



Ca' Foscari
University
of Venice

Master's Degree programme in International Relations

Relazioni Internazionali Comparate

“Second Cycle (D.M. 270/2004)”

Final Thesis

-
Ca' Foscari
Dorsoduro 3246
30123 Venezia

SPAIN-BRAZIL:

The impact of governmental relations in their policies

An analysis of the governments of José Luis
Rodríguez Zapatero and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva

Supervisor

Ch. Prof. Luis Fernando Beneduzi

Assistant supervisor

Ch. Prof. Paulo Gilberto Fagundes Visentini

Graduand

Carlos Manuel Muñoz Ruiz
Matriculation Number 860124

Academic Year

2016 / 2017

“Porque algunas utopías merecen ser soñadas; no las alcanzaremos todas, pero nos marcarán el rumbo por el que hay que avanzar. Ese rumbo estará marcado por un ansia infinita de paz, el amor al bien y el mejoramiento social de los humildes”

Discurso de investidura de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero
Congreso de los Diputados, 15 de abril de 2004.

SPAIN-BRAZIL, THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
IN THEIR POLICIES

An analysis of the governments of
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva

List of acronyms

ABC: Agência Brasileira de Cooperaçao. Brazilian Cooperation Agency

AC/E: Acción Cultural Española. Spanish cultural action

AECID: Agencia Española para la Cooperación Internacional y el Desarrollo. Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development.

AF: Alliance Française. French alliance.

ALBA: Alternativa Bolivariana de los Pueblos de Nuestra América. Bolivarian Alternative of the Peoples of Our America.

ALC: América Latina y el Caribe. Latin America and the Caribbean.

AOD: Ayuda Oficial para el Desarrollo. Official Development Assistance.

BC: British Council.

BID: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo. Inter-American Development Bank.

CEOE: Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales. Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations.

CEPAL: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.

EU: European Union.

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

IC: Instituto Cervantes. Cervantes Institute.

MAEC: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

MECD: Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte. Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport.

MERCOSUR: Mercado Común del Sur. Common Market of the South.

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

OCDE: L'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

OEA: Organización de Estados Americanos. Organization of American States.

PGE: Presupuestos Generales del Estado. State's general budgets.

PP: Partido Popular. Popular Party.

PSDB: Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira. Party of Brazilian Social Democracy.

PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español. Spanish Socialist Worker's Party.

PT: Partido de los Trabajadores. Worker's Party.

SEACEX: Sociedad Estatal para la Acción Cultural Exterior. State Society for Foreign Cultural Action.

SEAE: Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior. European External Action Service.

SEC: Secretaría de Estado de Cultura. Secretary of State for Culture.

SECIPI: Secretaría de Estado de Cooperación Internacional y para Iberoamérica. Secretary of State for International Cooperation and for Latin America.

SEGIB: Secretaría General Iberoamericana. Secretary-General of Ibero-American.

UNASUR: Unión de Naciones Suramericanas. Union of South American Nations.

Abstract	6
Introduction.	12
1. Iberoamerica as a pillar of Spanish foreign policy.....	18
1.1. The foreign policy of the governments of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero towards Iberoamerica 2004-2011.	21
1.2. Brazil and Spain, essential partners.	30
1.2.1. Harmony and ideological convergence between Rodríguez Zapatero and Lula da Silva.	33
1.3. Domestic policy conditions foreign policy.	40
1.4. The arrival of the economic crisis.	48
2. The socialist governments of Spain and Brazil in the multilateral framework.....	54
2.1. Lula and Zapatero: redefining politics in Latin America.	58
2.2. The Ibero-American Summits between 2004-2011.	63
2.3. The creation of the SEGIB (Ibero-American General Secretariat).	71
2.4. Relations between EU and Latin America.	75
2.4.1. EU-ALC Summits.	80
2.4.2. EU-MERCOSUR relations.	85
2.4.3. The relations between Brazil and the European Union.	90
3. The governments of Spain and Brazil in the bilateral sphere.	97
3.1. Strategic partnership for a better future.	100
3.2. The economic relations between Spain and Brazil during the socialist governments.....	102
3.3. Social relations between Brazil & Spain.	110
3.4. Cultural relations between both countries	114
3.4.1. The <i>Instituto Cervantes</i> in Brazil.....	120
3.4.2. The Brazilian Law of Spanish	125
3.5. Cooperation, a bet for the future.....	130
3.5.1. The relations between AECID and ABC.....	133
3.5.2. The Center for Brazilian Studies in Salamanca.....	137
Conclusions.....	140
Bibliography	146

Abstract.

Tra il 2003 e il 2011, con l'arrivo di Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero alla presidenza dei governi brasiliano e spagnolo ci fu un cambio nel modello politico di entrambi i Paesi. Queste nuove politiche dal taglio più sociale, enfatizzando quest'ultimo rispetto a quello economico, hanno avuto una grande importanza nelle azioni verso l'estero di entrambi gli Stati. In questo progetto, quello che desideriamo analizzare è l'impatto delle relazioni tra i due governi in un contesto bi e multilaterale. Per comprendere l'importante cambiamento di questi due esecutivi dobbiamo capire lo sviluppo delle politiche in entrambi i paesi e l'evoluzione di queste rispetto all'ambiente internazionale. Il ruolo di medie potenze che questi governi hanno voluto svolgere, la vocazione europea della Spagna, l'importanza del Brasile in America Latina ed i legami storici che collegano la nazione spagnola con l'America Latina rivelano una realtà complessa che si riflette nelle diverse forme di azione dei governi brasiliani e spagnoli. Il nostro scopo in questo progetto è quello di conoscere, oltre le volontà politiche promosse dai due governi, quegli obiettivi complessi secondi ai numerosi fattori nazionali e internazionali. Il cambiamento sociale proclamato dai governi del Brasile e della Spagna sarà la pietra angolare su cui si baserà tutto il nostro lavoro.

Le relazioni tra la Spagna e il Brasile durante la storia sono state segnate da una generale indifferenza. I collegamenti storici che hanno unito la Spagna all'America Latina non hanno incluso il Brasile perché quest'ultimo ha avuto un passato di colonizzazione diverso da quello subito da altri paesi dell'America Latina. Pertanto, fino agli anni Novanta del secolo scorso, le relazioni mantenevano un profilo basso senza una decisa importanza e l'ignoranza sociale sul Brasile in Spagna e sulla Spagna in Brasile era molto elevata, nonostante il Brasile fu uno dei centri di ricezione degli emigranti spagnoli verso l'America Latina. Come risultato dell'arrivo della democrazia in Spagna, la politica estera spagnola è radicalmente cambiata: dal militarismo, anacronismo e di chiusura, verso una politica moderna con alte aspirazioni per il futuro. Con questi cambiamenti è emerso anche una decisa variazione di rotta riguardo le politiche estere verso l'America Latina: la Spagna non ha più voluto proiettare l'immagine dell'invasore, la patria da dove è stato costruito il nuovo mondo, la Spagna ha voluto essere una nazione aperta ai suoi pari latinoamericani, democratici e alleati al resto dei governi Iberoamericani. Di conseguenza, i rapporti con il Brasile hanno cominciato a svilupparsi e a crescere, come

anche le intenzioni dei governi spagnoli e brasiliani di promuovere un importante partenariato tra i due, come dimostrano le numerose visite ufficiali.

Le riforme economiche svolte durante gli anni '90 in Brasile e in Spagna, la grande apertura del Brasile al mondo e la volontà di questo Stato latinoamericano ad essere attore globale e principale attore regionale, incoraggiava in Spagna la promozione del mantenimento le buone relazioni con il Brasile e nello stesso tempo lo sviluppo, in entrambi i paesi, di forme di pensiero per poter raggiungere un'Associazione Strategica.

È vero che le relazioni tra la Spagna e il Brasile hanno avuto inizialmente un interesse puramente economico per entrambi i paesi. Per la Spagna, il Brasile è il principale partner dell'America latina, fondatore del Mercosur ed indispensabile alleato per la promozione della sua azione esterna nella sfera economica, sociale e culturale. D'altro canto, il Brasile vede in Spagna un partner europeo, con il quale condivide legami storici e lo avvicina all'Unione Europea. Durante i governi di Fernando Henrique Cardoso e José María Aznar, una relazione tra i due stati è stata rafforzata e sviluppata, ed è stata, questa, la chiave per raggiungere il punto di partenza della nostra tesi. Le misure economiche del Brasile, la sicurezza giuridica fornita ed, allo stesso tempo, il desiderio di espansione dell'economia spagnola e delle sue imprese hanno stimolato un nesso di investimento tra i due paesi, che ha reso possibile lo sviluppo di nuove politiche.

Con l'arrivo del nuovo millennio, la modifica dell'ordine mondiale a causa di eventi come gli atti terroristici contro il World Trade Center di New York, ed accompagnata dai cambi nei governi dei paesi che intendiamo analizzare, un cambiamento nel quadro delle relazioni internazionali si andò delineando ed, in particolare, il nostro quadro di studio sarà basato sulle relazioni tra Brasile e Spagna, sia multi lateralmente che bilateralmente.

L'arrivo del nuovo esecutivo di Rodríguez Zapatero alla presidenza del governo Spagnolo si è mantenuto quello che fino ad ora nella democrazia e nella politica estera dei diversi governi era stato un asse essenziale, l'importanza dell'America latina come pilastro essenziale della politica estera spagnola. Spinta da motivi storici, sociali, linguistici, culturali od economici, possiamo affermare che la Spagna è l'unico paese nel quadro dell'Unione Europea che ha una politica estera esclusiva verso l'America Latina. Con il nuovo governo socialista, i legami con l'America Latina sono aumentati e allo stesso tempo sono stati introdotti nuovi campi di intervento, come il sostegno alla democrazia e la difesa dei diritti umani, la ricerca di un consenso nel quadro delle relazioni bilaterali con i paesi dell'America latina, che studieremo nei rapporti con Lula

da Silva e il suo governo in Brasile, nonché un ampio progetto per incoraggiare la più generale cooperazione e sviluppo.

In questo nuovo contesto, convergerà con la politica estera dispiegata dal governo di Lula da Silva in Brasile, entrambi gli esecutivi cercheranno il la migliore sintonia di intenti tra i propri dirigenti e il rafforzamento del ruolo politico. Se il cambiamento della politica estera spagnola, con l'arrivo di Rodríguez Zapatero, è stato un cambiamento importante nell'azione estera, a causa del suo ritiro dall'allineamento atlantico con gli Stati Uniti e del obbiettivo: Europa, America Latina e Nord Africa. L'arrivo di Lula da Silva, è stata una rivoluzione. La sua politica estera era molto più attiva di quella dei suoi predecessori, ha promosso il ruolo del Brasile in tutte le forme internazionali e ha sviluppato un'azione verso l'estero per poter svolgere un ruolo di primo piano nella regione e nell'arena internazionale.

D'ora in poi, sia multi che bilateralmente, il Brasile e la Spagna saranno giocatori essenziali. Se esiste una convergenza tra le politiche di azione estera tra i governi spagnoli e brasiliani, è sul medesimo aspetto sociale promosso da entrambi i governi. Un movimento sociale applicato nella politica interna ed esterna e che ha voluto dare priorità ai rapporti sulla sfera economica. Le intenzioni non potrebbero essere meglio accolte, ma come analizzeremo in questo progetto, le politiche si sono spesso rivelate troppo ambiziose. Il Brasile e la Spagna si sono arenati in molti dei loro piani perché entrambi si distinguono come potenze medie che aspirano a più. I loro piani politici in questo periodo si distinguono per la loro somiglianza e convergono, che in diverse occasioni si sono affrontati. Nonostante il buon accordo sviluppato da entrambi i leader, durante i loro mandati ci sono state anche momenti di contraddizioni e controversie che, anche se politicamente sono state un ostacolo presto superato che ha permesso di raggiungere accordi, hanno in ogni modo diminuito la buona armonia politica raggiunta.

Altri fattori che in diverse occasioni hanno diminuito il conseguimento di obiettivi contrassegnate sia in ambito multilaterale che in ambito bilaterale sono stati problemi interni ed esterni. In Spagna, durante il secondo mandato di Rodríguez Zapatero, i problemi dello Statuto catalano, accoppiati con la grave crisi economica subito dal 2008 e la fine del gruppo terroristico ETA hanno ridotto l'azione esterna del governo, che ha dovuto concentrarsi sui problemi interni. D'altra parte, il governo di Lula da Silva ha dovuto affrontare importanti scandali di corruzione che hanno svalutato la sua reputazione e quella del resto del suo esecutivo. Tuttavia, l'attività di entrambi i governi nel panorama della politica estera è rimasta sempre molto attiva.

Nello scenario multilaterale, cioè quello occupato dai forum, dai vertici, dalle organizzazioni internazionali, dalle agenzie, si è sviluppata una ridefinizione delle politiche di entrambi i governi. Il momento del cambiamento sociale è stato evidente sia nei vertici Iberoamericani che negli incontri tra gli Stati dell'America latina e l'Unione europea.

Un altro aspetto che ha segnato il panorama dello sviluppo della sfera multilaterale tra i due paesi è stato la creazione del Segretariato Generale Iberoamericano, che è servito a definire una struttura permanente ai *Summit* e al tempo stesso ha adempiuto ai desideri del Brasile in quanto ha visto nel vertice Iberoamericano un ruolo importante della Spagna nella regione che l'esecutivo brasiliano non ha visto con buon occhio. Con la creazione del SEGIB, lo sviluppo e la struttura dei summit cessano di essere condotti dagli Stati, poiché, dopo la sua creazione, l'incarico di farlo sarà quella istituzione, cosa che riduce le aspirazioni regionali di Spagna, Brasile e aiuta a rafforzare questi forum di dialogo. Tuttavia, questi incontri non hanno superato questa fase senza controversie e disaccordi, ma allo stesso tempo sono serviti a rafforzare i legami attorno a una comunità.

Il quadro multilaterale tra la Spagna e il Brasile è stato essenziale per continuare ad espandere e incoraggiare le relazioni tra i blocchi europei e latinoamericani. Le relazioni tra l'Unione europea e l'America Latina ed i caraibi sono state svolte attraverso vertici. Dalla creazione dell'Unione europea e con l'ingresso della Spagna e del Portogallo nella Comunità Economica Europea, le relazioni con l'America latina sono state stimolate e promosse dai governi spagnoli e brasiliani, con i primi vertici UE-LAC svoltisi a Rio de Janeiro ed a Madrid. Rodríguez Zapatero e Lula da Silva hanno visto queste relazioni come un'opportunità per superare gli ostacoli e migliorare le loro economie senza trascurare l'importanza che il momento di queste relazioni potrebbe avere per lo sviluppo di tutti i paesi che intervengono in questi vertici internazionali.

Così importanti sono stati i rapporti tra l'Unione europea, l'America Latina e Caraibi, nonché, ovviamente, per i governi spagnolo e brasiliano che si trovavano al vertice di Madrid, come si studierà più tardi, che qui venne deciso rilanciare i negoziati con il Mercosur, il principale blocco economico dell'America latina, dove il Brasile agisce come un importante giocatore.

Al tempo stesso che la Spagna e il Brasile hanno partecipato al multilateralismo come attori di riferimento, è stato necessario introdurre in questo contesto il rapporto più diretto nella sfera multilaterale, ovvero i rapporti tra il Brasile e l'Unione europea, grazie a un

certo l'impulso e il sostegno della diplomazia spagnola principiato dopo l'adesione alle Comunità europee.

Pertanto, nonostante i problemi che possono essersi verificati e che cercheremo di affrontare in questo documento, la sfera multilaterale è stata indispensabile per l'azione esterna dei governi di Lula da Silva e Rodríguez Zapatero. In essa hanno visto un'occasione per le loro aspirazioni nel quadro internazionale e, allo stesso tempo, una congiuntura per risolvere problemi di natura interna ed esterna.

Al tempo stesso in cui entrambi gli esecutivi hanno sviluppato le proprie politiche nel quadro multilaterale, non potevano lasciare da parte quello bilaterale che ha colpito direttamente le relazioni spagnola-brasiliana e che, sotto un'armonia politica senza precedenti tra Lula e Zapatero, ha prodotto un cambiamento delle relazioni essenziali dal punto di vista sociale.

L'importanza delle relazioni tra Spagna e Brasile in tutti i quadri delle relazioni internazionali è stata quella di promuovere politiche oltre quelle economiche. La lotta per i diritti umani, la promozione dell'istruzione e la promozione di una cultura della pace sono state sviluppate efficacemente in tutte le aree sotto il mandato di entrambi i presidenti.

Come abbiamo già detto, l'America Latina è sempre stata un collegamento storico per la Spagna, anche se non in Brasile. Con il cambiamento delle sue politiche e nella politica estera di entrambi i paesi, il Brasile ha acquisito un'importanza crescente a livello economico, sociale e culturale, cosa che è servita per l'accordo intergovernativo che portò alla firma dell'Associazione strategica tra Spagna e Brasile, la prima che la Spagna ha siglato con un paese latino-americano. Come risultato di questo e con l'arrivo di entrambi i presidenti la relazione bilaterale ha subito un ritorno positivo in materia sociale. Come verrà discusso nel terzo capitolo, le misure economiche intraprese dal Brasile hanno portato ad investimenti della Spagna, che a sua volta ha significato l'espansione del mercato del lavoro brasiliano, nuove opportunità nel settore aziendale, una nuova conoscenza del contesto sociale e culturale, che ha portato ad una crescente immigrazione degli spagnoli in Brasile, così come di brasiliani in Spagna.

Le buone relazioni bilaterali hanno influenzato e favorito la cultura, il lavoro, il crescente interesse per la lingua, gli incentivi al turismo, l'espansione del business e, anche se ci sono stati incidenti, la bilancia è positiva. Le relazioni bilaterali sono anche servite a sviluppare e attuare una nuova cooperazione per piani di sviluppo tra le agenzie

spagnole e brasiliane, che è in linea con le nuove politiche sociali dei governi di Lula e Zapatero.

In breve, in questo ampio progetto, analizziamo i diversi quadri d'azione esteri delle politiche svolte dai governi spagnoli e brasiliani tra il 2004 e il 2011, in particolare ai mandati di Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, sottolineando l'importanza del cambiamento dei due governi. In questo processo, come abbiamo analizzato, sono intervenuti molti fattori e attori, ciascuno con i propri interessi.

Le linee chiave di questa tesi si sono concentrate sull'importanza dell'America Latina per i governi spagnoli e brasiliani, analizzando i loro interventi sia in ambito multilaterale che bilaterale. L'azione esteriorizzante di entrambi i governi, in questa fase, è stata vasta e sarebbe impossibile analizzarla in un unico lavoro. Nonostante ciò, questa tesi espone gli eventi chiave e le loro conseguenze politiche verranno analizzate in contesto politico. I governi di Lula da Silva e Rodríguez Zapatero sono stati strumentali in un cambiamento nelle relazioni internazionali a livello sia multilaterale che bilaterale. Questa modifica è stata l'importanza dell'aspetto sociale nell'attuazione di tutte le sue politiche. Questa è stata la base alla nostra volontà di analizzare l'importanza dell'impulso sociale nelle varie sfere della politica estera.

Introduction.

With the entry into the 21st century, international relations enter a new stage in which we will witness great changes in the world order. The analysis of these changes is complex and laborious due to the number of existing sources and concatenated events that made these early years a staggering stage in international politics with the development of new models of diplomacy. We are witnessing a reorganization and tilting of global geopolitics.

This research tries to resolve important doubts about the development of relations between two key players in this new international sphere. Between 2003 and 2011, under the governments of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in Spain and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, a change was attempted in the model of relations between two countries, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Due to the political alignment of both executives, they promoted that relations between them and in the forums where both participate, gravitated on the orbit of social policies, where the development of people was the main pillar of their political program both internal and external.

We intend, therefore, to analyze the joint action areas of both governments to discuss whether this social will outlined in their political programs and in their declarations, became a reality with the purpose of their mandates.

Relations between Brazil and Spain have varied greatly throughout history. For Spain, Latin America has always been an essential part of the development of foreign policy, due to its political, economic, historical, social, cultural, and language ties. All these have served, since the arrival of the current democracy, as the main axis for the development of the relations between the different countries and Spain. The particularity of a common past, explains the importance of Latin America for Spain and vice versa. Despite this, Brazil was in a different position due to its particularities: not having that common past that Spain had had with other countries, the differences in language and its more direct link with other countries.

From 1978, the relations between Spain and Brazil are going to give a political turn that will serve to relaunch them. We can say that these relations are going to change from being irrelevant, where the existing problems were solved quickly due to their little importance, to a relation of association, of mutual necessity. This has been possible thanks to the important investments of companies in both countries, the constitution of social

and political bonds, as well as the good harmony among the executives throughout their democratic governments

I have always been struck by the external action of the states, and this is the basis of this project, to analyze the relations between the governments of Spain and Brazil under the governments of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Diplomacy has been, is and will be, a cornerstone in the development of foreign policies in international forums as in the bilateral sphere. Diplomacy is the way to avoid conflicts between states and solve them. It is an agent of promotion of each country.

My fields of study have always focused on trying to understand the relations between states in an increasingly globalized and more complex world. During my degree in History, I was able to know the ties that united and unite Spain with Latin America. In my opinion, the existence of a common past, often forgotten and neglected, must be an opportunity to confront the relations of the present and the future. Spain and Latin America have a common trunk, undeniable. That is where my concern for studying this process arises. Of these countries that make up Latin America, one of the most surprising is Brazil for its future prospects And development with respect to the countries of their environment.

With the beginning of the Master in International Relations, I have had the opportunity to learn more about the functioning of the world order and to discover at the same time the importance of Brazil on the one hand and that of Spain in its European context on the other.

Spain and Brazil are called to be two key players in their environment and therefore in the world order. The first in Europe, although with a clear Ibero-American projection. The second in Latin America, although with a presence more and more predominant in the international sphere, due to being part of the BRICS.

On the other hand, analyzing the social turn is for me a motive of complex reflection. In my opinion, the social issue, is without a doubt, one of the pillars of the state. The social state is to provide greater welfare to the citizens, ensuring for this, certain state coverage. Both presidents were willing to guarantee and expand it, but as we will analyze further, the objectives were very high, political will according to objectives but both internal and external circumstances influenced the difficulty of the processes.

During the present project we will analyze the impact of relations between the governments of the Kingdom of Spain and the Federative Republic of Brazil, presided by

José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero,¹ a member of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,² Member of the Workers Party, (PT). With the arrival of the two leaders to power in their respective countries, Lula da Silva on January 1, 2003, and Zapatero on April 16, 2004, a new route opens in the framework of relations between the two states.

We will tackle the paradigm change that occurs in the different frameworks of government action, both bilaterally and multilaterally, analyzing the different factors that influenced this. We will observe how the foreign policy of the cabinets of these socialist presidents changed in relation to the previous policy carried out by their predecessors, José María Aznar³ and Fernando Henrique Cardoso.⁴ On the other hand, it will be vitally important to highlight the personalism of the new presidents and their media nature.

Our objectives, beyond the simple fact of analyzing the foreign policy of the countries, focuses on verifying whether the political alignment of both executives, gave the expected results and that they themselves were proposed from the moment they came to power. Wills that have been ratified through different agreements, such as the 2005 Brasilia Declaration,⁵ where the new "social turn" can be seen in the policies of presidents

¹ José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was born in Valladolid on August 4, 1960. Socialist politician and fifth president of the Government of Spain since the Democratic Transition. He was president from April 16, 2004 until December 21, 2011, revalidating his position in the general elections held in 2008.

² Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was born in Caetés on October 27, 1945. Founding member of the Workers' Party, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil between January 1, 2003 and January 1, 2011, obtaining the confidence of the Citizens in the 2006 elections, where he revalidated his position.

³ José María Aznar López was born in Madrid on February 25, 1953. Member of the Popular Party and President of the Government of Spain with the same party from May 4, 1996 to April 16, 2004, resulting new winner in the elections of 2000.

⁴ Fernando Henrique Cardoso was born in Rio de Janeiro on June 18, 1931. Member of the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy and President of Brazil between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2002, revalidating his position in the 1999 elections .

⁵ On January 24, 2005, the Brasilia Declaration on the Consolidation of the Strategic Association between Brazil and Brazil was signed in Brasilia. The first section of the statement highlights the joint action of the two governments in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) initiative, the participation of the two countries in the efforts Of the international community in peace and stabilization missions with a view to promoting democracy and social development, as is the case of the United Nations Mission in Haiti, and the convergence on the need to discuss and implement, in Multilateral, ambitious

Zapatero and Lula, which expanded in the field of development cooperation the Strategic Partnership signed Between the two countries two years earlier, Brazil being the first South American country with which an alliance of this type was established. Therefore, our objective is ambitious, as it seeks to encompass all levels of action of the two governments. These actions will try to frame them below.

Firstly, the importance of Ibero-America as the second pillar of Spanish foreign policy during the Zapatero governments, preceded only by Europe and in particular of Brazil, an essential country for Spain due to key factors such as: the investments of Spanish companies in that state; the importance of this as a global and regional power in Latin America that serves to create opportunities for the promotion of relations between both countries; and finally, the expansion of the Spanish language in Brazil, being a non-Hispanic speaking country surrounded by Spanish speaking countries. As well as the importance of MERCOSUR, the main field of Brazilian foreign policy and that during the period of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has been promoted its development and integration with its partners, all Spanish speakers.

The Spanish government carried out a policy of concertation and support in international forums, where the similarity of ideas with Brazil led them to have a good political harmony.

For its part, Brazil secured its leadership as the main power in South America and aspiring to be world power.

The course of the bilateral and multilateral relations between Spain and Brazil was excellent but the objectives were difficult to reach for governments due to problems at national and international level, especially in Spain, where domestic policy, Dialogue with the terrorist group ETA and the problems of the Catalan Statute, greatly conditioned foreign policy and the arrival of the international economic crisis produced a serious deterioration in the government of Zapatero, who was forced to convene early elections.

A "social turn" will be implemented by both governments in both their internal and external policies, a paradigm shift that will be very relevant in international forums.

If we must emphasize something of both countries, it is the commitment to multilateralism in an effective and real way, the cooperation and the "social turn" of the

and effective measures to promote cultural integration in the world calling on nations to unite around an "Alliance of Civilizations".

policy, without neglecting the economic aspects, essential for the good development and application of the Different social policies.

Within the framework of multilateralism, our objectives will be to analyze the policies and decisions of both governments to achieve their agreed purposes, so we can frame them into three categories: 1) the commitment to the Ibero-American summits with a shared leadership strategy; 2) relations between the European Union and Latin America, where Spain and Brazil have been key players in strengthening relations between the two regions, with emphasis on the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean summits, on the other hand, relations between the European Union and MERCOSUR, and finally, Brazil's specific relations with the European Union, its pretensions and implications; and 3) the creation of SEGIB, the Ibero-American General Secretariat and its influence in the framework of relations.

At the bilateral level, the intention of the two governments has been to extend the agenda beyond the economic dimension to social and political issues, as highlighted in the objectives of the Brasilia Declaration. There will be a mutual rediscovery that will be evident with numerous visits either by presidents or ministers. At the same time that the relations between the two countries follow their course with a good harmony, Brazil will have a certain suspicion towards Spain, since in its intention to position itself as a regional and world power, it does not see with good eyes the role that the government of Spain wishes to carry out in Latin America.

As we have said before, one of our objectives will be to analyze the implementation of the so-called "social turn" of the policies within the framework of the relations between the countries, something that have been carry out without neglecting the economic sphere that it will therefore be essential to analyze the economic relations between the two countries during this stage and to see how the great Brazilian market is essential for Spain and its companies, as well as for Brazil, Spain is a gateway to Europe and an investor partner of confidence as demonstrate the data. But the scope of bilateral relations cannot focus only on the economic level. Cultural and cooperation relations have been greatly boosted during the presidency of the leaders. At the cultural level of vital importance have been: the development of the Cervantes Institute in Brazil, where it is currently the country with the most centers in the world; the approval of the Spanish Law in Brazil; and the promotion and development of the Center for Brazilian Studies in Salamanca. On the other hand, within the framework of cooperation there was a period of reform and modernization by the Spanish government. That is why international cooperation for

development will be an increasingly important instrument for the socialist government and will have one of its main partners in Brazil. The reform of the AECID and the approval of the *Plan Director* (2005-2008) will be key in this process.

It is for this reason that we are presented with complex and exciting objectives. Demonstrating the "social turn" proposed by both governments in all their frameworks is an arduous and at the same time essential task for the knowledge of their policies beyond their wills. Analyzing these political projects, is to be introduced in full reality of two countries with diverse and complex mentalities, formed at the time by two governments that opted for the need to prioritize not only the great national problems but also the daily problems of citizens,⁶ governments who opted for dialogue and social cohesion.

⁶ Speech of Investiture of the candidate for the presidency of the Government, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Congress of Deputies, April 15, 2004. "It will be a government destined to attend not only the great national problems but also the daily problems of citizens, which affect their daily life and that of their families ... In foreign policy, We must make clear our convinced European commitment; Must place in Latin America and the Mediterranean our centers of preferential attention; ... must make development cooperation an essential element of our international policy ... "

1. Iberoamerica as a pillar of Spanish foreign policy.

For Spain, the main fields of action in foreign policy have been four: Europe, Latin America, Mediterranean and North Africa, and the United States, including a fifth in the last years a, Asia-Pacific dimension.

And if the arrival of democracy translated into a new foreign policy, far from the Francoist idea of Spanish that sought to extend Spanish influence throughout America. Between 1945 and 1957 the creation of the Hispanic Community of Nations will try to seek support in Latin American countries to link them to the idea of a community and Spain as the "Mother Country".

This new policy towards Latin America with a new image of Spain that will take action through concrete projects. In the words of Celestino del Arenal, the main axes on which Spanish foreign policy will develop towards Latin America will be five: (A) support for democracy and the defense of human rights; (B) raising the political profile and consensus in bilateral relations; (C) the development of a development cooperation policy; (D) the start-up and consolidation of the Ibero-American Summits, and (E) the intensification of relations between the EU and Latin America.⁷

The relationship between Spain and Latin America has always been marked by historical, social and cultural ties, that is, they have an identity dimension. There is no other axis of external action where we can find the multidimensional nature of this relationship between Spain and the countries that define Latin America, there is no other European country with a regional foreign policy towards Latin America.⁸ The recovery of democracy in all Latin American countries and Spanish and Portuguese as common languages have allowed the recovery of values in the social, cultural, economic and political spheres of this community.⁹ We are therefore facing a historical reality in a globalized world that will be essential to the new international scenario.

⁷ Celestino del Arenal, *Política exterior de España y relaciones con América Latina, Iberoamericanidad, Europeización y Atlantismo en la política exterior española*, Fundación Carolina y Editorial Siglo XXI, Madrid, 2011, pag. 122.

⁸ Celestino del Arenal, "La dimensión regional de la política iberoamericana de España", *Quórum. Revista Iberoamericana* 19, pp. 28.

⁹ Declaration of Guadalajara (Mexico), adopted at the First Ibero-American Summit held in July 1991: "We represent a vast group of nations that share the roots and rich heritage of a culture based on the sum of

With the entry in 1986, under the Government of Felipe González,¹⁰ in the European Communities, Spain appeared before Latin America with the support of a common European project and stopped acting alone in this aspect, that is to say, it would produce a Latin Americanization of the European politics and a Europeanization of Ibero-American politics, something that will have advantages and disadvantages in the framework of Spanish foreign policy.

The triumph of the Popular Party with José María Aznar leading the way in the elections of March 3, 1996, produced in continuity during the first legislature marked by a policy of consensus with the Socialist Party,¹¹ but after the second legislature and after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, this consensus will be broken in the foreign policy of Spain, controlled by the popular executive, will take a turn to align with the positions of the Bush administration, moving away from Europe and focusing on the Atlanticism.

In relation to Latin America, the foreign policy of the second legislature of the Aznar government lost autonomy due to its alignment with the United States and the role it plays throughout the region.¹² But despite this, relations with Latin America were sustained by a strong economization of their policies.

In our case, relations with Brazil were consolidated and increased. If Aznar's government initially preferred a victory for PSDB candidate, José Serra, in the 2002 elections, Lula's victory and the formation of his executive shooed all fears.¹³ Lula da Silva built a positive image about himself, by this he was awarded by the Prince of

diverse peoples, creeds and bloods. Five hundred years away from our first meeting, and as one of the great spaces that shape the world today, we are determined to project the strength of our community towards the third millennium”.

¹⁰ Felipe González Márquez was born in Seville, 1942. Spanish socialist politician and President of the Government between 1982 and 1996. Graduated in Law from the University of Seville, in 1964 joined the Spanish Socialist Workers Party.

¹¹ Felipe Sahagún, “La política exterior española en 1999”, *Anuario Internacional CIDOB 1999*, Barcelona, pp. 29-46.

¹² David García Cantalapiedra, “España, Estados Unidos y las relaciones transatlánticas”, en Juan Carlos Pereira (coord.), *La política exterior de España. De 1800 hasta hoy*, Ariel, Barcelona, pp. 441-458.

¹³ Bruno Ayllón, “Zapatero y Lula: ¿Nuevo signo en las relaciones hispano-brasileñas?”, en *Boletín Brasil, Centros de Estudios Brasileños Ortega y Gasset, nº 1*, Madrid.

Asturias Award for International Cooperation in June 2003.¹⁴ The good relations between the two leaders, leaving aside the political ideas, (Lula affirmed that: “Aznar is not so conservative and I am not so leftist ”),¹⁵ fomented the good understanding between the two countries that resulted in the signing of a Strategic Partnership, conceived in October 2003 at the Ibero-American Summit of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.¹⁶

With the coming to power of the executive chaired by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the socialist project will try to respond to the new world scenario with a clear Europeanist vocation, reformulating the policy of cooperation for development, betting on effective multilateralism, regaining the importance of Latin America and imposing an important social turn to his policies.

In relation to its Ibero-American policy, political concertation was strengthened at the multilateral and bilateral levels. Due to its Europeanist vocation and the recovery of the importance of Latin America, distancing itself from the Bush administration, the government of Zapatero searched the consolidation of the relations between the European Union and the different agents of Latin America. On the other hand, and returning to the central theme of our project, relations with Brazil have continued to consolidate, although not without difficulties.¹⁷

Both countries, thanks to their harmony, have chosen to maintain a continuous and outstanding agenda in the multilateral and bilateral spheres, highlighting the consolidation and expansion of the Strategic Partnership of 2003, with the Brasilia Declaration in 2005.¹⁸ Brazil is the main Spanish bet in South America and this is demonstrated by the data of the relations between both governments, the number of Spanish companies in this country and the contacts between civil society.

¹⁴ Fundación Princesa de Asturias. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Premio Príncipe de Asturias de Cooperación Internacional 2003.

¹⁵ Folha de Sao Paulo, 30 de octubre de 2003, cuaderno A, p. 6.

¹⁶ Aznar y Lula firman un plan de asociación estratégica entre España y Brasil. Diario ABC. Fecha: 14 de noviembre de 2003.

¹⁷ Celestino del Arenal, “Brasil, las Cumbres Iberoamericanas y el papel de España en América Latina”, en *Revista CIDOB d’afers internacionals*, documento nº 39, diciembre, Barcelona, pp. 1-8.

¹⁸ Brasilia Declaration about the consolidation of the Strategic Partnership between Spain and Brazil. Document signed the 24th January 2005 between José Luiz Rodríguez Zapatero, President of the Government of the Kingdom of Spain and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil.

In this first chapter we will analyze the foreign policy of the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero towards Latin America and the special relationship of this executive with the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil. We will highlight how these two governments enjoyed an ideological convergence that was essential for the development of their national and international policies. The "social turn" that they gave to their policies was made possible by the prevailing economic conditions at the international level and the political will of both presidents. In spite of this we will observe how: the internal politics, the emergence and development of the global economic crisis, and the disagreements in some aspects of the two executives, tested the initial wills.

1.1. The foreign policy of the governments of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero towards Iberoamerica 2004-2011.

The speech of investiture, made by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in the Congress of Deputies on April 15, 2004, presented the bases of the Spanish foreign policy, which emphasizes the importance of the role of Ibero-America.

“The second axis to which the Government will devote particular attention is that referred to the Foreign Policy.

In this field, it is time to regain a consensus that should never have been broken. We have made no progress and we have put at risk many of our most important interests.

A consensus that, in this order, should make clear a convinced European commitment; must place in Latin America and the Mediterranean our centers of preferential attention; must maintain with the United States a relationship of partner countries and friends based on reciprocal loyalty and openness; must be unequivocally aligned with international law, with the reform and strengthening of international instruments of peace; and finally, to make cooperation for development an essential element of our international policy.

I will try to recover the institutional, political, cultural and economic presence of Spain in Latin America in order to contribute to the definitive projection of its peoples, consolidate democracy in all its countries and establish with them real

bases for the updating, modernization and effectiveness of our community of nations.”¹⁹

If on April 15 in the Congress of Deputies, President Zapatero outlined before the parliamentarians the objectives of his legislature, where we have highlighted the fragment in relation to the State's external action with Latin America, a month before, which would be his Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Angel Moratinos, developed the foreign policy program of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party. Next, we will highlight the most important aspects in relation to its foreign policy and the importance of Latin America.

The Socialist executive wanted to promote United Nations reform, something that was in line with countries like Brazil, that with the new government of Lula da Silva and its greater power in the international framework, they saw a need for a reform of the UN, Both countries agreed on the reform, their models diverged. In the next chapter, we will analyze in detail the differences in reform between the two countries.

In relation to the policy of cooperation and promotion of development, Spain will be part of the "Geneva quintet" for the Alliance against Hunger and Poverty. It will be formed by the presidents of France, Chile, Brazil, Spain and the support of the secretary general of the United Nations. On the other hand, the government of Zapatero proposed to increase Official Development Aid to reach 0.5% of GDP in its first term and in the second to 0.7%.²⁰

It emphasizes the government's desire to recover Europe as an essential pillar of its foreign policy, the Europeanist and Iberoamerican vocation as the natural environment of Spain's foreign policy, in Moratinos's words; "to recover Ibero-America as a strategic reference for our complementary external action but differentiated and, to the extent possible, autonomous of the remaining options".²¹

¹⁹ Speech of Investiture of the candidate for the presidency of the Government, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Congress of Deputies, April 15, 2004.

²⁰ Celestino del Arenal, *Política exterior de España y relaciones con América Latina, Iberoamericanidad, Europeización y Atlantismo en la política exterior española*, Fundación Carolina y Editorial Siglo XXI, Madrid, 2011, p. 468. Between 2004 and 2008 Official Development Assistance increased from 1,962 to 4,761 million euros, which meant that it increased from 0.24% to 0.45% of GDP. It will be the greatest increase in the history of Spanish cooperation.

²¹ Miguel Ángel Moratinos, "Una nueva política exterior para España", en *Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, 2004.

Spain has always had in mind Ibero-America as a priority in matters of foreign policy. Ties and links, especially historical, cultural and social, make the Spanish nation a key player in the region, and interregional, as it also acts as a bridge between Europe and Latin America.²² From his Europeanist vocation, Spain will seek during the governments of Rodríguez Zapatero a policy based on the agreement with the Ibero-American countries and the proposal of a global relationship that widens the margins of autonomy between the countries.

