revolt. In the three events, the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement tried to calm down the masses but their claims remained unheard. See Gerber, 2008;
ethnonationalism\textsuperscript{30}. In line with that and relevant to the subject of this thesis, the symbiotic relationship between the emergence of public mass education and the formation of the nation-state system reflects how education plays a pivotal role in shaping national identities. At the same time, public mass education reinforces the state's structure, as well observed by a prominent modernist scholar such as Ernest Gellner \textsuperscript{31}.

Nonetheless, the modernist theory falls short explaining the global rise of nations and nationalists movements in the contemporary era and the expanding global language of the nationalist framework\textsuperscript{32}.

Ethnosymbolism, in the words of its main theoretician, A. D. Smith, is an « approach which complements that of modernism »\textsuperscript{33}. It differs from the latter in some crucial points: the ethnic core of the nation; the plurality of ethnic past and the distinctive role of myth and symbols in the process of nation-formation; the occur-ness of the nation as a process of longue durée; the popular dimension of nationalism vis-à-vis the elitism of the modernist view of nationalism\textsuperscript{34}.

\textsuperscript{30} Like mentioned in the analysis of perennialism, if we would consider nationalism as a pre-modern phenomenon, it would be challenging to explain the differences between the Zionist enterprise and, for instance, the “resurrection” and politicization of Hebrew as daily language. As well-explained by the sociologist Alain Dieckhoff, the renaissance of Hebrew as a vernacular language started long before Zionism adopted it within the framework of its nation-building enterprise. Zionism and Jewish history represent a clear example of the modern nature of the nation, although many perennialist refers to ancient Israel as the first paradigmatic nation. This comparison fails however to explain the pure modern link which relates the nation and the state with all its modern apparatus, including mass education. See also Dieckhoff A., 2004, p. 188;

\textsuperscript{31} Gellner E., 1983;

\textsuperscript{32} Modernism defines nationalism as a transitory phenomenon doomed to disappear, given proper conditions of economic and social development. However, ethnic revival and the emergence of new ethnonational movements in the last decades does not fit well with this strictly deterministic interpretation. Smith A. D., 2003; Smith A. D., 2009;

\textsuperscript{33} Smith A. D., 2003, p. 359;

\textsuperscript{34} Smith A. D., 2009;
In other words, nationalism, in its ethno-symbolist interpretation, is a sort of culturalism\textsuperscript{35}, which places the ethnic community at the center of the longue-durée nation-formation process.

Here, the concept of ethnic group becomes of prior importance. Smith defines the ethnie as «a named and self-defined human community whose members possess a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of common culture, including a link with a territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the upper strata»\textsuperscript{36}.

To become a nation, an ethnic group should adopt standardized laws and a public culture, i.e. a political dimension. For ethnosymbolist the territory, defined as “homeland”, is perceived by the nation as a common property, the home of the people.

What can be extracted from the ethnosymbolist theory as a useful tool to inquire into the birth and development of ethno-nationalisms in Jerusalem (and in the overall Israeli-Palestinian space) is the pivotal role recognized to ethnicity and symbolism in the national(istic) narrative.

According to Smith, « it was on the basis of an ethnic model and around a dominant ethnic core population that political actors and institutions helped to forge the nation »\textsuperscript{37}. This feature of nations addressed by ethnosymbolist is crucial in the birth and development of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, being both national groups constructed on symbols, which in some cases are even shared. These symbols are invested by an ethnic value, varying from group to group, in an effort to ethnically nationalize what is otherwise shared or contested\textsuperscript{38}.

Symbolism is another specificity of this approach, which insist on the role played by particular myths, central in the nation-formation/nation-development process which

\textsuperscript{35} Malešević S. (2010), pp. 68-70;
\textsuperscript{36} Smith A. D., 2009;
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid p. 28, italics in original;
\textsuperscript{38} Gerber H., 2008;
“act as a common reference point for competing groups and as a nationalizing agent for new entrants into the political process. Such symbols offer a shared language through which differences are expressed and elaborated. By appealing to them as legitimizing devices, groups imply the existence of a larger and enfolding national entity in which they all participate and which, in turn, they acknowledge as exercising a coercive power over them”\(^39\).

A nation, for both ethnosymbolist and modernist is embedded in a specific temporal and geographical context\(^40\), which also represents a key concept in this analysis.

The contribution given by other scholars is extremely important to understand the logic of the ethnonation today.

However, given these premises, “ethnonationalism” risks to be just a redundant form or a synonym for nationalism. It is exactly what Walker Connor, one of the most important scholars in the field of ethnonationalist critic and theorization, meant by saying that there is no difference among the two terms if « nationalism is used in its pristine sense »\(^41\). The “spoiled” sense of nationalism for Connor is when people's loyalty to one country is defined as nationalism. A concept that he would rather label as patriotism (which is a civic, non-ethnic form of state)\(^42\).

Nationalism for Connor expresses one's allegiance to the nation, at the core of which there is an ethnic group\(^43\). Taking to the extreme Connnor's definition of ethnonationalism, Oren

\(^39\) Hutchinson J., 2005, p. 104;

\(^40\) Referring to this point John Hutchinson underlines how « a nation is not simply a space but a geographical milieu [...], situated in time with a layered past, and its pasts are brought into play to cope with different challenges » (Hutchinson 2005, p. 111);

\(^41\) Connor W., 1994, p.XI;

\(^42\) Other proposed synonyms of patriotism are: statism, etatism, civic loyalty or civic consciousness. Connor contests the use of the term “civic nationalism”, since it is misleading and it confuses two diverse and separate processes. See Connor, 2005;

\(^43\) Connor's approach is similar to ethno-symbolism, but it differs from it in some issues. A. D. Smith,
Yiftachel, a contemporary political geographer specialized in ethnicity and space, craftily observe how «the nation-state concept is rarely matched by political reality»⁴⁴, since states normally include more than one ethnic group as result of historical and social processes.

In Connor's view the psychological dimension, how the nation is perceived, matters much more than any other perspective. In its pristine sense the « nation refers to a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related »⁴⁵. Larger groups or associations, like citizenship in multi-national states, do not rely upon a blood connection⁴⁶. This view partially matches with the ethnocratic model. However, nations that are formed from a multiethnic base (the United States of America for instance), represent a notable exception to this rule. The term I will employ is then “multhiethnic nationalism”. We will see how Jewish ethnonationalism or Zionism pertains to this category⁴⁷. What it is particular of the Jewish case is that a kind of supra-ethnie put

the father of ethno-nationalism, defined Connor a “late-modernist” and he contested Connor’s separation between patriotism and nationalism and his psicologism, emphasizing the ethnic roots of each nation;

⁴⁴ Yiftachel O., 2006, p. 13. In its critic of the nation-state, Yiftachel cite Iceland as probably the only rare exception to the multi-ethnonational-state rule. On this issue, John Hutchinson shows a similar stand by employing the term “national states” instead of “nation-state” acknowledging that a “national state” is a state organized by the norm of its dominant nation. See Yiftachel, 2006; Hutchinson, 2005;

⁴⁵ Connor W., 1994, p. 212, italics in original. In a similar way the anthropologist Clifford Geertz affirmed that the cultural “given” at the basis of ethnicity are extremely powerful exactly because they are “seen” as given. See Geertz C., 1973. For another, opposite perspective on the psychological dimension of the nation see Smith A. D., 2002;

⁴⁶ ibid, p.212; Examples of multinational states involving an emotional bond are Britishness, Belgianness and Yugoslavianness. These sense of descending from the same ancestors for Connor is confined, in these cases, to Welsh, Flemish or Croats, which, in his view, are pristine nations. See Connor W., 1994

⁴⁷ Employing this concept of nation, France and Spain, for instance, are a perfect example of multhiethnic nation. Notably in Spain, Catalans and Basques are universally considered as nations, thanks to their popular adoption of nationalism and their centrifugal actions in order to establish a separate states, which have increased in the past years. Some scholars defines Spain a multinational state (or federation, even if there is no common position on naming Spain as a
together the different ethnic groups appealing to some founding and ancestral symbols and in so doing it seems to eliminate any internal centrifugal forces. As I will explain later, while I will deal with the concept of ethnocracy, the colonialist component plays a fundamental role in this process. Therefore, the lack of political dimension is the key to distinguish between an ethnic group and a nation. It is necessary to specify that the ethnic community is not a given entity, but a product of self-definition or better of differentiation. The Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth in his seminal work, Ethnic groups and Boundaries, demonstrated how «ethnic distinction do not depend on an absence of social interactions, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on which embracing social systems are built»\textsuperscript{48}. The self-definition occurs in Barth's view in consequence of a negative process of exclusion through a contact with the “other”\textsuperscript{49}. The role of borders in ethnic conflicts assumes particular relevance in the analysis of ethnonationalism operated by another ethnonationalist scholar, Daniele Conversi. Conceiving nationalism as a process of social categorization, which divides the world in various entities (nations) and categorize the self and the other, Conversi add that the ethnic group in a world of nation-states is not merely defined in negative terms\textsuperscript{50}. The internal processes headed to maintain external borders rely on some shared objective, factors, which could then be selected by nationalist elites to build and shape the nation. By doing so, nationalist elites stress the role of these symbols but «if the group to be mobilized is too fragmented and assimilated to retain some shared hyphen, social categorization can always be enforced to stimulating borders and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[48] Barth F., 1969, p. 2; \\
\item[49] Barth F., 1969, p.4; \\
\item[50] Conversi D., 2007; p. 80;
\end{footnotes}
opposition, rather than contents and uniqueness. Here is where the role of violence comes in.\(^51\)

Ethnicity is then, a social identity based on a fictive kinship\(^52\), perceived as “given” by the members of the ethnic group, which build their “difference” through contacts and established relations with other ethnic group, both as an internal “positive” selection and as an external “negative” refusal.

Both modernism and ethnosymbolism although extremely useful to understand the birth of nationalist movements and the spreading of the idea of nation present some problems in updating their agenda to current issues transforming the concept of nation and how do the ethnonational factor operates at micro-level.

Post-modernism is a cross-cutting movement within social sciences starting from the premises of modernity and trying to address most of the issues of the world we are living in, developed exactly to solve those question left unanswered by the big comprehensive narration of modernism and ethnosymbolism. In relation to nationalist theory it focuses critically on the nationalist discourse and the role of the nation-state\(^53\). Going beyond the structural limitations of modernism, post-modernist approaches seek to deepen the analysis of characteristic features of nationalist narratives.

From a theoretical perspective, post-modernism has been criticized by ethno-symbolist due to its failure in drawing a comprehensive methodological structure in order to facilitate the reading of different kinds of nationalism\(^54\). Despite this lack of uniformity and the unwillingness of postmodernist to develop a comprehensive narration able to encompass ethnonationalism in

\(^{51}\) Ibid, p. 81;
\(^{52}\) Eriksen T. H., 2009, p. 17;
\(^{53}\) Spencer P., Wollman H., 2002, p.49;
\(^{54}\) Smith A. D., 2009, p.13;
every form, its theoretical inputs have helped the debate on nation and nationalism in highlighting some crucial aspects of the nation-formation process and particularly of the perpetuation of the nation and ethnonationalism inside and outside Europe. Under the umbrella of post-modernism are grouped different approaches such as gender perspective on nationalism; everyday nationalism; rational choice of the nation; cultural studies and “hybridization” of identities. One of the most important methodological contribution of post-modernism is the tendency to use a multi-paradigmatic approach. This characteristic of post-modernism enables us to understand the evolution of ethnonationalism in the present, while “classic” theory seems sometimes to be more apt to explain the process of nation-building. “Everyday nationhood” perspectives have helped in broadening the ambiguous role of education in the nation-building and assimilation of minorities processes. Relationships among ethnic groups inside a states are not forcibly always in favor of the “charter” ethnic group. Finally, a cross-cutting approach is necessary to combine geographical studies with the sociology of nationalism and public policy analysis.

1.1.2 “Hot” and “banal” nationalism: complementary strategic dimensions

In the light of the above, the analysis of the ethno-national conflict in Jerusalem will then have multiparadigmatic approach. The tools necessary to explain the genesis and the current

Post-colonial studies, for instance, stressed the limits of previous analysis too much focused on European history and European nationalism. Thus, one of the main critics to the ethno-nation-state model of Smith and other ethno-symbolist, is the same existence of African nations. Smith is of course aware of the internal ethnic differences of many nation-state in the world, but his approach seems to justify it as a temporal factor. See Smith A. D., 2009;

On gender and nationalism see Yuval-Davis N., 1997; on the hybridization of identities see Hall S., 1990;

Fox J. E., Miller-Idriss C., p. 543, 2008;
development of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism and their respective internal struggle can be found in Connor's ethnonational approach and particularly in its “updated” version developed by Conversi, which employed successfully this multi-paradigmatic approach in the analysis of ethnic revivalism after the end of the Cold War. The point of view applied by Conversi, with his already mentioned theory on borders and mobilization, is one of the most useful ones for our purposes and to introduce the concept of ethnocracy. The value of myths and symbols and its selectiveness, central in the ethno-symbolist analysis and in Conversi’s approach, is crucial to fully realize what the exact place of Jerusalem is within the ethnonational narratives of its inhabitants.

The combination of diverse approaches is also functional to the double level of examination, meaning by it the “hot” and the “banal” nationalism\textsuperscript{58}. Hot nationalism is typical of the period of nation-formation or the struggle to acquire sovereignty over a certain geographical space through the establishment of a state. In the words of John Hutchinson « the “hot” didactic and transformative nationalism […] aims to instil the idea of the nation as a sacred and transcendent object of worship for which people must make sacrifice »\textsuperscript{59}. On the contrary, banal nationalism is more apt to describe the « flaggings of nationhood »\textsuperscript{60}, i.e. an everyday uncontested nationalism reproduced by symbols and by the same existence of the nation-state. However the process is not just in one direction. Hutchinson is quite clear in saying that

\textsuperscript{58} “Banal” nationalism is a term employed for the first time by the sociologist Michal Billig in its book entitled “Banal Nationalism”. Given that nothing seems really certain, his conclusion focused on the present and the next future when nation are perpetuated through its banal nationalism. This term would then be employed by John Hutchinson an ethno-symbolist, moving towards a new multi-paradigmatic approach, as he did already in his book “Nations as Zones of Conflict”. He then coined the term “hot” nationalism to differentiate it from the “banal” nationalism. See Billig M., 1995 and Hutchinson J., 2004.

\textsuperscript{59} Hutchinson J., 2005, p. 150;

\textsuperscript{60} Billig M., 1995, p. 175;
« banal nationalist will become “hot” in defending national cultural distinctiveness, homeland integrity, political power and political autonomy »61. “Banal” and “hot” nationalism would be helpful to conceive the different degrees and the outstanding value of symbols in reviving “banal” nationalist and helping to settle a banal concept of the nation. This distinction is also necessary to better comprehend the internal struggle of each ethnonational community and the degrees of nation-(re)creation and nation-reinforcing processes.

Nowadays both kind of ethnonationalism could be find anywhere62, but rarely can they be observed together. Jerusalem as a symbolic critical point is interested simultaneously by both types. Spatial struggle represents a clearly “hot” friction factor, while daily life, waving flags, holidays and education curriculum are deeply imbued with a “cold” version of nationalism.

Another important aspect, extremely relevant to understand the logic of power within the city of Jerusalem and on a broader scale in the Israeli-Palestinian space, is the “false” or supposed unity of the national community; internal ethnic division or categorization are at the core of the Israeli and the Palestinian ethnonations. Individual identities are in contrast with the collective dimension of the nation, but this does not imply the fictive nature of the nation or its non reality, but rather that « the myth of the nation as a unitary and autonomous society remains just that – a myth »63.

In conclusion, the ethnonation is then a politicized ethnic group, which is trying to establish a sovereign state. Or as Thomas Eriksen, a social anthropologist, pointed out, « a nationalist

61 Hutchinson J., 2005, p. 147;
62 Among the examples of “hot” nationalism today, the most cited are Catalan, Basque and Kurdish nationalism. In a certain way each nation without a state is employing a “hot” version of nationalism.
63 Smith A. D., 2009, p. 147; Although Smith underlines the “sociological reality” of the nation, here it seems surprisingly to Benedict Anderson's definition of the nation as an “imagined community”. See Anderson B., 1991;
ideology is an ethnic ideology which demands a state on behalf of the ethnic group »64. Problems arise when the symbolic and spatial resources are contested between two or more ethnonational groups or when the ethnic sub-national communities operate in order to acquire the control of the state.

1.1.3 Ethnonationalism and Religion

Particularly relevant to this study is the role of religion vis-à-vis the surface of ethnonationalist movements and its function in nurturing the current struggle around the control of the city. Both the two ethnonationalisms taken into account in this thesis hold a special relationship with religion. The secularist bias, which relegates religion to the private sphere, has proved unable to penetrate the dynamic of political life and conflict, particularly in this region of the world65. Brubaker tried to designate four methods to study the relationship between the two concepts: religion and nationalism as analogous phenomena; religion as an explanation or a cause of nationalism; religion as intertwined with nationalism; religious nationalism as a distinctive kind of nationalism66. The first and the last concept could not be applied to the case of Zionism or Palestinian nationalism where the relationship between religion and nationalism is a consequence of structural phenomena lying at the core of both ethnic groups. To better understand the logic behind religion and Zionism or Palestinian nationalism it is more useful to conceive religious nationalism as a particular kind. Indeed religion, as an explanation of nationalism, could contribute to highlight the scheme of opposition/substitution or religious inspiration of nationalism, but as pointed out by John Coakley (author of numerous studies on

64 Eriksen T. H., 2010, p. 144;
65 Brubaker R., 2012;
66 Ibid;
ethnicity, nationalism and religion in Ireland) «there is a risk, in thus discussing the relationship between religion and ethnonationalism in the domain of ideology, of confusing cause and effect»⁶⁷. However, the intertwining scheme it seems more flexible when applied to different cases. Coakley identifies three cases in which religion and ethnonationalism deeply influence one another: doctrinal secession (that is the case of many national Protestant churches); organisational fragmentation (for instance, the fate of the Orthodox churches in the Balkans and south-eastern Europe); frontier conflict⁶⁸. This categorization falls short in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian ethnonationalism, since it fails in taking into account how religious tradition and local religious symbolism could nurture nationalist movements as in the case of Palestinian nationalism and, even more of Zionism. Particularly concerning Zionism, religious tradition and the ethnonational myth are strictly intermingled in nurturing the ethnonational project⁶⁹. In the next chapter, I will describe how the relation between religion and ethnonationalism has influenced the Israeli state-building process by creating separate institutions and how in the perspective of territorial conquest within the Jerusalem borders, religion through education became an ethnonational reference for Israeli Jews and Palestinian Christians and Muslims. Religion and nationalism are strictly interconnected, but their relationship is not always evident. Nonetheless, as stated by Brubaker, « intertwining is not identity: the very metaphor of intertwining implies a distinction between the intertwined strands »⁷⁰.

1.1.4 Seizing the ethnonation

---

⁶⁷ Coakley J., in Conversi D., 2004, p.217. Further on, the author makes reference to similar processes involving linguistic differentiation and ethnonationalism;


⁷⁰ Brubaker R., 2012, p.16;
Ethnicity and nationalism are then strictly correlated and they may overlap in some cases, even if their correlation is quite clear, as explained above. Despite that, the process of nation-building and state-building is not irreversible. Moreover, not every ethnic group turns into a nation and most nations are a product of a multiethnic project, where either a new ethnie is produced\(^{71}\) or a “charter ethnic group” tends to assimilate other ethnic group compatible with its national project. Israel is a particular extreme example of this category.