The links between both sides of the Atlantic during this period will be the channel by which we analyze the factors of the new Ibero-American Spanish foreign policy between 2004 and 2011, being these: (a) strengthened political agreements with Latin American countries, (b) the "social turn" that the Socialist government wanted to impose on its Ibero-American policy, (c) consolidation of the Ibero-American Summits and with them, the strengthening of bilateral relations, and finally, (d) serving as a bridge between the European Union and Latin America,²³ that is, promoting the expansion and development of dialogue between the two communities.

We will now explain point by point, the sections mentioned above to get an overview of how the foreign policy towards Latin America of the governments of Rodríguez Zapatero was and was carried out.²⁴

- Strengthen political agreement with the countries of Latin America.

Jose Luis Rodríguez Zapatero presented himself to his Latin American partners at the ALC-EU Summit of the Mexican city of Guadalajara, held from 27 to 28 May 2004. At that summit, the worsening situation in Iraq, the enlargement of the EU, and the paralysis of multilateral trade negotiations have been key issues. Against this, Zapatero presented

²² Celestino del Arenal, *op Cit.*, p. 526.

²³ Celestino del Arenal, *op Cit.*, p. 482.

²⁴ We must mention that all the points that we will explain below, in Latin American code, will be developed later, highlighting the relations between the countries of Spain and Brazil and their importance in the different areas. It is for this reason that we will not go into depth in many of the aspects, since we intend in this point is to give a global vision of the situation to situate the reader before the problem that we analyze, that is, the relations between Spain and Brazil in all its dimensions under the governments of Rodríguez Zapatero and Lula da Silva.

his European credentials, the effective multilateralism of his foreign policy with a marked social turn.²⁵

In relation to the strengthening of the political profile with the countries of Latin America, we will emphasize relations with the different countries in two groups: on the one hand, those with which a strategic partnership agreement has been signed (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) and, on the other hand, the other countries, most of which are included in ALBA, the Bolivarian Alternative of the Peoples of Our America.²⁶

Relationships vary widely between countries due to different factors, often beyond political, social or economic attractiveness. Tuning among governments will be key to maintaining, fostering and expanding relations between any Latin American countries with Spain.

In my opinion, we must start to develop relations with Latin American states by Brazil, being essential partner and which established the bases of the Strategic Association and whose relations enjoy a good harmony between Zapatero and Lula da Silva. With both presidents and their political will, the dimension is extended to the social and cultural. Since the signing of the Strategic Partnership Plan,²⁷ signed in November 2003 between Lula da Silva and Aznar and later, with the change of government in Spain, relations have continued to advance in different planes, highlighting their prominence in the United Nations, where we emphasize the projects of the Alliance against Hunger and the Millennium Goals. With the signing of the Strategic Association, the first thing was to consolidate relations in the economic sphere. On the Brazilian side, to promote investments and the Spanish side, to obtain an economic return for the companies with the expansion of new markets and to obtain with the internationalization some benefits that in Spain began to stagnate. The turn between Aznar and Zapatero is to put in value the social plane and to continue fomenting the economic aspects, but undoubtedly, the change is essential to understand the policy carried out by the external action.

²⁵ José Antonio Sanahuja, "La Cumbre de Guadalajara: Consensos y Divergencias", en *La Actualidad*, Madrid, 2004.

²⁶ Celestino del Arenal, *op. Cit.*, p. 492-498.

²⁷ Aznar acuerda con Lula una Alianza Estratégica y se compromete a apoyarle. *La Vanguardia*. 16 de julio de 2003.

Brazil is the Spanish bet in Latin America and this is demonstrated by the signing of the Brasilia Declaration between Zapatero and Lula,²⁸ as well as their numerous meetings. In the following chapters we will analyze in depth the relations between Spain and Brazil in the different spheres, but what is no doubt is that the signature of this Strategic Association with this country, being the first with a Latin American state, allowed to develop a model of foreign policy towards that continent.

With Argentina, the signing of the Strategic Partnership arrived in June 2006. With the transfer of power between the Kirchner marriage, relations improved although they did not enjoy the good harmony like the one existing with Lula's government in Brazil. The proof of this, have been the problems of the investments of Spanish companies in Argentina.²⁹ However, despite this, Zapatero and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner have supported the return to negotiations between the European Union and MERCOSUR.³⁰

With regard to Colombia, there has been a slow approximation between the governments of Zapatero and Uribe because of their political differences. This approach was solved with the signing of the Strategic Partnership in January 2008. In this way, Colombia became part of the group of Latin American countries essential to Spain.

The signing of the Strategic Association with Chile took place in May of 2006, under the government of Michelle Bachelet. The understanding between the two executives is total and this is demonstrated by the participation of both in the Alliance Against Hunger program.

In Mexico, and under the mandate of both presidents of the National Action Party, Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón, relations were magnificent. The exchange of visits and the signing of a Declaration in which, as with Brazil, the Strategic Partnership deepened and expanded, demonstrated the good understanding between both governments.

The last of the key countries for Spain in Ibero-America will be Peru, where the victory of Alan Garcia meant for the Spanish executive satisfaction and was carried out, two

²⁸ Brasilia Declaration about the consolidation of the Strategic Partnership between Spain and Brazil.

²⁹ Celestino del Arenal, *op. Cit.*, p. 486.

³⁰ CUMBRE UE-ALC, Madrid, 18 de mayo de 2010. "Hacia una nueva fase de la asociación birregional: Innovación y tecnología para el desarrollo sostenible y la integración social", Consejo de la Unión Europea, Bruselas.

years later, with the visit of the king to Peru, the signature of the Association Between the two governments.³¹

Without going into detail since it is not our intention in this project, the most complex relations were with the Chavez government in Venezuela. The Spanish government tried to maintain good relations but various incidents such as accusations made at the Ibero-American Summits and accusations of terrorism have deteriorated the relations.³² The normalization of these relations came with the visit of Hugo Chavez to Spain in 2008.

Another of the measures that has had more relevance have been the nationalizations carried out by the ALBA countries, such as Ecuador and Bolivia. Although they have provoked tensions and a certain mistrust in relations, they have been maintained in the most diplomatic way possible. After explaining the political agreement made with the Latin American countries, we will briefly explain the “social turn” imposed by the socialist government in its foreign policy and specifically in Latin America.

- The “social turn” towards Ibero-American foreign policy.

This section will summarize the main lines of what was the “social turn” of the foreign policy of the governments of the Socialist Party towards Ibero-America, and then, to analyze these social policies in the bilateral and multilateral sphere, as well as in its field of comparison with Brazil, a key fact in our project.

With the arrival of the executive presided over by Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero there was a marked social turn in the foreign policy toward Ibero-America. Problems of a social nature will have a greater weight in external action, although this does not indicate a neglect of the defense of economic interests, key to governments, companies and workers operating in the region.

A period of paralysis of Spanish co-operation was closed and a stage of reform was set in motion, essential in order to illustrate the government's action in the region. In external action, social problems were now an axis of action, and poverty, social cohesion and inequality will play a relevant role. The Strategic Partnership agreements signed with the Latin American countries will be in line with this new political framework, which places emphasis on social and cultural development.

³¹ Celestino del Arenal, *op. Cit.*, p. 491.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 495.

This marked social turn in foreign policy will be carried out by the two foreign ministers that the government had: Miguel Ángel Moratinos³³ and Trinidad Jiménez.³⁴ This change in policy will have as main vectors: participation in the Alliance against Hunger; the commitment to increase development aid; strengthening work with NGOs; debt settlement for education; the social responsibility of Spanish companies; and support for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.³⁵ In short, the new name of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which will be renamed, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, will be in line with the new policy deployed by it, emphasizing cooperation as a key factor in the state's external action.

The change of political mentality was essential and in one of the aspects where major was reflected that was in the Ibero-American Summits, framework of consolidation of the Ibero-American Community of Nations.

- Consolidation of the Ibero-American Summits and the strengthening of bilateral relations.

The Ibero-American Summits have always been a reference in the Spanish foreign policy towards Latin America in their search of the Ibero-American Community of Nations. On the contrary, there are reservations on the part of some countries towards these Summits, their importance and the role of Spain. The socialist government team will attempt a shared leadership during this stage, something complex due to the diverse factors that affected the Latin American countries.

Since the first Ibero-American Summit since the arrival of Zapatero, he wanted to impose the famous social turn of his policy, also in the framework of the meetings between Ibero-American presidents. This has paid off, because between the Summit of San José of Costa Rica in 2004³⁶ and the Summit of Salamanca in 2005,³⁷ SEGIB was

³³ Miguel Ángel Moratinos Cuyaubé, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation between 18 April 2004 and 21 October 2010.

³⁴ Trinidad Jiménez, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation between October 21, 2010 and December 22, 2011. Before that, she was Secretary of State of Spain for Ibero-America.

³⁵ José Antonio Sanahuja, "La política de cooperación española a partir de 2008: el reto de culminar las reformas", *Quórum. Revista Iberoamericana* 19 (invierno), Madrid, 2007, pp. 37-55.

³⁶ The XIV Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and Government took place between November 18 and 20, 2004 in San José, Costa Rica, with the motto "Educate to progress".

³⁷ The XV Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and Government took place between 14 and 15 October 2005 in the Spanish city of Salamanca.

created, the Ibero-American General Secretariat, which gives the Summits a permanent structure and the role of these has been strengthened.

It is true that these actions reinforced the role of the Summits and gave it importance. However, there are three factors that are key to the development of this Project and that have conditioned the course of these meetings.

In the first place, Brazil is suspicious of Spain's role in Latin America, since Brazil is a power in the region and as a global player, does not welcome the interference of a predominantly European player in Latin American action.³⁸ This has not diminished the bilateral relations between both countries but has created some suspicion.

Secondly, the difficulty in relations with the ALBA countries, which prepare their common strategy before the Summits. Perhaps the greatest tension occurred between the presidents of Spain and Venezuela at the Summit of Santiago de Chile in 2007.³⁹

Thirdly, due to internal problems and the serious economic crisis in Spain, the Ibero-American Summits have had a secondary role. That is why Rodríguez Zapatero did not attend the meeting held in Mar del Plata in 2010.⁴⁰ Likewise, many presidents of other states also did not attend the meeting, which makes it less important to the Summits in their role as an international meeting.

For Spain, the Summits were essential in foreign policy towards Latin America. In the following chapters we will analyze the role of the Summits in all its areas of action. Another area where Zapatero's government put all its efforts was to strengthen relations between Europe and Latin America, and the role that Spain would play in this process.

- Reinforce the relations between the European Union and Latin America.

Relations between the European Union and Latin America had been paralyzed in recent years, partly because with Aznar's government in Spain, foreign policy turned from Europeism to Atlantism and alignment with the Bush administration.⁴¹ With the arrival

³⁸ Celestino del Arenal, *op. Cit.*, p. 511.

³⁹ Hugo Chávez did not stop insulting Jose Maria Aznar and the Spanish businessmen. Before this, Zapatero demanded respect before a democratically chosen president, to which Chavez continued with the insults. The King came out in defense of both presidents, telling Chávez; "Why do not you shut up?". Daniel Ortega, president of Nicaragua, attacked Spain which caused the king to leave the ceremony.

⁴⁰ During the first days of December took place a Council of Ministers presided over by Rodriguez Zapatero where economic measures of liberal court were approved to combat the crisis.

⁴¹ Celestino del Arenal, "La triangulación España-Unión Europea-América Latina", *Pensamiento Iberoamericano* 8 (2ª época), pp. 71-101.

of Zapatero in 2004 and among others the government of Lula da Silva in Brazil, will begin to break the standstill and promote a climate of understanding.

From the European Union and with the Spanish support, being Spain, the only state of the EU that has exclusive external action towards Ibero-America, the strategy of alliances with Latin America begins to be reconceived. It is at the Summit between the two communities, the one held in Guadalajara in 2004, precisely where Zapatero presents himself to Latin American leaders, where a reinforced partnership between both spaces is projected.

If the Guadalajara Summit in 2004 turned to vitalism in relations, it was at the Vienna Summit in 2006, where the European Union began to identify the most important demands of the Latin American community. However, it was at the Madrid Summit of 2010, where relations gained strong momentum with very positive results.⁴² Here, it was agreed to resume and promote negotiations between the EU and MERCOSUR, for their association.⁴³ These Summits, together with the bilateral Summits of the European Union with different Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, Mexico) and sub regions (CARIFORUM, CAN, MERCOSUR) have allowed Ibero-America with whom the EU has signed the first Association Agreement with another regional block.⁴⁴

The intention of the governments of both Rodríguez Zapatero and Lula da Silva has been of vital importance for the development and implementation of the Summits and meetings. Their political will was key to boosting the commitments between the two communities.

In short, we have analyzed briefly and highlighting the main points of action, which was the foreign policy of Spain to Ibero-America during the presidency of the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. In it, we have been able to know its most outstanding partners and aspirations. In the following sections, we will expand all the information provided, focusing on the axis on which our project revolves, that is, the relations with the government of Brazil, chaired by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

⁴² Carlos Malamud, "La Cumbre ALCUE de Madrid y el estado de la relación birregional Europa-América Latina", *Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano 98/2010*, Madrid, 2010, p. 2.

⁴³ Celestino del Arenal, "Las relaciones entre la UE y América Latina: ¿abandono del regionalismo y apuesta por una nueva estrategia de carácter bilateralista?", *Documento de Trabajo 36/2009*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2009, p. 17.

⁴⁴ Celestino del Arenal, *op. Cit.*, p. 16.

1.2. Brazil and Spain, essential partners.

Brazil and Spain have not always had the good relations of this moment. In fact, they could be cataloged as irrelevant until the 1980s. We do not mean by this that they were bad relations since the problems that arose were solved quickly due to their lack of importance. It is, as we have said, since 1979, with the visit of Adolfo Suárez⁴⁵ to Brazil, where a new Ibero-American foreign policy is inaugurated where the values of democracy are evident, human rights are respected and closer cooperation is sought with the Latin American countries,⁴⁶ and how to recover the historical ties lost during the years of dictatorship in Spain.

With the end of the political Transition in Spain and the arrival of the Socialist Party government under Felipe González, the visit of King Juan Carlos to Brazil takes place, inaugurating a new cycle in Spanish foreign policy.⁴⁷ It is from this moment on that the relations will obtain a great impulse, to a great extent promoted by the admiration of the Spanish democratic transition. Shared visions and similar experiences, accompanied by the structural reforms of Brazil and the prosperity of large Spanish companies, has led to the development of Spanish-Brazilian relations in this period.

In 1986, there will be one of the events that marked the past of relationships, marks the present and will determine the future. Spain and Portugal entered the European Economic Community.⁴⁸ Both countries have a Europeanist vocation and at the same time have strong ties with Ibero-America and in particular with Brazil, so that their entry will be a bridge between the two communities.

⁴⁵ Adolfo Suárez González, was born on September 25, 1932 and died in Madrid on March 23, 2014. He was a Spanish politician and lawyer, president of the Government of Spain from 1976 to 1981, being the first president democratically elected after the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco.

⁴⁶ Bruno Ayllón, "La política exterior de España hacia Brasil: de la mutua irrelevancia a la relación estratégica (1945-2005)." *Encuentro de Latinoamericanistas Españoles: Viejas y nuevas alianzas entre América Latina y España*, Santander, 2006, p. 3.

⁴⁷ Bruno Ayllón, *op. Cit.*, p.4

⁴⁸ BOE. State official newsletter. INSTRUMENT for ratification of the Treaty done at Lisbon and Madrid on 12 June 1985 concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. Madrid, Wednesday, January 1, 1986.

The economic reforms and the good will of the governments, allowed to project new objectives beyond the economic plane and with the signing of the General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1992 between Spain and Brazil,⁴⁹ contemplated new fields of action such as educational, cultural and technological.

From this moment the positions between Spain and Brazil will coincide in the necessary impulse of the regional integration and in the intensification of the relations for the Interregional Association. With the arrival of Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the Brazilian presidency,⁵⁰ a new phase of relations is inaugurated where the joint action will mark the way. The Ibero-American Summits and the relations between the European Union and MERCOSUR were promoted. A stage also marked by the promotion of education, language and culture, as evidenced by the educational cooperation programs and the action of the Cervantes Institute.⁵¹

Since the arrival of Cardoso in 1995, numerous visits were made between the presidents of Spain and Brazil. In 2000 the visit of his majesties the Kings of Spain to Brazil took place.⁵² This visit highlights the strong symbolic content, inaugurating the trips in the New Century to a country considered essential and priority.

During these years and thanks to the rapprochement between both countries, there have been understandings and alliances between the different political parties. For example the Popular Party (PP) in Spain and the Liberal Front Party (PFL) in Brazil. The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), manifested its intention to help the Party of the

⁴⁹ BOE. State oficial newsletter. Ministry of foreign affairs. General TREATY of Cooperation and Friendship between the Kingdom of Spain and the Federative Republic of Brazil and Economic Agreement integral to it. Madrid on 23 July 1992.

⁵⁰ Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was born on June 18, 1931 in Rio de Janeiro. Politician and university professor. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1992, Minister of Finance between 1993 and 1994, and President of the Republic of Brazil in two periods: between 1995-1999 and 1999 to 2002.

⁵¹ Bruno Ayllón, "Las relaciones culturales en la agenda hispano-brasileña: un poco de historia", *Revista de Cultura Brasileña*, nº 3, marzo, Embajada de Brasil, Madrid, 2005, p. 32.

⁵² José Coderch Planas, "España-Brasil: arquitectura de una relación privilegiada", en *ICE Brasil*, nº810 octubre-noviembre, p. 27.

Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB) to enter in the Socialist International. And the Brazilian Workers Party (PT) has great links with unions and Spanish parties.⁵³

It is true that during this stage, the relations that enjoyed a very good harmony, remained focused mainly on the economic level. So much so, that in the words of Bruno Ayllón we observe how: "Until 1995, the stock of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was very reduced, being limited to 0.60% of the total received in Brazil with an amount of 251 million dollars . In just five years, they accounted for 32% of the flow of FDI".⁵⁴ Faced with this, where a quarter of the investments made by Spain abroad are directed towards Brazil, it only remains to keep pace and, at the same time, move to a second level in relations, which advances in cultural ties, educational, social, cooperative and developmental.

In 2002, there was the victory of Lula da Silva in the Brazilian elections. The image of Lula in Europe was that of a responsible ruler, who would give Brazil the necessary social turn for its policies of development and of welfare state. In fact, we can say that once his term ended, in 2011, the opinion of the Brazilian people towards his president was very favorable.⁵⁵ A new stage in bilateral relations between Spain and Brazil was inaugurated and the new Brazilian President was awarded in June 2003 with the Prince of Asturias International Cooperation Award.

From Aznar's government, security was demanded for Spanish companies established in Brazil, while from Brazil, the Spanish executive was urged to support its social and economic reforms, that is to say, it called for Spain's commitment to impose a strong social turn to the new policies. Fears of Lula's leftism by the Jose Maria Aznar government remained unfounded; even so, the main supporters of the new Brazilian executive in Spain were the King and the Socialist Party.⁵⁶

⁵³ Bruno Ayllón, "La política exterior de España hacia Brasil: de la mutua irrelevancia a la relación estratégica (1945-2005)." *Encuentro de Latinoamericanistas Españoles: Viejas y nuevas alianzas entre América Latina y España*, Santander, 2006, p. 7.

⁵⁴ Bruno Ayllón, *op. Cit.*, p.7.

⁵⁵ Perry Anderson, "Le Brésil de Lula", *Le Débat* 2011/5 (nº 167), Gallimard, p. 2. In democratic conditions, it is difficult to be more popular at the end of a mandate than at the beginning. Lula has been the only ruler in the world who can boast about it. When he left the presidency in 2011, 80% of his citizens approved his administration.

⁵⁶ Remarks by His Majesty the King at the gala dinner given to the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil. "Receive our most effusive congratulations for this award, which constitutes a deserved

In 2003, specifically in October, Aznar's visit to Brazil takes place, where progress is being made in the preparation of the strategic partnership between both countries.⁵⁷ With this signature, it shows the good moment that lived the relations between both countries. With the arrival of the Socialist Party to power in Spain in 2004, relations will enter a new stage,⁵⁸ a stage where political harmony will mark the way and where the “social turn” will be present in all areas of action.

We wanted to highlight very briefly and concise, the relations between both countries in democracy until the arrival of the executives of Lula da Silva and Rodriguez Zapatero. From this moment we enter a phase where we will try to analyze most of the aspects that influenced the foreign policy of both countries and their relations both bilaterally and multilaterally.

1.2.1. Harmony and ideological convergence between Rodríguez Zapatero and Lula da Silva, the “social turn”.

With the arrival of the new Spanish government of the Socialist Party in March 2004 after the general elections of 11 of the same month and the presidency of Lula da Silva in Brazil, a new phase began in the framework of relations between both countries, in the bilateral as well as the multilateral framework. Both presidents were marked by their emphasis on social development, suggesting that the path to be followed by relationships would be marked by this dimension without discrediting the economic plane.⁵⁹

recognition for such outstanding political and personal trajectory of commitment to cooperation and delivery to the noblest causes at the service of humanity”.

⁵⁷ Strategic Partnership between Brazil and Spain, signed at the XIII Ibero-American Summit of Santa Cruz de la Sierra (Bolivia) on November 14, 2003. There are four areas defined in this document: political dialogue, joint cooperation actions, strengthening economic and trade links, and the promotion of educational cooperation. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/es/ficha-pais/6071-reino-de-espana>

⁵⁸ Bruno Ayllón, “De la asociación estratégica a la crisis: las relaciones hispano-brasileñas en un contexto de cambios estructurales”, en *Revista de Estudios Brasileños, Volumen I, número 1*, Salamanca, 2014, p. 27.

⁵⁹ Bruno Ayllón, “Zapatero y Lula: ¿Nuevo signo en las relaciones hispano-brasileñas?”, en *Boletín Brasil, Centro de Estudios Brasileños Ortega y Gasset, nº1*, Madrid, 2005, p. 7.

The socialist legislature in Spain began in April and in July 2004, Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos made his first visit to Brazil to strengthen ties between both countries, does not mean that there was a bad relationship between the former Spanish executive And the government of Lula da Silva but had suffered a certain political passivity.

The relations enjoyed a harmony never seen before between a Spanish government and one of a Latin American country. So much so that, in January of 2005 and coinciding with the visit of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero to Brazil, the Brasilia Declaration is signed,⁶⁰ where the intention is the consolidation of the Strategic Partnership between Spain and Brazil signed in 2003 between the governments of Aznar and Lula. In this statement we will collect those that will be the main objectives of both governments and which we will analyze.

The Brasilia Declaration, which marked the direction of relations between the two countries, was structured in five areas: a) strengthening bilateral political dialogue, b) employment and social development, c) economic growth and opportunities, d) education, culture, science and environment, and (e) cooperation for development. Although we will analyze all the points collected, we must make a special mention of the last of them, since in the same Brasilia Declaration, there is an attached document detailing the implementation plan of the Brazil-Spain cooperation for development program and has been coordinated by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECID).

- Strengthening bilateral political dialogue.

To this end, it was agreed to hold annual meetings, thus preserving privileged relationships. At the same time, this will serve to carry out international actions of a social nature, such as the reduction of hunger and poverty, as well as international aid to countries affected by natural disasters.

As much for Rodríguez Zapatero as for Lula da Silva, the Ibero-American Summits have a capital importance since they are the highest instance of the mechanism of political

⁶⁰ Brasilia Declaration about the consolidation of the Strategic Partnership between Spain and Brazil. Document signed the 24th January 2005 between José Luiz Rodríguez Zapatero, President of the Government of the Kingdom of Spain and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil.

agreement and cooperation within the framework of the Ibero-American Conference.⁶¹ While it is true that although the arrival of Zapatero was a change in the leadership strategy shared at the summits, there has always been some suspicion from Brazil. As a result of the numerous meetings between actors (such as the EU-Brazil Summit, the EU-Latin America and Caribbean Summits, Unasur and the Community of Latin American The Caribbean (CELAC), defined in 2011 but previously projected), have reduced the importance of the Ibero-American Summits.⁶² Even so, the efforts of both governments to maintain them and the creation of SEGIB have been key for these meetings to remain alive.

Due to its status as a key partner, Lula's government has joined in the promotion of an "Alliance of Civilizations," promoted by the Zapatero government within the framework of the United Nations. Conversely, it was the union of the Spanish government to the "Action against hunger and poverty", invited by Brazil, both partners of the Geneva quartet (France, Brazil, Chile and Spain, accompanied by the United Nations secretary general) . Ambitious objectives that, as we have seen, once their mandates have been finalized, have not been carried out due to the lack of clear priorities at the time. That is why we can say that the social commitment of both governments was very high, but the results unfortunately have not been as expected.

The two presidents have maintained the dialogue in the different international forums and preserved a common position in favor of continuing negotiations between the European Union and MERCOSUR. While it is true that this fact is relevant since Brazil is interested in a trade agreement between both actors, it is also true that between 2004 and 2009 there has been a gap between the European Union and Latin America. The economic crisis of 2008, which greatly affected the European Union as a whole and Spain in an extraordinary way, has caused Latin America to see in the EU a cause of problems and prepare itself to face the financial problems of European nations.⁶³ That is why, for Brazil, despite its political alignment with Spain, this is now less relevant, as the European

⁶¹ Brasilia Declaration, *op, Cit.*, p. 2,

⁶² José Antonio Sanahuja, "Un Brasil suramericano y una España europeizada: relaciones en el marco iberoamericano", en *Revista CIDOB d'afers internacionals* n° 97-98, Barcelona, 2012, p. 254.

⁶³ José Antonio Sanahuja, "Spain: Double track Europeanization, and the search for bilateralism", en RUANO, Lorena (ed.) *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policies Towards Latin America*. Londres, 2012.

Union. On the contrary, the importance of Brazil for Spain has increased during this period. The fact that has slightly counteracted this situation was the Madrid Summit in 2010 between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean, where the results were impressive.⁶⁴

Another of the strengths of the bilateral dialogue has been the reciprocal support of the two countries' candidacies in multilateral forums. This has given rise as we have seen to the participation of Brazil in the "Alliance of Civilizations" and of Spain in the "Action against hunger and poverty". Beyond this, the situation has been one of competition rather than reciprocal support in the forums and for this, we will highlight some examples derived from a Europeanized Spain and a South American Brazil. In 2005, Spain supports the French candidate Pascal Lamy in front of Seixas Correia, a Brazilian, for the leadership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 2011, José Graziano and Miguel Angel Moratinos, Brazilian and Spanish, compete to lead the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Finally, Brazil also beat Spain in its candidature for being an Olympic city in 2016, beating Rio de Janeiro against Madrid.⁶⁵

The last of the points that we will analyze regarding the strengthening of the bilateral dialogue has been the analysis of the situation of the emigrants residing in each of the States. Undoubtedly, one of the most tense moments between the two nations has been caused by the retention of Brazilian citizens at the Madrid-Barajas Airport between 2008 and 2010, due to visa problems.⁶⁶ This rejection led Brazil to take measures of the same caliber against Spanish citizens. Due to this fact, the vision of Spain in Brazil has deteriorated.

In this first part, we have analyzed how the strengthening of bilateral dialogue is not always accompanied by actions that justify it. Beyond the good intentions of both governments, the reality was quite diverse although it is true that important measures and actions were implemented. We will now analyze the following point of the Brasilia Declaration, employment and social development.

- Employment and social development.

⁶⁴ Carlos Malamud, "La Cumbre ALCUE de Madrid y el estado de la relación birregional Europa-América Latina", *Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano* 98, Madrid, 2010, p.7.

⁶⁵ ⁶⁵ José Antonio Sanahuja, "Un Brasil suramericano y una España europeizada: relaciones en el marco iberoamericano", en *Revista CIDOB d'afers internacionals* n° 97-98, Barcelona, 2012, p. 251.

⁶⁶ Carlos Malamud (coord.), *Relaciones España-Brasil*, Informe Elcano, Madrid, 2014, pp. 35-37.

One of the most interesting areas of this Declaration was the agreement to create a forum for civil society dialogue between Spain and Brazil, which should serve for the exchange of ideas that would arouse interest on both sides of the Atlantic. The willingness on this point was total between the two governments, but unfortunately this never came to fruition. That is why we come back to influence this aspect. The objectives were too ambitious, and therefore commitments have not been made and priorities have not been effectively marked.⁶⁷ The agenda with the arrival of Rodríguez Zapatero was marked by social aspects but the importance of economic aspects and private actors was essential. It is in this area that the initiatives implemented by Spanish companies in terms of social responsibility in Brazil and of public-private partnerships for development are introduced, a promotion of the economic sphere which, consequently, has also increased the social and development.⁶⁸

The next point to be analyzed in the Brasilia Declaration will be economic growth and opportunity.

- Economic growth and opportunities.

The signing of the Brasilia Declaration took place on January 24, 2005, and the same day the first meeting of the two countries took place to talk about investment and trade. Once again it was clear that although the intention of both leaders was to prioritize in social matters, if economic relations do not run well, it is difficult for all other aspects to work properly. Two years later, President Lula in his visit to Madrid on September 14, 2007, met in the Palacio de la Moncloa with the presidents of the most important Spanish companies and with strong investments in Brazil to present to them the Plan of Acceleration of the Growth between 2007 and 2010.⁶⁹

At this point we can say that the opportunities and economic growth raised in the Brasilia Declaration have had little effect on society in both countries. Private economic interactions and their links between the two nations have managed better this problem, resolving it before government action. The investments of Spanish companies in Brazil

⁶⁷ T. Costa, *As duas Espanhas e o Brasil*, Topbooks, Rio de Janeiro, 2009.

⁶⁸ Elvira Marco y Jaime Otero, "Colaboración público-privada en la acción cultural exterior", *Documento de trabajo 3*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2010.

⁶⁹ Celestino del Arenal, *Política exterior de España y relaciones con América Latina, Iberoamericanidad, Europeización y Atlantismo en la política exterior española*, Fundación Carolina y Editorial Siglo XXI, Madrid, 2011, p. 487.

have been key to employ sectors of society.⁷⁰ Once again, the voluntarism reflected in the document signed by both presidents, does not set priorities or clear objectives.

The next section is related to Education, Culture, Science and Environment.

- Education, Culture, Science and Environment.

If there was something specific in which both leaders agreed, it was in implementing Spanish-Brazilian cooperation in these fields, specifically in the field of education and culture. A wide agenda has been consolidated between the different governmental actors and the private sectors that has put in value the development and cultural interest that both states possess and want to develop each other. With the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Educational Matters and the promotion of the Draft UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents, Spain and Brazil were placed in a leading position in cultural and educational matters, both with a policy Of concertation and with this marked social focus.

The Spanish Government plans to increase and encourage the instruments of cultural cooperation, including the Cervantes Institutes and the Cultural Centers of the AECID. On the Brazilian side, the expansion of the Brazilian Studies Center of the University of Salamanca in Spain was promoted as a Brazilian cultural reference point in Spain, promoting the knowledge of the Latin American giant among Spanish students.

Much of this promotion of culture comes from the importance of language and an essential fact to understand the relations between both countries, this was the sanction of the Spanish Law in Brazil on August 4, 2005.⁷¹

Brazil can become the first country in the world where Spanish is the second most spoken language. The application of the Spanish Law requires all secondary schools to offer Spanish as an optional subject. This is due to the importance of MERCOSUR, with a majority of Spanish speakers, the boom of Spanish around the world and the strong investments of Spain in Brazil.⁷² At the same time, it serves as an option for many teachers

⁷⁰ Carlos Malamud (coord.), *Relaciones España-Brasil*, Informe Elcano, Madrid, 2014, p. 70. Brazil has proved to be the most attractive Latin American country due to the opportunities it offers to foreign investors. Spain is the second largest foreign investor in Brazil, only behind the US, and accounts for 15% of all FDI in Brazil. Spain is the first European investor country in Brazil, Brazil being the second destination of Spanish investments abroad. The first is the whole of the European Union.

⁷¹ Carlos Malamud (coord.), op. Cit., p. 58.

⁷² Álvaro Martínez-Cachero Laseca, "La enseñanza del español en el sistema educativo brasileño: situación y posible actuaciones", *Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, 2009, p. 1-2.

of Spanish teaching to obtain employment. Observed the demand of the Spanish language, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has promoted the opening of several Cervantes Institutes. In 1998 it opened its first center and nowadays it has eight centers, most of them open during the government period of Rodríguez Zapatero in his mission to promote culture and language, Brazil being the country with the most Cervantes Institutes in the world.⁷³

Finally, we will highlight the last aspect of the Brasilia Declaration and perhaps one where more emphasis was placed on development cooperation.

- Cooperation for development.

The scope of cooperation is undoubtedly one of the key sectors for both presidents for their social commitment. Here the continuity of what was already identified in the Strategic Partnership Plan was carried out and increased as a result of the change of government in Spain. The coordination was carried out by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID). The priority areas have been five: first, social development, secondly, the development of infrastructure and promotion of the economic fabric. Thirdly, the protection of the environment is highlighted, followed in fourth by the institutional strengthening and finally, in the fifth place the investment in the human race.⁷⁴

Despite the fact that the objectives were complex both bilaterally and multilaterally, until the onset of the economic crisis and with the emergence of serious internal problems, none of the governments failed to improve social relations and to carry Its policy to the highest levels of international organizations.

Lula's government collaborated on a permanent basis to foster a global partnership for development, where Brazil proposed its cooperation through its Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). Brazil promoted the reform of the UN Security Council, something that Spain shared in substance but not in form. Under Lula's government, 475 technical cooperation projects were carried out, making Brazil a global player in cooperation. Spain

⁷³ Carlos Malamud (coord.), *op. Cit.*, p. 58. Belo Horizonte, Brasilia, Curitiba, Portoalegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador de Bahia y São Paulo.

⁷⁴ Brasilia Declaration, *op. Cit.*, p. 8.

is the third partner for cooperation in Brazil. The balance is that between 2005 and 2009, Brazil has invested in cooperation for development an average of 0.02% of annual GDP.⁷⁵

On the other hand Spain had set some very ambitious goals. The socialist government wanted to reach 0.5% of GDP in Official Development Assistance in 2008. It reached 0.45%. Spain would participate together with Brazil in the great international bets in the fight against poverty and in favor of development.⁷⁶

The Master Plan 2005-2008 was created and Spain supported the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. The Statute of the Cooperator was approved and the reform of the AECID was carried out in 2006.⁷⁷ In 2007, the Covenant was adopted Against poverty. It was intended in the second legislature to reach the target of 0.7% of GDP for cooperation for development but the onset of the economic crisis changed the policy in all its areas and the objectives were impossible to achieve.

In spite of this and although in later chapters we will analyze in a more detailed way the cooperation policy of both countries, despite the difficulties and objectives not reached, obtains a positive balance in national, bilateral and multilateral terms.

1.3. Domestic policy conditions foreign policy.

The foreign policy projects of the new governments when they come to power in their states try to respond to the new challenges of foreign policy, although it is conditioned by their international reality and at the same time by the avatars of the domestic policy of those States.

In this section, we will analyze how domestic politics and its actors, clearly determines the foreign policy and the vision obtained by the rest of the countries of the State in question. Spain and Brazil during the governments of Rodríguez Zapatero and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva have carried out a foreign policy very different from their predecessors.

⁷⁵ Bruno Ayllón, "Contribuciones de Brasil al desarrollo internacional: coaliciones emergentes y cooperación Sur-Sur", en *Revista CIDOB d'afers internacionals*, nº 97-98, abril, Barcelona, 2012, pp. 195-201.

⁷⁶ José Antonio Sanahuja, "La política de cooperación española a partir de 2008: el reto de culminar las reformas", *Quórum, Revista Iberoamericana* 19 (invierno), pp. 45.

⁷⁷ Celestino del Arenal, *op Cit.*, pp. 467-476.

The internal circumstances of both countries have been very different and at the same time relevant to them. For Spain, the main internal problems have been the fight against ETA terrorism and the reform of the Catalan Statute.⁷⁸ These facts, have marked the agenda of the government mainly in the second legislature, reducing the external activity of the executive.

With regard to Brazil, various internal circumstances have conditioned its foreign policy and have diminished the government's capacity for action. These have been two mainly: a) the scandal of the *mensalao*,⁷⁹ giving rise to the crisis of the Brazilian government suffered in 2005 and on the other hand, although it is not a problem of a high gravity if it is a conditioner, b) the influence of the domestic Brazilians actors in foreign policy, such as the struggles between the Workers' Party and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, known as Itamaraty, as well as the influence of government actors, private actors and civil society.⁸⁰

We will not enter this section in which perhaps was the greatest determinant of Spanish foreign policy and although also important of the Brazilian, we are talking about the international economic crisis that we will analyze in the next section of the chapter.

In the first stage of this section, we will analyze the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy during the governments of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in Spain. As we have said, the most relevant facts were the fight against ETA terrorism and the reform of the autonomous statute of Catalonia. During the government stage of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the lack of consensus with the main opposition party (Popular Party, PP), has marked the legislature, which has negatively influenced the development of foreign policy, which as we said At the beginning of this Project is based or should be based on the consensus between the different parties even if there are discrepancies.

The PSOE won the elections on March 14, 2004, and just three days before, on March 11, Spain woke up with the biggest terrorist attack in the history of this country. It was a

⁷⁸ Celestino del Arenal, *op Cit.*, p. 411.

⁷⁹ As the newspaper THE ECONOMIST said: "The Economist explains: What is Brazil's "mensalão"? Portuguese neologism roughly meaning "big monthly stipend" was coined to describe clandestine payments made by the Workers' Party (PT), which won the presidency in 2003, to congressional allies in return for support for its legislative agenda." <http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/11/economist-explains-14>

⁸⁰ Clarisa Giaccaglia, "La influencia de los actores domésticos en la política exterior brasileña durante el gobierno de Lula da Silva", en *CONfines* 6/12 agosto-diciembre, Rosario, 2010, pp. 95-121.

jihadist attack that killed 192 people at the Atocha, Santa Eugenia and El Pozo stations, in Madrid. At that time, many journalists, politicians, police and a part of the society saw in ETA the culprit of these attacks, since they did not know the authors, but they saw in the terrorist band, artifices capable of realizing such atrocity. That is why ETA was seen in good part, harmed by this attack.⁸¹ With the arrival of the Socialist Party to the government, they saw an opportunity to definitively end ETA's terrorism. Ten days after the attack, the terrorist group issued a statement inviting the president of the government to find a solution of the negotiated conflict.⁸²

The fight against terrorism of ETA, accompanied by a process of dialogue with the armed band, Zapatero's big bet, was plagued by obstacles by the PP. Despite this, on October 20, 2011, the terrorist band announced the end of its armed activity.⁸³ To achieve this, democratic governments since 1978 have had to fight in different ways (judicial, political, police, diplomatic), so that finally on the date and in the words of the President of the Government can be spoken of "Victory of Democracy, law and reason".

It is clear that the fight against armed terrorism generated a great effort on the part of the government. At the same time that the opposition party did not help with its policy of tension, as well as the attacks produced by ETA during this time, did not help the Government to continue with the efforts made in foreign policy since the main problems were others. The fight against terrorism has always had a large budget line, a large number of troops, and has focused almost all the attention of the government, since probably the security policy of Zapatero has been one of the hardest in all democracy .