All in all, ethnonation as a theoretical tool to inquire the nature of power-relations in the contemporary world could be defined as a modern, political, group whose members shared common symbols, defined as ethnic, and they conceive the state as a property of their own national group. To a broader level, (ethno)nationalism is, as Malešević rightly points out, «[the] dominant operative ideology of modern times»\(^{72}\). We should bear in mind however, how the territorial dimension represent a watershed between a specific ethnic community and an ethnonational movement aimed at establish a sovereign state.

These theoretical underpinnings applied to the specific case of Zionism and Palestinian ethnonationalism would clarify the symbolic value of Jerusalem as source of one of the most intractable conflict. Their happening lead to the historical developments described at the beginning of the first chapter and to the division of the city into several small enclaves.

1.2 Ethnocracy

Having clarified what is the meaning of ethnonationalism in this thesis, I will now turn my focus on the internal logic of the ethnonationalism and its “container”, the state. In the contemporary

\(^{71}\) Meanwhile Italy is an example of a new “invented” ethnonational identity over symbols and resources of a mythical common past of the people inhabiting the peninsula, most migrant societies built nations through the work of a charter ethnic group. See Connor W., 1994;

\(^{72}\) Malešević S., 2006, p.94, italics in original;
world, the vast majority of states are multi-ethnic\textsuperscript{73}, even though not necessary multinational. Since the city of Jerusalem is administered by Israel, which is a democracy I would briefly inquire the nature of its democracy aiming at uncover its ethnic nature\textsuperscript{74}. Although the focus of this study is the educational management in Jerusalem, I will approach the issue of democracy in an ethnic state, in order to fathom the dynamics leading the municipal policies and the relationships between the different actors and education providers. I will try to show how this ethnocratic dynamic is then reflected, although with several important rearrangements, in an urban ethnic regime: the “re-united” or the “Greater” Jerusalem.

In the last decades, the rapidly changing international political landscape has unveiled the conceptual and analytical poverty in regime analysis and the limitations of the binary democratic-non democratic framework, both at a local and a global scale\textsuperscript{75}.

In 1992 the Knesset approved two Basic Law stating the “democratic” and “Jewish” nature of the state\textsuperscript{76}. Thus, unequal citizenship is openly admitted as a basic feature of the Israeli democracy. By defining the state as “Jewish” and not “Israeli”, the 1992 Basic Law\textsuperscript{77} defines the basis on which full citizenship is recognized on an ethnic factor. Only Jewish citizens are recognized as part of the nation-state, according to the Israeli Law\textsuperscript{78}. The translation into Law of this statement severely affects the democratic nature of the state. Moreover, as a global trend, the path of democratic nations in most part of the world diverged from a “pure” ethnic

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{73} Rouhana, N., Ghanem A., p. 321, 1998;
    \item \textsuperscript{74} For further references on the several forms of government adopted by states in the contemporary world see Yifftachel O. (2006);
    \item \textsuperscript{75} Yiftachel O., Ghanem A., 2004, p. 157;
    \item \textsuperscript{76} Yiftachel O., p.89, 2006;
    \item \textsuperscript{77} The law in question is known as “Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty” and together with other eleven Basic Laws it constitutes the fundamental, basic legislation of the State, lacking Israel a written constitution. Text consulted at \url{http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm}
    \item \textsuperscript{78} Yiftachel O., Ghanem A., 1994;
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
nation philosophy, to conceive a more inclusive idea of the state. Democracy became in the last part of the 20th century a shared form of government throughout the world. The particular combination of democracy and non ethnic (and therefore non-nation) states led to reconsider the blood-ties of the nation. A more inclusive, but not necessary less ethnic, concept of citizenship spread in different forms. As for the State of Israel, not every democracy “opened the gate of citizenship”. That was typical of most democracies in deeply divided countries.

In the Israeli case, the Jewish character of the state has become a vital part of the state. The two terms are, however, conflicting. To explain this phenomenon various terms have been coined by social scientist. One term explaining this particular situation is “ethnic democracy”.

In the last years Oren Yiftachel, in what is up to date his most important work, proposed an interesting concept aimed at summarize these dynamics: ethnocracy. An ethnocracy diverges from an ethnic democracy due to its only apparent democratic nature. In an ethnocratic regime, there are some democratic features, but the structure of the regime is deeply undemocratic and control by what is defined as the charter ethnic group.

Thus, the ethnocracy represent a hybrid form between an authoritarian state and a

79 The role of the state is therefore central in fixing the boundaries of the national group and the ethnonational and ethnic minorities living within the state. Further challenges to the maintenance of the boundaries come ceaselessly. In this sense the ultra nationalistic claim to identify the state and the nation forged the modernity through the political form of the nation-state. Who is in the state is part of the ethnonation. In a post-westphalian world it was not necessary the division of the world in nation-states, but was a probable outcome. However, as already explained the hyphen between the two terms it is still a relevant reality. Ethnonationalism is going in two different directions: a civic one, advocating for a more patriotic (in a Connorian understanding of the term) vision of the state and to open citizenship and the national boundaries to non-ethnic members; a more ethnic and subethnic one, leading to the upsurge of new national actors or to a civic defense of the “ethnonational” community. See Connor W., 1994; Yiftachel O., 2006;

80 Yiftachel O., 2006;
democracy\textsuperscript{81}, which combines elements from both systems but does not correspond to none of them. What characterizes the ethnocratic regime and differentiates it from other form of political and social division as the South African apartheid regime\textsuperscript{82} is, among other important factors\textsuperscript{83}, that

“the political, legal, and cultural mechanisms introduced for the purpose of segregating Jews from Arabs were [...] also used to segregate Jewish elites from other ethnoclasses, thereby reinforcing the process of ethnicization typical of ethnocratic regimes”\textsuperscript{84}

That is, there is not just one minority and not all minorities are constructed and treated as equal. Not even all majorities are the same. In a specific, highly contested space as the Jerusalem area, the changing demographic balance is or could act as a determinant factor to acquire a dominant position. However, the ethnonational project renders explicit who is entitled to be the charter group. That means who controls the ethnonational project operates not in the interest of the nation’s citizens, rather trying to avoid any change in the demographic balance and in the common perception of the aim of the nation.

Closely related to the idea of ethnocracy it is the concept of ethnic urban regime\textsuperscript{85}. Clearly Yiftachel points out the link between the two, by saying that

\textsuperscript{81} Yiftachel O., Ghanem A., 2004, p. 157;
\textsuperscript{82} The South African apartheid regime was an authoritarian, racial regime, technically defined as “Herrenvolk”. See Mann M., 1999;
\textsuperscript{83} Spatial segregation, for instance, is not legally defined and widespread as it was in apartheid South Africa;
\textsuperscript{84} Yiftachel O., 2006, p.123, 36-40;
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid, p.189;
“while the ethnocratic city is generally a product of the ethnocratic state, it does form an urban regime in its own right, which, in turn, shapes the major shifts, resources, and spatial transformations in the city area”\textsuperscript{86}. As we will show observing the structure and the management of the educational system, in an urban ethnocratic regime, the city is dominated by one ethnonational group, normally the same ethnonational group at the top of ethnocratic system\textsuperscript{87}, although it is classified and represented as mixed. This structure however is not fixed and immutable but rather fluctuating and inclined to change, obviously not through peaceful means. Another characteristic of the ethnocratic urban regime is the inequality of the citizenship status, being resources allocated on the basis of ethnicity and not residency\textsuperscript{88}. Linked to this conceptualization is the power of ethnonationalism and the logic of ethnoclasses within an ethnic urban regime. Those concepts, as we will see in the following chapters, help us understanding the complicated power mechanism through the separation of the various school streams. Ethnocracy is then a complex phenomenon based on the capitalist market dynamics and the ethnonational concepts, just explained above. The ethnocratic logic written inside the urban ethnocratic regime is the main principle guiding the process of Judaization of Jerusalem\textsuperscript{89}. I will employ this pattern to explain the spatial urban development of Jerusalem from 1967 onwards and to analyze whether the educational policies

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid, p.190;
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid, p.187;
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid;
\textsuperscript{89} Yiftachel O., Yacobi H., 2002, p. 138;
of the Jerusalem municipality have been suffering of an ethnocratic bias or the educational arena have been freed from this broader structural struggle. What is central, however in the ethnocratic framework developed by Yiftachel are the «coterminous processes of ethno-national expansion and internal ethno-class stratification»[90]. Of high importance are the theoretical underpinnings of the ethnic urban regime, working as a metaphoric bridge between different disciplines such as geography, education, public policies, sociology and international relations. In order to further clarify the structural organization of the Jerusalem educational system it is necessary to introduce the concept of “neo-millet”, and its theoretical relevance within the ethnocratic model as a substitute of the “ethnclass” concept.

1.2.1 A pre-modern legacy: Neo-millettization

Under the Sultan rule in the territories of the Ottoman Empire, and therefore in the wilaya of Jerusalem, religious communities of other scriptural religions (ahl al kitab)[91] were to be recognized fully administrative independence following Islam’s acknowledgment of Christian and Jewish as part of their religious tradition. With the Tanzimat Reform, in the late nineteenth century, these communities were defined as encompassing denominations at the level of the entire empire, institutionalizing this situation[92]. This institutionalization responded to a clear

[91] Ahl al-kitab, literally “People of the Book” refers to prophetic monotheistic religions which preceded the revelation of the Prophet Muhammad, i.e. Christians, Jews and to a certain extent Zoroastrians. See Nga Longva A., 2011, p. 57;
[92] Before the Tanzimat reform was rendered effective, the status of non-Muslim non-pagan minorities, i.e. believers of revealed religions, living in the Caliphate territories or under different forms of Muslim government, was protected by an institution called dhimma, an Arabic word denoting a covenant of protection modeled on the Prophet’s example. Dhimmi were called the members of this religious communities, which accepted to pay two special taxes in order to receive “protection” as religious community: a poll tax called jizya, and a land tax called kharaj. The two taxes represented also a
need of the Ottoman empire to transform itself in order to compete with the other European modern bureaucratic states, in much part already bureaucratized and presented as nation-state.

With the modernization of the state and the newly centralized education system, aimed at providing qualified staff for both the modern army and the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, the objective of the religious communities entered in collision with those of the state. Education, together with the army, finance, law and administration was the most affected field by this modernization process, which culminated in the centralization and reduction of the millets to seventeen headed by their supreme religious leader. The newly centralized millet system rested on an ethnic base, as distinct to religion.

Andreas Wimmer, a sociologist of ethnicity, describes the policy of the Ottoman Empire towards religious communities as "multiculturalism avant la lettre". In his analysis, Wimmer points out how this system was in reality a stratified, complex and balanced distribution of power in a transitional era from a pre-modern empire to modern-states. The "millet" structure remained in almost every new country born after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This structure was extremely relevant when communities and new administration had to cope with the provision of social services, particularly education.

Therefore, the term "neo-millet" indicates a community-based division of power, lying its roots symbolic acknowledgment of Islam's superiority face to other religions. Nga Longva A., 2011, pp. 58-59;

93 Wimmer A., p. 171
94 Ibid; the same concept of millet become secularized as part of this process.
95 Ibid;
96 Van den Boogert M. H., 2011, p. 42;
97 Le Thomas C., 2011;
98 Paul Rowe coined the term in an article on the legal status of the Coptic community in Egypt after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The context and the value accorded to this term by Rowe are
in a stratified social structure characterized by a dual logic of operation: an ethnonational level regarding the consolidation of an encompassing ethnonational group and an ethnic perspective aimed at establishing a structured hierarchy within the ethnonational community and its access to resource. The prefix “neo” indicates the semi-legal status of these prerogatives accorded to the various micro-societies.

The neo-milletization of the society is paramount to the ethnonational project. “Ethnclass” could be a misleading term, since it combines an abused, politicized and deterministic term such as class with the ethnic determinant that I have just analyzed while dealing with nationalism and its operational framework. Neo-millet, on the contrary will give a sense of continuity with the past, which is clearly evident, particularly in the educational sphere, by highlighting at the same time the different dimension of ethnic communal groups of the contemporary divided Jerusalem. A division written on the same ground of the city, built following the principle of ethnonational and communitarian isolation.

1.3 “How Many Cities”?: The ethnonational struggle for Jerusalem: Jerusalem’s urban development and the conflicting geography of space

At the core of the ethnonational Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies Jerusalem; main religious and symbolic center of the area. Jerusalem has faced significant alterations during the last century, which have transformed its geography and changed the nature of the city. Today Jerusalem is still rapidly changing, in a similar manner to other global cities, although the major forces reshaping it, pertain to the specific context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Jerusalem is no completely different and does not fit well with the concept of “neo-millet” employed here. See also Rowe P. S., 2007;

Yiftachel O. (2006);
longer the city discussed at the Camp David Summit in July 2000. Significant changes have occurred and the principle proposed by the United States President Bill Clinton to secure its partition is no longer feasible\textsuperscript{100}. The same United States, for long time neutral mediator of the peace-process, have just recently announced through the current administration and its president Donald Trump their intention to move their Embassy to Jerusalem\textsuperscript{101}, recognizing the city as de-facto capital of Israel\textsuperscript{102}.

The spatial development in Jerusalem follows, much more than in other parts of the world, its symbolic dimension. Settlement expansion in the Eastern part of the city is just the highest point of a broader policy apt to render effective the “re-unification” of the city.

Although several research and diplomatic negotiations talks of an annexation of East Jerusalem/Al Quds by the Israeli government following the 6 days war in June 1967, what happened on June 28th 1967 was not a formal annexation of the Eastern part of the city, but rather an extension of the city municipal’s boundaries to include 70 sq km of the West Bank\textsuperscript{103}.

This crucial measure was called as “The Jerusalem Declaration” and it described the new

\textsuperscript{100} International Crisis Group, n°134 (I), 2012, p.i;
\textsuperscript{102} This move has provoked international disapproval from some close US allies and a UN Security Council resolution calling for the withdrawal of the decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem has been vetoed by the US. At the general assembly an outstanding majority has voted for the condemnation of the Trump’s administration move. See also https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/18/us-outnumbered-14-to-1-as-it-vetoes-un-vote-on-status-of-jerusalem and https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-threatens-countries-with-loss-of-aid-over-un-jerusalem-vote/2017/12/20/3ddacadc-e5bc-11e7-833f-155031558ff4_story.html?utm_term=.539e77444674 consulted on 23.12.2017
\textsuperscript{103} In June 1967, after the 6 days War, the government promulgated a series of amendment to existing legislation and administrative orders. They aimed together to extend Israel's jurisdiction to a greatly expanded area of East Jerusalem and its hinterland. It would not be wrong to talk of a “de-facto” annexation, although it should be always specified since its omission could constitute a mistake in the approach to this issue. Lustick I., 2004, p. 200-215;
boundaries of the Jerusalem Municipal Corporation. According to Ian Lustick, author of an in-depth study of Jerusalem status after 1967, the immediate explanation for these measures tried to address the practical requirements of the population in the affected area, particularly the provision by the municipality to all its new inhabitants of services, welfare and education. To the population in East Jerusalem was offered the Israeli citizenship in substitution of the previous Jordanian passport. After the refusal of the citizenship by the outstanding majority of the population, the Israeli government accorded the status of “permanent resident” to the East Jerusalem inhabitants, which granted them several rights, including the right to vote in municipal elections and the right to access municipal services, as well as the payments of taxes. This refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the situation together with the boycott of municipal election by the almost totality of Palestinians residents coincided with the exclusion of Palestinian residents from the management of the city. It would be erroneous however to conceive this situation as a purely Palestinian self-exclusion from the city’s official political life and management. The reader should bear in mind that the enlargement of the municipal boundaries to the Eastern part of the city was also a unilateral move of the Israeli government in open contrast with the International Community. On the long distance, the boycott has

104 Lustick I., 2004, p.204; Lustick adds also that the purpose and interactions of these measures was to expand the municipal boundaries of West Jerusalem to include East Jerusalem, following the principle of excluding many Palestinian Arabs as possible while including as much land and other bureaucratic clashes within the Israeli government on the dimension of the Jerusalem Municipal Area. See Lustick I., 2004;


106 Not only accepting Israeli citizenship is perceived as a symbol of defeat by Palestinian Jerusalemites, because of the implicit consensus of the Israeli occupation, but « the same associated with the act derives also from the fact that often Israel grants citizenship to collaborators who take it to ensure the state will furnish them with full legal (and physical) protection should they need it » (International Crisis Group, 2012 (b), p. 21). See International Crisis Group, 2012 (b);
demonstrated to be potentially obsolete and self-defeating for Palestinians Jerusalemites.\textsuperscript{107} For this reason in recent years numbers of East Jerusalem permanent residents have grown significantly, as well as their participation in municipal activity and lobbying for human rights.\textsuperscript{108}

In order to fathom the deep, powerful attachment to the city by its inhabitants it is necessary to recall the concept of symbols, as just explained above.

However, I leave the symbols aside for the moment and I am going to focus instead on a brief summary of the city spatial evolution\textsuperscript{109} during the last century, paying particular attention to today’s changes. This is going to help us understand the intertwined logic behind the ethnocratic urban regime. The combination of space and ethnonational ideology it works as the basis on which construct the complex educational building. The set of power relations and the geographical division of the city plays a main role in the planning of public policies, not only referred to mere political control of the city, but as well to the control of its future development through education from any point of view.

\subsection*{1.3.1 Changing space(s): a brief history of Jerusalem’s urban development}

Jerusalem’s urban development is a modern and extremely rapid phenomenon considering the millenarian history of the city. Until 1860 the city constituted only of what today is known

\textsuperscript{107} International Crisis Group, 2012 (b), p. i;
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid;
\textsuperscript{109} A brief summary of the recent historical development of Jerusalem will obviously leave some information not directly necessary to understand the geography of today’s Jerusalem. Since the main purpose of this work is to analyze the educational policies within the city’s boundaries and their influence on the struggle for Jerusalem, I will focus more on the geographical aspect of division, such as the rapid changing of the spatial reality and artificial boundaries construction.
as the “Old City” within the 1541 Ottoman walls. The new city was mainly built in the second part of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth, but the process it is still ongoing. The sole exception was represented by village nuclei such as Silwan, Sharafat, An-Nabi Samwil, Shu'fat, Ath-Thuri and Al-Isawiyya. The first building to be erected outside the city's gates, intended as part of Jerusalem, were institutes, estates and private houses financed by various religious and ethnic groups. Several European states backed the local Christian Churches in order to establish new shrines outside the most recent of the walled city's gates, New Gate, at the Northwestern edge of the city boundaries, as well as in the southern part of the city along the road to Bethlehem and Hebron. The first purely Jewish building was commissioned by the English-Jewish philanthropist Moshe Montefiore in 1860 and it constituted of a long building, near Montefiore's windmill, were several families were hosted, exactly opposite to the Mount Zion and the Southwestern side of the walled city. This neighborhood called Mishkehnot She'ananim, became later famous as Yamin Moshe, from the name of its main commissioner.