The opposition made the dialogue with ETA and the Statute of Catalonia the cornerstone of the political discourse in which they argued that the PSOE was endangering Spain. When the government accedes to the dialogue with ETA, it knows perfectly well of its weakness, knew that this band did not have support neither international nor political nor economic.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Julio Bordas Martínez, "La lucha contra el terrorismo. La extinción de ETA", en *España en Crisis. Balance de la Segunda Legislatura de Rodríguez Zapatero*, Valencia, 2012, p.433.

⁸² Aleix Romero Peña, "El proceso de negociación con ETA durante la etapa de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-2011)", en *Historia Actual Online*, Madrid, 2012, p. 437.

⁸³ Aleix Romero Peña, *op Cit.*, p. 433.

⁸⁴ Julio Bordas Martínez, *op Cit.*, p.441.

The negotiation process, begun on June 25, 2005, was beginning in a phase of confrontation between the main state parties. This process was broken several times because of several terrorist attacks.⁸⁵

In 2008, new elections were held that gave the new victory to the Socialist Party. During this stage, ETA continued to kill but was much less deadly than in previous decades. The arrival of the cessation of armed activity, on October 20, 2011, coincided with a moment of severe crisis for Spain, in which Zapatero's government was in a process of continuous attrition due to the relevant factors: dialogue with the terrorist gang, the reform of the Statute of Catalonia, and the great international economic crisis, which made him lose government in favor of the Popular Party only a month later. Beating ETA has taken a lot of time and effort, 829 lives have been lost. ETA is no longer a danger of state and the victors have been all citizens. In matters of foreign policy, this issue has weakened the government, along with the others mentioned above, has diminished the government's ability in foreign action because of its efforts on these issues.⁸⁶ Despite this, and despite the reduction of the weight of Spain in foreign policy due to the concentration of efforts in domestic politics, the reward is hugely satisfying.

If the fight against terrorism was one of the major internal problems experienced during the Rodríguez Zapatero government stage, the territorial model, and in particular the reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, was another key factor in the socialist government's action. Significantly affects the executive's assessment of citizens and has consequences both internally and externally of its policy.

It is not the reason for this work to analyze the idea of secession of Catalonia nor its costs. What we do not know is how, starting in 2006 with the Approval of the New Statute of Autonomy and with the ruling of the Constitutional Court, the independence parties of Catalonia gave a turn towards independence⁸⁷ and how this affected the situation of the

⁸⁵ Between 2004 and 2011, the ETA terrorist group killed 12 victims. Source: <http://www.elperiodico.com/es/lista-victimas-ETA.shtml>

⁸⁶ Celestino del Arenal, op Cit., pp. 514-515. For the first time, the strong commitment of Spain by the Ibero-American Summits has not been represented by the president of the government. Reasons derived from the important crisis, and the agitation of internal politics. XX Ibero-American Summit of Mar del Plata, December 3 and 4, 2010.

⁸⁷ Mikel Buesa, *La crisis de la España fragmentada, Economía política de la era Zapatero*, Encuentro, Madrid, 2010, p. 171.

Spanish government. An internally convulsed Spain is observed as a weakened Spain in its external action.

With the arrival of Zapatero's executive in power in March 2004, he acceded to the reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia as a request by the Catalan political parties and part of society. The government accepts the petition in order to have the will to reform the Spanish model without changing the Constitution.⁸⁸ The Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia is the institutional norm in charge of regulating autonomy. It was approved by the Congress of Deputies and the Constitutional Court, which declared 73 of the articles, constitutional, 14 unconstitutional and 27 where a restrictive interpretation was proposed. With the reform and subsequent approval, the consequences were very different. In order to give us an idea of the provisions of the Statute and of the modifications of the Constitutional Court, we will highlight some of them, such as: a) The Constitutional Court accepts the preamble describing Catalonia as a "nation", although it points out that Spain remains the only Nation of a constitutional legal form, b) the sole holder of sovereignty is the Spanish people as a whole, c) Catalan is authorized as a language of normal use in the educational system, provided that it does not imply the exclusion of Spanish as a language of instruction.⁸⁹

As we have said, the reactions were diverse and while the large state parties positively accepted the ruling, Catalan autonomic parties criticized the resolution and those of independence, they described the sentence as a cut of competencies, so they deepened their political discourse towards secession.⁹⁰

As for the society, the statutory reform generated a distance of much of the Catalan population towards the government of Zapatero and along with the economic crisis that lashed to Spain, the independence was promoted like a solution.⁹¹ This process of reform, approval and promulgation of the Catalan Statute coincides with the second phase of Zapatero's foreign policy, which has been called the "non-presidential stage", coinciding with the end of its first term and the beginning of its second , 2006-2009. During this

⁸⁸ César Colino y Angustias Hombrado, "El Estado Autonómico: superando la resaca estatutaria y capeando la crisis", en *España en Crisis. Balance de la Segunda Legislatura de Rodríguez Zapatero*, Valencia, 2012, p. 197.

⁸⁹ César Colino y Angustias Hombrado, *op Cit.*, pp. 199-200.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

period the priorities of the executive will fall into domestic politics with the great questions of State.

It is for this reason that both analyzed, the terrorist struggle with the end of armed activity and the cessation of ETA violence, and the approval and reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, will be the main axes of this period, so that the president focuses specifically on these facts.⁹² The foreign policy with a strong primacy in the first stage of government, between 2004 and 2006, with events of great depth, will pass in this second stage to a second plane.⁹³

We have briefly analyzed what were the most important aspects of Spanish domestic policy and which conditioned the foreign policy since they concentrated almost all the presidential attention. Without reaching this importance, events also occurred in matters of internal politics in Brazil that conditioned foreign policy. These were in the first place the crisis of the *mensalao* and the important influence of the internal actors in the Brazilian foreign policy.

“*Lulismo*” is state management and governance that surpasses the political participation of the Workers' Party (PT), where the weight falls on the charismatic leader and mass leader, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. It is the policy of the agreements, an unprecedented political coalition.⁹⁴ This coalition gave rise to the obtaining of the parliamentary majority, partly bought with votes to the deputies. It is what we know as the crisis of *mensalao*. After some difficult beginnings in the government, accompanied by certain doubts on the part of the markets, the international agents, the opposition to its party and its policies, and even of a wide sector of the population, the corruption scandal occurred in 2005 diminished the capacity of the government.

The payment of this amount to the deputies was made from illegal funds controlled by the PT. The operation had been developed by José Dirceu and Soares Delúbio, Lula's

⁹² Celestino del Arenal, *Política exterior de España y...*, Fundación Carolina y Editorial Siglo XXI, Madrid, 2011, p. 413.

⁹³ Vicente Palacio de Oteyza, “¿Cuatro años más de política exterior?”, en *Política Exterior* 121, pp. 95-107. “The great paradox of this legislature consists, then, in having begun by foreign policy and having ended by the more domestic policy”

⁹⁴ Carlos Gadea, “La “izquierda política” en América Latina: el “Lulismo” en Brasil y la “Izquierda” en el Uruguay”, en *Espacio Abierto Cuaderno Venezolano de Sociología*, Vol. 22 no. 3 julio-septiembre, 2013, pp. 379-380.

chief of staff and party treasurer, respectively. On the other hand, Duda Mendonça, declared that the presidential campaign of Lula, had been financed with secret funds that came from private companies and banks, violating the electoral law.⁹⁵

This fact is not new in the Brazilian elections nor in the governments. By the spring of 2006, Lula had lost all of his closest circle. Those charged with the *mensalao* scandal were: José Dirceu (PT), former PT president José Genoíno, party treasurer Delúbio Soares and former secretary general Silvio Pereira.⁹⁶ Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was alone at the head of the Brazilian Republic, with a threat of impeachment on him by senior PSDB officials.

These processes were analyzed in depth by the Brazilian press, especially the newspaper *Folha de S. Paulo*,⁹⁷ which helped explain and knowledge and on the other hand to the vision of external agents. Lula's confidence was weakened but he hid two actions that would save his position and reinforce it.

This first fact was the improvement of the economic situation, with a surprising stability in the moment before the biggest economic crisis after the Great Recession.

Its second success was the improvement of the external situation, due to the importance of Chinese demand. As we will see later, the international crisis has been felt in practically all the countries of the world, although with enormous differences.

Despite the corruption scandals, Lula knew how to retain power. His popularity had dropped enormously, yet he was re-elected with the same majority as four years earlier. It is true that it has reduced poverty rates, the middle class has grown, and also the schooling and social protection by unemployment. Although its programs failed in many aspects,⁹⁸ the political impact was enormous and that he got great support despite the scandals.

⁹⁵ Perry Anderson, "Le Brésil de Lula", *Le Débat* n° 5, (n° 167), 2011, p. 23

⁹⁶ Joana Oliveira, "*Mensalão*: contextualización, histórico y los juicios del STF en la desconstrucción de las imágenes del caso como único y aislado." en *Observatorio político de América Latina y el Caribe*, Sciences Po, Paris, 2012, p. 4.

⁹⁷ Oscar García y Nuno Coimbra, "Corrupción y Accountability en Brasil y España: Los casos Mensalão y Barcenat en los medios de comunicación.", en *XI Congreso Español de Ciencia Política y de la Administración – AECPA*, Sevilla, 2012, p. 10.

⁹⁸ Perry Anderson, *op Cit.*, p. 26. "Lula s'était engagé à aider les pauvres...le programme Faim Zéro pour assurer un minimum vital à tous les Brésiliens, fut un fiasco. Le coût effectif du programme est une bagatelle. Mais son impact politique a été immense."

It is true that in this way, he conquered support in the rural classes and new middle class, created as a result of the measures fomented by his government. At the same time, it was considered in the world as the hope for the Brazilian people for its social policies that were transferred to international frameworks such as the United Nations and others such as the Ibero-American Summits where it found a common position with the Spanish president, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.

The crisis of the *mensalao* affected to a great extent the Party of the Workers and to Lula da Silva. At the same time that part of his inner circle was called to declare, the president lost support in the Brazilian electorate and in turn the image of Brazil fell in international forums due to the loss of confidence and the uncertainty of the government. Lula's reactions were immediate and the good news of his economy and the political revenue of his programs gave him the necessary support for his re-election. Despite the decisions taken, the foreign policy of Lula has been marked in large part by the influence of the internal actors as we will see now.

If Lula, in spite of the adversities suffered at the internal level, was able to maintain a foreign policy to the level of the circumstances that were supposed to Brazil, it can be considered one of the most important and successful aspects of his mandate.⁹⁹ The presidential image of this foreign policy has been key but, despite this, the *Itamaraty*, government actors, private agents and the elite, have played an essential role in the design and planning of Brazilian foreign policy. Lula's diplomacy has been cataloged by Celso Amorim as "*ativa e altiva*".¹⁰⁰ The agents of the Brazilian society demanded voice and participation, and the presidential character was faced to the groups sustaining its power.

In this sense we can highlight several conflicts with the internal actors in relations to foreign policy.

In the first place, the emergence of a "party diplomacy", managed by advisors, members of the workers' party, acting outside the diplomacy carried out by the Foreign Ministry or *Itamaraty*.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Bruno Ayllón y Víctor García, "Brasil, dos años de gobierno de Lula", en *Política Exterior*, nº 103, Enero-Febrero, Madrid, 2005, p.108.

¹⁰⁰ Bruno Ayllón y Víctor García, *op Cit.*, p. 108. "*Active and haughty*".

¹⁰¹ A. De Souza, "A agenda internacional do Brasil. A política externa brasileira de FHC a Lula", en *Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI)*, Rio de Janeiro, 2009, p.145.

Other less relevant but important actors have been, for example, the Congress.¹⁰² Thus, we can speak of a "federative diplomacy" to coordinate foreign action strategies among the main national actors.

Private actors in the rural and industrial economic sectors have been very important in foreign policy. The Landless Workers Movement (MST) has supported Lula and at the same time has been his most critical sector. The industrial sectors have pressed hard to bet on MERCOSUR. Both sectors through their organizations and unions have tried that the government did not leave them aside in a future negotiations.

Finally, civil society organizations and elites have had mixed views on the foreign policy of the Lula government. The post-liberals have been the ones who have supported Lula most. In this way, the number of actors increased when it came to making foreign policy decisions. We can say after the conclusion of his government that Lula's foreign policy has listened to the internal agents and has managed to control their requests.¹⁰³

In this section we have analyzed how domestic politics and its actors influence the foreign policy of Spain and Brazil. During the periods analyzed, we have observed how both governments had to face problems that forced them to change their position on foreign policy. Despite them, the executives tried to meet their external demands. In spite of this, the most important problem that we must analyze next was the international economic crisis.

1.4. The arrival of the economic crisis.

One fact that contributed negatively to the development of politics in the States, and specifically in our case, to Spain and Brazil, was the appearance of the economic crisis. This event appeared in 2008 and governments were forced to take measures, often hasty to address an international court problem. In the run-up to the crisis, the situation in Brazil and Spain is very different from what it is now. In Brazil, between 2004 and 2007, the Brazilian economy was going through a period of high growth and grew at a rate of 4.3%

¹⁰² Clarisa Giaccaglia, "La influencia de los actores domésticos en la política exterior brasileña durante el gobierno de Lula da Silva", en *CONfines* 6/12 agosto-diciembre, Rosario, 2010, p. 104. "The Congress played a prominent role in the foreign policy field, ratifying the protocol of accession by which Venezuela's entry into MERCOSUR."

¹⁰³ Clarisa Giaccaglia, *op Cit.*, p. 119.

of its GDP,¹⁰⁴ while that of Spain was at a rate of 3.5%, surpassed For the first time the average wealth of the European Union and ahead of Italy in per capita income.¹⁰⁵

If the situation of entry into the crisis of both countries was different, much more different was the exit. While for example in Brazil, the international crisis has not had a negative effect on poverty rates and the Brazilian economy has recovered well from this,¹⁰⁶ in the case of Spain the contrast is radical, obtaining in 2011 the worst results Economic growth of democracy and unemployment that had gone from 8.3% to 21.6%.¹⁰⁷

The effects of the economic crisis began to be noticeable at the start of 2008. For example, in Brazil there was a sharp decline in commodities prices, a reduction in the flow of foreign capital, a decline in international demand, higher unemployment, leading to lower domestic demand and slower production.¹⁰⁸ In Spain, like Brazil, it came from a prosperous economic situation, but it had a key structural problem for the development of the crisis, such as the structural deficit in the balance of payments, a productive model with little added value, a strong private debt accompanied Of very unbalanced balance sheets in banks and savings banks and a boom in credit promoter.¹⁰⁹ In short, although the economic situation until 2008 was indisputable good, there were factors or structural problems that could make us see the problems that Spain was going to suffer.

Brazil took important measures such as: the injection of credit into the market, stimulating access to it; The government applied tax reductions and at the same time stimulated activity in the housing sector with the *Minha Casa, Minha Vida* programme to be distributed in relation to the income level of families.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, the minimum wage was increased and unemployment insurance was increased. Despite the measures applied, GDP in Brazil declined by 0.2%, production fell, both industrial 5.5%

¹⁰⁴ Lucas Ronconi y Federico Marongiu, "América Latina frente a la crisis internacional: características institucionales y respuestas de política" en *Serie de Avances de Investigación n°45*, Fundación Carolina, Madrid, 2010, pp.34-47.

¹⁰⁵ Ignacio Molina, "Gobierno y Desgobierno de la Economía: las políticas de respuesta a la crisis", en *España en crisis. Balance de la segunda legislatura de Rodríguez Zapatero*, Valencia, 2012, p. 49.

¹⁰⁶ Lucas Ronconi y Federico Marongiu, *op Cit.*, p. 35

¹⁰⁷ Ignacio Molina, *op Cit.*, p. 50.

¹⁰⁸ Rosa María Marques y Paulo Nakatani, "La crisis mundial y la economía brasileña", en *Red de Estudios de la Economía Mundial*, Santiago de Chile, 2011, pp. 38-58.

¹⁰⁹ Ignacio Molina, *op Cit.*, p. 52.

¹¹⁰ Lucas Ronconi y Federico Marongiu, *op Cit.*, p. 43.

and agricultural 10.3%. With regard to credit, agricultural decreased 38%, trade 12% and people 22%. Due to the international problems that were causing the economic crisis, exports decreased by 26%.¹¹¹

For its part, Spain took measures of austerity and employment promotion, although they were ineffective. There was a 0.2% cut in public spending, the supply of public employment was stopped and the wages of senior officials were frozen. With regard to the promotion of employment, a resettlement plan was developed for the unemployed and in 2009 *Plan E* was applied to stimulate the economy and employment.

The situation in Spain was much more serious, so much so that the government tries to use the presidency of the EU turn to be able to obtain political margin for its reforms. Already in 2010, the executive has to negotiate with ECOFIN, a series of very strict measures and reforms such as: the cessation of all public works and major cuts in social spending¹¹² (freeze pensions and salaries, increase tax rates And delay the retirement age).

In Brazil, despite the fact that the measures promoted were not enough and had an impact on its economy, its foreign policy¹¹³ and domestic policy, partly also due to high growth rates in China and India.¹¹⁴ It is also true that he did not suffer a fall in production and knew how to recover well from the crisis. So much so that, in social matters, Brazil has met the Millennium Goals, halving the percentage of people living in poverty.¹¹⁵

In Spain, the government, during the first moments of the crisis, was engaged in political affairs of vital interest to the nation. Its passivity made the situation uncontrolled and led to the weakening of its economic policy, as well as its policy in the European Union and in its foreign and domestic policy. The reforms carried out were painful and damaging, deteriorating the situation of the citizens and many of them lost the confidence in the government to which they attributed to him a mismanagement of the crisis.¹¹⁶ This

¹¹¹ Rosa María Marques y Paulo Nakatani, *op Cit.*, pp. 38-58.

¹¹² Ignacio Molina, *op Cit.*, p. 71.

¹¹³ Celestino del Arenal, *op Cit.*, p. 487. "Visit of Lula da Silva from September 14 to 17, 2007, with the objective of presenting the Growth Acceleration Plan (PAC) for the four-year period 2007-2010. He met in La Moncloa with half a hundred presidents of the largest Spanish companies."

¹¹⁴ Rosa María Marques y Paulo Nakatani, *op Cit.*, p. 43.

¹¹⁵ Lucas Ronconi y Federico Marongiu, *op Cit.*, p. 46.

¹¹⁶ Ignacio Molina, *op Cit.*, p.52.

bad management led the government to advance the elections and lose them in favor of the Popular Party.

The consequences of the crisis were terrible at the international level but affected some countries more than others. In relation to our field of study, we have observed how it affected Brazil and Spain. While in Brazil measures were taken that although they did not avoid problems, if they supposed an adjustment that allowed to control the effects of the crisis, in Spain the reforms arrived late and they supposed a weakening of the Welfare State, painful and accelerated adjustments. More than five million unemployed people were reached and the average wealth returned to be below the European Union, the recession was greater than in the surroundings countries and the situation was so serious that it was feared by a rescue like the one that had occurred in Greece. The economic crisis greatly influenced the foreign policy of both countries. Potential for foreign investment and in the case of Spain, aid to development cooperation was reduced, making the objectives of the first legislature unattainable.¹¹⁷

To conclude this first chapter, a brief review of the development of relations between Spain and Brazil should be made. These relations, although developed especially in the last years of the twentieth century and have been deepened in the first years of the 21st century, have always had a cooperative nature although there have been differences derived from the incompatibility of interests due to different reasons.

In the following chapters we will analyze the relations between Spain and Brazil during the stages of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from the bilateral and multilateral perspectives, trying to understand the place that both countries occupy in the international system and how the place they have occupied throughout its history, has influenced the framework of these links with its foreign policies. In order to analyze the situation of the relations between the two countries in the different spheres of action of their foreign policy, it is necessary to analyze the determining factors in their relations, as well as their actors and the interaction that has occurred between them throughout of that step.

The processes of cooperation and conflict that we seek to know have occurred due to a set of geographical conditions, demographic movements, economic interests and mentality characteristics, which have shaped the framework of relations between Spain

¹¹⁷ Celestino del Arenal, *op Cit.*, p. 476.

and Brazil and have been essential to analyze these relations between the years 2003 to 2011.

Geographical factors have been responsible for most of the irrelevance of relations for much of the twentieth century, since while Brazil was never colonized by the Spanish empire, unlike the rest of Latin American countries and hence the importance of the agenda towards Ibero-America by Spain, and less against Brazil during practically the whole last century.

Demography has greatly influenced the bilateral agenda of relations between the two countries, and this factor has been the cause of the interrelation between the two countries for nearly a century. We will analyze how the demographic factor has continued to be an essential condition in the period we are trying to analyze, producing some of the minimum conflicts that exist at this stage. The demographic importance gave way to economic power with the advance of globalization and the development of both countries as average powers. Relations between Brazil and Spain in the last years of the twentieth century, coinciding with the presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso and José María Aznar, have taken an economic turn that, due to the important reforms undertaken by both presidents in their countries during the decade of the nineties, fostered development, attracted investment and led to the internationalization of large companies. From here, the ties were tightened in this plane and it was possible a consolidation of the relations between both presidents.

The ideological factors have had a strong presence in the development of the relations between Brazil and Spain throughout its history. The different stages of both states have converged at times. For a long period of time, power has been controlled by people who focused all their struggle against communism, which produced different forms of cooperation between the military dictatorship in Brazil and the Franco regime in Spain. The transition was a Spanish example observed and admired by Brazil as a form of consensus, advance and struggle for democracy. At the stage we are analyzing, the political convergence of both leaders, concerned with social cohesion, will make their relations the point of support for this social development of international politics.

The political factors, on the other hand, will help us to understand how the cooperation carried out between the two societies is fragmented in various sectors, giving rise to a true multidisciplinary cooperation that can be: political, economic, business, cultural, Scientific, technical or integration.

For this reason, the task of analyzing the international system of relations carried out by both governments is a complex task due to its many fields of action. In the following chapters, we will try to analyze the bilateral and multilateral scope in the Ibero-American context, where both countries find their great integration forums such as the European Union by the Spanish side and the MERCOSUR by Brazil. The context in which these relationships are framed is complex because of the large number of actors involved. The challenge of trying to analyze the complexity of these relationships is to try to understand the operation of the international framework, over time, nations have given more importance to the blocks where they are inserted. The European vocation of Spain, as well as the Ibero-American vocation of Brazil as a regional potential, will be essential to understand the framework of relations between both states.

2. The socialist governments of Spain and Brazil in the multilateral framework.

At the multilateral level, relations between countries are carried out through forums of dialogue, international summits, agencies and institutions that give voice to the different states and their insertion in the international panorama.

The actions of the governments of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero at the international level, specifically in the multilateral sphere, have been preceded by the actions of two conservative governments in the social and liberal fields in economic matters, Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil and of José María Aznar in Spain. To this must be added an event that shocked the world and turned the international political landscape, we speak of the attacks committed by Al-Qaeda against the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001. As a result of this fact the international framework changed and later, also the governments of Spain and Brazil.

With the advent of new executives, a new way of doing foreign policy in the multilateral sphere can be seen. Next, we will highlight how the arrival of both leaders to power, impelled a 180 degree turn to the foreign policies of their countries and with that, to the relations between them in the multilateral sphere.

The new executives, both Spanish and Brazilian, will try to respond to the new scenario created as a result of these attacks, which will mean a radical change in the foreign policy of both countries, which we will now observe as it is in a great harmony.

Both countries emphasize the legitimacy of foreign policy and the consensus of this type of policies with the parliamentary forces, although there was a confrontation with the main party of the opposition as a result of this foreign policy. In the case of Spain, the dissent occurred with the Partido Popular,¹¹⁸ led by José María Aznar and in Brazil with the Social Democratic Party of Brazil.¹¹⁹

The new Spanish executive chaired by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero will try to return to its status as a country with a strong European character, disconnecting from the alignment it had maintained during the mandate of José María Aznar with the United

¹¹⁸ Teresa Pérez Cachafeiro, *La política exterior de España. Balances y debates parlamentarios 2004-2008*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2007, p. 77.

¹¹⁹ Perry Anderson, "Le Brésil de Lula", *Le Débat*, nº5 (nº 167), pp. 18.

States. This was demonstrated two months after the arrival of the new government,¹²⁰ when under electoral promise, Rodríguez Zapatero withdraw troops from Afghanistan. To the marked European character was added the recovery of the importance of Latin America.

For the new Spanish socialist government to recover the Europeanism was essential,¹²¹ since at that time it was the European country with the fourth most powerful economy and Europe had to be the central axis of its policies against a transatlantic relationship.

Secondly, beyond the European dimension, the recovery of the Latin American and Mediterranean dimensions, which for historical reasons, had always been cornerstones in Spanish foreign policy.

If we travel to the other side of the Atlantic, the new government of Brazil headed by Lula da Silva regains strength in its diplomatic influence¹²² in the Latin American region due to the void left by the United States due to the events that occurred on September 11, 2001, and mentioned before. We observe how, in a certain way, there are particularities between the Spanish and Brazilian governments and is that due to the weakening of the United States and the change of government, both countries gain in diplomatic importance in the multilateral framework, in this case, they recover voice in their regional vocations natural areas such as Europe and South America. On the other hand, both in Brazil and in Spain there is an inflection in foreign policy with the change of government. The previous governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Jose Maria Aznar, fomented the alignment with the United States, something that with the arrival of the new socialist governments was rejected. It was decided to maintain a very good relationship with the United States but maintained a prominent position in its different areas of action, Europe and South America.

Both governments in this new stage will bet on the most active presence in International Organizations to print their opinion within the different frameworks of action that we will study in this chapter, whether the Ibero-American Summits, relations between the European Union and Latin America and their different Entities, the

¹²⁰ Miguel Angel Moratinos, "Una nueva política exterior para España", *Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, 2004, pp.1-8.

¹²¹ Celestino del Arenal, *Política exterior de España y...*, Fundación Carolina, Madrid, 2011, p.477.

¹²² Wallace Ferreira, "Política Externa do Governo Lula: coalizoes ao sul como alternativa multilateral", *Revista Debates v.1, nº 3*, Porto Alegre, 2009, p. 104.

importance of the creation of the General Secretariat for Ibero-America proposed by the governments of Spain and Brazil, as well as the action of governments in the United Nations.

The arrival of the new executives was essential for the vital contribution¹²³ that was made to development cooperation in both the multilateral and bilateral framework analyzed in the next chapter. In short, the incoming governments were betting to see the rest of the world as a reinforced image of their countries, highlighting the role of an organized and well-managed society¹²⁴ that bet on national sovereignty and equality in the multilateral framework. They advocated new social coalitions and effective multilateralism. In the words of Celso Amorim, Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister, an "*ativa e altiva*"¹²⁵ foreign policy, where the "social" prevails over other interests.

If the Spanish external importance was politically motivated in the European Union, that of Brazil fell to South America. This country borders all countries except Chile and Peru. That is why it is important to be a predominant player in the region and at the same time in its institutions, such as MERCOSUR, and also due to its capacity to receive external investments thanks to the economic measures carried out in the 1990s and during this stage influenced the development of both the investment companies, the country where they invested and the relations between them.

To this organization with the arrival of the government of Lula da Silva, the social and political interests are incorporated, beyond the predominantly economic ones with the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The importance of MERCOSUR shows the reciprocal importance of the European Union. For MERCOSUR, the European Union is the main economic bloc, accumulating 25% of the total value of exports.¹²⁶ Both for MERCOSUR and for the European Union, Brazil and Spain are essential actors that have allowed the development of economic and social policies that allow to improve the welfare of residents in both blocks. Beyond the good political harmony between leftist governments, the important objective for both the European Union and Mercosur is that

¹²³ Bruno Ayllón, "Brazil's contributions to international development: emerging coalitions and South-South cooperation", *Revista CIDOB d'afers internacionals*, nº 97-98, Barcelona, 2012, pp. 193-195.

¹²⁴ Wallace Ferreira, *op Cit.*, 106.

¹²⁵ Gilberto Maringoni, Gonzalo Berron, 2003-2013, *Uma nova política externa*, Copiart, 2014, p. 31.

¹²⁶ Celestino del Arenal, "La triangulación España-Unión Europea-América Latina: sinergias y contadiciones", *Pensamiento Iberoamericano* 8, 2º época, Madrid, 2011, pp. 76.

economic reforms will be in line. There is consolidation market freedom and state security for investments, and in this, Brazil was the indispensable Latin American partner.

The governments of Lula da Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero carried out important developments in the framework of foreign policy. The plans of Africa and the Pacific, the transversal policies of both executives, the strengthening of soft power as an element of essential external action, the involvement of different civil society actors in the state's external action, joint actions led as the Alliance of Civilizations or the Action against Hunger, as well as the social turnaround, were projects carried out by the governments of Spain and Brazil and although not jointly, yes in high harmony.

That is why, once we have highlighted briefly the main changes that took place in foreign policy with the arrival of the governments of Lula da Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero and the developments that initially produced upon arrival, in this chapter we propose to analyze their External action in the multilateral framework starting from the *social turn* that the two presidents undertook.

After analyzing the marked social turn that governments made to their policies, we will first address the Ibero-American Summits from 2004 to 2011, emphasizing their results, analyzing their positions and observing the influence of these in the different countries and especially in relations between Spain and Brazil.

The following section will correspond with the relations between the European Union and Latin America and the essential role of Spanish-Brazilian relations. We will highlight the summits between the European Union and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as their contributions. Relations between the European Union and MERCOSUR, with particular emphasis on Brazil's relationship with the European Union as a predominant country in Latin America and in the MERCOSUR bloc.

Finally, we will analyze the indispensable role played by the Ibero-American General Secretariat as an independent entity to the states, establishing the rules and referee of Latin American communities, all within the Spanish-Brazilian framework.

2.1. Lula and Zapatero: redefining politics in Latin America.

As we have said in the previous section, the coming to power of the PSOE in Spain and the PT in Brazil, headed by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, assumed in the framework of the relations between both countries an essential change in matter social and economic, and at the same time, promoted a new model of relations in the multilateral framework of Latin America and in the one developed in the different international organizations. While we have said that the good harmony between the two leaders was essential to make important progress in social policy in the forums of dialogue, the predominant role of both states makes them sometimes mistrust. Next we will try to analyze the new approaches of the two executives in matters of foreign policy in the Latin American and international scene.

For the governments of Lula and Zapatero, Latin American politics is essential and if, for the Brazilian, Latin America is the first pillar of its foreign policy, for Spanish it is the second one, surpassed by Spain's Europe's vocation, but clearly influenced by the historical ties. Recall that Spain is the only country in the European Union that has a Secretariat of State¹²⁷ dedicated solely to Latin American affairs. For obvious reasons, both governments, Spanish and Brazil have developed ambitious policies in this framework of action, although based on support and with an internationalist relationship. In spite of this, Spain plays a role in the region of preferential actor and that is seen in many occasions like imperialist,¹²⁸ like external actor who looks for the interference. Nevertheless, the policy carried out by Zapatero always sought the agreement with the rest of countries and preferably with those with which it maintained a strategic relation like the case of Brazil.

The arrival of both leaders represented the return of their countries to a policy "*vocationally Ibero-American*"¹²⁹ and is that both Lula and Zapatero thus presented their

¹²⁷ Secretaría de Estado para Iberoamérica, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación, Gobierno de España.

<http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/PoliticaExteriorCooperacion/Iberoamerica/Paginas/EspEnIberoamerica.aspx>

¹²⁸ Celestino del Arenal, *Política exterior de España y ...*, Fundación Carolina, Madrid, 2011, p.489.

¹²⁹ José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, *Discurso de Investidura del candidato a la presidencia del gobierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero*, Congreso de los Diputados, Madrid, 15 de abril, 2004, p. 12.

foreign policy. The former sought to be the main player in its South-South radius of action, leaving aside the alignment with the United States that had maintained its predecessor. On the other hand, Zapatero, focused on Iberoamerica the importance of Spanish foreign policy due to the importance of historical ties and a common past.

The presentation of both leaders took place at the Summit between Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union in Guadalajara (Mexico), it was in May 2004. From that moment it became clear the intention of both presidents, the development of multilateralism, a boost to cooperation and a social turn that would be evident in all areas of its foreign policy. As we see, they are similar objectives that demonstrate the harmony between both leaders, but at the same time they can pose obstacles between them.

The main features of these changes in the foreign policy framework of both countries will be presented below.

A) Return to the margins of autonomy. With the arrival of the governments of Lula da Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero, they tried to return to the margins of autonomy defined for each country. The alignment with the Bush administration of the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and José María Aznar altered the established margins. The historical positions of Brazil and Spain are those of predominant partners in Latin America and Europe,¹³⁰ and not in the Atlantic sphere. Notwithstanding, they had to worsen relations with the United States, although they did, they simply had to move from having a preferential vocation. The common policy of Spain and Brazil is reflected in the respect towards politics with Cuba and Venezuela.

B) Recovery of political harmony. Both Lula da Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero were leaders admired¹³¹ by many of the surrounding countries and the population. They came to power with high hopes and were praised by the international community. In this space, the two leaders were in charge of reinforcing the agreement with the other countries and for this they used the forums of dialogue such as the Ibero-American Summits that were an active motor of policies for the Latin American environment.

On the Spanish side, the agreement will be strengthened with those countries with which Spain will try to foster a strategic relationship such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile,

¹³⁰ Rafael Grasa Hernández, "La política exterior de Brasil durante el primer año de presidencia de Lula: un marco para el análisis de futuro", *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, núm 65, Barcelona, p. 98.

¹³¹ Gladys Lechini y Clarisa Giaccaglia, "El ascenso de Brasil en tiempos de Lula: líder regional o jugador global?", *Revista Problemas del Desarrollo*, 163, Rosario, 2010, p. 57.

Colombia, Peru and Mexico. On the contrary, Brazil will stand out as the most powerful state and the defender of the rights of Latin American countries in the international framework.

The conciliation was key and in part because of it was the change that occurred in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Spain. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation between 2004 and 2009 had been Miguel Angel Moratinos, who was blamed that he was not a good connoisseur of the Latin American world. In 2009 it takes place its relay, that happens to hands of Trinidad Jiménez, that had been until then Secretary of State for Iberoamerica.¹³² The importance of concertation in the policies of both states towards Latin America is therefore highlighted.

C) The impulse of a social turn. The governments of Spain and Brazil have led a social turn that has reached all forums for dialogue where they have acted and in the area of bilateral relations. This does not indicate that the social aspect has only been focused. The good progress of the economic aspect is indispensable for the achievement of social objectives.

From this moment, both governments will pay increasing attention to the social problems in Latin America as demonstrated in the plans¹³³ of the Brazilian and Spanish cooperation agencies. This social impulse of both governments, will also be glimpsed in the international organisms. Both Brazil and Spain have been founding members of the Alliance Against Hunger carried out by the United Nations. Both governments have increased official development aid and modernized their often obsolete cooperation policies. They have strengthened relations with the different social actors, emphasizing the NGOs and at the same time the private companies,¹³⁴ especially the Spanish companies installed in Latin America, concretely in Brazil. The governments proposed to these companies the creation of foundations where social insertion projects are

¹³² España: Trinidad Jiménez, nueva canciller “latinoamericanista”.
http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2010/10/101020_espana_cambio_gobierno_trinidad_jimenez_cuba_az.shtml

¹³³ Ana Carolina Melos de Sousa, Henrique Pigozzo da Silva, “A Política Externa Brasileira para a cooperação internacional em Defesa: análise dos projetos no âmbito da Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (2003-2014)”, *Rio Grande do Sul*, 2015, p. 2-3.

¹³⁴ Alfredo Arahuetes, Célio Hiratuka, *Relações Econômicas entre Brasil e Espanha*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2009, p. 78-80.

promoted. In definitive it was a question of moving from a simple aid policy to a development policy.

D) Better bilateral relations. The good tuning of the governments of Spain and Brazil opened the door to improving relations with the rest of Latin American countries. Political coincidence was essential for the improvement of these relations and at the same time, forums such as the Ibero-American Summits were essential to improve relations between states. In this way, Spain and Brazil were positioned as preferred interlocutors within the framework of Ibero-American action. In this way, the firms of Strategic Partnership gave rise to a reinforcement not seen until now with the Ibero-American countries. As far as we are concerned, the relations between Spain and Brazil were marked by the good harmony with some coincident objectives, remember that both states were the first to possess a Strategic Association agreement.

E) The importance of the Ibero-American Summits. Both Spain and Brazil have made great efforts to consolidate the Ibero-American Summits as a forum for dialogue among Latin American countries. Although both governments agree on the importance of these forums, Brazil does not see with good eyes the performance of Spain on many occasions as a predominant partner.¹³⁵ Due to this, it was decided to undertake the creation of the Ibero-American General Secretariat, which we will explain in this chapter and which implies intervention as coordinator of a non-state actor within the framework of multilateral policies in Latin America.

F) Relations between the European Union and Latin America. Both the government of Rodríguez Zapatero and that of Lula da Silva are confident in the strengthening of relations between Latin America and the European Union.¹³⁶ So much so that they have been the main drivers of the MERCOSUR Association Agreements with the European Union. The position of Brazil as the leading country in Latin America and MERCOSUR and the position of Spain in the European Union, being the fourth largest economy and the only country that has a state foreign policy towards Latin America, have made both states, preferential actors of this relationship.

As we can see, relations between Spain and Brazil have been consolidated thanks to the arrival of the new presidents Lula da Silva and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. The

¹³⁵ Celestino del Arenal, *Política exterior de España y ...*, Fundación Carolina, Madrid, 2011, p.497.

¹³⁶ Bruno Ayllón, "La política exterior del Gobierno de Lula y las relaciones de Brasil con la Unión Europea", *Real Instituto Elcano, Área América Latina- Europa*, Madrid, 2006, p.1.

bilateral and multilateral agenda of both executives has been strongly incorporated into a social dimension that had previously only been outlined. Proof of these new social policies have been the strong involvement of both governments in the United Nations, championing proposals such as the Alliance of Civilizations, the Millennium Goals and the fight against hunger.

Since the signing of Strategic Partnership in 2003 between Lula da Silva and José María Aznar, the relationship has advanced a lot and has taken important steps in social and cultural matters without neglecting the economic aspects and this is demonstrated by the different visits.

The first visit occurred only one month after taking office in the government. Miguel Angel Moratinos, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, visited Brazil in June 2004, and just seven months later, in January 2005, President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero signed with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the Brasilia Declaration and promote the above mentioned aspects. The intentions were clear in relation to the importance that Brazil had in the new executive. In September 2007, Lula da Silva visited Spain to meet with the most important entrepreneurs in the European country. Visit of economic court that sought to encourage investment in Brazil. A year later, in May 2008, Zapatero returned to visit Brazil to meet with Lula and that same year, on October 12, Lula was the guest of honor to the celebrations for the *Day of Hispanidad*. The numerous visits, to which we must add all the meetings in the common forums between them, give a good account of the great harmony between both leaders and the importance of relations between the two countries.

We summarize then that the redefinition of the policies of Lula and Zapatero pass by prioritizing the axis of action, that is to say, the improvement of the relations with the European and Latin American environment. The promotion of forums for dialogue, especially the Ibero-American Summits. Progress in relations between the European Union and Latin America. And finally, the development of a marked social turn that will affect all the areas of its policies in the external field.

Despite the good harmony between Spain and Brazil, the second one has uncovered itself as a world power, which implies that it happens to be a power in its environment and does not glimpse with pleasure that an extra-regional actor and that despite its historical links as is Spain, interferes as a protagonist in the Ibero-American framework.

2.2. The Ibero-American Summits between 2004-2010.

During this work we wanted to make clear the leading role of Latin America in the foreign policy of Spain. From the beginning of the new democratic Spain from 1976, foreign policy suffered a revolution and adapted to the democratic principles of European states. At the same time, Spain was uncovered as a normative power in Latin America, in certain cases, ambitious because this region was the only one where Spain could extend its power as economic, political and cultural leader country.

Thanks to the historic dimension of this foreign policy, Ibero-American Summits have been promoted since 1991,¹³⁷ as a platform for Spain in the Latin American scenario. For Spain has been its main bet in the region and for that reason has always been the country most interested in promoting them. With the advent of the new century and the growth and development of Brazil as a global and regional power, as well as the development of many Latin American countries and the development of autonomous external policies, Ibero-American summits have lost some of the meaning they enjoyed.

In this section we propose to analyze the role of these forums and the importance of the governments of Spain and Brazil during the stage of Rodríguez Zapatero and Lula da Silva. The period we will analyze of Ibero-American Summits will be between 2004 and 2010, starting at the 2004 Summit in San José, Costa Rica, later in October 2005, the Salamanca Summit, in 2006 in Montevideo, Ibero-American Summit in Santiago de Chile in 2007, San Salvador in 2008, Estoril in 2009 and Mar del Plata in 2010.

From these meetings, we will try to analyze the new Latin American scenario from the point of view of Spain and Brazil, focusing on what was until then the clearest expression of Latin American, the Ibero-American Summits. The new scenario in Latin America was complex due in part to the heterogeneity existing between the different states, something that contrasted with the scenario that the Ibero-American Summits had experienced in the nineties with a homogeneity¹³⁸ at least apparent and that at the same time facilitated the external action of Spain through this forum. With the start of the new decade, Spain will have to face a period of political division in Latin America.

¹³⁷ Cumbres iberoamericanas, *Secretaría General Iberoamericana*, 2016. <http://segib.org/cumbres-iberoamericanas/>

¹³⁸ Celestino del Arenal, "La triangulación España-Unión Europea-América Latina: sinergias y contradicciones", *Pensamiento Iberoamericano 8 (2ª época)*, Madrid, 2014, pp. 75-76.

At the same time as the political and economic division was the general theme, the Latin American region has obtained the respect of the international community for its stability.¹³⁹ An example of this has been the international economic crisis that has affected the European countries and the United States more than the Latin American states. In this way, Spain could no longer act in the region as a stabilizing agent. This regional stability has led to the weakening of extra-regional actors and the main regional players to grow in their desire to become regional and global powers,¹⁴⁰ as in the case of Brazil.

While foreign actors such as the United States, the European Union and Spain are being weakened, new extra-regional players appear as China, India and Russia.

One of the major changes in the context of the Summits, and an excellent representation of the transformation undergone by Latin America, is the new role played by Brazil. In the nineties it was a country that is far from what it is now. In the first decade of the new millennium, Brazil discovers itself as a regional actor with an aspiration to be global and able to be one.¹⁴¹ In this way, Brazil as an emerging power knows the decline of Spain in the region and relates it to its rise. With this scenario, the arrival to the government of Rodríguez Zapatero supposed a change in the strategy with respect to the Ibero-American Summits. The Spanish government introduced with the help of its Ibero-American partners and especially with Brazil, two novelties in the Summits that allowed it to partially recover the lost importance.

On the one hand, the first novelty was the change of strategy, going from a unilateral leadership practiced by the government of José María Aznar, to a shared leadership¹⁴² and for that was created the organism that today continues to govern the Summits and providing them with a permanent structure, the SEGIB. This process was carried out in 2004 at the San José Summit of Costa Rica. In the next section we will analyze in detail the role of SEGIB, its creation as well as its composition.

The second novelty introduced by Rodríguez Zapatero, supported by all the heads of state of the countries attending the Summits and which served to give greater importance

¹³⁹ Celestino del Arenal, "Brasil, las Cumbres iberoamericanas y el papel de España en América Latina", *documentos CIDOB n° 39*, Barcelona, 2013, pp. 3-4.

¹⁴⁰ Celestino del Arenal, *op. Cit.*, pp. 4.

¹⁴¹ Perry Anderson, "Le Brésil de Lula", *Le Débat* 2011, n° 5 (n° 167), pp. 34-35.

¹⁴² Julimar da Silva Bichara, "Zapatero y Lula: ¿nuevo signo en las relaciones hispano-brasileñas?", *Boletín Brasil, Centro de Estudios Brasileños Ortega y Gasset*, vol. 2, n° 1, Sao Paulo, 2005, pp. 2-3.

to the Summits was the social turn.¹⁴³ Since the San José Summit in Costa Rica, the commitments in these meetings have varied from those of the first decade and have addressed issues such as migration, development, cooperation and social cohesion.

Based on these innovations: the creation of the SEGIB, which has meant a quantum of organizational and functional quality in the Summits, the social movement promoted by the different heads of state participating in the Summits and the new linkage between these forums and civil society, the new framework of the Ibero-American Summits has been set up between 2004 and 2010. We will then analyze this stage chronologically to investigate the value of these encounters.

The first of the Summits attended by both Spanish and Brazilian presidents was held in San José, Costa Rica, between November 18 and 20, 2004. With the motto "Educate for Progress", all representatives maintained the Commitment in the field of cooperation and the promotion of it for a higher social expenditure.¹⁴⁴ It was at this Ibero-American Summit that the statutes that governed the Ibero-American General Secretariat, approved by all heads of state and at the same time largely driven by countries such as Spain and Brazil, were approved.¹⁴⁵ The first is because it affects the change of the System in Ibero-American foreign policy, from hegemonic leadership to consensus and shared leadership. The second because in this way is reduced the leading role played by Spain in said Summits.

At this summit, we declare investment in education as a priority and boost the increase in social spending. A change in the debt of these countries for the promotion of education was proposed.¹⁴⁶ The CIBERAMERICA portal was created on the proposal of the leaders, where all the countries had to unite to be able to reduce the digital divide that suffers the region. As we can see, the main measures in this Summit are of social character with what is revealed, the changes introduced.

The 2005 Ibero-American Summit took place in the Spanish city of Salamanca between 14 and 15 October. This was the beginning of SEGIB as General Secretariat of

¹⁴³ Celestino del Arenal, *Política exterior de España y...*, Fundación Carolina, Madrid, 2011, p.507-508.

¹⁴⁴ XIV Cumbre iberoamericana San José de Costa Rica, 2004. <http://segib.org/cumbre/xiv-cumbre-iberoamericana-san-jose-2004/>

¹⁴⁵ *Declaración de San José*, XIV Cumbre iberoamericana de Jefes de Estado y de gobierno, San José de Costa Rica, 2004, pp. 1-8.

¹⁴⁶ *Declaración de San José*, *op. Cit.*, pp. 1-8.

Ibero-America, with the Uruguayan Enrique Iglesias elected secretary general unanimously.

The agenda of this Summit continued to mark the line of the one celebrated the previous year. The most important measures adopted were the creation of a Civic Forum to fight poverty and an Agenda for Development.¹⁴⁷ At the same time, the Ibero-American Cultural Charter¹⁴⁸ was created for the promotion of diversity, as well as promoting the creation of a community space for research and education. Just before the Summit, an Ibero-American Entrepreneurs Forum was held for the first time with the objective of achieving certain commitments to combat poverty, social exclusion and at the same time foster development.

In 2006, the Ibero-American Summit was held in Montevideo, specifically on November 3 and 5, under the motto "Migrations and Development." An essential issue that deeply affects countries such as Spain and Brazil, which as we will explain in the next chapter of the bilateral relations between both states, this aspect has given rise to problems and clashes between these countries.

In relation to the Ibero-American Summits, this year is a turning point due to the fact that in the two previous years all the heads of states of the countries involved attended, twenty-one in total, whereas in 2006, there were 16 heads of State,¹⁴⁹ the rest being Vice Presidents and Foreign Ministers. In this way, the decline in the importance of the Ibero-American Summits is demonstrated despite the importance of the theme.

¹⁴⁷ XV Cumbre iberoamericana de Salamanca, 2005. <http://segib.org/cumbre/xv-cumbre-iberoamericana-salamanca-2005/>

¹⁴⁸ Declaración de Salamanca, *XV Cumbre iberoamericana de Jefes de Estado y de gobierno*, Salamanca, 2005, pp. 5-6.

¹⁴⁹ Europa press, 2/11;2016. La Cumbre Iberoamericana vuelve a tener significativas ausencias pese al esfuerzo de España. <http://www.notimerica.com/politica/noticia-cronica-cumbre-cumbre-iberoamericana-vuelve-tener-significativas-ausencias-pese-esfuerzo-espana-20061102203239.html>
"Nicaragua, Panama, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Brazil have not been represented by their heads of state. Lula da Silva argued that he could not come for electoral reasons."

The 2007 Ibero-American Summit held in Santiago de Chile has been the most controversial to date.¹⁵⁰ Despite the motto "Social cohesion and social policies to achieve more inclusive societies in Ibero-America" and approved the Ibero-American Convention on Social Security, the Summit went down in history because of the confrontation between Hugo Chávez and the King of Spain.

Chávez wanted to oppose the model adopted by the Summit and by the majority of countries attending, the market economy, imposing its neopopulist forms. In order to carry out this action, its main target was Spain due to its role as a relevant actor in the framework of the Ibero-American Summits, its important economy within the framework of the European Union and as a global player.¹⁵¹ The attacks that Chavez launched against the former president of the Spanish government, José María Aznar, provoked the anger of Spanish assistants like the King, the President of the Government and the Foreign Minister. Before the closing of the Summit, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero called for respect for a democratically elected president, while Chavez continued to interrupt him. The King replied energetically to Chavez with a "Why do not you shut up?", and soon left the meeting.¹⁵² This event, supposed a before and after in the development of the Ibero-American Summits. As a result, it is curious to note that, from all the Summits, we find the information on the agreements reached on the SEGIB website, while in this only the title and duration of the agreement appears.

In 2008, the Ibero-American Summit was held in El Salvador between 29 and 31 October under the theme "Youth and Development". This Summit has returned to normality and consensus, to which Hugo Chavez's non-participation in it contributed. The most important action carried out was the approval of the "San Salvador Consensus on the modalities of participation in the Ibero-American Conference"¹⁵³ so that they could participate in the Summits, members and non-Ibero-American actors as full-time observers.

¹⁵⁰ Cástor Díaz Barrado, "La posición de España en el espacio latinoamericano: el diseño de un nuevo componente de la política exterior española", *Quorum. Revista de pensamiento iberoamericano*, nº 9, Madrid, 2007, pp. 58-59.

¹⁵¹ Celestino del Arenal, "Cumbres iberoamericanas: Fin de ciclo", *Investidura como Doctor Honoris Causa en la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos*, Madrid, 2014, p.2.

¹⁵² Celestino del Arenal, *Política exterior de España y...*, Fundación Carolina, Madrid, 2011, p.511.

¹⁵³ Declaración de El Salvador, *XVIII Cumbre Iberoamericana de Jefes de Estado y de gobierno*, El Salvador, 2008, pp. 2-3.

The XIX Ibero-American Summit of 2009 took place in Estoril between 29 November and 1 December under the motto "Innovation and Knowledge". Large agreements have been reached, although in the face of the most relevant decisions, a consensus has not been reached among all heads of state¹⁵⁴, such as the situation in Honduras and the coup against the government of Manuel Zelaya. Something condemned by most Latin American countries. With the elections held in Honduras, Latin America was divided in two: on the one hand the block headed by Venezuela and headed by Brazil as a regional power, rejected the Honduran elections. Spain tried to place itself in the center as a mediator. In a report issued by those attending the Summit,¹⁵⁵ Zelaya was reinstated as president of Honduras for "a return to constitutional normality".

The 2010 Ibero-American Summit was held in the city of Mar del Plata in Argentina between December 3-4 under the slogan "Education for Social Inclusion". As we have seen since 2004, the slogans of the Summits and most of their agreements have revolved around the social framework. This Summit will be remembered for the implementation of a large Education project¹⁵⁶ in the Ibero-American environment. In spite of this, this Summit demonstrated the loss of importance of these meetings. To date no Spanish president since 1991 had failed to meet with the Summits, this being the first time a president, in this case Rodríguez Zapatero did not attend the meeting. He was presiding over an emergency Council of Ministers due to the measures taken to alleviate the effects

¹⁵⁴ XIX Cumbre iberoamericana de Estoril, 2009. <http://segib.org/cumbre/xix-cumbre-iberoamericana-estoril-2009/>

¹⁵⁵ Comunicado especial de la presidencia sobre la situación en Honduras, *XIX Cimeira Ibero-Americana Portugal 2009*, Secretaría General Iberoamericana, Estoril, 2009, p. 1. "Los Jefes y los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de los países iberoamericanos condenan el golpe de estado en Honduras y consideran inaceptables las graves violaciones de los derechos y libertades fundamentales del pueblo hondureño. En este contexto, consideran que la restitución del Presidente José Manuel Zelaya en el cargo para el que fue democráticamente elegido hasta completar su periodo constitucional es un paso fundamental para el retorno a la normalidad constitucional."

¹⁵⁶ Programa de acción de Mar de Plata, *XX Cumbre Iberoamericana 2010*, Secretaría General Iberoamericana, Mar de Plata, 2010, p. 1. "Las Jefes y los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno iberoamericano, tomando en consideración los objetivos establecidos en la Declaración de la XX Cumbre Iberoamericana, así como las deliberaciones sobre el tema de "Educación para la Inclusión Social pretenden adoptar el Programa "Metas 2021; la educación que queremos para la generación de los Bicentenarios, con el objetivo de lograr a lo largo de la década una educación que dé respuesta a un conjunto de demandas sociales inaplazables."

of the economic crisis that hit Spain. Although it is true that the Summits were declining in importance, the Council of Ministers was extremely serious and required the presence of the president, something that is constitutionally mandatory.

In spite of the important absences of the heads of state of the ALBA countries, a declaration on "The defense of democracy and constitutional order in Ibero-America" has been approved.¹⁵⁷

Through the analysis of the Ibero-American Summits, we have been able to verify how a heterogeneity has occurred that is far from the homogeneity lived during the last decade of the nineties. Brazil has uncovered itself as a regional actor who claims to be global and therefore distrusts Spanish interests in the region.

The economic crisis that has unequally affected the countries of Europe and Latin America has produced specific mismatches and increased political and economic differences.

In spite of the active participation, as the new diplomacy was defined with the arrival of Lula da Silva in the Ibero-American Summits, Brazil never saw the participation in these Summits especially relevant,¹⁵⁸ since the historical and cultural links the Summits are fundamentally Hispanic. Despite this, Brazil has been a main player in the Summits, with special relevance in the creation of SEGIB for the reduction of power of Spanish diplomacy and the rise of Brazil as a power. The Summits until the arrival of Zapatero enjoyed an almost total Spanish, something that rejected Brazil and as we see it has changed. At the same time, the implementation of Summits between the European Union and Latin America has reduced the importance of the Ibero-American Summits.

¹⁵⁷ Declaración Especial sobre "La defensa de la democracia y el orden constitucional en Iberoamérica", *XX Cumbre Iberoamericana Argentina*, Secretaría General Iberoamericana, Mar de Plata, 2010, p.1. "Reiteramos que nuestra comunidad se asienta en el respeto irrestricto del Estado de Derecho, el respeto a la soberanía, la defensa de la democracia, la voluntad soberana de los pueblos, la justicia social, el respeto a los Derechos Humanos y las libertades fundamentales que son requisitos esenciales para la participación en los distintos órganos de la Conferencia Iberoamericana y son conquistas de los pueblos iberoamericanos que no admiten retroceso."

¹⁵⁸ Carmen Fonseca, "A política externa brasileira da democracia. O paradoxo da mudança na continuidade?", *O Brasil e a política internacional*, Relações internacionais, 2011, pp. 40-41.

Spain, on the other hand, is aware of the situation and has focused its interest in Europe and in areas where the possibility of economic expansion is greater, such as Asia and the Pacific,¹⁵⁹ leaving aside historical, cultural and linguistic links.

Latin America as a united community is more solvent when it comes to tackling problems and that is why it has strengthened its role in the Summits with the European Union and in the case of Brazil, it has been one of the first country to seal a Strategic Partnership with the Union Europe,¹⁶⁰ for that reason, the Ibero-American Summits happen to have a second plane.

For Brazil, Spain is a competitor in the framework of action of the Summits since the Latin American country aspires to be a global actor, being already the great regional actor.

We have seen how the panorama of the Summits has varied markedly between the decade of its creation, and the first decade of 2000. Spain's commitment to shared leadership only reflects the difficulties of Survival of the Ibero-American Summits. Due to the increase of forums of meetings between the different actors such as the Summits between Latin America and the European Union that allows the countries to act as a community. At the same time that Brazil exerts itself as main regional actor and aspires to be a global actor and does not see with good eyes the Spanish intervention in the region, they give rise to a weakness of the Summits and to an uncertain future.

These forums will not be able to recover the importance they enjoyed in the first decade of life without a more relevant participation of Brazil, which considers these meetings as essential and at the same time a new rethinking of Spanish foreign policy towards Latin America.

The period between 2004-2010 in the Ibero-American Summits provides us with essential information on the relations between Spain and Brazil in the Latin American multilateral framework, where we observe a Brazil with aspirations to more and a Spain in search of a redefinition of the external project in Latin America.

¹⁵⁹ Fundación Alternativas, "Los objetivos de España en su acción exterior", *opex, Observatorio de política exterior española, Documento de Trabajo 21/2008*, Madrid, 2008, pp. 39-40.

¹⁶⁰ Francisco Aldecoa y Mercedes Guinea, "Nace la diplomacia común de la UE", *Política Exterior, Vol 24, nº 136*, Madrid, 2010, pp. 73-74.

2.3. The creation of the SEGIB (Ibero-American General Secretariat).

As we have been able to analyze in the previous section, for Spain, Latin America was the only area where it could predominantly deploy all its external action and carry out an entire program where the Spanish state was the main actor in the region. With the arrival of the first decade of the new millennium and the new executives in different countries such as Brazil and this case Spain, the situation had to change course in the framework of meetings such as the Ibero-American Summits. The change went from being a hegemonic leadership historically propelled by Spain due to the weakness of the countries of Latin America, to a leadership shared in the multilateral area due to the increasing heterogeneity reigning in the zone and at the same time, the birth of great powers who did not look favorably the role of Spain, such as Brazil.

This framework promotes the creation of the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB) at the Summit of Heads of State held in 2003, and subsequently the statutes are developed at the 2004 Ibero-American Summit held in San José, Costa Rica, to be finally ratified in Declaration of Salamanca,¹⁶¹ at the 2005 Ibero-American Summit.

That is why, due to the pressures of other states, especially Brazil, although it has subsequently been one of the countries that contributed most to the development of SEGIB,¹⁶² the Ibero-American Summit in Salamanca launched the General Secretariat Iberoamericana "as a permanent support body for the institutionalization of the Ibero-American Conference". SEGIB began as an institution that promotes the values of the region to be able to carry out the understanding between the countries that form it, in definitive, an organism that institutionalizes the Summits and that at the same time reduces the predominant power Which Spain had exercised until that date.

The first general secretary of this secretariat would be the Uruguayan D. Enrique V. Iglesias, proposed unanimously because of his extensive career in the framework of external relations. Enrique Iglesias had been President of the Central Bank of Uruguay,

¹⁶¹ Declaración de Salamanca, *XV Cumbre Iberoamericana de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno*, Salamanca, 2005, pp. 1-6. "Decidimos poner en marcha la Secretaría General Iberoamericana, como órgano permanente de apoyo para la institucionalización de la Conferencia Iberoamericana...Confiamos en la Secretaría General para impulsar los objetivos establecidos en el Convenio de Santa Cruz de la Sierra..."

¹⁶² Celestino del Arenal, "Brasil, las Cumbres Iberoamericanas y el papel de España en América Latina", *documentos CIDOB*, Barcelona, 2013, p. 5.

Executive Secretary of CEPAL, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay and President of the Inter-American Development Bank until 2005, from which he began to hold the position of Secretary General of SEGIB. After all, his candidature was accepted unanimously because he possessed the knowledge indicated to carry out this function and, on the other hand, he did not come from any country with aspirations to dominate the Ibero-American framework.

Beyond disputes over the definition of regional and global actors, SEGIB has been essential for the development of the Summits and at the same time to equip the Ibero-American community with an institution in charge of such relevant aspects as cooperation projects in the region with countries participating in these Summits. That is why, as described in the Declaration of Salamanca, the Heads of State instruct SEGIB to strengthen Ibero-American cooperation, internal cohesion and the international projection of the Ibero-American Community of Nations. We observe how the SEGIB has functions that are mostly social and cultural in Ibero-American society.

The Ibero-American General Secretariat supports the 22 countries of the Ibero-American community, where, beyond institutionalizing the Summits, they promote cooperation in cultural, social and educational matters.¹⁶³ We can say that thanks to a first option that was the simple fact of institutionalizing the Summits and subtracting power from a Spain that had made the Summits a Hispanic model, SEGIB has proved to be an institution that has produced for Latin America an important social wealth. It stands as a unique space of work, collaboration and agreements in the region and encompassing all countries. Support, promote, strengthen and implement are words that are recorded in the dictionary of SEGIB as the main tasks to be developed in the Ibero-American environment. Tasks that began in 2005 and that we will analyze next.

The first actions carried out by the Ibero-American General Secretariat were to support the initiatives that had already been launched in the previous Summits by the Ibero-American countries, specifically those that were aimed at eliminating poverty and hunger. At the same time and thanks to a proposal from Spain, promote the exchange of debt for education.¹⁶⁴ As an Ibero-American institutional entity, it is in charge of maintaining a

¹⁶³ ¿Qué es la Secretaría General Iberoamericana?, <http://segib.org/quienes-somos/>.

¹⁶⁴ Declaración de Salamanca, *XV Cumbre Iberoamericana de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno*, Salamanca, 2005, pp. 1-6. "...impulsar en el seno de la comunidad iberoamericana, y en terceros países, los programas de canje de deuda por educación y otras inversiones sociales..."

dialogue on everything related to investments and access to credit. Another important sector of SEGIB is cooperation, and for this purpose its role is to expand this sector, supporting low-income and resource-poor countries. One of the most important functions in the framework of the Ibero-American nations society, which allows the Ibero-American General Secretariat to coordinate policies, is everything related to migration. SEGIB is committed to coordinate policies for the treatment of migratory flows, which, as we have said on previous occasions, have created a strong controversy between Brazil and Spain.¹⁶⁵ For this reason, SEGIB is responsible for developing, along with other countries, public action programs to promote human rights, promote the rule of law, as well as experiences to encourage the development of immigrants. At the same time it is in charge of maintaining constant meetings with all the countries to develop common policies of action. As a permanent institutional, technical and administrative support body for the Ibero-American Conference, the statutes of SEGIB make clear its functions and the work of said institution. These have been approved by all countries participating in the Ibero-American Summits. As indicated in its statutes, the functions will be:¹⁶⁶

- Execute the mandates received from the Summits and Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;
- Support the Pro-Tempore Secretariat in the preparation of the Ibero-American Summits;
- Collaborate with the Pro-Tempore Secretariat, and the host country where appropriate, in the preparation, coordination and follow-up of sectoral ministerial meetings;
- To coordinate with the Pro-Tempore Secretariat the functions of rapport at the Ibero-American Summits of Heads of State and Government;
- Strengthen, in accordance with the Bariloche Convention, the work on cooperation within the framework of the Ibero-American Conference;

¹⁶⁵ Carlos Malamud, *Relaciones España-Brasil*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2014, pp. 53-56.

¹⁶⁶ *Estatuto de la Secretaría General Iberoamericana*, Secretaría General Iberoamericana, San José de Costa Rica, 2004, pp. 1-7. "Teniendo en consideración de las disposiciones contenidas en el Convenio de Santa Cruz de la Sierra Constitutivo de la Secretaría General Iberoamericana (SEGIB) y en el Convenio de Bariloche, los Estados Miembros de la Conferencia Iberoamericana acuerdan el siguiente Estatuto por el cual se regirá la Secretaría General Iberoamericana"

- Present proposals for programs, projects and cooperation initiatives to the meeting of the Heads of Ibero-American Cooperation;
- Collaborate with Member States in the design and management of Ibero-American cooperation programs, projects and initiatives;
- Technical and administrative support to the Ibero-American Conference;
- Contribute to the international projection of the Ibero-American Community;

Therefore, the entire structure of the SEGIB, both the Secretary General, the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary for Ibero-American Cooperation are responsible for forlating the Ibero-American Community, promoting links between these communities, supporting the preparation of the Summits and At the same time, implement South-South cooperation in the countries of the region as an independent institution to the countries that make up that community. In this way, greater autonomy, professionalism and the participation of the countries is equitable in every way.

We can say that the creation of the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB) has institutionalized the Summits and has given them an almost total impartiality that has served to give importance to this meeting within the framework of the Ibero-American community. Despite this and that Brazil's participation since the implementation of SEGIB in the Summits has been much more active, as we said earlier, this country and more specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the government of Lula da Silva, has never seen at the summit, a framework of paramount importance as evidenced by the different forums and the role played by Brazilian diplomacy.

Although the political alignment of the Spanish and Brazilian governments was almost total, the objectives were convergent and affected the development of the Summits.

Next, we will analyze the forums where Brazil has played a clear role as a regional power such as the Summits between the European Union and Latin America, the relationship between MERCOSUR and the European Union, and finally the direct relationship of this country with the Union through of its Strategic Association. In order to know all the deployment developed by Brazil in its diplomatic radius of action towards Europe, it is essential to discover in paper played at all times by Spain.

2.4. Relations between EU and Latin America.

Relations between the European Union and Latin America have maintained distance that has only been broken since the second half of the first decade of 2000. Since this period and thanks to the importance they had for the relaunch of Relations the coming to power in Spain of the government chaired by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and at the same time in Brazil, the government headed by Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, we can speak of a new stage in the framework of relations between Latin America and the Union European Union.

We wish to emphasize the summits celebrated between the European Union and the Latin American countries during this period, the first, the Guadalajara Summit in 2004 and the second in 2006 in Vienna, as the milestones that marked the new starting point of relations Reinforced between both political spaces. Thanks to these Summits, the European Union knew how to value the Latin American countries and the joint evaluations for the signing of the Strategic Partnership agreement began to be developed.¹⁶⁷ If the European Union was responsible for recognizing the importance of the Latin American countries to evaluate the possibilities of association, in a way it was thanks to Spain and its support, since this country had agreements of Strategic Association¹⁶⁸ with some of the most important countries of Latin America.

If we mentioned that the relaunch of these new relations took place between the years 2004-2006, a new phase of activation of the relations occurs between 2007 and 2010, culminating with the important Summit held in Madrid on May 18, 2010 between the European Union and Latin America. During this period, relations will develop a significant change, not only in the European Union and Latin America, but also between

¹⁶⁷ Celestino del Arenal, "Las relaciones entre la UE y América Latina: ¿abandono del regionalismo y apuesta por una nueva estrategia de carácter bilateralista?", *Real Instituto Elcano, documento de trabajo*, Madrid, 2009, pp. 3-4.

¹⁶⁸ Celestino del Arenal, "La triangulación España-Unión Europea-América Latina: sinergias y contradicciones.", *Pensamiento Iberoamericano 8 (2ª época)*, Madrid, 2011, pp. 79-81.

countries with the European Union, orchestrated by the diplomatic delegations of Spain and Brazil.¹⁶⁹

This change in the direction of relations, both biregional, multilateral and bilateral, will be reflected in the Commission Communication "The European Union and Latin America: A Global Actors Association".¹⁷⁰ From this communication, the European bloc enters into a commercial negotiation with Colombia and Peru, as we have spoken bilaterally, recognizes the new actors as UNASUR, and supports them for a future integration. At the end, change in relationships occurs flexibly in order to accommodate new political, economic and social situations and attitudes. In this new flexible framework of action, Spain and Brazil play an essential role. The first because as a European actor with Ibero-American links is responsible for unblocking the situation between both regional actors. The second, because as the main regional actor and with aspirations to global, is in charge of leading the action projects of the block as a whole.

We can say that, as a result of this change in relations, making them more flexible, the results have been positive and have been an important development in all areas and in different scenarios. And we want to reiterate in that aspect the contribution of the Madrid Summit in 2010, coinciding with the presidency of Spain in the European Union which has served to boost its leadership role, highlighting the axis formed by the Spanish diplomacy of Spain- European Union-Latin America.

The period we have mentioned, which culminated with the Madrid Summit in 2010, has been successful as this summit has included the biregional relationship between the European Union and Latin America, at the same time between the European Union and Mexico, Chile and Brazil , Summit with other forums such as those held with CAN, MERCOSUR and CARIFORUM.¹⁷¹ At the same time, a Summit between entrepreneurs from all regions, as well as forums among civil society.

At the summit, the policy of the European Union, which in a certain way coincides with that of Spain, namely the commitment to Strategic Partnership and multilateralism,

¹⁶⁹ Bruno Ayllón, "Las política exterior del Gobierno Lula y las relaciones de Brasil con la Unión Europea", *Real Instituto Elcano, América Latina y Europa, Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos*, Madrid, 2006, pp. 1-4.

¹⁷⁰ Comunicación de la Comisión al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo, "La Unión Europea y América Latina: Una asociación de actores globales", *Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas*, Bruselas, 2009, pp.1-11.

¹⁷¹ Celestino del Arenal, *Política exterior de España y...*, Fundación Carolina, Madrid, 2011, p. 542.

the promotion of International Organizations, development cooperation, rule of law and human rights.

At the successful Madrid Summit, the 2010-2012 Action Plan¹⁷² between Latin America and the European Union was implemented. Thanks to him, a more precise follow-up will be possible and the commitments will be able to evaluate towards the next encounter.

At the same time as the Action Plan was being launched, the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean Foundation was created, something already foreseen since the Vienna Summit in 2006.

If the Summit was a success as far as agreements are concerned, it was also in the future prospects, since on the one hand it allowed to resume negotiations between the European Union and MERCOSUR, paralyzed since 2004 by reluctance to agricultural products from the standpoint European and intellectual property rights within the scope of MERCOSUR.¹⁷³ At the same time, at the Madrid summit, a new global financial architecture and an almost unanimous rejection of protectionism were proposed under the major economic crisis that affected all international economies, but to a greater extent the European ones.

In this way we can observe how, as a result of these events between 2008-2010, there is a will between both sides, European and Latin American, cases like Brazil¹⁷⁴ and Spain for the promotion of relations between MERCOSUR and European Union.

At this stage, the meetings for an Association Agreement between the European Union and Central America began, something that has been initialed at the famous Madrid Summit in 2010. As we can see, this Association Agreement is the first is translated into

¹⁷² Plan de Acción de Madrid 2010-2012, "Hacia una nueva fase de la asociación birregional: Innovación y tecnología para el desarrollo sostenible y la integración social", *Cumbre UE-ALC, Consejo de la Unión Europea*, Madrid, 2010, p. 1.

¹⁷³ IV EU-Mercosur Summit, "Joint Communiqué", *Council of the European Union*, Madrid, 2010, p. 2. "At the occasion of the relaunch of the negotiations for an EU Mercosur Association Agreement, the Heads of State and Government recalled their importance in view of reaching an ambitious and balanced agreement between the two regions, which would deepen relations and offer great political and economic benefits to both sides."

¹⁷⁴ Albene Miriam Menezes & Roberto Goulart, "Brasil e Mercosul: rumos da integração na lógica do neodesenvolvimentismo (2003-2014)", *Caderno CRH*, V.29, Salvador, 2016, p.146-147.

rubric by the regional bloc of the European Union with another block, in this case, Central America, and at the same time has advanced without major problems.

If the signing of the Association Agreement between Central America and the European Union did not involve major problems and was effectively carried out, it was not the case of the CAN,¹⁷⁵ where the process was much more complex. Initially, the European Union sought to negotiate with the CAN, which was impossible and frustrating because of the diplomatic positions developed by the different countries, which were separated into two large blocs.

Following this position taken by the Andean countries, the Council of the European Union from 2009, opted for the measure of opening different channels of negotiation.¹⁷⁶ On the one hand, flexible relations were supported by the different countries of the Union, as it allowed to end the slowdown and pause enjoyed by relations but on the other hand the Union European Union broke its strategy of support for Latin American integration.

The breakdown of this policy was never as drastic due to the European Union was already having meetings with countries that did not belong to integration mechanisms such as Mexico, Chile and Brazil.

Due to the rupture of the Andean bloc and thanks to the division into two blocks and launching of the negotiation for the arrival of an Association Agreement, this took place in the already famous Summit of Madrid in 2010 between the European Union and Colombia and Peru.

It is true that although the progress of bilateral relations between the European Union and the various Latin American countries in search of a Strategic Partnership was the only effective action for the development of new relations with Latin America, it slowed down the European commitment to the integration of the Latin American bloc, but at the same time it was obligatory for the progress of relations with the countries mentioned.

These bilateral Association agreements, which do not go in the direction of Latin American integration, if they are in harmony with the agreements already made, such as those of Mexico and Chile. Resuming agreements with MERCOSUR, Latin America

¹⁷⁵ Alan Fairlie Reinoso, "Del Acuerdo de Asociación entre la Unión Europea y la Comunidad Andina (CAN) al Acuerdo Comercial Multipartes con Colombia y Perú: ¿Qué escenarios para la integración regional?", *Observatorio Social de las Relaciones Unión Europea – América Latina*, 2010, pp.9-11.

¹⁷⁶ Alan Fairlie Reinoso, *op. Cit.*, pp. 12-13.

almost in its entirety will enjoy different agreements with the European Union in one way or another.

Due to the will of the countries in their action in the different frameworks of action, the Madrid Summit in 2010 has been a success. It has demonstrated the commitment to integration. The news of the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States has been welcomed with joy in the European Union,¹⁷⁷ from where they have congratulated Brazil for the promotion of their diplomacy in the regional bloc. At the same time, this contrasts with that projected by Spain through the Ibero-American Summits in Latin America and the reluctance offered by Brazil.

It is for this reason that a new articulation of EU policies towards Latin America is needed, where priority is given to strengthening action in the face of new social realities, since the policy implemented since the 1990s has outdated in this regional block.

From here we present an association of two global blocks where Spain and Brazil have to play an essential and relevant role.

The strategy of Spain to support, together with the European Union, the support for Latin American block integration and at the same time the introduction of bilateral channels is essential to consolidate the results of the Madrid Summit and at the same time to achieve the objectives and develop new policies for the new global regional scenario.

At the same time, the policy carried out by Brazil is presented as the privileged interlocutor to carry out these processes. On the one hand, full member and main actor in the MERCOSUR bloc, regional and global actor that is accredited with the signature of the Strategic Association with the European Union. Promoter of the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, extolling its power in the region and at the same time devaluing the one developed by Spain within the framework of action of the Ibero-American Summits.

¹⁷⁷ Plan de Acción de Madrid 2010-2012, "Hacia una nueva fase de la asociación birregional: Innovación y tecnología para el desarrollo sostenible y la integración social", *Cumbre UE-ALC, Consejo de la Unión Europea*, Madrid, 2010, pp.6-7.

2.4.1. EU-ALC Summits.

As we have seen in the previous point, the relations between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean have been and are complex, due to different problems arising from integration, the diplomatic importance of the members that form it and the interests to which respond the different projections towards the outside of the blocks. The events from which the commitments have been made between the two actors have been the Summits held during this period, in our case, those held between 2004 and 2011, although we must remember their origins in order to understand their purpose and to analyze their objectives.

The European Union since its inception and as a first level bloc, made clear the necessary link with Latin America for what was necessary the signing of the Strategic Association Agreement. The initial priority has always been to seek this association with Latin America as a whole, avoiding it with the countries in the singular or with blocks within the region. As we see, much has changed the objective since the first Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1999 to this day.

Significant was the election of the headquarters of the first Summit. Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), which at that time and due to the economic reforms carried out by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil uncovered itself as a powerful regional economic giant that attracted a strong direct external investment of European countries, at the same time as for the European Union Was and is a preferred partner. There, in Rio de Janeiro in 1999, the first Summits of Heads of State of the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean were held to reach an agreement for the implementation of a Strategic Partnership, specifically based on increasing the welfare of societies as a whole.

In this first Summit the cornerstones of the meetings held have been the political dialogue, economic relations and the promotion of cooperation in the different fields. Its declaration establishes the general principles that will govern relations between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean,¹⁷⁸ promoting institutional dialogue in the political sphere. In the economic framework, the pattern was marked by the liberalization of trade, where at the same time that it should be integral, it was sought to be beneficial. Thirdly, the promotion of cooperation encompassed the cultural,

¹⁷⁸ Comisión Europea, "Cumbre Unión Europea – América Latina y El Caribe", Río de Janeiro, 1999, p.1.

educational, scientific, human and social spheres for progress at all levels and an imperative social equality that contrasts with the situation in many countries of Latin America where there is a high Inequality in all aspects.

In this first Summit we find a pattern that has governed the period we analyze in the framework of international relations, whether at bilateral or multilateral levels. We talk about the ambition of plans and policies, goodwill projects us in a utopian scenario that is far from reality, which a priori is exciting, later the goals achieved discover it as unrealistic. Put the bases of the relationship between both blocks, the Summit finalize with success with the objectives. Three years later, in particular in May 2002, the Madrid Summit between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean was held.

It is important to emphasize the importance of both Brazil and Spain throughout this process. Something that is credited with the location of the first two Summits, Rio de Janeiro and Madrid (1999 and 2002). We can say that before Lula and Zapatero, the importance of Brazil and Spain was already capital. With the Brazilian and Spanish presidents, this cooperation between blocks is reinforced and redefined in the new global space with a high promotion of social development. This new Summit reaffirmed the willingness already presented in Rio and accredits cooperation as the most important sector to achieve the Strategic Partnership¹⁷⁹ between both blocs.

In this new stage of relations, another factor that was not a priority was at stake. If at the beginning we wanted to find a relationship that affected only the two regional blocs, from now on come state and sub regional actors, as we find the agreements between the European Union and Chile and also with Mexico, and at the same time with the bloc MERCOSUR, headed by Brazil and one of the main economic partners¹⁸⁰ of the Union and which we will analyze in the following section.

Beyond the insertion of new actors, the objectives are the same, the search of the Strategic Association to reduce social inequalities in all its forms. The fight against poverty has marked the future of the Madrid Summit in the political, economic and social spheres.

¹⁷⁹ Florabel Quispe Remón, "Las Cumbres Unión Europea-América Latina y el Cariba y la Asociación Estratégica birregional", *Perspectivas sobre las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y América Latina*, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Madrid, 2009, pp. 142.

¹⁸⁰ Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Brasil, *European Union relations*. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/es/ficha-pais/6700-union-europea>

The Summit of Guadalajara held on May 28 and 29, 2004 had new actors that would change the profile of the Summits to give them a new focus.¹⁸¹ We are talking about the presidents of Spain and Brazil, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

This Summit reiterates what has been said in the previous ones, that is, the commitment to compromise in search of the Strategic Partnership and where due to the difficulties encountered due to the lack of Latin American integration, it was decided to prioritize in the sub regional blocs,¹⁸² either through MERCOSUR, with the impetus it received since the arrival of Lula; Central America, where a Strategic Partnership Agreement would subsequently be signed; and the CAN, which at first seemed an alternative but later divided into two blocks as we could analyze in the previous section.