As part of the expansion of the city, public services such as hospitals, international representations and schools were established. A clear example are the St. John's Anglican School and the Schmidt College, just outside Damascus Gate, today the centre of East Jerusalem's daily life.

However, the area which benefited the most from the urban explosion of Jerusalem, was the Jaffa Road at the Northwestern corner of the Old City, where many Jewish migrants (“Olim in

110 Arnon A., 1992, p. 3;
111 The first modern building erected outside of the city walls was the Russian Compound, in the northeastern part of the city, near the Jaffa Road. Tamari S., 2011; Hatabeh M., 2003;
112 Arnon A., 1992, p.26;
113 Blumberg A., 1998, p.16;
114 Hatabeh M., 2003, p. 26;
Hebrew) settled. Jewish immigration, although not so massive as in other parts of mandatory Palestine, changed completely the population balance at a point that already in 1922, only 5 years after the conquest of the city by the British Army, the Jewish population outnumbered the Arab population\footnote{Ibid, p.30; Following the Ottoman census in 1883 and in 1905, already during this period the number of Jewish families increased constantly throughout this period and settled mainly in the new city. See Arnon A., 1992; Hatabeh M., 2003, p. 31;}. Jews population was mainly concentrated along the Jaffa Road and within new neighborhood in the area, while Arabs remained the majority in the Old City and along the northeast-southwestern axis\footnote{The Jewish community represents a partial exception to this pattern since the area adjacent to the Western Wall was forbidden to them. Yehuda Ben Arieh, a former professor of geography of the Hebrew University, however, explains how the Jewish community settled around three main sacred building: the Synagogue of the Ramban, a Jewish Rabbi and scholar of the 13th century; the complex of the four Sephardim synagogues; the Hurva synagogue of Rabbi Yehuda Hassid. See Ben Arieh Y., 1975; It should be however noted how for centuries the Wailing Wall has been disregarded by Jewish pilgrims and the Jewish community in the city. The first references of the Wailing Wall dated}. Already at the beginning of the century and then throughout the Mandatory period until today, the struggle for Jerusalem was accompanied by a process of urban expansion, around which clashes over the control of local institutions and land ownership contributed to its rapid transformation.

During the mandate, the city was then already developing an ethnically separated neighborhood structure, which can be observed also in the provision of community services, such as education and health issues. This strict separation was still not complete, since many mixed neighborhoods were situated in the north-western part of the city, outside Damascus Gate. The ethnic separation is a completely modern phenomenon reproducing only in part the pattern of the Old Jerusalem. If in the Old city up to the second half of the 19th century, inhabitants of the same religious group tended to settle together, mainly around their most symbolic shrine\footnote{It should be however noted how for centuries the Wailing Wall has been disregarded by Jewish pilgrims and the Jewish community in the city. The first references of the Wailing Wall dated}, on the other hand the severe division of the Old City into four homogenous
and religious-based quarters, was a creation of European cartographers and travelers\textsuperscript{118}. It is evident how the millettization of the Ottoman society was provoked not only by internal forces and communities’ politicization, but it was also affected by a strong rationalistic, westernized, Cartesian way of thinking the space and human groups.

The United Nation Special Committee for Palestine (UNSCOP) tried to address the Jerusalem issue, together with the fate of Palestine, and issued a Partition Plan suggesting the internationalization of the city (the so-called corpus separatum) in the form of an International Trusteeship System in order to « meet[...] the special problems presented by Jerusalem [and] afford[...] a convenient and effective means of ensuring both the desired international supervision and the political, economic and social well-being of the population of Jerusalem »\textsuperscript{119}. The boundaries of the International Trusteeship were clearly defined in the UNSCOP Partition Plan corresponding to an area comprised between Bethlehem in the south, Shu‘afat in the north, Abu Dir in the East and Ein Karem westerly. The Plan approved on November 29th by the The United Nations General Assembly never entered in action, due to the outbreak of the civil between Palestinian Arabs and Zionist militias\textsuperscript{120}. After the declaration of

\begin{quote}
back the beginning of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, while in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century the cult of the Wall and its symbolism were already consolidated among the local Jewish community and in the Diaspora. See Ricca S., 2010, pp. 170-171;
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{118} Arnon A., 1992; Pullan 2012; According to Salim Tamari, a prominent Palestinian historian, the confessionalization of public discourse, through the confessionalisation of the quarters in the Old City, which replaced the \textit{mahallas}, the smaller Ottoman unit of governance, contributed to the enhancement of religion as a marker of national identity. This new conception of space and places did not only influenced community relationships and political life, but it was also cause and effect of a changed sense of social life, well exemplified by the rise of recreational clubs, cafés and the parallel development of secular education. See Tamari, 2011;

\textsuperscript{119} \url{http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/07175DE9FA2DE563852568D3006E10F3}, UNGA A/364 September 3\textsuperscript{rd} 1947, accessed on 18.03.2013;

\textsuperscript{120} Subsequently the conflict became an international war, after the declaration of Independence of the State of Israel, when Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Iraq deployed their army against the newborn state.
Independence of the State of Israel, proclaimed on May 14th 1948, a day before the end of the British Mandate, the city was divided in two parts. An Israeli West Jerusalem and a Palestinian East Jerusalem under Jordanian control. This historical event forced the territorial homogenization and changed permanently the city's face. Christian and Muslim Arab population was expelled from Western neighborhoods such as Baq'a, Qatamon, Talbyieh, Ma'manallah\textsuperscript{121} and the German Colony, while Jewish population was uprooted from the Old City and other Eastern neighborhoods in the northern part of the city\textsuperscript{122}. The sole exception was the Jewish enclave on the Mount Scopus/Al-Masharef Mountain constituted by the Hebrew University and the Hadassah Hospital as established by the July 1949 cease-fire agreement\textsuperscript{123}.

\begin{flushright}
See Gelvin J. L., 2005; Rogan E., Shlaim A., 2008; Bickerton I. J., 2009;
\end{flushright}
\textsuperscript{121} Today known as Mamilla, its popular Arabic and Hebrew version. See Arnon A., 1992, p. 33;
\textsuperscript{122} Arnon A., 1992; Tamari S., 1999;
\textsuperscript{123} Actually, the agreement established free access for Israeli citizens to the Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University but the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan violated systematically the terms of the cease-fire. Moreover Jordan prevented the access to Jewish holy places and the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives for Israeli citizens. See Klein M., 2005;
Figure 2: UNSCOP proposed partition plan. Jerusalem is fully within the proposed Arab state but identified as international area. Source: www.mideastweb.org
Figure 3: Zoom of Jerusalem as Corpus Separatum/International zone. Source: www.mideastweb.org

From 1948 until 1967 the city was literally divided in two parts by the so-called Green Line running north-south, along which Jordanian and Israeli soldier controlled the border face-to-face. Connections between the Eastern and the Western part were severed, since border streets were often blocked by cement walls and the surrounding building were used as shelter for snipers. Jerusalem internal border became then a desolate area, part of which was a no-
man's land\textsuperscript{124}. Accelerating a process in part already begun during the years of the Mandate, the population was totally segregated on ethnonational basis: to a Jewish Israeli West corresponded an Arab Palestinian Muslim or Christian East\textsuperscript{125}.

In 1967, as already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the overwhelmingly Israeli victory in the 6-days put an end to the situation of physical separation of the city in two halves. The enlargement of the municipal boundaries constituted a major shift in the urban planning and spatial development of the city.

The most violent change in the city was the destruction of the Moghrabi Quarter in the Southeastern corner of the city, in order to build the Western Wall Plaza and create an artificial sacred space in the heart of the city\textsuperscript{126}.

Settlement expansion and neighborhoods building in the Jerusalem area constitutes the zenith of the Judaization project, « that is the colonial expansion of Jewish political, territorial, demographic and economic control »\textsuperscript{127}. According to the ethnocratic model, which I have already explained before, « Judaization is the major axis shaping relations between the Zionist and Palestinian ethnonations, as well as between Jewish ethnoclasses »\textsuperscript{128}.

To actualize the reunification and in order to “Judaize” the sacred places once part of the Eastern side, «the 18 April 1968 [the] expropriation of 29 acres of the extended Jewish Quarter was one of the first in a series of Expropriation Acts culminating in the 20 August 1970 order whereby the state seized 4200 acres, an area almost three times larger than Arab East Jerusalem prior to 1967»\textsuperscript{129}. Since then, the city's map has changed with the construction of

\textsuperscript{124} Klein M., 1995, p. 59; \\
\textsuperscript{125} Efrat E., 2000, p. 242; \\
\textsuperscript{126} Ricca S., 2007; \\
\textsuperscript{127} Yiftachel O., Yacobi H., 2002, p. 138; \\
\textsuperscript{128} Yiftachel O., 2006, p. 102; \\
\textsuperscript{129} Ricca S., 2007, p.32; The first measures taken by the Israeli government in order to “Judaize” the
new settlements/neighborhoods behind the Green Lines in any direction. During the 70s a chain of new neighborhoods was erected to connect West Jerusalem to the former Jewish enclave on the Mount Scopus\textsuperscript{130}. These neighborhoods - Givat HaMivtar, Maalot Dafna, Ramat Eshkol and Givat HaTzarfatit (French Hill) – pertains to the settlements middle belt, within the city boundaries, as well as the Ring neighborhoods – Neve Yaacov, Gilo, East Talpiot, Ramot Alon and Pisgat Zeev – built a decade after\textsuperscript{131}. In the 1990s two additional neighborhoods – Ramat Shlomo and Har Homa – were built, contributing to fill the gaps in the ring around East Jerusalem\textsuperscript{132}, leaving the area in the east between French Hill and Jabel Mukaber as the only opening to the rest of the West Bank\textsuperscript{133}. The innermost belt\textsuperscript{134} consist of micro-settlements within or along the walls of the Old City, basically established legally or illegally by settler organizations starting in the mid-80s, often supported by the municipality\textsuperscript{135}.

Old City dated back the 11\textsuperscript{th} of June 1967, before the ceasefire, with the demolition of the Maghrebi Quarter. Some part of that area was then rebuilt to house the new Jewish inhabitants of the city, but the part nearer to the Western Wall was transformed into a plaza were amounts of Jews have been since then to gather and to pray at the Wall. See Dumper M. 2004 and Ricca S. 2007.

\textsuperscript{130} International Crisis Group, 2012 (a), p. 8;
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid;
\textsuperscript{132} Among the other purposes of the settlements belt, the strategic dimension was of pivotal importance, providing a necessary buffer in case of any political or military pressure. See Kroyanker 1982;
\textsuperscript{133} Actually a small group of ultranationalist settlers established its residence on the Mount of Olives. Apart from initiatives of small extremist settler organizations, often indirectly supported by the municipality and the State of Israel, official activities in the middle belt have been limited to the expansion (significant in some cases as in Gilo) of already existent settlement. Ibid;
\textsuperscript{134} Another outer belt consist of autonomous settlements, part of the Greater Jerusalem, but outside the municipality jurisdiction. These settlements – Givat Zeev, Maale Adumim, Gush Etzion – lies deeply inside the West Bank. Maale Adumim is today the biggest settlement in the entire oPt and it hosts a diversified population. See Weizman E., 2007; International Crisis Group, 2012 (a);
\textsuperscript{135} This policy was launched by the former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, himself owner of a three-floor building in the central Al-Wad street, in the heart of the Old City's Muslim Quarter. The process was the accelerated by Ehud Olmert, former Jerusalem Mayor and prime minister, which through the municipality backed settler organizations operating in the Old City directly and indirectly. See IPCC, 2009;
The state-sponsored Judaization of the Eastern side of the city was not the only spatial change occurred in the last years. The expansion of the Ultra-Orthodox – or better Haredi – community has not only contributed to the expansion of new settlements, but it has also changed the nature of some historic neighborhood of the Western side.

The “re-unification” of East and West, the new expanded municipal borders and the Judaization process have all had an impact on the new trends in the education sector, as we will see later in the following chapters.

To analyze the current dynamics changing the geography and social fabric of the city, I will then mainly employ this two intertwined main pillars: the constructed nature of ethnonationalism, which places symbolic elements and space at the center of its structure; the pervasive ethnocratic ideology which penetrates every aspects of the state and community life, sustained by a neo-millet structure.

Education and its administration lie at the heart of the ethnonational project and they assume a unique role in Jerusalem, rather different from the rest of the Israeli/Palestinian space. Before getting into the details of the Jerusalem education system, I will first with the history of education in the Israeli/Palestinian space in the last century.
Figure 4: Landscape of Jerusalem from the Mount of Olives. Picture taken by the
2. Forging the Nation(s): Development of the educational systems in Israel/Palestine

This chapter represents a bridge between the first and the third chapter of this thesis. In this part the evolution of the educational system in the Israeli-Palestinian space is connected to the broader framework of ethnonational struggle analyzed in the “first stage” at the beginning of the chapter, and to some of the historical and political developments common to Jerusalem and the entire Mandatory Palestine (and Israel/Palestine after).

Before approaching an analysis of how the educational system functions in Jerusalem, it is necessary to have a closer look at power relations within hegemony groups and how minorities are treated. The struggle over education acts in a similar way. Later on in the third chapter, I will describe in-depth the educational system in Jerusalem and I will read its condition through the lenses of this three stages to understand the historical, ideological and political forces, which have contributed to shape it.

The current educational system in Israel (including Golan Heights) and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories has its structural and ideological roots in the late Ottoman era, whereas the different curriculum were forged under the British Mandate and made official after 1948, at least for what it concerns the Israeli territory\textsuperscript{136}. Aim of this chapter is to introduce the structural forces involved in, and the theoretical framework around which, the plurality of modern educational streams was created within Israel and, after 1967, in the Occupied Territories. A

\textsuperscript{136} Since the 1967 war and the subsequent enlargement of the Jerusalem Israeli municipality to the eastern part of the Green line and some nearby villages, in East Jerusalem the official adopted curriculum was developed by the Jordanian Ministry of Education. I will return later on this point.
brief analysis of the late Ottoman millet system and the genesis of parallel educational system within the Yishuv under the British mandate is therefore necessary to have a clearer picture on the nationalization of the educational system in the State of Israel and the status of the so-called “Arab” education inside Israel. Moreover, a brief analysis of the Jordanian period in the West Bank and East Jerusalem will lead us to understand the development occurred after the so-called Oslo process in the realm of education particularly in the Jerusalem area. This represents a theoretical and metaphorical ring encompassing the peculiarities of the Jerusalem educational system(s), which I will analyze more closely in the next chapter.

Here, I will only mention those elements of the educational system developed during the British mandate and after the 1948, necessary to understand the genesis and development of modern education in the Jerusalem area. As we will see, this represents, to a certain extent, an exception within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

2.1 Mass education: ideology and structure

Mass or better state-sponsored education is a typical feature of the modern era. According to Ernest Gellner, author of one of the most important studies on education and nationalism, “at the base of the modern social order stands not the executioner, but the professor. […] The monopoly of legitimate education is […] more important, more central than it is the monopoly of legitimate violence”137. The monopoly of violence in the construction of modern national states still is important, however Gellner’s hyperbole gives us the sense of the changing role of education in the construction of modern nation-states. The renewed aim of education was to create a culturally homogenous collectivity transcending classes and low or high cultures.

137 Gellner E., 1983, p. 34;
while focusing on the development of a common standardized language, common myths, a common history and a general common feeling of belonging to the same ethno-nation\textsuperscript{138}.

We will now look into the development of the mass education system in the Israeli-Palestinian space starting from the Ottoman Empire until today’s situation passing through the British Mandate and the physical separation of this space in the aftermath of the birth of the State of Israel.

2.2 From the millet-structure to the Independence/Nakba

As in many other fields, 1948 Israel’s Independence/Palestinian nakbah marked a watershed also in the history of the educational system in Israel/Palestine. By that date, a new subject entered in the arena of the educational management: the State of Israel. To develop a comprehensive educational system from the scratch it is obviously not an easy task. Therefore the newborn Israeli state tried to capitalize on the already existent educational system(s)\textsuperscript{139}. The reference was the millet system, whereby religious communities enjoyed the rights of autonomy in several spheres, including in education. The development of the school system in Jerusalem and in the rest of mandatory Palestine in the late Ottoman era and throughout the Mandatory period followed strict ethno-confessional criteria, reflecting the will of the religious and nationalist authorities\textsuperscript{140}. The millet system gave the opportunity to European powers and churches to establish Christian confessional schools in the whole Middle East. At

\textsuperscript{138} Levy G., 2002; \\
\textsuperscript{139} Swirski S., 1999; \\
\textsuperscript{140} There were also some cases, especially among veteran Sephardi teacher to call for joint Jews-Arabs schools, but their voice went unheard. See, Elboim-Dror R., 1990;
the same time Ashkhenazi Jewish philanthropes funded the setup of modern schools for the Jewish population in the area\textsuperscript{141}. During this period “religion remained the main factor in the delineation of social boundaries in nineteenth century Palestine until […] ethno-religious nationalism became the main political factor in British colonial Palestine”\textsuperscript{142}.

From a managerial perspective, and therefore not looking at the curriculum and the class environment, during the British Mandate the main difference between the “Arab” education system and the “Jewish” education system was that the Arab system was directly managed by the Mandatory government in villages and partly in towns, while the Jewish system was directly administered by local communities\textsuperscript{143}. The so-called “Arab” education was the de-facto public school system financed by the British Authorities\textsuperscript{144}. During the Mandate, a secular modern westernized curriculum became the core curriculum in public school\textsuperscript{145}. The British administration's investment in the field of education were however not enough to satisfy the request of the population and it was even lower than those of the Arab states at the time\textsuperscript{146}. The fact that the school system catered only to Arabs and the subjects were taught in Arabic, made it a strategic contributor to the formulation of the Palestinian national movement\textsuperscript{147}.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Mar'i 1978; Elboim-Dror 1986;
\item Levy G., 2002, p. 116 ;
\item Ben-Or J. L., 1953, p. 381 ;
\item Swirski S., 1999, p.53;
\item The first attempt to introduce a modern, westernized and secular curriculum dates back to 1869 when the Sultan Abdulhamid II promulgated the Ottoman Public Education Law aimed at educating pupils in natural sciences and secular subjects in order to compete with the European powers. The slow implementation and the political troubles faced by the Empire impeded the fulfillment of the education reform. See Greenberg E., 2004, p. 3;
\item Ibid;
\item Khalidi R., 1997, pp. 173-174;
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Besides there was a parallel system of high-standard, private and confessional schools\(^{148}\) (mostly Christians) managed by the community on the model of the millet, later expanded to the Yishuv and to the Muslim majority. At a general level, the tension religion-modernity, particularly regarding science and technology, did not provoke a split within the Palestinian educational system\(^{149}\). For what it concerns Jewish education, the bulk of its system was forged by the Yishuv during the British Mandate. The Mandatory power destined a 10% of its education budget to the Hebrew-school system, in accordance to the Jewish population percentage in Palestine. The inspection of the British Authorities however, were perceived as a lack of independence by the World Zionist Organization, which decided to forgo the financial support in order to preserve education autonomy\(^{150}\). The Jewish school system resembled to a sort of federation of the school streams, largely autonomous and financed by the WZO. Three of those school stream participated politically and financially to the Zionist structure: the National Religious school stream\(^{151}\), the Workers school stream\(^{152}\) and the General Zionist school stream. A fourth school stream, the Agudath Yisrael school stream\(^{153}\), was expression of the non-zionist ultra-orthodox community and it did not rejoin the official political bodies of

\(^{148}\) Missionary schools concurred together with the Ottoman Tanzimat reform to introduce elements of modern education in Palestine and particularly in Jerusalem. See Fortna B., 2002;  
\(^{149}\) Swirski S., 1999, p. 56;  
\(^{150}\) Ibid, p.46; Elboim-Dror, 2000, p.28;  
\(^{151}\) The National Religious school stream, an educational spin-off of the National Religious Party, was in fact a sister organization of the Yavneh schools in Poland. The Yavneh schools network was together with the Tarbut schools, a secular Zionist school stream, the main reference for the middle class Polish Jews. The federate school structure established in Israel was actually similar to the school federal network in Palestine See Frost S., 1998; Swirski S., 1999;  
\(^{152}\) The Workers school stream was affiliated with the General Federation of Labor, HaHistadrut, controlled by the Labor Zionist Movement. See Lockman Z., 1996;  
\(^{153}\) The Agudath Yisrael school stream promoted a traditional, gender-segregated education: Horev schools for boys and Beit Yaacov schools for girls. See Swirski S., 1999, p. 49;
the Jews in Palestine\textsuperscript{154}. The three Zionist streams, operated under the control of the Education Office of the Vaad HaLeumi, the National Council of the Jews in Mandatory Palestine\textsuperscript{155}. As well highlighted by Shlomo Swirski, author of an extensive analysis of history of education in Israel,

\begin{quote}
“the Zionist religious communit[ies], and […] the socialist community became millets, and actually millets within a milla, given that the Zionist community itself was part of the overall Jewish milla”\textsuperscript{156}.
\end{quote}

The educational policy at the time was deeply influenced by political parties. The higher degree of freedom enjoyed by the Zionist education system and the possibility to develop an autonomous curriculum without external intervention had a positive effect, from a Zionist point of view, in the building of the national(ist) community. The Education Committee, the supreme authority dealing with education in the Yishuv, was composed by members of the Zionist Organization, members of the National Executive (the predecessor of the Israeli Knesset), representatives of the teachers' Union and only one member of the Mandatory authorities\textsuperscript{157}. On the contrary, the spreading of Palestinian nationalism was in part prevented by the control on public education exercised by the Mandatory government\textsuperscript{158}.