To realize the value of the entry of presidents Lula and Zapatero in these Summits, it is only necessary to contemplate the aspects that marked the Summit as they were multilateralism, something highlighted by both governments in their new diplomatic plans; the social cohesion and the biregional relationship that must be maintained and the agreements that are being reached will allow us to conquer the Strategic Partnership.

Two years later, negotiations were continuing but the fruits were not as expected. In 2006 at the Vienna Summit in May the objectives were to strengthen the links for the reinforcement of the biregional strategic partnership. The compromise still existed but the objectives to be complex are not achieved effectively. That is why the negotiations were moving forward, but not far from what began in 1999 in Rio. It is true that the Vienna Summit includes a factor that previously did not exist, was the case of the incorporation of civil society to the meetings,¹⁸³ for the achievement of the Association. A great achievement because they are the best connoisseurs the reality, beyond their priorities.

¹⁸¹ José Antonio Sanahuja, "La Cumbre de Guadalajara: consensos y divergencias", *La Actualidad*, Madrid, 2006, pp. 184-185.

¹⁸² III Cumbre América Latina y el Caribe – Unión Europea, *Declaración de Guadalajara*, Guadalajara (México), 2004, pp. 8-9.

¹⁸³ IV Cumbre América Latina y el Caribe – Unión Europea, *Declaración de Viena*, Viena, 2006, p. 17. "...Reconocemos la importancia de fomentar la responsabilidad social de las empresas, de estimular el diálogo social y la participación de todos los interlocutores pertinentes, incluida la sociedad civil, así como el respeto a la diversidad étnica, con el fin de construir sociedades más cohesionadas."

The Vienna Declaration reflects the consensus reached on the agenda by both regions, such as the strengthening of the rule of law, multilateralism and once again emphasizing cooperation among its priorities in order to reach an agreement between the two regions.

In 2008, the Lima Summit was held. His statement highlights the willingness of states to continue negotiations to reach a Strategic Partnership Agreement with common objectives.¹⁸⁴ The eradication of poverty, social cohesion and sustainable development have been the cornerstones of all the Summits held so far. It can be verified that since 1999, the wills of the leaders have varied little, only encouraged by a social turn imposed by Lula da Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero. To some extent this passage of time without any relevant agreement demonstrates the lack of commitment and the task of an ambitious agenda, which is subsequently shown to be empty.

The challenges proposed at all these Summits are too ambitious to be carried out and the commitment of leaders on many occasions is proven ineffective. Summits are always a hope to achieve real and achievable goals and objectives, and the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean alliance demonstrated their commitment at the next Summit, held in Madrid in 2010. All analysts speak of the success of this Summit against these previously analyzed.

Next, we will analyze the role that the Summit played in the partnership plans between the European Union and Latin America.

The Summit between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean, held in Madrid in 2010, took place in a very different context from those previously held. On the one hand, the EU countries were in a situation of very serious economic crisis, while on the other hand, the image of the countries of Latin America had improved greatly because they had been able to make the necessary adjustments to prevent This crisis affected them disproportionately. On the other hand, Brazil appeared as a protagonist as a global actor who had not practically suffered the crisis.

From there, the European Commission had evaluated the different points, highlighting the new challenges in both regions and how the solution was the dialogue for the search of common solutions. For this reason, new strategies were designed for the promotion and development of the Summits.

¹⁸⁴ V Cumbre América Latina y el Caribe – Unión Europea, *Declaración de Lima, "Respondiendo juntos a las prioridades de nuestros pueblos"*, Lima, 2008, p.1.

For this reason, we can catalog the Madrid Summit 2010 as a summit of results that have materialized in two documents.¹⁸⁵ A first document called the *Madrid Declaration: Towards a new stage in the biregional partnership: innovation and technology for sustainable development and social inclusion*. And a second document called: *Action Plan Madrid 2010-2012*. With these documents a Summit has been developed that has achieved objectives and at the same time has set tangible and achievable goals for both regions.

In search of the Strategic Association, meetings have been held with MERCOSUR, CAN, CARIFORUM and Central America, as well as with countries with priority interests such as Brazil, Mexico and Chile.¹⁸⁶ Another of the objectives achieved has been the rubric of the Agreement with Central America, initiated at the Vienna Summit of 2006.¹⁸⁷ As we can see, Association Agreements, if there is a real interest, are not delayed in time. In this case, in only four years, the EU and Central America have the first agreement between the European Union and a region.

At the same time, negotiations began between MERCOSUR and the EU, which had been paralyzed since 2004.

Another of the objectives achieved and that will be an important impetus for the progress of relations is the creation of the EU-LAC Foundation,¹⁸⁸ which will foster political dialogue between actors from both regions. Different sites were shuffled for that foundation, among which was Hamburg, seat that finally prevailed. There was some reluctance to this venue because it is not a city of the Latin American plane and the Latin American look in the European Union has been imposed by Spanish and Portuguese diplomacy. For all this, the Madrid Summit has been called a results summit, achieving some success.

We can speak of success due to the multitude of Trade Agreements, the signing of the Strategic Partnership between the European Union and Central America, the relaunching

¹⁸⁵ Consejo de la Unión Europea, *Cumbre UE-ALC, "Hacia una nueva fase de la asociación birregional: Innovación y tecnología para el desarrollo sostenible y la integración social"* – PLAN DE ACCIÓN DE MADRID 2010-2012, Madrid, 2010, pp.1-12.

¹⁸⁶ Julián Antonio Navarro Hoyos, "La VI Cumbre Unión Europea América Latina y el Caribe ¿Una cumbre de resultados?", *Revista VIA IURIS*, nº 9, Fundación Universitaria Los Libertadores, Bogotá, 2010, pp. 134.

¹⁸⁷ Consejo de la Unión Europea, *op Cit*, p. 8.

¹⁸⁸ Julián Navarro Hoyos, *op Cit*. p. 135.

of trade with MERCOSUR and the creation of the EU-LAC Foundation. In definitive, objectives fulfilled and set up a new stage between both regions. Despite this, not everything was successful. The Madrid Summit has not addressed the changes in the international order that have taken place since the beginning of these Summits to the present day. A revision in this aspect is necessary to modify the format of the Summits, making them more effective.

The consolidation of the Strategic Partnership Agreement is already imperative but the models used have not changed since its implementation in Rio in 1999.

The Summits must materialize concrete proposals, beyond the simple reiteration of the promotion of the communication and the objectives to reach the famous Agreement. That is why the participation of civil society becomes mandatory beyond political dialogue and its will. Definitely, the Summits are essential, practical and with an extraordinary purpose that are put at the service of the concrete actors, in this case government and civil society should serve to strengthen links between both regions in all their spheres. Once these links are materialized, the agreement for the achievement of the Strategic Partnership between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean will be a process.

2.4.2. EU-MERCOSUR relations.

After analyzing the relations between Latin America and the Caribbean with the European Union, to investigate its Summits and the objectives achieved thanks to the will put in them by the different heads of State, highlighting the social policy applied by presidents Lula da Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero since its arrival and concluding with the success of the Summit of Madrid 2010, it is time to analyze the relations between the European Union and the first commercial partner of this, the MERCOSUR. We will highlight in this section the background between the two blocs and we will investigate the situation in the period that concerns us, that is, between 2004 and 2011, at which time the Brazilian and Spanish presidents made efforts to encourage the promotion of negotiations and the achievement of different agreements, despite the fact that relations have been on hold since 2004.

MERCOSUR began in 1991 with the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion between the countries of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay,¹⁸⁹ although it is true that the pillars of this sub regional bloc were placed by Brazil and Argentina in 1985. With the signing of this treaty, an essential integration process was launched for the Latin American Community and which saw its hopes in the process of integration carried out by the European Union.

With the implementation of this integrative process, a project was relaunched that had high expectations both within the Latin American framework and outside its borders, due in part to its trade between the founding countries. As a result of this, the eyes of the European Union focused on MERCOSUR and a relationship began in which "EU countries were the largest receptors of MERCOSUR exports and almost a quarter of FDI (Investment Foreign Direct) received in Latin America came from Europe."¹⁹⁰ Given the importance between the two blocs, negotiations between the EU and MERCOSUR were initiated for the signature of an Association Agreement.

In 1995, only four years after the founding of MERCOSUR, an Interregional Framework Agreement was signed with the European Union,¹⁹¹ which would serve in the near future to reach an Association Agreement between both blocs where political dialogue, cooperation between axes and free trade would be the cornerstones of this important project.

Negotiations to reach the Draft Partnership Treaty began five years after the signing of the Interregional Framework Agreement, specifically in 2000, to finalize it shortly. At four years, in 2004, negotiations are suspended without reaching any agreement. This year, with the negotiations suspended, hopes were raised for the 2010 Madrid Summit between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean, where the EU could also have meetings with the sub regional blocs. It was in them, and thanks to the push of Spanish diplomacy, which held the presidency of the EU, where it was decided to restart

¹⁸⁹ Tratado para la constitución de un mercado común entre la República Argentina la República Federativa del Brasil, la República del Paraguay y la República Oriental del Uruguay. MERCOSUR, 31 de diciembre de 1994.

¹⁹⁰ Carlos Malamud, "UE y Mercosur: negociaciones sin futuro", *Real Instituto Elcano ARI*, Madrid, 2012, p. 2.

¹⁹¹ Carlos Malamud, *op. Cit*, p.3.

the negotiations between EU-MERCOSUR.¹⁹² In this, the president of Brazil, Lula da Silva, also actively collaborated, since his country was one of the most interested in reaching an agreement.

The resumption of negotiations is a success in itself because of the downtime, but no achievement in terms of the Agreement or Treaty has been achieved.

On the one hand, MERCOSUR is reticent to the Common Agricultural Policy, while the European Union protests against the strong protection in the markets of services by the MERCOSUR.¹⁹³ To all this, we must add the presence of China as a global player and maintains strong contact with Latin America. France and Italy are the ones that oppose more reluctance to the Agreement, due to the defense of the agricultural world. Spain, on the other hand, supports the achievement of an agreement, since despite the fact that the Spanish agricultural sector is in the French and Italian positions, Spanish diplomacy sees an opportunity to continue to maintain power in Latin America and hope that an agreement of this type with MERCOSUR can help to overcome the economic crisis that since 2008, crucially affected Europe and especially countries like Spain.

Thanks to the role of Spain, the role played by the government of Rodríguez Zapatero and the work done by its diplomacy both within the European Union, in Latin America and in charge of holding the Madrid Summit in 2010, end of the pause to the negotiations and the new situation of these was possible. So much so, that it was hoped to reach an Association Agreement between the European Union and MERCOSUR before 2011,¹⁹⁴ something that finally as we have seen has not happened and that still today does not happen. This position confronted Spain in a way with countries like Ireland, Austria, France or Italy, since these were more reticent to the Agreement with the MERCOSUR. Spain's position served to strengthen Latin American ties but left its agricultural sector without support.

¹⁹² Celestino del Arenal, "La triangulación España-Unión Europea-América Latina: sinergias y contradicciones", *Pensamiento Iberoamericano* 8, 2ª época, Madrid, 2011, pp. 83-84.

¹⁹³ Messias de Sá Pinto & Maria Helena Guimaraes, "O Mercosul e a Alca: os interesses (irre)conciliáveis da União Européia e dos EUA", *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol.48 nº 1, Brasília, 2005, pp. 3-4.

¹⁹⁴ Ángeles Sánchez Díez & Pilar Ruiz Huélamo, "El Acuerdo de Asociación de la UE y el MERCOSUR: de las trabas comerciales a las posibilidades en la cooperación y el diálogo político", *Regional and Sectoral Economic Studies*, Vol. 12, nº 2, 2012, p.93.

This fact demonstrates the paradigm shift that was taking place both within the European Union and within the MERCOSUR framework. Despite the fact that there was a clear majority in favor of achieving the Association Agreement; the cases of MERCOSUR with Brazil, with its president Lula in the front, and Argentina, and in the European case with the European Union at the top and countries like Spain among others, this agreement could not be reached because of the strong reluctance of partners with a great power of action as can be France and Italy. Although no agreement was reached, there were great facts that made us think that the Association Agreement would be signed months after the resumption of negotiations at the Madrid Summit between the European Union and MERCOSUR. These are:

A) China was playing a crucial role as an investment power in the Latin American region, which could favor a swift intervention by the European Union, wanting to be the first block to sign an Association Agreement with MERCOSUR. B) Secondly, with the arrival of the Brazilian elections and the importance of this country in MERCOSUR as a founding member and more powerful player in this bloc, there was an important interest in advancing the positions that the United States might want to obtain.¹⁹⁵ C) Another conditioning factor for the arrival of an Agreement would be the commercial success of the Agreement for some countries. It would be a way of stopping a failure, as for example for Spain and Brazil, since for the first a commercial agreement of this caliber, would help to overcome the economic crisis and the national situation, while for the second, under the government of Lula, would balance the failure to reach a fair agreement for them in the World Trade Organization.¹⁹⁶ D) Lastly and at the block level, the firm would lead to a more accelerated exit from the crisis that the European Union and, to a lesser extent, the countries of the Latin American bloc were living at the time.

Despite what we might think and that the situation makes us contemplate an optimistic panorama, the reluctance thought more than the success that could be created following the Association Agreement created between MERCOSUR and the European Union. Both sides with their restrictions and impositions have fostered this failure. As we have seen, both parties may have positive wills for the achievement of an Agreement, but the strong

¹⁹⁵ Lincoln Bizzozero, "Las relaciones MERCOSUR-Unión Europea: una nueva modalidad de participación de las regiones en la mundialización", *América Latina y el (des)orden global neoliberal*, 2011, p.112.

¹⁹⁶ Carlos Malamud, "UE y Mercosur: negociaciones sin futuro", *Real Instituto Elcano ARI*, Madrid, 2012, p. 6.

protectionism imposed and the negative one to give in their positions has been effective for the non-achievement of that Agreement.

In definitive and as argued by Carlos Malamud in his work, "among the greatest problems are, on the one hand, the free access of the agricultural and livestock production of Mercosur to European markets, due to the validity of the Common Agricultural Policies and the EU protectionism and, on the other hand, access to Mercosur markets for services, intellectual property and European industrial products due to the protectionism of the South American bloc."¹⁹⁷ And to give a good account of the success of the resumption of negotiations at the EU-LAC Summit in Madrid in 2010, we see that between the completion of the Summit and 2012, there were eight negotiation rounds to reach an agreement,¹⁹⁸ despite the fact that this agreement between the two blocs has ceased to be a priority for both the European Union and MERCOSUR.

There are numerous causes on both sides, for which the Association Agreement between the European Union and MERCOSUR has not been able to move forward. On the part of the European Union, we have already mentioned how high protectionism can be applied to its agricultural policy, although there may be others such as the major economic crisis that has endangered the future of the euro and at the same time has shaken the processes of integration that has made this community, something that may be another of the blocking factors. Since, when MERCOSUR was created and the first agreement with the European Union was created, the Union was made up of 15 members, while in 2004, when the negotiations were stopped, it had already 25. The integration mechanisms, while more complex and more numerous, are an added difficulty in making decisions by consensus.

On the side of the Mercosur bloc, there are also reticence as the important differences between countries, since they are while Argentina and Brazil are giants, even the second of them with aspirations to global actor, Uruguay and Paraguay are small countries with economies of short other problems such as the growing protectionism developed by Argentina, its leaders and its policies, which more than affect the relations between MERCOSUR and the European Union, has done more damage in its environment and in the own MERCOSUR, as evidenced by the growing problems between Brazil and

¹⁹⁷ Carlos Malamud, *op. Cit*, p. 7.

¹⁹⁸ Albene Miriam Menezes & Roberto Goulart, "BRASIL E MERCOSUL: rumos da integraçao na lógica do neodesenvolvimentismo (2003-2014)", *Caderno CRH*, V. 29, Nº 3, Salvador, 2016, p. 135-136.

Argentina. Another major problem deriving from MERCOSUR has been the entry of Venezuela as a full partner, which has generated new uncertainties and conflicts. So much so that today, and because of the measures taken by Venezuela and the drift of this country, Venezuela has been expelled from MERCOSUR.¹⁹⁹

In spite of the efforts made by countries such as Spain and Brazil that allowed the Madrid Summit to restart the process of achieving an Association Agreement between the European Union and MERCOSUR, both sides still have problems that to solve for themselves and at the same time to reach an agreement on the reluctance that prevent them from reaching the achievement of the partnership signature. For this reason, the European Union and the Latin American countries, aware of this difficulty, have begun to maintain relations to promote agreements between the country and the European bloc.²⁰⁰ The Treaty of Association between the European Union and MERCOSUR goes through an uncertain future and the actors cannot remain without doing anything to that situation.

In our case, for Brazil, a full member and a founding partner of MERCOSUR, given the situation, this situation has been to encourage and encourage its Strategic Partnership with the European Union, which we will now study and where new questions are raised about the importance of this Latin American giant with respect to the Union and relations with its closest environment in the Ibero-American framework.

2.4.3. The relations between Brazil and the European Union.

Finally, from the multilateral arena, we must analyze the relations that Brazil has maintained during this stage with the European Union, and at the same time the importance that Spain has played in this area. Brazil has exercised essential regional leadership in Latin America since Lula's arrival as reflected in the work of his diplomacy. As we have seen, Brazil has been an indispensable partner in addressing relations between

¹⁹⁹ BBC Mundo: Mercosur suspende a Venezuela por tiempo indefinido y exige a Maduro que desmantele la Asamblea Constituyente. 5th August 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-40839629>

²⁰⁰ Relaciones de la UE con MERCOSUR, *Unión Europea Acción Exterior*. http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/content/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/mercosur/index_es.htm.

the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as with MERCOSUR, despite their stagnation. That is why, in the last place, we will analyze the direct relations of the Brazilian country with the Union in order to close the Latin American circle of influence of Spain within the framework of the European Union.

As we know Lula's diplomacy since the arrival of this president has had a great importance in the axis of his government, where he opted for an opening and diversification of the relations that maintained with its partners,²⁰¹ as well as the development of new proposals for the relationships. One of Lula's first moves was to strengthen the role in the United Nations by scaling posts in the area of contributing partner, from 45 to 15 in just three years.²⁰²

At the same time that it promoted the presence of Brazil in the UN, it also wanted to reformulate its diplomacy in Latin America, thus reinforcing the role of Brazil in the regional scope. In this way, it competes with Spain in the region and sees it as an external partner of the one who distrusts by its interference. In spite of this, the European Union emphasizes the will of Brazil as an essential partner in the Latin American context. At the same time as it enlarges the role of its diplomacy during the Lula era, there are important changes, such as the transition from being a simple recipient of Official Development Assistance to an aid issuer and indispensable partner for the advance of this,²⁰³ both in Latin America as in other regions such as Africa or Asia.

With the changes carried out under the presidency of Lula da Silva, Brazil was recognized in the international context as a reference in the region and at the same time as a global player within the framework of the BRICS. But to analyze the relations between the European Union and Brazil in all its aspects, we must go back concretely to 1986. This year there were a series of events that will condition and mark the future of relations between the EU and Brazil.

²⁰¹ André Luiz Reis Da Silva, "Geometria Variável e Parcerias Estratégicas: A Diplomacia Multidimensional do Governo Lula (2003-2010)", *Contexto Internacional*, vol. 37, nº 1, Río de Janeiro, 2015, pp. 143-144.

²⁰² Ana Isabel Rodríguez Iglesias, "La Asociación Estratégica UE-Brasil: Retórica y Pragmatismo en las Relaciones Euro-Brasileñas", *Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos, Documento de Trabajo Serie Unión Europea nº 36/2010, vol.1*, Universidad San Pablo CEU, Madrid, 2010, p. 19.

²⁰³ Bruno Ayllón Pino, "La cooperación de Brasil: un modelo en construcción para una potencia emergente", *Real Instituto Elcano, estudio internacionales y estratégicos*, Madrid, 2010, pp.1-2.

The first of the key antecedents will be the incorporation of Spain and Portugal to the European Community.²⁰⁴ Thanks to these countries, the European Community will have a new focus on Latin America and specifically on Brazil, to which will be added an increasing interest. Secondly, the Round of the World Trade Organization, namely the Uruguay Round,²⁰⁵ began, where the key trade disputes between Brazil and the European Union will be analyzed. And third, the future of MERCOSUR is launched with the signing between Brazil and Argentina of the Integration and Cooperation Agreement.²⁰⁶

From this moment, relations between Spain and Brazil and the European Union will play an essential role in the framework of relations between the EU and Brazil due to its historical links with Latin America.

Only a year later, in 1987, the first document was prepared proposing a rapprochement in the relations between the European Union bloc and Latin America: "Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on the Relations between Communities and Latin America". Regarding the beginning of the negotiations in the Uruguay Round, Brazil obtained agricultural liberalization, which is a symbol of the important force of Brazilian diplomacy. This aspect would mark the relations between the European Union and Brazil in the commercial scope.

With the creation in 1991 of MERCOSUR between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, relations between the European Union and Brazil will regain strength and change the focus, since from now on Brazil was positioned as a preferential interlocutor between the EU and MERCOSUR.

From this moment and thanks to Spain's entry into the European Union years ago, Spanish diplomacy will be essential for the new impetus of relations between the two,

²⁰⁴ Acta de Adhesión de España y Portugal a las Comunidades Europeas, *Comunidad Económica Europea*, Bruselas, 12 de junio de 1985. "Instrumento de Ratificación del Tratado hecho en Lisboa y Madrid el día 12 de junio de 1985, relativo a la adhesión del Reino de España y de la República Portuguesa a la Comunidad Económica Europea y a la Comunidad Europea de la Energía Atómica", Documento BOE-A-1986-1.

²⁰⁵ La Ronda de Uruguay, el programa incorporado posterior a la Ronda Uruguay, *Organización Mundial del Comercio*. https://www.wto.org/spanish/thewto_s/whatis_s/tif_s/fact5_s.htm

²⁰⁶ Messias de Sá Pinto & Maria Helena Guimaraes, "O Mercosul e a Alca: os interesses (irre)conciliáveis da União Européia e dos EUA", *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol.48 nº 1, Brasília, 2005, p.6.

namely in 1994 the Vice-President of the European Union, the Spanish Manuel Marín,²⁰⁷ was the main driver of an interregional agreement between the European Union and MERCOSUR, which preceded the 1995 Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the two blocs. This was possible thanks to the political will of the Spanish-Brazilian leaders, on the one hand Felipe González, president of the Spanish government and at that moment president of the European Union and on the other hand, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, president of the Republic of Brazil. Both leaders recognized the EU and MERCOSUR as their most important partners on a reciprocal basis.

Four years later, thus demonstrating the importance of Brazil in relations, the first Summit between EU-MERCOSUR Heads of State took place in Rio de Janeiro.

It was at the Guadalajara summit between the Heads of State of the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean that Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva made his presentation for the first time, something that was welcomed with hope and enthusiasm by the European Heads of Government. Precisely for Lula, the new framework of foreign relations went through a regional integration, where Brazil was the main actor.²⁰⁸ This meant at the same time a strengthening of MERCOSUR.

In its first phase of government, the relations between Brazil and the European Union for Lula will be marked by the fact of being a strategic ally, always in search of the Strategic Partnership, but the failure of the Fifth Doha Round of the World Organization of Commerce, where Brazil was proclaiming the elimination of tariffs, which would be the EU's confrontation with this type of policies, frozen the relationship between the European Union and Brazil.

With the arrival of Lula and the new changes in the diplomatic field and his aspiration to exercise as a global actor, he called for a reform of the UN Security Council to have a permanent position.²⁰⁹ Thus began a tour of Europe at the same time as it requested the adherence for the program proposed among others by Brazil and Spain, of international

²⁰⁷ María Francisca Costa Cholbi, "Las relaciones comerciales de la UE con Brasil", *Boletín Económico de ICE* n° 3054, Madrid, 2014, p. 157-158.

²⁰⁸ Ana Isabel Rodríguez Iglesias, "La Asociación Estratégica UE-Brasil: Retórica y Pragmatismo en las Relaciones Euro-Brasileñas", *Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos, Documento de Trabajo Serie Unión Europea* n° 36/2010, vol.1, Universidad San Pablo CEU, Madrid, 2010, pp. 18-19.

²⁰⁹ Bruno Ayllón, "La política del Gobierno Lula y las relaciones de Brasil con la Unión Europea", *Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, Área: América Latina-Europa*, Madrid, 2006, p. 2.

action against the hunger. It is curious as of direct allies and with which it has a great political and ideological harmony, it has found a refusal to the reform of the Security Council, like for example of its Spanish partner Jose Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, although they maintained the social commitment that both presidents, such as the Action Against Hunger program and the Alliance of Civilizations.

At the same time, on this European tour he proposed to the European leaders the exchange of the Brazilian foreign debt for investments in education, something that was not new, but had been proposed by Spain in the first Ibero-American Summit in which it was presented as a new President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.

In the realm of the European Union, since the paralysis of relations between the European Union and MERCOSUR in 2004, arising from the conflict in the different rounds of negotiations in the World Trade Organization, tensions have been increasing between Brazil and The EU. Debates have become less productive. The dialogue between the EU-Brazil deteriorated during the first years of Lula's mandate, jeopardizing the agreements to reach the Strategic Partnership. The Brazilian diplomats and the European Commission were involved in a crossroads and accusations since the meetings in the World Trade Organization, something that was contributed in an upcoming way by the Hong Kong Summit²¹⁰ in relation to the World Trade Organization out in 2005.

At this summit, the European Union extended its proposal to all participants. This was rejected by members of the G-20, Brazil and the United States. Following this, European heads of government received a missive from the Brazilian president, requesting that the European Union's agriculture-related proposals would give a real impetus to the negotiations that were taking place. Due to the negative of the heads of government, specifically the French government, Lula da Silva directly accused the European Union of wanting to perpetuate poverty in the world,²¹¹ because it did not make any kind of concession on agriculture.

Brazil's allies in MERCOSUR were still pushing for a change in policies and the European Union launched a counteroffensive, saying Christina Lagarde, French Foreign

²¹⁰ La Ronda de Doha, Declaración ministerial adoptada el 18 de diciembre de 2005, *Organización Mundial del Comercio*, Hong Kong, 2005.

https://www.wto.org/spanish/thewto_s/minist_s/min05_s/final_text_s.htm.

²¹¹ Lena Lavinas, "Brazil, from reduction of poverty to a commitment to eradicate extreme poverty", *Revista CIDOB d'afers internacionls*, nº 97-98, Barcelona, 2012, pp. 68-69.

Trade Minister, "they want to take everything, even underwear." The tension went on so much so that EU Commissioner Mandelson accused Brazil, the United States and the WTO of being allies to attack the EU, "You are ganging up to beat me."²¹² For all these tensions and points so different, the WTO meeting had no end to success.

Once the second term of Lula was reached, the situation was somewhat different, at least there was a situation of reduced tension that produced some successes. For example, the EU-MERCOSUR situation was unblocked, since at that time Spain held the presidency of the European Union under the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. MERCOSUR has clearly been a driving force for the rapprochement of Brazil to the European Union and vice versa.

It is true that if we take stock of the foreign policy carried out under Lula da Silva's government in Brazil towards the European Union, this shows a negative balance, even though during this stage the first European Union-Brazil Summit took place, held in Lisbon in July 2007 and has laid the groundwork for the start of the Strategic Partnership between both spaces and at the same time installs a Summit between the two partners annually.

The increase in tension has led to this stagnation of relations which has been accompanied by the paralysis of relations between the EU and MERCOSUR.

In spite of the apparent willingness that exists between both blocks, we can define the situation of the Lula stage with respect to the EU, taking the following balance.

On the one hand we find a negotiating intransigence of the EU, which has promoted confrontations, so much so that as we have analyzed previously, these clashes have occurred directly with Brazil, the United States and the World Trade Organization, in relation to the protection of its agricultural sector. On the other hand and as some researchers point out, the excess of voluntarism and an erroneous consideration of the means and the policies in the external action of the Brazilian executive has been essential for the stagnation of these relations. While foreign policy should be a state policy, where the main lines do not vary, the foreign policy of Cardoso and Lula is completely different and has been the cause of this situation.

²¹² Bruno Ayllón, "La política del Gobierno Lula y las relaciones de Brasil con la Unión Europea", *Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, Área: América Latina-Europa*, Madrid, 2006, p. 5.

Lastly, as stated by Celso Lafer, "the Lula Government and its collaborators in the Planalto and in the Itamaraty committed errors of conception and diplomatic execution, as well as the lack of expertise in setting priorities such as paralysis of the MERCOSUR-EU trade negotiations".²¹³

As we have seen the stagnation of the negotiations can be caused by several factors. Despite this, we have been able to verify how the approach taken, which has at times been fruitful, such as the first Summits carried out to reach a Strategic Partnership agreement, has been possible thanks to the will of Brazil in the first place as an essential ally and secondly, Spain because of its links with Latin America and its important role within the Union. That is why good relations between Brazil and Spain, will help promote good understanding within the framework of the integration blocs, be it European Union and Latin America, EU and MERCOSUR, and finally the European Union and Brazil.

In conclusion, we can say that the good harmony between both countries has not only served as next in the next chapter we will analyze, to foster a good understanding between the two powers at bilateral level. We can say that the good harmony of leftist governments on both sides of the Atlantic has contributed to bring positions in the different forums where they participate and at the same time to introduce new policies in such forums that promote more efficiently social development and increased welfare in the integrated states.

²¹³ Bruno Ayllón, "La política del Gobierno Lula y las relaciones de Brasil con la Unión Europea", *Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, Área: América Latina-Europa*, Madrid, 2006, p. 6.

3. The governments of Spain and Brazil in the bilateral sphere.

In this third chapter we will analyze bilateral relations between the two countries. To lay the foundations of the privileged relationship that the governments of Lula da Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero have experienced, it has taken years of rapprochement. The democratic stability, the processes of integration of both countries in the EEC, later in the European Union and MERCOSUR, culminated finally by a Brazilian economic stabilization thanks in great measure to the Real Plan and the maturation of the Spanish economic system, have been the key processes that have enabled, on the one hand, to make Spain and Brazil competitive markets in the globalized world and, on the other hand, to develop an essential and strategic bilateral relationship. In this chapter, we will study from the bilateral perspective, political, economic, cultural, and cooperation relations to obtain the fundamental range of the Strategic Association enjoyed by both countries.

With the advent of the democratic system in Spain, there was a change in the development of foreign policy and, consequently, in relations with Brazil, without a doubt, a change promoted by the democratization of Spain in the first place,²¹⁴ and secondly the prudent Brazilian opening. The Spanish Transition was a reason for study and admiration in Brazil, which is why, thanks to the similarities in the democratic processes experienced, we will analyze the common experiences for future policies of common action.

It is from 1986, when a new stage in bilateral relations between Brazil and Spain was inaugurated, as the integration processes of both countries contribute to this. On January 1, Spain enters the European Economic Community (EEC) and in Brazil will begin the Program of Integration and Economic Cooperation between this country and Argentina (PICE).²¹⁵ Both areas, EU and MERCOSUR, have strengthened relations, provided political stability and contributed to the development and business specialization essential for future investments. From MERCOSUR, with its main sponsor, Brazil, they know that Spain is the fundamental partner in Europe in order to reach a good negotiation

²¹⁴ Iliana Olivie, Manuel Gracia y José Ignacio Díaz, *La presencia global de España*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2015, p. 2.

²¹⁵ Carlos Malamud, "Los sistemas políticos español y brasileño. Un intento de comparación en perspectiva histórica" en *Seminario Brasil-Espanha*, Río de Janeiro, 2000, p. 3.

agreement, as demonstrated at the 2010 Summit²¹⁶ between the European Union and Latin America held in Madrid, on the occasion of the Spanish presidency of the European Union.

If the processes of democratic development and integration are key to the development of bilateral relations between Brazil and Spain, economic stability represents the third pillar for the implementation of a privileged partnership. In Spain, the economy has traveled many different paths. From integration into the European common framework, it fostered business specialization and internationalization at the same time. In Brazil, with the implementation of the *Plano Real*, a privatization program was carried out and the investment legislation changed.²¹⁷ Together with the attraction of the MERCOSUR economic bloc, they provided essential opportunities for relations between both countries.

The *Plano Real* meant leaving behind the national-mercantilism model to move to open and international capitalism. Its main purposes were to control inflation by promoting moderate economic growth, to develop the international economic opening and at the same time that it produced the state stability, in order that these measures would produce the arrival of investment flows that would increase the Brazilian wealth.²¹⁸ That is why the *Plano Real* has been a success in Spanish-Brazilian relations, since it has contributed credibility and confidence to the Brazilian economic and political system, while at the same time has allowed the arrival of Spanish investments due to the specialization of the Companies of the Hispanic country and its internationalization due to the integration processes experienced.

If there was a moment of fundamental change in Spanish-Brazilian relations, it was during the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. These were developed in all areas, reached later, with the arrival of Lula da Silva, the strategic partnership or “parceria” between the two countries.

Since 1996, the measures carried out provided a good balance between relations and, thanks to economic interests, the other areas were also benefited. In 1995, Fernando Henrique Cardoso came to power in Brazil, with a presidency of eight years, while in

²¹⁶ Cumbre UE-ALC, “Hacia una nueva fase de la asociación birregional: Innovación y tecnología para el desarrollo sostenible y la integración social”, en *Consejo de la Unión Europea*, Madrid, 2010.

²¹⁷ Bruno Ayllón, *Las Relaciones Hispano-Brasileñas: de la mutua irrelevancia a la asociación estratégica (1945-2005)*, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2007, p. 317.

²¹⁸ Bruno Ayllón, op Cit., p. 326-330.

Spain, the long socialist government gave important signs of weakness, which would produce that in 1996, in the general elections, the victory went to the Popular Party with Jose Maria Aznar at the head. The socialist government of Felipe González chose Latin America because due to the historical ties to internationalize along with the European Union as a field of integration,²¹⁹ something that continued with the government of Aznar.

Cardoso, meanwhile, brought maturity to Brazil in its international insertion, opted for MERCOSUR²²⁰ and generated interests that encouraged investments in Brazil. The relations between Spain and Brazil continued to advance in their consolidation, as can be observed in the different visits between the high commanders of both countries. With Aznar in power in the government of Spain, gave the opportunity to attract investment and opportunities that could be analyzed by large Spanish multinationals, starting a process of spectacular expansion,²²¹ with a number that we will later check in the economic analysis of bilateral relations.

In short, all the mechanisms executed between the two countries are prepared for the "parceria" that both Spain and Brazil were seeking. With the massive arrival of investments with the governments of Cardoso and Aznar there was also an unprecedented development in the cultural and cooperation spheres that undoubtedly are fixed in the Spanish-Brazilian agenda when, in 2000, Spain occupies the first Place in the investment in Brazil.²²² It is for this reason that the transition to the instrumental axis within the framework of the relations between both countries occurs at this stage and is fixed in the following, between the governments of Lula and Zapatero.

The development of relations between Spain and Brazil has entailed enormous diplomatic efforts in comparison with other Latin American countries. And thanks to these efforts the stage between the two socialist governments has been fruitful despite the vicissitudes that have occurred in the framework of international relations.

²¹⁹ Celestino del Arenal, *Política exterior de España y relaciones con América Latina, Iberoamericanidad, Europeización y Atlantismo en la política exterior española*, Fundación Carolina y Editorial Siglo XXI, Madrid, 2011, p. 193-195.

²²⁰ Gesner Oliveira and Frederico Turolla, Política económica do segundo governo FHC: mudança em condições adversas, en *Tempo Social – USP*, 2003, pp. 195-217.

²²¹ José Coderch, "España-Brasil: arquitectura de una relación privilegiada", en *ICE Brasil, nº 810*, octubre-noviembre, pp. 27-34.

²²² Bruno Ayllón, *Las relaciones Hispano-Brasileñas:...*, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2007, pp. 179-185.

Visits by high leaders have been constant and frequent between the late 1990s and the early 21st century. If there is a visit that consecrates the relations and serves as the impetus for the maintenance and reinforcement of these, it was that of the kings of Spain in the year 2000. Three years later, in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, the strategic partnership between Brazil and Spain was signed, giving rise to the first association of this type between Spain and a Latin American country. The "parceria" demanded by both countries was emphasized and given the importance of essential relations for development and a new impetus for them in the bilateral and multilateral framework, where the European Union and Mercosur would play a predominant role.

In spite of the good political harmony between leaders, the impetus in relations, the reforms carried out, the agreements signed and the development of investments and economic flows in both directions, the "parceria" was strongly marked by its economic character. Civil society and experts in international affairs, promoted a change in the framework of relations that went through a social bet of these. With the arrival of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, this paradigm shift will be encouraged. In the following sections, we will try to analyze how has been the relations between Spain and Brazil, highlighting the change that occurred with the arrival of the presidents previously mentioned.

3.1. Strategic partnership for a better future.

On January 24, 2005, presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero held a meeting that would undoubtedly change the sign of bilateral and multilateral relations between Brazil and Spain in relation to the change produced between these leaders and the previous governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and José María Aznar.

With the signing of the Brasilia Declaration between the two leaders, the bilateral political dialogue was reinforced and emphasized in four points that were to be reinforced in a new framework of relations between countries. The new vectors to consolidate in the new Spanish-Brazilian relations in the bilateral framework would be: 1) employment and social development, 2) economic growth and opportunities, 3) education, culture, science and environment, 4) Cooperation for development.

In the following sections we will try to analyze the evolution of these bilateral relations beyond what is written in the famous Brasilia Declaration. While it is true that in spite of the problems that might have occurred between the two countries, and although at some moments during the period of socialist governments, relations had a point of tension, good harmony prevailed at all times during Lula's mandates and Rodríguez Zapatero, as we will see in the following sections.

Although good relations have been a key element in the development and implementation of many of the negotiations for the joint work of both governments, these projects have often remained theoretical and have not been consolidated due to the irruption in the international scene of the important international economic crisis, that affected to a great extent Europe and with special force to the countries of the south of the continent. We see how two stages in this framework of bilateral relations are evident as previously mentioned. On the one hand, a first stage that covers 2004 to 2008, it creates and consolidates the Declaration of Brasilia. Here proposals are developed and work groups are created. On the other hand, the stage between 2008 and 2011, in this second stage, the position of Spain in the international scenario is tarnished by the arrival of the economic crisis and by its important problems in its domestic policy. For that reason, the relevant role that the president of the Spanish government, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, had maintained until that moment was reduced.

As has been envisaged, the differences between the theoretical and practical framework were considerable and good wills did not always materialize. For example: the strengthening of the dialogue and the creation of Bilateral Tourist Agreements was satisfactorily received but later proved to be infeasible, as we will analyze later. Economic growth was considerable and led to the creation of a large number of jobs but could never reach growth levels in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The educative and cultural matter, the impetus of the Cervantes Institute was the axis on which the Educational Project in Brazil revolved. With strong success since to this day continues being the country that counts on more centers. And cooperation for development, has carried out large projects in Brazil but always recognizing that the country is not a priority country when allocating the aid. In spite of this, the work carried out between AECID and ABC has been essential for the promotion of a large number of projects. It is for this reason that, following the signing of the Brasilia Declaration between the two governments, a new stage is opened in the framework of bilateral relations, which has been seen by many countries as an example of government behavior

but at the same time has had shadows that deserve to be reviewed. It is true that political wills often depend on the vicissitudes of the moment to be carried out. At many times throughout this period, the situation was not always favorable and that is what we try to analyze in this chapter in reference to the bilateral framework between Spain and Brazil.