2.3 The State's supremacy: The Compulsory Education Law, the Reform and The “triangle structure”

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid;
\textsuperscript{155} The Council was the effective branch of the Assembly of the Elect managing local matters, while the Jewish Agency was responsible of advocating and monitoring on Zionist fundamental goals. See Wasserstein B, 1991;
\textsuperscript{156} Swirski S., 1999, p. 49;
\textsuperscript{157} Gaziel H., 1996, p. 29;
\textsuperscript{158} Brown N. J., 2003, p. 197;
2.3.1 The Compulsory Education Law: the State enters in the educational arena

After the establishment of the State of Israel, those inhabitants of the Israeli-Palestinian space, notably the entire Jewish community and those Palestinian Arabs, which ended within the Israeli borders after the ceasefire, remained under the control of the Israeli Government\textsuperscript{159}. A Ministry of Educational Affairs was set up in March 1949 and Zalman Shahar was appointed as first minister of education in Israeli history\textsuperscript{160}. The Ministry acted clearly as a successor of the Education Department of the Yishuv National Executive\textsuperscript{161}. The first move in the educational field of the newborn state was to establish compulsory education, with the 1949 Compulsory Education Law, which regulates the relationship between the central government as guardian of the state (and to some extent of the ethnonation), the local authorities, and citizens as parents of the pupils\textsuperscript{162}. This Law maintained all the different school system as they were with the notably addition of a new system, called “Independent” (Hinukh Atzma’i), close to the ultra-orthodox party Agudath Yisrael\textsuperscript{163}. Indirectly the Law established the legitimization and the predominance of the central power of the ministry over local authorities. The Law established the sharing of the educational costs between the centralized structure of the Minister and the local authorities\textsuperscript{164}.

Moreover, as the name itself suggests, the Compulsory Education Law defined education through the 8th grade as compulsory. During this period the educational systems were extremely different from each other, since they were still expression of a pre-independence

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{159} From 1948 until December 1966, Palestinian Israeli citizens were put under military regime by the State of Israel. See Reiter Y., 2009, p. 40;
\textsuperscript{160} http://www.knesset.gov.il/govt/eng/GovtByMinistry_eng.asp?ministry=5 ;
\textsuperscript{161} Gaziel H., 1996, p. 36;
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid;
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid;
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid;
\end{footnotesize}
Israel where ideological streams tried to defend their status or to influence the political development of the Yishuv. Despite the establishment of a ministry and the role of the state as “tutor” of compulsory education, in the first years of statehood pupils were still enrolled in schools based on their parents' political and ideological affiliation, reproducing a common pattern of the pre-statehood era\textsuperscript{165}. The 1949 Law could be seen as a temporary solution of the newborn State, waiting to establish a national education pattern. The State carefully entered in the educational arena, the most sensible field to religious and ethnonational communities, trying to impose its predominance but leaving some bargaining chips to the various communities.

2.3.2 Mamlakhtiyut

A major change occurred in 1953 with the State Education Law. Abolishing the different educational systems, the law was approved by the Knesset within the broader project of nationalization endorsed by the Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, aimed at placing the State and its values at the center of the Israeli political and practical life, called Mamla\textsuperscript{k}khtiyut.\textsuperscript{166} Mamlakhtiyut is a term developed with the intent of describing the passage from the Yishuv to the State of Israel. Mamlakhtiyut was the ideology of State, necessary to create unity and impose the role of the State as unifying force, dissipating all sectarianism and division that had characterized the political and social life of the Yishuv.

\textsuperscript{165} Yablon Y. B., 2009, p. 539;

\textsuperscript{166} A balanced special committee composed by members of governments, supreme court, academia, school systems and parliament was set up to prepare the Law trying to mediate on between different interests. Finally, the Law was supported by most of MKs. Only members of the Mapam (the Communist Party) and Agudath Yisrael (the ultra-orthodox party) voted against the Law, while Herut's members abstained. See Gaziel H., 1996, p. 38; Swirski S., 1999, p. 103;
As well captured by Gal Levy, an Israeli sociologist author of several studies on ethnicity and education,

"Mamlakhtiyut was an ideology that served a dual purpose: first to set out criteria for inclusion and exclusion in the national collective, as well as in Israeli citizenry; and second to build up an autonomous state apparatus"\(^{167}\)

The two domains in which this process of unification and nationalization was applied more rapidly and decisively were the military and education. In regards to the monopoly of violence, Ben Gurion’s government acted successfully in the immediate aftermath of the proclamation of the state of Israel. The different political parties’ armies were dissolved and the creation of a unified army, Tzahal, witnessed the actual supremacy of the state in front of political groups and streams.

As for education,

The Law left two government school streams; the religious (Mamlakhti Dati) and the general one (Mamlakhti), to which the ultra-orthodox stream, “recognized but unofficial”, was added\(^{168}\). The final result was then, an educational system based on multiple social fractures and diverging interests, which marks the end of a fundamental period for the consolidation of the state\(^{169}\).

The first aim of the law was to cope with the lack of an overall educational policy, while bargaining with the different needs of the internal micro-societies. The “State Education Law” was considered a victory of Ben Gurion over the micro-societies system\(^{170}\). Reality was

\(^{167}\) Levy G., 2002, p. 84; 
\(^{168}\) Gaziel H., 1996, p. 38; 
\(^{169}\) Smotriez A., 2009, p.133; 
\(^{170}\) Swirski S., p. 108;
however slightly different as testified by the development of the Israeli educational system. The political action led by the Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben Gurion, is commonly known in Hebrew as Mamlakhtiyyut, which indicates the action of the state of superimposing its doctrine and interest over particular concerns of the various millets. In fact, the system was carved up in a new way, recognizing official status to the 1920 separation between the religious and the secular stream. The Ultra-Orthodox party Agudath Yisrael was able to maintain its separate schools. The two religious “millets” were the main winner of the 1953 accords on state education, since they were able to maintain their educational micro-system and to gain recognition (i.e. resources) from the state. On the other hand the bulk of the “destreamed” schools came under the control of the Mapai-dominated Ministry of Education. The origins of the bargaining power of Agudath Yisrael goes back to the 1947 “status quo” between the ultra-orthodox micro-society and the Zionist leadership at the eve of the independence. The Zionist movement and the ultra-orthodox were able to found a common ground when the Zionist establishment of the Yishuv agreed on the fundamental “Jewish” nature of the future state and conceded full autonomy to religious education, receiving in exchange the ultra-

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{171} In its early years the Zionist movement was still searching for legitimization in a mainly tradition Jewish community. Being education an extremely sensible topic, particularly within the traditional Jewish world, until 1920 the firsts Zionist congresses never discussed this issue. In 1902 the first religious Zionist block, the “Merkhaz HaRukhani”, the predecessor of the National Religious Party, was formed in order to advocate religious demands within the Zionist movement. Its efforts brought to the 1920 approval by the World Zionist Organization of the institutional division between a general westernized Zionist school system and a religious traditional Zionist school system, which should not be confused with the ultra-orthodox school system. Although institutionally separated, the general Zionist and the religious Zionist educational network, they were both financially and politically by the Zionist movement and its institutions. See Swirski S., 1999; Gross Z., 2003; \textsuperscript{172} Ibid, p. 104; \textsuperscript{173} Educational matters apart, the “status quo” set the conditions for the future Israeli state. Since then Sabbath has been declared official day of rest, state kitchens have had to follow “Kasherut” (Jewish dietary laws) and matters of personal status including marriage have been under the jurisdiction of}
orthodox approval to their enterprise. Swirski, observed how « the practical demands presented by Agudath Israel negotiators had less to do with religious piety and more to do with strengthening the viability as a micro-society »\textsuperscript{174}. After the amendment of the 1953 State Education Law, the Agudath Yisrael schools networks and other minor ultra-orthodox education organization were put under the label of “recognized but unofficial” education, enjoying institutional and curricular freedom and at the same time financial support from the state.

However, the effort made in 1953 by Ben Gurion to unite the different streams into an Israeli state school system, failed because it left intact the major dividing line, that of religiosity. Nonetheless, « the centralized nature of the system gave a great deal of power to the bureaucracy of the system, including the Ministry of Education and […] the power of the local authorities was weakened when compared to the Yishuv era »\textsuperscript{175}.

2.3.3 The School Reform Act

In 1968 a major reform of the education was approved by the Labor-led government. This reform known as “School Reform Act” was principally aimed at coping with the changing nature of secondary education, but it influenced as well the structural organization of primary education beyond the number of years it entailed. Following the reform, the traditional 8+4 was replaced by a 6+3+3 schooling years structure\textsuperscript{176}. Moreover, the Reform extended compulsory education through the 10th grade; compulsory education age has been recently changed by religious courts. See Ben-Yehuda N., 2010, p.21-22; Friedland R., Hecht R., 1996, p. 18;

\textsuperscript{174} Swirski S., 1999, p. 105;
\textsuperscript{175} Gaziel H., 1996, p. 59;
\textsuperscript{176} Iram Y., Schmida M., 1998, p.8;
the 29th amendment to the “Compulsory Education Law”, which extended it to the 12th grade\textsuperscript{177}.

The Zionist narrative in its various micro-society formulation, was the only version taught in schools regarding the historical developments. The “national” narratives that were being woven in the schools of the Alliance Israelite Universelle or in the Palestinian schools of the British Mandate were supplanted by the Zionist hegemonic “national” program of the pre-1948 Yishuv\textsuperscript{178}.

2.4 Arab Education

At the same time the Palestinian minority, which lived secluded in military-governed areas, was not a target for incorporation into the national community, rather they were an object for control. Incorporation in the Israeli society did not pass for them through education, as a special curriculum, called “Arab education” was developed for Palestinian Israeli citizens\textsuperscript{179}. The major difference passed through the main language of teaching, which despite of being Hebrew is Arabic, although pupils learn Jewish history and religion.

Separation according to ethnic community was also the rule in the relatively few and small urban centers\textsuperscript{180}. Ethnic segregation has remained a distinctive feature of Jewish schools in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{177} Section A, Education Legislation and the Structure of the Education System .pdf http://cms.education.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/80371F5E-6AFC-445A-81A5-2DB9EAF6184/130303/sectionA.pdf consulted on 15.08.13;
\item \textsuperscript{178} Swirski, S., 1999, p. 166;
\item \textsuperscript{179} Swirski S., 1999, p.112;
\item \textsuperscript{180} Home ownership is the norm in Israel and the fact that many of the pre- and post- 1948 housing project were initiated by the various micro-societies, contributed to prevent the territorial amalgamation between veteran and new immigrants. See Swirski S., 1999;
\end{itemize}
Israel for the Palestinian minority, school segregation was cut and dried. After 1948, the separation between Jewish and Arab schools was left intact by the Israeli authorities. The only change was that the curriculum would be dictated by the Israeli Ministry of Education, which was also responsible of supervising textbooks, administering expenses and services. The two national communities remain educationally separated; the discourse of integration refers only to Jews of different origins. The separation represents the heritage of the Ottoman millet tradition translated and mediated by an ethnonational vision of the world on the way to (re)create a neo-millet environment. The situation of Arab education has always been characterized by an ambiguous duality between development and control. From one side the Israeli government improved significantly the state of education in Arab Palestinian-populated areas under its control, building new schools and implementing local services, but at the same time the Ministry of Education developed a new curriculum aimed at omitting “contested” sections of history and geography. Schoolbooks were also entirely written by a committee appointed directly by the Ministry. In this sense, if the passage from the Mandatory period to Israeli sovereignty left untouched the systemic division between Jewish and Arab education, the control of the new authority was a clearly violent attack on the Palestinian Arab minority. Through education the Israeli government tried to marginalize the Palestinian minority internally and externally.

The situation changed in the 1970s, when two special committees were appointed by the Ministry of Education to cope with the issue of “Arab” education, as it was then called. The curriculum was adapted to the needs of the Palestinian Israeli population;

\[182\] The Committee entitled of developing a new curriculum was composed mainly by Arab speaking Jewish teachers under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Education and Culture. See Al-Haj M., 1998;
\[183\] Al-Haj M., 1998, p. 100-101;
history, religion and civic studies were object of an in-depth revision aimed at highlighting the connection between the Palestinian population of Israel and the Arab population in the entire Middle East as well as reinforcing the sense of “love for the homeland”\textsuperscript{184}, the State of Israel. It blended in a rather unproblematic way with a Jewish school system that still in the diaspora was shaped along similar-millet lines, given the lack of a unitary source of communal authority\textsuperscript{185}. Contrary to what happened in other colonial and immigrant societies where segregation was the result of official policies, in Israel it fit well with the desire of the neo-millets to maintain their separate identities, although this process was not exempt from ideological and political clashes between the different factions, particularly among the Jewish community, where secular and religious Zionist entered in conflict with ultra-orthodox communities.

2.5 East Jerusalem: the capital and its “country”

Between 1948 and 1967, East Jerusalem, as well as the West Bank, was formally part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In the entire area, west of the Jordan River the Jordanian education Ministry implemented its curriculum both in primary and post-primary schools. As it was the case on the Israeli side, the Jordanian government amended a law establishing compulsory education in the first years after the state’s independence. In 1952, the Education Reform Law stipulated that education was now a right of every citizen and primary education was compulsory for a period of seven years\textsuperscript{186}. The curriculum based on the British legacy lacked an organic vision or an educational philosophy. The process of state formation and the lack of a unitary clear vision within Jordanian society, impeded the Jordanian Kingdom to

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid, p. 102;
\textsuperscript{185} Swirski S., 1999, p. 118;
\textsuperscript{186} Abbas M. K., 2012, p. 72;
develop a clear educational project, at least until the Education Law n° 16 of 1964. Among the measures implemented by this law, there was the establishment of an Education committee and an Education council in order to decentralize the schools' management, up to then in the hands of the Minister of Education. Nonetheless the Six Day War and the “re-unification” of Jerusalem by the Israeli Government put an end to the Jordanian jurisdiction on the west side of the Jordan river. Contrary to what happened in the West Bank, where a military administration was in charge, in East Jerusalem the Israeli government tried to implement its normal policies. In the educational field, there was an outstanding consensus among Israeli administrators on the need to substitute the Jordanian school curriculum with the Israeli curriculum for Palestinian Israeli citizens, the so-called “Arab” education curriculum mentioned above. Despite the initial effort, the Israeli government abandoned its enterprise, because of a strong opposition from East Jerusalemites, which did not want to give up on their national educational rights. The response of Palestinian families to the effort of the Israeli administration to implement its curriculum in all 68 public schools in East Jerusalem, was twofold: protests and strike began at the beginning of 1967/68 school year, were followed by a dramatic increase of the number of pupils enrolled in religious private schools. The public system became a secondary source of education provision. In 1974 a special committee appointed by the Minister of Education, Yigal Allon, reported the failure of the Israeli attempt

---

187 Ibid, p.73;
189 According to official sources, enrollment in public primary schools in East Jerusalem dropped by approximately 15%, while the decrease was much higher in secondary education where numbers dropped by almost 65%.
190 Private Jordanian-run schools became a sort of safe haven for those families trying to avoid the enrollment of their pupils in the public system, which could not even afford the payment of private elite-oriented schools, such as many Christian schools. Ibid;
to substitute the Jordanian curriculum and called upon a return to the pre-1967 situation. The condition posed by Israel in order to return to the former Jordanian curriculum was the government’s right, through the Israeli Ministry of Education, to supervise Jordanian textbooks. Elementary education, however, returned to the Jordanian curriculum only in 1981. Notwithstanding Israeli control and filter over the Jordanian curriculum, the public system finally was revitalized, while private schools continued to be largely autonomous, with the same exceptions of public school regarding Israeli supervision over curricular and textbooks contents191.

Generally speaking, the Jordanian curriculum emphasized Arab culture and the confrontation against the Israeli state, although it did not teach young Palestinians about their own social background and the development of their ethnonational movement192. In the interlude between the 6-days war and the establishment of the PNA, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan continued to play a pivotal role in the formation and education of thousands of young Palestinians, through curriculum provision and high school graduation exams. At the same time, other schools network were operating throughout the occupied territories. Waqf schools were not directly affected by the change of regime, since they were still placed under the jurisdiction of the Jordanian Waqf Ministry. UNRWA schools continued to implement the Jordanian curriculum, given the unrecognized occupation of East Jerusalem and the West Bank by the United Nations General Assembly. Private schools, mainly Christian schools dependent from a particular Church enjoyed a greater degree of freedom, as part of the informal accords

192 Graham-Brown S., 1984, p.66;
between Christian leaders in Jerusalem and the Israeli government\textsuperscript{193}. A major change, like the one occurred in 1948, took place in 1994, after that the first part of the Oslo process started.