3.2. The economic relations between Spain and Brazil during the socialist governments.

Economic relations have been the true engine of change in the overall set of relations between the governments of Spain and Brazil. From the beginning of the Transition process in Spain and with the arrival of democracy, Spanish companies began their processes of expansion and modernization. From this moment the situations between both countries changed from the economic perspective as we will observe below.

Since 1978, economic relations were marked by the favorable deficit towards Brazil. The difficulties of entry into a market that was not yet configured as was the Brazilian, accompanied by the characteristics of the Spanish companies that were not yet prepared for a landing in an unknown market, protected by an excessively strict legislation, did not help the development of trade between both countries. The key percentage data of these years are very representative to understand the concerns of Spain before the trade balance against Brazil. Spain exported to Brazil 1.13% of the total volume of Brazilian purchases in 1970 and eleven years later, the percentage had fallen more than half, being this of 0.42%.²²³

An essential change experienced by both countries in their trade relations were the integration processes in the European Economic Community and MERCOSUR. From the mid-eighties, on the Spanish side, insertion into the European Common Market was an opportunity in every sense, and especially of specialization and transformation of the country's business system, which continued to maintain antiquated structures of Francoism.²²⁴ On the Brazilian side, the Spanish integration raised some suspicion, since they saw Europe as the true Spanish market, something that could cause the decline of

²²³ Carlos Malamud, *Relaciones España-Brasil*, en Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2014, p. 34.

²²⁴ Celestino del Arenal, "La política exterior española en Iberoamérica, 1982-1992", en *La política exterior española en el siglo XX*, Madrid, 1994, p. 285.

investment in Brazil.²²⁵ The Spanish government attempted to calm the doubts of the Brazilian government by showing that it would act as an assistant in placing the Brazilian agricultural products in the newly opened market²²⁶ and serve as an interlocutor between MERCOSUR and the European Union to reduce the barriers that protected the European agrarian policy against the Brazilian one.

Despite the logical doubts of the Brazilian government in the mid-1980s, Ibero-America and especially Brazil, was an essential destination of Spanish investment from these years, but even so, it will not begin to have a prominent presence until the middle of the nineties. In order to get an idea of the path taken by Spanish investment in Latin America, and concretely in Brazil, we can define it in six phases: the first one between 1980-1982, where direct investments were liberalized, the second between 1983 and 1986, where investment continues to advance but in a slower way, the third phase between 1987 and 1990, which led to an investment takeoff in Latin America but to a lesser extent in Brazil, the fourth stage between 1990 and 1995, consolidation of investment, professionalization and liberalization measures. In the fifth stage, 1995-2000, during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso there is the real explosion of Spanish investment in Latin America and specifically in Brazil. From 2000, we can define this stage as of business specialization, the flows continue to increase although in a slower way.²²⁷

Undoubtedly, an important factor that has allowed the arrival of strong investments have been the integration processes of both countries in the EU and MERCOSUR, which have served to give stability to their economies and institutions and at the same time to reinforce the image of these states abroad and therefore the image of their companies and their ways of acting.²²⁸ Thanks to the integration and its stability, the investments arrived from Spain to Brazil of continuous form, seeing in Brazil a market of greater interest even than the own Spanish.

²²⁵ Celestino del Arenal, La adhesión de España a la Comunidad Europea y su impacto en las relaciones entre América Latina y la Comunidad Europea, en *Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, pp. 15-16.

²²⁶ José Antonio Alonso y Vicente Alonso, "La incorporación de España a la CEE y el futuro del comercio con Iberoamérica", en *Política Exterior*, Madrid, 1988, p.77..

²²⁷ Alfredo Arahuetes y Célio Hiratuka, Relaciones Económica entre España y Brasil, en *Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, 2007, p. 75.

²²⁸ Mauro Guillén, The Rise of Spanish Multinationals, European Business in the Global Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 143-145.

It is with the integration in these blocs that we can overcome the differences between Spain and Brazil, lay the foundations for a Strategic Association, give muscle and instrumentality to the relationships to develop successful investments for both countries.

Since 1996, with the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, foreign direct investment (FDI) has come from Spain to Brazil, being the first company to inaugurate this stage, the insurer MAPFRE. At the moment, in 1996, of all the direct foreign investment that Spain makes in Latin America, Brazil obtains only 5%.²²⁹ The worldwide trend of business specialization, coupled with the significant globalization that was being experienced and the moment of widespread growth of most European and Latin American countries, together with the creation of MERCOSUR and the vision of a large commercial block, were the essential attractions. For the significant investments made by Spanish companies in Latin America, which saw in the region, margins of profit higher than those that could be obtained in Europe.

On the other hand, the implementation of *Plano Real* and the National Privatization Program (PND), as well as the privatizations carried out, attracted the attention of energy and financial companies (ENDESA and SANTANDER Bank), since the privatizations were carried out in these sectors.²³⁰ Spanish companies specialized in the common European market, had the advantages of being part of the largest global economic bloc, had solvency and, together with the weakness of the Brazilian currency, made large purchases of privatized Brazilian companies.

To get an idea of the change in the Investment System, we just have to highlight some data. In 1995, the Spanish FDI in Brazil was 0.6%, which meant a final amount of 251 million dollars. In 1998, only three years later, the Spanish FDI in Brazil of 22%, reaching a total of 5,120 million dollars and obtaining the first position of the investment in this country. A year later, in 2000, Spain represents 32% of FDI in Brazil. The data are overwhelming, since the growth of 8,000% and represents a quarter of Spanish investments abroad,²³¹ being Brazil the first country in the world in reception of Spanish investment. From this moment and thanks in large part to the strong investment, relations

²²⁹ Alfredo Arahuetes, "Inversiones europeas en Iberoamérica 1990-2000", en *Perspectivas Exteriores 2002*, los intereses de España en el mundo, Madrid, 2002, pp. 267-268.

²³⁰ Emilio Ontiveros, "Flujos de inversión hacia América Latina", en *Perspectivas Exteriores 2002*, los intereses de España en el mundo, Madrid, 2002, pp. 302-303.

²³¹ Bruno Ayllón, *Las Relaciones Hispano-Brasileña:...*, 2007, pp. 403-404.

in all areas would gain importance, and one could speak of Strategic Partnership between both governments.

If we talk about the importance of Spanish direct foreign investment in Brazil, we must mention the role of Telefónica in this process. Telefónica joins the Brazilian market in 1997, a year later, it buys 51% of TELESP and later TeleLeste cellular. In 2000, Telefónica owned 25% of the market.²³² In 2001, together with Portugal Telecom, they controlled 42% of the telephone market in Brazil.

In the financial sector, the investment importance lies with Banco Santander and BBVA. The first is awarded by the State Bank of Sao Paulo and subsequently by BANESPA.²³³ In 2001, the profits produced by SANTANDER in Brazil gave this bank its most important global contribution. For its part, BBVA acquired Excel, the fourteenth largest bank in Brazil. In matters of competition in investments between Spanish financial institutions in Brazil, it can be said that SANTANDER Bank has won the battle against BBVA.

In terms of energy, ENDESA and IBERDROLA bet heavily in their investments in Brazil, so much so that in 2000, IBERDROLA owns 10.9% of the Brazilian electricity market share. Beyond the three essential sectors we have observed, there are also others such as the oil tanker, the transport sector or the hotel industry, which have also set their sights on Brazil to make investments during the late nineties and early nineties.

For all this, the strong ties created by Spanish companies in Brazil, tighten relations but at the same time injected a strong economic vision that although essential, is not always ideal for the development of joint government actions. As is the case of some sectors of Brazilian society that have seen in Spanish companies the return of a conquering Spain.

An essential factor in the economic key to be reinforced, once Spanish investments in Brazil are satisfactory, is the export of Brazilian goods to the Spanish market. While for Spain, Brazil is the most important partner after the bloc of the European Union and United States, and the first in Latin America. For Brazil, the share of exports to Spain is

²³² Bruno Ayllón, op Cit., p. 408.

²³³ Alfredo Arahetes y Célio Hiratuka, Relaciones Económica entre España y Brasil, en *Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, 2007, p. 38.

residual in comparison with the Spanish volume.²³⁴ The measures carried out by Cardoso in Brazil, economic stability, the importance of Mercosur as an economic bloc, the specialization and internationalization of Spanish companies, all accompanied by good relations between both governments, have encouraged the increase of union ties Between both countries. In spite of all this, during the governments of Lula da Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero, we will promote as we will continue to maintain good economic relations and at the same time accompany them with the necessary social turn. Spanish foreign policy towards Latin America will be based on encouraging the relations left by the Aznar and Cardoso governments.

In the Brazilian elections of 2002, the political exhaustion of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, as well as the one of its economic policy, was glimpsed. With the victory of Lula da Silva, the economic framework of this consisted in inspiring confidence, continue with the fiscal adjustment established and strict Real policy.²³⁵ These actions were developed by Antonio Palocci and José Dirceu, responsible for the Treasury and Civil House.

Prior to the arrival in power of both leaders, Brazilian and Spanish, between 2001-2003, there had been a change in the dynamics in the economic relations between both countries, where Spanish exports to Brazil had declined, while imports Towards Spain from the Latin American country increased.²³⁶ Something remarkable in spite of the enormous volume of exchanges between the two countries.

Since 2003, the vocation of the Brazilian government has been to attract investment and increase the pace of growth of the economy, through more proactive policies, emphasizing the PAC.²³⁷ The appearance in the political scene of Guido Mantenga and Dilma Rousseff,²³⁸ for the promotion of these initiatives has been essential to maintain

²³⁴ Guillermo de la Dehesa, "Las relaciones económicas entre Brasil y España", en Seminario Brasil Espanha, Rio de Janeiro, 2000, pp. 10-11.

²³⁵ Alfredo Arahetes, *La internacionalización de la empresa española, Estudio monográfico sobre el entorno económico y las oportunidades de inversión en Brasil*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2009, p. 35.

²³⁶ Alfredo Arahetes y Célio Hiratuka, *Relaciones Económicas entre España y Brasil*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2007, pp. 56-57.

²³⁷ Alfredo Arahetes, *op Cit.*, p. 41.

²³⁸ *Ibid*, p.42. Both Pallocci and Dirceu had to leave the political scene due to scandals of corruption. Being replaced by Mantenga and Rousseff.

the power in the mandates of Lula and to reactivate the economy. Thanks to its reforms, its resources and its situation, Brazil has been one of the most important countries in the international sphere during the first years of the 21st century. Its political and economic importance is key to any international financial structure and within the BRIC country package, being Brazil, the second power in the American continent.

Since the mid-1990s, the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso approved the reforms that would serve Brazil to be a global player in the international market, actions have been aimed at strengthening stability, fostering growth and encouraging social inclusion,²³⁹ something that has been in line between the governments of Lula and Zapatero.

Thanks to the reforms, Brazil has been one of the countries with the greatest Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) since the end of the 1990s. Regarding the commercial volume between both countries, both Brazil is essential for Spain, as Spain for Brazil. For Spain, Brazil is the most important partner in Latin America not because of historical, cultural or social links but because of the importance of its economy and its weight in the Spanish trade balance, as evidenced by its economic exchanges and political relations.

One of the most significant aspects of economic relations between Brazil and Spain is FDI. If in the previous years, the Spanish FDI put all its sights on Brazil, between 2003 and 2009, there was a change in the direction of this,²⁴⁰ occupying the European Union, 65% of the investment volume, being reserved for America 16%. We should not forget that the Spanish vocation is Europeanist and the common market is essential for the development of investments, although the ties with Latin America are relevant for the development of Spanish companies. It should also be understood that in 2002 the new common currency for Europe was launched, this would overwhelmingly stimulate trade relations with the environment of countries with a common European monetary framework. The euro was the main asset for the integration of the European market. Although the focus of FDI was on Europe, Spain remained the first EU country in terms of FDI numbers in Latin America. Within the Latin American investment, 35% of this investment was directed to Brazil reaching in 2009 up to 50% of all investment in Latin

²³⁹ Carlos Malamud, *Informe Elcano, Relaciones España-Brasil*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2014, pp. 22-23.

²⁴⁰ Alfredo Arahetes, *La internacionalización de la empresa española, Estudio monográfico sobre el entorno económico y las oportunidades de inversión en Brasil*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2009, p. 84.

America.²⁴¹ The importance of this country for Spanish FDI is highlighted. With the signing of the Brasilia Declaration, investment was continued on both sides of the Atlantic between the two governments. We must emphasize that in terms of FDI, Brazil is the second most relevant market, only surpassed by the United Kingdom.²⁴² In 2010, near the end of the mandate of the Socialist Party in Spain, the volume of FDI to Brazil was 55,000 million dollars. In fact, in 2006 Lula da Silva's visit to Spain was aimed at promoting investment. To this end, he met with the main businessmen of the country to explain the benefits of PAC, its star program to attract foreign investment to Brazil.

The importance of Spanish FDI in Brazil during this period stands out in the telecommunications sector, banking, natural resources, as well as infrastructures.

As we noted above with the number of Spanish companies that settled in Brazil from the end of the nineties, this volume has continued to expand, with Spain being the second investor country in Brazil. In spite of its constant investments and the importance that Brazil has had during all the stage between the governments of Lula and Zapatero, Spain still does not have in this country the presence and the cultural dynamism that it has in other Latin American countries, although The efforts of both governments were to reinforce this plan in both directions.²⁴³ The Brasilia Declaration signed in 2005 reflects the identification of common interests between the two governments, which serves for a political and rational construction of bilateral relations.

We can see the difference between the agreements signed in the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium, with those carried out between the governments of Lula da Silva and Zapatero. While in the 1990s, the agreements stand out due to their scarcity, leaving the bilateral relations to an economic level and of little intervention by the governments, the main agreement is signed in 2003, being the signature of the strategic partnership plan. From 2005 to 2010, a total of twelve agreements were signed²⁴⁴ with climate change, cooperation, the Brasilia Declaration, where the strategic partnership signed two years ago was signed. The implementation in 2008 of an action

²⁴¹ Alfredo Arahuetes, *op Cit.*, p.128.

²⁴² Carlos Malamud, *op Cit.*, p. 65-67.

²⁴³ Marcial Poncela (coord.), *Brasil: un gran mercado en expansión sostenida, Experiencias de internacionalización de empresas españolas en mercados emergentes IV*, Cátedra Nebrija Santander en Dirección Internacional de Empresas, Madrid, 2012, pp. 42-45.

²⁴⁴ Carlos Malamud, *Informe Elcano, Relaciones España-Brasil*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2014, p. 35.

plan on science and technology. An essential change is observed in the bilateral relationship model.

In relation to Brazil and the Lula government, from 2003 there is a tendency where imports increase although below exports. In relation to the latter, during the period of Lula's rule, exports have been mainly directed to the European Union, Nafta and Mercosur,²⁴⁵ although there has been a smaller share from 2003 to 2006.

With regard to Spain, since 2003, exports have always been increasing, especially at a very high rate until 2005²⁴⁶ and thereafter in a slower way. This growth, in particular until 2005, led to an investment of the balance in the commercial account with Spain. Between 2005 and 2009, the increase in imports increased the surplus to Brazil.

It was not until the 1980s that Brazilian investments abroad began to cease to be irrelevant. Starting in the new century, Brazilian companies discover the advantages of internationalization and seek expansion and opening up to new markets. At the beginning of this century, most of the investments abroad are made within the framework of Mercosur,²⁴⁷ specifically in Uruguay, due in part to proximity and tax advantages. From 2003, with the arrival of Lula da Silva to power, Europe obtains a previously unknown importance, reaching 65% of the investment of Brazil. Spain, for its part, has seen an increase in the volume of investments coming from Brazil since 2004, reaching 5% of the Brazilian total.

We have seen how the exports of Spain to the Brazilian market have been growing, except in the first two years of the new century. The first Spanish companies that began installing in Brazil have given way during the first decade of the 2000 to new industries²⁴⁸ on the rise such as the tourism sectors and the new technologies. At the same time, Spanish imports from Brazil have grown exponentially. On the Brazilian side, we see how its exports have increased towards the EU, which also means an increase in Spain, even higher than the European average.

For all these reasons, relations between the governments of Brazil and Spain have been of great interest to both of them, since as key members in Mercosur and European Union,

²⁴⁵ Perry Anderson, "Le Brésil de Lula", *Le Débat*, nº5 (nº 167), pp. 31.

²⁴⁶ Alfredo Arahuetes y Célio Hiratuka, *Relaciones Económicas entre España y Brasil*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2007, p. 92.

²⁴⁷ Alfredo Arahuetes y Célio Hiratuka, *op Cit.*, pp. 143.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 170-171.

they promote the progress and growth of relations in all its plans. We should not think that the political harmony between Lula and Zapatero served to make Spain a connecting bridge between Europe and Brazil, rather what was sought was to have a stable and reliable partner in the framework of action of the European Union to encourage and carry out interesting policies for both.

3.3. Social relations between Brazil & Spain.

An aspect that has marked the cultural ties between Brazil and Spain have been the social relations between both states. If, until the middle of the second half of the twentieth century, relations between the two countries were marked by the importance of Spanish immigration in Brazil, since the 1970s, there was a strong reduction of these flows. With the advance of Spanish and Brazilian democracy, both governments tried to meet the needs of their expatriates. During the 1980s, Spanish residents in Brazil received exclusive medical care in a center specifically dedicated to the Spanish colony resident in Brazil. In exchange for this service, Brazilians had free medical care at the World Cup in Spain in 1982.²⁴⁹

Later, with the arrival of the integration processes experienced in Europe and with the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumed the importance of this aspect in the protection of its citizens in European territories and consequently in Spain.

Since the 1990s, migratory flows have become increasingly important. On the one hand there is a return of Spanish immigrants resident in Brazil to Spain, due to the good conditions they enjoyed. On the other hand, new problems appear such as the irregular entry of Brazilian immigrants into Spain. Many of these citizens who enter irregular situations are part of mafias and networks of human trafficking, where a large number of women are forced to prostitution.²⁵⁰ As a result of these cases, the collaboration between the state security forces of both countries has been strengthened.

Such has been the change in the paradigm of emigration from Spain to Brazil that in estimated numbers, in the year 2000, 120,000 Spaniards lived in Brazil, of which 88,000

²⁴⁹ Bruno Ayllón, *Las Relaciones Hispano-Brasileñas: de la mutua irrelevancia a la asociación estratégica (1945-2005)*, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2007, pp. 367-368.

²⁵⁰ Brasil lidera exportação de escrava sexual, diz estudio, *Folha de Sao Paulo*, 29 de noviembre de 2000.

lived in Sao Paulo.²⁵¹ Most of the profile of these emigrants is direct from multinationals who, because of their investments, have created roots in Brazil.

Within the framework of social relations, it is probably where there have been more tensions in the area of bilateral relations between the governments of Spain and Brazil between 2003 and 2009. If for Spain, the Spanish colony in Brazil happened to have an abundant presence and of relevant importance, during this time the Spanish emigration was of temporary character and of high qualification. At the same time, Brazilian emigration came to Spain as a preferred destination attracted by various factors. Below we will analyze the most significant aspects of this stage and its involvement in the bilateral framework between the governments of Lula da Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero.

Both Brazil and Spain have been destined to receive and send migrants from different parts of the world throughout their history. Historically, Spain has been a country of emigration, changing that tendency in the last years, especially during the stage of the last socialist government, 2003-2011.²⁵² Of all the Spanish emigrants who throughout history went to Latin America, 15% did so towards Brazil.²⁵³ The figures to date tell us that since 1885, Brazil has hosted 725,000 Spanish immigrants.

The trends throughout this period have been very heterogeneous and since 1960, with the Franco opening and the subsequent entry into democracy, the flow of Spaniards to Brazil declined considerably, considering it to be inexpressive. From the last years of the twentieth century and the beginning of the new century, emigration to Brazil regains strength. In these years, the profile of the Spanish emigrant is translated into senior executives, dependent of Spanish companies based in Brazil. They have a high level of qualification, a high level of income and their residence is temporary.

Another key trend that we find in the framework of relations occurs in the second stage of Zapatero's government in Spain. The arrival of the economic crisis reduces labor possibilities, increases unemployment and job insecurity. Due to this, a very different

²⁵¹ Oficina de información Diplomática, *República Federativa de Brasil*, Ficha País, Ministerio de Asuntos Exterior y Cooperación, Madrid, 2015.

²⁵² Enrique Conejero, "La política de inmigración en España", Revista de investigación, editado por Área de Innovación y Desarrollo S.L., 2012, p. 2.

²⁵³ INE, Datos sociológicos de ciudadanía española. Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social. Gobierno de España.

<http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/mundo/consejerias/brasil/emigracion/contenidos/datosSocio.htm>

trend has been observed since 2010, where Brazil has attracted an important interest thanks to the demand for work, the reforms carried out and the opportunities offered by a country in constant growth.²⁵⁴ That is why, a new flow of Spaniards, with high levels of training and unemployed have seen in Brazil an alternative for their future work.

Currently in Brazil, there are about 122,000 Spaniards, where more than 60% live in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.²⁵⁵

On the other hand, we find the emigration of Brazilians to Spain. As Carlota Solé writes,²⁵⁶ Brazilian emigration abroad is part of the global context of capitalism and would be an expression of growing socioeconomic inequalities between countries and the labor needs of rich countries. In our case, the Brazilian emigration to Spain is inserted in the third stage of migratory movements of the European country. This recent phenomenon is due in part to the growth of the Spanish economy, which has led to a demand for labor. At the same time, Spain is part of the European Union, so obtaining a residence permit in this country is synonymous with great advantages. Other factors such as its geopolitical reach and good relations with Brazil, as well as its quality of life, a flexible immigration policy, salaries higher than its neighboring country, Portugal, and the proximity of both languages, made of Spain a favorite destination for many Brazilians²⁵⁷ who saw in their country, very reduced labor options.

To all this, we must add the restrictions applied in the immigration policies of the United States.²⁵⁸ The tightening of visa policies made countries like Spain receive large flows of Brazilian emigrants. In any case, the recent emigration of Brazilians, that is to

²⁵⁴ Marcial Poncela (coord.), *Brasil: un gran mercado en expansión sostenida, Experiencias de internacionalización de empresas españolas en mercados emergentes IV*, Cátedra Nebrija Santander en Dirección Internacional de Empresas, Madrid, 2012, pp. 200-201.

²⁵⁵ Ramón Villares, "La inmigración española en Brasil", *La aportación de España al Brasil*, Fundación Consejo España-Brasil, 2016, Sao Paulo, p. 2-3.

²⁵⁶ Carlota Solé, Leonardo Cavalcanti, y Sonia Parella, *La inmigración brasileña en la estructura socioeconómica de España*, Observatorio permanente de la inmigración, Madrid, 2011, pp. 167-170.

²⁵⁷ Erika Masanet, Rosana Baeninger, y Miguel Angel Mateo, "La inmigración brasileña en España: características, singularidades e influencia de las vinculaciones históricas", en *Papeles de Población nº 71*, CIEAP/UAEM, Madrid, 2012, pp. 2-3.

²⁵⁸ Erika Masanet, "O Brasil e a Espanha na dinâmica das migrações internacionais: um breve panorama da situação dos emigrantes brasileiros na Espanha", *Revista Brasileira de Estudos de População*, Vol. 25 nº1, Sao Paulo, 2008, pp. 153-155.

say between the years 2002-2009, is a phenomenon characterized by feminization,²⁵⁹ since 70% of Brazilian immigrants arriving in Spain are women. All of them occupy very diverse jobs, from self-employed, qualified employees, manual workers, non-manual workers and those dedicated to social reproduction.

Undoubtedly, the most important conflict between Spain and Brazil during the governments of Lula de Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero has been due to the influx of immigrants.

The conflict began with the repatriation of Patricia Camargo Magalhaes on February 10, 2008. This Brazilian citizen was traveling from Brazil to Lisbon, Portugal, and for this he had to stop at the Madrid-Barajas Airport. The authorities held her for three days and at the end she was repatriated. During this month and until March 5, thirty more Brazilians were repatriated to their country from Spain. The tension increased between both executives and the media echoed the news,²⁶⁰ which generated distrust and uncertainty among citizens.

Due to the policies implemented by Zapatero's executive, arguing that his action was due to a tightening of the visa policies of the Schengen Zone, the *Itamaraty* acted accordingly, repatriating 6 Spaniards from the airport of Salvador de Bahia. From the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the argument was to act in opposition to the Spanish government and to attack with the same intensity. During the summer of 2008, both Spain and Brazil for the Brazilian and Spanish tourists stopped being preferential destinations, reducing the volume of visitors in those periods. After these months of tension between the two countries, the situation was resolved amicably due to strong ties that unite the two countries, as well as the political harmony between the two presidents.

Immigration, we have seen how it has been a key factor in all recent periods. In our field of study, immigration to Brazil and to Spain of Spanish and Brazilian citizens respectively is framed in a context of globalization. In the last years and thanks to the good development and growth of both economic, the migrants of both countries have been of economic scope. Although those who went from Spain to Brazil before the

²⁵⁹ Carlota Solé, Leonardo Cavalcanti, y Sonia Parella, *La inmigración brasileña en la estructura socioeconómica de España*, Observatorio permanente de la inmigración, Madrid, 2011, pp. 180-183.

²⁶⁰ No son inmigrantes, son turistas. Brasil toma represalias por las trabas a sus viajeros para entrar en España. Diario El País. 23 de febrero de 2012.

http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2012/02/22/vidayartes/1329943814_691446.html

international economic crisis, were professionals with a high level of training to be part of large business groups, those who did after the crisis, mostly are profiles with a high level of training but looking for a better job situation. In contrast, Brazilian emigrants who have arrived in Spain,²⁶¹ most of them have a low professional profile and their main job is to be a higher-paid workforce than in their country of origin.

3.4. Cultural relations between both countries.

Just as the set of relations between both countries developed with the arrival of democracy to both countries political stability and integration processes in the economic blocs, cultural relations suffered the impact of these processes, which resulted in Improvements in this field.

Despite the positive impact of the rapprochement between the two countries, cultural relations between 1979 and 1992 presented a minority attention, in relation to other Latin American countries, although there are traits that highlight the desire of both governments to revitalize such relationships. At the beginning of the eighties, the priority cultural topics were the exchange of books, the validation of titles and the activities of the House of Brazil in the University City of Madrid.

The King of Spain, in his 1983 visit to Brazil, was betting on a development of cultural relations as indicated in his agenda and during this decade the Institute of Ibero-American Cooperation (ICI) granted numerous scholarships to Brazilian citizens to study in Spain.²⁶² In spite of the few cultural ties during this stage, Spain wanted to transmit an image of stability, prosperity, in accordance with its economic position, transmit beyond values linked to monetary flows, cultural values commensurate with its heritage as an instrument of peace . That is why during the nineties, an important cultural program was developed, stimulated by the rise of this type of diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy,²⁶³ along with the large Spanish multinationals represented in Brazil.

²⁶¹ Carlota Solé, Leonardo Cavalcanti, y Sonia Parella, *La inmigración brasileña...*, Madrid, 2011, pp. 186.

²⁶² Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana (ICI), 1991, *Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional*, p. 10.

²⁶³ Angel Badillo, "Las políticas públicas de acción cultural exterior de España", en *Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, 2014, pp.5-6.

It is remarkable, the disparity between the action of both countries in reference to the culture. While Spain has done a lot of work in cultural diplomacy in Latin America and much of Brazil, in order to avoid having a negative view of Brazilians due to the significant investments made, the Brazilian government has not encouraged this aspect.²⁶⁴ There being a great imbalance between both governments. The dissemination of culture in all its forms has promoted new agreements between both governments and since the arrival of Lula da Silva and Zapatero has been a benchmark in the area of bilateral relations.

If relations, with the New Century have been increased by economic interests between Brazil and Spain, have also done so in cultural matters with the new governments. With the Declaration of Brasilia, foreign cultural action between the two countries is strengthened, although it has been carried out in an unequal way. With respect to Spain, where cultural action abroad has traditionally been a minority and carried out by the government, since the early years, specifically since 2002, the cultural action abroad in Brazil has been developed by numerous actors,²⁶⁵ public, private, Citizens in particular and associations, who wish to make relations between the two countries, culture as a strong point, both Spanish in Brazil and Brazilian in Spain.

Although the economic level is undoubtedly the one with the greatest interest, a good cultural perception is essential for the evolution of common projects between entities, investments in different fields or a platform to enter Latin American and European markets.

In order to improve and maintain the relations between the two countries and at the same time that the citizens feel the cultural bonds between both territories, the actions that have been carried out have been the expositions; the promotion of cultural activities by the responsible actors; the training of students and teachers; study and research grants to develop their projects in both countries; as well as the publicity on the part of the entities in charge of that cultural promotion.

The institutions based in Brazil and responsible for the promotion of Spanish culture, these are:

²⁶⁴ José Castello, "La política cultural de los Gobiernos brasileños", en *A era FHC um balanço*, Sao Paulo, 2002, pp. 645-646.

²⁶⁵ Juan José Prieto, "La imagen de la cultura española en Brasil", en *Observatorio imagen de España, Análisis de acciones e instituciones españolas*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2013, p. 2.

- The Spanish public administrations. First, the *Instituto Cervantes*, which has eight centers spread throughout the Brazilian territory. The Ministry of Culture, from the Embassy of Spain in Brasilia, which controls the Education Office of Rio de Janeiro, the existing Technical Advisories, the Spanish Teaching Resource Centers, the Miguel de Cervantes Spanish-Brazilian College, based in Sao Paulo, and the Spanish School Santa Maria, in Belo Horizonte. On the other hand, the action of the General Consulates in Brazil and the Honorary Consulates. The AECID, Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development, from the Cultural Center of Spain in Sao Paulo. *Turespaña*, in charge of promoting tourism between both countries. The ICEX, Spanish Institute of Foreign Trade. The Carolina Foundation, which develops a scholarship program for Brazilian students in Spain.
- Private Institutions. We highlight the Houses of Spain. One of the most important private actors is the *Sociedade Cultural Brasil-Espanha* (SCBE), in charge of promoting the image of Spain in Brazil. Other important actors in the private sector have been the large Spanish companies based in Brazil,²⁶⁶ those who need to improve their external image have allocated a significant part of their profits to foundations for the development of a program such as that carried out by *Banco Santander*²⁶⁷ to the granting of a large number of scholarships for Brazilian students.
- Lastly, thanks to the promotion of tourism, citizens are an essential part of this scheme, because with their opinions, they improve and enhance the image of a country, in this case not only of Spain in Brazil but also of Brazil in Spain²⁶⁸.

From the Brazilian side in Spain and the promotion of culture as an action carried out by different entities, both public and private, we must say that they are less effective and milder than the opposite.

²⁶⁶ Elvira Marco y Jaime Otero, "Colaboración público-privada en la acción cultural exterior", *Documento de trabajo 3, Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, 2010, pp. 10-11.

²⁶⁷ Bruno Ayllón, *Las relaciones hispano-brasileñas: de la mutua irrelevancia a la asociación estratégica (1945-2005)*, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2007, p. 198.

²⁶⁸ Júlia Erminia Riscado, "A política externa cultural espanhola para o Brasil", *Anais do XXVI Simpósio Nacional de História – ANPUH*, Sao Paulo, 2011, p. 5.

Beyond the Brazilian Embassy in Spain and the role of its General Consulates, the most important cultural impulse is promoted by the Hispano-Brazilian Cultural Foundation in collaboration with the Center for Brazilian Studies in Salamanca. Casa do Brasil, in the university city of Madrid, Friends of Brazil Association. We also find the Nucleus of Entities Brazil Spain (NEBE), the Brazil-Spain Chamber of Commerce. The Casa América, belonging to the Spanish state, although with important Brazilian ties. The Organization of Ibero-American States and the Niemeyer Center of Avilés in Asturias.

Although both presidents have given added value to culture and cultural action within the framework of bilateral relations, Lula's government compared with Zapatero's has placed less emphasis on this. Brazilian cultural GDP represents 1.5%, while Spanish exceeds it by more than double.²⁶⁹ The cultural image is essential for the valuation of the inhabitants of one country with respect to another.

Despite the institutional impulse of Spain during this time to improve the image of Spain in Brazil, the results indicate that still more emphasis is needed on this aspect. For example, almost 20% of Brazilians do not associate a specific cultural image to Spain,²⁷⁰ while society, we must make an effort to abandon the thought that Brazil is soccer and samba.²⁷¹ Thanks to Lula, the image of Brazil was revitalized²⁷² and this became the most universal Brazilian during his term.

A key factor in the cultural context is the language, since 40% of Brazilians consider Spanish to be indispensable for the working world.²⁷³ Even so, there is little editorial demand for titles in Spanish and Brazilian respectively, although the translation of volumes between 2005 and 2008 increased enormously, thanks to the commitment of Prisa Group, the largest group of communication in Spanish that during 2006-2009 has made its landing in Brazil, promoting Spanish as a language at the same time that it acquired radio licenses for its implantation in Brazil.

²⁶⁹ Juan José Prieto, "La imagen de la cultura española en Brasil", en *Observatorio imagen de España, Análisis de acciones e instituciones españolas*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2013, p. 5.

²⁷⁰ Juan José Prieto, *op Cit.*, p. 7-8.

²⁷¹ Bruno Ayllón, *Las relaciones hispano-brasileñas: de la mutua irrelevancia a la asociación estratégica (1945-2005)*, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2007, p. 213-215.

²⁷² Bruno Ayllón, *op Cit.*, p. 239.

²⁷³ Juan Prieto, "La acción cultural exterior de España a través del Instituto Cervantes", en *Observatorio Imagen de España, Análisis de acciones e instituciones españolas*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2012, p. 3.

Thanks to the Brasilia Declaration and the political will of both leaders, between 2004 and 2010, the Spanish and Brazilian culture have had a boom in both Brazil and Spain, where historical ties are essential for this new rapprochement between both countries.

The different Spanish agents have generated in Brazil a wide variety of cultural actions, something that in contrast, the Brazilian agents have not done so in Spain. In spite of this, this new cultural diplomacy has been an essential factor in the bilateral relations between the two governments during the Lula da Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero stage as evidenced by the opening of centers, creation of agreements and a high mutual interest. The objectives were incredibly difficult to meet, something researchers²⁷⁴ had already seen at the time of signing the Brasilia Declaration. Not all have been achieved, but tremendous progress has been made in building a model of bilateral relations, where the cultural role is a weapon with enormous influence. According to a survey of the Royal Institute Elcano, Brazilians value with an 8 out of 10 the cultural image of Spain, rising two points in just five years. In spite of this very good valuation, the Brazilians in their majority do not have an image nor a personage that to associate to the Spanish culture. At the time of analyzing the language, the Brazilians emphasized an enormous importance to the learning of Spanish, although even today it is placed below the English.

The last of the key elements in the framework of bilateral cultural relations will be the importance of the Spanish language in Brazil. Since the 1970s, with the launch of new relations between the governments of Spain and Brazil, the Spanish language was a crucial issue to be addressed by the two executives.

The Spanish language has always been a reference for the evolution of bilateral relations with the countries of Latin America, has served as an essential value to build common ties that with Brazil had not developed. That is why, despite the similarities between Spanish and Portuguese, language remained a stumbling block for the full development of bilateral relations and the scope of "parceria".

Brazil was aware of the importance of knowledge of Spanish as a priority language, and it was further verified. Between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, when MERCOSUR was integrated, Brazil began to be part of a predominantly speaking community Spanish and of vital importance for its external action. The Brazilian

²⁷⁴ Elvira Marco y Jaime Otero, "La transformación de la diplomacia cultural española", *Estudios de Política Exterior* nº 134, Madrid, 2010, p. 4.

government promoted the teaching of Spanish in Brazil,²⁷⁵ as did the Spanish government since the mid-1990s, promoting the diffusion of the language and forming teachers for its teaching.

Beyond the importance of Spanish for the integrated market in MERCOSUR, it is also due to the large number of Spanish companies based in Brazil, so it becomes a language with great employability in Brazil. On the other hand, the influence of the Hispanic culture, not only the Spanish, but also the influence of all the countries of its surroundings, is influenced by this official language in 21 countries. The importance of the study of Spanish in Brazil at the end of the nineties is demonstrated by the data of the *Instituto Cervantes*, where 45% of the candidates for Spanish-language qualification are Brazilians.²⁷⁶

Not only have citizens seen in Spanish an important language, essential for the external environment of Brazil and with a future in the world of work. The government has implemented Spanish in classrooms in progressive ways. This has been made possible thanks to the will of the Brazilian governments and to the efforts of the Spanish governments,²⁷⁷ such as the visit of the Minister of Education and Culture, Mariano Rajoy, in 1999, showing their collaboration for the implementation of Spanish in the Brazilian educational system and proposing a cooperation plan for the development of the same.

Another of the great bets for the development of the Cervantes language has been the *Instituto Cervantes*, cornerstone of this process as an organism for the promotion of Spanish in the world. Nowadays, thanks to the impetus of Rodriguez Zapatero's government, Brazil is the country where Spain has the largest number of these centers,²⁷⁸ with a total of eight offices throughout the country.

²⁷⁵ El presidente de Brasil envía al Congreso la ley que establece la enseñanza obligatoria del español, *ABC*, Madrid, 11 de julio de 1993.

²⁷⁶ Joan Prieto Gutierrez, "La acción cultural exterior de España a través del Instituto Cervantes", en *Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, 2013, pp. 7-8.

²⁷⁷ España prepara un desembarco cultural en Brasil para propagar el castellano, *El Mundo*, Madrid, 30 de septiembre de 1999.

²⁷⁸ Álvaro Martínez-Cachero Laseca, "La enseñanza del español en el sistema educativo brasileño: situación y posibles actuaciones", en *Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, 2009, pp. 1-8.

For its part, Spain has given much less importance to the teaching of Portuguese. We can say that during the nineties the most relevant initiatives around the Portuguese have been: the signing between the governments of Brazil and Spain of a declaration of intentions to promote Portuguese in Spain and, on the other hand, some Spanish multinationals with large volume of business in Brazil, have decided to adopt Portuguese as a language of importance,²⁷⁹ behind Spanish.

As we will now analyze in the two sections, the great advance of the Spanish language in Brazil is due to two main actions that are: the expansion of the Cervantes Institute in Brazil, this being the country with more centers in the world. And on the other hand the approval in 2005 of the Law of Spanish, where it obliges all the centers to offer the Spanish, at least of optional way. For both the Zapatero and Lula da Silva governments, this increase in the importance of the Spanish language in Brazil merely demonstrated the growing importance of the Cervantes language in Brazil, and the importance of this in the framework of both bilateral and multilateral relations.

3.4.1. The *Instituto Cervantes* in Brazil.

Since March 21, 1991, the Law establishing the *Instituto Cervantes*,²⁸⁰ was established, it was clear that this center would work to promote Spanish culture and to teach Spanish in non-Spanish-speaking countries.