2.5.1 Oslo and everything after

Similar to other states in the region when they gained their independence, the Palestinian National Authority, established after the signature of the Principle of Declaration on Self Interim Agreement, has invested considerable resources and energies in education aiming to establish the foundations of a future Palestinian State\textsuperscript{194}. In the Oslo accords, education was one of those areas where Israel agreed to cede limited jurisdiction to the Palestinian Authority\textsuperscript{195}. The PNA started its action in the realm of education in September 1994, by succeeding the Israeli Military Government and the Jerusalem Municipality in the management of education in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip\textsuperscript{196}. Nonetheless, until 1999, when a new Palestinian curriculum was completely developed\textsuperscript{197}, schools falling under the PNA Ministry of Education and Higher Education (later the two ministers became separated) continued to employ the Jordanian Curriculum.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{193} Cheshin A., Hutman B., Melamed A., 1999, p. 104;
\textsuperscript{194} Rohde A., 2012, p. 237; Mazawi A. E., 2000, p. 371;
\textsuperscript{195} The Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed on 29 August 1994 transferred powers from the Israeli military government to the Palestinian Authority in five areas: education and culture, health, social welfare direct taxation and tourism. See Parsons N. C., 2005, p. 79; Shlaim A., 2009, p. 264;
\textsuperscript{196} Greenberg J, 1994, p. 6;
\textsuperscript{197} The “First Palestinian Curriculum Plan” was published in 1998 in Jerusalem by the General Administration of the Curricula, a branch of the Ministry of Education, after the approval of the Palestinian Authority and its Legislative Council. The national Palestinian curriculum envisages some crucial innovations affecting primary education as, for instance, the teaching of English from the 1st grade and the introduction of a third language as optional (normally Hebrew or French). See Velloso A., 2002, p. 150; World Bank, 2006, p. 25;
\end{flushleft}
The Palestinian national curriculum, has been in force since 2000 in the entire West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, unifying for the first time after 1948 these three areas under the same educational “umbrella”.

2.6 An unfinished project?

The Israeli education system has been characterized by a triangle structure, where at its head is the National Jewish education system, both secular and religious in a perennial tension with the ultra-orthodox system and the Arab education system, frequently perceived as a second and third level category education. Despite the Oslo process ultimately failed, in the realm of education some developments have changed the shape and the education system and its legacy proved to be long-lasting198.

In Jerusalem, where the ethnonational struggle is perceived at its most and where space and place are strictly intertwined with education and educational policies, this triangle system presents some unique exceptions. While in the East bodies and institutions active in the management and provision of education services are multiple and varied, in the West the Arab education component is nowhere to be found, unlike other areas under the direct administration of the State of Israel inhabited by an Arab speaking population, such as Galilee, Tel-Aviv-Jaffa or Haifa. In the next chapter I will explain how the Jerusalem Educational System(s) works and the how the public policies of the different educational actors are influencing the nature of this system.

198 Rohde A., 2012, p. 238;
In conclusion, unlike other democracies where political power is defined by political culture, through litigation and legislation, in Israel, as well summarized by Swirski, this power is «exercised through transacting within the state apparatus, or becoming a part of it, since that is where the politics of carving up takes place »\textsuperscript{199}. Therefore, the balance of power and the role played by the various actors managing education are pivotal in addressing the fate of Jerusalem's communities and that of the city itself. Through their activity, these actors forge a new educational geography, which is cultural and economic, aimed at changing the balance of power within the city. The next chapter will focus on the role of these actors in the Jerusalem educational arena and what relationship they entertain.

\textsuperscript{199} Swirski, 199, p. 108;
3 Education System(s) in Jerusalem

According to the “Jerusalem: Facts and Trends 2012” report published by the Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies, an advanced social science research centre based in West Jerusalem, « Jerusalem's education system is the largest, most diverse, and most complex municipal education system » in Israel and in the Occupied Territories. The city has several education providers, which together contribute to forge a complex, intertwined body of different educational streams mirroring to a large extent the complexity of the city’s population. A first major difference, is established at level of the language of instruction, which is either Arabic or Hebrew.

Following the same structure of the Educational Department of the Jerusalem municipality, we can distinguished four main educational streams, which roughly correspond to the broader Israeli educational system division: public secular education for Hebrew speakers (Mamlakhti); State Religious education for Hebrew speakers (Mamlakhti Dati); “Recognized but unofficial” or Haredi education; public Arab education. To this four group other three streams, no less important should be added: private religious schools in East Jerusalem; Waqf schools; UNRWA schools. Sometimes, in a misleading way this three streams are grouped together with the public Arab education, but although most of them face the same issues, the

200 Choshe M., Bluer E., Korac M., Yelinek A., Assaf-Shapira Y., p. 61, 2012;
201 Marshall J. B., Ora A., p. 27, 2002;
202 Some notable exceptions are Yiddish schools pertaining to the Haredi educational stream and international private schools which employs English or French as primary language of education. Interview of the author with S. D. General Director of the French cooperation office, Jerusalem, 14.02.2012; Interview of the author with Haim Rubinstein, Deputy Director Primary Education Office MANHI, Jerusalem, 17.05.2012;
203 Choshe M., Bluer E., Korac M., Yelinek A., Assaf-Shapira Y., p. 61, 2012;
204 Ibid;
curriculum they administer is different, as different is their concept of education. Moreover, public policies affect them in different ways, as well as different is their relationship with the three main education providers\textsuperscript{205}.

All seven educational streams but UNRWA are either directly administered from or can only operate with the agreement of the Israeli Ministry of Education and the Education Department of the Jerusalem Municipality, the main education provider in the city. East Jerusalem schools, meaning schools whose primary language is Arabic, depend on the Palestinian Authority for what it concerns their curriculum\textsuperscript{206}. Being the largest city of the area\textsuperscript{207}, Jerusalem also hosts numerous unique and experimental schools. Among them, a special place for its relevance regarding the conflict issue should be accorded to the Bi-lingual school “Hand in Hand”, which I will treat separately for its uniqueness and its efforts in showing how these divisions could be overcome.

Purpose of this chapter is to describe the status of the current education landscape in Jerusalem.

Before going into the details of each education stream, I am first going to describe the nature of and the role played by the three main encompassing education provider: the Israeli Ministry of Education, the Jerusalem Education Administration (MANHI) and the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of Education. After a brief description of their characteristics and how they relate to each other within the Jerusalem education system, I will turn to the different educational stream, trying to address their specificity and their differences. Only when dealing with the

\textsuperscript{205} International Crisis Group, 2012 (b), p. 5;

\textsuperscript{206} Velloso A., 2002;

\textsuperscript{207} Jerusalem’s total population is 839,000. Of these 256,000 resides within the boundaries of East Jerusalem.
different education stream I will approach the role of the other minor education provider, not operating at system level\textsuperscript{208}.

3.1 Contextualizing the Jerusalem educational system in a regional perspective

Educational systems in the Middle Eastern region have been facing diverse challenges during the last decades. Between Israel and its neighboring countries there is a wide gap which has become bigger since 1948\textsuperscript{209}. According to the UNDP \textit{2013} report aimed at calculating the Index of Human Development, Israel is, together with the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, the only country in the region showing a high level of human development\textsuperscript{210}. If we consider that the Gulf’s Sheikdoms are not relevant to this case study and the comparison is restricted to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Israel ranks 19th while the Opt rank 110th. Notwithstanding, the Middle East and North Africa Region has made significant improvement in increasing enrollment levels in the recent years. The situation in Jerusalem is therefore clearly exceptional and particularly striking. The divided city, placed under exclusively Israeli administration, still conserve half of the city with an educational prospect more similar to that of the West Bank than to the western side of the Green Line.

From a demographic perspective Jerusalem is also one of the youngest cities in the Israeli-Palestinian space, thanks to the high fertility rate of the Haredi population and the Palestinian

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[208] Although being educational provider, the Jordanian Waqf Ministry, the United Nations Relief Works Agency are not provider at a system level but rather are entitled of managing a specific educational stream. Therefore, they will be developed apart, when I will analyze the various educational streams.
\item[209] \url{http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/101406.html} UNDP, Adult literacy rate, both sexes (% age 15 and above), consulted on 20.08.2013;
\item[210] UNDP, 2013, p. 16;
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
residents\textsuperscript{211}. The total student population is of 224,259, more than the inhabitants of the Israeli city of Rishon-Le-Zion\textsuperscript{212}.

Primary schools, which are the main topic of this study goes from 1st through 6th grade\textsuperscript{213}, which normally correspond to the 6-12 age bracket.

3.2 Institutional Actors

3.2.1 The Israeli Ministry of Education

The Israeli Ministry of Education acts as an encompassing authority monitoring the entire educational system. The Ministry together with the Jerusalem Education Administration (MANHI) is entitled of the management in the whole area of the Jerusalem municipality with the sole exception of curriculum and textbooks development for private and public Arab speaking schools, prevalent in the eastern side of town\textsuperscript{214}. The 1953 State Education Law decreed that education is given by the State and on its behalf, authorizing the Ministry of Education of developing general educational policies\textsuperscript{215}, reproducing a consolidated pattern of modern states\textsuperscript{216}.

The Education Ministry is composed of several offices and units representing the different departments and levels of education for the whole country. At the hierarchical top of the

\textsuperscript{211} Choshen M., Bluer E., Korac M., Yelinek A., Assaf-Shapira Y., 2012;

\textsuperscript{212} Ibid;

\textsuperscript{213} In Israel grades are indicated with alphabet letters, being Aleph the 1st grade and Yud Beth the 12th.

\textsuperscript{214} Yair G., Alayan S., 2009;

\textsuperscript{215} Gaziel H., 1996, p. 48;

\textsuperscript{216} Benavot A., Resh N., 2003, p. 171; As I explained in the first chapter, while dealing with ethnonationalist theories, according to “modernists” scholar of (ethno)nationalism, modern mass education and the development of widespread school networks have been pivotal in forging nationalist generations. See Gellner E., 1983;
Ministry's structure lies the Office of the Minister of Education\textsuperscript{217}. The minister's office operates as joining link between the political reality of the parliamentarian majority and the administrative structure of the Ministry. A major change in the Ministry's operative structure occurred during the '70s when a reform dismantled the age-based units division (kindergarten, primary school, high school and university) and it reorganized the Ministry of Education into pedagogic units and administrative units. Practically, this reform set up different branches embracing all levels of education, of whom some went under the supervision of the pedagogic Secretariat and others under the educational Administration section\textsuperscript{218}. The branch of Religious Education has a totally autonomous status, despite being legally subordinate to the Director-General of the Ministry of Education. The chief of the Religious Education section works in coordination with a religious education council, composed of prominent religious Jewish figures, on curriculum development and educational policy determination\textsuperscript{219}. Acting as a ministry within a ministry, it reproduces a similar pattern to that in force during the Mandatory period among the Yishuv's political structure\textsuperscript{220}.

The ministry of Education\textsuperscript{221} is direct responsible of funding primary education in the entire Jerusalem area, developing the official public curriculum\textsuperscript{222} and the overall management of education services. As mentioned above East Jerusalem schools have a different curriculum.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid;
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid, p. 50;
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid;
\textsuperscript{220} Kleinberg P., 1969, p.124;
\textsuperscript{221} Beginning of 2017, the current Israeli Minister of Education is the Member of Knesset Naftali Bennet, also leader of the extreme right wing party “The Jewish Home”. Bennet succeeded Shai Piron, member of the recent established Yesh Atid (“There is Hope”) party.
\textsuperscript{222} Yair G., Alayan S., 2009, p. 238;
\end{flushleft}
since the Oslo agreements. I will then describe their situation when dealing with the role of the Palestinian Authority in the Jerusalem's education sector.

3.2.2 MANHI

The Jerusalem Education Administration, better known through the acronym MANHI derived from its Hebrew name Minhelet Hinukh Yerushalayim, is the Municipality section entitled of the management and administration of education, from pre-school through higher education, within the municipal boundaries. MANHI is directly responsible of extra funding, special education and the maintenance of building as well as school planning and construction. MANHI works in close contact with the Ministry only on particular projects, while on the daily administration of education the two institutions works separately and at different level being the Ministry's activities focused at the macro-system level and the development of the curriculum concerning the whole country. MANHI's role is, however of primary importance in administrating Jerusalem's schools. The Municipality is the direct responsible for the geographical distribution of institutes and for the allocation of part of the ministerial budget.

MANHI is structured along separated sections roughly corresponding to the different public educational "streams"; State schools, State religious schools, Haredi schools, Arab schools.

---

223 112,560 students were enrolled in primary education schools dependent or recognized by Manhi during the 2012/13 school year. JIIS, http://www.jiis.org.il/upload/yearbook2013/shnaton_M0213.pdf consulted on 29.07.13;
224 Yair G., Alayan S., 2009, p. 238;
225 Recent development allow school principals to decide freely how to allocate MANHI's funds. Interview of the author with Rafiqa Osman, MANHI “East Jerusalem section”, Jerusalem, 02.05.2012; Weiss E. S., 2002, p. 8;
226 At the time of the field research Director of the MANHI was Moshe Tur-Paz, who replaced Danny Bar Giora in the second part of 2012 after his resignation. Interview of the author with Souad Daas, Jerusalem, 22.04.2012; Interview with Rafiqa Osman;
The MANHAH, the Jerusalem Haredi Education Administration is the most independent of these section operating with a high degree of freedom concerning curriculum choices and which educational policies to endorse and how to implement them\textsuperscript{227}. MANHAH is responsible of the “recognized but unofficial” Haredi school network, which is to all degrees a corpus separatum within the public system; a group of different school networks affiliated to ultra-orthodox political parties.

A specific section is dedicated to East Jerusalem (called “Hinukh Mizrakh”, meaning East Jerusalem Education) schools\textsuperscript{228}. The East Jerusalem education section deals with any kind of “recognized” school serving the Palestinian Arab population. Public education falls completely under the jurisdiction of MANHI’s East Jerusalem section, while private recognized schools and WAQF schools enjoy a higher degree of autonomy. Despite the adoption of the PA’s curriculum, there is no official contact or cooperation between MANHI and the PA. Cooperation and negotiation at this level happen between the Ministries.

3.2.3 Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Education

The Palestinian Authority was established in the aftermath of the so-called Oslo accords. According to the 1994 Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Power and Responsibilities, the PA was entitled to exercise complete sovereignty on five areas: culture and education, tourism, direct taxation, health and social welfare\textsuperscript{229}.

\textsuperscript{227} Interview with Haim Rubinstein;
\textsuperscript{228} Employees of this section are in major part Palestinian Israelis coming from nearby villages, such as Abu Gosh, and a small minority of Jerusalem residents, mainly working as teachers or in Educational training centers dislocated in East Jerusalem. Interview with Rafiqa Osman;
\textsuperscript{229} Velloso A., 2002, p. 149;
The Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MOEHE) is in charge of the development of the Palestinian curriculum adopted in each Arabic speaking school in East Jerusalem. The Ministry of Education and Higher Education was established in 1994 by the Palestinian Authority, although, already in 1996 the Ministry split into two separate Ministries; the Ministry of Higher Education dealing with university and post-secondary education in general and the Ministry of Education in charge of pre-primary, primary and secondary education.

The MOEHE of the Palestinian Authority can be defined the “twin entity” of the Israeli Ministry of Education operating at macro-level; on top of that the Ministry is responsible of some key functions directly affecting the daily administration and provision of education services, such as the payment of teachers' salaries. From this perspective it has an in-between role to that of MANHI and the Israeli Ministry of Education.

In the initial, transitory period, the PA decided to maintain the Jordanian curriculum in East Jerusalem's schools meanwhile it was preparing a new national curriculum. Once the Palestinian curriculum was ready for the implementation, in 2000, it was adopted by every school in East Jerusalem, no matter what educational stream they belonged to. The school year 2000/01 saw also the adoption of Palestinian textbooks in East Jerusalem's school as well as in the rest of the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Fourteen new textbooks of several different subjects, including Palestinian national education, were prepared for the 1st and the 6th grade. The East Jerusalem case represent a significant exception to the situation of complete separation in the realm of education, since it is the only area where the Israeli Ministry

230 Velloso A., 2002; Weiss S. E., 2002; Yair G., Alayan S., 2009; Rohde A., 2012;
231 Velloso A., 2002, p. 149;
232 Ibid;
233 Weiss E. S., 2002, p. 6;
of Education and its Palestinian counterpart collide. In addition to the curriculum the PA's Minister of Education is responsible for the preparation and administration of the Tawjihi, the final exam which 12th graders take before completing their educational path, before eventually moving onto higher education\textsuperscript{234}.

These three main actors of the Jerusalem education system provides the main ingredients necessary to each system to function properly. Since the beginning of this tripartite system, and even more after the failure of the Oslo process, their relationship is extremely unbalanced being the Israeli Ministry of Education and MANHI close to act as “owner of the educational system, while the Palestinian Ministry of Education represents an “unwanted guest”. Nonetheless, their action contributes in several ways to shape the complicated web of educational streams, involving thousands of Jerusalem's residents.

3.3 Educational streams in the Jerusalem’s educational arena

I will now turn to the description of each of the different educational streams, highlighting their

\begin{table}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>ISRAEL</th>
<th>PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Primary</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>6-11</td>
<td>6-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>12-17</td>
<td>10-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>18-22</td>
<td>18-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory Education</td>
<td>From age 5 to 17</td>
<td>From age 6 to 15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{234} Yair G., Alayan S., 2009, p. 241;
structural differences, regarding the curriculum organization, number of students and classrooms, legal status and their territorial spreading within the Jerusalem municipal boundaries.

3.3.1 Public Hebrew Education (Mamlakhti)

Public State Hebrew education in Jerusalem does not significantly differ from other parts of Israel. The reform structure has been implemented in most part of the schools. Overall, 90% of Jerusalem’s public school system, considering State Religious education as well, adopted the reform structure of 6 years elementary school, followed by 3 years of intermediate school. The other 10% is still structured on an 8 plus 4 years basis. In the year 2012/13 the students enrolled in the public Hebrew education (Mamlakhti) were 24,750; 3,629 less than 12 years ago, when the decline in the enrollment of pupils in the non-religious public sector Jerusalem stream started. The core curriculum of Hebrew non-religious education is dictated by the Israeli Ministry of Education, with the notable exception of “distinctive schools” and it includes mathematics, science, history, Jewish studies, English, art and physical education. There are several Distinctive schools in Jerusalem, often located in well-off neighborhoods, such as the Jerusalem Sudbury Democratic School in the German Colony. Another “distinctive school”, part of the Hebrew Public non-religious stream is the bi-lingual “Hand-in-

235 Interview with Haim Rubinstein;
236 http://jiis.org/?cmd=statistic.490 Table XIII/7 .pdf, downloaded on 08.08.13;
237 Yaacov I. Schmida M., 1998, p. 27;
238 Sudbury schools are democratic schools first appeared in the United States in 1968 and they propose a completely democratic structure where students are part of the school management. There are no age grades and until recently it was not even recognized by the municipality. Today it represents probably the biggest exception to the core curriculum within the “normal” public Hebrew non-religious education stream. Hasson, 14.06.2013;
Hand” school which could be even handled as a separate network, considered its revolutionary purposes and the lack of the language variable, being both Hebrew and Arabic teaching languages.

3.3.1.1 Yad be Yad

The Jerusalem Hand-in Hand school was founded in September 1998, as the first bilingual school within the municipality borders of an Israeli city and constitutes the hub of the Center for Bilingual Education's broader system. The school is classified as a “non-religious school” supported by the Ministry of Education. Regarding the curriculum, its core is similar to this of the Public State Hebrew (Mamlakhti) school system, differing from this category thanks to the strict bilingual pattern it has adopted. Moreover the school offers additional integrative courses and activities ranging from theater to additional languages such as French or yoga courses.

At the beginning, the school functioned as a section of the Experimental School, a liberal

---

239 The first bi-lingual school in Israel has been founded in 1984 in the bi-national community of Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salam. The village is an intentional community jointly established by Israeli Arab and Israeli Jewish citizens in 1972 and today it hosts 52 families. When the first children grow up the community faced the problem to provide a proper education to its pupils. Thereby a nursery and a kindergarten were soon established by the community, followed in 1984 by a recycled-material built primary school. Since 1993 the Israeli Ministry of Education has recognized the primary school to which accorded the title of “experimental school” in 1997. Today the school holds the title of “recognized independent school” and it is open to families from nearby communities, which show interest in receiving a bilingual education. The primary purpose of the community, however, was not serve the wider Israeli-Palestinian population, but rather focus on a population already clearly ideological committed as a part of the community project. See Bekerman Z., Zembylas M., 2010; http://www.nswas.org/ consulted on 15.06.2013;

240 Interview with Ira Kerem, Yad be Yad Donor Relations officer, Jerusalem, 17.04.2012;

241 Bekerman Z., pp. 5-6, 2005;

242 Interview with Ira Kerem;
progressive Jerusalem school, mostly attended by the children of the academic and liberal community which populates the city. The school moved to another building, donated by the Swiss government, within a year from the foundation, officially because of the excessive burden of conducting two different educational experiments (the one of the Experimental school and the bilingual project) in a same educational structure\textsuperscript{243}. Today the school is situated in the southern part of the city on the western side of the Green Line, in the southern part of Gonen-Katamon, in the Pat sub-quarter, north of the Beit Safafa neighborhood.

Being founded just 15 years ago, the first graduated students, which pursued their entire scholastic career within the bilingual school, finished in June 2011. Other schools pertaining to the same management have been established in the Palestinian town of Sakhnin in the Galilee region, in the Palestinian village of Kfar Kara in the Wadi Ara valley, in the centre of Israel, and a more recent school opened in September 2002 in Haifa. The Sakhnin school was founded in 1998 and it was the first HIH's school to start a junior high school, while the in Kfar Kara classes goes just through the 6th grade\textsuperscript{244}. The HIH network is going to welcome a new pre-Kindergarten group of pupils, since a brand-new school will be inaugurated in Jaffa in the Fall 2013\textsuperscript{245}. The CBE's network rely for much part of its work on international donors, either private or public. Among the HIH's donors a major role is played by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which in 2011/12 academic year accorded to the school a 1.080 million US dollars grant\textsuperscript{246}.

The HIH network is characterized by a strong bilingual policy, which to the Jerusalem case

\textsuperscript{243} Bekerman Z., Zembylas S., p. 10, 2010;
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid;
\textsuperscript{245} \url{www.handinhandk12.org/news/pre-k-in-jaffa} consulted on 02.08.2013;
\textsuperscript{246} The USAID grant varies from year to year and it is negotiated on annual basis. Interview with Ira Kerem;
applies only to the primary school, i.e. from the 1st to the 6th grade, due to the excessive financial burden of extending the double-teacher policy to secondary education grades\textsuperscript{247}. During the 2012/13 school year the Yad-be-Yad elementary school in Jerusalem hosted 279 pupils, of whom 143 boys and 136 girls\textsuperscript{248}. Symmetry is a major criteria of the school not only in the double teacher innovative structure, but also regarding the gender-balanced student population.

3.3.2 Public State Religious Education (Mamlakhti Dati)

Since its foundation State Religious Education (SRE), which is also known through its Hebrew name Mamlakhti Dati, tried to integrate traditional religious education as found in traditional religious rabbincical schools (yeshivot) with modern education as proposed by general secular schools\textsuperscript{249}. State Religious Education based its educational philoshophy on three principles aimed at forge religious citizens able to cope with any kind of challenge of the modern world and prepared to work, while observing God's law. The three main theoretical pillar of SRE are: inculcation of religious beliefs and knowledge of sacred writings; acquisition of basic skills necessary to be integrated in the contemporary world, including proficiency in sciences, languages and mathematics; a strong nationalistic education with the objective of reinforcing the national community, expression of God's will\textsuperscript{250}.

Since the 1953 State Education Law, State Religious schools have been open to all kind of pupils willing to receive at the same time a religious and modern education, following the

\textsuperscript{247} Interview with Ira Kerem;
\textsuperscript{248} http://jerhinshnotonout.jerusalem.muni.il/pages/pViewShnaton4Mosad.aspx?mosadID=8399 consulted on 23.07.13;
\textsuperscript{249} Yablon Y. B., 2009, p. 541;
\textsuperscript{250} Yablon Y. B., 2009, p. 541; Gross Z., 2003, pp. 150-151;
principle of “religious education for all”\textsuperscript{251}. In the 2012/13 school year in Jerusalem 45 SRE primary schools were active, of whom 4 dedicated to special education\textsuperscript{252}. The weight of the SRE primary stream within the city's boundaries is similar to that of the Public secular education stream, although SRE elementary schools provide education to a higher number of pupils respect to its secular counterpart. In the 2011/12 school year, 11,460 students were enrolled in primary SRE schools, vis-à-vis 11,270 enrolled in secular public schools\textsuperscript{253}. Schools can be either integrated or separated on sex basis. According to MANHI, in the 2012/13 elementary gender-segregated schools reached a total of 22 institute, equally divided between female and male schools, while the remaining 21 elementary schools providing normal religious education were integrated\textsuperscript{254}. Within SRE national celebrations assume a particular, tremendously important role. Historic events are invested of a messianic significance aimed at combining the two souls of Religious Zionism. The Jerusalem Day for instance, celebrated every year on the 28th day of the Jewish month of Iyar, plays a pivotal role in the fusion of modern ethnonationalism and religious tradition.

3.3.3 Public Arab Education

Public education in East Jerusalem is a direct successor of public education under Jordanian rule until 1967. As in the case of secular Hebrew public schools, public education in the eastern part of the city is administered by MANHI, which operates according to the framework of the Israeli Minister of Education. The Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Education is responsible

\textsuperscript{251} Gross Z., 2003, p. 153;
\textsuperscript{252} Special Needs Students in Israel are assigned to separate schools;
\textsuperscript{253} JIIS, \url{http://www.jiis.org/upload/shnaton2-education-english.pdf}, consulted on 17.08.13;
\textsuperscript{254} Interview with Haim Rubinstein;
of the provision of the curriculum and textbooks, which are, however, previously controlled by
the Israeli Minister of Education, in order to verify the presence of politically sensitive
elements. In the scholastic year 2011/12 42,474 pupils were enrolled in public schools in
East Jerusalem from the kindergarten to 12th grade. Currently, with 32 public elementary
schools, 9 special education schools and 20 high schools the Public Arab education stream
continues to be the biggest school stream in East Jerusalem, hosting 40% of Palestinian
students. The scholastic calendar follows Muslim holidays and schools do not close on
Jewish festivities. Unlike Hebrew public education, primary education in East Jerusalem's
schools goes through the 8th grade. Arabic is the primary language of education in every
school, while Hebrew is learned, starting from the 3rd grade as a second language together
with English, being that the biggest difference of the “Jerusalem Palestinian Curriculum” to the
Palestinian Curriculum implemented in the West Bank and Gaza. The teaching of Hebrew
is particularly encouraged by the Ministry and the Municipality contributes with 50 New Israeli
Shekel (NIS) for each pupil to buy Hebrew books, while families should only add 15 NIS. At
the end of the high school students sustain a final exam, called Tawjihi administered by the
PA's Ministry of Education, with the notable exception of the Beit Safafa school which employs
both curricula, Palestinian and Israeli and prepares its students to pass the Bagrut examination
and the Tawjihi.

Children are enrolled in the nearest school within the boundaries of their territorial
administration. In case they are obliged to be enrolled in another school, outside their

Yair G., Alayan S., 2009, p.241;
ACRI, p. 6, 2012;
ACRI, p. 2, 2011;
Interview with R. O.;
Unlike their Jerusalem peers, Palestinian children attending school in the West Bank and Gaza does
not study Hebrew at any grade. Interview with R. O.;
neighborhood, a bus service is provided by the municipality\(^{260}\). However, the current situation is harsher for children than what is prospected by the law, since thousands of children fall out the system. Schools are overcrowded and sometimes the municipality does not provide a bus service for children in need of crossing the entire city\(^ {261}\).

3.3.4 Recognized but unofficial education: Haredi Education

The recognized but unofficial religious educational stream is actually composed of several, different school networks each one responding to a particular ethnoreligious group. To put all these different networks under the same common term and to name it “Haredi educational stream” could be misleading. As pointed out by Varda Shiffer in a study on the funding of the Haredi educational stream, Haredi

“is an all-inclusive term, which does not express the wide variety of subcommunities, circles and groups that people tend to categorize under the heading of Haredi community or Haredi sector”\(^ {262}\).

 Nonetheless, from a public policy perspective, this term could be employed as a synonym for recognized but unofficial religious education without leaving aside any relevant information\(^ {263}\). Despite the enormous differences registered within the community, there are several common elements of the Haredi stream's organization, structure and political behavior vis-à-vis the

\(^{260}\) Interview with R. O.;

\(^{261}\) The current design is also discouraging students from continuing their education career after completing primary school and moving onto secondary school as, apart from three integrated schools, two located in Silwan and the other one in Umm Lisun, all the other schools are separated, thus rendering complicated for certain kids to access secondary schools. Interview with R.O.;

\(^{262}\) Shiffer V., 1999, p. 138;

\(^{263}\) Ibid;
State, the municipality and the other actors of the Jerusalem educational system.

The Haredi stream is the most important within the Jerusalem system, given the high birth rate of the ultra-orthodox community and the deep symbolic value of the city for the community, which built an enclave within the city during the last century. As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, a specific section within MANHI called MANHAH\textsuperscript{264}, which means Jerusalem Education Administration Haredi is overseeing the management of schools pertaining to this stream.

Despite being financed by the ministry of Education and the municipality, which through MANHAH is responsible of building maintenance and technical assistance\textsuperscript{265}, neither the Ministry nor the Municipality are responsible of curriculum contents, hiring and firing teachers and registration of students\textsuperscript{266}.

Ideally according to its supporters and members, Haredi education reproduces the historical pattern of Jewish traditional education as it developed throughout centuries in the diaspora. Gender-segregation is strictly observed. Boys studies mainly the Holy Scriptures in institute called Talmud Torah, while girls are forbidden to study the Bible and other sacred books.

Within the field of Haredi schools, we can make a further distinction. The two main Haredi school network are divided along ethnic lines: the Independent education network (Hinukh Atzma'i), which was the first network of ultra-orthodox schools to be recognized by the state in 1949 and serves mainly Ashkenazi pupils; the Fountain of Torah education (Ma'ayan

\textsuperscript{264} Literally Minhal HaHinukh shel Yerushalayim Haredi;

\textsuperscript{265} Interview with Haim Rubinstein;

\textsuperscript{266} http://www.moia.gov.il/Publications/teachers_en.pdf downloaded on 14.03.2012;
HaHinukh HaTorani) network, affiliated with Shas\textsuperscript{267}, the Mizrahi Haredi main political party\textsuperscript{268}. Most institutes are affiliated with a Yeshiva, a high school for young males committed to the study of the Bible or a female high school for girls, which follows the same educational philosophy of the elementary institution. Unlike public secular and religious schools, Talmud Torah and elementary Haredi institutes for girls continue to adopt an 8 + 4 years structure. In the year 2011/12 46,114 pupils were enrolled in the Haredi schools stream at the elementary level, of whom 25,219 were male and 20,895 female\textsuperscript{269}. The majority of Talmud Torah and Female elementary schools are located in Haredi neighborhoods or in areas of the city with a high increase of Haredi inhabitants. Including secondary education students, only 15\% of pupils attended a school in a non-Haredi neighborhood\textsuperscript{270}.

3.3.5 East Jerusalem private school network

The universe of private schools in East Jerusalem is deeply intertwined with the religious dimension of the city. Although religious Christian seminars and traditional Muslim schools have played a role forming the city's religious intelligentsia for centuries, the first religious private schools offering a modern education appeared in the second half of the 19th century.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{267} Shas is principally an ultra-orthodox party that claims to represent the interests of the economically and socially disadvantaged Mizrahi population. The Party was founded in 1983 in Jerusalem by a group of Mizrahi rabbis who broke out with the Ashkenazi-rulled ultra-orthodox Agudath Israel party. It has been one of the major forces of the recent Israeli political scene, taking part in almost every right or left government. See Schiffman E., 2005;

\textsuperscript{268} Shiffer V., 1999, p. 140;

\textsuperscript{269} Interview with Haim Rubinstein; Data recorded by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies varies a little bit, counting a total of 46,612 students enrolled in the ultra-orthodox stream. However data communication from Haredi schools and MANHAH does not always reach a 100\% accuracy level. On the partial mapping and data collection from Haredi education institutions see also Schiffer V., 1999;

\textsuperscript{270} \url{http://www.jiis.org/?cmd=datast.292&act=read&id=572} consulted on 05.08.2013;
\end{footnotesize}
Starting from that period, each Christian confession established a permanent presence in Jerusalem together with institutions and services to the local community, often supported by European states. As elsewhere in the Middle East, this effort was justified by a perspective of conversion among local population through education provision\textsuperscript{271}. In Jerusalem this aspect assumed even higher importance than elsewhere, given the symbolic role of the city in Christendom.

The traditional Greek-Orthodox community, the most important Christian community in the city was rapidly overcome by Anglican and Catholic efforts to establish a local community through missionary services focusing mainly on education\textsuperscript{272}. At the beginning these schools were intended to serve the local Christian community for a career within the Church apparatus, but the theological orientation was soon substituted by a westernized secular educational philosophy attracting students from the Muslim community\textsuperscript{273}. These schools became rapidly a term of reference for notables and local elites, given its modern secular curriculum and the high standards in use for teachers’ selection. In the first years of the 20th century and under the British rule, Anglican schools, such as St. George’s School played a very central role in educating a new generation of political activists\textsuperscript{274}. Nowadays the most prominent confessional private school in East Jerusalem are located within or just outside the walls of the Old City.

\textsuperscript{271} This was particularly true of Protestant schools. Lacking any previous representation in the Middle East, Protestants, mainly British, tried to convert so many people as possible in order to contrast Catholic expansion. To reach their objective they addressed their educational offer not only to those Christians of other confession which could not count on the support of a foreign state, especially Greek Orthodox, but also to Muslims in general by placing emphasis on the students’ Arab identity. This combination of religion, ethnicity and nationalism will not produce the effect wished by British Protestants but it will contribute to the uprising of nationalist movements in the entire region. Nga Longva A., 2011, p. 76;

\textsuperscript{272} Frantzman S., 2011;

\textsuperscript{273} Ibid, p. 199;

\textsuperscript{274} Ibid, p. 191-192; Sanchez K., 2007, p. 67;
The Christian Quarter, for instance, hosts two well-known Catholic schools where part of the Jerusalem Palestinian intelligentsia was educated during the last century: the Collège des Frères and the Terra Santa School.

Given the religiously-mixed background of the pupils, private Christian schools employ an integrated, rare school calendar. Muslim and Christian holidays\textsuperscript{275} are both observed and weekly lessons start on Monday morning and end on Thursday afternoon, in order to let Muslim pupils celebrate the Friday with their families. On Saturday, however pupils attend classes and they rest again on Sunday, giving the opportunity to Christian student and staff to participate at masses and Christian celebrations\textsuperscript{276}.

There is no clear pattern regarding mixed classroom, being this choice completely dependent on the school's will. The Terra Sancta college and the Greek Orthodox Institute for instance do not offer mixed classroom at the elementary level, while the Armenian St. Jacob school and the Collège des Frères have started to endorsed this policy in the last years\textsuperscript{277}.

---

\textsuperscript{275} Christian holidays changes from school to school, according to the particular confession of each community. Interview of the author with Marie Armelle Beaulieu, Journalist at Terra Santa Journal, Jerusalem, 04.12.2011;

\textsuperscript{276} Interview of the author with F. M., Director at Terra Santa Institute, Jerusalem, 26.02.2012; Frantzman S.; 196;

\textsuperscript{277} Interview with Marie-Armelle Beaulieu;
3.3.6 Waqf schools

The Arabic word waqf (plural awqaf) is normally translated in English as “religious endowment” or “trust”, although this literally translation does not evoke the deeply pietous dimension inherent in the Arabic root of the word. This institution common to the entire Muslim world, have played a crucial role in the economic political and cultural life of Jerusalem for centuries. The institution of the waqf consists in the endowment of property for charitable or private purpouses\textsuperscript{278}, which possess three main characteristics: it is inalienable, irrevocable and for

\textsuperscript{278} Despite in Shari’a Law a waqf was considered valid only if the donation was made for charitable and
perpetuity\textsuperscript{279}.

Using religious endowments to supply services to the population is an ancient custom throughout the entire Muslim world and the Old City of Jerusalem is no exception to this pattern\textsuperscript{280}. The Muslim community up to the beginning of the mandate used the waqf to set up its traditional schools (kuttab pl. katatib), for teaching the Qur'an and the Islamic principles\textsuperscript{281}. The waqf school system rapidly grow during the first period of Israeli sovereignty on East Jerusalem, when many families fled from the public system where Israel was trying to impose its “Arab education” curriculum and enrolled their pupils in schools managed by the awqaf\textsuperscript{282}.

The waqf school system is still dependent of the Jordanian Waqf Ministry based in Amman, although in Jerusalem the Supreme Islamic Council – Al-Waqf has its office in the heart of the Old City inside a building adjacent to the Esplanade of the Mosques. The Supreme Islamic Council, officially a private institution affiliated with the Jordanian Waqf Ministry, is responsible for waqf affairs in Jerusalem and in the Palestinian Territories, including schools management\textsuperscript{283}.

Waqf schools followed the same trajectory of other East Jerusalem school networks by altruistic purposes, over time for several different reasons, such as the threat of confiscation by the state, *awqaf* established for the benefit of family relatives became the rule. This trend led to a distinction in denoting the two kind of donation: the *waqf khayri*, endowed for general community purposes; the *waqf dhurri* endowed for family members. See Dumper M., 2003;

\textsuperscript{279} Dumper M., 2003, p. 236;

\textsuperscript{280} According to Michael Dumper, author of an extensive study of the waqf institution in Palestine and in contemporary Israel, the origins of the use of waqf donations as a form of state investment is due to Salah ed-Din, after its conquest of the city from Crusaders' hands. Schools were financed through inns, hammam and pilgrims kitchens normally located nearby the school building. See Dumper, 2003, pp. 238-239;

\textsuperscript{281} Greenberg E., 2004, p. 3; Frantzman S., 2011, p. 189;

\textsuperscript{282} Cohen H., 2011, p. 69;

\textsuperscript{283} Nasrallah R., 2003, p. 40-41;
adopting in 2000 the Palestinian curriculum for all its grades and classes. Currently the Jordanian Waqf Ministry and the Palestinian Ministry of Education run the waqf school stream jointly through a cooperation agreement. The latter is responsible of providing school textbooks and updating the curriculum, while then Jordanian Waqf ministry has the overall supervision and administration of the system. In the 2011/12 school year, 39 primary and secondary schools were operating in the Jerusalem area. Six of these schools lie nowadays on the eastern part of the separation wall.