From the beginning, the eyes of the promoters of the Institute, as well as of the different actors who participated in the creation, were placed in Brazil as one of the key countries for the teaching of Spanish. This is due as we have said to several factors: the importance of MERCOSUR as economic block and main active of the foreign policy of Brazil; on the other hand, the countries of the Brazilian environment are all Spanish speaking; thirdly, the arrival of large investments by Spanish companies to Brazil would produce a large number of jobs in which knowledge of Spanish would be key; and finally the importance to the Brazilian government of teaching Spanish, since it has been promoted at different educational levels with different laws for its learning.

²⁷⁹ Bruno Ayllón, *op Cit.*, p. 454.

²⁸⁰ Jorge Urrutia, "La actividad académica del Instituto Cervantes (1991-2006)", en *El Instituto Cervantes: 15 años*, Madrid, 2006, p. 1.

All of this made Brazil a perfect scenario for the promotion, development and evolution of the *Instituto Cervantes*, so much so that during the government stage of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, at the end of his term, Brazil was the country with the most centers in the world, with a total of eight.²⁸¹

In the first years of life, the *Instituto Cervantes*, its main function was to incorporate into the staff, the necessary teachers for the execution of the academic program launched and at the same time, the institution of examinations at each level,²⁸² similar to those already used by the British Council or *Alliance Française*. From there and from their presentation in society, the program is defined and the accent is placed on the diffusion of the culture of the Spanish-speaking countries and their language. Despite the good intentions, the initiatives were complex in relation to the budget, the *Instituto Cervantes* in comparison with the great European cultural promotion institutes had a very small budget.²⁸³

For the *Instituto Cervantes* the importance of Brazil is essential, where the teaching of language has always played a special role in the framework of bilateral relations. This importance has come on the one hand by the pressures on the part of the government of Spain to foment the teaching of Spanish in the Brazilian educational system, which would be an opportunity to create more centers of the *Instituto Cervantes* and its activities throughout the Brazilian territory and thus, to be official center for the formation of teachers of Spanish language. This is due to a good part of the visits of the Minister of Education in 1999 and of the Kings in 2000.²⁸⁴

El *Instituto Cervantes* is set up in Brazil in 1998 and has never stopped growing, but when it has done so, as we will see below, it will be in the stage between the governments of Lula da Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero. The first center opened in Sao Paulo, fomenting the formation of teachers, knowing that in Brazil progress was being made to boost Spanish in both the public and private spheres.²⁸⁵ Three years later and due to the demand

²⁸¹ El Instituto Cervantes en cifras, Memoria Institucional 2010, Madrid, 2011, p.1-3.

²⁸² Jorge Urrutia, "La actividad académica del Instituto Cervante 1991-2006", en *El Instituto Cervantes: 15 años*, Madrid, 2006, pp. 2-3.

²⁸³ José Andrés Fernández Leost, *Acción Cultural Exterior en Europa: un análisis comparado*, en Fundación Alternativas: observatorio cultura y comunicación, Madrid, 2015, pp. 15-18.

²⁸⁴ Bruno Ayllón, *Las Relaciones Hispano-Brasileñas: de la mutua irrelevancia a la asociación estratégica (1945-2005)*, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2007, pp. 449-450.

²⁸⁵ Bruno Ayllón, *op Cit.*, pp.452-453.

of Spanish students, the increase of Spanish investment in Brazil, and the increase of exchanges between Brazilian students with Spain and vice versa, it was decided to open the second center, in the town of Rio de Janeiro.

After the arrival of the presidents Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, it was decided to change the framework of existing bilateral relations between both countries. If the signing of the Strategic Association in 2003 already with Lula in power and Aznar in his last year in office in Spain, was key to the good harmony enjoyed by the relations between both countries, the subsequent signing of the Declaration of Brasilia,²⁸⁶ between the two socialist presidents, consolidated the Strategic Partnership, signed two years ago and emphasized social development, education and culture. The objectives were ambitious but soon they were going to give important results.

One of the key aspects for the development of the *Instituto Cervantes* in Brazil was the application on August 5, 2005 of the Spanish Law²⁸⁷ by the Lula da Silva government. This fact was undoubtedly due to the learning needs of Spanish that Brazil presents, but also to the pressures made by Spain for its application. On the other hand, knowing the benefit that this Law would have for Spain, the Italian, German and French diplomacy promoted the repeal of said Law but without obtaining satisfactory results.²⁸⁸

In this section we try to analyze and understand the importance of the role of the *Instituto Cervantes* within the framework of bilateral cultural relations between Spain and Brazil. The Law of Spanish is an essential part of understanding evolution. Due to the importance of this Law, we have dedicated a section in this chapter to know its development, background and the role of Spanish in Brazil, beyond the *Instituto Cervantes*. A year before the application of the Law, the *Instituto Cervantes* due to the demand for both teacher training and students interested in learning, *Instituto Cervantes* opened two new centers, Brasilia and Salvador de Bahia.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁶ Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación, *Declaración de Brasilia sobre la Consolidación de la Asociación Estratégica entre España y Brasil*, Brasilia, 2005, p. 1.

²⁸⁷ Álvaro Martínez-Cachero Laseca, *La enseñanza del español en el sistema educativo brasileño*, Colección Orellana, Ministerio de Educación, Brasilia, 2008, p. 60-62.

²⁸⁸ Bruno Ayllón, *Las Relaciones Hispano-Brasileñas: de la mutua irrelevancia a la asociación estratégica (1945-2005)*, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2007, pp. 459-462.

²⁸⁹ José Coderch Planas, "España-Brasil: arquitectura de una relación privilegiada", en *ICE Brasil n°810* Brasilia, 2003, pp.33-34.

With the application of Law of Spanish and according to a study carried out by the Secretariat of Basic Education, Brazil in 2005 has a deficit of more than 13,000 teachers,²⁹⁰ which gives the *Instituto Cervantes* an option to increase its resources for the formation of these. That is why, during the period between 2005 and 2010, the supply doubles in centers, passing from four to eight centers throughout the country: Salvador de Bahia, Belo Horizonte, Brasilia, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro And Sao Paulo.

The annual budget of *Instituto Cervantes* has increased between 2004 and 2011, from 68 million euros to 102 in 2011, where approximately 35% of the resources went to Brazil.²⁹¹ The opening of new centers has allowed the promotion of Spanish in a large part of the Brazilian territory. Thanks to the Declaration of Brasilia, signed by both presidents, and the implementation of the Spanish Law, the framework of bilateral relations has varied its scope of action, allowing in this way to promote cultural ties through this Institute.

The importance of Spanish is key in Brazil and because of this, this country has been the priority of the government of Rodríguez Zapatero in its expansion of the *Instituto Cervantes*. Spanish is a mother tongue for more than 472 million people. In 2011 and before the change of government in Spain, data from the *Instituto Cervantes* indicates that more than 20 million students study Spanish as a second language, Brazil occupies the first place with a percentage of 30%. Currently in Brazil between primary and secondary education, promoted by the Spanish Law of 2015, University Education, Cervantes Institutes and other private centers, total a total of more than six million people studying Spanish.²⁹² These data together with the Spanish speakers in Brazil, estimate that in fifteen years, about 30 million people will speak Spanish in Brazil. The function of the *Instituto Cervantes* has been essential in all its centers, where they have spent in

²⁹⁰ Álvaro Martínez-Cachero Laseca, *La enseñanza del español en el sistema educativo brasileño*, Colección Orellana, Ministerio de Educación, Brasilia, 2008, p. 85-87.

²⁹¹ José Andrés Fernández Leost, *Acción Cultural Exterior en Europa: un análisis comparado*, en Fundación Alternativas: observatorio cultura y comunicación, Madrid, 2015, pp. 24-27.

²⁹² David Fernández Vítores, "El Español: una lengua viva", en *Instituto Cervantes*, Madrid, 2016, pp. 15-18.

less than ten years to quadruple their enrollments, passing in 2002 to have 66,434 enrollments to 243,085 in 2011.²⁹³

In spite of the importance of the *Instituto Cervantes* in Brazil, its work for the teaching of languages, obtaining official titles and at the same time, teacher training for the teaching of Spanish, there are voices that criticize this work, since they argue that it is about of a new form of colonialism on the part of the Spanish government. Some analysts who accused the government of Aznar of fomenting a new economic colonialism due to the great investments made by Spanish companies in Brazil with the Zapatero government argue that this new colonialism²⁹⁴ is based on the social action of states and cultural relations . The teaching of Spanish by the *Instituto Cervantes* for these critics is not adequate because they argue that the Spanish of Spain is not appropriate for relations with MERCOSUR, preferring the Castilian of neighboring countries.

In any case, Brazil presents itself as the great hope of Spanish in the world. The importance of the environment, its external relations, its bilateral relations with Spain, especially those carried out between Lula da Silva and Zapatero, the reforms applied by the Lula government in the matter of languages in the teaching and the expansion of the centers of the *Instituto Cervantes*, have been key in the promotion of Spanish throughout the territory, and together with the development of this language in the educational system as we will see below, have made Spanish in Brazil a language of insertion in the world of work for Brazilians and at the same time an opportunity to discover new cultures.

The work of the *Instituto Cervantes* has been key to this development, and this is a reciprocal work in which both Brazil and Spain obtain a return that will be key to maintain the good harmony in the framework of the bilateral relations and to continue fomenting the expansion of the "parceria".

²⁹³ David Fernández Vítóres, *op Cit.*, p. 18.

²⁹⁴ Bruno Ayllón, *Las Relaciones Hispano-Brasileñas: de la mutua irrelevancia a la asociación estratégica (1945-2005)*, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2007, p. 453.

3.4.2. The Brazilian Law of Spanish.

Foreign languages have not always occupied the important field of education they occupy today in Brazil. The teaching of these languages began mainly with the creation of the Public School Pedro II, where from 1838, the subjects of Greek, Latin, French and English were introduced.²⁹⁵ Spanish will not appear on the scene until 1919, as an optional subject.

With the first educative reform of Francisco de Campos in 1931 under the government of Getulio Vargas and due to its predominant nationalism, the teaching of these languages was prohibited to minors of fourteen years.²⁹⁶ Eleven years later, with the reform *Capanema* in 1942 Encouraged the study of languages and due to World War II had been abolished classes of Italian and German, leaving an important field of action for Spanish.²⁹⁷

In 1961 the *Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação* (Law of Guidelines and Bases of Education) was applied, where the schools had the power to choose the languages that incorporated to its education plan. During this stage and due to the predominant role that the United States was playing in the world and in a very special way in Latin America, the study of English was generalized. Due to this Law of reform of the Educational System and the second LDB of 1971,²⁹⁸ Spanish occupied an irrelevant role in the Brazilian Educational System. It is from the 80s, with the implementation of a new framework of bilateral relations between the governments of Spain and Brazil, Spanish joined the Brazilian educational model, encouraged by the various associations of Spanish teachers.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁵ Álvaro Martínez-Cachero Laseca, *La enseñanza del español en el sistema educativo brasileño*, Colección Orellana, Ministerio de Educación, Brasilia, 2008, p. 51.

²⁹⁶ Álvaro Martínez-Cachero Laseca, *op Cit.*, p. 52.

²⁹⁷ Júlia Erminia Riscado, "A política externa cultural espanhola para o Brasil", en *Anais do XXVI Simpósio nacional de História ANPUH*, Sao Paulo, 2011, p. 6.

²⁹⁸ Álvaro Martínez-Cachero Laseca, *op Cit.*, p. 57.

²⁹⁹ Graciela Inés Ravetti Gómez, "El español en Brasil: desafíos para contribuir a las nuevas comunidades en formación", en *Congresos Internacionales de la lengua española*, Madrid, 2001.

It was with the entry of Brazil in MERCOSUR, economic block where predominantly Spanish is spoken and the third LDB in 1996,³⁰⁰ where the Spanish gained strength to include a foreign language in compulsory education. This impulse of Spanish in the Brazilian system due to many factors such as: the insertion of Brazil in MERCOSUR; the importance of bilateral relations with Spain; the arrival of important investments by Spanish companies due to the economic reforms carried out in Brazil by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso; the expansion of the *Instituto Cervantes* throughout Brazil has led to the fact that in 2005, thanks to the needs and good relations between both governments, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva sanctioned an Act, known as the "Law of Spanish,"³⁰¹ that established the obligatory offer of Spanish in the middle schools and of optative enrollment by the student.

The Law does not impose Spanish as a foreign language that every Brazilian student must study, but the study center must offer Spanish as a foreign language, establishing a deadline until 2010.³⁰²

Reactions to the Law were very different. While for example Inés Visuales and Cesar Antonio Molina, the first Director of the Ortega y Gasset Foundation in Argentina and the second Director of the *Instituto Cervantes* in Spain, both institutions dedicated to the teaching of Spanish to foreigners, declared their joy for the approval of the Law, arriving to catalog like "the most important news of the last years".³⁰³

On the other hand, there were numerous criticisms towards the approval of the "Law of Spanish" because it would be necessary to hire many Spanish teachers,³⁰⁴ something that the budget of the Ministry of Education could not afford. On the other hand, the

³⁰⁰ Álvaro Martínez-Cachero Laseca, *La enseñanza...*, Colección Orellana, Ministerio de Educación, Brasilia, 2008, pp. 57-59.

³⁰¹ María Teresa Celada y Fernanda Dos Santos Castelano, "El español en Brasil: actualidad y memoria", en *Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, 2005, pp.3-5.

³⁰² Alessandro Candeas, "La enseñanza del español en Brasil: un compromiso de integración cultural", en *IV Congreso Internacional de la Lengua española*, Cartagena de Indias, 2007, pp. 2-3.

³⁰³ Álvaro Martínez-Cachero Laseca, *op Cit.*, p. 71.

³⁰⁴ Bruno Ayllón, *Las Relaciones Hispano-Brasileñas: de la mutua irrelevancia a la asociación estratégica (1945-2005)*, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2007, p. 453.

implementation of the Act, which has often been interpreted in a confusing way, has been carried out very late, since in many states no initiatives have been taken until 2007.³⁰⁵

The situation of Spanish has varied greatly throughout history, depending heavily on globalization and the impetus of bilateral relations. With the entry into the new century, there has been a huge increase in the study of Spanish in all levels of the educational system.³⁰⁶ It is for all that, the arrival until 2005 and the application of the “Law of Spanish”, has not been an easy road. The history of Spanish in Brazil, despite its importance, is quite recent and short.

With the arrival of the new century, the importance of MERCOSUR and the first stage of expansion of the *Instituto Cervantes* in Brazil, the demand for Spanish language courses continued to increase, placing itself behind those of English language.³⁰⁷ All these data on the increase of the importance of Spanish in Brazil are highlighted in the impulse that have led Spanish publishing companies, with the publication of books both in Spanish, for their learning, and in Brazilian of Spanish authors, for the promotion of the Hispanic culture and all Spanish-speaking countries.³⁰⁸

The application of the Law of Spanish was a complex task, remember that the Brazilian Parliament had laid out 14 propositions of law for the teaching of Spanish years ago. With the execution of this Law culminates one stage and another begins. It began a stage, qualified by members of the government,³⁰⁹ of cultural and social integration, which serves at the same time to encourage the processes of political and economic integration in MERCOSUR.

Thanks to the application of Law 11.161 or “Law of Spanish”, it helps to promote the integration of the peoples of Latin America and at the same time has served for the growth of international cooperation, in this case educational and cultural, since it opens an

³⁰⁵ Francisco Moreno, “Brasil y el español, condenados al entendimiento”, en *Economía exterior: estudios de la revista Política Exterior sobre la internacionalización de la economía española* nº 52, Madrid, 2010, pp. 140-141.

³⁰⁶ Francisco Moreno, “El español en Brasil”, en *El español en el mundo*, Anuario 2000 Instituto Cervantes, Madrid, 2010, p. 1.

³⁰⁷ Agustín Mendoza Villaba, “El español en Brasil”, en *IV Congreso Internacional de la Lengua española*, Cartagena de Indias, 2007, p. 11.

³⁰⁸ S. Moreno, “El gran negocio dl castellano en Brasil”, en *La Clave*, 2004.

³⁰⁹ Alessandro Candeas, “La enseñanza del español en Brasil: un compromiso de integración cultural”, en *IV Congreso Internacional de la Lengua española*, Cartagena de Indias, 2007.

opportunity for teachers from Latin American countries and Spain, since in calculations of the Brazilian government, the Ministry of Education should between 2005 and 2010 double its teaching staff.³¹⁰ The data that we obtained in 2010, show us how we could not hire such a high number of teachers, although the number of teachers has increased in large numbers.

The “Law of Spanish” has been a major boost in Latin American integration, specifically in MERCOSUR. In this regard, a program of bilingualism has been carried out at the border, following the application of this Law. The Brazilian government has implemented a program³¹¹ in the 588 villages that are in the 15,000 kilometers of border to promote peace, development and cooperation from the educational field with the teaching of both languages.

We can conclude in this sense that the application of the “Law of Spanish” can be approached from different aspects. On the one hand, it has been a real revolution for the promotion of integration of the Latin American bloc, especially in MERCOSUR, where educational programs have been carried out to promote cooperation. Thanks to the application of the “Law of Spanish”, relations between Brazil and Spain have continued to encourage and foster the strategic partnership or "parceria" between the two governments. The great development undergone by the *Instituto Cervantes* has been caused in part by the application of this Law. The Institute has undergone a transformation, going from three centers in 2003 to eight in 2010, thanks to the boost of bilateral Spanish-Brazilian relations in this area social, educational and cultural, where the “Law of Spanish” has had a capital importance.

The promotion of cultural ties and the social movement promoted by both presidents has marked the tone of bilateral relations. The Law of Spanish was born due to the need of Brazilian society to teach the Spanish language, but we must remember that it does not impose the teaching of this language, it imposes it as an optional subject. Despite the need of the Brazilian people to learn Spanish, the Law has enjoyed the international support of the Spanish-speaking community.

We have talked about the benefits of the application of the “Law of Spanish”, although this has also had numerous criticisms. Some analysts have considered the impossibility

³¹⁰ Álvaro Martínez-Cachero Laseca, *La enseñanza...*, Colección Orellana, Ministerio de Educación, Brasilia, 2008, pp. 73-86.

³¹¹ Alessandro Candeas, op Cit., 2007.

of its application due to the large number of new teachers needed for its introduction. In this aspect the number of teachers that the ministry should contract varied from 6,000 to 250,000.³¹² Many of these erroneous analyzes have been caused by a misinterpretation of the Law, since it was thought that it was forced to the teaching of Spanish, while what was sanctioned in the Law was that the Spanish language became obligatory between the foreign languages.

Other criticisms came from the non-Spanish-speaking international community, mostly from France, Italy and Germany, who did not welcome the application of the Law.³¹³

In spite of all the differences, we can conclude that the sanction of the “Law of Spanish” reinforced the multilateral relations between the Spanish-speaking countries and in which we are concerned, in the bilateral relations between Spain and Brazil. It reinforced what Lula da Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero had promoted in the Brasilia Declaration a few months earlier, the paradigm shift within the framework of their relations. Now it was prioritized in the social, cultural and educational framework compared to economic, although this aspect was not without importance.

The Law for the interests of both governments was a success beyond its later development. Despite its implementation problems, the increase of Spanish students in Brazil is significant and will be essential in maintaining the bilateral relations of the next governments. That is why both the “Law of Spanish”, sanctioned in 2005 and the development of the *Instituto Cervantes*, are two essential axes in the development of bilateral relations in cultural matters between the governments of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, essential actions for the development of the “parceria” between both executives and for the future development of their relations at any level of the international framework.

In this partnership that reflects the languages, Portuguese has not been equally promoted in Spain. Although Portuguese in recent years is an important language for insertion in new markets and at the same time in their societies, in Spain neither the national authorities nor the Brazilian foreign action have not successfully made the

³¹² Álvaro Martínez-Cachero Laseca, *La enseñanza...*, Colección Orellana, Ministerio de Educación, Brasilia, 2008, p. 97.

³¹³ Bruno Ayllón, *Las Relaciones Hispano-Brasileñas: de la mutua irrelevancia a la asociación estratégica (1945-2005)*, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2007, p. 451

insertion of this language into the academic landscape. In data from *Real Instituto Elcano*, we can see how Portuguese is gaining prestige at the global level thanks to: the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP), countries like Brazil and Angola, as we have analyzed in the first, is an investment country, and at the same time it is the gateway to other markets. Portugal, even if it is a smaller country within the European Union, can be a relevant intermediary.³¹⁴ We must also emphasize that, in the Spanish context, the historical links with Portugal have been of indifference. In spite of the closeness between the two countries, relations have not always been the best that has influenced in a negative way in sectors such as in this case, the language business. On the other hand, Brazil has a relatively recent importance, although we see how each day Brazil is analyzed as an emerging market which encourages many to learn the language. In spite of the lack of willingness of governments to promote measures that promote the teaching of the Portuguese language, let us remember that in the negotiations for the application of the Law of Spanish in Brazil, initially it could be applied equally in Spain for Portuguese, something that was never carried out. For this reason, despite political will, historical indifference and the thought that until now was a not really important language, have made in Spain the study of Portuguese is a minority. Although it is true that every year, the number of students continues to rise but far from the top.

3.5. Cooperation, a bet for the future.

Cooperation has been one of the factors that most influenced the development of bilateral relations between the two countries. With the end of the Franco regime and the arrival of democracy, a new stage begins in the context of foreign policy and at the same time in the policy of cooperation. During the first years, the profile maintained by the cooperation has been quite low and in relation to Brazil, has been characterized by the social and scientific support, with the scholarships destined to Brazilian students.

A new stage in Spanish cooperation will start from the entry of Spain into the European Economic Community. From 1988, the budget of the countries that formed this economic block will increase by 50%. Although the budget increased notably in relation to Latin

³¹⁴ Alexandra Albuquerque y José Paulo Esperança, "El valor económico del portugués: lengua de conocimiento con influencia global", *Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, 2010, p. 10-11.

America, little volume will go to Brazil, with only 138 million pesetas (829.396,704 €).³¹⁵ With the entry into the 1990s, Brazil ranked 17^o among the Latin American countries in relation to the destination of Official Development Assistance (ODA). During these years, Spanish cooperation with the Secretariat of State for Cooperation and Ibero-America at the forefront, has not highlighted the fact of allocating large quantities to Brazil, despite this, steps were being taken to reverse this situation.

In 1995, the Cooperation Commission of both countries met to promote this area in the framework of bilateral relations. In this way, Brazil was succeeded until the 14th place as a recipient of cooperation in Ibero-America,³¹⁶ and in the following years the trend continued to rise. Likewise, with the increase of funds destined for Brazil, participation in regional programs, born after the American Summits, has been carried out. In terms of cooperation during the 1990s, there are two types of cooperation:³¹⁷ educational cooperation and scientific and technological cooperation. Thanks to the first one, an agreement was reached between the University of Salamanca and the Government of Brazil for the creation in 2000 of the Center for Brazilian Studies (CEB) and the Brazil-Spain Foundation.

In relation to the stage of the governments of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Lula da Silva, the objectives were ambitious, coming to declare that the master plans of the cooperation agencies of both countries were an excellent opportunity³¹⁸ to widen the path of bilateral relations between Spain and Brazil. That is why, to produce this paradigm shift in the area of cooperation between both countries, certain practices had to be solved. First, an increase in development aid that both presidents, the Spanish and the Brazilian promised to increase and did, but not with the expected results. As in the case of the Spanish government, Official Development Assistance went from 0.24% to 0.5% of GDP in the first legislature, from 1,962 million to 4,761 million. In its second legislature, the target stood at 0.7%, but the economic problems, the deficit that dragged Spain and its

³¹⁵ Celestino del Arenal, "Los acuerdos de cooperación entre la UE y América Latina 1971-1997", en *Revista Española de Desarrollo y Cooperación*, 1997, p. 118-121.

³¹⁶ Estrategia de Cultura y Desarrollo de la Cooperación Española, *Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación*, Madrid, 2007, p. 10.

³¹⁷ Bruno Ayllón, op Cit., p. 463.

³¹⁸ Plan Director de la Cooperación Española 2009-2012, *Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación*, Madrid, 2007, p. 3.

economy, made that goal become utopian and unreachable and ODA³¹⁹ remained in Levels of 2008. Despite this, the levels and budgets for cooperation by the Spanish state have been the highest in its history, almost tripling the alarming data of Spanish cooperation at present with a scarce 0.18% GDP.³²⁰

In the case of Brazil, cooperation during the Lula administration stage has been a key factor. Between 2006 and 2010 they have reached historic values³²¹ that have been reduced by 30% with the arrival of Dilma Rousseff's executive. It is noteworthy that, with both executives, the traditionally weaker sectors such as cooperation in this case have undergone a reinforcement that, although not definitive, has reinforced the cooperation strategy of both countries and has also incorporated a new sector of Cooperation between the two countries, triangular cooperation,³²² that has serve to reinforce the strategy in other countries less develops. In the bilateral context, the one carried out by both executives through their diplomatic agencies and their cooperation agencies AECID and ABC, the cooperation due to the consideration of Brazil as a developed country, in the scientific-technological area, although it is not ruled out for that reason the implementation of projects of eradication of poverty and human development.

Therefore, the increase in the volume of aid, stimulated at the same time by the improvement of the quality of the aid between the two agents and at the same time, taking into consideration and involving the different actors of cooperation in both countries, has been Essential for the proper development of aid. The management of education policies for development and their coherence has been key to good management by both entities, which has been possible thanks to the good understanding of both governments in the creation of memorandums of understanding in the educational framework. In this section we are going to learn about the most relevant Educational Project during this stage in the framework of cooperation between both countries and also analyze what projects have

³¹⁹ Official Development Assistance

³²⁰ *El desmantelamiento de la cooperación española e dos décadas del 0,7.*
http://cadenaser.com/ser/2014/09/28/sociedad/1411870414_850215.html

³²¹ Carolina Milhorange de Castro, "Brazil's South-South Foreign Policy Post-Lula", *Afrique Contemporaine* 2013/4, nº 248, p. 4.

³²² *Cooperação Brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional: 2005-2009*, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, Ministeria das Relações Exteriores, Brasília, 2010, p. 16.

been carried out by both Brazilian and Spanish cooperation agencies developed between 2004 and 2011, as well as its priorities in this area.

3.5.1. The relations between AECID and ABC.

The relations between the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency during the governments of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva have been marked by the good understanding between them, the gradual increase of the budget dedicated to the different types of cooperation,³²³ and policy-making between the two agencies.

This has been demonstrated in the different meetings that have taken place between the two agencies, where they have analyzed and evaluated the cooperation processes that these agencies have maintained throughout this period. During the years 2006 and 2010 these meetings have been held, which will be analyzed below, explaining the cooperation policies between both countries. Both governments, thanks to their agencies, work mainly in five areas of cooperation, such as bilateral cooperation programs, decentralized cooperation, triangular cooperation, the one derived from the Ibero-American Summits, and lastly carried out through Multilateral Organizations.³²⁴

During the meetings held between AECID and ABC, the shortcomings in cooperation between the two countries during the 1990s have been reflected.³²⁵ As a result, during the socialist governments of Lula da Silva and Zapatero, attempts have been made to reach some levels closer to the rest of the bilateral relations framework. To this end, the Brasilia Declaration, signed in 2005, which has served as a plan for the consolidation of the Strategic Partnership signature, initialed in 2003, has been a catalyst for cooperation, as it places special emphasis on this , with the Implementation Plan of the Bilateral Cooperation Program.

Following the AECID Director plans 2001-2004, 2004-2008 and 2008-2012 and the priorities of the Brazilian government through the ABC, Brazil has been designated a

³²³ *Acta de la Reunión de Seguimiento y Evaluación de la III Comisión Mixta Hispano-Brasileña de Cooperación*, Brasilia, 2006.

³²⁴ *Acta de la Reunión de Seguimiento y Evaluación...*Brasilia, 2006.

³²⁵ *Plan Director de la Cooperación Española 2005-2008*, Secretaría de Estado de Cooperación Internacional, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, Madrid, 2004.

preferred country in the area of cooperation. This results in the achievement of consensus through coherent policies, with an increase in the volume of aid and an improvement in its destination, which implies at the same time an improvement in management.³²⁶ For the implementation of these policies, beyond the actions of both cooperation agencies, the involvement of Brazilian social actors is essential.

The goal of both agencies has been to improve the lives of people at risk of social exclusion and for this have been realized programs, seminars, workshops where all the aforementioned actors can participate. The volume of aid provided from Spain to Brazil in terms of cooperation has increased from 2004 to 2011. At one point, it reached 13 million euros in 2004, reaching 20 million in 2006, 30 in 2008 and reaching the ceiling between 2008 and 2011, with almost 40 million euros.³²⁷ The sectors that have been developed during this stage in the framework of cooperation between Spain and Brazil have been: social development, the economic and business sector, the environment sector, democratic governance and citizen participation and the sector of gender.

- Social development. It prioritizes its policies in the most vulnerable groups and in the development of its most basic needs.

Firstly, throughout this stage we have found a special provision from both governments towards cooperation policies in support of vulnerable youth as a priority action for their integration in all areas of society. This has been carried out through Schools-Workshop programs,³²⁸ with the projects of Sao Luis (Maranhao), Joao Pessoa (Paraiba) and Salvador (Bahia).

Secondly, within the framework of social development are joint projects of education. Efforts have been made to promote education in excluded populations to combat poverty. The projects that have been carried out have been two: Saberes de las Aguas and the Alliance for the Development of the Community of Candeal, Salvador (Bahia).

³²⁶ Guilherme Ziebell, Ana Melos, Henrique Pigozzo, "A Política Externa para a cooperação internacional em Defesa: análise dos projetos no âmbito da Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (2003-2014)", *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, Brasília, v. 67, 2015, p. 117.

³²⁷ Livia Maria Nogueira, Luis Miguel Puerto, Bruno Ayllón, *Asociados para el desarrollo, Propuestas para la cooperación España-Brasil*, Documento de Trabajo, Fundación Carolina CeALCI, Madrid, 2009, p. 54.

³²⁸ Cooperação Brasileira para Desenvolvimento Internacional 2005-2009, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE), Brasília, 2010, p. 20-22.

As third point appears the urban management, where the management of the heritage of the cities in a sustainable way is prioritized. In this section two major joint projects of cooperation are framed;³²⁹ on the one hand, the project to revitalize the Historic Center of Joao Pessoa and the Urban Revitalization Project in Sao Luis. In these projects of heritage management have also participated other Spanish cooperation actors as for example, in the second case, the Junta de Andalucía.

- Promotion of the economic and business sector.

During both plans director of this stage has been tried to prioritize in the support to small company, the economic insertion and the strengthening of the structures.

Fishing occupies preferential positions within this framework of action, since in Brazil artisanal fishing is a great source of income for many families, although it has a precarious structure. On the contrary, Spain is one of the reference countries in the fishing field, which can be very useful. Projects³³⁰ have been carried out: development of artisanal fishing in the area of influence of the National Park Lençois Maranhenses, as well as support for the development of a training center in fishing and marine culture in Cabedelo (Paraíba).

Tourism has also occupied a preferential place in the field of cooperation. In Brazil tourism is a potential sector although in many places it lacks organization and efficiency. Spain, on the other hand, is a world power. More than five tourism cooperation projects have been completed, many of them with the participation of Spanish regional entities. One of the most important has been the tourism-cultural development program in the region of the Jesuit-Guarani Missions.³³¹

In the microfinance sector, great strides have also been made in the bilateral cooperation sector. This type of economy has been promoted through the Bank of Credit Cooperatives (BANCOOB-Banco de las Cooperativas de Crédito), as well as in the Bank of the Amazon (BASA-Banco de la Amazonia).

- Cooperation in the Environment sector.

In this section, local policies have been stimulated through the Araucaria XXI Program of the AECID and, on the other hand, the Brazilian Agenda 21 of the ABC. These

³²⁹ Acta de la Reunión de Seguimiento y Evaluación de la III Comisión Mixta Hispano-Brasileña de Cooperación, Brasilia, 2006.

³³⁰ Cooperaçao Brasileira para Desenvolvimento...2010, p. 30.

³³¹ Acta de la Reunión Hispano-Brasileña...Brasilia, 2006.

programs have encouraged the improvement of management and reduction of damages to the environment, which together with Ecotourism, encourage economic activities in the rural environment, favoring inclusion in these communities.

- Cooperation in the area of Democratic Governance and citizen participation.

In the first place, the good management of Public Affairs by the different bodies of Brazilian officials has been encouraged. The topics discussed have been management reform, strategic management as well as social programs.³³² A total of 384 staff members have been benefited throughout this period and the foundations have been laid for the continuation of this fruitful project.

Initiatives have been implemented to strengthen the rule of law, such as the Training in Human Rights of Judges and Security Forces in the State of Bahia, as well as the implementation of the Project to Support the Creation of the School of Labor Judiciary.

Lastly, one of the key actions in this section has been the strengthening of Trade Union Organizations for the protection of workers, executed by the Brazilian and Spanish Cooperation Agencies along with NGOs represented in both countries.³³³

- Cooperation in the field of Gender and Development.

Both the AECID master plans and the ABC guidelines point to the gender sector as a priority. Increasing women's capacities, their inclusion in the labor market, reconciliation with domestic life is key and has led to a number of joint programs with the United Nations Fund for Women (UNIFEM). In the framework of cooperation between the two agencies, a wide decentralized cooperation has also been developed, where as we have already said, the Spanish Autonomous Communities have played an important role. In relation to the triangular cooperation of Spain and Brazil, the most important projects have been carried out in Peru, Bolivia and Haiti.³³⁴

And as we analyze in the second chapter, the cooperation carried out at the Ibero-American Summits and within the framework of the United Nations has been essential to maintain the role demanded by Presidents Lula da Silva and Zapatero. A framework

³³²*Plan Director de la Cooperación Española 2005-2008*, Secretaría de Estado de Cooperación Internacional, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, Madrid, 2004.

³³³ Acta, *op Cit.*, 2006, p.17.

³³⁴ Memorando de entendimiento entre o governo da República Federativa do Brasil e o governo do Reino da Espanha para a criação de um programa conjunto de cooperação triangular, Brasília, 2011.

where the social sphere was or was at the height of the economic and financial framework that had been so successfully carried out between Spain and Brazil.

As we have seen, the increase in the budget of the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in cooperation, as well as Official Development Assistance, has benefited the creation, consolidation and execution of numerous projects, in our case in Brazil, where thanks to the Increase of the sums, both government agencies, AECID and ABC, have been congratulated for the work done throughout the period 2004-2011.

3.5.2. The Center for Brazilian Studies in Salamanca.

The field of cultural relations in foreign policy is now understood as a fundamental dimension, where cultural diplomacy acts as an instrument of understanding between governments in the framework of cooperation, peace and foreign trade.

As we said earlier, cultural relations have had little attention between Spain and Brazil. If relations between the two countries began to rise strongly during the last decade of the twentieth century and have continued this trend throughout the first twenty-first century with the governments of Lula da Silva and Zapatero, cultural relations have undergone a major advance more slowed. In spite of this, actions have been carried out that have been essential for progress in this cultural framework. Undoubtedly, one of them has been the creation of the Center for Brazilian Studies of the University of Salamanca, key institution to know the cultural relations between both countries throughout its history.

On October 26, 2000, before the signing of the Strategic Association between the governments of Spain and Brazil, the Protocol for the creation of a Center for Brazilian Studies between the Federal Government of Brazil and the University of Salamanca was signed.³³⁵ This center of studies was born, as can be read in its founding act, with the aim of coordinating and promoting teaching and research activities in Brazil, in order to raise awareness of its cultural, demographic, political, social and economic aspects. The establishment of the Center for Brazilian Studies at the University of Salamanca was accompanied by the creation of the Hispano-Brazilian Foundation, which has been and continues to be the main source of funding for its activities.

³³⁵ Centro de Estudios Brasileños de la Universidad de Salamanca.
<http://www.cebusal.es/institucional/historia/>

The success of the creation of CEB is due in large part to its first director, Dr. José Manuel Santos and to the support of the Brazilian Embassy in Spain, with his ambassador to the front Mr. Carlos Moreira, who affirmed in later statements to the Signature for the creation of CEB that:

“There was a very large growth of the Spanish presence in the economic and financial area, which was not accompanied by the advance of knowledge about Brazil. The presence of researchers of Brazilian World in Spain is a stabilizing factor, in that it is better when the other side of a relationship is well informed”.³³⁶

If the Center for Brazilian Studies was created under the presidency of the government of Mr. José Maria Aznar, the change of model that supposed its true insertion in the Brazilian university panorama was under the government of Mr. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Its first director, D. José Manuel Santos, was the promoter and creator of the Diploma of Brazilian Studies, which has enabled young Spaniards to take specialization courses in Brazilian universities. The next director of the center, Professor Dr. Eduardo Fabián Caparros, approached the center to new fields of study beyond the framework of the social sciences. It is from July 2008, under the direction of Dr. Gonzalo Gómez Dacal, where the Center for Brazilian Studies gains in importance, it reinforces its international relations, especially with the University of Sao Paulo and the Federal University of Pernambuco. It was during his mandate that the statutes of the Center were elaborated and the transfer of its headquarters took place. Both events gave importance to the center, which resulted in an expansion of activities and training offer.

It is for all that, in spite of the scarcity of initiatives and where the majority are joint collaborations with official institutions of Spain,³³⁷ as in this case, this face-to-face cultural increase of Brazil or "the Brazilian" in Spain has been essential for the Good understanding and development of bilateral relations and the incorporation and prioritization of culture in the agreements signed between both governments.

Bilateral relations between Spain and Brazil underwent a major change with the arrival of Lula da Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero. It is true that the previous governments laid important foundations for the development of fruitful relations, aware of the importance

³³⁶ “Espanha pasará a ter brasilianistas”, Folha de Sao Paulo, 25 de octubre de 2000.

³³⁷ Bruno Ayllón, *Las Relaciones Hispano-Brasileñas: de la mutua irrelevancia a la asociación estratégica (1945-2005)*, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2007, p. 243.

of both countries, for Spain being an essential partner in the European Union and Brazil, the country that undoubtedly has the relevance in Latin America, so we say that the links are not chance. However, what is certain is that with the arrival of the new presidents, the bilateral framework has focused on the social level as we have been able to see in its entirety, moreover, to demonstrate the importance of this social plan alone we have to observe how the most important confrontation occurred in this period between governments. It was not a confrontation for economic, political or cultural reasons, they were social reasons, we refer to the treatment received by Brazilian tourists in the Spanish airports.

Despite this, bilateral relations have developed in full harmony. The economic relations in which Spanish business investment has used part of its benefits in the promotion of sectors of civil society. In social matters, agreements have been signed for their development and avoid problems such as those that happened with tourists in 2008. On the cultural level, the promotion has been very outstanding although it is true that more from Spain to Brazil than on the contrary, although this situation is being reversed. Finally, at the level of cooperation, collaboration between the two state agencies, organizations and private entities has been crucial and fruitful, doubling budgets and developing large-scale projects. In short, relations in the bilateral framework have been expanded within the framework of social development, which was the initial proposal signed by the presidents in the Brasilia Declaration.

4. Conclusions.

The period between the arrival of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero to the presidency of the Government of Spain, that is to say, from April 16, 2004, when Lula da Silva was already President of the Federative Republic of Brazil from 2003 until the end of government of both, for Lula on December 31, 2010 and for Rodríguez Zapatero, on December 21, 2011, has been a convulsive stage, marked by very diverse periods and of great political importance. In this paper, we have tried to analyze the relations between Spain and Brazil, both multilaterally and bilaterally. This range of time has served us to understand a complex reality and replete with factors that interact with each other in search of very different objectives in the framework of international relations. After extensive readings, in-depth analyzes of ministerial documentation and study of the projects of both governments, we can argue, as we will emphasize below, that there is no single conclusion after the completion of this project. Numerous conclusions will be highlighted for the future, to continue analyzing the importance of relations in the international framework and the importance of the actors involved in them.

Throughout history, relations between Spain and Brazil have gone through different stages: indifference, rapprochement, understanding, reinforcement, indispensable and essential, but if we had to qualify, the stage analyzed during this period, governments of Lula da Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero, would be strategic. Strategic stage in the different levels of action of both states. Strategy to develop a change in the relations towards a prioritization of the importance of the social, which will be evident between Spain and Brazil in their direct relations, as well as in the forums of participation of the two countries. Undoubtedly, this is the most relevant action that has taken place with the arrival of both presidents to power; it has stimulated and promoted a social turn that has affected all lines of action of both governments and we no longer speak only of our study analysis as the international framework, but also the internal framework of national public policies. Faced with a stage of economic development, important boom and at the same time beneficial to society, these presidents have focused their policies on the development of social rights and increase the welfare of citizens, without neglecting the economic aspect.

This social movement between the two presidents that has been analyzed from the different perspectives of the external action of the states has been certified with the implementation of the Brasilia Declaration between Brazil and Spain.

In the three chapters of this paper, we have tried to analyze the role played by governments. The Brasilia Declaration put the objective high, and yet, despite having ambitious wills that could overturn relationships, with the risk of "nadar e morrer na praia", the objectives have mostly been reached.

In the first chapter, we have analyzed the importance of Latin America in the foreign policy of Spain and, consequently, Brazil. As this one, despite not having the historical ties that Spain had with the rest of Latin American countries, it has become an indispensable partner as stated in the aforementioned Brasilia Declaration, due to its commercial, economic, strategic, cultural and cooperation importance.

The convergence of both governments has been essential in order to strengthen political dialogue in all directions, as evidenced by the numerous visits made between Spain and Brazil, and at the same time as this has influenced the creation of new scenarios for the promotion and improvement of the society. It reinforces the dialogue marked as an essential point in the Brasilia Declaration, in the creation of numerous initiatives both bilaterally and multilaterally, including the new management bodies of the Ibero-American Summits, the creation of the Alliance of Civilizations and Action against hunger and poverty within the framework of the United Nations, and the resumption of talks to reach an agreement between the European Union and Mercosur.

Another key factor in the Brasilia Declaration has been the promotion of employment and social development, which, like the previous point, has been encouraged at all levels. One of them has undoubtedly been that of the Ibero-American Summits, which is certain that they have lost weight in the international scene as a forum of action among the Ibero-American countries, but at the same time and with the application of a new structure and an organism permanent establishment created by Spain and Brazil, has redefined its position to focus these meetings on promoting Ibero-American social development. This new position of the Summits has given rise to numerous projects of development of the countries and to an increase of the economic items of the states towards this scope.

Economic growth never ceased to be a priority, but it certainly competed in importance with the new social factor. Both Spain and Brazil have encouraged and promoted economic growth as an opportunity and at the same time, see in economic growth the increase of the ties between both countries. To this, the contribution of Brazilian and

Spanish companies has been essential. Thanks to their benefits they have been able to develop foundations and finance projects in the different social frameworks: human rights, cooperation, labor insertion, education. The work of the ministries of education of both countries together with the external action proves indispensable in increasing the welfare of citizens in this type of actions. In economic growth is framed the proposal made by both Spain and Brazil in the Ibero-American Summits and in the European Union-Latin America and the Caribbean Summits. The proposal supports the exchange of countries' external debt for education. In the proposal, regardless of whether or not we are able to observe the will of governments, they understand education as the indispensable weapon for growth.

Education, culture, science and the environment have also been an essential part of the plans between the two governments, as highlighted in the Brasilia Declaration and as it has been seen throughout the period analyzed. The promotion of the language, the foster of cultural centers in Spain and Brazil, the public and private commitment in education to encourage the study of both and in both countries, as we highlight in the third chapter with the importance of the Center of Brazilian Studies at the University of Salamanca, as well as the great expansion undergone in recent years by the *Instituto Cervantes*, highlighting the importance that Spanish is gaining in Brazil, have been essential to demonstrate how the importance of this sector has changed to the preceding step. We can say that this stage has been fruitful for the birth of Brazilians and Hispanists, trained academics and experts in both countries, and with their studies, demonstrate and encourage the mutual importance of these two countries in any field of external action.

Cooperation has been a key element in the development of bilateral and multilateral relations. As discussed in the third chapter, development cooperation has meant a rediscovery for both countries. New joint development plans have been developed, applicable in Brazil as well as triangular models, where the beneficiaries have been other countries. The cooperation agencies have worked together and have given important benefits in social development. To talk about cooperation during this stage is to speak without a doubt of success. Both Brazil and Spain have doubled their budgets in development cooperation, so much so that they have climbed numerous positions in the international lists. Undoubtedly, there will be errors, aspects to be improved and policies more efficient, but in my opinion, both governments in agreement succeed in doubling their budgets in development cooperation is a success for their relations and international policy in general.

Undoubtedly, in these three chapters that compose this thesis, we enter into a complex reality, which has not been perfect. When we speak the Brasilia Declaration and observe its results, and despite the fact that in our opinion the balance is positive, the common of both states and the similarity of the policies carried out beyond the distance that separates one and another country, there have been incidents that fortunately have not interfered in the good harmony between the two states, but they have been able to cause frustration in the environment of the relations. These incidents have been for example: the events that occurred with the Brazilian tourists in the Spanish airports in 2008, which we analyzed in the third chapter; the Europeanist position of Spain that Brazil does not see with good eyes in the framework of Ibero-American action and concretely in the Summits, but fruit of that position gave rise to the birth of the SEGIB that has impelled an impulse in the relations; and the Brazilian position in Latin America as the main regional actor, with aspirations similar to Spain. All this, framed in the international context, presents a complex reality with many actors. In spite of this and as we have said, we consider the balance as positive due to the importance of the social movement promoted by both governments in bilateral and multilateral terms, as well as the launching of numerous initiatives, especially in cooperation for the promotion of democracy, human rights, education, culture, in short, to increase the welfare of citizens.

Therefore, analyzing the relations between Spain and Brazil both in the historical context and in all its external action has undoubtedly been a challenge because of the many actions that have been carried out. Trying to understand how the different processes have worked between economic blocs, integration blocs, individual countries, ministries and different secretariats, adds an added complexity to the work.

The relations between Brazil and Spain have been a door to the disposition of the European and Latin American blocks to maintain relations in search of a Strategic Association like the Brazilian and Spanish states. Negotiations between the EU and Latin America, the European Union and Mercosur, and the EU itself with Brazil, have been made possible in large part by the implementation of Spanish diplomacy of a plan to encourage relations with Latin America and its economics blocs. To this end, the European Union, promoted from Spain, has tried to approach positions to reach agreements that in the future are essential for the social development of both European and Latin American countries.

That is why the Brasilia Declaration signed in 2005 between Presidents Lula da Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero has been essential. Political dialogue between the two powers

has strengthened despite changes in the international scene, such as the rise of China in Latin America and the main investment country currently in Brazil. On the other hand, social development has been a priority, fostered by governments in all their plans, both inside and outside their borders, maintaining their economic position at the same time as this practice was encouraged. Economic growth has been the engine of this privileged relationship and although other aspects were prioritized within the framework of the relationship and was severely affected by the onset of the international economic crisis, it never ceased to be a priority. Education and cooperation have been essential at this stage, with growth never seen before.

Therefore, the good harmony between the two countries, encouraged by the need for partnership between the two countries due to external action strategies, let us not forget that Brazil is the seventh economic world power, regional leader and recognized global actor, while Spain is the 14th world power and key country in the European Union, have made the links between the two countries strengthened and the common policies expanded. All this process has not been the fruit of a period without problems and easy, on the contrary, there have been setbacks and in some cases the objectives have been excessively ambitious but, we can conclude saying that the relations between Brazil and Spain during the Lula stage Silva and Rodríguez Zapatero has been an advance in the different spheres at the bilateral level and could be defined as a multilateral success due to the impetus they have made in the different forums to reach agreements of general interest.

At the same time, this application of the policies carried out by both executives creates precedent. It creates a precedent in the sense that the impulse of the social sphere within the framework of international relations can be carried out without at any time neglecting the economic aspect, rather, making it the cornerstone of the process for the implementation of policies that improve the welfare of citizens.

In fact, the economic aspect was always essential in the policies of the governments of Spain and Brazil. The volume of investment continued to grow, with the exception of the years of international crisis that profoundly affected the Spanish economy. The economic sphere has served both countries to advance their social policies, the state wealth generated has been used for social development both internally and externally due to the policies promoted. In short, the welfare of citizens has increased and good relations accompanied by good relations in the economic framework have made the importance of relations between Spain and Brazil increase and observe this stage as a new model of

external action based on the social aspect , without neglecting the importance of the economic aspects.

Bibliography

Texts consulted

ALDECOA, Francisco & GUINEA, Mercedes. “Nace la diplomacia común de la UE”, *Política Exterior*, Vol. 24, nº 136, Madrid, 2010, pp. 62-75.

ALONSO, José Antonio & ALONSO, Vicente. “La incorporación de España a la CEE y el futuro del comercio con Iberoamérica”, en *Política Exterior*, Madrid, 1988, pp. 74-82.

ANDERSON, Perry. “Le Brésil de Lula”, *Le Débat* 2011/5, nº 167, Gallimard, pp. 22-40.

ARAHUETES, Alfredo & HIRATUKA, Célio. *Relações Economicas entre Brasil e Espanha*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2009.

ARAHUETES, Alfredo. “Inversiones europeas en Iberoamérica 1990-2000”, en *Perspectiva Exteriores 2002, los intereses de España en el mundo*, Madrid, 2002.

ARAHUTES, Alfredo. *La internacionalización de la empresa española, Estudio monográfico sobre el entorno económico y las oportunidades de inversión en Brasil*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2009.

ARENAL, Celestino del. “Brasil, las Cumbres Iberoamericanas y el papel de España en América Latina”, en *Revista CIDOB d’afers internacionals*, documento nº 39, Barcelona, 2013.

ARENAL, Celestino del. “Cumbres iberoamericanas: Fin de ciclo”, *Investidura como Doctor Honoris Causa en la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos*, Madrid, 2014.

ARENAL, Celestino del. “La dimensión regional de la política iberoamericana de España”. *Quórum. Revista de pensamiento iberoamericano*, nº 19 Alcalá de Henares, 2007, pp. 27-36.

ARENAL, Celestino del. “La política exterior española en Iberoamérica, 1982-1992”, en R. Calduch (coord.) *La política exterior española en el siglo XX*, Madrid, 1994, pp. 270-302.

ARENAL, Celestino del. “La triangulación España-Unión Europea-América Latina: sinergias y contradicciones”, *Pensamiento Iberoamericano* 8, Madrid, 2011, pp. 71-101.

ARENAL, Celestino del. “Las relaciones entre la UE y América Latina: ¿abandono del regionalismo y apuesta por una nueva estrategia de carácter bilateralista?”, Documento de Trabajo 36/2009, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2009.

ARENAL, Celestino del. “Los acuerdos de cooperación entre la UE y América Latina 1971-1997”, en *Revista Española de Desarrollo y Cooperación*, 1997.

ARENAL, Celestino del. *La adhesión de España a la Comunidad Europea y su impacto en las relaciones entre América Latina y la Comunidad Europea*, en Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid.

ARENAL, Celestino del. *Política exterior de España y relaciones con América Latina, Iberoamericanidad, Europeización y Atlantismo en la política exterior española*. Fundación Carolina y Editorial Siglo XXI, Madrid, 2011.

AYLLÓN, Bruno. “Contribuciones de Brasil al desarrollo internacional: coaliciones emergentes y cooperación Sur-Sur”, en *Revista CIDOB d’afers internacionals*, nº 97-98, Barcelona, 2012, pp. 189-204.

AYLLÓN, Bruno. “De la asociación estratégica a la crisis: las relaciones hispano-brasileñas en un context de cambios estructurales”, en *Revista de Estudios Brasileños*, vol. 1, nº 1, Salamanca, 2014, pp. 25-44.

AYLLÓN, Bruno. “La política exterior de España hacia Brasil: de la mutua irrelevancia a la relación estratégica (1945-2005).” *Encuentro de Latinoamericanistas Españoles: Viejas y nuevas alianzas entre América Latina y España*, Santander, 2006, pp.22-31.

AYLLÓN, Bruno. “Las relaciones culturales en la agenda hispano-brasileña: un poco de historia”, *Revista de Cultura Brasileña*, nº 3, Embajada de Brasil, Madrid, 2005.

AYLLÓN, Bruno. “Zapatero y Lula: ¿Nuevo signo en las relaciones hispano-brasileñas?”. *Boletín Brasil*, Centros de Estudios Brasileños Ortega y Gasset, nº 1, Madrid, 2004.

AYLLÓN, Bruno. *La cooperación de Brasil: un modelo en construcción para una potencia emergente*”, Real Instituto Elcano, estudio internacionales y estratégicos, Madrid, 2010.

AYLLÓN, Bruno. *La política exterior del Gobierno de Lula y las relaciones de Brasil con la Unión Europea*, Real Instituto Elcano, Área América Latina-Europa, Madrid, 2006.

AYLLÓN, Bruno. *Las Relaciones Hispano-Brasileñas: de la mutua irrelevancia a la asociación estratégica (1945-2005)*, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2007.

BADILLO, Ángel. *Las políticas públicas de acción cultural exterior de España*, en Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2014.

BIZZOZERO, Lincoln. “Las relaciones MERCOSUR-Unión Europea: una nueva modalidad de participación de las regiones en la mundialización”, *América Latina y el (des)orden global neoliberal*, 2011, pp. 97-116.

BORDAS MARTÍNEZ, Julio. “La lucha contra el terrorismo. La extinción de ETA”, en *España en Crisis. Balance de la Segunda Legislatura de Rodríguez Zapatero*, Valencia, 2012, pp. 433-454.

BUESA, Mikel. *La crisis de la España fragmentada, Economía política de la era Zapatero*, Encuentro, Madrid, 2010.

CANDEAS, Alessandro. “La enseñanza del español en Brasil: un compromiso de integración cultural”, en IV Congreso Internacional de la Lengua española, Cartagena de Indias, 2007.

CASTELLO, José. “La política cultural de los Gobiernos brasileños”, en *A era FHC um balanço*, Sao Paulo, 2002, pp. 177-193.

CELADA, María Teresa & DOS SANTOS CASTELANO, Fernanda. *El español en Brasil: actualidad y memoria*, en Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2005.

CODERCH PLANAS, José. “España-Brasil: arquitectura de una relación privilegiada”, en ICE Brasil, nº 810, Madrid, 2006, pp. 27-34.

COLINO, César & HOMBRADO, Angustias. “El Estado Autonómico: superando la Resaca estatutaria y capeando la crisis”, en España en Crisis. Balance de la Segunda Legislatura de Rodríguez Zapatero, Valencia, 2012, pp. 191-218.

CONEJERO, Enrique. “La política de inmigración en España”, Revista de Investigación, editado por Área de Innovación y Desarrollo, S.L., 2012.

COSTA CHOLBI, María Francisca. “Las relaciones comerciales de la UE con Brasil”, Boletín Económico de ICE nº 3054, Madrid, 2014, pp. 157-167.

COSTA, T. *As duas Espanhas e o Brasil*, *Topbooks*, Rio de Janeiro, 2009.

DE SOUZA, A. “Agenda internacional do Brasil. A política externa brasileira de FHC a Lula”, en Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI), Rio de Janeiro, 2009, pp. 142-156.

DEHESA, Guillermo de la. “Las relaciones económicas entre Brasil y España”, en Seminario Brasil Espanha, Río de Janeiro, 2000.

DÍAZ BARRADO, Cástor. “La posición de España en el espacio latinoamericano: el diseño de un nuevo componente de la política exterior española”, Quórum. Revista de pensamiento iberoamericano, nº 9, Madrid, 2007, pp. 56-63.

FAIRLIE REINOSO, Alan. *Del Acuerdo de Asociación entre la Unión Europea y la Comunidad Andina (CAN) al Acuerdo Comercial Multipartes con Colombia y Perú: ¿Qué escenarios para la integración regional?*, Observatorio Social de las Relaciones Unión Europea-América Latina, 2010.

FERNÁNDEZ LEOST, José Andres. *Acción Cultural Exterior en Europa: un análisis comparado*, en Fundación Alternativas: observatorio cultura y comunicación, Madrid, 2015.

FERNÁNDEZ VITORES, David. “El Español: una lengua viva”, en Instituto Cervantes, Madrid, 2016.

FERREIRA, Wallace. “Política Externa do Governo Lula: coalizoes ao sul como alternative multilateral”, en Revista Debates v.1, nº 3, Porto Alegre, 2009, pp. 100-125. Folha de Sao Paulo, 30 de octubre de 2003, cuaderno A, p.6

FONSECA, Carmen. “A política externa brasileira da democracia. O paradoxo da mudança na continuidade?”, O Brasil e a política internacional, Relações Internacionais, 2011, pp. 33-43.

GADEA, Carlos. “La izquierda política” en América Latin: el “Lulismo” en Brasil y la “izquierda” en el Uruguay, en Espacio Abierto Cuaderno Venezolano de Sociología, vol.22, nº 3, 2013, pp. 377-392.

GARCÍA CANTALAPIEDRA, David. “España, Estados Unidos y las relaciones transatlánticas”, en Juan Carlos Pereira (coord.), *La política exterior de España. De 1800 hasta hoy*. Ariel, Barcelona, 2012, pp. 441-458.

GARCÍA, Oscar & COIMBRA, Nuno. “Corrupción y Accountability en Brasil y España: Los casos Mensalao y Barcenas en los medios de comunicación”, en XI Congreso Español de Ciencia Política y de la Administración-AECPA, Sevilla, 2012.

GARCÍA, Victor & AYLLÓN, Bruno. “Brasil, dos años de gobierno de Lula”, en Política Exterior, nº 103, Madrid, 2005, pp. 104-113.

GIACCAGLIA, Clarisa. “La influencia de los actores domésticos en la política exterior brasileña durante el gobierno de Lula da Silva”, en CONfines 6/12, Rosario, 2010, pp. 95-121.

GRASA HERNÁNDEZ, Rafael. “La política exterior de Brasil durante el primer año de presidencia de Lula: un marco para el análisis de futuro”, Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, nº 65, Barcelona, 2004, pp. 95-109.

GUILLÉN, Mauro. The Rise of Spanish Multinationals, European Business in the Global Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.

LAVINAS, Lena. “Brazil, from reduction of poverty to a commitment to eradicate extreme poverty”, Revista CIDOB d’afers internacionals, nº 97-98, Barcelona, 2012, pp. 67-86.

LECHINI, Gladys & GIACCAGLIA, Clarisa. “El ascenso de Brasil en tiempos de Lula ¿líder regional o jugador global?”, Revista Problemas del Desarrollo, 163, Rosario, 2010, pp. 53-73.

MALAMUD, Carlos (coord.). Relaciones España-Brasil, *Informe Elcano*, Madrid, 2014.

MALAMUD, Carlos. “La Cumbre ALCUE de Madrid y el estado de la relación birregional Europa-América Latina”, Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano 98/2010, Madrid, 2010.

MALAMUD, Carlos. “Los sistemas políticos español y brasileño. Un intento de comparación en perspectiva histórica” en Seminario Brasil-Espanha, Río de Janeiro, 2000.

MALAMUD, Carlos. *UE y Mercosur: negociaciones sin futuro*, Real Instituto Elcano, ARI, Madrid, 2012.

MARCO, Elvira & OTERO, Jaime. “Colaboración público-privada en la acción cultural exterior”, Documento de trabajo 3, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2010.

MARCO, Elvira & OTERO, Jaime. “La transformación de la diplomacia cultural española”, Estudios de Política Exterior nº 134, Madrid, 2010.

MARCO, Elvira & OTERO, Jaime. Colaboración público-privada en la acción cultural exterior, *Documento de trabajo 3, Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, 2010.

MARINGONI, Gilberto & BERRON, Gonzalo. *2003-2013, Uma nova política externa*, Copiart, Tubarao, 2014.

MARQUES, Rosa María & NAKATANI, Paulo. “La crisis mundial y la economía brasileña”, en Red de Estudios de la Economía Mundial, Santiago de Chile, 2011, pp. 38-58.

MARTÍNEZ-CACHERO LASECA, Álvaro. La enseñanza del español en el Sistema educativo brasileño: situación y possible actuaciones, *Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, 2009.

MASANET, Erika, BAENINGER, Rosana & MATEO, Miguel Angel. “La inmigración brasileña en España: características, singularidades e influencia de las vinculaciones históricas”, en Papeles de Población nº 71, CIEAP/UAEM, Madrid, 2012, pp. 87-119.

MASANET, Erika. “O Brasil e a Espanha na dinâmica das migrações internacionais: um breve panorama da situação dos emigrantes brasileiros na Espanha”, *Revista Brasileira de Estudos de População*, vol. 25, nº 1, Sao Paulo, 2008, pp. 151-174.

MELOS DE SOUSA, Ana Carolina & PIGOZZO DA SILVA, Henrique. “A Política Externa Brasileira para o cooperação internacional em Defesa: análise dos projetos no âmbito da Agencia Brasileira de Cooperação (2003-2014)”, Rio Grande do Sul, 2015.

MENDOZA VILLALBA, Agustín. “El español en Brasil”, en IV Congreso Internacional de la lengua española, Cartagena de Indias, 2007.

MENEZES, Albene & GOULART, Roberto. “Brasil e Mercosul: rumos da integração na lógica do neodesenvolvimentismo (2003-2014)”, Caderno CRH, v.29, Salvador, 2016, pp. 135-150.

MILHORANCE CASTRO, Carolina. “Brazil’s South-South Foreign Policy Post-Lula”, Afrique Contemporaine 2013/4, n° 248, pp. 45-59.

MOLINA, Iganacio. “Gobierno y Desgobierno de la Economía: las políticas de respuesta a la crisis”, en España en crisis. Balance de la segunda legislature de Rodríguez Zapatero, Valencia, 2012, pp. 49-75.

MORATINOS, Miguel Ángel. “Una nueva política exterior para España”, en Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2004.

MORENO, S. “El gran negocio del castellano en Brasil”, en La Clave, 2004.

NAVARRO HOYOS, Julián Antonio. “La VI cumbre Unión Europea, América Latina y el Caribe ¿Una Cumbre de resultados?”, Revista VIA IURIS, n° 9, Fundación Universitaria Los Libertadores, Bogotá, 2010, pp. 123-138.

NOGUEIRA, Livia María, PUERTO, Luis Miguel & AYLLÓN, Bruno. *Asociados para el desarrollo, Propuestas para la cooperación España-Brasil*, Documento de Trabajo, Fundación Carolina CeALCI, Madrid, 2009.

OLIVEIRA, Gesper & TUROLLA, Federico. “Política económica do segundo governo FHC: mudança em condicoes adversas”, en Tempo Social-USP, 2003, pp. 195-217.

OLIVEIRA, Joana. “Mensalao: contextualización, histórico y los juicios del STF en la desconstrucción de las imágenes del caso como único y aislado”, en Observatorio político de América Latina y el Caribe, Sciences Po, Paris, 2012.

OLIVIÉ, Iliana, GRACIA, Manuel & DÍAZ, José Ignacio. *La presencia global de España*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2015.

ONTIVEROS, Emilio. “Flujos de Inversión hacia América Latina”, en *Perspectivas Exteriores 2002*, los intereses de España en el mundo, Madrid, 2002.

PALACIO DE OTEYZA, Vicente. “¿Cuatro años más de política exterior?”, en *Política Exterior* 121, Madrid, 2011, pp. 95-107.

PÉREZ CACHAFEIRO, Teresa. *La política exterior de España. Balances y debates parlamentarios 2004-2008*. Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2007.

PONCELA, Marcial (coord.). *Brasil: un gran mercado en expansión sostenida, Experiencias de internacionalización de empresas españolas en mercados emergentes IV*, Cátedra Nebrija Santander en Dirección Internacional de Empresas, Madrid, 2012.

PRIETO, Juan José. “La imagen de la cultura española en Brasil”, en *Observatorio imagen de España, Análisis de acciones e instituciones españolas*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2013.

PRIETO, Juan. “La acción cultural exterior de España a través del Instituto Cervantes”, en *Observatorio Imagen de España, Análisis de acciones e instituciones españolas*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2012.

QUISPE REMÓN, Florabel. “Las Cumbres Unión Europea-América Latina y el Caribe y la Asociación Estratégica birregional”, *Perspectivas sobre las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y América Latina*, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Madrid, 2009, pp. 135-171.

RAVETTI GÓMEZ, Graciela Inés. “El español en Brasil: desafíos para contribuir a las nuevas comunidades en formación”, en *Congresos internacionales de la lengua española*, Madrid, 2001.

REIS DA SILVA, André Luiz. “Geometría Variavel e Parcerias Estratégicas: A Diplomacia Multidimensional do Governo Lula (2003-2010)”, Contexto Internacional, vol. 37, nº 1, Río de Janeiro, 2015, pp. 143-184.

RISCADO, Júlia Erminia. “A política externa cultural espanhola para o Brasil”, Anais do XXVI Simposio Nacional de Historia-ANPUH, Sao Paulo, 2011, pp. 1-10.

RODRÍGUEZ IGLESIAS, Ana Isabel. *La Asociación Estratégica UE-Brasil: Retórica y Pragmatismo en las Relaciones Euro-Brasileñas*, Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos, Documento de Trabajo Serie Unión Europea nº 36/2010, vol.1, Universidad San Pablo CEU, Madrid, 2010.

RODRÍGUEZ ZAPATERO, José Luis. *Discurso de Investidura del candidato a la presidencia del Gobierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero*. Congreso de los Diputados, Madrid, 15 de abril de 2004.

ROMERO PEÑA, Aleix. “El proceso de negociación con ETA durante la etapa de José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-2011)”, en *Historia Actual Online*, Madrid, 2012, pp. 39-51.

RONCONI, Lucas & MARONGIU, Federico. “América Latina frente a la crisis internacional: características institucionales y respuestas de política” en *Serie de Avances de Investigación nº 45*, Fundación Carolina, Madrid, 2010, pp. 34-47.

SA PINTO, Messias de & GUIMARAES, Maria Helena. “O Mercosul e a Alca: os interesses (irre)conciliáveis da Uniao Européia e dos EUA”, *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol. 48. Nº 1, Brasilia, 2005, pp. 129-150.

SAHAGÚN, Felipe. “La política exterior española en 1999”. *Anuario internacional CIDOB 1999*, Barcelona, 1999, pp. 29-46.

SANAHUJA, José Antonio. “La Cumbre de Guadalajara: Consensos y Divergencias”, en *La Actualidad*, Madrid, 2004, pp. 177-197.

SANAHUJA, José Antonio. “La política de cooperación española a partir de 2008: el reto de culminar las reformas”, Quórum. Revista de pensamiento iberoamericano, nº 19, Madrid, 2007, pp. 37-55.

SANAHUJA, José Antonio. “Spain: Double track Europeanization and the search for bilateralism”, en RUANO, Lorena (ed.) *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policies Towards Latin America*, Londres, 2013.

SANAHUJA, José Antonio. “Un Brasil suramericano y una España europeizada: relaciones en el marco iberoamericano”, en Revista CIDOB d’afers internacionals nº 97-98, Barcelona, 2012, pp. 245-261.

SÁNCHEZ DÍEZ, Ángeles & RUIZ HUÉLAMO, Pilar. “El Acuerdo de Asociación de la UE y el MERCOSUR: de las trabas comerciales a las posibilidades en la cooperación y el diálogo político”, *Regional and Sectorial Economic Studies*, vol, 12, nº 2, 2012, pp. 85-96.

SOLÉ, Carlota, CAVALCANTI, Leonardo & PARELLA, Sonia. *La inmigración brasileña en la estructura socioeconómica de España*, Observatorio permanente de la inmigración, Madrid, 2011.

URRUTIA, Jorge. “La actividad académica del Instituto Cervantes (1991-2006)”, en *El Instituto Cervantes: 15 años*, Madrid, 2006, pp. 852-861.

VILLARES, Ramón. “La inmigración española en Brasil”, *La aportación de España al Brasil*, Fundación Consejo España-Brasil, Sao Paulo, 2016.

ZIEBELL, Guilherme, MELOS, Ana & PIGOZZO, Henrique. “A política Externa para a cooperação internacional em Defesa: análise dos projetos no âmbito da Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (2003-2014)”, *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, v.67, Brasília, 2015.

Online documentation

¿Qué es la Secretaría General Iberoamericana?, <http://segib.org/quienes-somos/>.

Acta de la Reunión de Seguimiento y Evaluación de la III Comisión Mixta Hispano-Brasileña de Cooperación, Brasilia, 2006. http://www.aecid.es/Centro-Documentacion/Documentos/Evaluaci%C3%B3n/ComCoop-CSE-brasil-acta_esp.pdf

BOE. State official newsletter. INSTRUMENT for ratification of the Treaty done at Lisbon and Madrid on 12 June 1985 concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. Madrid, Wednesday, January 1st, 1986. <https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1985/08/08/pdfs/A25119-25119.pdf>

BOE. State official newsletter. Ministry of foreign affairs. General TREATY of Cooperation and Friendship between the Kingdom of Spain and the Federative Republic of Brazil and Economic Agreement integral to it. Madrid on 23 July 1992. <https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1992/07/16/pdfs/A24602-24605.pdf>

Comisión Europea, “Cumbre Unión Europea – América Latina y El Caribe”, Río de Janeiro, 1999. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/noneurope/idel/d12/docs/cumbrederio/declaracionfinales.htm>

Comunicación de la Comisión al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo, “La Unión Europea y América Latina: Una asociación de actores globales”, Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas, Bruselas, 2009. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009DC0495&from=ES>

Comunicado especial de la presidencia sobre la situación en Honduras, XIX *Cimeira Ibero-Americana Portugal 2009*, Secretaría General Iberoamericana, Estoril, 2009. <http://segib.org/wp-content/uploads/CumbreMemoriaEsp.pdf>

Consejo de la Unión Europea, *Cumbre UE-ALC, “Hacia una nueva fase de la asociación birregional: Innovación y tecnología para el desarrollo sostenible y la integración social”* – *PLAN DE ACCIÓN DE MADRID 2010-2012*, Madrid, 2010. <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release PRES-10-150 es.htm>

Cooperação Brasileira para Desenvolvimento Internacional 2005-2009, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE), Brasília, 2010. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/component/tags/tag/25-abc-agencia-brasileira-de-cooperacao>

Cumbres Iberoamericanas, Secretaría General Iberoamericana, 2016. <http://segib.org/cumbres-iberoamericanas/>

Declaración de Brasilia sobre la Consolidación de la Asociación Estratégica entre España y Brasil. Documento firmado el 24 de enero de 2005 entre José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, Presidente del Gobierno del Reino de España y Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Presidente de la República Federativa del Brasil. http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/liaison_offices/wfp067856.pdf

Declaración de El Salvador, *XVIII Cumbre Iberoamericana de Jefes de Estado y de gobierno*, El Salvador, 2008. <http://segib.org/documento/declaracion-de-san-salvador/>

Declaración de Guadalajara. Cumbres Iberoamericanas de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno. Primera Cumbre Iberoamericana de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno, Guadalajara, México, 18 y 19 de julio de 1991. <http://segib.org/documento/declaracion-de-guadalajara/>

Declaración de Salamanca, *XV Cumbre iberoamericana de Jefes de Estado y de gobierno*, Salamanca, 2005. <http://segib.org/documento/declaracion-de-salamanca/>

Declaración de San José, XIV Cumbre iberoamericana de Jefes de Estado y de gobierno, San José de Costa Rica, 2004. <http://segib.org/documento/declaracion-de-san-jose/>

Declaración Especial sobre “La defensa de la democracia y el orden constitucional en Iberoamérica”, *XX Cumbre Iberoamericana Argentina*, Secretaría General Iberoamericana, Mar de Plata, 2010. <http://cancilleria.gob.ar/declaracion-especial-sobre-la-defensa-de-la-democracia-y-el-orden-constitucional-en-iberoamerica>

El Instituto Cervantes en cifras, Memoria Institucional 2010, Madrid, 2011. http://www.cervantes.es/sobre_instituto_cervantes/memoria_2011_2012.htm

Estatuto de la Secretaría General Iberoamericana, Secretaría General Iberoamericana, San José de Costa Rica, 2004. <http://segib.org/wp-content/uploads/estatutosegib.pdf>

Estrategia de Cultura y Desarrollo de la Cooperación Española, *Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación*, Madrid. http://intercoonecta.aecid.es/Documentos%20de%20la%20comunidad/Estrategia_cxd.pdf

Fundación Alternativas, “Los objetivos de España en su acción exterior”, opex, Observatorio de política exterior española, Documento de Trabajo 21/2008, Madrid, 2008. <http://www.fundacionalternativas.org/observatorio-de-politica-exterior-opex/documentos/documentos-de-trabajo/los-objetivos-de-espana-en-su-accion-exterior>

III Cumbre América Latina y el Caribe – Unión Europea, *Declaración de Guadalajara*, Guadalajara (México), 2004. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/eurolat/key_documents/summits_eu_alc/iii_2_5_2004_guadalajara_es.pdf

INE, Datos sociológicos de ciudadanía española. Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social. Gobierno de España. <http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/mundo/consejerias/brasil/emigracion/contenidos/datosSocio.htm>

IV Cumbre América Latina y el Caribe – Unión Europea, *Declaración de Viena*, Viena, 2006.

<https://eulacfoundation.org/es/system/files/Cuarta%20Cumbre%20Uni%C3%B3n%20Europea-Am%C3%A9rica%20Latina%20y%20el%20Caribe.%20Informe%20de%20las%20Copresidencias%20sobre%20la%20Cooperaci%C3%B3n%20UE-ALC.pdf>

IV EU-Mercosur Summit, “Joint Communiqué”, Council of the European Union, Madrid, 2010.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114486.pdf

La Ronda de Doha, Declaración ministerial adoptada el 18 de diciembre de 2005, *Organización Mundial del Comercio*, Hong Kong, 2005.

https://www.wto.org/spanish/thewto_s/minist_s/min05_s/final_text_s.htm.

La Ronda de Uruguay, el programa incorporado posterior a la Ronda Uruguay, *Organización Mundial del Comercio*.

https://www.wto.org/spanish/thewto_s/whatis_s/tif_s/fact5_s.htm

Memorando de entendimiento entre o governo da República Federativa do Brasil e o governo do Reino da Espanha para a criação de um programa conjunto de cooperação triangular, Brasília, 2011. <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/2011/memorando-de-entendimento-entre-o-governo-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil-e-o-governo-do-reino-da-espanha-para-a-criacao-de-um-programa-conjunto-de-cooperacao-triangular/>

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Brasil, *European Union relations*. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/es/ficha-pais/6700-union-europea>.

Oficina de información Diplomática, *República Federativa de Brasil*, Ficha País, Ministerio de Asuntos Exterior y Cooperación, Madrid, 2015. http://www.exteriores.gob.es/documents/fichaspais/brasil_ficha%20pais.pdf

Plan de Acción de Madrid 2010-2012, “Hacia una nueva fase de la asociación birregional: Innovación y tecnología para el desarrollo sostenible y la integración social”, Cumbre UE-ALC, Consejo de la Unión Europea, Madrid, 2010.
<https://eulacfoundation.org/es/system/files/Cumbre%20UE-ALC%2C%20Plan%20de%20Acci%C3%B3n%20de%20Madrid%202010-2012%2C%20Madrid%2C%2018%20de%20mayo%20de%202010.pdf>

Plan Director de la Cooperación Española 2005-2008, Secretaría de Estado de Cooperación Internacional, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, Madrid, 2004.
http://www.aecid.es/Centro-Documentacion/Documentos/Planificaci%C3%B3n/Plan_Director0508_Esp.pdf

Plan Director de la Cooperación Española 2009-2012, *Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación*, Madrid, 2007.
http://www.aecid.es/Galerias/publicaciones/descargas/plan_director_2009_2012.pdf

Programa de acción de Mar de Plata, *XX Cumbre Iberoamericana 2010*, Secretaría General Iberoamericana, Mar de Plata, 2010. <http://segib.org/documento/declaracion-de-mar-del-plata/>

Relaciones de la UE con MERCOSUR, *Unión Europea Acción Exterior*.
http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/content/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/mercosur/index_es.htm.

Tratado para la constitución de un mercado común entre la República Argentina la República Federativa del Brasil, la República del Paraguay y la República Oriental del Uruguay. MERCOSUR, 31 de diciembre de 1994.
http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/719/1/CMC_1991_TRATADO_ES_Asuncion.pdf

V Cumbre América Latina y el Caribe – Unión Europea, *Declaración de Lima*, “Respondiendo juntos a las prioridades de nuestros pueblos”, Lima, 2008. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/eurolat/key_documents/summits_eu_alc/v_16_5_2008_lima_es.pdf

XIV Cumbre iberoamericana San José de Costa Rica, 2004. <http://segib.org/cumbre/xiv-cumbre-iberoamericana-san-jose-2004/>

XIX Cumbre iberoamericana de Estoril, 2009. <http://segib.org/cumbre/xix-cumbre-iberoamericana-estoril-2009/>

XV Cumbre iberoamericana de Salamanca, 2005. <http://segib.org/cumbre/xv-cumbre-iberoamericana-salamanca-2005/>

News

Aznar acuerda con Lula una Alianza Estratégica y se compromete a apoyarle. La Vanguardia. 16 de julio de 2003. <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20030716/51262778636/aznar-acuerda-con-lula-una-alianza-estrategica-y-se-compromete-a-apoyarle.html>

Aznar y Lula firman un plan de asociación estratégica entre España y Brasil. Diario ABC. Fecha: 14 de noviembre de 2003. http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-16-07-2003/abc/Nacional/aznar-propone-a-lula-establecer-una-alianza-de-relaciones-estrategicas_195231.html

BBC Mundo: Mercosur suspende a Venezuela por tiempo indefinido y exige a Maduro que desmantele la Asamblea Constituyente. 5th August 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-40839629>

Brasil lidera exportação de escrava sexual, diz estudio, *Folha de Sao Paulo*, 29 de noviembre de 2000. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc2911200025.htm>

Centro de Estudios Brasileños de la Universidad de Salamanca.
<http://www.cebusal.es/institucional/historia/>

El desmantelamiento de la cooperación española de dos décadas del 0,7.
http://cadenaser.com/ser/2014/09/28/sociedad/1411870414_850215.html

España: Trinidad Jiménez, nueva canciller “latinoamericanista”.
http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2010/10/101020_espana_cambio_gobierno_trinidad_jimenez_cuba_az.shtml

No son inmigrantes, son turistas. Brasil toma represalias por las trabas a sus viajeros para entrar en España. Diario El País. 23 de febrero de 2012.
http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2012/02/22/vidayartes/1329943814_691446.html