Relationship between Awqaf administration and MANHI are quite tense, and even worse is the situation involving the Israeli government. Lack of mutual recognition led to the confiscation of waqf properties and building by the Israeli authority through the application of the Absentee Property Law. This continuous clash over awqaf buildings severely affects the right of receive a proper education for East Jerusalem childrens.

3.3.7 UNRWA schools

In the immediate aftermath of the 1948 war, the United Nations General Assembly established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Commonly known under its acronym, UNRWA, the agency was established with the resolutions 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 to carry out direct relief and work programmes for

284 Interview of the author with Sawsan Safadi, Waqf Jerusalem Office, Jerusalem, 20.06.2012; OCHA, 2011, p. 85;
285 Interview with Sawsan Safadi;
286 The Absentee Property Law passed in 1950 in the Israeli Knesset in order to reduce potential claims by Palestinians refugees who had fled during 1948 and dispossess their properties. Waqf mutawallis (administrators) were considered absents if they were not resident in Jerusalem. In that way, absentee landlords lost their rights over these properties just like it did the Supreme Islamic Council, the main waqf administrator. The mutual lack of recognition between the Shari'a Court and the Israeli Government played certainly a role in this issue, which seriously damaged Palestinian citizens. See Dumper M., 2003, pp.248-249;
Palestine refugees\textsuperscript{287}.

Providing education is one of the most important Agency’s service, together with any kind of assistance within refugee camps in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The Agency has begun to set up a school service on May 1st 1950\textsuperscript{288} and it still continues to provide education in refugee camps to the descendant of the 1949 refugees. UNRWA « operates one of the largest education systems in the Middle East, opening the doors of its 700 schools to nearly 500,000 pupils every day »\textsuperscript{289}, including the Jerusalem area.

With the Jerusalem urban sprawl and the enlargement of the city’s municipal borders in the post-’67 era, some refugee camps have become city neighborhoods. These refugee camps, lying mostly in the northeastern municipal border of the city, house 6 UNRWA's primary school directly dependent from the Agency for its management. Its geopolitical importance notwithstanding, UNRWA's schools occupy a marginal seat within the Jerusalem education macro-system. UNRWA's education system could be placed between the international private schools (i.e. the French Lycée) and the public system, since its scholastic curriculum is completely draw upon the PA’s curriculum, with some notable exceptions, such as a special human rights education programme. Moreover, being a Programme of the United Nations, completely depending on donors’ contributions, the political and financial situation of this education system is extremely fragile\textsuperscript{290}. Due to its own nature, the Agency does not exercise any legal control on the refugee camps and its attitude is much more re-active than pro-active

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{287} http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=85 consulted on 25.06.2013;
\textsuperscript{288} Dickerson G., 1974, p. 122;
\textsuperscript{289} UNRWA, 2012;
\textsuperscript{290} UNRWA was established as a temporary solution for Palestinian refugees, presuming that the return of the refugees would have been negotiate\textsuperscript{s}. States interests and the critical political situation rendered it one of the most long-lasting among UN Funds, Programmes and Specialized Agencies. See also Graham-Brown S., 1984;
\end{flushright}
due to its inability to emancipate its work from donor states\textsuperscript{291}.

Despite these critical points the Agency's work is extremely close to that of a public or private education provider. UNRWA, unlike other UN Agencies, is responsible for running schools, delivering the curriculum, hiring and training the professional staff\textsuperscript{292}.

Following the Agency's own educational policy, « the vision of UNRWA's education programme is to establish an [...] education system which develops the full potential of Palestinian refugees to enable them to be confident, innovative, questioning, thoughtful, tolerant and open-minded, upholding human values and religious tolerance, proud of their Palestine identity and contributing positively to the development of their society and the global community »\textsuperscript{293}.

UNRWA's programme operates within a broader national and regional context, where the different national situation have an influence in its programmatic development. Therefore the Jerusalem situation is a unique case; while the main UNRWA's educational counterpart is the Ministry of Education and Higher Education of the Palestinian Authority, the Jerusalem's schools are located within the Jerusalem Municipality jurisdiction, an Israeli municipality.

In UNRWA schools, elementary education consist of six years for all eligible children. Pupils, according to the UNRWA Educational policy, are entitled to receive education in one of the

\textsuperscript{291} At the period of the finalization of this dissertation, beginning of 2018, the US have announced a massive cut to their contribution to UNRWA's budget totaling to almost half of their annual contribution. Being the US the biggest donor the impact of their withdrawal will most likely lead to the interruption of some of the services provided, among them education. The reduction of the contribution is in line with the announced changes in the foreign policy of the USA. According to a speech made on January 17th 2018 by the UNRWA’s Director General Pierre Krahenbuel «at stake is the access of 525'000 boys and girls in 700 UNRWA schools, and their future. At stake is the dignity and human security of millions of Palestine refugees». https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/statement-unrwa-commissioner-general-pierre-kr%C3%A4henb%C3%BChl-1 consulted on 28.01.2018 \\
\textsuperscript{292} UNRWA, 2012;

\textsuperscript{293} UNRWA Educational Reform 2011-15, p.1;
Agency's school, if they reach the age of 5 years and 7 months at the beginning of the school year\(^ {294}\). To access at the UNRWA's school potential students must be children of registered Palestinian refugees or children of a Palestinian refugee married to a non-refugee or either children of non-registered Palestinian refugees\(^ {295}\). School participation is free of charge for pupils and after the successful completion of the primary school, children goes to a 3 year lasting preparatory cycle. According to the Agency, the cost per child in a school in the West Bank and in the Jerusalem territories reached the amount of 711.3 US dollars in 2009\(^ {296}\).

USA and Germany are among the different donors which contribute to the educational system of the Agency in the West Bank, those who contributes the most, immediately followed by Norway and the European Union. For what it concerns the Jerusalem area at the beginning of 2011 the Al-Aqsa Foundation signed an agreement with the Agency to fund, through the Islamic Development Bank, the construction of a new school in the Shu'afat refugee camp, a suburb on the northern outskirt of Jerusalem\(^ {297}\).

In addition to the financial cooperation with member states and private or interstate foundations, UNRWA has established a partnership with the British council and the American Centre to develop its own curriculum, drawing also upon the expertise of the UNESCO International Bureau of Education (IBE) global Centre for Curriculum Development\(^ {298}\).

\(^{294}\) The same age is required in UNRWA’s schools in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and in Syria, while in Lebanon and Jordan the required age is 5 years and 8 months at the beginning of the school year.

\(^{295}\) UNRWA Educational Reform Strategy 2011-15, p. 17;

\(^{296}\) Ibid p. 25;


\(^{298}\) UNRWA Educational Reform Strategy 2011-15, p. 55;
4 Effects of an ethnocratic approach to education administration

4.1 An intertwined web of educational streams

As we have seen in the last chapter, the current education landscape in Jerusalem is varied and fragmented. The most evident separation line divides Israeli Jews (Jerusalem citizens) and Palestinian Arabs (Jerusalem residents), following the same path of the overall conflict.

Looking at these co-existing education systems from an ethnocratic perspective, I identify some main trends currently contributing to the further fragmentation and weakening of the social structure, hindering any possible chance of peace. As mentioned before, the ethnocratization of the education system(s) operates at an overall global level and within the Israeli ethnogroup. The micro-system of Haredi schools, looking like little islands in an open vast ocean of ethnocommunities, is an example of how this city is divided and fragmented in more parts than just East and West.

In this final chapter, I will use the ethnocratic model to draw some conclusions on the current trends and impact of education policies and administration in Jerusalem in the light of the historical evolution of the Israeli and Palestinian education systems.

Given the recent political evolution and changes, I have mainly identified three trends worth to be isolated and analyzed to better understand the impact of education on the cohesion of the social tissue in a divided city such as Jerusalem:

1. The failure of the state of Israel to uphold to its national and international commitments and guarantee equitable quality education to all Jerusalem’s
citizens. This failure is typical of all ethnocratic regimes, but the dynamics behind it are more complex in Jerusalem than elsewhere;

2. The widening of the Israeli Jewish-Palestinian gap through the content of education and the parallel trend of ethnonational reconciliation in the Israeli Jewish sphere;

3. The inefficiency of peace education experiments, such as Hand in Hand to develop a critical mass demanding for peace and change the political environment, still underlying its symbolic fundamental role and its impact on individuals;

4.2 The right to education faced to the logic of ethnocracy

More than 20 years after the Oslo agreements and with more than a decade of PA’s curriculum in almost all Palestinian schools, Jerusalem finds itself at a critical crossroads. The city has been cut off from the rest of Palestine by a separation barrier that has changed the shape of what was originally included as part of East Jerusalem in 1967, leaving some neighborhoods on the Eastern side of the barrier. This geographical separation has some critical practical and symbolic implications for Palestinian students.

Education is a mirror of politics; fractions are slowly but inevitably eroding social cohesion and any hope left for peace and reconciliation. Nuseibeh, author of a study on the discrimination of East Jerusalem residents in the education field, is right in identifying MANHI and the Israeli…

299 Cohen H., p.128, 2010;
Ministry of Education as the main responsible for the violation of the right to education of East Jerusalem's children.

To analyze this failure of providing equitable quality education to all children in Jerusalem, I want to look at the situation of access to secondary and higher education in the city.

From a system administration perspective, as explained in the third chapter, Jerusalem is dependent from three main providers (or macro providers), though in reality at micro level this providers are more. These three providers are the Israeli Ministry of Education, the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education and the Jerusalem Education Administration (MANHI). The first two are responsible for the design of the curriculum respectively in the Hebrew speaking schools and the Arab speaking schools. MANHI is responsible for the daily administration of the sector including school construction and teachers' allocation, certification and salaries. The Oslo agreement then have created this situation of power sharing in the realm of education where the PA's curriculum is implemented in all East Jerusalem schools but the daily administration of the public schools is in the hand of the Jerusalem municipality (MANHI). Since 1967 though, public education in East Jerusalem has been transformed in a battleground. New elements in this past decade have however changed the balance of this battle.

The 1960 Convention against Discrimination in Education, ratified in 1961 by Israel, states that

> "the term "discrimination" includes any distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other

300 A notable exception is represented by Haredi schools as mentioned in the previous chapter. As these chapter enjoy a large degree of freedom and some subjects are unique to this type of schools, Ministerial control on some subjects is minimal.

301 Interview with Haim Rubinstein; Shlomo O. (2017), p. 232;
opinion, national or social origin, economic condition or birth, has the purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in education”\textsuperscript{302}

Particularly in the section (b) of Article 1 the question of quality and equity in the provision of the education service is explicitly mentioned as discrimination consist in “limiting any person or group of persons to education of an inferior standard”\textsuperscript{303}.

On the national level, the Compulsory Education Law, the State Education Law and the Pupils' rights Law all concur in stating that regardless of ethnicity or place of residence every child in Israel is entitled to the right of Education: Even if East Jerusalem citizens are technically not Israeli citizens, the Fourth Geneva convention\textsuperscript{304} states that their right to education has to be respected equally to every other child\textsuperscript{305}. To understand how this inequity is affecting East Jerusalem inhabitants and how it is changing the education landscape, I want to look at the question of curriculum and access to secondary and tertiary education. Despite formal cooperation in the field of education was included in the Oslo agreements, the turn taken by the events soon after the signing has halted the whole process. This has some practical implications, seriously affecting East Jerusalem students. Given that Tawjihi (the final exam of secondary education following the Palestinian curriculum) is not recognized by Israeli universities, many of them in the past years, either paid for private schools providing lessons in Hebrew and other subjects thus allowing them to sit for entry examination at tertiary level or they had to find ways to move abroad. Palestinians students have literally been trapped in an unfavorable situation of high demand and low supply of higher education opportunities. A third

\textsuperscript{302} Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960);
\textsuperscript{303} Ibid;
\textsuperscript{304} Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of War (1949);
\textsuperscript{305} Shlomo O. (2017), p. 233;
option is the enrollment in Palestinian universities. The design of the Palestinian university system, only allows students who have received a score of at least 70% at the Tawjihi to access universities. According to Nuseibeh, this situation acts as a deterrent for Palestinian students as many of them “feel intimidated by the final exam as they have to get very high grades to enroll in Palestinian universities”\textsuperscript{306}. On top of this, most of the Palestinian universities are not even physically accessible to Palestinian students as they will have to move on the other side of the wall. By cutting this ties or at least discouraging as much as possible movements from the West Bank to Jerusalem and the other way round, the choice of universities left for Palestinian students is extremely reduced. According to Nusseibeh, this is one of the cause of high dropout rate after primary education.\textsuperscript{307} Chances of getting into secondary and then eventually higher education are much lower for a Palestinian student resident in East Jerusalem, than a student in West Jerusalem. According to Rafiqa Osman, responsible for grade 1-8 of MANHI East Jerusalem division “[there is] only one case of integration between Tawjihi and Bagrut, Beit Safafa Primary School […] where children learn both curricula. They learn Hebrew as second language starting from grade 2 and English as third language”\textsuperscript{308}. Usually in Palestinian schools in East Jerusalem, students starts learning Hebrew from the third grade, but still their learning based on the PA’s curriculum does not allow them to sit for entry examinations to Israeli universities once they have completed the secondary cycle\textsuperscript{309}. Palestinian students are then trapped between their ethnonational identity and the push from

\textsuperscript{306} Nuseibeh R. A. (2015), p. 150-151. On top of sit for a general knowledge assessment, East Jerusalem Palestinian students also have to sit for a psychometric and a cultural test, deemed discriminatory;

\textsuperscript{307} Ibid;

\textsuperscript{308} Interview with R. O.;

\textsuperscript{309} Nuseibeh R. A. (2015);
the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian civil society\textsuperscript{310} to have them study the PA's own curriculum\textsuperscript{311} and their inability of cultivating the ties with the rest of the World Bank. Space, education and identity are strictly interconnected\textsuperscript{312}. Interestingly, one of the outcomes of the failure of providing free public education to all Palestinian citizens has been the mushrooming of new private institutions in East Jerusalem, labeled as “Recognized but not formal”\textsuperscript{313}. Due to the lack of space in public schools, new schools all over East Jerusalem were opened to give every child a chance to receive an education. These schools although cheaper than regular public elite schools described in the previous chapter, are not entirely free and parents have to pay tuition to send their children to school\textsuperscript{314}. According to Oren Shlomo, professor of Urban Planning and Design at Harvard and author of a research on the provision of public social services in East Jerusalem, the Israeli recognition of the recognized but not formal stream is a “clear manifestation of the schools' gradual inclusion in Israeli state apparatuses in terms of their administration funding pedagogy and supervision”\textsuperscript{315}. This however does not hide nor does it justify the lack of a quality public education system comparable to the one in West Jerusalem. The progressive weakening of the Jerusalem public system is leading to a situation of friction between Israel and the Palestinian civil society. By looking at the impact

\textsuperscript{311} Hidmi N.I. (2017);
\textsuperscript{312} Rotem M. & Gordon N. (2017); Yiftachel O. (2006);
\textsuperscript{313} Shlomo O. (2017) p. 232. The majority of these schools have been opened by Palestinian Israelis who have seen an economic opportunity given the high demand for education services and limited seats availability in the public system. The fact that both government and parents contribute economically has been a pull factor for entrepreneurs to enter in the education arena. On the Palestinian side the role of NGOs who have either opened this type of schools or pushed children to enroll in this schools has been severely criticized. See Hidmi N. I. (2017);
\textsuperscript{314} Public funding from Israeli cover 75% of a normal school allocation. Shlomo O. (2017) p.233; Interview with Marie-Armelle Beaulieu;
\textsuperscript{315} Shlomo O. (2017) p. 233;
that geography has on the education system it is possible, I argue, to understand how the
Judaization of the space goes hand in hand with the provision of public social services. Despite
the Oslo agreement give autonomy to the PA in the realm of Education, the fact that East
Jerusalem is cut off from the rest of the West Bank is causing a sense of deprivation and
disaffection to the ethnonation in the East Jerusalem population. The discrimination and
overlooking of the public system by the Jerusalem administration is then a major factor of
dropout and linked to the rise of illiteracy. This trend, I argue following Slomo and Yiftachel,
will have a direct impact on the socioeconomic fabric of the city, where East Jerusalem
inhabitants will be condemned to a position of subjugation active mainly as cheap labor for the
dominant ethnonational group. East and West Jerusalem do not enjoy the same rights when
it comes to access to quality education at all levels, from primary to universities.

Education is a major powerful tool. Education outcomes inequality and ethnic discrimination
reflect the inequalities in education policies and in general reflect inequalities of the state’
structure.

4.3 Internal reconciliation, external segregation

From a general perspective, all the co-existing education systems, and by this I mean all the
systems I have described in the previous chapter, differ obviously in their approach and the
type service provided to the citizens. This is exactly why I have listed and described them

316 Ibid;
Palestinian education system is the difference of performance in international learning assessment
tests such as TIMMS, where Israeli students obtain regularly much better results than Palestinian
students;
separately. However, some trends of reconciliation or further separation might be identified by looking at two elements: what is happening within the Public education system in West Jerusalem and in Israel; what are the consequences of co-existing curriculum within an ethnocratic city.

4.3.1 Closing the gap

Within the dominant ethnonation at the top of the Israeli system, we find the two ideological education streams, which came out of the Yishuv and merged to form the leading classes of the Israeli society\(^{319}\). Haredi education still represents an exception.

This process of fragmentation however has been slowly diluted vis-à-vis the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some researchers as Levy argue, and I tend to agree with them, that the despite the apparent failure of the Mamlakhtyiut of institutionalizing a single education system, over the time the system has settled itself.

Levy in his analysis of the relationship between education and ethnicity in Israel underlines clearly how in the passage from the Mandate to the State of Israel, political parties struggled to maintain their education system, institutionalizing the so-called stream system\(^{320}\). It is indeed true that the systems are different, and different is what is taught and even the daily behaviors of pupils based on what type of school they are enrolled in. Still, once again following a shifting political pattern that has seen Israel moving from its secular socialist Zionist years to a more modern neo-liberal democratic Jewish version, the difference in what children learn in Mamlakhti and Mamlakhti Dati schools is not as wide as the first years of the State of Israel.

\(^{319}\) Levy G (2002);

All these students are finally ending in the same universities and accessing (almost) the same job market\textsuperscript{321}.

Levy is right then in stating that the main division between Mamlakhti and Mamlakhti Dati, was not a failure of the Mamlakhtiut per se but more a victory of the main political parties in their struggle to control migratory flux of Jewish communities all over the Middle East\textsuperscript{322}.

“The non-secularisation of the educational system thus proved to be a means to keep society fragmented and segmented along both ethno-national and ethnic lines.”\textsuperscript{323}

Huge differences still remain between these two national state streams and the Haredi system(s). However, also in this case, the pattern is similar. Differences are reducing, even according to the Director of MANHI (at the time of the research):

“There is no big difference between Mamlakhti and Mamlakhti Dati. Yes in Mamlakhti Dati students learn more religious subjects and they day is longer but they all end up going to the same universities. They go to military together. They are the same people. The only different system we have in [West] Jerusalem is the Haredi. Also there things are changing. More and more Haredi students go to high school and in the end at university”\textsuperscript{324}

I then argue that the logic of divide and rule\textsuperscript{325} within the Israeli public education system in Jerusalem has been counterbalanced by a strategy aimed towards the creation of a national

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{321} On the process of ethnicization of Mizrahi population and the ethnicization internal to the Israeli Jewish society through education and the role played by the Mizrahi religious party Shas, see Levy G. (2002);
\textsuperscript{322} Levy G. (2002) p. 168;
\textsuperscript{323} Ibid;
\textsuperscript{324} Interview with Haim Rubinstein;
\textsuperscript{325} Levy G. (2002);\
\end{flushleft}
enemy, favoring a reconciliation between secular and orthodox. In Jerusalem, this has also been possible due to the relative minority role of the secular population compared to the growing orthodox population. Textbooks show us clearly how this feeling keeps being nurtured even today.

4.3.2 Learning about the Other

When looking at the content of education and at how the actual learning process happen in the classroom, the main separating line, between all these systems, is obviously represented by the language of instruction, Arabic and Hebrew\textsuperscript{326}.

Taking textbooks as an example, it is possible to identify an ethnonational pattern on both Israeli and Palestinian side.

The studies on textbooks in Israel and Palestine mainly focus on those subjects widely recognized as fueling the ethnonational feeling: History (the past and present of the ethnonation), Geography (the home of the ethnonation), the Image of the Other (ethnonation boundaries).

Nurit Peled-Elhanan, an Israeli Lecturer in Language Education and peace activist founder of the Russell Tribunal on Palestine 2009\textsuperscript{327}, in her analysis of the content of Israeli History and Geography textbooks points out how the content of these books is centered on reinforcing the Israeli Jewish ethnonation\textsuperscript{328}. Peled-Elhanan identifies some critical features of Israeli textbooks, which can be summarized as Legitimacy of the ethnonation, Dissimulation of the Other, Fragmentation and separation of the other ethnonation from the territory and Reification

\textsuperscript{326} Notable exception is the bi-lingual mixed school Hand in Hand described in the previous chapter.

\textsuperscript{327} The Russell Tribunal on Palestine is an International People’s Tribunal created by peace activists and a varied group of people with the objective of promoting peace in Israel/Palestine. See also \url{www.russelltribunalonpalestine.com};

\textsuperscript{328} Peled-Elhanan N. (2012);
of the past\textsuperscript{329}. All these elements concur to create a sense of belonging to the Land and a common past for all the members of the ethnonation. There is a clear intent of education and political authorities to create a bond among the population. There are differences in their daily experience, but what pupils learn on textbooks in public schools in West Jerusalem (and in the rest of Israel) is directed towards the reinforcement of the ethnonation.

On the other hand, Palestinian official books have been in use in schools since the early 2000s as a result of the setup of the PA within the Oslo agreements framework\textsuperscript{330}. Education has indeed been one of the few areas were at least at a first glance the PA’s action has been more successful. As explained in the previous chapter however, the PA does not have an actual control on East Jerusalem schools. Soon after the implementation of the curriculum, the Israeli authorities as well as European and North American researchers have heavily criticized Palestinian textbooks for nourishing hatred against Israel\textsuperscript{331}. There is indeed evidence of key geographical omissions, depicting Palestine as if Israel would not exist\textsuperscript{332}, similar however to the messages contained in the books analyzed by Peled-Elhanan. Following these accusations, the municipality decided to revise the content of the Palestinian textbooks and exercise a sort of censorship for all East Jerusalem public schools\textsuperscript{333}.

Textbooks are just an example of the battle over education and other social services. From this perspective, the gap between the main Israeli Jewish ethnonation and the Palestinian ethnonation is widening more and more. Following a typical pattern of other ethnocracies, the main ethnonation, in control of the state apparatus, is indeed offering access to education to
other ethnonational minorities but at the same time preventing them to enjoy the same level of quality services. Not only, the access to education is often arbitrarily interrupted by the dominant ethnonation. In the case of Jerusalem, I argue, the ethnocratic logic is acting to widening the gap between Palestinians and Israelis. The Palestinian curriculum is suspended and manipulated following the taste of the dominant ethnonation to weaken the Palestinian identity of East Jerusalem’s children. As a consequence of this action, children in East Jerusalem live a different experience and exposure to Palestinian culture, history and identity. The Israeli system on the other hand has been quite successful in its objective of reducing the gap between secular and orthodox population. A significant remnant of the neo-millet society is indeed represented by the Haredi system(s). Despite this gap has been reducing, the city is still divided even on its Western side.

4.4 Failure and hopes for peace education

The way an education system or even a single establishment is managed can either fuel conflict or build peace. Unequal access to opportunities to enjoy quality education can be source of conflict and increase a feeling of discrimination in certain parts of the population, especially when there is evidence that this unequal access is based on ethnicity.

The reason why I decide to treat Hand in Hand as a separate system lies in its view of the society and its final aim: overcome the current segregation of different ethnonational groups and end the ethnocratic current education system in Jerusalem. Hand in Hand is the only school that explicitly tries to build a common space of dialogue between Israeli and Palestinians. Indeed the school does not attracts many students, particularly from the Israeli

______________________________

334 Mjøberg Lauritzen S. (2016);
orthodox population. Students come mainly from a secular elite background.\footnote{Interview of the author with Ira Kerem, Hand in Hand school, Jerusalem, 16.04.2012;} From this point of view, the school is not cementing the intra-Jewish ethnic bond, although this is not its main objective. The school is however showing to policy makers, on both the Israeli and the Palestinian side, that education can be a link between people in Jerusalem, instead of being a barrier\footnote{Interview with Ira Kerem;}. The efforts of the schools are however not having a great impact. Peace education essentially has to be promoted by motivated individuals or groups leading the overall process and that have to be involved in the design and content of the education programme\footnote{Tawhil S. p. 15}. Peace education programmes however have little or no impact if the surrounding environment is not enabling a discourse of peace.

In the case of Hand in Hand peace education has nonetheless an impact on individuals:

“When you are in the school, you are all mates. Of course when things get a bit tense outside you can feel it inside the school too, but simply you do not talk about it. But, apart from that we were all friends…always…inside and outside school. I grew up with Arab friends and with Jewish friends. These are my people”\footnote{Interview of the author with A. M., former Hand in Hand student, Lilongwe (Malawi), 20.04.2017;}.

This quote gives us a sense of how the Hand-in-Hand project it is not completely a binational multicultural project. In other words, it indeed is a multicultural and peace project but with a dominant culture and view of society pertaining to the dominant ethnonation. As typical of many ethnocratic spaces the ethnonation can arbitrarily decide how and where this culture can meet.

My intention here is to show that even if a peace education process can be successfully put in

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Interview of the author with Ira Kerem, Hand in Hand school, Jerusalem, 16.04.2012;}
\item \footnote{Interview with Ira Kerem;}
\item \footnote{Tawhil S. p. 15}
\item \footnote{Interview of the author with A. M., former Hand in Hand student, Lilongwe (Malawi), 20.04.2017;}
\end{itemize}
\end{flushleft}
place, it cannot be separated to the surrounding political and economic environment. Still within the Jerusalem educational landscape, the project is revolutionary and often targeted by far right Jewish extremists.

What the school represents is an exception to the ethnonational alternatives. If we use the ethnocratic lenses, the school still has clear Israeli predominant imprint. Education, as said before, reflects the power balance within the society and it helps to change or shape it but there needs to be an enabling environment for allowing those changes. This enabling environment is represented by politics and economics. Palestinian students once completed their education in the mixed school, will still face challenges of being in-between two worlds, similar to the situation of the Israeli Palestinian population. Not fully Israeli but not recognized as Palestinian.

The mere fact that school exist shows however how education can be used as a tool to promote a culture of peace, in contrast to the negative images promoted in the textbooks of all the other education systems.

4.5 Global emerging trends and the fragmentation of the Palestinian identity

Education may serve both as an instrument of emancipation increasing the opportunities available to individuals and groups, and as a tool of ideological domination and political

339 Yiftachel O. (2009);
340 https://www.ft.com/content/9f615fe8-3eaa-11e5-9abe-5b335da3a90e;
341 Hand in Hand is also official part of the secular (mamlakhti) stream;
342 Shlomo O. (2017);
343 Textbooks in use in Hand in Hand are reviewed and approved by the Israeli Ministry of Education. These textbooks however are promoting a unified view of the Israeli/Palestinian space recognizing the right of both people to live on the same land. Interview with Ira Kerem;
repression\textsuperscript{344}. Indeed education is an area of major resistance of the Palestinian population, since 1967\textsuperscript{345}. A double conflicting mechanism operates in East Jerusalem. On one side, Palestinians have less opportunities of integration in the economic structure of the city due to the lesser quality of their education and to their position in the ethnic ladder of Jerusalem; on the other side the Palestinian resistance that sees in the education system the last remnants of its identity.

In this chapter, I tried to sum up how the ethnocratic logic has fragmented Jerusalem and what are the current trends in the educational landscape.

The separation of the East Jerusalem population from the rest of the West Bank and their slow but progressive assimilation in the cultural and economic Israeli sphere in a subordinate role similar to what happens in other ethnocracies.\textsuperscript{346} On one hand, we have a failing system not equipped to provide equitable quality education to Palestinian children, nor to grant them equitable access to the labor market. On the other a successful reconciliation between secular and orthodox population.

The way education is conceived and managed in Jerusalem gives us an idea of how fractured and deeply divided the city is, not only at identity level but even in the daily life of its citizens. Interactions are many but they do not happen on an equal ground. Education is a realm where disparities can grow or disappear. The decision lies with the main provider of education that, generally speaking, is the state. In this case, an ethnocratic state exercises its legal authority over part of the town, and de-facto authority on the other side, leaving the other potential state

\textsuperscript{344} Tawhil S. p. 4 1997;
\textsuperscript{345} Hidmi N. I. (2018);
\textsuperscript{346} There still are some key differences between the case of East jerusalem and the case of the bedouins of the Negev or the case of the non-Jew Palestinian who stayed in Israel after 1948. The situation can be compared but the dynamics behind this assimilation are typical of Jerusalem as explained in this chapter.
to a role of observer being unable to manage the delivery of basic social services\textsuperscript{347}. This situation is then producing what we can label as multilayered ethnocracy. Ethnonationalism, in the multi-dimensional form I have described in the first chapter of this thesis, takes the form of a separation between the West and the East. In actual terms, ethnonationalism takes the form of separate lives and voluntary segregation. Symbols are exposed to further stress the unity of the ethnic nation and to physically mark the territory, following a typical of Hutchinson’s banal nationalism that can become “hot” at any time.

Within each ethnonational community, the ethnocratic logic then operates to divide even further the population into privileged and less privileged ethnic components of the society. This way of operating, I argue by following Yiftachel and Levy, is a modern combination of the ethnonationalism as conceived in Europe in the Eighteenth century and the millet community structured Ottoman society.

The legacy of the Oslo agreements produced a schizophrenic reality were a censored version of the Palestinian curriculum is, or more precisely should be, implemented in every school, but children, teacher and schools have no formal relationship with the PA\textsuperscript{348}. The Palestinian population of the city is becoming increasingly dependent from Israeli social services. Those pupils falling outside the public system face a serious risk of illiteracy, if they do not have economic means to afford private education. As a response to this emergency, within the global trend of neo-liberalization in education, the private for-profit institutions have appeared in East Jerusalem in the last years are changing the education landscape and are having an impact on the sense of belonging to a common ethnonation of the Palestinian population that

\textsuperscript{347} Shlomo O. (2017);

\textsuperscript{348} Interview of the author with Ronit Sela, ACRI Communication Chief, Jerusalem, 03.04.2012; Shlomo O. (2017);
will be evaluated in the coming years\textsuperscript{349}. The Judaization of East Jerusalem neighborhoods; disparities among resource distribution; lack of serious plan for peace education programmes; and the neo-milletization of Jerusalem's population are changing the social structure of the city, reducing hopes for a peaceful shared solution and threatening the internal stability of West Jerusalem, trapped between the exodus of secular Jews and extremist visions of the city's future.

\textbf{Figure 6: Trend of schools by ownership in East Jerusalem since the First intifada.}

\textit{Source: O. Shlomo 2017 (p. 233)}

\textsuperscript{349} Interview with Ronit Sela;
Conclusions

Through this thesis, I described the historical evolution and the current status of the Jerusalem education system to uncover its ethnocratic nature and the role it plays in the conflict for the control of the city.

The disparity of treatment in the provision of basic social services shows how the administration of the different education streams is another realm of conflict between Israel and Palestine. I then tend to agree with many Israeli and Palestinian scholars in their demystification of Israel as the only democracy of the Middle East, due to its inherent and explicitly stated in the constitution Jewish character.

Going further, I sustain that the fractures within the society are multiple and the neo-milletization happening in education further nurtures these fractures reinforcing the control over the city by Israeli Jews, secular and orthodox, or in other words the dominant ethno-nation. East Jerusalemites are cut off from the rest of Palestine. The fragile economic situation is putting the allegiance to the Palestinian nation in doubt for many families. I have showed how the response has been a further fragmentation of the system and the fast rising role of private education service providers.

On the other hand, the religious divide in the Jewish Israeli society of Jerusalem has diminished, at least between secular Jews and Orthodox Jews. A worrisome distance between the ultra-Orthodox communities and the rest of the Jewish Israeli ethnonation might result in a sort of internal conflict. As of today, however, this conflict has been avoided due to the existence of the external ethnic conflict with the non-Jewish population. In this sense, I showed how education has been a tool to nurture “banal” nationalism and create an enabling environment for “hot” nationalism to grow.
The simple division of education hinders the creation of bonds among citizens and interethnic (and religious) dialogue. From one side this division represents the will of the communities to administer themselves and it has its roots in the Ottoman period of the millet. On the other hand, the ethnonation who controls the state apparatus can use the social services as a tool to prevent the creation of an alternative narrative, which may damage its ethnonational plan. This is the neo-milletization of East Jerusalem’s population.

It is then indeed clear how the politics and the content of education in Jerusalem have been developed with a clear intent to avoid or at least discourage peace, in order to prepare Jerusalem citizens’ to fight for the control of the city. As education does not happen in a vacuum, the way in which it is administered determines to what extent change is possible and what are the priorities of all these communities. In a city still deeply divided, where the battle for its control is still real, little place is left for a democratic open education system favoring peace and dialogue.
Bibliography

Scientific literature: Books and Articles


- Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) & Ir Amim, Failed Grade: East Jerusalem’s Failing Educational System, Jerusalem, 2012;


• Ben-Or J. L., “Arab Education in Israel”, *The Journal of Educational Sociology*, vol. 27 (8), pp. 380-384;


Gordnosville, 2004;

- Fortna B., Imperial Classroom. Islam, the State and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002;
- Gerber H., Remembering and Imagining Palestine: Identity and Nationalism from the Crusade to the Present, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2008;
- Gelvin J. L., The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005;


• Hirst D., " Rush to Annexation: Israel in Jerusalem ", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 3-31, 1974;


• Imber C., “Ottoman Empire: 1300-1650 The Structure of Power”, Palgrave MacMillan, Gordonsville, 2004;


• Klein M., “Old and New Walls”, *Political Geography*, n°24, pp. 53-76, 2005;
- Mazawi A. E., “The reconstruction of Palestinian Education: between history, policy politics


- Oren S., “The governmentalities of infrastructure and services amid urban conflict: East Jerusalem in the post Oslo era”, *Political Geography* vol. 61, 224-236, 2017;


- Parsons N. C., *Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa*, Routledge, New York, 2005;


• Ricca S., "Heritage, Nationalism and the shifting Symbolism of the Wailing Wall", *Archives des sciences sociales des religions*, vol. 151, pp. 169-188, 2010;


• Rotem M. & Gordon N. “Bedouin Sumud and the struggle for education”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 46 (4), pp. 7-27, 2017;


• Schiffman E., “The Shas school system”, *Nationalism and Ethnic politics*, vol. 11 (1), pp. 89-124, 2005;


• Swirski S., Politics and Education in Israel: Comparison with the United States, Falmer Press, New York, 1999;


• Tamari S., Jerusalem 1948: the Arab neighborhoods and their fate during the war, The Institute of Jerusalem Studies and Badil Resource Center, East Jerusalem, 1999;


• Weiss E. S., Palestinian and Israeli Nationalism: Identity, Politics and Education in Jerusalem, Cairo Papers in Social Science, vol.25 (4), American University in Cairo Press,
Cairo, 2002;


- World Bank, *West Bank and Gaza: Education Sector Analysis. Impressive achievements under harsh conditions and the way forward to consolidate a quality education system*, Middle East and North Africa Human Development Group, Report n° 41043, 2006;


- Yemini M., Bar-Nissan H., Yardeni O., “Between “us” and “them”: Teachers’ perceptions of the national versus international composition of the Israeli history curriculum”, *Teaching and Teacher Education*, vol. 42, pp. 11-22, 2014;

- Yiftachel O., *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006;

Religiosity and the remaking of urban space, Routledge, New York, 2010;


Websites


- [https://www.ft.com/content/9f615fe8-3eaa-11e5-9abe-5b335da3a90e](https://www.ft.com/content/9f615fe8-3eaa-11e5-9abe-5b335da3a90e), consulted on 25.01.2018;


- [http://jiis.org/?cmd=statistic.490](http://jiis.org/?cmd=statistic.490) Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies (JIIS), *Table XIII/7Classes and Students in Primary Schools in Jerusalem (Hebrew Education) 1986/87-2012/13*, .pdf downloaded on 08.08.2013;

http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm consulted on 20.06.2013;


http://www.mideastweb.org/, consulted on 25.11.2017;


http://www.nswas.org/ consulted on 15.06.2013;

http://www.russelltribunalonpalestine.com consulted on 25.05.2017;


Newspaper Articles


Other sources

- Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Paris 14 December 1960;
- Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York 20 November 1989 (consulted on http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx);
- Convention Relative to the protection of Civilian persons in time of war, Geneva 12 August 1949;
- Human Development Report 2013, UNDP;

Interviews

- Interview with Marie-Armelle Beau-Lieu, Journalist at Terra Santa Journal, Jerusalem 04.12.2011;
- Interview with Zvi Bekerman (Ph.D), Professor at the School of Education and Director of the Melton Centre for Jewish Education at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 26.04.2012;
- Interview with Yuval Dror (Ph.D), Professor at Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 20.03.2012
- Interview with Ira Kerem, Partnership & Donor Relations Chief “Yad be Yad bilingual school”, Jerusalem, 16.04.2012;
- Interview with A. M., former Hand in Hand school student and graduate, Lilongwe (Malawi), 20.4.2017;
- Interview with Rafiqa Osman, Deputy Chief Arab Primary Education Jerusalem (MANHI), at Jerusalem Municipality, MANHI Section, Jerusalem, 02.05.2012
• Interview with Ronit Sela, Communication Chief, Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Jerusalem, 03.04.2012;

• Interview with Haim Runimstein, Deputy Director of the Jerusalem Education Authority (MANHI), in Charge of Elementary Education at Jerusalem Municipality, MANHI Section, Jerusalem, 17.05.2012;

• Interview with F. M., Terra Santa Institute director, Jerusalem, 26.02.2012;

• Interview with Sawsan Safadi, Waqf Directorate of Education, Jerusalem Office, Jerusalem, 20.06.2012;

• Interview with L.A., Jordanian Waqf, Education in Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 16.06.2012;

• Interview with Souad Daas, Hebrew teacher at the Old City Jaffa Gate Teacher Center and Education students at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 22.04.2012;

• Interview with S. D., French Cooperation Service Director, Jerusalem, 14.02.2012;